Military Vehicles: Repair

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 4th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My noble friend makes an important point. To reassure him, these factors are taken into consideration before a gift is made. For example, we consider in what state we would reasonably give equipment to allies, because we have to take into account the availability of spares, the time to bring vehicles up to standard and the implicit costs of that. We are always realistic. Indeed, my noble friend will be aware that we have made a number of donations of vehicles to Ukraine. These have proved to be very helpful.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, given the continuing challenge of getting the Ajax programme on track and the verdict of the Defence Select Committee that defence procurement is “broken”, these decisions are particularly concerning. Is it not the case that many of the scrapped Challenger tanks will have been some of our least used vehicles? My recollection is that they were returned from Germany in working order and were in storage for 15 years—since I was the Secretary of State. Can the Minister comment on this and explain how we can ensure that such short-sighted decisions cannot be repeated?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

On Ajax, as the noble Lord is aware, a corner has been turned, thankfully, and good progress is being made. On the Challenger tanks, the noble Lord will be aware of the upgrading taking place now to create CR3—Challenger 3—tanks from innovated and improved CR2 tanks. But the noble Lord might be interested to know that money has also been given to the Army to ensure that, in addition, a cohort of CR2 tanks is upgraded so that they are available to operate with Warrior until the full transition to CR3 has taken place. As the previous Secretary of State for Defence made clear, we will consider whether the lessons of Ukraine suggest that we need a larger tank fleet. That is under consideration.

Nuclear Submarines: AUKUS

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I can simply clarify to the Chamber that the AUKUS programme’s SSN-AUKUS submarines are nuclear-propelled, not nuclear-armed.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the first AUKUS pillar 2 autonomous weapons and artificial intelligence trial took place in April. On 27 June, the White House Indo-Pacific co-ordinator, Kurt Campbell, said that there would be co-operation with all three countries on artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and that other allies and partners would be invited to join this development. That is quite a significant development, although not unexpected, given the elements of AUKUS. Is there any possibility that we will get a ministerial Statement on this matter?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

What I can confirm to the noble Lord is what is already in the public domain. We have always said that, as progress is made with the three countries on pillar 2—which is distinct from the original pillar, which is trilateral—other critical defence capabilities will then seek opportunities to engage allies and close partners. As the noble Lord correctly indicated, the trial held in April was most encouraging, and a two-minute video was released by all three nations. We have to take one step at a time.

Army Foundation College: Welfare Inspection Regime

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 11th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of Ofsted’s welfare inspection regime in respect of the Army Foundation College in Harrogate.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome that Ofsted rated the Army Foundation College in Harrogate as outstanding in all areas and for overall effectiveness, reflecting the excellent standard of the provision of duty of care and welfare. Ofsted praised the strong ethos of emotional and psychological safety, inclusion and teamwork that it identified as firmly embedded. The college continues proactively to engage with Ofsted’s recommendations to ensure that all recruits are prepared for and supported throughout their training.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for that Answer. In 2013, 2018 and 2021 Ofsted graded welfare and safeguarding at AFC Harrogate as outstanding. Answers to Parliamentary Questions and the MoD’s own records reveal, among other examples, that between 2014 and 2023 the college itself recorded 72 complaints of violence by staff, at least 13 of those cases being proven; that in 2018 a prosecution of 16 accused members of staff collapsed for procedural reasons due to the flawed handling of the case by the RMP; and that in February this year Simon Bartram, an AFC instructor, was found guilty of disgraceful conduct and sexual assault over a nine-month period between 2020 and 2021. Ofsted, despite being invited so to do, says it cannot engage with the information relating to any of these events. How can the Ministry of Defence be comfortable with this? What steps, if any, is it taking to improve the inspection of welfare and safeguarding at the AFC?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord refers to profoundly regrettable and utterly unacceptable incidents, but it is important to put the period of nine years to which he refers into a more specific context. First, the college, having learned from those earlier appalling incidents, has introduced important changes, reflected in the much-improved environment on which Ofsted commented so positively in its 2021 report. Secondly, the MoD has introduced new policies and changes to deal with sexual offences and unacceptable sexual behaviour below the criminal threshold. It has taken steps to improve the complaints system, has created the Defence Serious Crime Unit and has a zero-tolerance policy for sexual offences and sexual relationships between instructors and trainees. All of that now reflects a much-improved climate at the college.

I can confirm that the specific case to which the noble Lord referred was dealt with through the service justice system. The individual was found guilty of nine charges. He was sentenced to detention, reduced in rank and discharged from the Army. Sadly, we cannot ever eliminate the prospect of something unacceptable happening, but significant steps have been taken to try to reduce that possibility.

Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 3rd May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not share the noble Lord’s pessimistic assessment. As I have pointed out, there is in place an exciting programme of land vehicles. For Boxer, initial operating capability will be achieved in 2025. We anticipate that very good progress is being made on Ajax, and they will come into play later on in this decade. I point out to the noble Lord that, as he is aware, we have Warrior functioning; it is part of the transition. We have Challenger 2, and we are upgrading to Challenger 3. We have got a perfectly well-equipped Army. We observe our obligations to NATO and we observe our obligations to keep this country safe.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, between the cancelled Warrior capability sustainment programme and the extraordinarily delayed Ajax programme—it may well be in a good place now, but it is not expected to have what is called “full operating capability” until 2029, which is a full decade longer than was planned—the MoD has spent over £3 billion in failing to introduce or upgrade two armoured vehicles. What lessons have been learnt from this, and what changes to procurement have been made? Is there nowhere else in the world a vehicle already in production that we could buy with some of the £41 billion set down for capability of this nature in the future?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

In relation to Ajax, I confirm for the noble Lord that the initial operating capability requires 50 operational deployable vehicles to be delivered and to be achieved by December 2025, and that will be a significant augmentation of the capability. The full operating capability requires 422 of the 589 operational deployable vehicles to be delivered; that is to be achieved between October 2028 and September 2029. As I indicated to my noble friend Lord Lancaster, there is a very exciting period of development for land capability; I think we should celebrate that.

On the final point of the noble Lord’s question, I have acknowledged that I think there is the opportunity for the MoD, in procurement, to look at different models of getting things when they need them. I think this is recognised within the MoD, and I think the phrase used has been that we have pursued the exquisite, involving cost and time, perhaps at the expense of actually getting what we need, when we wanted it.

Ukraine

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 2nd May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to the noble and gallant Lord that I think that the evidence to date has been that Ukraine has mounted an extraordinarily courageous and very effective response to Russian air aggression. Among the many types of equipment we have supplied to Ukraine, we have included anti-aircraft missile systems that can be launched from both land and ship.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, for the obvious reason that we must at all costs avoid an escalation of this war, Ukraine’s allies have equipped Ukraine for a defensive war, but now all the talk is about offensives. Attacking is certainly much more difficult than defending. If all the Leopard 2 tanks that have been promised arrive, will there be sufficient to break through the Russian defences? Who is going to provide the air support that will be necessary for any offensive to be effective?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Obviously we remain engaged with Ukraine on its immediate needs and how best we, in conjunction with partners, can respond to them. I am not at liberty to disclose operational matters, for reasons widely understood. We constantly monitor the situation, and we will continue to do whatever we can to support Ukraine as it tries to repel this illegal invader.

AUKUS Defence Partnership

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 16th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord makes a number of important points; let me try to deal with them.

On the management of contracts and the willingness to have teeth and bite where that is necessary, I think the noble and gallant Lord would be encouraged to see the complete difference in approach in the MoD now compared with some years ago. That is partially because the MoD has woken up to the need to be much more effective in how it manages these enormous contracts with vast sums of taxpayers’ money. To be honest, it is also because we felt the bite from teeth—from your Lordships in this Chamber, from our friends in the other place, and from entities such as the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee. These were unpleasant experiences for the MoD but what they signalled was an absolute need to radically reform and revise what we were doing.

In addition to all that, the one word of comfort I can offer to the noble and gallant Lord is this: bear in mind that this is a trilateral arrangement and agreement. There is, therefore, a triumvirate interest in ensuring that nobody is slipping and everybody is keeping up to the mark. That will be an added enhancer to how we monitor and regulate the performance of the contract.

On the important matter of skills, industries are already engaged—I have seen it at first hand—in really imaginative programmes in their communities with young people. I have been hugely encouraged when I have seen how they operate in different parts of the country. They are engaging with both primary and secondary schools. They are making these critical connections with young people, many of whom then make the choice not only to follow a career in technology but to do it with a particular company. That is one very positive way of trying to increase the skills base available to our industry partners.

At government level, particularly in the Department for Education, there is a recognition of the unrelenting need to reappraise constantly how we seek to improve the provision of skills and ensure that education is aligned with what the economy and industry are asking for. I do not have at my fingertips the details of what we have done so far but I would be happy to write to the noble and gallant Lord about that.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, welcome as this Statement is, there is nothing at all in it about the financial or opportunity costs of this partnership. Is it true that it will cost $245 billion over three decades? How much of that cost will we bear? Which budget will it come out of? In answering a question today posed by the noble Lord, Lord Swire, on the fourth Oral Question, the Minister—the noble Baroness, Lady Penn—indicated that all nuclear capability would be charged from some other part of the budget. I do not understand that to be the case but, if it is the case, it is a change; if it comes with this, it is very welcome. How much is this going to cost, is it going to come from the existing Ministry of Defence budget and what will be the opportunity cost of that if that is correct?

Given that China poses threats in every domain, not just under the water, what assessment have we made of Australia putting so many of its eggs in this exquisite capability basket, given that we will depend on it in all these other domains to be an active ally with capability?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

On cost, the noble Lord will not be surprised that I am unable to give specific figures, for what I think are widely understood reasons. I imagine that differing levels of cost will apply because, for example, the role of the United States is based on it having an established Virginia class of submarine being built; as the noble Lord will be aware, part of the agreement is Australia seeking to buy three of those. There are now huge issues for Australia in creating the infrastructure that it will need to build the submarines, so, again, it is anticipated that its costs will be different from those of either the US or the UK.

For our own part, as is indicated, we in the UK have been investing in our submarine-building infrastructure. Some £2 billion was announced last year to support the Dreadnought class of submarines. The recent integrated review refresh announcement of £5 billion—obviously, I am rounding the figure up for ease of use—will be split into three, spread over two years, to sustain the nuclear enterprise. My understanding is that the additional £6 billion, which will be spread over three years—£2 billion per year—is also allocated to the nuclear enterprise, excluding the Dreadnought enterprise. That is money that we know is going to be there, and we are therefore able to budget appropriately.

It is important to go back to what the Prime Minister and the Chancellor have clearly indicated: that, having regard to the turbulent world in which we live, they see defence as a national primary responsibility and priority. They are prepared to work, even in difficult economic circumstances, to ensure that we do as much as we can to sustain a powerful and effective defence capability.

I turn to the last part of the noble Lord’s question, which was about this perhaps being a unique solution for Australia. Australia must make its own strategic decision about what it seeks and what it wants. Eighteen months ago, it identified that it had a need and that the best way to respond to that need was to seek a nuclear-propelled submarine. It is positive and gratifying that it then looked to the United Kingdom and the United States. As the noble Lord will be aware, we have a long-standing and close relationship on the construction of submarines. Australia has made a perfectly balanced decision that this type of submarine, propelled as it is by nuclear propulsion, offers huge advantages: it is far more effective in itself; it can circumnavigate the globe without coming up; it is difficult to detect; and it is much more efficient to run. For those who, naturally, care about the environment, it produces a cleaner form of emissions than, for example, a diesel-powered submarine.

Australia has looked at this closely and come to its own strategic, sovereign decision about what it wants. We should all feel very proud that it wants the UK to be part of this vital partnership in delivering what it seeks.

Nuclear Weapons: Failsafe Review

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 6th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in begging leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, it would not be appropriate for His Majesty’s Government to comment on the United States Government’s plans to commission an independent review into the safety, security and reliability of their nuclear capabilities. We have absolute confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent, but for the purpose of safeguarding national security, we will not provide detailed comment on arrangements for its assurance.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, on 27 February, the Minister for Europe, Leo Docherty, addressed the UN Conference on Disarmament. He mentioned emerging threats posed by new technologies, promised transparency, and committed to the continuing development of concrete initiatives in reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. He did not mention the US Administration’s ongoing public and independent review of the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons, command and control, and warning systems to reduce the chance of a blunder or miscalculation, particularly from cyber threats, as an example of a confidence-building, concrete, risk reduction initiative. Since all nuclear-armed states face the same risks, surely this is a concrete and transparent risk reduction initiative, which the UK and France, at least, as nuclear and NATO allies, should also commission. Will this be on the agenda for the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Macron on Friday?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As I said in my initial response to the noble Lord, there is a very robust system within the United Kingdom, as he will be of aware, for how we deal with the safety of our nuclear weapons—there is a surveillance programme to check that they are continuing to be reliable and safe—their security and the regulatory regime that covers our nuclear activity. We continue to invest in future capabilities to underwrite safety and performance. That includes collaboration with France under the 2010 Teutates treaty; we are jointly building and operating a hydrodynamic trials facility—EPURE—in France and a complementary capability, AWE. It is interesting that the United States last carried out a review in 1991, I think. I am aware of the noble Lord’s organisation and I pay tribute to his knowledge. His interest in this matter has been encouraging the US to carry out a review, but I reassure noble Lords that there are very robust structures within the United Kingdom.

Afghanistan: Independent Inquiry

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 20th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, hold our Armed Forces in the highest esteem. and I welcome this wide-ranging inquiry. However, I am bound to say that I do not think anybody could read this Statement and the detail of the terms of reference without coming away with a very strong sense of disquiet about how these cases were investigated until now and how much other activity beyond these two cases the inquiry will have to investigate.

The Minister refers us to Saifullah and Noorzai, the two judicial review cases which are—or appear to be—key to this investigation happening at all. The second paragraph of the Statement opens:

“The decision has been informed by two ongoing judicial review cases known as Saifullah and Noorzai. The claimants in those cases assert that relevant allegations of unlawful activity were not properly investigated.”


The last sentence of the fourth paragraph reads:

“The Saifullah and Noorzai claimants have been consulted on the terms of reference but I will not comment further on ongoing court proceedings.”


I am bound to say that after a quarter of a century of practising in a court, in plain English that seems to me that we were compelled by the fact that we were going to lose these cases to have this investigation, and that is why the cases have been suspended while a proper investigation takes place.

There is another point I feel bound to ask the Minister about. On 14 July, James Heappey, the Minister for the Armed Forces, answered a UQ arising from a “Panorama” programme, which used language that my noble friend Lord Coaker repeated—and I encourage that sort of language in the House of Commons. He said among other things that the

“alleged criminal events referred to in the … programme have been fully investigated by the service police”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/7/22; col. 490.]

The circumstances of these two cases, Noorzai and Saifullah, were referred to in the programme. Why is there no mention of this “Panorama” programme in the Statement? A completely different impression was left in July in the House of Commons, and indeed in your Lordships’ House, about the reliability of that “Panorama” programme and the fact that it had happened at all, so why was there no mention of that? Did the Minister for the Armed Forces know about these two ongoing judicial reviews when responding to the UQ? Why did he not mention them to the other place, and why were they not mentioned in your Lordships’ House at that time? That suggests to me that not all the information that should have been given to Parliament was given at that time.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I will deal first with the matter of previous investigations. The noble Lord will be aware that significant investigations and reviews have already been undertaken by the MoD to investigate the allegations. That includes through service police investigations; reference was made to Operations Northmoor and Cestro. Steps have also been taken to improve the service justice system, and the inquiry will take all this into account.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, I said that the Secretary of State proposed back in May that progress should be made on looking at an inquiry. I cannot specifically comment on what my right honourable friend Mr Heappey said in the other place on 14 July; I would need to look at Hansard. I think it would be for him to respond to the noble Lord’s challenge or charge that he did not fully disclose to Parliament what the current situation was. Obviously I am not privy to what he knew, and it will be for him to address these matters.

As I previously indicated, a process was already under way to look at the possibility of a statutory inquiry. On the “Panorama” programme itself, the Royal Military Police has independently requested material from several sources, and legal engagement continues to secure access to that material, but as yet no new evidence has been received. This matter will now pass to the inquiry and to Lord Justice Haddon-Cave to pursue whatever channels of evidence he wants to procure.

I do not think there is anything more I can offer the noble Lord. He will see from the terms of reference that this goes much wider than just the two events investigated under Northmoor and Cestro. There is a very wide remit for the inquiry and for Lord Justice Haddon-Cave to investigate a whole raft of things. To go back to the earlier point on which I think we are all agreed, if anything needs to be discovered and to come out, it is in the interests of all those who serve this country bravely and with the highest standards of professionalism that their reputations are kept intact. If there has been any wrongdoing, this inquiry will seek to uncover that.

Ukraine: Russian Drone Attacks

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 29th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As the right reverend Prelate will be aware, it is not so much the numbers of drones as the way in which they are used, which is required to comply with international law and the law of armed conflict. Drones have allowed Ukraine to stretch the limits of its armed forces, and certainly, having eyes in the sky to spot targets and then direct artillery fire means that it can make better use of what it has.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are to be commended for imposing sanctions on three individuals and one commercial entity here in the UK who have been responsible in part for the provision of kamikaze drones to Russia from Iran. What plans do the Government have to work with allies to ensure that sanctions are tethered to international criminal accountability, following the French example? Only two days ago, the French courts decided that two senior executives at Amesys should face prosecution for knowingly providing technology that facilitated the torture of Libyan citizens by the Gaddafi regime. Should we not be following that example?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

What is important is that, first, we have an effective sanctions regime. As the noble Lord indicated, the UK has sanctioned more than 1,100 individuals and 100 entities, and with our allies has frozen around £275 billion of assets. The noble Lord will be aware that certain actions constitute breach of law, and those will be acted upon. But perhaps pertinently, the Government are considering closely with international partners all options for seizing assets. They could be used, perhaps, to support the people of Ukraine and contribute towards the reconstruction of their country.

Fleet Solid Support Ships

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As far as I understand it, Harland & Wolff currently expects the contract to support 1,200 shipbuilding jobs across its yards in Belfast and Appledore. As everyone is aware, Harland & Wolff has a strong reputation. It has been having a challenging time. As I said earlier, the extensive £77 million infrastructure investment will make a big difference to it and put it in a position where it will be poised to bid for future contracts.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, before leaving the European Union and since, we have been told repeatedly that one of the advantages of coming out is that British ships will be built in British yards. The use of the active verb in these sentences is important. I looked closely at the Minister’s answer to this Question in the House of Commons. He said that the ships would be assembled at Harland & Wolff. Where are these ships to be built? They are built in modules. Is the work to be in Britain or elsewhere? Is the bulk of this contract going to be abroad? The £77 million is welcome, as are the jobs, but what proportion of the contract is coming to the United Kingdom and what proportion is going to Spain? What other G7 country does this? None.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I can only repeat what I said in response to earlier questions: that the majority of these ships will be built in the UK. As I understand the technical situation, the majority of the blocks and modules from which the ships will be assembled will be built at Harland & Wolff’s facilities in Belfast and Appledore. Again, I repeat that this is very good news for British shipbuilding, particular on the back of the recently announced Batch 2 of the five frigates at Govan. This is all indicative of the very good state of the British shipbuilding industry. I refer the noble Lord to what the chief executive of Harland & Wolff had to say:

“I am pleased to see the Government seize the last opportunity to capture the skills that remain in Belfast and Appledore before they are lost for good.”


That is testament to the strength of this decision.

Royal Navy: Conduct towards Women

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I very much hope that they will. I have described to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, where the teeth are in a lot of the changes that have now been made. There are real repercussions for miscreants now if they transgress and fail to observe the high standards of behaviour that we expect. But perhaps helpfully—to reassure my noble friend—we are in fact now publishing the annual reports on sexual complaints within the Armed Forces. We published in March of this year the single service sexual harassment surveys. We have also instigated a D&I programme to monitor and measure the efficacy of our initiatives, to make sure that they are delivering. In April of this year, we mandated climate assessments across Defence, and that is to try and ensure—as my noble friend rightly identifies—that the changes we are making are delivering the improvements we hope.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness will recollect that, in the interim report into the behaviour of the Met police, the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, revealed that hundreds of police were getting away with breaking the law and with misconduct. The reason for that was largely because, despite the importance of patterns of behaviour to the investigation of sexual predators and other alleged offenders, the misconduct procedures in the police force deliberately ignored patterns of behaviour and dealt with each allegation separately. They therefore could not corroborate each other. Can the Minister give us the assurance that the military misconduct and disciplinary procedures do not proceed on that basis—because it is a deliberate loophole to protect the institution?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the dramatic change which has been taking place within the MoD, leading to changes of policy and legislative change, has been accompanied by leadership training and education. One reason why women are now prepared to come forward is because, in improving the complaints system, we have introduced an independent route separate from the chain of command. Women now feel a confidence not just in reporting but because the system is robust and will deliver them a result and something will be done. I very much hope that, with the climate assessments mandated across Defence, any pockets of behaviour that were emerging and looked unacceptable would be rooted out and we would become aware of them. The system certainly is there to improve that transparency.

Armed Forces: LGBT Veterans

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 17th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I can tell the noble Baroness that the call for evidence that commenced in August has been extended to 1 December to provide the fullest opportunity for people to contribute. The review team continues to meet stakeholders. The chair has been meeting senior veteran charity officials and senior military officers to gain their insight. The team has also been investigating historical records to develop an in-depth chronology of the ban. The efforts to obtain testimony and make sure that the review is fully informed are very extensive.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, my question is further to that asked by my noble friend Lord Cashman and the similar question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden. Similar to the decision to pay interim compensation to the victims of the infected blood scandal while that inquiry continued because of the urgency of the case, is this not a case where a presumption in favour of generosity should be made so that compensation can be paid in some form to the victims of this dreadful decision now? The moral case is plain and Ministers, including our Minister, have repeated it. Surely the MoD’s own records would make such a restitution relatively easy to administer.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

In fact, we do not have the numbers. That is one of the difficulties. As the noble Lord is probably aware, in the early 2000s, the MoD settled a number of claims from former members of the Armed Forces who had been dismissed for being LGBT. The compensation awarded to claimants consisted of damages for loss of earnings, loss of pension and injury to feelings.

We must not pre-empt what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, is undertaking. We should leave him as an independent reviewer to carry out his full scope of inquiry, analyse the responses, come to conclusions and decide what recommendations are important for the Government to look at. There is a need for consistency in how we seek to redress these issues.

Defence: Type 45 Destroyers

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 10th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As the noble Baroness will be aware, the propulsion issue that arose with the Type 45s was a complex technical issue. Indeed, it has been a complex engineering project to rectify it, but, thanks to the evidence through “Dauntless”, we are now satisfied that very healthy progress has been made.

As I have said previously in the Chamber, the case of HMS “Prince of Wales” is unfortunate. I understand that she has now made it to Rosyth, which is good news, and will be going into dry dock. We will then be able to explore in more detail the exact nature of the fault. It is not thought to be a class fault. HMS “Queen Elizabeth” has been inspected and is continuing to discharge her duties in the US in support of the Atlantic Future Forum.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in December, in a report entitled We’re Going to Need a Bigger Navy, the Defence Select Committee expressed concern that the Type 45 PIP programme was “slipping”. In February, in their response to conclusion 20 of that report, the Government admitted that barriers to speeding it up included

“constraints of industrial capacity”.

In a letter dated 21 June, they said that they were

“assessing options to accelerate the programme”.

Do those options include addressing the constraints of industrial capacity? If so, what are the constraints and what are the options for addressing them?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The response given at the time was a reflection of both industry and the department doing their best to advance the correction of the propulsion defects. As I have indicated to the Chamber, progress has certainly been made with “Dauntless” and is being made with “Daring” and “Dragon”. We are looking at the options as best we can to accelerate the programme and complete this as early as possible before 2028. However, as I said earlier, that must be balanced against the Royal Navy’s current and future operational commitments.

Ukraine Update

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 5th September 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

We understand that the sanctions imposed by the UK and our international partners are having deep and damaging consequences for Putin’s ability to wage war. We have sanctioned more than 1,100 individuals and 100 entities and, with our allies, have frozen around £275 billion-worth of assets. That includes oligarchs worth £117 billion. We have also announced new sanctions on Kremlin-imposed officials in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics. Russia’s GDP is expected to contract by 3.5% to 8.5% in 2022, but that is compared to a pre-invasion forecast of 2.8% growth. By 2026, Russia’s economy is expected to be 16% smaller versus the pre-invasion trend estimated by the International Monetary Fund. There is evidence that it is hitting Putin hard. Much more problematic is to know whether the message is reaching ordinary Russian people. There is evidence to suggest that, sadly, they are now beginning to experience the hardship of the consequences of Putin’s illegal war. It may be that with that, coupled with the tragic deaths of and injuries to the loved ones and relatives of many people and families in Russia, they may now be beginning to pose the question: what is this about and why are we doing it?

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, looking slightly beyond now and the immediate future, what assessment have the Government made of the fact that on 25 August, the day after Putin’s chief of defence acknowledged that the Russian military campaign had stalled, President Putin signed a decree, which will come into effect on 1 January 2023, increasing the size of his country’s combat forces by 137,000 people? That brings Russian combat personnel to 1.15 million people. If we take into account that Ukraine has set itself the target of a 1 million-strong military, what are the implications for the strategic stability of the part of the world that we are a key part of? What assessment have the Government made of this significant development?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

It may be that Putin passes a law or makes a decree, but we have seen that the mass and volume of his armed forces numbers have not delivered for him the military triumph that he clearly anticipated was within his grasp when he embarked upon this illegal war. As the noble Lord will be aware, various reasons are hypothesised for that: many of these troops were untrained, many were provided with equipment not fit for purpose, and there seems to have been an absence of overall strategic command. So there are inherent weaknesses within the fundamental operational capacity of the Russian military. That has become evident as Ukraine has embarked on its activity to defend the country and seek to call Putin to account.

The noble Lord is right that these levels of activity are alarming but we must not be distracted and we must never lose sight of the fact that something wrong, illegal and dangerous has happened; somehow, we and our like-minded friends and allies have to respond to that by helping Ukraine. The gift that Putin would wish for is to think that anyone is getting bored or fed up or is now taking this all for granted. We are not—this country is not doing that, and neither are our European and NATO partners. We are resolved to stand shoulder to shoulder with Ukraine and do whatever it takes to assist in bringing this illegal invasion to an end.

Afghanistan: British Special Forces

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 14th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank my noble friend. I am sure the House will have paid close attention to his authority in relation to these matters.

I reassure the House that the RMP is a professional, competent and well-trained investigative authority, and it has proven itself in that effectiveness on numerous occasions. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, it engages with the civilian police force to make sure that it is absolutely abreast of all the procedures and processes of modern technology.

My noble friend is quite right: if there is anything wrong, if anything criminal has happened and the evidence can be produced to substantiate that, of course it is in the interests of the MoD and the great majority of law-abiding, upstanding and honourable members of the military that these matters be investigated. I reassure him again that if we are made aware of any new evidence that supports the assertions made in the programme then, yes, they will be investigated.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the SAS has an international reputation as the bravest and best. All I can say from my time as Secretary of State for Defence is that that is a well-earned reputation. The allegations are very grave. I do not intend to draw the Minister into any comments about specific allegations, but at the heart of the response from the MoD is the information, which is impressive, that extensive independent investigations have taken place and no charges were brought because there was no evidence to justify that.

My problem is that at the heart of the programme is an allegation that investigators told the police—this is apparently supported by some video evidence—that they were obstructed by the British military in their efforts to gather evidence. That is a fundamental and important allegation, which, separately from anything else, needs to be investigated.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to the noble Lord that, as he will understand from his own background, we need evidence. That is why the RMP has asked the BBC for the evidence. Where is the substance of the information on which it based this programme? That is what we are waiting to see. As I remarked in the Statement, the BBC wants to seek the RMP’s legal authority for seeking this information, which seems to be the most perverse way of approaching everyone’s interests in trying to find the truth and establish justice. Still, there is engagement between the RMP and the BBC and the noble Lord is correct: if there is evidence to support these very serious allegations, and it is new evidence, it will be investigated.

Defence Spending Priorities: NATO Summit

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 6th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The Prime Minister has made it clear that the investments we propose to embark on, such as AUKUS and FCAS, will mean that defence spending will reach 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade. It is currently projected to reach 2.3% of GDP this year. We constantly assess the threat and our ability to respond to it, which is a responsible way to proceed.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, on Monday in the other place, while making a Statement, the Prime Minister was on more than one occasion asked a variant of the excellent question that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, asked. He never once answered the question but twice prayed in aid what he called the “gigantic” commitment we are making to the AUKUS agreement and how it will increase defence spending very considerably, taking it over the target of 2.5%—those are not the exact words but that is what he said. On 16 December when he made the initial Statement about AUKUS he said nothing about predicted costs. On the contrary, he said that AUKUS came with lucrative defence and security opportunities. There is no information in the public domain on the predicted cost of AUKUS so where can I find the evidence of the gigantic commitment we seem to have made, that only the Prime Minister seems to be aware of?

Ukraine: UK and NATO Military Commitment

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not agree with my noble friend’s somewhat dismissive commentary on how the UK has responded to this. I think, by universal assent, the UK has played a pivotal role in coming to the aid of and supporting Ukraine, which knows that it has in us a solid and reliable friend. I say to my noble friend that within the whole Baltic area there has been a bolstering of the enhanced forward presence, to which the UK has been an important contributor. That has been a necessary response. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, what we are witnessing is quite simply an illegal and barbarous invasion by President Putin of an innocent sovereign state.

It is interesting that, within the Baltic area, Sweden and Finland now seek to join NATO. I assume they are motivated by the sense of comfort and reassurance that the alliance will bring them if they are able to become members. That is a matter for hope and optimism.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I wish to associate myself with the expressions of gratitude to our Armed Forces and our veterans. Yesterday in the other place, Leo Docherty, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence People and Veterans, in answering this Question spoke about the Government’s

“absolute resolve to meet our NATO commitments”

and said that they are doing that by delivering

“at pace the technological and military revolution necessary to make ourselves more lethal, agile and deployable around the world than ever before.”

He went on:

“For too long, the measurement of our military capability has been about men and vehicles in garrisons, rather than our ability to project power”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/6/22; col. 558.]


The Minister knows that I think that is the right approach. Why then, on 15 June, did the MoD slip out, under cover of a Written Ministerial Statement, the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy and its accompanying document on the ethics of military AI? When will the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister come to Parliament to explain how this strategy will, in the words of that Statement,

“transform the culture of defence”—[Official Report, Commons, 15/6/22; col. 13WS.]

and to answer questions about it?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

As ever, I appreciate the noble Lord’s interest in these matters. Indeed, the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy was published on 15 June. It is an important development; on artificial intelligence, we as a department want to be effective, efficient, trusted and influential. As for when there will be an opportunity to question the Secretary of State in the other place—or, for that matter, to question me in this Chamber—I will make inquiries about what the intention is for parliamentary procedure. I shall try to ascertain whether there is a likely date for a Statement. Personally, I think it would make for an interesting and very useful debate in this Chamber.

Ukraine Update

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 27th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I apologise; I endeavoured to respond to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. The Foreign Secretary has expressed a view and of course is perfectly entitled to have it. My role as a Defence Minister is to explain how we in the MoD are working with our NATO partners and our allies and how we are trying to co-ordinate delivery. At the end of it all, as I said earlier, in conjunction with Ukraine we are trying to work out and supply not just what it needs but to do so when it needs it. Part of that is reflected in the response that I was able to give in explaining to the House that we can now confirm that Brimstone will be provided. That is something that the Ukrainians specifically wanted because of its capacity.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

One of the things that the Ukrainians really do need is the capability to clear up the incredible amount of unexploded ordinance, some of which has been seeded deliberately by the Russians as they remove themselves from around Kyiv. We should be proud of the Halo Trust, which has gone back to Ukraine and has over 40 locally employed people who have been doing that work, even during some of the dreadful violence that has been going on. I know the Government are supporting them. Apart from anything else, the trust needs funding to pay the people who work for it and who do this dangerous, difficult but much-needed work.

The second thing the trust needs is an appreciation by the Ukrainian Government of the importance of certain senior people avoiding national conscription to other jobs. It might be helpful if our Government, in conjunction with the Halo Trust, argued that the Ukrainian Government should allow these key people to this work. They are experts who have been doing it for eight years in that country, in the most dangerous of conditions, supported by this organisation. Can the noble Baroness, perhaps on their behalf, make some of these arguments?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am indebted to the noble Lord for a perceptive contribution. He is quite right that that has emerged as an issue in the area; indeed, it was referred to in the other place. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Ben Wallace, said that we were looking at it to see what we could do to help. I will take those comments back to my department and will see whether we can produce something more positive.

National Shipbuilding Strategy

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 15th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, in the absence of my noble friend Lord West of Spithead, I convey to the Minister that, having had a conversation with him, he, like I, welcomes this refresh of the National Shipbuilding Strategy to the extent that it reflects Parker, because it takes a systems approach to these issues. To that extent, it is an energising read.

However, I know that my noble friend would think that that butters few parsnips unless we know when the ships will actually be ordered. The infographic that is figure 3 in the document—I know now how much the Minister likes infographics; I shall come back to figure 1 in a moment—refers to what is called the

“Decision point for future Capability”.

That means absolutely nothing. One or two of them stretch over 14 years. The questions that I think my noble friend would like me to ask are: when are these ships going to be ordered and what ships are going to be ordered on those dates, because that is really important?

Perhaps I may stretch the House’s patience a little to ask my own question. I like the infographic in figure 1 because it shows the extensive, comprehensive nature of this industry across the United Kingdom. The executive summary says:

“The shipbuilding industry supports 42,600 jobs right across the country and adds £2.8 billion to the UK economy. It supports a vast supply chain and skilled jobs around the country in both the civil and defence sectors and delivers world leading capabilities for the Royal Navy.”


That is really encouraging. It is a very comprehensive view of the impact on our economy that the strategy could have as it is refreshed.

The problem is that the National Shipbuilding Strategy which is refreshed is that of 6 September 2017. Let me read to the Minister from the foreword by the then Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Fallon. He said:

“Today some 111,000 people are working in the maritime and marine sectors in the UK, including in the shipyards, supplying the parts, or supporting the equipment that keep this great industry alive, from Appledore to Rosyth and beyond.”


What happened to those 70,000-plus workers within five years of the first strategy?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord included a lot of material in his question, and I am not sure I can respond to it all. Let me pick up first on the important figure that he referred to, which is the outline of what shipbuilding will be for the United Kingdom over the next 30 years. That is a very healthy, refreshing and encouraging picture.

I appreciate that the noble Lord wishes to reflect the persistence of his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord West, in wanting to pin down figures. I have covered the timescale for the Type 26 and the Type 31. The noble Lord will be aware that the Type 32 is still in concept, but that will be an exceedingly important addition to the Royal Navy for the reasons that I described earlier, and they will be UK-built.

As the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to, we will also be dealing with not just the fleet support ships but a multirole ocean surveillance ship and a multirole support ship—probably a number of these; these are the ships that will replace the landing platform docks and the landing ship dock auxiliaries in the early 2030s. We will be dealing with the future defence Type 83, which will replace the Type 45 destroyers. It will be a key part of the future of our air defence systems, and will provide wide-area air defence for the carrier strike group from the 2030s. In among all that is a miscellany of other shipbuilding activity.

The noble Lord will understand that I cannot be more specific about dates; it is impossible to do that when much of this is in the concept phase. He will understand that the plans are laid, the need is identified and the political resolve is there to order and deliver these ships.

Ukraine: Military and Non-military Support

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have any information on that precise point, but I undertake to investigate and respond to the noble Lord if I can.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, innocent civilians will pay the cost of political failure if the current tensions over Ukraine continue to escalate. The most important non-military support we can give Ukraine is to continue intense, robust dialogue. The Secretary of State for Defence explained this in the Statement he made last week, and I commend him for his willingness to meet with General Shoygu in Moscow. Does the noble Baroness not agree that if we are going to find a sustainable solution to this problem without further unnecessary deaths, we need to concentrate on diplomacy?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord speaks with authority and makes a very important point. He will be aware that the NATO approach over recent years has in fact been deterrence, dialogue and defence, and that is a sustainable way forward. It is certainly an approach this Government endorse, and it is the approach we are endeavouring to prosecute at the moment. We just hope that President Putin is hearing the entreaties being uttered and understands that there are very, very grave consequences to follow if he decides to pursue his proposals to invade Ukraine.

Ukraine

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Yes, I reassure my noble friend that we will do everything we can to support Ukraine. As I said earlier, Ukraine is a friend and an important bilateral defence partner. In terms of the agreements it has reached in its own right, and legitimately so, with the international community and NATO, it has positions which should be respected. Like NATO, the UK will continue to review, assess and monitor, and we shall continue to respond, in conjunction with our allies, in the best way we can.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the Statement and particularly that, of its three pages, one is devoted to dialogue, which is the only way in which the dreadful current set of circumstances will be resolved. However, I am disappointed that, despite the fact that the paragraphs on dialogue begin with the sentence

“I must stress that no one wants conflict”,


there is no recognition that there is existing conflict. There is conflict going on in the eastern part of Ukraine and, despite the refreshment of a ceasefire on 22 December, violations of that ceasefire continue. In fact, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine’s daily report for today says that it recorded, in the last 24 hours, 113 ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region. In the Luhansk region,

“the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, including one explosion”

and 144 violations in the previous 24 hours. There is existing conflict going on and people are suffering. There are missing persons and all the aspects of violence that we have come to know in many countries across the world recently. My question for the Ministry of Defence, the Minister, the Secretary of State and the Government is: what are we doing to try to lessen or cease that violence for the people who are living with it daily? It is so bad that that amazing mine-clearance organisation, the HALO Trust, has had to suspend its work in the region at the moment.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very important point. He is right that we should remember that a considerable part of Ukraine continues to be illegally occupied, with the negative and unwelcome consequences to which he referred.

The United Kingdom, as the noble Lord will be aware, has supported Ukraine for over 30 years since it became a sovereign state in its own right. Since 2015, through Operation Orbital the UK has done what it can to help build what I described earlier as the resilience of the Ukrainian armed forces. We have provided defensive training to over 22,000 Ukrainian troops since 2015. That includes the maritime training initiative, to which I referred, to help the Ukrainian navy rebuild its capacity.

In June last year we entered into an agreement with Ukraine through a memorandum of implementation, which affirmed the UK as open to supply Ukraine with defensive weapons systems as well as training. That principle remains. The noble Lord will possibly be aware that we signed a UK export finance treaty last November to finance the Ukraine naval capabilities enhancement project. That treaty amounts to £1.7 billion of assistance.

That is meaningful help and it might assist your Lordships to understand that this is not just empty rhetoric. The proposal is that there will be missile sale and integration on new and in-service Ukrainian navy patrol and airborne platforms, including a training and engineering support package. There is a going to be development and joint production of eight fast-missile warships with modern defensive armaments. We will also assist with the creation of a new naval base in the Black Sea as a primary fleet for Ukraine and a new base in the Sea of Azov.

What the UK is trying to do in a holistic manner is to come to Ukraine’s aid in helping it to be more ready to defend itself. I think the UK can be satisfied with, and justly admired for, the help it has been giving. It has not been doing that alone, of course. As the noble Lord will be aware, the United States has been assisting as well.

The United Kingdom is very conscious of the extremely sensitive position in which Ukraine finds itself, not least because of the issues to which the noble Lord referred, but we are doing a number of very substantive things to assist it.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I know that you are all waiting agog for my response to what has been a wide-ranging and very interesting debate, but I am required to make a correction in relation to our previous debate on Amendment 26. I have been informed that the process that I described is slightly different. The precise fees payable are made through both the affirmative and the negative resolution procedure, which is different from what I may have read out from the speaking notes. I am pleased to put that correction on the record.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for raising this issue, which is important and which we are all interested in. Clearly, some of your Lordships have concerns about it. As I said, it led to a very interesting debate. The essence of the amendment is that your Lordships are concerned that those who join the Armed Forces before their 18th birthday are obliged to serve longer than those who join after it.

Obviously, this is a bit of reprise of what I said in Committee, but I clarify that this is a matter not of length of service but of discharge. The statutory “discharge as of right” rules allow all new recruits, regardless of age, to discharge within their first three to six months of service, depending on their service, if they decide that the Armed Forces is not a career for them. In addition, service personnel have a statutory right to claim discharge up to their 18th birthday, subject to a maximum three-month cooling-off period. These rights are made clear to all on enlistment. Ultimately, all service personnel under the age of 18 have a statutory right to leave the Armed Forces up until their 18th birthday, without the liability to serve in the reserves, which would be the obligation on an adult aged over 18 who was leaving the services.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, referred to a specific example, and I confess that I was not familiar with it. I understood that he referred to the RAF, but if he would care to write to me with the details, I will certainly look at that in detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, was specifically concerned about the perceived unfairness to the under-18 group who serve longer than a new start of 18 years or over if they pursue a career in the Armed Forces. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, alluded to some extent to the letter I sent him in an endeavour to explain what these arrangements are about and the rationale behind them. I reiterate for the benefit of the Chamber that the policies in place covering the recruitment of young people below the age of 18 are designed carefully to be lawful, fair and fit for purpose, both for the individual and the service they volunteer to join.

The primary reason for the minimum period of service in the Army for those under 18 is that the Army must ensure that it maintains the right workforce levels to enable it to deploy personnel over the age of 18 on operations at home and abroad. Recruits under the age of 18 are not fully deployable on operations, and their notice period therefore runs from the point at which they become fully deployable alongside those who enlist after their 18th birthday. This minimum period of service for those under 18 also allows the Armed Forces to provide our young people with world-class training. It develops well-rounded junior personnel, both morally and conceptually, and, in turn, all this quite simply brings huge benefit to the individual, the Armed Forces and wider society. I feel that is positive and something that we should celebrate.

I acknowledge the recent reports of entirely unacceptable behaviour at the foundation college resulting in the conviction of an instructor, and the noble Lords, Lord Russell, Lord Browne and Lord Coaker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, referred to this. That is something we all deplore. It indicates to me that there is a system which works: that if somebody behaves absolutely unacceptably in a criminal fashion, they are dealt with within the system. I do not think we should be complacent about this in any way. I was as disturbed to read that report as anyone, but it suggested to me that there are systems in place.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, particularly sought reassurance about this. I want to reassure her and your Lordships that for under-18s any reports of bullying are taken extremely seriously, and tough action is taken against those who fall short of the Army’s high standards. The duty of care for all our recruits, particularly those aged under 18, is of the utmost importance, and we recognise the need to treat under-18s differently.

The Armed Forces foundation college—

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I am very much obliged to the noble Baroness for giving way; she is very generous. However, at this point I think it is appropriate to ask her specifically if it is true that there were 60 complaints between 2014 and 2020 from parents or trainees about bullying behaviour at AFC Harrogate. Is that true?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have that information before me. I will certainly undertake to investigate, and I will write to the noble Lord with whatever I find out.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

With respect, if it is true, will the noble Baroness also express in that letter whether she is concerned that that does not appear to have been reflected in the inspections of AFC Harrogate? If it had been, I am sure the noble Baroness would have shared that when we discussed this in Committee.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I have added to my choreography before standing at the Dispatch Box: can I get a Polo mint in before the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, concludes? The answer is no. That is the first question I am able to answer.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Browne, for tabling Amendment 59, which is supported by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Houghton and Lord Craig, and engages with the subject of novel technologies. It is a significant issue that merits discussion, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for his kind remarks.

There is no doubt that the increasing adoption of innovative technologies is changing how military operations are conducted. The noble Lords’ analysis—that we need to be particularly mindful of the legal ramifications—is hard to dispute. From the engagement that I and the department have had with the noble Lords, I know that they understand very well the broader complexities likely to be created by Defence use of AI and are anxious that we should address these issues both purposefully and systematically. This scrutiny and challenge is welcome, because we are grappling with questions and subjects that are indeed very complex.

I hope to reassure your Lordships that the department is alert to these issues and has worked extensively on them over the course of the last 18 months. Noble Lords will understand that I cannot set out details until these positions have been finalised, but work to set a clear direction of travel for defence AI, underpinned by proper policy and governance frameworks, has reached an advanced stage. Key to this is the defence AI strategy, which we hope to publish in the coming months, along with details of the approaches we will use when adopting and using AI. This commitment, which is included in the National AI Strategy, reflects the Government’s broader commitment that the public sector should set an example through how it governs its own use of the technology. Taken together, we intend that these various publications will give a much clearer picture than is currently available, because we recognise that these are important issues that attract a great deal of interest, and we need to be as transparent and engaged as possible.

Noble Lords asked pertinent questions. I think the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked some of these: where in the chain of command does responsibility for AI-related outcomes reside? When might the Government have an obligation to use AI to protect service personnel from harm? What are the military and moral consequences of machine-speed warfare? These are vital questions, and we recognise that we do not yet have all the answers.

Nor can we hope to arrive at these answers on our own. We have to persist in our engagement with our international partners and allies, and with our own public and civil society. It is perfectly legitimate for parliamentarians to take an interest in this subject, to ask questions and to table debates. I hope that our forthcoming publications will provide a solid platform for an ongoing effort of public engagement and efforts to enhance public understanding, subject to the usual caveats that may apply to the release of Defence information.

To turn to the subject of the proposed amendment, we are committed to ensuring that our Armed Forces personnel have the best possible care and protection, including protection against spurious legal challenges. I assure noble Lords that, regardless of the technologies employed, all new military capabilities are subject to a rigorous review process for compliance with international humanitarian law. Furthermore, we also adjust our operating procedures to ensure that we stay within the boundaries of the law that applies at the time.

International and domestic frameworks provide the same level of protection around the use of novel technologies as for conventional systems because their general principle is to focus on the action, rather than the tool. These frameworks therefore offer appropriate levels of protection for our personnel. Earlier this year, we acted to bolster this protection in historical cases, for example, through the overseas operations Act.

In respect of artificial intelligence, I have mentioned our forthcoming AI strategy and our plan to publish details of the approaches we will use when adopting and using AI. This is really where we come to the nub of the issue. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, put his finger on it, as did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I want to try to encapsulate what I hope will be a substantive and reassuring response to them all.

These approaches will not affect or supersede existing legal obligations, but they will ensure coherence across defence. They will also drive the creation of the policy frameworks and systems that, in practical terms, are needed to ensure that personnel researching, developing, delivering and operating AI-enabled systems have an appropriate understanding of those systems and can work with and alongside them in compliance with our various legal and policy frameworks.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne, specifically referred to the NATO AI principles. Essentially, NATO’s position is that alliance members can sign up to these NATO-wide standards or they can produce their own to a similar standard. We support NATO’s leadership in the responsible use of artificial intelligence and, as I have indicated, we intend to publish details of our own approach in early course.

In addition, we will continue to engage internationally, including through the United Nations Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, to promote consensus on international norms and standards for the use of new and emerging technologies on the battlefield, while continuing to act as a responsible leader in this area.

I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, who asked about the phrasing I used in response to her noble friend Lord Clement-Jones’s question last week. From memory, I said two things: first, the UK has no systems that could unilaterally employ lethal force without human involvement at some stage in the process. I think that I went on to say that, sharing the concerns of government, civil society and AI experts around the world, the UK opposes the creation and use of systems that would operate without context-appropriate human involvement. I think that is the phrase the noble Baroness sought clarification on.

The phrase means that a person is exercising some form of control over the effect of the use of the weapon in a way that satisfies international humanitarian law. This could be some form of control over the operation in real time, or it could be setting clear operational parameters for a system. I hope that that has been helpful to the noble Baroness in explaining what was behind the use of that phrase.

I have endeavoured to provide reassurance to noble Lords that the Ministry of Defence takes these matters very seriously, is already doing all that needs to be done, and is planning to be proactive in communicating our approach appropriately to Parliament and the public. On this basis, I suggest that the amendment is not needed.

I also say, with the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and no sense of impertinence, that I do question the utility of requiring a review and a report. This will necessarily be only a snapshot; it will quickly become out of date when we are dealing with a rapidly evolving subject matter. Not to put too fine a point on it, the effort of staffing it risks reducing the capacity needed within the department for developing the extensive systems and frameworks that we need to ensure the proper handling of AI.

I must say that I have enjoyed this debate, as I always enjoy my engagement with the noble Lord, Lord Browne—but, for these reasons, I ask that he withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her response to this debate and, with the indulgence of the Committee, I will refer to parts of her response. I was greatly appreciative of it all, but some parts I welcomed more than others.

I will start with the last point. The criticisms the Minister made about the vehicle that I tabled in order to have this debate was correct. It is implicit in the way I debate these issues that they are moving so fast that probably there is no point in time at which we could publish a report that would not quickly go out of date. I accept that. In fact, for that reason I wish that people, and sometimes senior military officers—but thankfully no British ones—would stop talking about a “race” for this technology. A race requires a line, and the development of this technology has no winning line that we know of.

In fact, the likelihood is that when we move to AGI, which is a hypothetical but likely development, whereby an intelligent agent understands or learns any intellectual task that a human being can, it may well be that we think we are at the line, but the machine does not think we are at the line and runs on and looks back at us and laughs. So I accept all of that but, at some point, we need to find a framework in which we in Parliament can connect with these issues—a methodology for the Government to report to Parliament, to the extent that they can, and for all of us to take responsibility, as we should, for asking our young people to go into situations of conflict, with the possibility that these weapons will be used, with all the implications.

So that is what I am seeking to get. I want a 24 year-old who is asked to take some responsibility in an environment in which these weapons are deployed to know with confidence that he or she is acting within the law. That is my shared responsibility with the Government; we need to find a way of doing that. This may be an imperfect way, but we may always be in an imperfect situation with a moving target. So I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. None of these debates answers any questions fully, but they all add to our collective knowledge.

I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, for his unqualified support. He took me slightly by surprise with the deployment of his eloquence to make the case for deploying the law as a weapon of war. I fear that I agree with him—I used to be a lawyer—but I will have to think long and carefully before I give him my unqualified support for that. However, I suspect that, as always, I will end up supporting what he said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

I apologise, but I had not finished—it was a dramatic pregnant pause that misled the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Your preface is a long one.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

It is not a preface. I want to turn to Amendment 62, for a couple of paragraphs. The amendment would ensure that

“soldiers aged under 18 are not required to serve for a longer period than adult personnel.”

In my view, the amendment addresses an issue that is just wrong—we just should not be keeping people who signed at 16 in the Army longer than people who signed at 18, just because of their age. There is no justification for that discrimination, in my view. It is an abuse of their rights; they should be treated the same as everybody else, and we should simply get rid of their distinction. I have finished now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

On Amendment 62, can the Minister answer this deceptively simple question? Why do the Army, in their regulations regarding the minimum service period, discriminate against younger recruits? On the issue of whether this is legal, I am not arguing that it is illegal—but will the Minister confirm for the record that the only reason why this discrimination, which would be unlawful in civilian life, is lawful, is because the Armed Forces benefit from an exemption from the Equality Act 2010 which was put there to allow them to continue to discriminate?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I think I can add nothing more to what I have already provided by way of an explanation for how that system works and why it is there, and why we do not believe that it is as discriminatory as the noble Lord indicates. However, I am happy to look at his remarks in Hansard and see whether I can provide him with a fuller response.

In conclusion, I thank your Lordships for all contributions. I genuinely thought that it was an extremely interesting debate, and I have welcomed the thoughts from contributors all around the Room.

Autonomous Weapons Systems

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I simply repeat to the noble Baroness what I said to my noble friend Lord Lancaster: that UK Armed Forces do not use systems that employ lethal force without context-appropriate human involvement.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, the National AI Strategy was published in September and promises were made that, before the end of the year,

“details of the approaches the Ministry of Defence will use when adopting and using AI”

will be published. However, on 22 October the AI strategy for NATO, which presumably we agreed to, was published and it emphasised the principles of lawfulness, responsibility and accountability. Does the Minister not agree that it is now time for the UK to publicly reaffirm our commitment to ethical AI, including international law and human rights, and to tell our public and the international community that our Government are ready, as our Governments always have been, to show global leadership on these issues, particularly on lethal autonomous weapons?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite correct that the department has said that it will publish a defence AI strategy. When I was told it would be in the autumn, I pointed out that the autumn had pretty well come and gone. I am reassured that significant work has been done on the strategy and we can expect publication in early course. It will set out our vision to be the most effective, efficient, trusted and influential defence organisation of our size, and have principled components to it. I would not wish to pre-empt what the strategy will say, but I would hope that it will serve to answer many of the noble Lord’s questions.

AUKUS

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 16th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I say to my noble friend that we see this as a partnership among three important global players. It is a partnership with important and broad security objectives but its immediate raison d’être, as driven by Australia, is to seek help in being supplied with nuclear-powered submarines. That is the first focus of the partnership; it is therefore not something that it would be appropriate for France to be involved in.

On our broader relationship with France, I hope that my noble friend was assured by what I said in my earlier remarks. France is related to us and our defence relationships in a number of ways, not least on our bilateral front but also through NATO. There is a strong relationship there that we want to nurture and sustain.

My noble friend asked when the partnership will be operational. This is a technically challenging proposition. The first phrase will happen over the next 18 months and will involve a tripartite, or trilateral, discussion among the three parties to the agreement as they work out what is possible and how matters might be taken forward.

My noble friend also asked about command. This is not a military operation; it is an alliance, first of all, to help with the specific project of building and delivering nuclear-powered submarines. The submarines will be under the command of Australia, and it will have autonomy of operation over them.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Ricketts, I have had insufficient time to get my head around the implications of what I consider to be quite a momentous announcement. I assume that the Government worried those implications to death before they agreed to join, so I have two questions.

First, assuming that the method of propulsion for these boats will use highly enriched uranium—a fissile, weapons-grade material—and the safeguarding of this material will be outside the IAEA structure, who will take responsibility for that safeguarding? What steps can we ensure are taken, and how will they be reported?

Secondly, this is the first time in history that a non-nuclear arms state will acquire a nuclear submarine. What assessment have the Government and their allies made of the sort of signal this sends to our adversaries that are nuclear arms states? Have we considered that this will be interpreted by them as permission to equip all their allies and friends with nuclear submarines? If so, this has momentous consequences for the proliferation of these materials and weapons in the world.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord. He used an interesting adjective in relation to this agreement; he described it as “momentous”, which I think is an accurate and apposite assessment. His concern about nuclear materials was basically whether we have asked our URENCO partners for permission. In the next 18 months, we will consider a wide range of technical, legal and practical issues for this project and do not want to pre-empt those findings. I reassure the noble Lord that the usual high standards of security will be maintained. The UK’s nuclear enterprise has more than 60 years of experience of delivering world-class, nuclear-powered submarine capabilities safely.

On the interesting issue of the IAEA, we have spoken to the IAEA director-general and will keep in close touch. As the noble Lord indicated, it does not have competence for nuclear defence issues, but we will engage with it as appropriate during the consultation period to ensure that we are fulfilling our obligations and to give absolute confidence that no HEU will be diverted for weapons purposes.

Afghanistan: British Equipment and Training

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 16th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I do not have the precise information about the value of kit that over the years was handed to the Afghan national security forces. In so far as a limited amount of government equipment was left, some was handed over to our American allies, but no equipment of any military use has been left that may fall into other hands.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, this is but one of a number of very serious and regrettable consequences of a premature and chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some of this weaponry, such as rifles and pistols, and equipment, such as trucks, is pretty easily used, mended and deployed. But there are also, thankfully, modern aircraft and armoured vehicles which tend to need more skilled operators and technical maintenance including regular software updates. This is a NATO problem, not just a UK problem, because this equipment will be sold to the highest bidder and not just possibly used but, more importantly, reverse engineered, which will create very difficult problems for our future deployment of it. What steps are we and our NATO allies taking to monitor and interdict such possibilities?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord makes an important point that this is broader than the United Kingdom. As the Chamber will understand, the NATO alliance activity in Afghanistan—obviously by implication of what it was doing—raised an inevitable risk; do you help and try to support, which includes providing equipment? You cannot have a crystal ball to see into the future. As I said earlier, when it became clear the Taliban were taking control of Afghanistan and an evacuation plan had to be conceived, careful thought was given to controlling what was under our control, and that was the equipment that we had. I have explained the situation in relation to that.

Armed Forces: Gambling Disorders

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 13th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The right reverend Prelate will be aware that a study by Swansea University, sponsored by the Forces in Mind Trust, is currently taking place to understand the levels of gambling participation and attitudes to gambling in ex-service personnel. We have not seen the report, but we hope that it will enable officials within the MoD to evaluate the extent of gambling participation, its nature—that is, leisure pursuit by comparison with addiction—and if there is anything more that can be done.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, military veterans are eight times more likely to become problem gamblers than those in the general population. That is the view of the Army Headquarters Regional Command, in its headline facts on page 3 of its transition IPPD information sheet which itself is entitled Gambling—A Serious Risk to Military Personnel. The appropriate questions are: why are soldiers more vulnerable to gambling, why do military veterans have such a heightened prevalence of problem gambling as opposed to the general population, and what is the MoD doing to understand what lies behind that prevalence and how it can be tackled before the vulnerability forms?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

These are all pertinent questions, and we are looking closely, as I say, at what this University of Swansea study will disclose. There is anecdotal evidence that people who go into the Armed Forces may be innately more inclined to take risks and therefore may be of a disposition that predisposes them to acquiring a gambling addition rather than to recreational gambling. We try to inform and educate by activity within the Armed Forces, giving advice and support within the chain of command and from other agencies. We certainly try to support our veterans both in the transition programme for them to re-enter civilian life and then through, for example, Veterans UK’s veterans welfare service and the Office for Veterans’ Affairs.

Unidentified Flying Objects

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 30th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The important point, on which I wish to reassure your Lordships, is that the UK air defence community detects and monitors all flying air systems 24 hours a day to provide an identified air picture as part of the UK’s national security posture and our commitment to the integrity of NATO airspace. That is supported by Typhoon aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth and RAF Coningsby, which are held at high readiness to intercept any threat to UK airspace.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in 2008 the MoD began the process of releasing all its UFO files. In 2009 Sir Bob Ainsworth, the Secretary of State, accepted the advice that:

“In more than 50 years, no UFO sighting … has indicated the existence of any military threat to the UK; there is no defence benefit in … recording, collating, analysing, or investigating UFO sightings”


and

“the level of resources devoted to this task is … diverting staff from more valuable defence-related activities”,

and he closed the relevant unit. Does the US report reveal any evidence containing any reason to review that advice?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I simply say to the noble Lord that I seek to reassure him that, as I have indicated, we deal with actual threats substantiated by evidence. He is quite right about the closure of the UFO desk in 2009. I can confirm that the department holds no reports on unidentified aerial phenomena and that all relevant material created and held by the UFO desk has been passed to the National Archives.

British Armed Forces: Iraqi Interpreters

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 1st February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con) [V]]

I can confirm to the noble Baroness that the investigation will involve speaking to the contractor. Steps have already been taken to interview personnel concerned with Operation Shader who were in the camp between January and March 2020. The position is a little complicated in that the contractor changed, and therefore it is necessary to speak to the former contractor as well. We hope to be able to give an update by the end of February, and I undertake to report to the noble Baroness at that time. We constantly assess the risk that our interpreters are exposed to, and we have protections in place with our contractor to ensure that the best possible safeguards are afforded to them.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, life for Iraqi British Army interpreters has always been terrifyingly hazardous. At least 40 have been brutally murdered by militia groups. They are targets only because they work side by side with British soldiers. We know that and we should have the evidence to prove it. The resettlement scheme that they might have used closed in 2010, and now they have no accessible visa or asylum route to safety. They deserve real and prompt action, not just words. I invite the Minister to contrast the treatment of Iraqi interpreters with that of those who have British national overseas status in Hong Kong. Why can they not be offered equal treatment?

[Baroness Goldie (Con) [V]]

I confirm to the noble Lord that when the MoD uses a third-party contractor to source interpreting services, strict conditions of contract apply, and these are incorporated into the contract. These are standards set down by the MoD for contracting requirements and deployed operations. Very particularly, they require that the operational circumstances within which the contractor capabilities are delivered to the MoD must be as safe, secure and reasonable as possible for the workforce. They set out obligations both for the MoD and the contractor to ensure that that happens, and we take those obligations very seriously.

Armed Forces: Reduction

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 22nd October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord raises significant issues. His question impinges on two aspects: one is the integrated review and the other is the spending review. In relation to the latter, the spending review process continues in respect of the defence budget, and the Ministry of Defence is in discussion with the Treasury on the department’s settlement. In relation to the integrated review, because of the decision to move to a one-year spending review, the Government are considering the implications for the completion of the integrated review and will provide an update to Parliament once that is decided.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, on 30 September, when launching the Integrated Operating Concept 2025, the CDS described the UK’s future campaign posture as demanding and said—I shall read this in short—that we would see

“armed forces much more in use”

and

“engaged and forward-deployed”—

with

“training and exercising being delivered as operations”—

and that it would involve supporting other countries in a pattern of possible combat operations against common threats.

Since then, as well as anonymous government briefings that a cost-cutting Army will slash its manpower by 7,000, we learn from MoD evidence to the Defence Select Committee that by 2025, the Army will not even be able to meet the demands of the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, never mind the IOC. Can the Minister explain those apparent contradictions?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord is predicating his question on speculation and hypothesis. I can respond to his question only in relation to facts as I am aware of them. The core obligation of the MoD is, of course, to protect the UK and keep our citizens safe. We shall always prioritise how we respond to the threats that the UK faces. For example, the Armed Forces continue to meet all their current commitments, keeping the country and its interests safe.

Covid-19: Military Operations and Support

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Thursday 10th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

Obviously, at specific times certain personnel have been affected, depending on their health situation. We have taken steps to enable safe training, including social distancing during roll calls and physical training, isolating at the beginning of courses and reconfiguring communal spaces such as canteens, sleeping quarters and classrooms. Therefore, a consistent pattern of training has continued.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, NATO has already felt the effects of the pandemic: Norway called off Cold Response 2020, Exercise Defender-Europe 20 was restructured and trimmed and Covid-19 entered the Latvian-based NATO battlegroup. Meanwhile, the US European Command has cancelled or postponed a lot of planned exercises. Against this background, what steps is NATO taking to ensure that it will be able to perform core tasks and missions, in the short term and in the longer term, in the absence of these exercises?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite correct that decisions were taken to pause certain exercises, and that was the correct decision with regard to the safety and well-being of those who otherwise would have participated. NATO and all member states are anxious to resume activity when circumstances permit that to happen. We must take account of situations in host countries, not just their health situation but what their particular requirements and restrictions may be. I am confident there is a resolve on the part of NATO and the member states to do whatever we can to continue activity, but we must always have at the forefront of that the health, well-being and safety of the personnel of all member states.

Nuclear Weapons (International Relations Committee Report)

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Tuesday 16th July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I first apologise for being slightly late into the Chamber; I was caught unawares by the preceding Statement ending a little early. I thank my noble friend Lord Howell for tabling this Motion and all noble Lords for their perceptive and helpful contributions. I particularly pay tribute to him and his committee colleagues for a thorough and comprehensive report. To me, it is a significant contribution to a subject of vital importance. I know my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon is very sorry not to be responding to this Motion. He has important duties this week in Washington at the 2019 Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, hosted by the State Department. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Collins, that we are all very glad to hear the positive news about his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Judd.

This debate comes at a time when the international security environment is increasingly complex—at times fraught—and arms control frameworks are coming under increasing challenge. In this context, we should not underestimate the positive impact of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and its enduring value as a central pillar of the rules-based international system that the United Kingdom has done so much to build and uphold. I welcome the chance to reflect on the achievements of the treaty, outline some of the challenges we face and set out what we are doing to overcome them.

The NPT was built on consensus and has been at the heart of global efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and encourage nuclear disarmament efforts for nearly 50 years. It has overwhelmingly delivered on its objectives and we should celebrate its success. To quote the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, it has made “a massive contribution”. I realise that this is a difficult debate for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb; I may not support her view on unilateral disarmament, but I respect and see the passion with which she holds it. Let me try to reassure her by now turning to the NPT and considering it in a little more detail.

First, the NPT has limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the time of its inception, the world feared a widespread arms race that could have resulted in dozens of nuclear-armed states within decades. The NPT helped to persuade some countries to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons and to ensure that many more did not seek to acquire them. Secondly, it has provided the framework and confidence for a significant reduction in nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War. The UK has provided a good exemplar, significantly reducing its nuclear weapon stockpile since the Cold War peak. Finally, the treaty extended the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy around the globe. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for his recognition of these virtues. His map in the report is encouraging, and I commend him on his imagination in suggesting its inclusion.

The non-proliferation treaty continues to offer a framework that is central to our goal of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. The value of this treaty is widely recognised by nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike, which is why it has received near-universal acceptance. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the treaty next year, noble Lords should be in no doubt that this Government remain committed to its step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised that point. This approach includes the universal application of the NPT, the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the start and successful conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.

However, I must be candid: significant further disarmament is difficult to foresee in the current security environment. Some countries are expanding their nuclear arsenals and pursuing a reckless path of breaching arms control and disarmament treaties, as well as developing destabilising new delivery systems for nuclear weapons. We must remain resolute in working to deter such threats and in facing down those who seek to undermine decades of progress. Against this complex security backdrop, the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to both our security and that of our NATO allies, for as long as the global security situation demands.

But even in this challenging context and environment, we are making progress towards verifiable, treaty-based future disarmament. Part of this requires us to understand and overcome the challenges in verifying nuclear disarmament, so that all states can have confidence in the process. The UK continues to play a leading role in developing verification tools and techniques working alongside nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. We hosted the first-ever verification exercise for nuclear disarmament in 2017, as part of our quad partnership with Norway, Sweden and the United States. We are active participants in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We also took part in the recent UN Group of Governmental Experts on verification.

Next year’s NPT review conference falls 75 years after nuclear weapons were released on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 50 years after the NPT entered into force, and 25 years after it was indefinitely extended. It is clear to us that the NPT remains as relevant and important now as it has ever been. That is not just the United Kingdom’s view: it is widely shared around the world. However, we also know that even a treaty as important as this requires constant nurturing to ensure that it remains effective.

My noble friend Lord Howell mentioned that trust—I think that is the word that he used—is key and he is absolutely correct. The UK is doing everything we can to encourage trust and confidence, which is also important. That is why we are working with international partners to ensure that the review conference reinforces our shared interests and seeks to advance its goals.

My noble friend Lady Anelay of St Johns asked how we were preparing for this review conference and whether we can resolve differences. The noble Lord, Lord Collins, also raised that point. We recognise that achieving consensus at the review conference will be challenging, but we will invest all our energies in striving for a positive outcome. As part of our preparation between now and the conference, we will chair the P5 dialogue, which was established a decade ago by the United Kingdom to build mutual trust and confidence between the nuclear weapon states.

The noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord Hannay and Lord Collins, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and my noble friend Lord King raised some apprehensions about the backdrop to this conference. The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, particularly raised the issue of new START. That is a bilateral treaty between the US and Russia. It is a decision for the US and Russia to take forward discussions about extending the treaty and we of course support effective arms control. There is no doubt that new START contributes to international stability. All allies support continued implementation, early and active dialogue and ways to improve strategic stability, and we will use our best efforts to encourage an extension of it. But at the end of the day it is a decision for the United States and Russia.

In an intervention, my noble friend Lord King raised the position of India and Pakistan. Having made his intervention, he now seems to have disappeared, but I will share with the rest of the Chamber that he wondered if they would be parties to the next P5 dialogue. It is correct that that would require the agreement of all P5 members because the P5 process is primarily for NPT issues, but we encourage discussion among all these countries in a variety of fora, so we have noted those important concerns. In addition, we plan to engage in discussions on transparency and risk reduction with all state parties.

Noble Lords raised a number of points that I would like to try to deal with, if I may. The question of cyber capability and cyber risks arose, and that is no surprise. It was raised by my noble friend Lord Howell and the noble Lords, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord Purvis of Tweed, Lord West and Lord Collins, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. It is an important issue to raise in the context of the report and of this debate. The Government take their responsibilities for maintaining a credible independent nuclear deterrent extremely seriously. We have robust measures in place to keep that nuclear deterrent safe and secure. We invest significant resources in ensuring protection against cyber and other threats. However, as noble Lords will understand, it is not government policy to comment on specific security measures relating to the nuclear deterrent, for the purposes of safeguarding national security. I reassure noble Lords that, more broadly, the Government doubled investment in cybersecurity to £1.9 billion in the last strategic defence and security review in 2015. No one is indifferent to or casual about the immensity of that threat. It is the threat of the modern age and the Government are acutely aware of it.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton]

On the Government’s commitment to cybersecurity, every single time this issue is raised in whatever context in this House the government spokesperson raises this point about £1.9 billion—without explanation. The £1.9 billion announced in 2015 and again in 2016 is to cover five years of all the work that the Government do on cybersecurity in every aspect of public policy. But the National Audit Office reported on that in March this year. My reading of that report suggests that the true figure is £1.3 billion and that, in the first two years, the Treasury transferred 37% of the funding to other matters that were priorities for the Government that were not originally intended to be included. Can we please in future have specific information on the issue that is before the House about how much is being spent by the MoD on the Dreadnought programme and on cybersecurity? That is the question, not what the Government may or may not be spending on cybersecurity writ large.

[Baroness Goldie]

I hear the noble Lord, but he will understand as well as anyone, with his distinguished experience in these matters, that we cannot comment on specific security measures and I do not think he would expect the Government to do that. But I hear his detailed questioning about the funding. I have no specific information available this evening, but I undertake to make further investigation and write to him.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, raised a couple of issues about policy and strategy—essentially, why the UK maintains a nuclear deterrent and what our commitment to disarmament is. I suggest that actually the two are not mutually exclusive. It is clear from the evidence that the committee received that the Government have a strong record on nuclear disarmament. We have significantly reduced the size of our own nuclear forces since the Cold War peak and we have about 1% of the total global stockpile. But it is absolutely clear that the independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to our security today and will do for as long as the global security situation demands. It has existed for more than 60 years to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life and I submit that it is helping to guarantee our security and that of our allies. But the commitment that we have to the NPT is manifest. Noble Lords will understand my suggestion that the two positions are far from mutually exclusive.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, raised the matter of Russia and the strategic approach. His specific question was about whether at the recent meeting between the Prime Minister and President Putin any discussion had taken place. Apparently, a wide range of issues was discussed, including global security issues, but I have no more specific information than that.

My noble friend Lady Anelay raised paragraph 197 of the report and how the Government proposed to respond in practical terms in their dealings with nuclear possessor states. We have regular and frank exchanges on such issues through the P5 and bilaterally and we encourage all possessor states to recognise their responsibilities and to refrain from destabilising rhetoric and destabilising technology.

A number of noble Lords raised Iran, including my noble friend Lady Anelay and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham. The UK expressed deep concern that Iran is pursuing activities inconsistent with its commitments under the JCPOA. We did that in a statement with France and Germany earlier this month. The UK remains committed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. We think it is important for our security and for neutralising the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. We and remaining parties are working hard to ensure that it is upheld for as long as Iran meets its commitments, including full IAEA access. I say to the noble Baronesses that the Government regret the United States’ decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose sanctions, but we continue to work with our European partners and Iran to try to find solutions to support economic relations.

I think my noble friend Lady Anelay also raised the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of Hormuz. We are concerned at tensions in that area and we are doing everything we can to de-escalate them by diplomatic means. However, international maritime law must be respected and upheld. We shall protect British shipping in the region. The recent escort of a British tanker by HMS “Montrose” demonstrated our resolve to offer that protection.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised the issue of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We remain fully committed to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and to the establishment of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We believe that realistically that is going to be possible only when political solutions are found to the tensions in the region. We believe that the convening of a conference has potential but we think it will be worth while, valid and achievable only if it is on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by all states in the region, as set out in the 2010 NPT review conference plan.

It is clear that the NPT has made a substantial contribution to international security and prosperity. It succeeded in all three of its pillars and has earned its place as the central pillar of the arms control architecture. This Government remain committed to multilateral disarmament. We will continue to work tirelessly to uphold the NPT and to explore practical ways to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

This has been an extremely helpful and interesting debate. I once again commend my noble friend Lord Howell and his committee for their hard work in producing this report. It is a very useful report. I realise that this was difficult for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, but the report and what we have debated this evening indicate what is possible when people are bonded by the same objective and motivated by the same desire. Perhaps perversely, she and I have the same objective; we just have different ways of arriving at it.

I conclude with the words of my noble friend Lady Anelay still ringing in my mind: a watched pot never boils. I think we all agree that this is a situation and a subject where we do not want the pot ever to boil.

Ebola Outbreak: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Monday 20th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the right reverend Prelate for his remarks. The whole Chamber will recognise that he speaks with deep personal knowledge, and I am sure a degree of personal pain, in understanding what is happening in that country. Sadly, it is the case that community trust is one of the most challenging aspects. When we consider that there have been ongoing attacks on both Ebola treatment centres and front-line health staff, it paints a very depressing picture indeed.

As I said, working in conjunction with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other global and NGO partners, we are endeavouring to address the very issues the right reverend Prelate talks about. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for DfID made it clear in the other place that he is actively engaged in such dialogue to determine how pressure can best be brought to bear. He was very clear that pressure might have to be brought to bear on the Government and opposition parties, United Nations agencies, NGOs—whoever. Certainly, the UK Government are prepared to pursue that energetic role if that would make the attainment of treatment more realistic for the very people now needing it and surmount the challenges that the noble Lord, Lord Patel, rightly identified as being the impediment to getting treatment to those people.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Patel, said, we have the technical ability to tackle Ebola. We know that. This outbreak in the DRC faces an incredibly complex challenge of insecurity, which I do not intend to go into in much detail, but it also faces an underfunding challenge. I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, which was comprehensive and very informative, and speaks well for the Government. The insecurity challenge is enormously difficult—war has been raging in the DRC for a long period—but the underfunding challenge is simple. The Red Cross says that it needs $30 million to carry out all of its activities in the DRC and to prepare the surrounding countries for the likelihood of spread. It has half of that. The international community has behaved disgracefully. It promised much more than it has delivered. The Government should concentrate on putting pressure on our international allies, friends and others to come up with the money that they said they would donate for this crisis.

[Baroness Goldie]

I thank the noble Lord. I am sure that the point he makes will resonate not just in this Chamber but beyond. He is right: funding remains a concern. The World Health Organization continues to report gaps in funding of critical activities. The UK has been one of the major donors alongside the USA, the World Bank, ECHO and Gavi, and continues to lobby other donors to contribute, but the noble Lord is right to identify an area of profound concern. Certainly, this Government will be untiring in our efforts to persuade other parties that they need to step up to the plate.

Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Wednesday 9th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak in support of the Motion of my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon, and I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, for a number of reasons. He has given me an opportunity to use a sentence that I never thought I would in my political career, which is that I agree with him. The Prime Minister’s deal is unacceptable. I am not tempted to engage with the elements of his excellent speech simply because I want to change the subject.

When she opened this debate on 10 December, the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, the Leader of the House, sought to persuade us that the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration represent the national interest and that they should be considered and,

“voted on as a package in the other place”.

She described the political declaration as outlining,

“the scope and terms for our country’s future relationship with the EU”.—[Official Report, 5/12/18; col. 979.]

Others have spoken before me, such as the noble Lords, Lord Dobbs and Lord Forsyth, and it seems to me that there is much more scope in this political declaration than there are terms. That relationship, she said, included security and defence, law enforcement and criminal justice, and referred to a security partnership which the Government assert will keep our citizens safe and will require negotiation of the broadest and most comprehensive security relationship in the EU’s history.

The UK’s internal security is a matter of the greatest importance and consequently I shall confine my remarks to the internal security challenges that the Prime Minister’s deal has generated for us, although, largely, these challenges are ignored by the Government Front Bench in this place and in the other place. On occasions their treatment of this issue has been more egregious than that.

On 17 December, when Theresa May returned from the European Council she said in a Statement to the other place,

“our Brexit deal includes the deepest security partnership that has ever been agreed with the EU”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/12/18; col.527.]

At best, that language was odd; at worst, it was misleading. To clearly state that we have an agreement when no such agreement exists is misleading.

Thankfully, others were more straightforward. During the Recess, this issue dominated the news agenda for two days, on 27 and 28 December. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Cressida Dick, said in an interview on the “Today” programme that the consequences of not having a security deal—a no-deal Brexit—will,

“be more costly, undoubtedly … and potentially, yes, put the public at risk”.

In the same interview she said that our security would be lessened even if the Prime Minister’s deal is approved. That latter point received less publicity, but essentially is the issue that I want to expand on in this speech.

Apart from the Leader’s passing reference in her opening remarks to the necessity of the further work required to turn the political declaration into a legally binding treaty and the aspirational vocabulary of the declaration itself, no government spokesperson has ever given us any further information about how they plan to achieve their ambitious objective of,

“the deepest security partnership that has ever been agreed with the EU”.

Importantly, they have not admitted what they know to be the case—that the full benefit of membership of the EU in security terms cannot be replicated under the proposed deal at its very best. That was the very point that Cressida Dick made in her “Today” interview.

On 17 February 2018, at the Munich security conference, Theresa May pleaded for an urgent deal with the EU on post-Brexit security co-operation, warning:

“This cannot be a time”,


to,

“jeopardise the security of our citizens”.

Rightly, she said that the,

“threats we face do not recognise the borders of individual nations or discriminate between them”,

that a “deep and special partnership” in security was needed and that,

“we cannot delay discussions on this”.

In particular, she warned that if there is no special deal on security by the time Britain leaves, extraditions under the European arrest warrant will cease, and if the UK does not continue to be part of Europol, information sharing will be hampered, undermining the fight against terrorism, organised crime and cyberattacks, and putting all of our citizens at greater risk.

On 19 June in Vienna, in a speech at the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, Michel Barnier clearly set out the EU 27 position on security co-operation. The European arrest warrant, Europol, The Schengen Information System, the European Investigation Order, and the ability to enforce judicial decisions across Europe in real time have obvious benefits for all Europeans, he said. Co-operation of this nature is both unique and unprecedented throughout the world but, as he set out in his speech, the trust that underpins this legal infrastructure requires common rules and safeguards, shared decision-making, joint supervision and implementation and a common court of justice.

What Monsieur Barnier described was an “ecosystem”. He was blunt in saying if you leave this ecosystem, you lose the benefits of this co-operation. While explaining that the EU wants an ambitious new relationship with the UK, he admitted that realism demands that we are honest about what is possible when the UK is outside of the EU’s area of justice, freedom and security and outside of both the EU and Schengen. My intention in this speech is to give the Minister the opportunity to be honest about what is possible in these circumstances.

I remind the House that in her Statement on the December European Council, the Prime Minister could not be said to have been fully honest with us when she said that we already had the necessary security partnership with the EU. Intelligence officers, police chiefs, security officials and even the Security Minister are constantly stressing how crucial quick and efficient data exchange is to counterterrorism, policing and law enforcement co-operation, and to Europe’s security. Most of this is done through access to EU databases, to which access is limited to those with EU or Schengen membership. There is clearly no guarantee that the UK could have access to this data post-transition, and there is no precedent for a non-EU country having such access.

At Munich, Theresa May reminded us that the UK has extradited 10,000 people through the European arrest warrant. For every eight warrants issued by other member states, we issue only one. She reminded us that the EAW had played a crucial role in supporting police co-operation in Northern Ireland and is fundamental to the security situation there. I remind noble Lords that before the European arrest warrant entered into force, 13 out of the then 25 member states, including Austria, Germany and Poland, had constitutional restrictions on extraditing their citizens. Some prohibited the extradition of their own nationals for all crimes. That is the situation in which we will find ourselves with those countries post our leaving the European Union.

In her opening remarks, the noble Baroness echoed a point that has been made repeatedly by the Prime Minister and other Ministers: that negotiating requires compromise. The question that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, cannot duck in his response is: on what elements of security and to what extent are the Government willing to compromise? In the absence of an answer, the Government cannot expect our support. Nobody voted for less security when they voted for Brexit.

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, the contributions are exceedingly interesting but overrun creep is beginning to enter the proceedings. I respectfully remind your Lordships of the advisory time limit of six minutes.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Browne of Ladyton and Baroness Goldie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

It is crucial that we understand that the Prime Minister proposed in Munich a treaty for what was referred to as “internal security”, which is internal security within the European Union. It would be a treaty which had plenty of detail and clearly reflected co-operation with the existing institutions of the European Union—that is where we get into discussion about the European Court of Justice. But for external security, there would be co-operation. Why this difference? Why a treaty for internal security, and why just co-operation on global security, with a clear indication that we would leave the European Union’s foreign policy on the date of Brexit?

[Baroness Goldie]

There seems to be an inescapable distinction between these two positions. In relation to the internal security of the EU, there can be a meaningful discussion about what we can do to assist and support that, but when it comes to external security and just as I have outlined, there is a multiplicity of other positions, agencies, alliances, relationships and partnerships which govern what we do. I can see that what would be appropriate to deal with one scenario might not be appropriate to deal with another, but I say that without prejudice to whatever the negotiations are currently covering. I am not privy to the detail of the negotiations, but there seems already to be evidence that constructive dialogue is taking place. From what we have heard from the Prime Minister and her absolute and unqualified commitment to security and to trying to embark on as close and harmonious a relationship as we can get with the EU post Brexit, there is no doubt about her conviction on these matters.

We have to work as closely as we can with the EU post Brexit. The Prime Minister has made that crystal clear and is right to do so. The UK is not without influence. As the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, noted, it enjoys a status in relation to these matters—I refer again to our P5 position on the United Nations Security Council. One area in which people have been sceptical is in their asking why the UK should be treated differently from other third-country partners as we try to negotiate new arrangements with the EU. Taskforce 50 noted in its presentation on external security that the EU would lose one of its two permanent members of the Security Council when the UK leaves. Taskforce 50 recognises that this could merit a specific dialogue and consultation mechanism with the UK.

Perhaps I may return to a very legitimate question posed by a number of your Lordships: what is all this going to look like and is there any sort of shape to it?