Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, either there is a realistic power to vary the rate—I can see that there are some arguments in favour of that, which found favour with Mr Sumption, as he then was, when sitting in Guernsey—or it does not have any real meaning, as is the case following the decisions of the Court of Appeal. Although flexibility is desirable, if it is meaningless and if we as a legislative body decide that we are not going to overrule any decisions of the Court of Appeal, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is absolutely right about being accurate in the way that we legislate.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I hesitate to take either side of this argument, given the wisdom and experience of both noble and learned Lords, who have given conflicting views. I am therefore perfectly content, for once, to allow the Minister to indicate the Government’s attitude. After all, this Bill is not ending here; it is going to another place and there will be time for people with greater acumen than mine to look into the arguments advanced by the noble and learned Lord. It will be interesting to see what the Minister makes of them, but, of course, it is not the end of the day and perhaps this elevated discussion can take place with a more useful result than we are likely to see today.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I return to a group of amendments concerned with the regularity of the review of the discount rate. I raised this matter at Second Reading, in Committee and on Report, so I will not weary the House by going over the arguments again. Suffice it to say that I entirely agree with what the Bill does in providing for the obligation to have regular reviews at a certain juncture, although the Lord Chancellor has the right to have an earlier review if necessary. My argument, which I am glad to say the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, supports, as I think others in the House do, is that it is important that the reviews be regular and there would be an obligation to hold them, but that they do not have to take place too frequently. Why is that? Because those involved in litigation, on both sides, will inevitably seek effectively to guess—however well informed that guess might be—what the discount rate will be after it has been determined.

If there is to be a change every three years, the period leading up to the moment of change is likely not to result in settlements or to result in adjournments—in other words, in perfectly legitimate gaming of the system. This will happen inevitably whenever a review is about to take place, but it will happen less often if it is five years than if it is three years. This will, I think, help to produce more settlements. There are always uncertainties in litigation, but this is a particular uncertainty in large cases, where the discount rate can have such an effect on the quantum of damages. My submission is that five years, for the reasons I have already advanced, remains a better provision than three years. I accept that any provision is arbitrary, but I hope that the Government will listen to me today, will take into account all the evidence they have obtained and decide that, after all, five years might be a better period than three years. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am slightly puzzled at the effect of amendment as moved by the noble Lord, because the Bill prescribes that the rate of return must be started within a period; not every three years, or every five years, but within that period. So potentially, it seems to me—perhaps the noble and learned Lord will either correct me or confirm that I am right—that you could have a review at less than five years, depending on the circumstances. If, for example, there were a crash, as in 2008, which affected rates of return and so on very significantly, you would not have to wait up to five years to deal with it; you could have that review within the period. In effect, any time within that five years could mean a three-year review, a shorter review or something with a maximum of five years. If that is the case, is that acceptable to the Government?

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I could not hope to better that very compelling speech and I will not try to add any confusion to the analysis. I agree with what my noble friend Lord Hodgson said about the desirability of periodical payments, but all is not gloomy on that front. I regularly act for the NHS in settlements involving periodical payments even now, when it is probably less attractive for periodical payments than it has ever been, having regard to the change in discount rate. Nevertheless, the desirability for periodical payments is a point that the House is generally agreed upon and I entirely accept what my noble friend has said.

However, it has to be said—my noble and learned friend the Minister will confirm it—that the courts have power to order periodical payments by virtue of Section 100 of the Courts Act 2003, which built on the original Act—the Damages Act 1996. The fact that they do not is usually because both sides are advised at a reasonably high level, having regard to the size of the claim and the complexity of injuries, so on the whole the courts will stand back and not seek to impose on or insist against somebody’s periodical payments. None the less, it is something that all advisers will be very much bearing in mind, and I do not disagree with the suggestion that the rules of the court may well be useful to ensure that as far as possible these are considered by the courts, the parties’ advisers and the parties themselves.

I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, which, as he kindly said, built on something that I put down in Committee. He puts it much better in his amendment than I did. Of course, the variation in rate is something that was explored, as I said in Committee, by Jonathan Sumption QC, as he then was, in a case in Guernsey, when he decided that it would be appropriate in certain cases to have a different discount rate. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, the amendment makes the scope of the power clearer. There is much in what he says.

I look forward to what will apparently be a fruitful analysis by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, when he comes to address his amendments. The review that he suggests in Clause 89 troubles me a little because, although all noble Lords are concerned to encourage periodical payments, I am not quite sure how that will work. There are all sorts of reasons why people may or may not have periodical payments. Certainly by changing the discount rate in an upward direction from, say, 0.75% to 1% or 2%, it is much more likely that they would go for periodical payments. However, there are a plethora of reasons why they will or will not seek periodical payments. It is quite a difficult thing for that review to provide the sort of clarity that I am sure the amendment is seeking to achieve. I look forward with interest to the explanation behind it.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I shall attempt to provide some sort of explanation. The amendment seeks a review of what is actually happening in the light of the changing circumstances; it does not prescribe a particular solution. It offers precisely the opportunity for the professions to contribute to ensuring that the arrangements for periodical payments suit the client, particularly those who have suffered significant injuries and may be looking for lifetime support. It is very much an open request, and the expertise of the noble Lord—and others, of course—is very welcome in dealing with it.

Amendment 73A in my name also seeks a different review on the assumptions on which the discount rate itself is based and how investors have dealt with that over time. As will be seen, the review should, I hope, indicate whether the assumptions on which the discount rate is based need to be changed, and set out any recommendations.

This is entering new territory, and it is reasonable to have a report within a reasonable time—three years is probably long enough—to allow a proper examination of the impact of the new arrangements. For that matter, there is a question of course about how often there should be such a review. It would be difficult to prescribe, because interest rates and returns on investments change. We have been living in a fairly good period in terms of returns, but that may not last. So periodic reviews should be very much part of the agenda.

On the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, I strongly support the position that he takes and hope that the Minister will feel sympathetic to it and to the other amendments in this group.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

I am not really persuaded by the logic of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It is not as if all claims will be faced with a five-year period. If a case is brought two years before a review, the courts will be dealing with a more recent determination than if it had been five years. I do not see the advantage of the noble Lord’s proposition. There will be some cases that will obviously be closer to that date than others.

[Lord Faulks]

May I help the noble Lord? When you are coming up to a review period, whenever that is—whether of three years or five—there will be an element of one party or another seeking to guess the outcome. My point is that you do not come up to that cliff edge so often if it is five years rather than three.

[Lord Beecham]

Yes, but if you bring your case a year or two before a review, whether it is a three-year or a five-year review, your position is not changed, is it? I just do not see the logic of the amendment, and I will not be supporting it.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

I must apologise to the noble Lord for delaying his expectations slightly, and declare my interest as an unpaid consultant in my old firm of solicitors.

It is clear that we must have a proper definition. It is equally clear that the definition ought to be provided by a medical source. The groupings of this rather long day are such that the recommendation that I shall be making in the next group is relevant to this first group, in that the responsibility for defining a whiplash injury should be on the Chief Medical Officer and the definition incorporated into primary or secondary legislation. That takes the decision away from politicians. I disagree with the noble Lord—I do not think that the definition should be a political decision: it should emanate from the medical profession and be embodied in legislation. An amendment to that effect on Report would perhaps be helpful.

It is clear that there are problems; nobody denies that. There is an argument about the extent to which the current system is being abused, but any abuse is unacceptable and reflects on innocent people who have suffered genuine injury. Their cases need to be dealt with properly. So there has to be change. However, with due respect to those who tabled these amendments, who may well have drawn on medical advice, we should at some point incorporate a requirement for that medical advice to emanate from a medical source—I have suggested the Chief Medical Officer but it could be another source—rather than be determined by politicians.

[Lord Faulks]

The term “whiplash” is pretty loose. What is the noble Lord inviting medical experts to do to interpret a term that is not really medical?

[Lord Beecham]

There surely has to be a medical definition—and where better to get it from? The medical profession deals with injuries that are labelled “whiplash injuries”. There may be some argument about the definition, but surely it can be decided only on the basis of medical skills.

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[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that intervention. My point is that if someone has been genuinely injured, whether in the course of employment or not in the course of employment, they are entitled to make a claim, and nothing should preclude that, regardless of whether they receive a message in the current form or in an amended form. It seems to me that it would be inappropriate to make a distinction between the circumstances in which you may or may not suffer a whiplash injury. My point was simply that if there is an amendment to the law, those seeking to encourage not the genuine claimants—of which there are certainly some—but those who are not genuine may revise their message to take into account the revision that we make in the law. Of course I am not against genuine claims. On the amendment tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and my noble friend Lord Hodgson, although I understand the disaggregation that lies at the heart of their amendment, I am not for the moment persuaded that this is not a matter that is catered for under Clause 2(3) and (4). I shall listen with interest to what my noble and learned friend says.

[Lord Beecham]

Perhaps I may invite the noble Lord to refer to the provisions that refer to MedCo. He talked about doctors’ reports as if they could be made by rather unscrupulous doctors at the behest of a client. Would not use of the MedCo system pretty well ensure that the reports would be valid and authentic?

[Lord Faulks]

The MedCo system has contributed very considerably to the improvement in the standards of medical reporting. For those of your Lordships who are not familiar with it, it was a system to prevent what was undoubtedly an abuse of the system by some doctors, to allow the random allocation of medical experts to deal with whiplash injuries. It is certainly an improvement. My point is that there is still a risk in certain cases of there not being reliable medical evidence.

Prisons: Staff Safety

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 11th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

The Question asked in the House of Commons related to the safety of staff in prisons following walk-outs and protests last week by between 5,000 and 6,000 officers protesting about the rising tide of violence threatening both staff and prisoners. Assaults on prison officers reached 5,500 last year, an increase of 36%, while last year there were 32,000 incidents of self-harm, up by 74% since 2010, a shockingly high number given that the prison population is around 85,000. There were 100 suicides in 2015-16.

Is it not clear that our prisons are both chronically overcrowded and dangerously understaffed? The Howard League for Penal Reform has chronicled the deteriorating position in a worrying number of prisons. In Lewes, for example, 50% of its 640 inmates were being locked in their cells during the working day, some of them for as much as 23 hours a day. In February, staff at Wetherby young offender institution refused to let 300 prisoners out of their cells for a day because of rising violence. We recently had a Statement on the dreadful conditions in Wandsworth prison in which assurances, albeit of a rather vague character, were given about rectifying the situation revealed in a television programme. The Lord Chancellor talks a good game about improving conditions and replacing old and unsuitable prisons, but then he is the Lord Chancellor who set out on the road to his political Damascus in support of Boris Johnson, only to recant and discover at the very last minute that if Boris was the answer he had been asking the wrong question for weeks.

When will the Lord Chancellor, or whoever succeeds him—I rather hope it might be the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—recognise that the crisis in our prisons cannot sensibly be tackled without a significant reduction in the number of prisoners and a significant increase in the number of properly trained staff with adequate support in relation to issues of mental health? Will he now revisit his decision to spend just £10 million to increase safety, approximating to around all of £125 per head of the prison population, which is not of course, a static number?

Is it not time for another high-powered review of the state of the service, along the lines of the inquiry into Strangeways conducted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, 26 years ago, but extended to the entire custodial system?

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his thorough criticism and the questions that he raises about the state of our prisons and the safety of staff and indeed of other prisoners. We freely acknowledge that there is a problem and that we have to do something about it. It is not a problem that is easily solved and, as the Statement indicated, there are a number of factors. There is an increase in the number of violent offenders in our prisons. Substantial problems have been caused as a result of the use of psychoactive substances. It is clearly far less than desirable that prisoners should be locked in their cells for long periods and not engaged in purposeful activity. The Secretary of State clearly wants to involve as many people as possible and as many organisations as possible in trying to improve the situation. That was why he invited the BBC into Wormwood Scrubs to see the conditions there.

There has been new funding of £10 million for prison safety, allocated as appropriate, and that will be supplemented by £2.9 million from existing budgets so that a significant number of governors—those facing the greatest challenges—will have an opportunity to improve safety levels. There is also £1.3 billion, which the Secretary of State secured from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to modernise the prison estate. That will be a long-term project, but one which the Secretary of State is most anxious to help with.

Motoring Offences Review

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 7th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

This is a difficult area. The distinction between careless driving and dangerous driving, although long established, does not please everybody. There are always difficult balances between assessing the culpability of driving and the effect of driving. Relatively minor episodes of careless driving can cause serious injury; very dangerous driving can sometimes not cause much in the way of harm. It is a difficult matter. It is also important to establish some proper correlation between the sentencing for driving offences and sentences, say, for dishonesty or assault cases and that sort of thing. It is a difficult matter, but we are proceeding.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, has the abolition of the requirement to display a tax disc made enforcement of motoring offences more difficult? Have the Government made any assessment of the loss of revenue as a result of that change?

[Lord Faulks]

I am not aware of any assessment of the loss of revenue. I will certainly write to the noble Lord if such information is available. But it is of course perfectly possible to trace by the individual registration number, through computers, exactly who has the car and who should have the car.

Magistrates

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 7th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My noble friend makes an important point and, with her experience of the magistracy, a pertinent one. We very much respect the contribution that magistrates make to our criminal justice system. Some 90% of criminal cases in the justice system are dealt with by magistrates. As to her specific point, defendants are always encouraged to plead guilty— where appropriate, of course—at the earliest possible opportunity, and judges and magistrates very much bear in mind that, although there is a temptation for brinkmanship, the best way to show mitigation and reduce your sentence is to plead guilty at an early stage and save all the costs that my noble friend referred to.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, on 23 December, the Ministry of Justice declined a freedom of information request on the modelling of proposals to increase the sentencing powers of magistrates, but admitted that it had carried out such modelling. On 7 June, the Minister, Mr Vara, told the Justice Select Committee that he was not aware of any such modelling. Will the Government now disclose what assessment has been made of the impact on prison numbers of the proposed changes? If they proceed with the proposal, when will they review the effect of that change?

[Lord Faulks]

The question of appropriate sentencing powers is a difficult one. It goes back to 1952, when the magistrates were first given their powers. There are different views on whether it is appropriate to increase the sentencing powers. For example, the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League think there ought to be a decrease in sentencing powers. There is a great deal of thought being carried out on this. I am not currently aware of any modelling and I cannot go beyond the answer given, but I will take that back to the department and bear in mind the question posed by the noble Lord.

Court Proceedings: Written Transcripts

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 28th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

There is not, in fact, a printed record of proceedings. There is a recording, which is then transcribed. It is the cost of transcription that we are concerned with.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, do the Government recognise that not everybody has access to digital technology? What steps are they taking to deal with that aspect of the matter? Is not the more important question that of access to justice generally, with the increasing number of unrepresented parties appearing in courts making for delays in the system and, apparently, an increasing reliance on McKenzie friends? Do the Government really think that is the way to promote access to justice?

[Lord Faulks]

That is rather outside the Question, but it is none the less an important point. On accessibility, if there is a transcript and, in the judge’s view, it is appropriate, it can be obtained at public expense. In certain circumstances, there can even be legal aid to obtain a transcript. It is most important that judges and, more importantly, litigants are given assistance. We still have a system of legal aid. McKenzie friends are somewhat controversial, but they can, in appropriate circumstances, provide great help to litigants and the court.

Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) (Amendment) Order 2016

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 13th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move that the Committee has considered the draft Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2016, which I will refer to as “the civil order”, and the draft Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) (Amendment) Order 2016, which I will refer to as “the family order”.

The orders are intended to address the workload of the Court of Appeal and are made under Section 56 of the Access to Justice Act 1999. They have been consulted upon with members of the senior judiciary, as is required by Section 56. As their titles suggest, the orders make provision in respect of the routes of appeal from judicial decisions in civil and family proceedings. I will start with the civil order.

The civil order replaces the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) Order 2000. If made, the order will remove the current distinction made for certain proceedings between interim and final decisions, so that appeals from all decisions of a particular level of judge will follow the same route and, as far as possible, lie to the next level of judge. This is the key amendment made by the order. The civil order also reflects amendments made by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 to Section 5 of the County Courts Act 1984, which widened the definition of “judge of the county court”.

The 2000 order currently makes provision for routes of appeal where a route is not already provided in other legislation. In particular, the order makes provision for an exception with regard to appeals against final decisions in claims which are allocated to the multi-track and appeals from decisions in specialist courts; for example, proceedings under the Companies Acts. At present, these appeals lie directly to the Court of Appeal, in some cases circumventing both the county court judge and the High Court, irrespective of the level of judge who made the decision to be appealed. This exception might well have been thought appropriate at the time that the 2000 order was debated, but there is no doubt that both the county court and the High Court have the requisite level of expertise to determine such appeals irrespective of whether the decisions appealed are interim or final. In the meantime, valuable judicial and administrative resources in the Court of Appeal are being lost to matters that can quite properly be determined in the lower courts.

Turning to the detail of the civil order, the Ministry of Justice has worked with the senior judiciary to ensure that these amendments will work, and we are grateful to them for their assistance. Although the civil order may appear quite detailed, its effect is to simplify the routes of appeal so that appeals from decisions of district judges sitting in the county court will lie to a circuit judge, except in respect of appeals in proceedings under the Companies Acts, which will now be determined by the High Court; appeals from decisions of circuit judges will lie to the High Court; appeals from decisions of masters and district judges sitting in the High Court will lie to a High Court judge, except in proceedings which have been allocated to the small claims track of the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court, where an appeal will lie from a decision of a district judge to an enterprise judge; and appeals from decisions of High Court judges will continue to lie to the Court of Appeal. The result will be that cases will be considered at the most appropriate level of court, which, in turn, will result in a more efficient use of available judicial resources.

Recent amendments to Section 5 of the County Courts Act 1984 significantly increased the number of judges who might sit in the county court, and list no fewer than 25 judicial officeholders, including certain tribunal judiciary, who may do so. In reflecting this reform, and to ensure that the correct route of appeal is applied in each case, the civil order also recognises that when sitting as a judge of the county court, some of that number will be accorded a level of seniority commensurate with that of a circuit judge, while others will be accorded that of a district judge.

I should add that the amended order will not undermine the judicial power to order that an appeal be transferred to a higher appellate authority should the circumstances of the case merit it. Also, as is apparent on the face of the civil order, the new arrangements are not intended to affect the rules relating to second appeals, which will continue to lie to the Court of Appeal.

The aim of this new civil order is to clarify and simplify the appeals process to ensure that the route of appeal in civil proceedings lies to the next level of judge. This should reduce the number of appeals that are lodged in the Court of Appeal and reduce pressure at that court by making best use of judicial time, ensuring that cases are heard in the most appropriate level of court.

I now move on to the family order. This order amends the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) Order 2014, which I will refer to as the 2014 order, to route certain family court appeals away from the Court of Appeal to the High Court. The order also includes consequential amendments to the Family Procedure Rules 2010. Those rules set out the practice and procedure that is to be followed in family proceedings in the family court and the High Court.

Family proceedings in England and Wales are dealt with primarily in the family court, with the High Court also having jurisdiction to hear such cases. The default route of appeal from a decision of a judge of the family court would be to the Court of Appeal. However, the 2014 order already makes provision for appeals from decisions of certain judges in the family court to be routed to a different, higher, level of judge in the family court. For example, an appeal from a decision of a district judge in the family court already lies to a circuit judge in the family court.

The family order will amend the 2014 order so that appeals from certain decisions of circuit judges and recorders in the family court will lie to the High Court rather than to the Court of Appeal. It has been laid in response to concerns about the quantity of appeals currently being made to the Court of Appeal. Ministry of Justice statistics published in June 2015 show that family-related appeals to the Court of Appeal increased by over 200% between 2008 and 2014. Appeals must be dealt with in ways proportionate to the grounds of complaint and the subject of the dispute, while ensuring effective access to justice.

The changes proposed under the order mean that, rather than an appeal hearing taking place before a court of up to three Court of Appeal judges, appeals routed to the Family Division of the High Court will be heard by a single, specialist and experienced High Court judge. It is clear that this change will reduce the senior judicial resources required for these types of appeal and, by moving some work to the High Court, the Court of Appeal will be better able to manage cases of appropriate weight for that court.

Routing certain appeals to the High Court instead of the Court of Appeal should also lead to a reduction in the time it takes for these appeals to be heard and, by reducing the number of appeals going to the Court of Appeal, I hope this change should also benefit the flow of cases in that court. This will allow for more effective and expeditious determinations in other appeals, for example public law appeals relating to children.

The senior judiciary was consulted on these proposals in November 2015. It was supportive of these proposals and its views were key in determining the content of the order. We also consulted 10 key stakeholders, including the Law Society, Bar Council and the Council of Her Majesty’s Circuit Judges, who were broadly supportive of our proposals and whose responses helped us to finalise the policy position. Further details in relation to the points raised in the consultation responses are summarised in the Explanatory Memorandum to the family order.

The amendments to the 2014 order made by the new family order will apply to appeals from decisions of the family court made by circuit judges and recorders in all proceedings, including appeals from decisions made relating to contempt of court, with some exceptions. Those exceptions are: appeals from decisions made on appeal in the family court, so as not to create an extra level of appeal; appeals from decisions made in proceedings under Part 4 or 5 of the Children Act 1989, for example appeals against orders placing a child in the care of a local authority; appeals from decisions under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, including adoption and placement order appeals; and appeals from decisions relating to contempt of court linked to the above proceedings.

In the case of appeals relating to proceedings under Parts 4 and 5 of the Children Act 1989 and those under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the consequences of the state intervening in a family’s life, the fact that the relationship between a parent and their child may be completely severed and the child’s status changed by adoption, and the complexities arising in these proceedings are considered so serious as to merit these types of appeal continuing to be heard by the Court of Appeal.

To summarise, appeals must be dealt with in ways that are proportionate to the grounds of complaint and the subject of the dispute, while ensuring effective access to justice. The amendments made by the family order will allow that to happen. By moving some work to the High Court, the Court of Appeal will be better able to manage cases of appropriate weight for that court.

I should add that, as well as these measures to improve the flow of work through the Court of Appeal, the Civil Procedure Rule Committee has recently launched a further and separate consultation outlining proposals to raise the threshold for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal and remove the automatic right of oral renewal for permission to appeal where permission has been refused on the basis of the documents in the case. The consultation closes on 24 June.

If the proposals under consultation, which I have described to the House, are accepted then they will apply to appeals to the Court of Appeal in both civil and family cases. This consultation, along with these two orders, form a suite of reforms to improve efficiency in the civil courts. We are grateful for the ongoing work of the judiciary in our efforts to achieve this. Noble Lords will be aware that judicial recruitment is the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor. That of course means ensuring that he meets his statutory obligation in respect of appointments, but also keeping workload under review—as he does—to ensure that enough judges are available to hear appeals within a reasonable timeframe.

Noble Lords will wish to know that the Lord Chancellor’s decisions are informed by a so-called complement group made up of senior judiciary and HMCTS officials who examine the business need at all levels of the judiciary and advise the Lord Chancellor on the optimum complement. Both orders respond to concerns about the volume of appeals directed to the Court of Appeal and they will ensure that cases and appeals are being heard in ways that are proportionate to the grounds of the complaint and the subject of the dispute. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, when these orders were debated at the Third Delegated Legislation Committee, for all of 13 minutes, with an opening in the Commons by the Minister responsible there of two minutes, my honourable friend Christina Rees expressed support for the changes, which had the backing of the senior judiciary, as we have head, recognising the need to reduce the workload on the Court of Appeal. It took a freedom of information request from the Law Society, apparently, to reveal that almost half of the 646 trials adjourned in that court were adjourned because of a lack of judicial resources.

Can the Minister explain why the Government allowed the number of cases to increase by 59% in the last five years without increasing resources or taking action of the kind embodied in this order? Is there a particular category of case which is responsible for this increase? To what extent, if any, has the reduced availability of legal aid in both family and other proceedings had a bearing on the matter, particularly given the number of unrepresented parties? Can he answer the question asked by my honourable friend and not answered by the Minister in the other place, as to the evidence base for the assertion that:

“The High Court has the capacity to absorb the extra appeals, thus lowering waiting times”.?

She also asked to what extent these changes meet the four requirements made by Lord Justice Briggs for easing the load on the Court of Appeal, namely increasing the court’s resources, reducing its workload, improving its efficiency and—I hope this would not be the case—deliberately reducing the quantity and quality of the service.

Somewhat disconcertingly, the Minister in the Commons admitted that, on their own, the changes,

“will not necessarily address any backlog of work held by the Court of Appeal, but they will ensure that the backlog does not continue to increase and that cases are dealt with at an appropriate level and as swiftly as possible”.—[Official Report, Commons, Third Delegated Legislation Committee, 8/6/16; col. 6.]

What does that mean in terms of the number of cases that will go to the Court of Appeal, as compared with the present situation, and as to the waiting time for hearings in that court? Needless to say, the so-called impact assessment, as is all too often the case, fails to supply the relevant information.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the family proceedings order refers to the consultation carried out by the Ministry of Justice and referred to by the Minister with a range of 10 stakeholders, albeit none from court users, as opposed to the judiciary and legal professionals. The consultation responses “broadly supported” the rerouting of appeals from circuit judges and recorders in family proceedings to a High Court judge rather than the Court of Appeal. But what does “broadly” mean? Did any of the consultees raise questions about resources or target times for hearings?

Finally, to what extent will the Ministry of Justice monitor progress under this new regime, both in terms of the cases to be heard in the High Court as now prescribed, and in relation to the effect of the reduced workload in the Court of Appeal? I trust that we will not be waiting for three or more years before the position is reassessed, particularly given that the changes are principally directed at a significantly sensitive area of law—the family area. I should declare a paternal interest inasmuch as my daughter sits as a part-time deputy district judge.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for the questions posed by the noble Lord and I congratulate his daughter on the contribution that she is making to the administration of justice. I am sure that she, like all judges, will be feeling the pressure that heavy workloads can create. The noble Lord asked if any consideration had been given to whether the lower courts could cope with additional work. The answer is that HMCTS, as is its responsibility, is fully aware of and supportive of the changes, and the Ministry of Justice has been working with the senior judiciary, who are supportive of the measures and keen for the order to come into force.

The noble Lord suggested that there has been a somewhat tardy response to what was clearly something of a crisis in the build-up of cases and the capacity of the Court of Appeal to deal with them. I am sure he will understand that any Government will have to be careful before depriving any litigant of their rights of appeal, which are well established, and will have to satisfy themselves, after the appropriate level of consultation, that restricting or changing the routes of appeal is in fact in the interests of justice and will not prejudice the interests of a particular appellant, while of course bearing in mind the fact that justice must be administered in an efficient way. The noble Lord will see that there has been a nuanced response in terms of the appeal process, so some of the appeals that I outlined in my opening remarks will still go straight to the Court of Appeal, where it is considered that that is appropriate. So this has not been an across-the-board response.

As to the consultation, there was a requirement for the Ministry of Justice to consult with the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, the President of the Family Division and the Chancellor of the High Court before making the order. All specifically indicated that they were content with the provisions, and their views were key in determining the content. But in addition to the consultation with the senior judiciary required by statute, the Ministry of Justice held a wider consultation on these proposals with 10 key stakeholders: the Council of Her Majesty’s Circuit Judges, the Association of District Judges, the Magistrates Association, the Chief Magistrate, the Bar Council, the Association of Lawyers for Children—very much, I respectfully suggest, representing the consumer—the Justices’ Clerks’ Society, the Family Law Bar Association, the Law Society and Resolution. That was a pretty broad series of bodies to consult before deciding on the appropriate changes to the arrangements.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for supplying that information, but perhaps he could advise the department that in future when it sets out a position on these matters, it should give a rather fuller account of the consultations it has carried out—because it does not appear in the documentation that has been put before us.

[Lord Faulks]

I am tempted to say better late than never—but, in any event, the information is available, and I hope that it has satisfied the understandable curiosity that the noble Lord had about the extent of the consultation.

On the management of resources—clearly something that is a responsibility of the Government—this is an estimation. Of course one can never be precisely sure about how many people will be appealing. I do not have any figures on whether the increase in appeals is related to any of the matters that the noble Lord suggested. On the face of it, it seems somewhat unlikely that the reduction in legal aid in certain areas would result in there being more appeals. It could result in more or fewer appeals—but none the less, there has been an increase. As I also indicated, there is a consultation shortly to close as to whether there ought to be a change in the threshold for allowing an appeal to be launched in the first place. The Government are waiting for the response to that before deciding the next step.

On the question of backlog, the answer is simply this: we do not want to deprive anybody retrospectively, as it were, of a right to appeal that they had, so it will take a little time for the changes, which we think will improve matters, to take effect. Nothing very dramatic will happen until this order takes effect and we can reroute the appeals in the way we suggested.

On the question of monitoring progress, we will do so. If necessary, we will make appropriate changes to ensure, in so far as possible, that the administration of justice is efficiently carried out. We will continue, as we have done, to consult the judiciary—not only the heads of division, but various other bodies—to ensure we do this in the best way we can.

These are important changes. The appeal process is fundamental to civil and family jurisdictions. We feel we have the balance right. This should help to deal with the volume of appeals currently being made to the Court of Appeal and will make a significant difference to the progress of appeals prospectively after the order comes into effect. We also take the view that the order will clarify and simplify the process to ensure that the route of appeal is to the next level of judge. The family order will mean that certain family appeal hearings take place before a single, specialist and experienced High Court judge.

I hope that I have answered the questions the noble Lord asked. I beg to move.

Criminal Cases Review Commission (Information) Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 5th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord on bringing forward this Private Member’s Bill—which is something of a misnomer in review of the eminent rank that he achieved in his professional life. The Bill confers powers on the commission to obtain, with the leave of the court, material that may assist it in the exercise of its important functions in reviewing the validity of convictions.

I suspect that the Guardian may not be the Minister’s journal of choice for reading at breakfast, or perhaps at all, but by coincidence it published last week a disturbing critique by Eric Allison, its respected prisons correspondent, of the working of the commission. The report was prompted by a decision of the Court of Appeal that two men who had served 24 years in prison between them after being convicted of crimes that they did not commit were not entitled to compensation. This outcome perhaps reflects a flaw in the system rather than in the court’s judgment, and I invite the Minister to undertake a review of the position with a view to empowering the courts to order compensation where they deem it to be appropriate after quashing a conviction.

The article contains further disturbing material. The commission now receives 130 applications a month, while in addition the universities that run the Innocence Project receive two or three a week. Of course, not all of these will be justified, but it would appear that the commission is struggling to carry out its important role. The commission’s chair says that for every £10 being spent on a case 10 years ago he now has just £4 with which to carry out the work, while the workload has increased by 70%. It is true that only a minority of cases are referred, but of those, 70% succeed on appeal.

Mr Allison is sceptical about the implicit conclusion that most claimants are making false claims, not least because while a claim is pending they will not get parole or better conditions. But even if that were wrong, justice surely demands more support for the commission’s work, not least when one of the contributory causes of wrong convictions is inadequate legal support during the original trial. Given the potential impact of legal aid cuts on the preparation and conduct of trials, that is something that may get worse,

I hope that the Minister, who has facilitated the passage of the Bill and to whom the House is indebted in that respect, will discuss these matters with the commission and ensure that it has the resources required to carry out its duties effectively in this important area of the criminal justice system.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, as the House will appreciate, we very much welcome the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, apart from commenting on my breakfast-time reading, raised two important points. He will understand that of course I cannot comment on individual cases, but I understand the concern that he expressed in relation to compensation. It is not something, as the House will appreciate, that the Criminal Cases Review Commission deals with, so it is outside the scope of the current Bill.

The position, as noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, may remember, is that where there is a miscarriage of justice—and the test was recently altered—it is the state not the courts that is responsible for compensation, and decisions are made on the basis of the statutory test. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for the Court of Appeal to take on this function after overturning a decision of the lower court. If it were to do so, we should need to consider whether a further appeal might lie against a Court of Appeal decision on compensation. So although these matters are always kept under consideration, my initial reaction is that this is not an appropriate way forward.

On the noble Lord’s second question, the CCRC is managed within the same spending review process as the remainder of the Ministry of Justice. The commission must live within its means, as we all must when budgets are tight. To exempt any particular area from finding savings means that the burden of saving falls disproportionately on other areas.

In fact, I do not think that the position is as bad as the noble Lord suggests. Since 2010, the Criminal Cases Review Commission’s annual budget has been reduced from £6.47 million to £5.178 million—a cut in real terms of 26%. During the same period, the Ministry of Justice’s net settlement was reduced in real terms by 35%—so the commission has fared well compared with other areas in the ministry. Indeed, the commission’s budget for the last three years has remained at £5.178 million, in part specifically to recognise the need for the CCRC to continue to take proactive steps to address its backlog. The budget for 2016-17 will also ensure that the CCRC can continue to prioritise tackling the backlog.

Furthermore, this is not simply a matter of resources. In these straitened financial times we expect all agencies and services to make efficiencies and improvements to their processes to provide the very best level of service. The focus over the last two years has been on efficiency, not savings—doing more with the existing level of resource. The CCRC has worked to manage its caseload more effectively by reviewing all its work practices and by making improvements. Since 2010, the commission has improved its performance. It closed 947 cases in 2010-11. That rose to 1,632 cases in 2014-15.

The Government congratulate the commission on the work that it does. It is a very valuable function. The Bill will assist it further in the discharge of its duties. It extends its scope to England, Wales and Northern Ireland. We now have a legislative consent Motion to legislate on behalf of Northern Ireland. I repeat my welcome for the Bill.

Prison Safety

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord will know, because his party was in government for five of the last six years, that what happens in prisons represents a real challenge for any Government. However, I can tell him that prison officers have increased in number by 440 this year. Further to that increase, we are continuing our drive for more prison officers; the training is improving—going from six to 10 weeks; we are cracking down on psychoactive substances and their importation into prison; and we are acting through a number of different initiatives to identify particular risk points for violence. We are doing everything we can to tackle these very real problems.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, given the shocking revelations about the use of synthetic cannabis by prisoners, which the Chief Inspector of Prisons described as having a “devastating impact” on prisons, including 19 deaths between 2012 and 2014, when will the Government recognise the need to reduce the prison population substantially and to increase prison staffing substantially?

[Lord Faulks]

The prison population is of course a feature of the sentences passed by judges. We are as anxious as anyone else to reduce that prison population in a way that is consistent with the safety of the population and that respects the sentences that have been passed. I have already answered the question about increasing prison staff. As to psychoactive substances, we are world leaders in what we are doing to track the ingestion of these substances. We are trying a test to detect them in 34 different prisons. We hope, when that is proved successful, to roll it out through the prison estate, so that we have an offence and a test which should get this under control.

Civil Proceedings, Family Proceedings and Upper Tribunal Fees (Amendment) Order 2016

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 15th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this debate has been short but not lacking in power nor indeed in criticism of the Government. It feels almost nostalgic to hear in this Session of Parliament criticisms of the Government generally in their handling of the economy and of the Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State. We are on familiar ground. It even included, from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the customary disavowal of anything being wrong with the economy at the time of the election in 2010.

[Lord Beecham]

The noble Lord misrepresents me. I did not say that there was nothing wrong with the economy. I said that it was recovering—and it was.

[Lord Faulks]

I stand corrected, though the recovery seemed to be rather in the eye of the beholder. In any event, the approach of the noble Lord appears to be that these changes are not justified in economic terms and that they will or might have the tendency to cause hardship.

Of course, I readily accept—as I did in opening this debate—that fee increases are never likely to be popular. On the question of divorce, there was an acceptance, if not an enthusiastic one, by the noble Lord that we had listened to representations, concluded that the original proposal was too high and reduced the sum that needs to be paid in order to obtain a divorce. Reference was made by the noble Lord to what judges said in the course of giving evidence—distinguished judges, I fully acknowledge.

Insurance Industry: Whiplash

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The Government are attacking this problem on a number of different fronts. Referral fees is one; the LASPO reforms is another; and there is the MedCo portal, which means that all whiplash injuries must go via a neutral evaluation with limited costs. All are contributing to a decrease in the number of whiplash claims, but there are still too many, and we still feel that there is fraud at the root of all this.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, of course no one would defend fraudulent claims, whether for whiplash or other injuries. However, the raising of the small claims limit to £5,000 will represent a further reduction of access to justice to people and even businesses of modest means with valid claims. Given that the Government claim the insurance industry—in which motor insurers alone receive £15 billion a year in premiums—will save £1 billion from the increased limit, having already saved £7 billion in the last four years, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that any further savings from their latest surrender to the industry’s interests will be substantially passed on to policyholders? Or is this to compensate the industry for the insurance tax levy increase, which it will no doubt in any case pass on to policyholders?

[Lord Faulks]

There is no question of the Government surrendering to the insurance industry, as the noble Lord puts it. The insurers already announced that they will reduce the premiums to insurance companies by £50. We will watch insurance companies very carefully to see whether they translate their promises into action. Of course, as all noble Lords will know, insurance is a highly competitive world. All of us will have been irritated by the invitations to compare the market. Ultimately, the market should prevail.

Legal Services Act 2007 (Claims Management Complaints) (Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 2016

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 18th January 2016 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

The Legal Services Act 2007 (Claims Management Complaints) (Fees) Regulations 2014 enable the Lord Chancellor to charge fees to regulated claims management companies to recoup the costs of the Legal Ombudsman’s work in handling complaints about these companies. Since January last year, the Legal Ombudsman has been able to consider consumer complaints against claims management companies. It is funded for this work by grant-in-aid from the Lord Chancellor, and the 2014 fees regulations enable the Lord Chancellor to recoup the costs from the companies themselves. It is right that the costs of handling such complaints fall on the claims management sector and not on the taxpayer.

The draft regulations before us amend the level of fees set out in the existing 2014 fees regulations for the financial year beginning 1 April 2016 and for subsequent years. This will ensure that the Lord Chancellor can recover the full costs of the Legal Ombudsman in dealing with complaints about the claims management industry in the 2016-17 financial year.

The Legal Ombudsman has one year’s experience of operation of the complaints scheme. During this time, the Legal Ombudsman has dealt with fewer cases requiring an ombudsman decision than expected, although the number of complaints is increasing. The number of initial consumer contacts and inquiries to the scheme has been substantially more than envisaged.

In the light of its experience so far, the Legal Ombudsman has revised downwards its estimate for the number of cases that will require ombudsman resolution during the next financial year and therefore the expected costs. However, in addition to the Legal Ombudsman’s expected costs for 2016-17 we also need to recover a shortfall in the amount invoiced for 2014-15 and 2015-16. This was the result of a greater number of market exits than was estimated in the fee model. This means that the total cost to be recovered from the market for 2016-17—around £2.3 million—remains broadly similar to that for 2015-16. Due to the contraction in the market, however, fees have had to be increased. Effectively, it is a smaller cake.

Noble Lords will be aware that a fundamental review of the regulation of claims management companies is currently taking place. The review is considering what powers and resources are required for a strengthened regulatory regime and what other reforms may be necessary, and is due to be completed in early 2016. As such, I cannot say any more about it at the present time.

The claims management sector has undoubtedly acquired a poor reputation as a result of a small number of companies engaging in poor business practices. The Legal Ombudsman provides redress for consumers of regulated claims management companies, including the potential for awards of compensation, and will continue to assist the claims management regulator in driving out poor standards and practices in the market.

I know that noble Lords welcome the fact that the Legal Ombudsman is now able to deal with complaints about claims management companies. It is therefore right that the Legal Ombudsman’s costs relating to regulated claims management complaints continue to be met by the claims management sector, in the same way that the costs relating to complaints about the legal services sector are met by that sector. I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are right to take action in this matter, and I certainly endorse the new arrangements that have been laid out, but it has a rather curious history. Looking at paragraph 4.2 of the Explanatory Note, I can see that it was some seven years after the passage of the 2007 Act before steps were taken to deal with this issue. The paragraph contains this rather curious sentence:

“This provision treats the designated Claims Management Regulator as an approved regulator to be levied in the same way as other approved regulators for the costs of the Legal Ombudsman”.

It goes on to say:

“However, there is currently no designated Claims Management Regulator and the function is fulfilled by the Secretary of State”.

One might have thought that he had more important things to do. Obviously, Mr Gove and his predecessor will not have been involved in this personally, but it is a curious situation that for some years there apparently was no functioning regulator in post.

The position appears to be, as the Minister has indicated, that a £500,000 shortfall has occurred in a very short period. I do not know whether he is able to indicate how many cases there were. He said that there were not many, but £500,000 is a reasonably large amount of money. It will be interesting to know how many cases there were and how many of those were from small companies, which appear to be leaving the market. But the very fact that after all these years there are clear deficiencies in how some of those providing this service are operating raises questions about the degree to which their activities are regulated in advance of the unfortunate outcome, which sometimes leads them to be subject to charges for maladministration or their conduct. Does the review to which the Minister referred encompass looking at the qualitative regulation of the industry? Should there not be a floor above which the resources of these companies should be fixed? If not, we will continue to have a situation in which, quite apart from the financial implications for the Government, people who have consulted these companies presumably are being short-changed. One wonders what has happened to valid claims that have gone astray as a result of maladministration. That side of it does not seem to be touched on at all in relation to this order, but it may be encompassed within the review. I certainly hope that that is the case, but if it is not, perhaps the Minister could undertake to look into the nature and quality of the supervision that ought to be exercised and, if necessary, what improvements should be made to what has gone on recently.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

I entirely endorse what the Minister has said, but the danger is that the process of finding companies works only if the companies are in existence and have resources. Therefore, it seems to me that the regulation needs to be at an earlier stage to ensure that they do not carry on business unless they can demonstrate that they have the financial capacity to meet their liabilities. I assume—but it would be good to have the confirmation, if not today than perhaps subsequently—that that element is being considered as part of the review to which the Minister referred.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that, and I understand the noble Lord’s concern about having prior approval rather than waiting for things to go wrong; I think that is effectively what he is saying. I do not want to pre-empt what is in the wide-ranging report. Of course, there are a number of ways of ensuring that, including the possibility of professional indemnity insurance, or something of that sort. But I accept his point that it is important that there is protection before, rather than after, the event. I do not undertake that the review will cover that point, but it is none the less a valid concern.

Prison Service: Trans Prisoners

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord makes what he may think is a clever point, but I refer him to paragraph 2.6 of the instruction system, on “The Approval and Implementation of Policy and Instructions”, which provides as follows:

“Regardless of expiry dates, instructions remain in force until specifically cancelled, marked ‘obsolete’ or replaced and removed from the Intranet”.

That policy does not fall into that category; it remains current.

Of more substance—of course it is very important that in formulating any change to the Prison Service instruction we take account of the trans community’s views; we are doing so, as my ministerial colleague explained in answering a question of a similar nature to the House of Commons last Friday.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the whole House will join the Minister in expressing condolences to the family of Vicky Thompson, and also welcome the Government’s response to this tragic case and look forward to the outcome of the review that has been announced. There have been 186 suicides in prisons in the year to September, and a 21% rise in self-harm. Those statistics reflect the pressure on prisons and staff, echoed in the latest report on Feltham young offender institution. Therefore, will the Government’s review extend to the size of the prison population, and will the training of prison staff—the briefest of any comparable country—be substantially extended in time and depth?

[Lord Faulks]

I do not wish to pre-empt what may be considered appropriate to be considered under the review. Certainly, training would be an extremely important factor. The training has been extended to cover a specific module for prison officers to consider equality provisions, which takes into account particularly the protected characteristics of transgender prisoners. The scope of the review will embrace all things that are relevant to make sure that the Prison Service treats such prisoners appropriately. The original Prison Service instruction is an impressive document but, of course, there is room for continual improvement, and we will endeavour to arrive at an appropriate destination.

Restorative Justice

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I will of course pass on that concern to the Prisons Minister. I assure the noble Lord that the standards for restorative justice are set out in the victims’ code, and the necessary trained facilitation and all the necessary support should be present.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, it is some eight years, I think, since the publication of the last report validating the success of the restorative justice programme. Since that time, I believe that the Howard League for Penal Reform has made an annual award to schemes covering respectively adults and young offenders. Is it possible for the Government now to look at ways of supporting that kind of approach in order to promote the scheme and perhaps invest in it, given that the likelihood is that the development of restorative justice will cause savings to be made in the custodial system and indeed in the judicial system?

[Lord Faulks]

The Government are well aware of the advantages of restorative justice and in fact they have contributed to it very considerably, with £30 million having been made available to RJ services for victims over the last three years. Of course, the noble Lord is right to draw attention to the Howard League’s contribution. There have been contributions from all sorts of providers in different fields.

Ministerial Code

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

There is no question of sneaking it through. It has been available since 15 October 2015 and this is the second time in a week that I have answered questions at the Dispatch Box on the Ministerial Code. It has also been the subject of much debate, as the noble Baroness points out, in the newspapers and elsewhere. Those authors she cites are entitled to their view, but it is not a view that I agree with.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, if the change makes no difference why make the change?

[Lord Faulks]

I indicated that from time to time the Prime Minister may clarify duties, just as the Civil Service Code does. That is his prerogative. The duty on the part of Ministers is to obey the law.

British Bill of Rights

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 28th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

A number of objections have already been raised, before we have even published our proposals, and I hope that all Members of this House will approach this British Bill of Rights—something that was floated not only by the Liberals but twice by the Labour Government—with an open mind. Among the various objections to a proposed Bill, the idea that the fact that we have any doubts about the primacy of the Strasbourg court might affect Putin’s foreign policy is one I find absolutely ridiculous.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

Will the Minister tell us whether the Attorney-General was consulted about the change to the Ministerial Code? What is his view of the remarks by the former Treasury Solicitor and head of the government legal service that:

“It is disingenuous of the Cabinet Office to dismiss the changes to the ministerial code as mere tidying up”,

and that Ministers,

“will regard the change as bolstering, in a most satisfying way, their contempt for the rule of international law”?

[Lord Faulks]

I have already made clear to the House what Ministers regard as their duties, and I do not resile for a moment from that. As the noble Lord will well know, details of internal discussions and advice are not disclosed to the House—and I do not propose to depart from that well-established convention.

Maximum Number of Judges Order 2015

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, the effect of the draft order is simply to increase the number of Court of Appeal judges by one. That number is set by statute under Section 2 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which currently provides for a maximum of 38 Court of Appeal judges.

In March 2015 Lord Justice Pitchford, an existing Court of Appeal judge, was appointed by the Home Secretary to lead the inquiry into undercover policing and the operation of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad. The inquiry, which began on 17 July 2015, was established under the Inquiries Act 2005 and is anticipated to conclude at around the end of 2018. Having been appointed as such, Lord Justice Pitchford remains a Court of Appeal judge and is counted in the current complement of 38. However, he is unable to fulfil any duties in the Court of Appeal while he leads the inquiry.

In order to ensure that the total number of Court of Appeal judges available for deployment remains at current levels, it is necessary to increase their number by one. There is no other method for revising the number of Court of Appeal Judges other than by an order such as this. I therefore commend this draft order to your Lordships and beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

Could the Minister indicate whether it is intended to retain the maximum number at 39? Is it a permanent provision? It would be perfectly sensible if it were, but it is not quite clear to me whether that is the case. Secondly, while he cannot commit himself or those appointing a member of the Court of Appeal, I would hope that whoever makes the decision does not follow the line laid down by Lord Sumption recently about appointing women to the Supreme Court. We could do with more women in the upper and indeed the lower branches of the judiciary, and I hope that this will be an opportunity for those making the appointment to take with as good a grace as possible.

[Lord Faulks]

On the noble Lord’s first question, the position is that Lord Justice Pitchford turns 70 in March 2017 and must at that point retire as a Court of Appeal judge. It is anticipated that on his retirement, or at the end of the inquiry, if that is sooner, a similar order to this one will be made, returning the number of judges to the Court of Appeal back to 38.

I turn to the second point made by the noble Lord. He referred to the issue of diversity, which is of course important to the public’s confidence in justice. It is harder to boost diversity in the Court of Appeal in the short term, as the majority of eligible candidates come from the ranks of High Court or deputy High Court judges of at least seven years’ qualifying experience, but the Lord Chief Justice and Lady Justice Hallett are leading work to increase the diversity of applicants at key feeder grades for the higher judiciary—namely, recorders and deputy High Court judges. I am sure that he will welcome the appointment on 22 October, last Thursday, of two female High Court judges, one of whom will be the first Asian woman to sit at this level. When sworn in, they will take the number of women High Court judges to 23 out of 108, which is 21%. The Government are absolutely committed to increasing diversity, and whatever Lord Sumption may or may not have said about the reality, the Government are acutely conscious of the need to do that and are taking steps to ensure that we can realise that ambition.

This is a reasonable amendment, which maintains the complement of Court of Appeal judges when one of their members is engaged, as is Lord Justice Pitchford, in important work elsewhere. I hope that noble Lords will agree the proposed amendment and I beg to move.

Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) Regulations 2015

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 7th September 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this is one of the rare occasions on which I can congratulate the Government and the Minister on doing something positive in the arena of legal aid. Later this evening we will revert to the more normal discussions that take place between us across the Chamber in another respect. However, this is an important matter, and I very much welcome the Government’s initiative in ensuring that the change in the law can be adequately enforced.

In that connection, with regard to something that we have just discussed at some length concerning other serious matters relating to safety within the home, there is the publicity that is being given about the issue generally, but more particularly about the availability of legal aid for those suffering from abuse in terms of either of the two categories embodied in the order. It may well be the case that the Government are already directing publicity not only at the potential victims but at organisations and others who might be able to assist in disseminating the information that legal aid is available. It may be too early at this stage for the Minister to give an indication of the number of cases that are thought likely to be brought under each category, or it may be that the information is simply not available this afternoon. However, if and when it becomes available, that information would be helpful—and, of course, it would lend some force to any publicity that the Government will no doubt give about the remedies that will be available.

Having said that, the Opposition certainly support the Government’s steps here. We look forward to assistance being given to people who are being ruthlessly exploited and who hitherto have had insufficient protection from the law.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for his support for these regulations, and I look forward to renewing our customary postures later in the day.

As he rightly says, these are early days, and it is difficult to give any figures. I made the very same inquiry of my officials and understandably they were somewhat tentative. I do not suppose that the numbers are going to be very large. What I can say, of course, is that there has been a great deal of publicity generally about both areas that we are concerned with. Therefore, I think that the general public and all those who are likely to encounter these issues will be aware of the situation and will be keen to find out the extent to which there may be legal aid, and I am sure practitioners working in this area will make themselves aware of it.

A guide to the court process was published in July this year, and I understand that it includes the relevant information. I am now being handed a copy, which lays out, in paragraphs 31 to 34, the information which will assist. This is under the female genital mutilation protection orders; it explains their scope and who can apply, and it contains information about the availability of legal aid. Anybody familiarising themselves with these orders—a practitioner or anybody affected by or concerned about them—would find out that legal aid was available. I am not sure whether there is similar information in relation to modern slavery but, if there is, I will undertake to convey it to the noble Lord.

That being, I think, the scope of the inquiry made by the noble Lord, I think we can now proceed to ask noble Lords to approve this amendment. I believe that it is a reasonable one and that it will provide appropriate frameworks for the provision of legal aid for victims of both FGM and modern slavery.

Criminal Justice: Secure College

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to support young people in the criminal justice system in the light of the decision not to go ahead with the building of a secure college.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, in recent years we have seen welcome reductions in proven offending by young people and in the number of young people in custody. However, we have not seen similar success in reducing reoffending by young people. We are carefully considering how the youth justice system can more effectively prevent offending by young people and set them on a path to a better future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Minister convey to the Lord Chancellor the thanks of this House for his abandonment of his predecessor’s misconceived plan to house in a so-called secure college one-third of the young offenders in custody? Can he tell us whether and how the £1.56 million staffing and procurement costs and the £4.04 million of development costs incurred during this sorry saga can be recouped?

[Lord Faulks]

I am happy to convey the good wishes of your Lordships’ House to the Secretary of State. As to the spend, it will not be recovered. The pathfinder designs could be used or adapted to other forms of youth or adult custody in the future, and alternative provision could be developed on the prepared site at Glen Parva. However, the noble Lord and the House may be relieved to know that we will not be spending £85 million on the secure college.

Prisons: Secure Colleges

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 18th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister’s reply is matched for opacity only by the very similar reply given yesterday by his colleague Mr Selous to my honourable friend Dan Jarvis. That reply said that:

“The Coalition government legislated for secure colleges and we are now considering the next steps. We remain clear that education should be at the very heart of youth custody”.

What next steps are the Government contemplating? Is it a possibility that the Government will resile from their ill-informed and ill-advised policy of establishing a massive secure college on the Glen Parva site in Leicestershire?

[Lord Faulks]

The difficulties that exist with youth custody are well known, such as reoffending. Of course, as the House will be aware, the good news is that the number of those in youth custody has reduced from 3,000 to 1,000. This means that those in various forms of youth custody present real problems and real challenges. The secure college pathfinder was a solution favoured by the last Government. We have not ruled out using a secure college. It has not yet received approval at Treasury level, but all of the ideas which it incorporated have not been abandoned. They contain many sound approaches to providing the right answer to this difficult problem.

Prisons

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 26th March 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, when the noble Lord became the Chief Inspector of Prisons in 1995, I am sure that in the course of inspecting prisons, he was anxious to be fair and objective in his inspections regardless of whether they were private prisons or public prisons. These two prisons are private prisons. Unfortunately, the chief executive of the Howard League for Penal Reform, Frances Crook, disapproves of private prisons and has been quoted as saying that,

“making money out of punishing people is both reprehensible and immoral and it is on these grounds that we have opposed the private management of prisons”.

Just before Christmas, she said on “Newsnight” that for a three-week period over Christmas, young offenders would be locked in their cells while there was a 40% reduction in staff numbers. Both these assertions were completely wrong. She was given an opportunity to retract, but she declined to do so. NOMS has to bear in mind the welfare of prisoners, the families who would be concerned about such misinformation, and the morale of prison officers.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, last Thursday, the process of appointing a successor to the highly regarded Chief Inspector of Prisons, Nick Hardwick, ground to a halt when Mr Grayling refused to consider the candidate put forward by the appointment panel. Moreover, on the same day the Justice Committee objected to his appointment of two so-called independent members of the selection panel—of four—who just happened to be Conservative Party activists. One of them is an adviser to that paragon of political impartiality, Grant Shapps. Today, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has raised serious and legitimate concerns about a ban on visits to prisons by Frances Crook of the Howard League for Penal Reform. Incidentally, I understand that G4S, which runs the prisons, had no objection to her going to them. What reassurance can the Minister provide that during what remains of the Lord Chancellor’s tenure of office, Mr Grayling will desist from pursuing his career as a serial offender against the interests of justice?

[Lord Faulks]

That is a large question, and perhaps I can answer some of the many sub-questions in it. The Secretary of State had nothing to do with the decision taken by NOMS, but I of course, as a Minister, take responsibility for that decision, which was an operational one. As for the appointment process, this is under way. The noble Lord seems to be very well informed about the process, and an announcement will be made in due course. There is no question that Nick Hardwick has not been allowed to act independently. The Government’s preference is that all public posts are re-competed at the end of the fixed term, with that incumbent free to apply.

Court Fees

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 26th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My noble and learned friend will know that there were two consultations regarding these proposed enhanced fees, in which the judiciary’s comments were fully taken on board by the Government and certain modifications were made to the original proposals. However, ultimately, the question of fees and the cost of the courts is a matter for the Government to decide.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my interest as an unpaid consultant in my former solicitor’s practice. On 15 February, the Observer reported Vince Cable’s request for information about the overall decline of 80% in employment appeal tribunal applications and 90% in sex discrimination cases since the imposition of substantial fees for those applications. Can the Minister tell us what reply the Lord Chancellor has made to Vince Cable’s request for information, and to his question about the Lord Chancellor’s failure to implement a promised review? In the light of this experience, why should we accept the Government’s assurances that increasing fees by up to 600% in the civil courts will not lead to fewer claims being brought there?

[Lord Faulks]

The question of employment tribunal fees is very different. There were, in fact, no fees at all. As a result of a relatively modest fee, there has been a significant decline in the number of claims brought. I am sure the noble Lord would accept that some of the claims brought hitherto were somewhat on the speculative side. That no longer takes place. Furthermore, the intervention of ACAS, as from May 2014, has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of these cases getting to employment tribunals, and surely it is better that tribunals should, on the whole, be avoided. What is more, as a result of our long-term economic plan there has been a significant increase in the number of people in employment. This Government are about hiring, not firing.

Probation

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 12th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I do not accept the characterisation given by the noble Lord. The suggestion that Parliament has not had the opportunity to consider this is not borne out by the fact that there were 50 hours of debate in Parliament, including debates on the Bill and a Westminster Hall debate. We have given information to Parliament and the public at every stage of the process, placing key documents in the Libraries of both Houses, including draft contracts, the staff transfer scheme and details of successful bidders. The matter has also been considered by the Justice Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. I also do not accept the noble Lord’s characterisation that there are problems. The issue has been carefully monitored. Of course, there may be some difficulties, and we are happy to hear any representations from anybody about how we can respond to these.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, it is understood that in the course of court hearings over a challenge to the legality of the Government’s proceeding with the contracts for the 21 community rehabilitation companies, a number of concerns were raised. These related to problems with IT, the management of sensitive victim information, lost records of offender contacts, staff shortages, delays in pre-sentence and standard reports, and more besides. To what extent have these issues been resolved and what arrangements are in place to ensure regular monitoring of the situation?

[Lord Faulks]

I presume that the noble Lord is referring to the judicial review instituted by NAPO that was withdrawn by NAPO, which was ordered to pay the substantive costs of that judicial review. As to pre-sentence reports, there is a 97% response rate of timely reports. As all those who have had to sentence offenders will appreciate, from time to time before this transformation there were delays in these reports. It is greatly to the credit of the probation service that it has maintained this standard. It is to be congratulated on the hard work that it is doing in coping with this transformation.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 21st January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in his customary forensic and formidable critique of the decisions made, and the manner in which they are made, by the Lord Chancellor. As we have heard, the House has secured an amendment to the “highly likely” test. The courts will be able to allow a case to be brought or to grant relief where they deem there is an exceptional public interest, notwithstanding that it would be highly likely that the defect in procedure would not have affected the outcome.

It is, however, somewhat unclear what is meant by “exceptional public interest”. The Richard III case attracted more public interest than any judicial review case that I can recall, and certainly more interest from the Lord Chancellor, who constantly relies on that one case to justify his assault on judicial review. Would such exceptional interest have allowed the court to deal with that case if it had been demonstrated that it would have failed the “highly likely” test? If not, will the Minister give us some examples, given that the courts are now directed that they must strike down a claim unless such exceptional public interest exists? Further, if judicial discretion remains, it would surely have been better not to substitute “must” for “may” in the injunction to apply the test contained in the amendment.

The final government amendment deals with financial information to be supplied by those contributing to the funding of judicial review applications; and again under pressure from this House, and again, no doubt, with the advice of the Minister, the Government have moved, in this case to promising a consultation on the limits beyond which disclosure would be required. That is, of course, welcome, although it is not clear whether Parliament will have an opportunity to debate the outcome of such a consultation before the rule committee makes its decisions. Perhaps the Minister will give me an indication about that.

I have always acknowledged the need to get behind the facade which can be erected via a shell company or other device, such as was used in the Richard III case, partisan supporter of that much maligned monarch though I am, but it is a pity that the Government have not sought to consult on how to do that, rather than come forward with what originally certainly looked like a device which could have a chilling effect on genuine supporters of a claim for review. Nevertheless the change embodied in the amendment, as far as it goes, is welcome.

It has been striking, as this Bill has gone through both Houses, how little support it has attracted from government Back-Benchers in either Chamber, with the notable exception of the noble Lord, Lord Horam. In the last round of ping-pong in the Commons three Conservative lawyers—Geoffrey Cox QC; the former and widely lamented Attorney-General, Dominic Grieve, and the former Solicitor-General, Sir Edward Garnier—all voiced stringent criticisms. We are, however, where we are, and thanks to deliberations in this House, and, I suspect, to the wise counsels of the Minister, it is a better place than we might have been. I only hope that after the general election we will have, whoever forms the next Government, a Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice who, if not judicial, will at least be judicious.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his observations about the rule of law and its importance. I find no difficulty in agreeing with his critique of the rule of law, its role and its importance, and judicial review as a part of that.

There is perhaps one area where I would not wholly agree with him, and that is in his submission in relation to “exceptional”. I say submission because, as he will appreciate, those looking for clarification on what “exceptional public interest” may mean, pursuant to the rule in Pepper v Hart, might be interested in what was said in debates. They might have their attention drawn by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, or indeed by some other counsel, to what he himself said in the course of the debate. I do not think that that is quite within Pepper v Hart. He referred, for example, to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said in one particular case. I think that different judges have used the word exceptional to mean different things in different contexts. I see the noble and learned Lord nodding. I simply say that “exceptional public interest” will depend on its context, and we are content to leave it to the judges to decide what it means. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, did his best to tempt me into giving examples—even trailing the Richard III case, which he said was a classic case in which the public were interested. The public can be exceptionally interested in something without it being a matter of exceptional public interest. I trust that judges will be able to make that distinction.

As for the rule committee, it is, as noble Lords will know, separate from the Lord Chancellor, who has been much maligned in the course of this debate. It will decide what is appropriate on the basis, I hope, of a wide consultation on the issues. No doubt it will bear in mind, among other things, observations that have been made during the course of this debate. I am grateful for all the contributions to the many debates that we have had.

[Lord Beecham]

Will the Minister indicate whether there will be an opportunity for this House, and indeed the other place, to debate the outcome of the consultation before the rule committee makes its mind up?

[Lord Faulks]

No, I will not give that undertaking. The rule committee will have the basis for consultation and the basis of the debate and it will be subject to the usual parliamentary procedure, meaning that each House will have the option to vote against—so to that extent. That is perhaps an answer.

The debate has been of a very high quality. Indeed, I pay tribute, as other noble Lords have, to the scrutiny that the Bill generally—not just the matters that we are dealing with today—has received from every quarter of the House. There have been different fields of expertise brought to good effect in the course of the consideration of the Bill by your Lordships’ House. There have been a considerable number of amendments to the Bill in many different areas. Today, and in the course of the most recent debates, we have focused on the modification of the reforms of judicial review and in relation to parliamentary oversight of under-15s and girls in secure colleges—and, indeed, on the secure college rules, which will now be subject to an affirmative resolution. However, there have been other important amendments, such as the new offence of revenge pornography; the custody arrangement for 17 year-olds; various provisions to clamp down on dishonest personal injury claims; and extending reporting restrictions to young people, to name but a few.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

There is a lot of competition in that respect. I merely say that on this Bill it is not worth the House taking a position that is a departure from its normal practice. I genuinely fear that the Lord Chancellor will use such a vote to muster support against the much more serious amendments that we have sent back for the Commons to consider. That will not help us in sticking to those amendments, should they come back to us. That is why I will not be in either Lobby this evening if the noble and learned Lord decides to test the opinion of the House.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking against Clause 2 in Committee and in the debate today, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, has maintained that the clause adds nothing useful to Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 or to the existing common law and is therefore unnecessary. I take this opportunity to explain why the Government believe that the clause has an important purpose, which merits the support of the House.

The clause stems from our wish to ensure that people can feel confident about participating in activities that benefit others without worrying about what might happen if something goes wrong and they find themselves defending a negligence claim. Clause 2 sets out to provide valuable reassurance that if that happens, the court will take careful and thorough account of the context of the defendant’s actions when reaching a decision on liability. Rather as the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, said when introducing the provisions of the Compensation Act, as I have quoted before:

“They will reassure people who are concerned about being sued that, if they adopt reasonable standards and procedures, they will not be found liable”.—[Official Report, 28/11/05; col. 81.]

So two separate Governments have identified a fear.

It is said that there is no solid evidence and that such evidence as there is is anecdotal. I agree with my noble friend Lord Hodgson: it is rather hard to identify and amass solid evidence about this. However, I am not sure that many people would disagree with the proposition that we have a culture where litigation hovers over many activities like a shadow and can genuinely inhibit the sort of things that most people would consider to be desirable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

With great respect to the noble Lord, considering the activity in question focuses the judge on the activity that is said to have caused the particular injury, or tort, which has eventuated.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords—

[Lord Faulks]

Perhaps I could finish answering this question before I answer the next one. That would necessitate a judge looking at the activity in question and deciding whether, in relation to the activity in question that is being examined by the court, a generally responsible approach was exhibited by the defendant. What that would not involve would be going through his or her safety record for the previous 10 years, if that is what is being suggested. In fact, as the noble Lord may or may not know from personal injuries claims, very often disclosure of the history of accidents in a factory or documents on previous injuries is done in conventional personal injury claims, as the law is now—there is nothing different about that. So with great respect I do not accept the noble Lord’s suggestion that there would be a lengthening of trial or a greater complication in those terms.

[Lord Beecham]

The Minister must forgive my impatience again. He has concentrated on personal injury claims, but he would concede that the clause does not restrict itself to such claims. Could he identify some of the other sorts of cases, as his ministerial colleague did in the House of Commons, the non-personal injury cases—contract cases and matters of that kind? Would he say that, if a defendant had demonstrated an approach towards protecting the safety of his staff, that suffices to let him escape from damage to other interests of others? What sort of other interests do the Government intend to be covered by the provisions of the clause?

[Lord Faulks]

The Bill is described in its preamble as being to make,

“provision as to matters to which a court must have regard in determining a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty”.

I do not see any reference to breach of contract there. But the noble Lord is right in the sense that Clause 3 refers to,

“a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others”.

That would open the door to the possibility of other interests being considered. Having regard to the general structure of the Bill, I would not wish to add anything to what was said in the House of Commons. I imagine that it is going to be focused primarily on conventional personal injury cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

I have another question. The Minister’s colleague, Mr Vara, said:

“Narrowing the clause … would mean that … bodies such as voluntary organisations, religious groups or social clubs which demonstrate a generally responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of their clients or members would not be able to benefit from its provisions. That cannot be right”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/10/14; col. 693.]

That is the argument that he made in opposing an amendment which had been tabled. That seems to suggest that the Government were contemplating situations in which such organisations would be protected in the course of their general functions in the event of a claim arising—rather than, as the noble Lord implied, only in relation to a particular case in which they failed, as it were, to have sufficient regard to the safety or other interests of a client. Surely the noble Lord is in error in advancing the argument that we are looking only at the particular individual who might be involved in such a claim. That seems to me much too narrow an approach to the terms set out in the Bill.

[Lord Faulks]

I do not have the full context of what my ministerial colleague said in the House of Commons, but I do not believe that I am in error when I give the reasons for my answers to the various questions that have been posed. As I say, these words are not mere surplusage; they are put in to clarify and limit the extent to which “generally responsible” has an application.

I suggest that this provision is an important but modest reflection of what many people would say was a sensible encouragement of employers to adopt a predominantly or generally responsible attitude to the safety or other interests of others—but which, in appropriate circumstances and subject to the court’s overall discretion, allows these matters to be taken into consideration. That is as far as it goes. It is a modest but, I suggest, sensible addition to the law—and it is an addition to the law, as I think is accepted. Given the clarification I have attempted to give the noble Lord on the limit of the measure’s scope, I invite him to withdraw his amendment.

Prisoners: Work

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 8th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I do not accept the noble Lord’s characterisation of what is happening in prisons. We have increased the number of working hours. Our aim is to replicate as far as possible the normal working week in the community, real work experience and the acquisition of skills, which support effective rehabilitation. As to deaths in custody, any death is a tragedy. We have a number of different ways of investigating them. A review chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is looking into the deaths in custody of 18 to 24 year-olds and we are expecting its report in April next year. We have a number of measures in place to ensure that those unfortunate incidents can be reduced.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

On 27 November I asked about prison overcrowding and staff shortages. In an uncharacteristically peremptory tone the Minister replied that he did not share my gloom, that the work done in prisons is of a very high standard and that we have a dedicated body of prison officers. What is the ratio of officers to prisoners now compared to 2010? What is the Government’s response to the worrying report on work-related stress among prison officers and the well-being of prison officers produced by the occupational health and occupational psychology departments of the University of Bedfordshire?

[Lord Faulks]

We are always concerned for the welfare of prison officers, who do a very fine job indeed. Benchmark reports incorporate staffing resources for escorting and patrolling activity areas. We are satisfied that prison officers are enabling people to do the work, which was the subject of the original Question. We are recruiting more prison officers but we are satisfied that they are doing an excellent job.

Legal Aid

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 4th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord has frequently, before this House and elsewhere, helpfully advanced suggestions for providing legal assistance other than through legal aid. The Government are grateful for those suggestions and they continue to consider the report that he provided.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the Lord Chancellor’s fig leaf to conceal the damage he has wrought to the legal aid system was the exceptional funding scheme, which he estimated would attract 6,000 applications a year—in itself, only around 1% of the former case load. In the event, applications are running at only around 1,000 a year, of which only some 14% are granted. Will the Government urgently review that scheme, and if not, why not?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, in fact, the number of applications in 2013-14 was 1,520. It is extremely difficult to anticipate precisely in what circumstances exceptional funding might or might not be appropriate. A considerable number of judicial reviews are taking place with regard to the exceptional funding scheme generally and on specific cases. The noble Lord of course objects to any cuts in legal aid. It must be remembered that despite what was in the manifesto of the party opposite, it has objected to every single cut to both criminal and civil legal aid. I look forward to hearing how it will justify an additional spending of half a billion pounds; that did not feature in the debate on the Autumn Statement.

Public Protection Sentences

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 3rd December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

That ignores the particular judgment exercised by a judge when sentencing an individual. We do not know precisely what the sentence would have been with the current sentencing powers. Of course, the party opposite introduced IPP sentences. There are now different sentences. These individuals were sentenced to IPP sentences because the judges considered that they represented a potential danger to the public. The Government have to bear that in mind.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government’s response to the judgment is welcome in that they are now providing resources for sex offenders, but what has happened in relation to other offenders for whom courses have also been unavailable? How many such prisoners are awaiting courses? What would be the cost of dealing with the backlog and what is the cost of failing to do so in terms of having to continue to house these people in Her Majesty’s prisons?

[Lord Faulks]

The Government have increased the number of commissioned completions of courses in relation to the core sexual offenders course and in relation to the healthy sex course. The party opposite has adopted a surprising posture. We are doing our best to clear up some of the mess caused by the IPP sentence. We are clearing it up in a responsible way. We are making sure that courses are made available where they can be, where there are suitably qualified people to provide them, but not releasing dangerous prisoners into the population.

Offenders: Rehabilitation

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 27th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for acknowledging that we have made progress. We hope to continue to make progress. Of course, he is quite right: we must learn from experience elsewhere, in Sweden or wherever else there is good practice.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, will the Minister explain how the crucial process of rehabilitation is assisted by the present state of our prisons, suffering as they do from overcrowding, staff shortages and a rising tide of self-harm and suicide?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord makes a number of allegations about the unsatisfactory nature of our prisons. There are different reports for different prisons. I cannot possibly deal with all prisons at the Dispatch Box. I do not share his gloomy view of the state of our prisons, having visited a number of them. The work done in our prisons is of a very high standard and we have a dedicated body of prison officers who take great satisfaction in their work. I do not accept his description.

Divorce: Effect on Children

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 26th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Baroness is, of course, taking through this House her own Private Member’s Bill, which makes various recommendations for giving greater clarity to the arrangements on divorce. The Government are considering that, together with the Law Commission’s report on prenuptial agreements and financial arrangements after divorce. Certainty is of course desirable, but at the same time flexibility may be necessary to deal with difficult cases. The Government have already made it clear that they do not propose to bring forward legislation in this Session. The next Parliament will have an opportunity to consider not only the Law Commission’s thorough consultation but all the good work that the noble Baroness is doing in respect of her Bill.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, what assessment have the Government made of the Family Matters project, currently being piloted in Oxford, Crewe and Newcastle, which addresses the problems faced by families and children in these circumstances? What guidance and resources are they giving to schools and the National Health Service to detect and support children who are suffering from the effects of marital or relationship breakdown?

[Lord Faulks]

I am afraid that I am not briefed on the precise matters that the noble Lord has referred me to. Of course, the Resolution report referred to by the noble Baroness emphasises the various problems that are occasioned to children on divorce; they are well known, but they are helpfully emphasised in that report, and the Government are considering its consequences very carefully.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, contend that Clause 2, along with Clauses 3 and 4, should be removed from the Bill for a number of reasons, one of which is that it covers the same ground as the Compensation Act 2006. There is a breadth of criticism of this clause, including that it is not well drafted and that there is insufficient evidence to justify the whole Bill, but in particular this clause. The two are, in a sense, not entirely unconnected.

The question is how we deal in legislative terms with a problem that may not be seen as a problem by those who are skilful in the law. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will navigate his life secure in his knowledge of the law and the likely outcome of any case. His conduct will be so affected. Others are less knowledgeable about the law and much of their conduct is based on an imperfect understanding of what the legal position is and what it might be in the unhappy event, as my noble friend Lord Hodgson says, of finding themselves in court.

Successive bodies, such as the committee of the Department of Constitutional Affairs, which preceded the Compensation Act, found that there was a perception of a compensation culture, as did my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham, in his report Common Sense, Common Safety. Those outside the law would quite confidently assert that there was a compensation culture. Quite what they meant by that would no doubt vary between individuals, but some of the instances cited by my noble friend Lord Hodgson are instructive. He provided evidence based on what his committee heard. This was not a single assertion. It was not based on one person’s experience. It was an accumulation of evidence.

Those in your Lordships’ House who are not lawyers would, I suggest, recognise the very problem that the Bill seeks to confront. My noble friend Lord Hodgson is absolutely right to say that the Bill is not the answer to that problem. It is just one possible answer to that problem. With respect to the fault in the drafting that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said he found, I just wonder whether someone who is not skilled and learned in the law would have much difficulty in understanding what was meant by Clause 2. It conveys that somebody who is potentially to be sued for being in breach of statutory duty or negligence would have their actions, if acting for the benefit of society or any of its members, taken into account. Is that so difficult a concept? I suggest not. It would provide some reassurance.

It is said to be rather unworthy of Parliament that we should be sending a message. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who shows the breadth of his allusions to popular culture and Shakespeare, relies on the Bee Gees. Sending a message is not, of course, the primary purpose of legislation but, as I said at Second Reading, we legislate in a particular context. We do not live in a hermetically sealed Chamber where we do not take into account what people on the outside think and say. We should indeed not be out of step with those who drink at the Dog and Duck, who are aware of the possibility of a compensation culture. If the Bill chimes in common-sense terms with what ordinary people feel—that we have gone too far—then the Bill is providing a useful purpose.

[Lord Beecham]

The Minister is not resiling, is he, from the position that Clauses 2 and 4 do not change the existing law?

[Lord Faulks]

At the moment we are debating Clause 2. I gather that we are to have the delight of a debate on Clause 4 in due course. The position is that, were the Bill to be enacted, a judge would have to have regard to the matters contained in, among others, Clause 2. It has been said, rightly, that judges would normally be expected to pay attention to the matters in Clause 2 in any event, but I suggest that it is sometimes useful for a judge, perhaps faced with a seriously injured claimant, to bear in mind a specific statutory provision when considering what is often an extremely hard task for a judge—to turn down a badly injured person—because the injury was sustained as a result of the act of someone acting for the benefit of society or any of its members. It should not change the law, but it is sometimes useful to put into statutory form what is often difficult to find in the morass of common-law decisions.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, referred to the evidence that was given in Committee in the House of Commons, commented on what my ministerial colleague had said and asked, and pointed to so-called horrific unintended consequences that were not challenged. I am not entirely clear what the horrific unintended consequences were, and although I understand what he meant by saying that they were not challenged, we should be a little careful in drawing an analogy between not challenging something in court, which is often of great significance, and the rather less structured method in which evidence is adduced in committees. None the less, I take his point that the cross-examination was perhaps less than ideal and not particularly illuminating.

I respectfully suggest that there is evidence to support the clause. A survey of volunteering and charitable giving carried out in 2006 and 2007 by the National Centre for Social Research and the Institute for Volunteering Research found that worries about risk and liability were one of the significant reasons cited by 47% of respondents to the survey who volunteered. The National Council for Voluntary Organisations confirmed that these concerns remained a real issue for many voluntary organisations when it gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee following the introduction of the Bill.

In terms of people being deterred from helping others in emergencies, a recent survey, carried out in August 2014 by St John Ambulance, showed that 34% of more than 2,000 adults questioned said that they might be deterred from intervening due to worries about legal repercussions. Evidence also suggests that responsible employers worry about spurious or speculative claims being brought by disgruntled or opportunistic employees. We heard at Second Reading the speech from my noble friend Lord Cotter. Then there is the report by the noble Lord, Lord Young, Common Sense, Common Safety, and the report of the red tape task force under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Hodgson, from whom the Committee has heard today. I submit that there is evidence, of a positive sort, of a perception.

We should not underestimate what acceding to the amendment to remove Clause 2 would do: it would emasculate the Bill. At the moment, it is broadly drafted so it would apply in a wide range of situations where people are acting for the benefit of others, whether they are doing so on a voluntary basis or in a paid capacity. For example, it could include organised charitable activities such as running a village fete or informal, individual activities such as helping an elderly neighbour with their shopping. It could also cover workers such as teachers, doctors and members of the emergency services, who are acting for the benefit of society as part of their jobs.

The clause does not tell the court what conclusion it should reach and will not prevent a person engaged in socially beneficial action being found negligent if the circumstances of the case warrant it. It will be for the court to determine whether a person was acting for the benefit of society and, if so, what weight it should give to that factor in all the circumstances of an individual case. I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Blair, said about trying to frame appropriate legislation in the context of health and safety. It is very difficult to cater for the myriad circumstances that arise. However, the idea is that this will give the courts the maximum flexibility to reach fair and just decisions, while sending a strong signal to give reassurance to the public that they will, in all cases, consider the wider context of the defendant’s actions, prior to reaching a conclusion on liability.

I have already addressed the Committee on the difference between the Compensation Act 2006 and this Bill—the use of the word “may” and the requirement that is contained in this Bill. I do not think the Committee would like me to repeat that. There are, of course, similarities, but the Bill requires the court to consider in every case.

Reassurance is important: we want to encourage volunteering. I am glad to say that volunteering is increasing, but it could increase still further. As my noble friend Lord Hodgson said, it is a desirable trend and it is tragic if people are deterred by the fear of litigation. I do not apologise for saying that this is a difficult target to hit. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may fire bullets at me all afternoon, but we are trying to identify, through this legislation, matters that it is hoped will reassure, by legislating in a way that is in tune with how the public see the current situation. I respectfully submit that the Bill, which may be unusually short and unusually drafted, in the sense that it uses ordinary language—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

I, too, support the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I sympathise with the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, but the whole point of the law of negligence is that it is for a claimant to establish that the defendant did not act reasonably. Some of the cases cited by the noble Lord would be very unlikely indeed to attract any award of damages against somebody acting reasonably in an emergency situation to help somebody with unfortunate consequences. I cannot see that any such claim would succeed but he is right to differ slightly from the amendment tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. However, the best formulation is that put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I hope the Minister will accept it.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, we have had a very useful debate on this group. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that Clause 4 should be removed from the Bill but has also proposed a specific amendment that would amend the definition of acting heroically, should the clause be retained. The noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Aberdare, and my noble friend Lord Attlee suggested various amendments to the clause, as indeed did my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, who is not in his place.

I will respond to the argument that Clause 4 should be removed and then I will deal with the amendments. As I explained at Second Reading, Clause 4 requires the court to,

“have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred when the person was acting heroically by intervening in an emergency to assist an individual in danger and without regard to the person’s own safety or other interests”.

Unfortunately, all too often people are unwilling to intervene and step forward in emergencies due to the fear that they might be sued and ordered to pay damages should they attempt to help. This is not to suggest that people do not act spontaneously and positively in such circumstances; many do, assisting others and coming to the aid of distressed individuals without a second thought to their own interests. However, we have heard how other people stand by and do nothing because they feel that it is safer not to get involved and run the risk, however unlikely, of a negligence claim being brought against them. Clause 4 helps to allay these concerns by giving a reassurance to those brave and laudable members of our society that heroic behaviour in emergencies will be taken into account by the courts in the event that a claim for negligence or breach of a relevant statutory duty is brought against them. It will assure those who are in two minds about intervening to assist an individual in distress that doing the right thing is recognised by the law. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that the Compensation Act 2006 covers similar territory but, as I have already explained, we prefer the approach taken in the current Bill for the reasons I have given, and I do not think that it would be helpful if I went over them again.

I now turn to the specific amendments that have been tabled in relation to Clause 4. Amendments 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14 would all amend the wording in the clause which provides clarification as to what is meant by “acting heroically”. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, have proposed in Amendment 10 to remove the final words of the clause, which refer to acting,

“without regard to the person’s own safety or other interests.”

I am grateful to them for tabling this amendment because we have been considering this issue carefully following correspondence received from St John Ambulance. I am also mindful of the persuasive points made at Second Reading and again today by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, on that organisation’s behalf. As the noble Lord said, St John Ambulance has indicated that the words,

“acting without regard to one’s own safety”,

conflict with first aid practice, which encourages first aiders to do precisely the opposite; namely, to have regard to whether intervening in an emergency might put themselves or others at risk. Although we think that it is unlikely that the courts would misinterpret the clause in that way, we can understand why St John Ambulance has raised concerns about this issue. If its misgivings can be allayed through the omission of the words in question, that is certainly something we would be willing to consider before Report.

I turn to Amendments 8, 11, 12 and 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, and my noble friend Lord Attlee. I realise they may seek to address the same issue identified by St John Ambulance but, rather than omitting the final 11 words of the clause, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, they suggest an alternative form of words. The noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, has suggested that,

“without regard to the person’s own safety or other interests”,

should be replaced with a requirement that the defendant acted,

“reasonably and with a public-spirited intention”.

Meanwhile, my noble friend Lord Attlee’s amendments seek to replace them with a requirement that the defendant must not have been acting “perversely”. He defines perversely in Amendment 14 as,

“a course of action that a reasonable person … would not take in the circumstances, irrespective of”,

whether that person was putting his own safety at risk. I suspect that both my noble friend and the noble Lord are thinking about situations in which a person intervenes in an emergency and then does something so risky or careless that it makes the position of the injured person even worse. They would not want the Bill to help defendants who have acted in that way. I am grateful for their attempts to improve the clause, which I know are very well intentioned. I have already mentioned in response to the amendment proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beecham, that we would be prepared to look more closely at whether a government amendment along those lines might be desirable. There is certainly a consensus that the final 11 words of the clause are problematic and we will consider the options carefully before Report.

I turn to the final amendment in this group, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. Amendment 13 would add a further subsection to Clause 4 which would require the courts, when reaching a decision on liability and damages, to consider,

“the circumstances in which the rescuer acted … the eventual outcome and outcome anticipated by the rescuer … and … the risks to which the rescuer was exposed”,

as an effect of his or her actions. I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment, but I believe that the additional wording would add unnecessary complexity to the clause, the purpose of which is to reassure brave members of the public who act heroically by coming to the aid of someone in danger or distress that the courts will take the context of their actions into account in the event of their being sued.

I gratefully decline the invitation offered to me by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to cite examples that would be entirely separate in the various clauses; there is bound to be a degree of overlap—there often is. The scenario that the clause evokes in most people’s imagination is sufficiently clear for it to be worth a clause on its own, but I accept that there will inevitably be instances that might be covered by both clauses. I hope that the undertaking I have given in relation to the final 11 words of the clause, which could either be removed or replaced by a government amendment, will be such that noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this connection will be prepared not to press them.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 10th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I understand that the Minister may accept the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and in that case the noble and learned Lord will have entered the fold, but this time it is the ministerial sheep who will emerge wearing the Woolf’s clothing—and for that I am sure the House will be grateful.

The noble and learned Lord identified some of the potential problems that need clarifying and we look forward to receiving that clarification. I would like to add another issue that was raised in the debate on Report, and that is the possible availability of legal aid for such applications. I dare say that the Minister will confirm that that will at least be considered and that any reference to it will be contained in such a report in due course.

One other matter to touch on is no doubt encompassed within the terms of the amendment. There was an indication at an earlier stage that the Government would possibly be looking to the magistracy as a source of potential recruitment for those who would undertake this responsibility. The matter has aroused some concern. Obviously I am not asking the Minister to give an indication finally one way or the other, but I take it that he would confirm at least that that is not the only possibility that will be looked at—in which case we will await the Government’s response in due course with keen anticipation.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for his helpful explanation of the amendment to Clause 8 in his name, and for helpfully setting out the concerns that lie behind it. I understand them, and why the noble and learned Lord seeks to make sure that Parliament is given the opportunity to consider a report by the Secretary of State about how the recall adjudicator model will operate before the provisions can be brought into force. I have no objection to the principle of what his amendment is seeking to achieve and am happy to make a commitment that before the recall adjudicator provisions are brought into force, the Government will produce a report for Parliament on matters such as the recruitment process, qualifications, training and costs.

The amendment of the noble and learned Lord is quite specific on some aspects of what the report must contain. I bear in mind what he said, namely that this should be a minimum, as he saw it; we do not indeed anticipate that it would be restricted entirely to those matters. In particular he is specific about the anticipated costs of the recall adjudicator system compared to the costs of recruiting more Parole Board members and case managers.

While the Government would be happy to provide an analysis of the respective costs and benefits of the new model—and indeed we will be publishing a further impact assessment on this—we would not wish to be tied to including in the report such a direct comparison of the sort prescribed in the amendment. This is a constantly evolving area of work, with the Parole Board itself driving forward changes to its process, and new operating models, and we would want our cost-benefit analysis to have the flexibility to take account of those developments rather than tying ourselves in the legislation to making this very specific cost comparison. But we will provide information as to costs.

However, I accept the point and agree that our report should set out the respective costs of the new process and systems compared to carrying on with the Parole Board model. The Government’s position is that we would have no objection to providing a report on the sort of information that the noble and learned Lord asks for, but until we have had more time to consider exactly what that report should contain and how best to present the information, we would not wish to be constrained by the exact requirements of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

When the Government introduced the recall adjudicator provisions, I explained that the aim was to introduce greater flexibility in the way that determinate recall sentences are reviewed and to allow the Parole Board to concentrate its resources on indeterminate sentence prisoners. There is a great deal of further work to be done on the detail. The noble and learned Lord was quite right to identify the case of Whiston and the decision of the Supreme Court, which enabled the Government to bring forward this amendment, albeit on Report—but we would not have been able to bring it forward before then because the decision had not been reached. I think that inadvertently the noble and learned Lord suggested that the decision had been reached in 1914. It was a little more recent than that—2014, to be precise—but I am sure nobody misunderstood that. The Government move a little faster than that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I certainly endorse the remarks of the noble Lord, who has consistently questioned the detail of the Government’s proposals in respect of secure colleges. I must agree with him that the BMA report, published only last Tuesday, makes for sombre reading. The report emphasises the need for the state,

“to ensure that detained children and young people have access to healthcare that is appropriate for their age and health needs”—

which the EHRC has identified as a critical human rights challenge—given that,

“Custodial detention is the most extreme form of social exclusion that can be imposed by the state”.

That need is likely to be enhanced in the secure college context by the very nature of the institution and its physical remoteness from the family and community whence the offenders have come and to which they will return. After all, the report refers to the average time that offenders will be housed in the college as 85 days, which is not a long period. Clearly, after they move on, there will be a concomitant need for the provision of adequate healthcare and, indeed, educational provision.

It appears, then, that NHS England will have to do more than simply commission healthcare provision within the college. It is welcome that there will be such a physical provision, although the noble Lord has pointed out that, of itself, that will not be enough. NHS England will have to ensure that appropriate provision will be made when the offender returns home, quite conceivably in a different NHS region. How will that work? Will NHS England assume responsibility in a different region, or will it be involved from the outset? How will the commissioning process work, both for the period during which the offender is in the college and afterwards?

What will be the role of the relevant local authorities? Leicestershire, in the first instance, will be the site of the first college. Will the home authority deal with educational and childcare provision on the offender’s return home or return to residential care in the case of looked-after children? Have there been any discussions with local authorities—with Leicestershire in the first instance, which presumably will be able to provide educational and other provision if the project goes ahead within its boundaries—and with the Local Government Association on behalf of other local authorities generally, in respect of the need to follow up when the offender returns home?

The noble Lord has made a robust critique of the proposals this afternoon and throughout the debates on this Bill. When the Bill returns to the House of Commons, it is important that the other place should have a response to the questions that he has raised, the suggestions he has made and those which I have added.

However, at this stage, I join the noble Lord in expressing our thanks to the Minister who has, as ever, argued the Government’s case with great skill and perhaps conviction—but certainly with great skill. We are grateful to him and to the Bill team for the assistance that they have given. In some respects, the Bill has been improved, but this area remains extremely problematic. I hope that the Minister will be able to persuade his colleagues to look again at the questions and issues that have been raised, in which case he will be entitled to even more gratitude than that which I and others now extend to him.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am, of course, disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, remains concerned about the provisions in the Bill to create secure colleges. With 68% of young people reoffending within a year of leaving custody, the Government have taken the view that it is clear that things must change. As the House knows, secure colleges will put high-quality education at the centre of efforts to rehabilitate young offenders. These provisions in the Bill provide the framework for this approach.

As the noble Lord was good enough to say, the Government have gone to great lengths to engage Peers, stakeholders, practitioners and experts—and, indeed, young offenders themselves—on our plans. Indeed, we are currently consulting on our approach to secure college rules and, in response to concerns voiced in this House, we have amended the Bill to make these rules subject to the affirmative procedure to the extent that they authorise force, which was an area of particular concern.

The noble Lord described my position as being rather like that of a tank commander. I am not sure whether that was a compliment or the opposite. Be that as it may, it would be wrong to suggest that the Government are frozen in a rigid posture in responding to any new knowledge or learning that is available on the best way to treat these particularly vulnerable young people. The report from the BMA published last Tuesday will inform the Government’s approach to this issue and, indeed, to all issues.

Of course, the noble Lord is quite right, as was the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to focus on the health needs of this cohort. The Government have worked closely with NHS England since the inception of the proposal, and I assure the noble Lord and the House that we have a very constructive and well established relationship with the Department of Health and NHS England on youth justice. I should remind the House that NHS England commissions healthcare for young people in custody. During the debates, I attempted to indicate to the House how the provision of healthcare within the secure college should enable its better delivery to these young people—better, we hope, than in the current youth custody estate.

As I say, we continue to develop these plans. We will, of course, bear in mind all advice from whatever source, particularly any new learning that is available. However, we continue to believe that these secure colleges—whatever anxiety may reasonably be expressed about them—will provide an appropriate means of giving education to young people who, sadly, have often lacked any continuity in their education and, at the same time, help them to rehabilitate and to emerge at the end of their sentence with a much better chance of leading useful lives. I hope that I have gone some way to reassure the noble Lord and ask the House to pass the Bill.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I would be grateful if he would comment on the role of local authorities through their children’s services departments, in addition to the health aspect. The two cannot be divided.

[Lord Faulks]

They cannot—but I am not going to comment in detail from the Dispatch Box on those precise roles. Of course, as the noble Lord will be aware, local authorities have statutory functions in relation to all young people in their local authority area. Those duties will continue, depending on the geographical position of the young person—and of course the NHS has its own obligations, wherever that individual may be. If I have any further information to elaborate upon my answer to that question, I will do so in writing.

Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 4th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Indeed, but the noble and learned Lord is saying in his amendment that this Bill should not get a Second Reading because the matter is covered by Section 1 of the Compensation Act. I am identifying what lay behind the legislation when it was brought in, what it attempted to do and why, if the noble and learned Lord will bear with me, it failed to do so.

[Lord Beecham]

The noble Lord read out the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, in the previous Labour Government. I referred to Greek legend, and I concede entirely that the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, and the previous Labour Government nodded, as did Homer. I would not defend the section of that Act but the noble Lord has to point to any distinction between the effect of that Act and the present Bill.

[Lord Faulks]

I am entirely aware of the question that the noble Lord asked and I am attempting to answer it.

Perhaps I may go on to refer to what happened following the passing of that Bill. Was there a fundamental change in the compensation culture? What happened? After the coalition Government came to power, my noble friend Lord Young of Graffham produced his report Common Sense, Common Safety, which was widely applauded by all sides of your Lordships’ House. He observed in his report that there was a growing fear among business owners of having to pay out for even the most unreasonable claims. The fear of business owners and small business owners, referred to by my noble friend Lord Cotter, is a reasonable matter to take into account. My noble friend Lord Young also identified a public misconception that,

“we can be liable for the consequences of any voluntary acts on our part”.

He described this belief as “particularly pernicious” because it might,

“deter people from engaging in organised voluntary activities in the mistaken belief that they can be sued should anything go wrong”.

He recommended that people who seek to do good in our society should not fear litigation as a result of their actions. He said:

“It is important to have clarity around this issue and at some point in the future we should legislate to achieve this if we cannot ensure by other means that people are aware of their legal position when undertaking such acts”.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson, whose report Unshackling Good Neighbours has been referred to, led a task force established by Nick Hurd, the son of my noble friend Lord Hurd, who has spoken on this issue. He may have observed that unfortunately his son did not share his lack of enthusiasm for the Bill when speaking in a brief intervention in the House of Commons. Fortunately, the family of Hodgson was more together than the family of Hurd. My noble friend Lord Hodgson said that the fear of becoming involved in litigation was a major preoccupation that deterred people from volunteering. The task force acknowledged the work of various government departments in producing guidance on health and safety, but argued that it was unlikely to provide volunteers with the general reassurance that they seek. The task force took the view that the Government’s efforts seemed,

“‘to fall short’ of Lord Young’s recommendation to clarify through legislation if necessary that people would not be held liable for any consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their part”.

The response of Dr Davis Smith in his evidence to the Public Bill Committee was also important. His perspective as the executive director of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations was interesting. He said:

“Parliament has a hugely important role in sending out messages about what is valued in society, and I think that sending out the message that volunteering and community and social action has a hugely beneficial role to play in society—recognising that there are barriers and difficulties that must be addressed—is a really important function that Parliament can play. Even the process of having discussions such as this and getting the debates out as part of the passage of legislation is helpful in raising awareness in society more broadly”.—[Official Report, Commons, Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill Committee, 4/9/14; col. 14.]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, challenge me to say that this Bill effectively adds nothing to the Compensation Act. I respectfully suggest that since the Act we have had an explosion of claims. These have resulted in what I submit to the House is an extremely sensible part of the LASPO Act, which implemented the Jackson reforms and went a considerable way to stopping the explosion of claims by modifying the amount of cost that could be recovered.

We have improved the control of claims management. The question of claims management was touched on in the Compensation Act. It went nothing like far enough. We have reduced the number of claims management companies. We have introduced a successful unit to monitor carefully what claims management companies do. They have halved in number. We now have heavy fines if they transgress in any way. We have introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill, still before your Lordships’ House, provisions that will deter fraudulent claims.

Anyone who watches television or reads newspapers will, I suspect, share with me the feeling of depression and disgust at the vulgar advertising for claims brought, which are often meritless. People resent being telephoned and asked to take part in a fraud, and being told that they have been involved in an accident of which they have no recollection. For those who say that the compensation culture is a mere figment of the Government’s imagination, I say that they are not paying attention to what normal people say.

[Lord Beecham]

Is the noble Lord able to identify what proportion of these claims relates to the provisions of this Bill? What proportion of them relates to claims for compensation for injuries suffered as the result of voluntary activity or heroic action?

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the Opposition will support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It seems to me quite possible, within the framework of that amendment, to proceed along the lines mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, Clauses 71 and 72 are about transparency. They require an applicant for judicial review to provide, with their application, information on funding for their case and that the court considers this information when exercising discretion to order costs. It is important to emphasise that, while permission will not be granted until information has been provided, there is no question of preventing permission if the applicant’s funding is insufficient, and the judiciary continue to have complete discretion in relation to the making of costs orders against third parties disclosed in that information.

Requiring the applicant to provide this information to the court will give the court the information necessary to achieve flexibility in apportioning costs fairly, and to prevent a third party from using a front man or shell company to shield themselves from incurring their share of costs. Your Lordships have heard that there is a potential problem, and although it is not always easy to know what the situation is, this provision should enable the courts to make their decision based on evidence. We say that the judges do not always have all the relevant information available or presented to them, which has the potential to hinder their ability to order costs in a just and equitable manner.

Amendments 157 and 158 would stop the provision of information about financial resources being mandatory, allowing for permission to be granted where no information has been provided but permission is “nevertheless appropriate”—which is undefined. The Government consider this unnecessary, as the clause does not stop permission being granted if insufficient finances are available. It requires only that the court should be provided with an accurate picture. The court still has discretion.

The clauses will not require onerous or invasive information from applicants, and the information requested should always be information that the applicant would have, even if they did not have funding at that stage. The clauses are designed to promote transparency in court proceedings, not to provide for a time-consuming forensic examination of an individual’s financial affairs.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has not moved Amendment 156. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and Amendment 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, seek to change when the court should have regard to funding information, and what that information should be. My understanding is that they rely on Clause 71 being removed from the Bill and set out the power for the court to require the applicant to provide certain information about funding when the court is determining, or intends to determine, costs. They also limit the information to sources of funding that are actually available to the applicant, rather than sources that are likely to be available, and rather than looking at the applicant’s ability to fund the judicial review generally, the information would be limited to how the applicant would meet the other side’s costs.

Amendment 161A would mean that those who are likely to fund and drive litigation could escape the appropriate costs liability simply by not promising to provide the support. Amendments 160 and 161 seek to instate a position where the court need not consider financial information provided by the applicant, even if it considers it appropriate. In my view, these amendments are unnecessary and defeat the point of Clause 71 in making sure that the court has clear and transparent information early in proceedings.

The key to Clauses 71 and 72 is they do not create new cost liabilities for claimants, nor does the sufficiency of funding they demonstrate have an impact on the progression of the case. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the courts would not be expected to make an award against a third party who was simply funding the litigation and not seeking substantially to control, influence or benefit from it. I said words to that effect in Committee; I say them again now, and I hope those words will be useful when anyone comes to interpret this provision should it become law. It is clear that the applicable case law requires more than only funding; as in the case law referred to by my noble friend Lord Lester, the person must be seeking to drive the litigation or to benefit from a potential remedy in the case. I should emphasise that.

Under those principles, costs awards are not prescriptive, nor is it our intention that they should be. We are simply allowing the court to make decisions with the appropriate information available to it. For example, the court will not have to make an award against a parent in a school challenge case and would not be expected to do so. We do not agree with Amendment 162 that prospective funding or the ability of company members to provide financial support can be excluded from this consideration, nor do we agree that the court should consider only those who have promised to provide funding. In our view, that creates an easily avoidable threshold.

We also do not agree that this information should be provided only on the making of an order by the court, as stated in Amendment 159B. There is no reason why the court should not be informed of the parties driving litigation early on in proceedings, as this would enable the judge to make decisions on costs without having to order the parties to provide information. Essentially this amendment seeks to favour the opaque, rather than the transparent. What information an applicant should provide will be set out in court rules. The rules will not require invasive financial information but will require the claimant to be clear about the sources of their funding. It will be perfectly acceptable to update the court if funding does not materialise; that was a point made in Committee and I would like to make that clear. The requirements will not be burdensome for claimants. The Government have on many occasions stated that they wish to see a light-touch approach, and I am sure that any rules will be fair and proportionate to the court’s need for transparency.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, made reference to the judiciary’s response. I am sure he has read carefully what it is and I am in no position to contradict it. My understanding was that the judiciary had welcomed transparency, although, having revisited what I said in Committee, I did not seek to rely specifically on that as the only basis for this argument. He may well be right that the comments were directed more at non-parties than in the situation of an applicant. If I inadvertently misled Parliament, I make it absolutely clear that that was not my intention.

The requirement for transparency is wholly understandable and wholly consistent with judges making decisions on the best possible information. The question is: is this going to be chilling? I suggest that it will not be chilling to those who have good reasons for bringing claims and who are, as one would expect, open and frank about what, in financial terms, is driving the challenge.

This has been a useful debate and I hope it has enabled me to be clear about what lies behind Clauses 71 and 72 and to allay any remaining concerns. The Government take the view that these clauses do not take away the judge’s discretion. As is always the case, he or she will make the decision on the basis of the facts of each case. These clauses enable the judge to have better information before exercising the discretion. No judge wants to exercise a discretion in the absence of all the information that could reasonably be made available to them. It is not obvious to me why this is as objectionable as it is said. With that reassurance, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 27th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I am sorry that my noble friend is not satisfied with the explanation that I have been rather laboriously making—which is that it all depends on the difference between scope and remuneration. The scope of legal aid has not been altered; we are simply talking about an amendment to remuneration at one stage of the process—a particular regulation which was considered in Committee. It was the subject of a debate on these matters. Admittedly there was opposition to it on the basis that this could stifle people from bringing judicial review, but it was not then suggested that there was some violent inconsistency between the LASPO Bill and what was said during its passage, and the change pursuant to Section 9. Now, however, it is being suggested that there is some bad faith on the part of the Government.

[Lord Beecham]

Did the Minister really say that the application of a residence test does not—

[Lord Faulks]

I am not talking about the residence test at all. I shall come to that shortly, but it is a different issue. Noble Lords are perfectly entitled to ask me questions about it at that stage. I am talking about the suggestion that—regardless of the residence test, which is a separate issue that I shall come to later —the provisions on legal aid for judicial review in some way breach an undertaking that was given to Parliament. That seems to be the burden of what is being suggested.

The power to make changes in the future should not be unnecessarily constrained as proposed. Any changes made to scope, under Section 9, and eligibility, under Section 11, are subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring full parliamentary debate as appropriate. I am sorry that the affirmative procedure is not considered to be as satisfactory as primary legislation. Nevertheless, it remains a proper way to bring such matters before Parliament.

As I said in Committee, making such changes by primary legislation would be a cumbersome process and a disproportionate use of this House’s time. It would stop the Government of the day making necessary changes without primary legislation, even where change was necessary to ensure that the provisions remained up to date. The House may possibly remember—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, may well remember—that during the passage of the previous Bill, certain noble Lords, of whom I was one, were anxious that the power should include both improving and increasing the scope of legal aid, if it was considered appropriate, and that became part of the LASPO Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, it will come as no surprise to noble Lords that I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the observations that both he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, have made. It was interesting to reflect on the defence that the Minister made in Committee on these matters. He said:

“In particular, there is the sense, expressed by a number of noble Lords, that this particular Secretary of State and Lord Chancellor does not have sufficient regard for the rule of law and, essentially, there is a lack of confidence that he will exercise his powers in a way that Parliament would find satisfactory”.—[Official Report, 30/7/14; col. 1670.]

I think that summed up the position very well, not merely of your Lordships’ House but of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and many other bodies, not least the Divisional Court in the case about which we have heard and which is currently the subject on appeal.

The Minister, on that occasion, and in dealing with virtually the same amendment as that which we are now debating, described the situation created by the Bill—Clause 73—as “a pretty commonplace provision”. He said that,

“it is commonplace because noble Lords might like to know that Section 149 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 contains”,—[Official Report, 30/7/14; col. 1670.]

a similar provision, as does Section 53 of the Pensions Act 2014, and Section 20 of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014.

It is perhaps not surprising that that should be the case, given that it is precisely the same Government who have enacted all those measures. Whether there are antecedents under previous Governments, I do not know. Even if there were, the crucial point is that judicial review relates to the fundamental rights of the citizen. These other matters, important as they are—the noble Lord referred to other items of legislation last time—may well be significant, but there can be nothing more significant than the application of the rule of law and access to justice to test whether decisions have been made lawfully. That is an absolutely fundamental right. Even if there were precedents in respect of other legislation, that does not for a moment justify their extension to this very sensitive and important area.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, has demolished any case for the robustness of the affirmative procedure as a process that allows effective scrutiny, and other noble Lords are, of course, aware of the limitations of the affirmative procedure. It is simply impermissible to frame legislation in such a way that the Secretary of State could act by secondary legislation without in any way defining what it might be, how far it might go, who might be affected and what it would do to the core principle we have debated for much of today about the right of the citizen to protection against unlawful decision-making by the Executive in any form—not merely the Government but other forms of executive agency. That strikes me as a very poor argument indeed.

The Minister is no doubt unable to depart from the stance that he has hitherto adopted. I, frankly, cannot believe that his heart is in it, whatever he will say at the Dispatch Box. It is a blot on the Government’s bona fides in this area to proceed with legislation in this form. Clearly, there is no way we can take it further tonight, but I hope that the Minister will report back to the Secretary of State and encourage him to redeem his reputation.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the final speeches at this stage of our scrutiny of the Bill have very much echoed what was said in Committee. As I explained then, it is often necessary to give full effect to the provisions of an Act by making further provision in secondary legislation. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, acknowledged as much in his remarks in that debate. However, he and other noble Lords questioned, as they seek again to do in Amendment 178, the inclusion of a power to make supplementary provision.

Concern was expressed in Committee that the drafting would permit the power to be exercised to make provision about anything which the Lord Chancellor considered fell within the scope of the general area or subject matter of the Bill. This evening, the focus has been on judicial review. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, rightly stressed its importance and that of the independence of the judiciary. Of course I entirely accept that, and I hope that nothing I have said during the course of our debates has sought in any way to undermine those core principles of our system. However, Clause 79 refers to any provision of the Bill. As noble Lords will be aware, that is a final provision to deal with all the various provisions, which cover quite a wide field, it has to be said. Our debates have ranged over many areas of law and many provisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

No, I am simply saying that it is not exclusively directed at Part 4. It is to do with any provision in the Bill; it is a general provision for implementation. It would include it, but it would include anything else that came within the scope of Clause 79.

I explained in Committee the narrow construction given to such powers. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that this was an extraordinary provision. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, however, acknowledged that it found its way into other Acts of Parliament—apparently without demur from the Opposition, including the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which, as the noble Lord will appreciate, was before this Government came to power. The suggestion that it is somehow the Conservatives or this Conservative-led coalition who have form for introducing such provisions is simply not correct. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act and the Offender Rehabilitation Act contain powers to make supplementary as well as consequential and incidental provision. There are recent similar examples within the responsibility of other departments. Those cannot be levelled against the Lord Chancellor, who has been demonised in our debates. They include the Pensions Act, the Local Audit and Accountability Act and the Infrastructure Bill currently before Parliament.

Since Committee, we have considered carefully whether it would be sufficient to rely on that part of the power which is undisturbed by the amendment. Of course, the power is quite wide even without the supplementary provision. It is right to acknowledge, as I did in Committee, that there is a degree of overlap between the various concepts used and adjectives deployed. The fact that the existing powers agreed by Parliament included the power to make supplementary provision suggests that the overlap is not complete. For that reason, we think that the right course is not to amend the provision—with the reassurance as to the possible use of the power, which I mentioned. In other words, this will not be construed as giving any Minister the opportunity to make provisions which are not in the Bill—what he might have liked to have been in the Bill in retrospect—but construed very much in the way that such provisions are customarily construed.

[Lord Beecham]

In that event, is the noble Lord prepared to say that the supplementary power will not be applied to the judicial review provisions of the Bill?

[Lord Faulks]

I am not going to give any such undertaking from the Dispatch Box. It will be construed as a matter of statutory construction, and Parliament will view it if there is a change, but I am not going to limit any future Minister or future Parliament on what they want to do in any part of this legislation. This is a standard measure which the noble Lord’s colleague on the Labour Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, though harshly critical of almost every provision in the Bill, said was absolutely standard in all legislation. He contrasted this with other provisions in the Bill which he found more offensive. He is unfortunately not in his place today to expand on his views.

Noble Lords have been concerned that such powers could be used unchecked. I accept, of course, that it can be difficult to determine whether a particular instrument falls within the power under which it is made, but that is the function of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments—which, as I am sure noble Lords will agree, is assiduous in reviewing secondary legislation, and, as part of its remit, specifically considers whether the power to make an instrument is wide enough to cover all that is in it.

I turn now to Amendment 179, which seeks to remove the power for any implementing provision to amend primary or secondary legislation in any way whatever, whether it falls within the category of “supplementary” or within any of the other categories mentioned in Clause 78. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, previously expressed some concerns about the meaning of this provision. In particular he asked why the drafting referred to both the repeal and revocation of legislation and why Clause 79(5) applied only to repeals but not revocations. I am happy to provide clarification on that score. Proper drafting practice is to refer to the repeal of primary legislation but to the revocation of secondary legislation. There is no practical difference between the two. Subsection (5) refers to repeals and not revocations because that provision is only about the enhanced parliamentary scrutiny for instruments which amend or repeal primary legislation, which I alluded to in Committee.

As I explained before, the removal of this provision from the legislation would be a serious constraint on the implementation of the Bill. It would, for example, prevent consequential amendments being made to primary legislation for provisions which have, despite the department’s best efforts, been missed. It may also impede the consequential amendment of existing secondary legislation, something which it is not normally appropriate to do in the Bill itself. Without such amendments it may not be possible to bring provisions of the Bill into force.

Amendments to existing legislation can of course only be made if they fall within the scope of the power. That means that they can only be made for the purpose of implementing what is already in the Bill. I would remind the House that any instrument which amended primary legislation would require approval both in your Lordships’ House and in the other place. I hope that the reassurance that I have already given about that will also go some way to alleviating concerns about the commonplace power in subsection(2), without which it may not be possible to properly give effect to parliamentary intentions.

I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Deben feels that there has been a lack of transparency in the way that the Government have approached this Bill, if that was what he was suggesting. I have endeavoured to assist the House in Committee and on Report. I am sorry that he, as a supporter, feels that we have not assisted him or the House sufficiently. It is a matter which I very much regret and I hope that it is not a view shared around the House by supporters of the Government. I hope that, with the further reassurance that I have given in this respect, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment is an appetiser for the main course that awaits us in the form of secure colleges, about which we will hear a good deal.

Secure children’s homes care for some of the most damaged children, necessitating intensive and, it has to be said, expensive care. The numbers have been reduced in recent years. There are now 138 places in secure children’s homes. In Committee, I suggested adding them to the facilities that might be provided by the Secretary of State alongside existing young offender institutions and secure training colleges and the secure colleges that the Bill seeks to establish.

In his reply, the Minister explained the failure to include secure children’s homes, on the list, on the basis that local authorities had the power to provide such homes, and the Secretary of State does not and never has had that power. He went on to say that it is for local authorities to provide sufficient places as are required in secure children’s homes, and we think it right that they retain responsibility for this.

However, the amendment does not require the Secretary of State to provide secure children’s homes; it gives him the power to do so. In any event, it is surely desirable that such provision is seen as part of a range of different facilities. Given the pressure on local authority budgets and the concerns that secure colleges, if they are to be included under this legislation, might reduce the demand for such places, it is surely reasonable for the Secretary of State to have some involvement—potential, if not immediately actual—with this part of what should be seen as essentially one service aimed at providing for these children of varying degrees of vulnerability and difficulty, albeit in different ways.

I hope the noble Lord will acknowledge that this is meant to be a constructive amendment, which does not impose a duty but opens up the possibility of having a whole-system approach to this group of young people. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short debate about the place of secure children’s homes in the youth custodial estate. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, it is something of an appetiser for what I know is to come during the course of this afternoon and evening.

I recognise on behalf of the Government that much good work is done in secure children’s homes, and that they often accommodate some of the most vulnerable young people in custody. The Government are clear that we will continue to provide separate specialist accommodation for those who need it. We have also made clear that, while we believe the secure college model could cater for the majority of young people in custody—that is, a secure college rather than a secure children’s home—it will not be suitable for 10 and 11 year-olds or for some young people with the most acute needs or vulnerability.

This year, we have demonstrated our commitment by continuing to provide places in secure children’s homes by entering new contracts with nine homes to provide 138 places. I know that many noble Lords will have observed the decline in the number of places in secure children’s homes that the Government contract, but that, as was acknowledged on Monday in your Lordships’ House, reflects a substantial and welcome reduction in the number of young people in custody overall in recent years.

The current arrangement is that the Secretary of State may provide places in young offender institutions and secure training centres; the Bill seeks to give him the power also to provide secure colleges. In addition, he has the ability to enter into contracts for the provision of youth detention accommodation in secure children’s homes. Amendment 107 would change this by giving the Secretary of State the power to provide secure children’s homes directly. The power to provide these homes rests with local authorities, not the Secretary of State, and we think it right that this should remain the position. Secure children’s homes are created by different legislation with the purpose of ensuring that there is provision for children whose welfare needs are so acute that a court decides they must be accommodated securely. Meeting the needs of this particular group of children is the important distinction between secure children’s homes and other forms of custodial provision.

The Secretary of State has a duty to ensure that there are sufficient places in youth detention accommodation for young people remanded in or sentenced to custody, and in discharging this duty he continues to contract places in secure children’s homes for those young people who require them. We think that that is the right arrangement, rather than the Secretary of State providing secure children’s homes, which are intended to serve a greater purpose than simply accommodating convicted or remanded young people.

I recognise the concern about the future of secure children’s homes and we will no doubt come back to that when we consider the substantial group of amendments that follows this debate. The Government are clear that there continues to be a place for them in the youth custodial estate, but we consider that the position is adequately catered for by the current arrangements. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, as I hinted when moving the amendment, I shall not divide the House on this issue. However, the Minister overlooks a key element in the case that I put, which is that local authority budgets are extremely hard pressed and it will be increasingly difficult for them to sustain the level of investment needed in this provision. Having said that, I shall not press the amendment, but I invite the Government, or perhaps the Minister, to talk to the Department for Education and the Department for Communities and Local Government about the financial implications of continuing provision in, I think, only nine local authority areas now, for which funding is under great pressure. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to the debate on these amendments and to all those in the Chamber and beyond who have engaged with and helped to shape our proposals for secure colleges. It has been said during the debate that our proposals are rushed and ill thought out, and that there has been a failure to engage.

We have made considerable efforts to engage with a wide range of stakeholders and experts right the way through, from the gestation of this idea to bringing legislation before Parliament and developing plans for a pathfinder secure college. In our Transforming Youth Custody consultation, published in February 2013, the Government engaged with a wide range of organisations in the education, custody and voluntary sectors. Uniquely, we asked them to submit outline proposals for how a secure college might tackle the problems of poor education and reoffending outcomes. What I think there is complete agreement on in your Lordships’ House is that there is far too high an instance of reoffending by young offenders and that education is insufficiently catered for within the secure youth estate.

Those responses directly informed the Government’s response to the consultation, published in January this year. After the Bill was introduced in this House, I hosted an open event in July to outline our proposals, to share our latest plans for the design of the pathfinder secure college—the clue is in the name: pathfinder—and to listen to the views of those with interests and expertise in this area. Peers were assisted by iPads that gave a design and indication of the precise configuration of the secure college and how the various parts would work together. It proved a fruitful exercise, I believe, and the discussion that day with Peers led to substantial changes to our design for the pathfinder secure college.

Following that meeting, we secured additional land for the site, increasing its size by two acres and extending the range of sporting facilities and outdoor space. We also reconfigured the layout of the site to ensure that groups of the more vulnerable young offenders, whom we had already planned to accommodate separately, could access education and health facilities via a different route from older children at the site and would have separate sporting facilities. I was pleased to share those revised plans at yet another open meeting with Peers last week.

Noble Lords will also be aware that, following my commitment in Committee, last week the Government published a public consultation on our plans for secure college rules. It is a substantial document with a considerable amount of detail. I hope that those noble Lords who have felt it appropriate to comment on the inadequacy of the consultation will at least take the trouble to read carefully this consultation and realise the amount of detail that has been provided in order to come to the right final conclusion as to the rules.

The secure college rules set out the proposed policies which will inform those rules, and in respect of the use of force—clearly a matter of considerable importance to the House—set out draft indicative rules to facilitate greater scrutiny of our proposals. Noble Lords will also be aware that the Government have brought forward an amendment to make rules authorising the use of force subject to the affirmative, rather than the negative, procedure.

Throughout the process, Ministers have written to and met with a wide range of stakeholders to keep them apprised of our plans. Only yesterday the Prisons Minister, Andrew Selous, met a range of children’s charities and groups with an interest in youth justice. We also have been working closely with NHS England, the Department for Education and experts in education and custodial provision to test our designs for the secure college pathfinder. Our revised plans are now publicly available and are being scrutinised by Blaby District Council as part of the planning application for the pathfinder.

I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will recognise that considerable efforts have been gone into and opportunities provided for the views of others to inform our thinking. I have to say I was very disappointed to hear the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, whom the House of course greatly respects on this area, suggest in Committee that, notwithstanding our engagement, it was,

“both unreasonable and irresponsible of the Government to expect Parliament to rubber-stamp it until it knows more”.—[Official Report, 23/7/14; col. 1173]

The Ministry of Justice and my officials have worked extremely hard to provide information about secure colleges. There were also lengthy debates in the House of Commons. I hope noble Lords have had a chance to see them. I have read all of them. A great deal of detail was provided at that stage and then in your Lordships’ House in the lengthy Committee stage. The Government have attempted to give answers to all the various points that have been given to them. It is, therefore, with great disappointment, that we are accused of being in contempt of Parliament.

I will now turn to the amendments. They cover the use of force, secure college rules and the powers of the Secretary of State to contract out the running of secure colleges. I will start by addressing the amendment on the use of force, as this is relevant to the government amendment in respect of the secure college rules. Amendment 121 seeks to restrict the circumstances in which a custody officer may be authorised to use force in a secure college. I am aware that a similar amendment was recommended in the recent report on the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. While the Government share the view that force must only ever be used as a last resort, and that only the minimum force required should be used, we believe it is right that force be available in a wider range of circumstances than the amendment permits.

In addition to preventing harm, we believe that force must also be available to prevent escape, to prevent damage to property and for the purpose of maintaining good order and discipline. I recognise that it is the final category which has attracted most debate. During a constructive debate in Committee, I set out the Government’s view that custody officers in secure colleges should be able to use force for the purpose of maintaining good order and discipline, but that this use would be subject to stringent controls.

In our consultation document on our plans for secure college rules, we have gone into a great deal of detail about our approach to the use of force. I am glad that my noble friend Lord Marks made reference to the instances given on page 23 of that document of particular examples which he, I think, accepted were instances where there would, in exceptional circumstances, have to be force used in circumstances where one would not normally want it to be used.

We have clarified that force, in these circumstances, may be used only where a young person poses a risk to maintaining a safe and stable environment and where there is also a risk to the safety or welfare of the young person against whom the restraint is used or that of another young person. We have set out examples in the document of the types of circumstances in which we believe the use of force for these purposes would be justified. We are clear that force can never be used as a punishment.

The consultation document makes clear our position that the use of force for good order and discipline would be authorised only to the extent that it was strictly necessary and proportionate; that only authorised restraint techniques could be applied; that the use of pain-inducing techniques for reasons of maintaining good order and discipline will be prohibited; that only the minimum restraint necessary for the shortest possible time must be used; that the young person’s dignity and physical integrity must be respected at all times; and that the best interests of the young person against whom the force is used must be a primary consideration. We have also set out safeguards and procedures to be followed before, during and after any use of restraint for maintaining a safe and stable environment.

The Government recognise the sensitivity and importance of provisions relating to the use of force with young people. That is why we are consulting publicly and in great detail, and we will consider the responses that we receive. However, for the reasons that I have set out, we do not agree with the restrictions that the amendment would place on the circumstances in which force could be used in secure colleges.

As a further commitment to ensuring scrutiny of our proposals on the use of force, we are bringing forward an amendment to the process for approving secure college rules. In its third report of the Session, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended that if the Bill is to enable secure college rules to authorise the use of force for the purpose of ensuring good order and discipline, then such rules should, to the extent that they authorise, be subject to the affirmative procedure. We have accepted that recommendation and brought forward Amendment 122.

This amendment will make the entire first set of secure college rules subject to the affirmative procedure, as they will contain provisions authorising the use of force. This will give Parliament additional oversight of the secure college rules, although I cannot agree to Amendment 111, which would require the rules always to be subject to the affirmative procedure—a requirement which does not apply to prison or young offender institution rules, for example.

[Lord Beecham]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I ascribed the wrong number to the schedule to which I referred earlier. It is Schedule 6 which is about the use of force. The Minister has referred to a number of instances which are certainly in that schedule, but he did not refer to paragraph 8(b), which talks about the use of force being permissible,

“to prevent, or detect and report on, the commission or attempted commission by them”—

that is, prisoners—

“of other unlawful acts”.

That seems an extremely wide definition. Nor did the Minister refer to paragraph 9, which relates to use of force in connection with searches.

[Lord Faulks]

I could go through the entire section, which is very lengthy, and deal with all the various aspects seriatim, but I am not sure that that would be a particularly useful process at Report stage, given that I am sure that all those who have been listening to this debate will have had the chance to see the entire detail of the relevant section of the secure college rules. I think that I have summarised fairly the Government’s approach in the rules. I also referred to those two specific examples to which reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. There have been discussions at the various meetings that we have had. So I would rather not be tied down to specific examples of when force should be used. We believe that the structure is there. We are of course listening to the consultation carefully and we encourage all those who are concerned, of whom there are many in your Lordships’ House, to take part in that consultation to assist us further in arriving at a satisfactory position, which I am sure we will be able to do.

The publication of the Government’s consultation will also reassure the noble Lords and noble Baroness who tabled Amendment 108 that we will certainly make secure college rules before such an institution opens. These rules will be essential to ensuring that young people are detained safely and securely in these colleges, and that they are educated and rehabilitated effectively. However, I strongly believe that this does not need to be placed in the Bill.

It is in the context of creating secure college rules that I turn to Amendments 120A and 120B, which would set out in primary legislation the conditions governing the authorisation of the use of force. I welcome the noble Lord’s amendment, which adopts much of the approach taken in the consultation document. However, I believe that this is a case for the rules rather than for primary legislation. I have provided assurances on how they will come into effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am perfectly happy to accept the costs from the noble Lord. As regards the offending rate, one needs to look over a long period. He tells me those rates but I have not had a chance to see those specific rates or for how long a period. However, I am sure that there are variations within the secure college estate. It would cost around £100 million each year to do what seems to be suggested, which is not a viable solution. It is, as we know, easy to forget the deficit, but this Government do not do so.

Although the secure college pathfinder will have a capacity of 320, the site is composed of seven distinct accommodation buildings, with some broken down into smaller living units. Young people can be accommodated in distinct groups, a sense of community can be fostered in each, and the younger and more vulnerable groups can be kept separately if that is considered appropriate. Our plans demonstrate that big does not mean imposing and impersonal. The size will enable a breadth of services and opportunities to be offered.

It is a consequence of the welcome and significant reduction in the number of young people in custody that there are fewer custodial establishments and that some young people inevitably will be detained further from home. This is not a new problem and, for the reasons I have outlined, a network of small, local facilities is not, sadly, a viable alternative. However, distance from home remains one of the factors taken into account by the Youth Justice Board when placing young people in custody. I am sure that that will be very much a factor. Furthermore, there will be visits as well as technology.

I recognise what lies behind these amendments. I acknowledge the very real concern of noble Lords about young people, whether they are under-15s, girls or more widely, but we genuinely believe that we have sufficient flexibility in the system. We do not think that these requirements should find themselves into law. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I shall be brief. If the proposal goes ahead, which it might, we will end up with two groups of about 40 young people, boys and girls, from all over the country, in one central location and in an establishment where the vast majority of young offenders, as we have heard from the chief inspector, will be extremely vulnerable and very difficult. The whole atmosphere of the place cannot be compartmentalised in the way in which the noble Lord describes. It is not a satisfactory outcome and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 22nd October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, will the Minister take it from me that I can count?

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord’s arguments do not deserve lesser consideration for their recent arrival in our debate. He asked, for instance, why personal injuries, rather than other fields, should be singled out for attention. The answer is simply this. Of course fraud has a role in the law of contract, the law of property and other areas of the law. But this is a provision to deal with a particular mischief, of which we are all aware in one form or another. Unfortunately, the explosion of claims, with dishonest claims and people calling others to invite them to participate in dishonest claims, has become widespread, and the Government are responding in a variety of different ways, including by regulating claims management companies—I am glad to see the reduction in the number of such companies—and by introducing this provision.

Amendment 128 was tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, to whom the House listens very carefully on all things, but perhaps particularly in areas such as this. It would extend the scope of Clause 49 to cover claims for items linked to the personal injury claim. As he has indicated, this could typically include items such as damage to property and the cost of credit hire. The effect of the amendment would be that where the court was satisfied that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest, its order would dismiss any such related elements, as well as the claim for personal injury—when, for example, a claim for personal injury is used as a vehicle for other fraud.

I understand precisely what my noble friend says, and I have considerable sympathy for what lies behind the amendment, which is to make the clause as strong a deterrent as possible. However, after careful consideration by my officials and myself, I believe, on balance, that it would unnecessarily complicate the clause, and could have unintended consequences that would not be desirable.

The types of loss that would be caught by the amendment arise primarily in motor accident claims, and in practice payments for such losses are generally made up front by the claimant’s insurer, and are then recovered by them from the defendant’s insurer in the event that negligence is admitted or proved. This means that the amendment could affect subrogated rights between insurers, and could operate to the disadvantage of the claimant’s insurer, who would find it much more difficult to recover such sums. That might in turn have the undesirable consequence of making insurers less inclined to make payments in respect of this kind of loss to genuine victims of accidents for whom, for example, the rapid replacement of a vehicle could be essential.

The complexity of the law on subrogated rights means that the potential for this type of unintended consequence would be high. In any event, I do not consider the amendment necessary. The existing focus of the clause on personal injury claims avoids complexities of this nature, and ensures that the core matter in relation to which the claimant has actually been dishonest, and where the main scope for dishonest behaviour arises—the personal injury claim—will be dismissed whenever the court considers it appropriate. We are confident that this should provide a sufficiently powerful deterrent to discourage claimants from seeking to bring fraudulent and exaggerated claims, and believe that the amendment could on balance run the risk of creating uncertainty in the law and would make the clause unnecessarily complex in practice.

On Amendment 128A, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that it would be more appropriate to have not the civil standard of proof but the criminal standard of proof. I think that he refers—if not explicitly, implicitly—to a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on this, which based its recommendation on the view that the inclusion of the relevant measure is indicative of the quasi-criminal nature of the sanction imposed by the dismissal of the claim. The Government strongly disagree that that is the case. Subsection (7) simply ensures that the order for dismissal can be taken into account by a court hearing any proceedings against the claimant in relation to the same dishonest behaviour, whether they be civil or criminal proceedings for contempt or a criminal prosecution. This is to ensure that the claimant is dealt with fairly and that any punishment imposed in those proceedings is proportionate given the overall effect of the consequences of the claimant’s dishonest behaviour upon him or her. This approach is also reflected in other aspects of the clause—in particular, subsection (5) in relation to costs sanctions.

As we have set out in the ECHR memorandum accompanying the Bill, we consider that the adoption of a civil standard of proof can be fully justified. The sanction of deprivation of property involved in the dismissal of the claim would occur in the context of civil proceedings in relation to civil compensation, proceedings which are brought by the claimant, not the state. No criminal conviction could arise from the dismissal process itself, and it does not involve anything that could be said to be a criminal charge. We consider that the analogy drawn in the ECHR memorandum with the approach of the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts to confiscation proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in which a civil standard of proof has been upheld, is a valid one, and that the adoption of the civil standard of proof in Clause 49 is both fair and appropriate.

Amendments 128B, 128C, 128D, 128E, 130A and 130B tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks are similar but not identical to those tabled by him in Committee, save that the court is given a discretion to reduce the award of damages rather than dismiss the claim entirely, or, it would seem, take no action at all, in circumstances where the genuine part of the award is £25,000 or more. We do not believe that it is appropriate to impose a financial limit of this nature. I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said about this. Although the widening of the court’s discretion not to dismiss the claim is of a lesser extent to that which the noble Lord previously suggested, the amendments would still weaken the effect of the clause and interfere with its effective operation by imposing what is inevitably an arbitrary dividing line.

As I explained in Committee, the sanction imposed by this clause—the denial of compensation—is a serious one, and will be imposed only where the claimant’s dishonest behaviour goes to the heart of the claim. If the court, having heard all the evidence, is satisfied that that is the case, I believe that it is right that it should be required to dismiss the entire claim unless doing so would cause substantial injustice to the claimant. People who behave in such a way should not be able to get compensation regardless, whatever the amount involved.

The amount of compensation which the claimant would otherwise have been awarded, and the proportion of the overall claim which that represents, will, of course, be matters that the court may wish to take into consideration in deciding whether the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest and, if so, whether its discretion not to dismiss the claim should be exercised. Where the effect on the claimant might be particularly harsh or unfair on the facts of the case, the substantial injustice test will provide sufficient protection. The addition of a further discretion simply waters down the deterrent effect of this provision.

On Amendment 129, during the debate in Committee some uncertainty was expressed about the policy intention underlying subsection (5) of Clause 49, and whether the existing drafting of the subsection clearly and accurately captured that intention. In the light of those concerns, we have tabled government Amendment 129, which clarifies the position by replacing the existing subsection with a new subsection. This provides that when assessing costs in the proceedings, a court which dismisses a claim because of the claimant’s fundamental dishonesty must deduct the amount of damages that it would have awarded to the claimant from the amount of costs which it would otherwise order the claimant to pay in respect of the defendant’s costs. The intention underlying this provision is, as I have previously explained, to ensure that claimants are not excessively sanctioned by both losing the genuine element of the award of damages and having to pay the defendant’s costs without any credit for what the defendant has saved by avoiding payment of the genuine element of the award. I should add that one of the main intentions behind this provision is to deter people from bringing these claims at all, or at least deter them from being dishonest when advancing them.

Beyond that, it is not our intention to interfere more generally with the court’s discretion on whether to make a costs order and, if so, in what terms. We believe that the court should be able to make whatever orders it considers appropriate. In many cases the court will doubtless decide to award the defendant’s costs in full, apart from the sum deducted under this subsection. However, in some cases, it may decide only to award the defendant some of its costs in circumstances where it considers that certain costs have been unnecessarily incurred—for example, where the defendant had spent money pursuing an irrelevant issue.

Amendment 129 preserves the court’s discretion to do this, or indeed to decide, in the circumstances of a particular case, to make no award of costs at all. We believe that it is important for a provision on this issue to remain in the clause to ensure that it operates in a fair and proportionate way, and I am therefore—although I do not think my noble friend is pursuing it with any vigour—unable to accept Amendment 128F, which would remove it altogether.

My noble friend Lord Hunt has indicated that he remains concerned that Amendment 129, the government amendment, may still create some confusion, and has proposed Amendment 130 instead. While I share my noble friend’s concern to ensure that the provision is as clear as possible, on careful consideration, we do not believe that his fears about our amendment are justified.

In particular, I should point out that, even if the actual assessment of the amount of costs payable is undertaken by a different judge or officer at a later date, as would normally be the case in a detailed assessment of costs, assessment is still being undertaken by the same court that has dismissed the claim, and so the requirement to deduct the amount recorded in subsection (4) from the ultimate costs “bill” that the claimant may have to pay applies regardless of the point of time at which, or judge by which, the costs payable are determined. I am also concerned that my noble friend’s amendment simply restates the existing law confirming the discretion of the court to award costs. On balance, we feel that it is unnecessary to restate this in legislation, and it might be taken to imply that this was not already the position, or that special rules regarding the court’s discretion as to costs are required in these cases. That would be contrary to the policy, which is not intended to make any changes to the rules on costs themselves.

On reflection, I consider that government Amendment 129 makes it amply clear that if the court decides to order costs against the claimant, it must deduct the amount of the damages it would have awarded but for the effect of Clause 49, so that the claimant has to pay whatever costs, if any, that are ordered net of that amount. I believe that the Government’s amendment clarifies this policy intention in a way that removes any ambiguity that might have arisen from the previous text of the subsection. However, I remain extremely grateful to my noble friend for drawing that to the attention of the House. I am sorry that I detained the House a little longer than might be desirable at this time but these are complex provisions, and it may be helpful if I provide a little detail about this.

I conclude by dealing with the question of where parts of a claim may be involved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out a possible ambiguity. It may be that this is what he has in mind. I shall answer the question: why does the court have a discretion not to dismiss the claim when the claimant would suffer a substantial injustice? We believe that an element of discretion is necessary because difficult cases may arise where depriving the claimant entirely of damages may cause substantial injustice. This might be the case, for example, where a claimant had genuinely been very seriously injured through another person’s negligence, perhaps requiring substantial ongoing future care and support as a result, but stupidly colluded in a bogus minor injury claim by a family member in relation to the same accident. We do not, however, think there is any need to amend the provisions. We think that judges will be able to work with these provisions and that the Government’s intention and, I hope, that of noble Lords from all around the House, will be achieved by these important provisions. I hope that all noble Lords who have tabled amendments will agree to withdraw or not move them.

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[Lord Beecham]

I am afraid I cannot beat the brevity of that. I would like a little guidance from the Minister about the nature of the regulation. Can he give any indication of how effective whatever the regulatory body is—I confess that I do not know which it is—in overseeing this practice? I am entirely with the Government in wishing to ensure that such practices are limited as much as possible, for precisely the reasons that were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and with which we all concur: the promulgation of false claims, which is wrong in itself and, of course, a drain on the economy generally. I am not clear what the regulatory system currently is, or how effective it is. While supporting the Government’s intentions in the amendment, it would be helpful to have an impression of that.

[Lord Faulks]

I am happy to write to the noble Lord with as much detail as we have. In the mean time, I can tell him and the House that anecdotal evidence shows that the practice is more prevalent among solicitors than non-regulated persons. However, once there is a ban in place preventing legal services providers from offering an incentive to issue claims, there is a possibility that non-regulated persons offering inducements to issue claims with legal services providers will be used as a way around the ban.

As to what types of third party rather than regulated persons might offer a benefit, these are likely to be but not restricted to those working in what are described as “first notification of loss teams”. The teams are used by insurers and are the central point that clients contact when they wish to make a claim on their insurance policy. The intention is to ban any inducement which encourages or might have the effect of encouraging a person to make a claim or seek advice about making a claim, including so-called welcome payments, free gifts and cash advances.

The noble Lord will know that there is far too much by way of unsolicited phone calls going on in relation to personal injury claims, which is another matter we take seriously. It is a complex issue that requires action on a number of fronts, both legislative and non-legislative. We have taken a number of measures as set out in our nuisance calls action plan of 30 March. I can give the website address if necessary. It includes increasing the fines that Ofcom can issue from £50,000 to £2 million, enabling the Information Commissioner’s Office to issue fines of up to £500,000, and providing simple and consistent information to consumers on preventive action that they can take and how they can complain about unsolicited phone calls via Ofcom.

If the noble Lord is having particular difficulty with being asked to make fraudulent claims, which I am sure we have all encountered, he may wish to know that he can register with the Telephone Preference Service, which should result in his avoiding such claims. I hope that that provides some further information, but I undertake to give more information in due course.

[Lord Beecham]

I thank the noble Lord for providing further information, but it is not terribly helpful because the Telephone Preference Service seems to be totally useless. Apart from anything else, it does not seem to work with a BlackBerry these days. It is quite extraordinary. Having appreciated that regulated persons include members of my profession and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, I am sure that he will agree that it is a very sad commentary on the current state of what was a profession and is now increasingly descending, if I may put it that way, into a rather unscrupulous business —which is a matter I think we would both deplore.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 20th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the Bill extends electric monitoring, a procedure which thus far has proved problematic and extremely expensive, when you think of the problems with G4S and I think Serco in the contracts that they had. It extends the principle into new territory—namely, that of prisoners on licence. The policy in that respect has been criticised by the Chief Inspector of Prisons on the grounds that there is little evidence of absconding or committing further offences while prisoners are on licence. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s comments on that. In passing, I hope that he is in a position to deny current rumours that the highly respected chief inspector is unlikely to be reappointed. He has a deserved reputation for the job that he has been carrying out in difficult circumstances for the last few years.

The impact assessment in support of this provision is somewhat feeble. It states:

“Though benefits likely to arise from the increased use of ELM have been identified, we are not able to quantify these benefits at this stage, as ELM is not yet in widespread use in England and Wales. As such, we are unable to calculate impact”.

In other words, this is an impact assessment with no impact whatever. As the following further statement confirms, the number of additional prison places cannot be accurately estimated. Let us reflect on the terrible overcrowding in our prisons now, with a shocking rise in the number of suicides, as we read at the weekend. What is the Government’s estimate of the likely impact of the implication of this new technology, in terms of both cost and of increasing the prison population?

The way in which the Government intend to progress the matter is, as usual, equally unsatisfactory, with the Secretary of State empowered to impose a code of practice without parliamentary scrutiny or approval—hence Amendment 8, which would require such parliamentary approval for the code of practice that the Government envisage. Perhaps the Minister could tell us what is happening about the code. In Committee, the then Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who has escaped or is on licence to another department, said that a revised code would be issued to promote transparency in relation to outsourced services. What is happening about this? What consultations have taken place, and with whom? Will there be reports on the outcome of those consultations?

Amendment 7 would make contractors subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act in the same way as public authorities. It seems absurd that, in the world of the Ministry of Justice alone, Her Majesty’s prisons are subject to FOI requirements while private prisons are not. Given that we are talking about encroachments on the liberty of the individual—and they may well be justified in many cases—it is surely necessary to extend the protection of the FOI regime to this area. I should make it clear that we are not against electronic monitoring, as it clearly has a place, but it must be technically effective and cost effective, especially in the light of the previous experience, with the contracts that went so badly awry and led to large sums of money having to be reclaimed from the contractors, and applied sensibly. We have very little to go on at the moment in terms of how the new scheme would work.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Perhaps I should begin by suggesting that Amendment 6 is, perhaps, not as well conceived as it might be, because it would provide for the court to decline to impose an electronic monitoring condition in certain cases. However, the court has no role in setting conditions for offenders released from custody on to licence after serving the required part of their sentence. This is a matter for the Secretary of State, through the governor. The parole board also makes recommendations as to licence conditions when the offender is subject to discretionary release.

In the case of an electronic monitoring condition imposed by virtue of an order made under proposed new Section 62A of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, as inserted by Clause 7, this is solely a matter for the Secretary of State, through the governor. The amendment would actually have no effect. However, I understand the concern behind the amendment, which is that offenders should not be made subject to compulsory electronic monitoring when this is unsuitable for some reason, or when it is impractical. We recognise that there will be offenders who are unsuitable for compulsory electronic monitoring. For example, this may be because of physical or mental health issues, or because of a practical problem, such as not being able to make arrangements for the offender to recharge the battery in the tag.

These issues are, we suggest, already dealt with by the clause. The order-making power specifies that the Secretary of State may provide for cases in which the compulsory condition should not apply. I appreciate that this may not be immediately obvious from a reading of the clause, but the Explanatory Notes—although I take the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about their inadequacy in some respects, and I shall come on to deal with that—are helpful in this regard, as indeed was my noble friend Lord Ahmad when he spoke on the matter in Committee.

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[Lord Beecham]

Could the Minister indicate whether there will be consultation on those proposals, and with whom?

[Lord Faulks]

I hope to come to that in a moment.

As was explained in Committee, the code will not only encourage the use and enforcement of contractual provisions to ensure that current FoI obligations about information held on a contracting authority’s behalf are met but will promote the voluntary provision of other information where this would help to provide a more meaningful response to requests. The success of this approach will, as was also made clear in Committee, be monitored by both the Government and the Information Commissioner. If it does not achieve sufficient transparency, we will consider what other steps, including the possible formal extension of FoI to contractors, are required. Once the code of practice is issued, it is important that we give it the opportunity to prove its worth before deciding whether further measures are necessary. I therefore invite noble Lords not to press Amendments 7 and 120.

We also debated Amendment 8 in Committee, and I sought then to explain why it is not appropriate. We agree that the code of practice is a necessary and important document. It is intended to make sure that the necessary safeguards are in place for the proper management of the data gathered by electronic monitoring conditions. It will, of course, comply with the Data Protection Act. However, it is for operational purposes and will not introduce any new legal requirements. That is why we do not propose to agree its content through parliamentary procedure.

I should remind the House that it passed the provisions in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 that inserted new Section 215A into the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This also provides for a code of practice relating to the processing of data from electronic monitoring and is linked to provisions allowing location monitoring of offenders as a community requirement. This provision was approved by Parliament with no requirement for the code to be subject to affirmative secondary legislation. The amendment would, therefore, be inconsistent with the provisions already approved for a code of practice.

I should perhaps add a little more about the scrutiny that has been undertaken in relation to electronic monitoring and the approach to contract management that has informed the new contracts. Within the MoJ, and specific to electronic monitoring, this has meant the new contracts being drafted and let with key elements such as open-book accounting being critical. Accountability for contract management will be much clearer, with contract owners called regularly to account for their detailed knowledge of the contracts and their operational assurance that services are properly assured and audited.

On the amendment, I can only reiterate the assurances that I have given previously. We have committed to consultation on the code of practice, which will include consulting the Information Commissioner. I also confirm that the code of practice will be published. I do not have, at the moment, a specific date for publication of the code of practice but we hope to issue guidance to the standard contract clause by the end of 2014. If I receive further information on the probable date for the code of practice, I of course undertake to inform the House, and certainly the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.

I hope that I have satisfied the House on these issues of concern. Electronic monitoring would naturally be a matter of concern, but it is also a valuable tool in the detection and prevention of crime. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Beecham]

Because the Act to which we have already referred gives the Secretary of State the power to do exactly what is required. He should be exercising that power, and that is what we would expect him to do.

We share the concern of all Members of your Lordships’ House, and the deep anxiety voiced about what is happening to people who serve much longer sentences than the person whose plight is laid out in this correspondence. We call upon the Government to use the power that they rightly conferred upon themselves just two years ago. In that way the matter can be resolved. Of the 650 prisoners, while some are still deemed to be at high risk, many are already deemed to be at low risk and on that account very likely to be released. As other noble Lords have pointed out, that will free up prison spaces and potentially reduce the cost to the public purse, both of which are highly desirable objectives. Therefore I hope the Minister can give an indication that action will be taken—if not necessarily strictly along the lines that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has proposed then in some other way—to deal with the appalling situation affecting too many people which has accumulated over the years.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this has been an excellent and very well informed debate, with contributions from sources well versed in the law and experienced in criminal law, and sources who had occasion to come into contact with the law and its implications. I am grateful for all those contributions, many of which were extremely economical—I congratulate noble Lords on their restraint in allowing the House to proceed—but powerful.

We return to this subject of IPP prisoners who remain in prison despite the fact that the sentence has now been abolished and may not be imposed on offenders convicted after December 2012. We debated a very similar amendment at length in Committee so I do not intend to rehearse the entire debate we had then. Noble Lords are well aware of the Government’s position and we do not think it would be right or appropriate retrospectively to alter IPP sentences that had been lawfully imposed prior to the sentence’s abolition, particularly because these sentences were imposed with public protection issues in mind. However, I recognise, as many noble Lords have said, that fairness—an elusive concept though that is—should be at the forefront in considering these issues, as should the equally elusive concept of justice that is vital in considering issues of this sort. I am also painfully aware of the implications of keeping any prisoner one day longer than he or she ought to be kept in prison because of the expense involved, expense that we can ill afford, but the Secretary of State has to balance concepts of fairness and justice with his duty to protect the public.

Perhaps I may make one or two observations about the history, which has been summarised by noble Lords in the course of this debate. While echoing the worthwhile tributes paid to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for his tenacity in this area, I cannot quite agree with his assessment of the disparity in position between short-tariff IPP offenders sentenced before the 2008 reforms and those sentenced afterwards. It is not the case that, prior to 2008, courts were without any discretion in imposing IPP sentences. It was in the court’s discretion to judge whether the offender met the high risk threshold set out in the 2003 Act—did he present a significant risk of serious harm? The presumption that he presented such a risk if he had committed a previous Schedule 15 offence was a rebuttable presumption, and the court was free to disregard it if it was not a reasonable view in the individual case. I do not deny that, where they found the offender to meet the dangerousness threshold, courts were indeed obliged to impose IPPs on eligible offenders, and that was plainly Parliament’s intention.

I should also stress that it remained possible to receive an IPP with a lower tariff than two years until IPPs were abolished by this Conservative-led Government by the LASPO Act 2012 where the offender had a serious previous conviction, and in fact a number continued to get short-tariff IPPs. It is likely that some of those sentenced to IPPs with short tariffs between 2005 and 2008 would have remained eligible for an IPP, and perhaps received an IPP after the 2008 reforms. I cannot agree, therefore, that this group of IPP prisoners can be presumed to be less dangerous than other IPP prisoners.

As I have said before, it is right that offenders serving indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for public protection—a species of preventive detention, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said—should continue to be detained post tariff if their detention is necessary for the protection of the public and they are therefore not safe to release. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and a few others have seen an analysis of management information, prepared last year, relating to the situation of IPP prisoners who were sentenced prior to July 2008 with tariffs of under two years, who remained in prison and whose tariff had expired.

It is true that initially the cost of providing the information, which has been accurately summarised by the noble and learned Lord, was considered too high but, such was his tenacity and, as I understand it, such was the respect that the Ministry of Justice had for him, the information was provided and has been summarised by the noble and learned Lord. The position is that my colleague the Prisons Minister, Andrews Selous, has agreed with the House authorities that the information can be lodged in the House Library. It will take one week for this to appear but I confirm that he has requested that it be put in the Library. However, I can also confirm that the figures that the noble and learned Lord announced were accurate, so they have informed the debate in terms of the numbers and the periods in prison.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for setting out his amendment so clearly. What lies behind it is wholly understandable. However, it must be put in the context of the significant programme of reforms that the Government have introduced on the police use of stop and search, to which the noble Lord did make reference.

Noble Lords will be aware that on 30 April, the Home Secretary announced a comprehensive package of measures to reform the way that stop and search is used. The measures, some of which were launched on 26 August, will ensure that the powers are used fairly, effectively, and in a way that encourages community confidence. These measures will impact positively on all sections of the community, including children. The Government are highly sensitive to the need to ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place so that the public can trust the police to use all their powers appropriately. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act and its codes of practice have robust safeguards that ensure consistency, transparency and rigour in the way in which stop and search is used by the police.

The use of stop and search has reduced significantly under this Government. However, these powers are vital in the fight against crime and the police must be able to act promptly should they have a reasonable suspicion that a person is carrying an unlawful item. It is a sad fact that in some areas it is quite common for children under the age of criminal responsibility to be used by older children and adults to carry drugs and weapons and, in some cases, firearms for the criminal benefit of others, either in the hope that police may not suspect that they are being used to carry the items or in the knowledge that if they are suspected of being couriers or are stopped and searched, they cannot be arrested or prosecuted for any criminal offence because they are below the age of criminal responsibility.

There are also operational difficulties. How does a police officer judge a child’s age with any precision? What do the police do while waiting for the “appropriate adult” referred to in the amendment to arrive? There are safety issues, too. What if the child has been given a gun or a knife by older gang members? One knows how easy it is for older gang members to manipulate younger ones.

These issues need mature consideration. That is why I maintain what I said in Committee, that although we remain open to revising or improving—if appropriate—the very considerable steps we have taken to improve stop and search powers, we will await the final report at the end of this month and take notice of any recommendation to change the operational procedures. However, I am sure the noble Lord and the House will bear in mind the significant reform package that we have already brought before the House.

I will me give a further example of the operational difficulties that might be caused if this amendment were to find its way on to the statute book. Imagine that a fight breaks out between two gangs of youths and the police have reasonable suspicions that weapons have been concealed. If the police were then required to wait, this could prevent them from acting in a case where there is an immediate issue of public safety involved. That could be difficult, as I am sure the House will understand.

There are already important safeguards attached to Section 1 stop and searches, which were outlined when the amendment was last debated on 14 July. They apply to anyone who is stopped and searched, regardless of age. Furthermore—this is worth stressing—Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places the police under an obligation to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when exercising their functions.

This is stop and search—which is, one hopes, a fleeting encounter to, if necessary, disable somebody who the police reasonably think has something that they need to have removed from their possession. However, in response to the noble Lord’s understandable concern, let me stress that the Government have made a priority of ensuring that stop and search should be used fairly, so that the police target this power when they have reasonable suspicions that a person is carrying an unlawful item. In those situations, where there is a risk to public safety, we suggest that it is right that the power to stop and search an individual is not unduly restricted, regardless of age.

Unfortunately, it is not entirely a creature of a bygone age, as the noble Lord suggests, in harking back to Oliver Twist or something of that sort. There is a case that, unfortunately, young children are used in the way that I have described. The requirement to wait until an “appropriate adult” turns up is difficult, and unnecessary in light of the safeguards that exist to protect the welfare of children under the age of criminal responsibility.

While I understand the noble Lord’s concern, and the initial hesitation that anybody would have with a child under 10 being involved in the criminal justice system, we suggest that there is reason for this power to exist, appropriately circumscribed in the way that I have attempted to describe. For those reasons I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response. I shall not ask the House to divide on the amendment but I will make a couple of suggestions to him. First, in the mean time, the proper recording of events—ascertaining names, addresses and dates of birth—should become pro forma. It is surprising that it is not yet universal. It would be a relatively straightforward matter. I presume that it would be for the Home Office to direct the police authorities, but no doubt words ought to be had with ministerial colleagues about that. Secondly, given that Scotland has now changed the law, I suggest that in a year or 18 months, whichever Government are in office at that time—I hope that it might be a different one—could look at the Scottish experience. I take the Minister’s point but it is more relevant to the stopping than to the searching. We agree that it necessary for the police to stop, but the question is about the search part of it. Given that Scotland has made a change in respect of the age of 12, I would have thought that its experience, within a relatively short period, would be relevant here. If the Minister would be good enough to give an undertaking—if he or his party are still in office at that point—that that would be put into force, it would be a welcome concession. I hope that an incoming Government from our party would take the same position. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, Amendment 51 relates to identity theft, which is a growing problem, particularly in this age of cybercrime. It is rising rapidly and is estimated to cost more than £3 billion a year. It is usually referred to in the context of fraud and economic crime but, as I said in Committee, a number of offences could apply to the use of someone else’s identity; for example, those under the Fraud Act 2006, the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981, the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and the Theft Act. As the Minister said in Committee, these relate to the use of a false identity for fraud purposes. For example, Section 2 of the 2006 Act deals with the crime of fraud by false representation. In the Minister’s words, this would,

“cover a person pretending to be someone else for the purposes of making a gain for himself or another”.—[Official Report, 14/7/14; col. 485.]

However, the motive might not be economic gain; it might be to obtain information for personal reasons or in the course of undercover activities, such as some of those that have featured in industrial disputes or civil liberties and environmental campaigns. There is also the kind that I saw demonstrated in a remarkable one-man show at the Edinburgh Festival by the stand-up comedian—if that is not too limited a description—Mark Thomas. He had been working for an environmental campaign and someone attached himself to it—not an undercover policeman in this case but an undercover person employed by someone else. It took a long time for this chap to be exposed but exposed he was. He had used a false identity to become involved in the organisation.

In Committee, the Minister criticised the amendment on the grounds that it would also apply to innocent persons; for example, people who collect a parcel from the post office using a relative’s identification. That is a little far-fetched. It ignores the unlikelihood of anyone being charged with an offence in such circumstances and, perhaps more relevantly, the explicit provision contained in the amendment empowering the Secretary of State to set out in regulations what would constitute a defence to a charge under the proposed new section.

In fairness, the Minister outlined a range of initiatives being pursued by a variety of bodies and this is welcome, although it is unclear how co-ordinated the activity is. However, given the very serious concerns about fraud and infractions of privacy, it is surely time to consolidate and update the legislation. I suggested that it would be helpful to hear a report on progress in this area before Report, and it is disappointing that this has not occurred. I request that the Minister takes another look at the issue to see whether he can come back at Third Reading with a more helpful resolution to the problem. For the avoidance of doubt, I assure him that the amendment is not designed to protect Nigel Farage and UKIP from identity theft at the hands of David Cameron and the Conservative Party. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the Government recognise that there are significant challenges in dealing with the many consequences of identity theft. However, as I explained in Committee, these challenges relate to the difficulty of identifying and catching offenders, rather than to any lack in the criminal law.

The proposed amendment suggests:

“A person is guilty of an offence if, knowingly and without reasonable cause, he uses a means of identification of another person or a fictitious person”.

It omits any reference to the consent of that other person and proposed new subsection (3) leaves the defence to be made by regulations set out by the Secretary of State. That is a fairly novel proposal: a Secretary of State who does not enjoy the undivided confidence of the party opposite is being asked to set out in regulations the nature of the defence.

[Lord Beecham]

Perhaps it might be a job for the Minister.

[Lord Faulks]

I am flattered by the suggestion. However, whether it is done by me, an official or anyone else, it is a slightly strange way of formulating an offence.

I respectfully ask: where is the gap? The Fraud Act 2006 already includes offences that would apply to anyone who assumes a false or non-existent identity to commit fraud. In particular, Section 2 sets out the crime of fraud by false representation, which would cover a person pretending to be someone else for the purpose of making a gain for himself or another.

While identity theft is not in itself a criminal offence, the use of a false identity for the purposes of fraud is. As drafted, the amendment would apply to innocent persons who were able to represent a relative or partner when conducting financial or domestic affairs on their behalf with permission from the identity-holder. The noble Lord cast some scorn on the example I gave in Committee of collecting a parcel on behalf of someone else. I accept that no sane prosecutor or police officer would take that matter further. None the less, it is alarming to think that that could constitute a criminal offence, albeit one that one would not expect the police or the prosecution to pursue.

I assure the House that the Government take identity crime extremely seriously. I should like to remind the House of some of the initiatives being pursued to prevent identity crime. We are working with banks and credit card companies to promote technical solutions to identity theft to help the victims of such crimes. We are also working with credit reference agencies to provide a free service for anyone who has had their personal details used fraudulently. The credit reference agencies liaise with each other and the banks to restore compromised personal credit records. The service can be accessed by contacting Experian, Equifax or Call Credit. The Home Office is also leading a multi-agency strategic group formed to reduce the threat to the UK. The group is engaged in a range of activities to tackle the problem, such as strengthening the issuing process for government documents, tackling the supply of specialist printing equipment for criminal purposes, improving data-sharing of false identities and taking down websites offering false documents for sale.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, in supporting this amendment. I hope the Government will look at it sympathetically. In previous debates, the Minister had some reservations about costs and the like, which have now been addressed by the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. I very much hope that the Minister will indicate that the Government are prepared to accept that.

If there remain any areas of doubt, then perhaps he would undertake to bring the matter back at Third Reading so that any potential difficulties or shortcomings might be addressed. It is clearly not easy to do that after 10 pm on the first day on Report. I hope we can resolve any remaining doubts at Third Reading, though if the Minister is able to accept the amendment this evening then so much the better.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for his continued concern and interest in this matter, and for his elegant and accurate summary of the progress of the amendment and the resultant meetings that took place with me, my noble friend Lord Bates and Home Office officials. I hope that the noble Lord is reassured that the Government now recognise his concerns, which have been eloquently supported this evening by my noble friend Lord Lexden, as they were in Committee.

The Protection of Freedoms Act reflected the Government’s determination that people’s lives should not be unfairly blighted by historical convictions for consensual gay sex with people over 16. However, where someone has died, these provisions would not have the same effect. The Government accept that, as well as removing obstacles for the living to find work, there is a recognition that a disregard puts right a historic wrong, and that this would apply to the deceased as well as the living.

Following the helpful discussions the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, had with me, my noble friend Lord Bates and Home Office officials, the Government are willing to explore ways of achieving disregards for the deceased, over a longer timescale. What I mean by “over a longer timescale” is not while this Bill is going through its process and not by Third Reading, as I understand my noble friend was indicating. He may ask why not. We have made some progress, but officials would want to carry out a full and proper assessment. Some issues that require attention include a precise definition of who could apply on behalf of the deceased. We have made progress in that. There is an assumption that the amount of applications will be manageable, but we want to carry out more work to obtain greater confidence on this, as each application does place a significant burden of work on the police in tracing local records. On documentary evidence, the effect of a disregard is not clear, as there are no police records to delete, and we would not want to destroy historic records from the National Archives.

These points were touched on in our meetings, but officials are most anxious that all those matters should be completely resolved before proceeding to legislate rather than to impose too heavy a burden, when we ask them to focus on so many other issues. We want to ensure that the decision to disregard maintains the current exacting standard to ensure that only the deserving are granted a disregard. Of course, there are very deserving cases.

While I cannot accept this amendment and I am not committing to introduce such a change in this Bill, the Home Office repeats its commitment to consider this matter and would be happy to include the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in any further discussions. He has done the House a great service by bringing this to our attention but I hope the assurances that I have given will allow him to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, were any other Members present, they might share my bewilderment at being faced at a very late stage, not only today but in the process of the Bill, with a series of amendments of what can only be described as some complexity for those of us—and I suspect that is most of us—who are not familiar with the territory to which the noble Lord has introduced us this evening at some length. As he has said, it is not possible—it is simply laughable—to endeavour to take these amendments to a vote tonight, but it may also be difficult to do this in time for Third Reading. The Minister may be able to comment on that.

Among these puzzling amendments I am puzzled most by Amendment 106C, with its reference in particular to a defence of there being a view to publication of journalistic, literary or artistic material. I do not see how that meets the more substantive case that I can well see in relation to what might be called the Leveson issues in 106A. These are matters that clearly need to be investigated further. I do not know whether the noble Lord envisages having these matters dealt with at Third Reading, but frankly I should have thought that that was unrealistic at this stage of the Bill. There may be another opportunity with other Bills for these matters to be taken forward. They are of such complexity that it is unreasonable to expect them to be dealt with in the course of this Bill. If that sounds a bit too ministerial, I apologise. I apprehend that the Minister might for once think that I am on the right track. We shall find out shortly.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, often sounds ministerial, and from comments that he may have made earlier this afternoon he is clearly anticipating events in May when he will be able to perform that task. I do find myself in the rare position of agreeing with his comments generally about these amendments, in that they have appeared very late—late even among the amendments that have appeared in the course of this Bill, and there has been no shortage of amendments and no shortage of complexity in amendments. Indeed, I pay tribute to Members of the House for managing to get through so many amendments of such complexity today. It has taken a great deal of restraint by Members to enable the arguments to be deployed, often by others. No doubt those Members who restrained themselves may have thought they would have made better arguments or expressed the arguments with more clarity than those who did speak, but admirable restraint was shown.

We come to consider these amendments. My noble friend Lord Marks will appreciate that the pressures of time on myself and my officials has limited my ability to respond adequately to what are plainly serious issues, as he has outlined. I intend to speak to Amendments 106C and 106D in this group first. Sections 77 and 78 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 already provide for the changes that have been proposed for the Data Protection Act. Section 77 provides for an order-making power permitting the Secretary of State to introduce a custodial sentence for breaches of the offence in Section 55 of the Data Protection Act 1998. The penalty will apply irrespective of who has committed the offence. Given that people’s liberty is at stake and the seriousness of the offence, it is vital that proper thought is given to the introduction of such a change. That is why Parliament also provided that there must be a properly undertaken and detailed consultation with the Information Commissioner, the media and other potentially affected parties before that penalty applies. Therefore, such a change in the law now would be premature.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I cannot add much to what I have already said. For the first time, in statute—if this clause becomes law—we shall have a requirement for information about financial resources to be provided. We shall also have clear guidance to the court as to how it should exercise its discretion on using that information about financial resources. I think that the noble Lord himself said that it was useful to have some of these things stated in the statute. That is precisely what we are doing.

[Lord Beecham]

The Minister has battled with arguments from around the House with as much valour as Richard III displayed at the battle of Bosworth, and with approximately the same result. The Minister’s arguments fell very far short of providing evidence of the case that the Government are seeking to rely on. We heard from him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, about two cases. I am not sure whether one of those was hypothetical or not—I think it was a planning matter of the kind that the noble and learned Lord referred to—and the other was the Richard III case. As to the illustration of Islington cited by the noble and learned Lord, I think that the circumstances would be different now. Speaking as someone whose daughter lives in Islington and whose son has just sold a tiny flat for an enormous amount of money in Islington, I think it would be difficult to find anybody who could be described as poor in large parts of that borough. However, leaving that aside, and more substantively, let us look at the Richard III case. There is a point, and it is a fair point, about shell companies being established for that purpose.

[Lord Faulks]

I am hesitant to interrupt the noble Lord, but since he is coming on to deal with Richard III, and I was asked a question about it, I now have a better answer than the one I gave earlier. He may be able to comment on my answer, so I shall give him an opportunity that he might not otherwise have had. The position is that in the Richard III case the claimant—a shell company—got an absolute protective costs order as the company had no assets, so no costs at all were payable when the claimant lost the case.

[Lord Beecham]

I repeat that I think there is a potential issue with shell companies. How many other cases of that kind have occurred? The only one we have heard about, and the only one to which the former Lord Chancellor has legitimately referred, is the Richard III case. How many of the other 336 cases that have been brought for judicial review in the past few years have involved what I agree is an abuse? If there is a problem, which the noble and learned Lord and the Minister are perfectly right to address, could it not be dealt with differently? If necessary, there could be legislation dealing precisely with that situation, rather than a general application of principle which could affect many others who are perfectly legitimately seeking to advance their claim? It is fair to say that the Minister has not given the impression of knowing—I do not blame him, because I am in no better a position—whether the court’s current discretion will extend, as implied by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to dealing with that situation now. If it did not, we would be prepared to support and discuss what kind of amendment might be made to the Bill to deal with that particular and discrete situation, as I have no doubt other noble Lords, particularly noble and learned Lords, would be.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am afraid that I am unable to resist thanking all noble Lords for their interventions on this debate. They have been extremely helpful, and I mean that. This is particularly in the light of the fact that I indicated at Second Reading—as has been referred to in the course of the debate—that we were listening to arguments about this clause. My honourable friend Shailesh Vara MP also gave such an indication in the other place. We will have benefitted greatly from the debate today in deciding on our final position.

Although the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that I was grateful for the intervention from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, it is of course the House which is grateful for all contributions on all sides. With great respect, the point about an intervention is not that it assists any one side, but that it assists the court. An intervention is there to assist the court. I noted and agreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, who said that interventions are extremely helpful. They certainly can be extremely helpful, but not all interventions are equally helpful.

Clause 67 as currently constituted aims to strengthen the cost rules relating to third parties who voluntarily apply to join in a judicial review case as interveners. I stress “voluntarily” apply. These interveners can include anyone who is interested in the issues which the court is considering, and they seek permission from the court to intervene in a judicial review case through filing evidence or making representations. Of course, I accept the fact that interveners can add value and assist, as many noble and learned Lords have said. However, they can also delay and hinder. Sometimes they make arguments beyond those required by the court, or merely amplify or repeat those already made by a party.

Here I must declare an interest. I have been in a considerable number of cases where there have been interveners, at the level of both the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court, and on one occasion I acted for an intervener. In fact, I think that that was in the very same case in which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was also acting for an intervener. I am glad to say that we kept our remarks within the short compass, and our skeleton arguments were similarly brief. I do have experience of the mounting level of interventions in litigation.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to the possible chilling effect on those who habitually intervene; those were his words. With great respect, in his use of the word “habitually” there is perhaps an indication of something about which the Government are concerned. There are of course cases where the court is greatly assisted by interventions brought by a disinterested party, which can bring a particular knowledge or contribution to the debate. However, the court might be less assisted by those who habitually intervene and who have a particular agenda which may require or indicate that they support one side or another.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, who is to decide whether a habitual intervener should be allowed to intervene? What is wrong with the court making that decision of its own volition?

[Lord Faulks]

I was coming to that very point. Interventions can prove difficult for the courts to control. The reason I say that is because on occasions an application is made for an intervener to intervene and, on the face of it, the judge deciding whether or not they can intervene will do so on the basis that they have a knowledge of the case. The judge, having regard to the submissions that he or she receives, considers that the intervener might well be of assistance. The level and degree of intervention is then very often beyond the control of the judge who originally gave permission, so that one can then encounter—perhaps at the hearing of a judicial review, or at the Court of Appeal stage—a very substantial skeleton argument, bundles of authorities, and arguments which range very loosely around the subject matter of the dispute. Here I speak from experience.

Inevitably, this causes expense to all parties involved, whether the applicant or the respondent, because they have to consider the arguments. They cannot rest assured that the judge is simply going to ignore everything on the basis that it might be outside the scope of the intervention. Of course, good judges customarily curtail submissions made orally once the matter gets to the stage of a hearing, and do so effectively. That does not remove the danger of quite excessive levels of intervention and contribution.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I will compensate for the length of time that the noble Lord took—quite rightly—in moving his amendment by being commensurately brief in my remarks. On behalf of the Opposition, I support a stand part negative, as it were, in relation to Clause 70, for the reasons that the noble Lord advanced.

Amendment 82B, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy, would effectively disapply Clauses 64 to 69 in favour of the terms set out, which would align the situation to that of the Aarhus convention. I think we are of one mind in inviting the Government to look again into this issue. It is another example of them failing to appreciate the implications—to put it in a benevolent sort of way—of what they are doing in this connection, not just to domestic concerns but to the international obligations to which we subscribe. I hope the Government will listen seriously to the noble Lord’s critique, look again at the amendments tabled, including the amendment in my name, and revise their position before we get much further down the road with this Bill.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords—my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham—for their contributions to this debate. Clause 70 enables provision to be made to exclude judicial reviews about issues which relate entirely or partly to the environment from the revised costs capping regime established in Clauses 68 and 69, which we debated in the previous group. Clause 70 is to reflect our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the various European directives which implement it, which set out requirements for access to justice concerning environmental matters. This includes a stipulation that such procedures must be,

“fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.

This is relevant to judicial reviews in certain environmental cases. Allowing for such environmental cases to be excluded from the costs capping regime in Clauses 68 and 69 allows the Secretary of State enough flexibility to meet future changes in the international landscape. A separate regime has already been established in the Civil Procedure Rules to govern costs capping orders in such cases in England and Wales. It applies a fixed costs framework under which, in a claim raising issues that fall under the Aarhus convention, the liability of the claimant to pay the defendant’s costs is automatically capped at certain levels. This regime is simple to operate and understand.

Amendments 81C and 82B would seek to exclude certain types of judicial review from the provisions in Clauses 64 to 69. Those claims might be considered very broadly as “environmental”. Amendment 81C defines those cases that are excluded by reference to the Aarhus convention and introduces a requirement that, provided certain conditions are met, costs capping orders should be made in these cases.

Amendment 81C also aims to restore the full recoverable success fee and after-the-event insurance premium structure that the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 removed, implementing the Jackson reforms to reduce excessive costs in civil litigation. Amendment 82C would seek to define what would fall within the definition of an Aarhus convention claim. Amendment 81A is contingent on Amendment 81C. Its effect is to make Clause 69 subject to the changes to Clause 70, which I have already discussed.

Attempting to define these claims in statute risks either being too generous and gold-plating the Aarhus requirements, or alternatively being too restrictive and missing out claims which should be caught by the Aarhus regime. The definition as set out in the proposed new clause is very broad, and appears to err on the side of gold-plating. In particular, we would not necessarily accept that all private law claims falling within the new clause should come under the term “Aarhus Convention claim”.

The Government see no reason for excluding additional cases, particularly such a broad range of cases as would be covered by these amendments. Too broad a definition would create an incentive for claimants to characterise their claims as “environmental”, generating satellite litigation and assisting, for example, those bringing weak claims to shelter from their proper costs liability. In the Government’s view Clause 70, which allows for the exclusion of certain environmental judicial reviews from the new protective costs order regime which Clauses 68 and 69 will establish, is sufficient to ensure compliance with our obligations under the Aarhus convention and the directives which implement it. The proposed new clauses would upset the careful balance between ensuring the proper measure of access to justice in environmental and other matters and ensuring that judicial review is not misused.

I turn now to Amendment 82D. The new clause seeks to amend Section 10 of the LASPO Act, which makes provision about exceptional case determinations for individuals, and Schedule 3 to that Act, which makes provision about exceptional case determinations for legal persons, so that Section 10 and Schedule 3 would both refer explicitly to claims for judicial review related to the Aarhus convention. The Government do not believe that such an inclusion is necessary. First, funding would already be available to bring a judicial review with a potential benefit to the environment, subject to the merits and means test. This is in the scope of the general civil legal aid scheme by virtue of paragraph 19 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to LASPO. Section 10 of LASPO provides for exceptional funding in cases that are outside the general scope of civil legal aid. Secondly, along with the provisions of the Aarhus convention, this amendment is concerned with reflecting EU directives. The current provisions under Section 10 and Schedule 3 already provide for legal aid to be granted where it is necessary to make the services available to the individual or legal person because failure to do so would be a breach of the individual or the person’s enforceable EU rights.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to reviewing the CPR. The Government have committed to reviewing the costs regime for environmental cases when the European Court of Justice handed down its judgment in the Commission v the United Kingdom case. Following that judgment in February this year, and recent case law, we are reviewing the current costs regime. As part of that review, we will consider whether the current costs regime for Aarhus claims should make provision for statutory review proceedings dealing with environmental matters, look at what scope there is to amend the current cap—which is currently £5,000 for individuals and £10,000 for businesses—and consider the principles determining what level of costs in a particular case would be prohibitively expensive, as set out in Edwards v Environment Agency and reiterated by the European Court of Justice in its various infraction judgments, and whether they could be included in the costs regime.

The Government do not accept that all private nuisance claims are caught by the convention requirements. They tend to focus on enabling those with interests in land to protect their private property rights rather than enabling members of the public to challenge environmentally deleterious acts. However, on the occasions where a private nuisance claim relates to actions which do not merely harm the claimant’s private property rights but contravene provisions of national law relating to the environment, there are judicial and administrative procedures which may be relied upon by members of the public.

The Aarhus convention protects the right of environmental NGOs to bring judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to intervene in existing cases, so Clause 67 does not put the UK in breach. As to reviewing the application of LASPO to this area, I recall that during the debate when the LASPO Bill was going through Parliament there was an attempt to carve out an exception for cases of this sort. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the Committee will have heard me say, the Government are committed to reviewing the effect of the LASPO provisions, but it is far too early to do so in this particular context. The review will take place within five years—perhaps sooner than five years, but certainly not much sooner—so as to allow a full review of the effect, bearing in mind in particular that there was a large spike in cases before April 2013, the cut-off date, which may make it very difficult to analyse satisfactorily the effect of LASPO.

Of course, I will reflect carefully on the observations of my noble friend Lord Marks and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, but I gratefully decline my noble friend’s invitation to amend the Long Title of the Bill as currently advised. It is our view that these provisions are sufficient to ensure compliance with our obligations under the convention and the EU directives. I therefore respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Faulks]

My legal caution found me using the expression “alleged”.

[Lord Beecham]

Perhaps the noble Lord will pass the legal caution on to the Lord Chancellor.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that contribution.

The Lord Chancellor made in the Daily Telegraph various comments which resulted in what was described—not alleged to have been described—as a “kick in the shins” by Lord Justice Moses. All I can say is that, during the time I have been standing at the Dispatch Box, the Lord Chancellor’s shins have been extremely bruised by the number of comments that have been adverse to him personally, to his responsibility to the office or to his disregard for the rule of law. I am sure that he is painfully aware of the harm that has been done to him by the observations that have been made. It is a matter for your Lordships whether you think that is appropriate.

I should also say this. Of course, the withdrawal of legal aid in any context is not something that any Government relish, but throughout the period—and we are now coming to the end of this Parliament—the party opposite has opposed all cuts to legal aid, whether they are civil legal aid cuts or criminal legal aid cuts. They have advanced very skilfully all sorts of arguments about the outrage that has followed. It is time for some clarity to emerge from the party opposite as to whether it will in fact restore legal aid to all these areas where it is said that it has been wrongly withdrawn or whether this is to some extent posturing on their part.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to the difficulties that she described of children in particular in relation to the residence test. Although, as I say, I am not going to go into great detail because it is all to be considered by the court—at least in terms of the vires of the residence test—the Government’s position is that they do not believe that the JCHR should have concluded what it concluded in that respect. The committee appears to have proceeded on the basis that a child needs a lawyer in all cases to represent them and to ensure that their views are taken into account. There have always been cases where the child speaks for himself directly or where a parent or guardian ensures that the views of the child are properly taken into account. The Government are not aware of any evidence before the committee that indicated in such cases the child is not able to express views and participate appropriately in legal proceedings.

Following the ruling of the court in the residence test case, noble Lords will be aware that the draft order introducing the residence test was withdrawn. The amendment before the Committee now would therefore introduce an exception to the residence test in the abstract. I would respectfully suggest that the appropriate place to consider any exceptions would be while considering the residence test as a whole, rather than in isolation and in the context of a free-standing provision for judicial review. Nevertheless—there should be no mystery about this—I should make it clear that we do not agree that an exception should be made to the residence test for all judicial review proceedings. The test reflects our view that individuals should have a strong connection to the United Kingdom in order to benefit from the civil legal aid scheme. In line with those principles, we therefore decided that, in general, applications for legal aid for judicial review proceedings should be subject to the same test.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to certain “concessions”, as she described them. What happened was that, following careful consideration, we proposed certain limited and focused exceptions for judicial review cases that relate to an individual’s liberty, and for certain immigration and asylum judicial reviews. I am glad that she called them concessions; she previously described the Government’s position as a “climb-down”, which is perhaps not a kind way in which to describe the approach that the Government try to take on difficult decisions.

We believe that the residence test is by and large a fair test that should make sure that legal aid is targeted at those cases where it is justified. Moreover, it achieves the essential policy aim of targeting legal aid at those with a strong connection to the United Kingdom. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, a wasted costs order transfers costs caused by the legal representative’s improper conduct from the party to the legal representative personally. The clause places a new duty on the courts, where a wasted costs order is made, to notify a legal representative’s regulator—I confirm that all the regulators mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would be included, within the definition of the 2007 Act—and/or the Legal Aid Agency, where the court considers it appropriate to do so.

The clause’s rationale, and the reason it should stand part of the Bill, is that there are no further formal consequences when a wasted costs order is made. The Government’s view is that the implications of receiving a wasted costs order should be strengthened to encourage legal representatives to consider more carefully decisions they make, both in handling claims and in deciding whether or not to pursue a case. The changes introduced by the clause seek to achieve this, and I will therefore in due course urge that Clause 50 stands part of the Bill.

Amendment 69A, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Kennedy, seeks to replace the duty to consider notifying the regulators or the Legal Aid Agency with the discretion for the court to decide whether or not to notify them where it considers that it is appropriate to do so. It does so by changing “must” to “may”. In the Government’s view, the amendment is unnecessary. The mandatory requirement—the “must”—goes no further than requiring the court to notify where it considers it appropriate. The court is not absolutely required to inform the listed bodies or persons, or to inform any one of them, but to inform such of them, if any, as it considers appropriate. If the court does not consider it appropriate to inform any of those listed, it does not have to do so. Accordingly, it has to consider whether it is appropriate to inform one or more of them but it is not obliged to do so in a particular case: it is entirely a matter for the court. The discretion that the amendment seeks to introduce is already provided for in the clause as drafted.

Our view is that the courts should consider making a notification in every case where a wasted costs order is made but that it would be inappropriate to require it in every case. We agree that it is a matter for the courts based on the facts of the individual case. When notified of a wasted costs order, it will be for the relevant body to decide what, if any, action should be taken. Clause 50 does not make mandatory any action, as in the Government’s view that is properly a matter for the body based on the individual circumstances.

The noble Lord asked about the position of the Bar Standards Board, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and, I think, the Legal Aid Agency. The independence of the regulators is a fundamental principle and we do not wish to undermine this by setting out what action they should take upon receipt of a wasted costs notification. The Government have been in touch with the relevant bodies, informing them of the changes under Clause 50 and offering advice as to how they may wish to proceed. The Bar Standards Board has advised that it would treat the matter under existing procedures as an expression of concern about a barrister’s conduct. It might choose to investigate and could ultimately take formal disciplinary action if it considered it appropriate to do so. The Solicitors Regulation Authority would also welcome wasted costs order notifications and would treat such information in the same way as it treats all intelligence that it receives. The Legal Aid Agency is looking into taking account of wasted costs orders using existing contract performance management mechanisms for current legal aid contracts and contracts commencing this August. If adopted, contract managers would consider the number and financial value of wasted costs orders made and discuss them with the provider directly. The Legal Aid Agency might consider it appropriate to issue a contract notice or to take other contractual enforcement steps.

In view of the explanation that I hope that I have provided, and in view of the fact that I understood this probably to be a probing amendment, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 69A, and I urge the Committee to agree to Clause 50 standing part of the Bill.

[Lord Beecham]

I suppose that I should have declared an interest as a member of the Law Society, although I confess—thank heavens—that I am not actively practising my profession and have not done for some time.

I thank the Minister for his explanation. I am still slightly at a loss to understand how it can be claimed that, as far as the solicitors’ profession is concerned, the clause would make any difference, given the Law Society’s stated response, as I have already indicated, that:

“The Solicitors Regulation Authority would not take further action if notified that a wasted costs order has been made against a solicitor”.

I do not know whether that has been discussed directly with the authority or whether there has been subsequent discussions and a change of position. It just stands slightly at odds with the Minister’s reply. Perhaps he would care to look into that and write to me, placing a copy of the response in the Library, because it looks as though different approaches may be being adopted by two of the three parts of the profession.

Having said that, I certainly concur with the noble Lord that this is essentially a probing amendment and I beg leave to withdraw it.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I now turn to Clauses 51 and 52 and government Amendment 86. Clause 51 amends the Contempt of Court Act 1981 by introducing a defence available to publishers or distributors. This provides that, where they have published material relevant to proceedings but prior to those proceedings becoming active, they cannot be in contempt unless the Attorney-General has given notice that proceedings are active. If the publisher fails to remove the material, the Attorney-General can commence contempt proceedings. Clause 52 provides a related right to appeal against court injunctions.

These clauses were included in the Bill at introduction to implement recommendations by the Law Commission intended to reform the law of strict liability contempt. The purpose was to remove the burden on publishers to monitor online archives for potentially contemptuous material, while protecting a defendant’s right to a fair trial. However, the Government have received representations from media organisations making it clear that they oppose the measures. The Joint Committee on Human Rights also commented on the issue in its 14th report of this Session. The Government have carefully considered those concerns. We remain of the view that the proposals are balanced and measured but we are satisfied that the existing law will continue to provide satisfactory protection to the integrity of legal proceedings.

Since the measures were intended to assist the media but the media do not want them, we see no purpose in proceeding with the clauses. The then Attorney-General therefore announced in a statement on 30 June, and I also gave notice at Second Reading, that the Government had decided not to pursue the measure and would seek to omit the clauses from the Bill. Amendment 86 is consequential to the omission of Clause 51, since there is no purpose in defining its extent. I urge the Committee to agree that Clauses 51 and 52 should not stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, as the noble Lord the Minister said, the Government have had second thoughts—somewhat belatedly, but nevertheless just in time—about their proposal to create a new defence to the strict liability rule in relation to the offence of contempt of court, where material published on the internet before criminal proceedings commence remains accessible online. The objects of the Government’s policy are clearly laudable but the method involved the Attorney-General issuing notices to publishers identifying prejudicial material. While the notion seems sensible in principle, the JCHR has pointed out concerns that this risks creating what it described as an “arbitrary or disproportionate” exercise of power by the Attorney-General, since the Bill in no way qualified the power by restricting its exercise to where there might be a,

“substantial risk of serious prejudice”,

despite the Government’s indication that this was their intention.

The JCHR also questioned whether the “public interest” defence contained in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was affected by the Bill as it was drafted. Perhaps the Minister would care to respond to that. I appreciate that it is almost irrelevant but it would be interesting to know whether the Government had taken that point in the original draft. The committee went on to express surprise at the Government’s state of denial that the arrangements had any implications for the freedom of expression and, further, that they did not intend to lay down regulations about the exercise of the Attorney-General’s power. This looked an appealing notion in many ways but it was ill thought through and led to some wholly inadequate drafting of the clauses that the Government have now withdrawn, having clearly had second thoughts about them.

It would be churlish not to welcome this apparent change of heart; after all, for every Minister that repenteth there is much rejoicing—especially when it comes to the Ministry of Justice—if not in heaven then in legal and judicial circles. However, none of this must be taken by the less responsible elements of the media as a licence to produce or permit the continued publication of material that might prejudice a fair trial. We have seen the media—sometimes the print media but also other forms that have such wide circulation nowadays—engage in such publication too often.

It may be necessary to revisit the issue at some point, but in that case I trust that this or any succeeding Government would look carefully at the points raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which certainly merit reflection. If anything were to be done along the lines of, or motivated in the same way as, the Government’s original proposals, obviously it would be sensible to incorporate those concerns and to deal with them in a way that might meet them if it became necessary—although one would hope that it would not—to strengthen the law in this area. Perhaps the second to last thing that anyone would want to do would be to curb the freedom of the press; the last thing that anyone would want to do would be to prejudice the possibility of a fair trial. The media has a role in ensuring that that highly desirable end is met in all circumstances. I do not dissent from the noble Lord’s withdrawal of the two clauses.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this has been, as ever, a very well informed and interesting debate, and it has been particularly beneficial to have the views of those who are not lawyers to consider. I suppose I must congratulate the Minister on this occasion on having at least two supporters from the government Benches, which is double the usual quotient, if not better than that. I simply say, however, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, who makes a valid point about financial information, to which we will come later when we discuss a further group of amendments, that there are other arguments about finances. These include in particular, as we shall no doubt hear, the chilling effect on those who are not in a position of wealth or able to find large sums of money to meet the potential costs. That is an item very much to be weighed in the balance. As the noble and learned Lord himself pointed out to his noble friend Lord Horam, who has been in his time the noble friend to all three political parties and members of them and remains on friendly terms with members of those parties, in the planning field the landscape has changed in any event, perhaps in a timely fashion. I do not think the noble Lord’s concerns are particularly relevant to the day’s deliberations, but in any event all that is required effectively is for those making decisions to comply with the requirements of the law. That is ultimately what judicial review is all about.

I support the amendments in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile, to which I have subscribed my name, and will speak to some amendments specifically in my name. I refer to Amendments 71B, 72D, 72E and 73A and 73C in this group. I will outline those briefly before turning to the substance of the argument. Amendments 71B, 72B and 73C would replace the words that we have heard something about this afternoon, “highly likely”, with the word “inevitable”, which is currently the position. That is to say, the outcome of the Bill for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred. Instead of that being “highly likely”, that would become the “inevitable” position. That is a material restoration of the position as it now stands.

Amendments 72D and 73E would remove the obligation on the court—that is, both the High Court and the Upper Tribunal—to refuse to grant leave even if it believes that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the behaviour complained of had not occurred. Amendments 72E and 73A would alter the definition of the conduct complained of for the purposes of determining whether such conduct would have made a difference to the outcome to mean any procedural defect rather than the conduct of the defendant; they would put it on more of a procedural basis.

As we have heard today, Clause 64 raises a new and significant barrier on the road to those seeking to hold the Government or other public bodies to account for a failure to observe the law. This self-serving change is one of a series deliberately designed to constrain judicial scrutiny and narrow judicial discretion. Its argument is partly based on a false claim that the number of judicial review cases has trebled whereas, as was made clear at Second Reading and, tellingly, repeated by the Constitution Committee in its second report on 4 July, after taking into account the transfer of immigration cases to the Upper Tribunal, the number has increased in 13 years by only 21%, or 366 cases.

Of those, only 0.4% have been conducted by campaigning organisations—that is to say, 50 cases in 13 years. Yet those campaigning organisations have attracted the obloquy of the Lord Chancellor, who, as we heard powerfully from the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in the debate on Part 2 of the Bill, has described organisations as being “left-wing”. Incidentally, those organisations that have brought judicial review comprise such extremist left-wing agitators as the Countryside Alliance, the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and UKIP’s former treasurer. However, the Lord Chancellor has not confined himself to that observation. He spoke—or wrote, to be more precise—in the Daily Telegraph that judicial review is,

“exploited inappropriately by pressure groups with a political point”.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I hardly need remind your Lordships is a cross-party—indeed, a cross-House—committee, with members from all Benches, including the Cross Benches, observed that:

“Such politically partisan reasons for restricting access to judicial review, in order to reduce the scope for it to be used by the Government’s political opponents, do not qualify as a legitimate aim”.

I think that most noble Lords who have spoken would concur with that fairly damning conclusion as, I suspect, many others would as well.

If the Government are concerned, as the Minister claimed to be at Second Reading, that “other more meritorious”—I pause to inquire whose definition of “merit” would be applicable—judicial reviews “can proceed more quickly” perhaps the Minister can tell us, in addition to those matters that have already been referred to by noble Lords, how many of the 25 recommendations made by the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law in February the Government propose to adopt, or, if they have not yet reached a conclusion, at the very least what consideration has been given, and in what form, to those proposals.

Of course, as we have already heard, the amount that the noble Lord, Lord Horam, referred to, of a six-week period for raising an objection, has already been dealt with. A six-week period being imposed would in some cases present very serious difficulties, particularly with regard to the position of the non-availability of legal aid for pre-application work. However, of course, not all those cases are funded by legal aid in any event. I cannot speak of the Islington experience with the inside knowledge of my noble friend Lord Adonis or as acquired by the noble and learned Lord, but the fact that there is a disagreement about that on a particular case does not make a case for the substantial change that the Government are embarking on.

The effect of this clause in lowering the threshold for refusing permission to proceed to one in which it is only “highly likely” that the claimant will not succeed is, in the words of the Joint Committee,

“highly likely to conflict with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights”,

and has drawn the vigorous condemnation of the senior judiciary. The amendments before us echo the recommendations of the committee, not least in the requirement that it would be inevitable that the claimant’s case would fail. The Government choose to ignore the difficulty of claimants effectively having to try the issue without the benefit of legal aid or advice, which, as I have said, is not available at the permission stage.

Moreover, the JCHR recommendations address the additional and fundamental issue of whether the application would make a substantial difference to the applicant if the conduct complained of had not occurred. The recommendation in the Bill personalises the claim when in the first place many such claims by definition—as we have heard, again, from other of your Lordships tonight—give rise to a public interest element that transcends the position of the applicant, whether that is the applicant for a television licence or other rather more intrinsically weighty matters. Secondly, of course, it ignores the fundamental imperative of the decision-making being lawful. As the Constitution Committee points out,

“lowering the threshold risks unlawful administrative action going unremedied”.

When the President of the Supreme Court says that,

“any interference in or restriction of judicial review has to be looked at very carefully”—

to which I add the obvious further obvious comment that this must be especially true when those proposing the interference are by the very nature of the process the potential respondents in many claims—your Lordships’ House is obliged to take heed.

I very much hope, even at this late stage, that the Government will review their position. If not, I envisage that on Report, those of us who have tabled amendments and spoken to them tonight will seek to test the opinion of the House about a fundamental, radical and wrong-headed change to our system, which we must use our best endeavours to halt if we cannot improve it.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this has, correctly, been a lengthy debate, in which views have been expressed by a number of noble Lords with judicial and legal experience and—to the benefit of the debate—by noble Lords who have different but none the less valuable experience to contribute to the debate as a whole. Since this is our first opportunity to consider Part 4, it is wholly understandable that the comments made by certain noble Lords have ranged beyond the strict confines of the clause that we are considering, because the general thrust of the argument embraces more than one clause. I make clear that any points that arise in the subsequent groups should be taken again, and that no noble Lord should feel any restriction by having mentioned them in this first group.

The development of judicial review has been contributed to, quite apart from this debate, by a number of those who have contributed to the debate. Although they have not said so, it is clear that there is a great deal of judicial pride in the fact that it has evolved and provided a valuable, and indeed fundamental, check on executive power, not just in this country but, as we have heard, in Northern Ireland. I do not resile from anything that I said at Second Reading about the importance which the Government attach to judicial review, nor indeed in the columns of the Times. I have not ventured into the Daily Mail or any of the other organs that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to, nor have I expressed any views about the particular political affiliations of any potential applicant, which are nothing to the point. The question is whether it is appropriate for any—and in particular these—reforms to take place.

Of course, it is tempting to suggest that judicial review is so perfect an object that it is beyond improvement. It is described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, as “a heresy” to consider any modification of the doctrine of judicial review. I agree with those who said clearly that any change to judicial review should be looked at very carefully indeed—quite so. That is precisely what this debate and subsequent debates enable us to do. However, I respectfully differ from the point that it is beyond Parliament’s competence to make some modest changes, and these are modest changes. That is appropriate if Parliament approves that these changes are made, bearing in mind, of course, that they should not encroach on the proper role that judges have established and which they perform so well. We must accept, as illustrations have shown in this debate, that there is the potential for abuse in judicial review. That is not to say that it does not have an extremely vital function, but we should be astute enough to ensure that the doctrine is sufficiently rigorous to remove or at least limit the possibilities for abuse.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, would the case that the noble Lord has just outlined not be one in which the decision be “inevitable” rather than “highly likely”? Would the amendment that I have tabled not therefore meet that sort of case?

[Lord Faulks]

It might or might not be “inevitable”, but we suggest “highly likely” would ensure that it would not survive. “Inevitable” might leave room for the argument that it was highly likely but not inevitable. This makes sure that the position would be as we say that it should be.

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[Lord Beecham]

I am not entirely clear about the Minister’s position in relation to the process. Assuming that the highly likely test—indeed, any test under the present arrangements—is retained, it would presumably need to be the subject of the application for permission. The Minister is nodding. Will the applicant not therefore have to make a case at that stage? That is presumably the whole point of applying for permission. In circumstances where legal aid is no longer available for those who do not have the means, does that not place a heavy burden on an applicant in a way that the inevitable—that is the word he used—test would not do at that crucial stage?

[Lord Faulks]

An applicant now may fail at the permission stage if the outcome would be inevitable, given the putative departure from lawfulness on the part of the public authority. It is precisely the same calculation that an applicant has to make whether the test is inevitable or highly likely, that the result would be the same. Both are directed at whether there is essentially a technical departure with no real substance. As I said, the only difference is whether the matter is a very low or a slightly higher bar. The position is that all claimants in any form of litigation will have to consider the real merits of their case and decide whether it is worth pursuing.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 28th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, briefly, this group contains amendments to the process for making secondary legislation concerning the provision and use of information about financial resources, the provision of information when seeking a costs capping order, and identifying which cases are “environmental” for the purposes of costs capping orders. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, these amendments are inspired by the third report of this House’s Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which was published earlier this month, on 11 July.

I hope that I may deal very briefly with these issues. That is not to say that they are not important, and we will deal with them by way of a detailed response when we consider later groups that raise the issues covered by the report. The Government are considering how to proceed with the recommendations in that recent report and will set out how they intend to do so in due course. As such, although I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their amendments, the Government are unable to accept them in advance of full consideration of the committee’s recommendations.

I should, however, take the Committee’s time to discuss the role of the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, which is composed of members of the judiciary, both senior and more junior, and eminent barristers, solicitors and lay representatives. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report proceeds in part on the basis that the existing structure for the making of Civil Procedure Rules, created by the Civil Procedure Act 1997 and amended by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 pursuant to the principles agreed with the senior judiciary and set out in the concordat on the judiciary-related functions of the Lord Chancellor, does not make the Civil Procedure Rule Committee immune from influence by the Secretary of State, given that he has the power to direct rules to be made to achieve a specified purpose.

I should like to refute any suggestion that the Lord Chancellor improperly interferes with the making of rules, or that the rule-making committees or officeholders in any way play a quiescent role in the making of procedural rules before the making of which they must consult with such persons as they think appropriate. Their experience and expertise is respected entirely and there should be no suggestion of the Government steamrolling or negating the influence of those committees or officeholders on the rules. However, as I have said, the Government are carefully considering the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report and intend to make clear their position ahead of Report. In light of that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

I am grateful for the Minister’s assurances. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

It is true, and I am going to come on to deal with that. The different establishments are there, in the view of the Youth Justice Board, to deal with the different challenges that the individuals present. My point is that secure children’s homes are no panacea. The starting point is that the overall rate of reoffending is simply not acceptable. That is why we are introducing secure colleges.

I entirely accept the point made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that the Government should be aware of the long-term cost as well as the short-term cost. Indeed, the whole purpose of secure colleges is that, with the benefit of proper education, the Government consider that there should be a cost-saving in the long term because of the accrued benefit for young people who go to secure colleges.

[Lord Beecham]

I am sorry to intervene at this point, but it is sensible to do it now rather than later. Are we to infer from that that the Government’s ultimate intention is to dispense with the 138 places in secure children’s homes or is it their view that there will still be some place for secure children’s homes? If so, how will they approach determining how many?

[Lord Faulks]

I respectfully ask the noble Lord to be a little patient; I am going to deal with that point in the course of my remarks. I have not been speaking for long. I have been much criticised for not giving the House information. I should perhaps remind the Committee that there were meetings offered first to the party opposite, then to this side and to Cross-Bench Peers. There has been written information and there was a further meeting at which the details of secure colleges, including demonstrations on visual display units, were supplied. That, together with the answers I have given and the answers I propose to give further, should give the Committee at least as much information as it can reasonably expect.

I have heard in the course of the debate arguments that there are better ways to improve the youth custodial estate and particular emphasis was placed on the secure children’s homes. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for whose expertise the Committee is indebted, mentioned a number, in particular Diagrama, a Spanish not-for-profit organisation that runs custodial facilities. The Ministry of Justice is aware of the work of Diagrama, and it is an example, as I understand it, of the type of innovation that we want to introduce and attract into secure colleges. We have, as I said previously, an open mind, and we are anxious to encourage innovation. However, as the noble Lord quite rightly said, he would not expect me to comment from the Dispatch Box on the advantages or disadvantages of the specific matters that he raised in his speech, valuable though his contribution is to the general approach to trying to find the right answer to these difficult problems.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, Amendment 44 seeks directly to extend the Freedom of Information Act to providers of secure colleges who have entered into a contract with the Secretary of State under Schedule 6 to the Bill. The amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, is similar to Amendment 11, which we debated in Committee on day one. It would provide for private providers not currently subject to the Freedom of Information Act to make information available both in response to FoI requests and proactively through publication schemes.

As the noble Lord said, the amendment differs in one respect from Amendment 11 in that it would lead to the formal extension of the FoI Act to providers of secure colleges, whereas the amendment debated previously sought to achieve the same ends in relation to providers of outsourced electronic monitoring services through the code of practice that the Secretary of State would issue under new Section 62B of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act, which is being introduced through Clause 6 of the Bill.

As we set out in the debate on Amendment 11, the Government recognise that there are concerns about the position of private providers of public services, under the Freedom of Information Act. The issue of outsourced public services was considered in some detail during the post-legislative scrutiny of the Freedom of Information Act carried out by the Justice Select Committee in 2012. The committee recommended the use of contractual provisions, rather than the formal extension of the Freedom of Information Act, to ensure that transparency and accountability are maintained. In particular, the committee said that it believed that,

“contracts provide a more practical basis for applying FOI to outsourced services than partial designation of commercial companies under section 5 of the Act”.

The committee also felt that,

“the use of contractual terms to protect the right to access information is currently working relatively well”.

The Government recognise not only that concerns exist in this area but the potential challenge that the increased delivery of public services by non-public sector providers poses to transparency. It is for that reason that the Government accepted the committee’s recommendation. Later this year, the Government will issue a revised code of practice under Section 45 of the Freedom of Information Act to promote transparency about outsourced public services in response to FoI requests. As we explained in the debate on Amendment 11, the guidance to be provided in the code will promote and encourage the use and enforcement of contractual or sub-contractual obligations to ensure that contractors provide information held on behalf of public authorities. It will go further than the current obligations under the Act. It will encourage contractors voluntarily to provide additional information beyond that held on behalf of the contracting public authority where, for example, doing so would help the contracting public authority to provide a more meaningful response to requests.

The Government and the Information Commissioner will monitor the effectiveness of the code. If it does not prove successful, the Government have said that they will consider what other steps may be necessary to ensure accountability, including the possible formal extension of the Freedom of Information Act to contractors. As I have indicated previously, we believe that our approach represents an appropriate balance between transparency and minimising burdens on business. As a result of the steps that we are taking, I suggest to the House that the measures proposed through these amendments are, with respect, unnecessary. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I will withdraw the amendment and I am grateful to the noble Lord for reaffirming the Government’s general position. He did not—I do not criticise him for this—quite deal with the further point I made about having a monitor, particularly the issue of the Secretary of State reporting on the outcome of such issues. He may wish to consider that. I hope we can clear up that point because, if the Secretary of State is issuing or preparing a report, it should be in the public domain. That may very well be intended but perhaps we can deal with that matter before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, it would appear that in this area, as in others, we are short of information about the number of cases in which young offenders are named. There does not appear to be a dataset indicating how many of these young people are being named and, apparently, has there been no research of any great depth on the impact of being named on such young offenders or their families—as my noble friend pointed out, particularly in relation to their siblings.

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, as long ago as 1989, stated that as well as the right to privacy, “best interests” of the child should always,

“be the primary concern in making decisions that may affect them”.

It is striking that, although it is a matter for the courts whether the child should be identified, the applications tend to be made by the media on the grounds of public interest. The capacity of the media to identify their interests with the public interest is of course unlimited, but in this rather sensitive area it might be thought that the principles of the convention should be taken a great deal more seriously. Some of the ways in which the media have portrayed young offenders, complete with photographs—my noble friend mentioned a case where a child’s photograph was prominently displayed—and emotive language such as how “young thugs” should be dealt with, are not conducive to meeting the requirements of the convention, which we should all respect.

I understand that the Government are looking at the existing law on reporting restrictions and had indicated that they would be coming to a conclusion some time this year. They may not have done so, but I do not know whether the Minister is in a position to indicate when that review might be completed. It would be helpful to the House to know when that might occur. In fact, the Government—I should, in fairness, say successive Governments—have not responded to the UN committee’s report, which is dated as long ago as 2008. In addition to the general principle to which I referred, that report made the strong point that respecting privacy should extend especially to avoiding messages that expose the child to shame and are against their best interests.

This is potentially quite a serious issue. From my experience as a councillor and, indeed, as chairman of the social services committee in Newcastle in the 1970s, I recall very well the famous case of Mary Bell, who was a young child when she committed offences that became notorious. Rather like the subsequent Bulger case—or rather, those who were guilty of killing Jamie Bulger—she became exposed to a great deal of publicity. That made assimilation into adult life extremely difficult for her, as it has for other defendants, it would appear, including those in the Bulger case. This is a very sensitive area in which we need a clear position from the Government in terms of a response not only to the amendment but perhaps more importantly to the UN convention requirements of as long ago as 2008.

Of course, there may be public interest in knowing what is happening, but a public interest in knowing does not necessarily amount to a matter of public interest. The two terms become confused. I hope that that is not the position that the Government ultimately end up with. There are clearly issues here that can have a long-term impact on young offenders. I entirely take the Minister’s point: the whole point of dealing with these young offenders is to ensure they do not offend again and can assume their place in society. We should not facilitate making that any more difficult by permitting disclosure when it is not necessary. I hope that the Government will look sympathetically at the amendment moved by my noble friend and respond to the long outstanding report and recommendations of the UN convention.

None of us would say that people—even young people—who commit serious crimes should not be punished or go through the processes that the law prescribes. They should not, however, be subjected to public obloquy in addition to that. It is rather disconcerting that, at the time of the riots in London a few years ago, the Home Secretary seemed keen to publicise the identity of some of those, particularly young people, who were involved in criminal and quite disgraceful behaviour. I think that many of us would feel that, in that sort of case and for that sort of young offender, publicity might be regarded as almost a badge of honour and is therefore not to be encouraged from any perspective. I hope that that situation will not recur. In the mean time, we have a number of offenders, some of whom are involved in very serious offences, whose anonymity has been done away with in a way that cannot be conducive to helping them to reform and to assume a normal place in society.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and those tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Dholakia. All have shown considerable commitment to the subject of how we respond to children and young people in the youth justice system. Some have direct experience of how children and young people are dealt with in court, as magistrates, lawyers or counsellors, in one or more of those capacities or in some other capacity. I welcome the opportunity to debate the issue of youth reporting restrictions. Noble Lords’ amendments bring into focus a range of issues, each of which I will deal with in turn.

First, as to online content, noble Lords are seeking to address a potential lacuna in the existing reporting restrictions framework which was remarked upon by the High Court in the case of MXB v East Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust. The court commented that information that would normally be prohibited from publication in a newspaper could be published and made available to the public via Facebook or Twitter. The present position therefore appears to be not entirely clear, although it may conceivably become clearer in the light of further developments in case law. However, we know that the publication of information through online content is in many ways quite different from the more traditional forms of communication that Sections 39 and 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 were intended to cover. For example, information can now be published, updated, viewed and replicated almost instantaneously in a way that could not have been envisaged by Parliament many decades ago.

However, the ability to view such information may be restricted by the author of the online content to a very limited set of individuals indeed. We must be mindful of the boundary between private correspondence via e-mail, which the current youth reporting restrictions framework, rightly, in no way seeks to curtail, and publication to the world at large. It is worth noting that, in its recent reports on the law of contempt, the Law Commission considered what statutory definition might capture online content and identified a drafting solution very different from that put forward by the noble Lord. I wish to reassure noble Lords that the Government are aware of the concern that has been raised and are giving further thought to this very technical and complex issue. In light of that assurance, I hope that, in due course, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

As to criminal investigations, Amendment 48B, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to commence Section 44 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which has been on the statute book for some time. Section 44 applies whenever a criminal investigation begins into an alleged offence and means that no information enabling the identification of a young person under 18 suspected of committing the offence may be reported by the media. Section 44 also gives the Secretary of State the power to extend the protection to children and young people who are alleged to have been the victims of, or witnesses to, a criminal offence but only by means of an affirmative order. Hansard indicates that on 29 June 1999, during Committee stage in the other place, the affirmative procedure in respect of victims and witnesses was introduced by the Opposition when in government. A number of objections were raised in respect of Section 44 and were considered in a process in which parliamentary scrutiny went hand in hand with discussions with the print and broadcast media. I have recently received letters from the Newspaper Society and the BBC outlining similar misgivings.

During what I referred to as hand-in-hand discussions, it was suggested that it may be time to look at whether the media’s own regulatory arrangements to protect vulnerable young people could be strengthened in a way that is specific to young people who might be harmed by publicity about crime. Given the significant restriction that Section 44 potentially imposes on the freedom of the press and the possibility that its aims might be achievable through other means, it was determined that Section 44 should be extended to victims and witnesses only after both Houses had been given the opportunity to debate the issue again. Since then, the section has never been commenced and guidance and regulations have been pursued instead.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the Committee is indebted to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and to other noble Lords who have spoken in the debate, for raising a matter of concern and for pointing out the inconsistency that now applies, particularly in regard to the welcome change that the Bill incorporates, and to which other noble Lords have referred, about having an appropriate adult present when a 17 year-old is being charged or interviewed.

Noble Lords have spoken in moving terms about the problems faced by vulnerable young people in the circumstances that the amendment addresses. Clearly, from their point of view, it would be highly desirable for a different sort of accommodation to be made available. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who has not participated in the debate, might agree that it is better from the police’s point of view if they do not have responsibility in an area where, as the noble Baroness has just pointed out, they do not have the expertise to look after vulnerable young people who might be capable of inflicting harm upon themselves in a difficult and unusual situation.

Both sides of the equation, as it were, argue for a change and a degree of consistency across the legislative framework. It would, however, be desirable, if it has not yet been undertaken, to consult with the Local Government Association representing local authorities in England and Wales to ensure that the local authorities have an awareness that this will, necessarily, impinge to some degree upon their responsibilities, and for an adjustment to be made in the financing that would no doubt be required to provide a safe, temporary haven for these young people before they make their court appearance. If the Minister is unable to give an unequivocal response today, I join others in hoping that, between now and Report, matters might be progressed.

This may be seen primarily as a matter for the Home Office but it is clearly of interest for the Ministry of Justice and I hope that the two departments between them—possibly with, as I said, the involvement of the Department for Communities and Local Government and maybe even the Department for Education, which has a potential interest in respect of children’s services—might come to a fairly rapid conclusion about what is not an inherently complex matter in a way that would satisfy the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, and, more particularly, those who have undergone a traumatic experience with their own children and do not wish to see that repeated in respect of other 17 year-olds and their families.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the contribution that the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has made to our debates generally on the plight of young people, particularly those who are or have been in care, who, sadly, often find themselves in the position that this amendment particularly focuses on. I join others in expressing the Government’s deepest sympathy with the family of Kesia Leatherbarrow. It was, as all noble Lords have pointed out, a tragic case.

The main purpose of the amendment is to include, within the definition of “arrested juvenile” in Part 4 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 17 year-olds in the context of police detention following charge. I acknowledge that although 17 year-olds may often appear confident and adult, that can conceal vulnerability, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, pointed out. In line with the current treatment of 10 to 16 year-olds the amendment would have the effect of requiring a 17 year-old who has been charged and denied bail to be transferred to local authority accommodation when it is both appropriate and practicable for the police to do so.

I understand that this proposed amendment, which has at its heart a laudable intention, is related to the Hughes Cousins-Chang High Court ruling of April last year. The Government did not appeal that ruling and accepted the findings of the court, which related solely to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act codes of practice C and H. Specifically, the ruling required that 17 year-olds, when arrested on suspicion of committing an offence, must be provided with an appropriate adult and have a parent or guardian informed of their detention. The Government made these changes in full as soon as possible, allowing for the statutory obligation to consult on all changes to the PACE codes, and these provisions were made mandatory in October.

Since the implementation of the High Court ruling, the Government made clear their commitment to review the primary legislation relating to the treatment of 17 year- olds as adults in the criminal justice system. This was to consider whether changes should be made for similar reasons. I can confirm, as noble Lords have already indicated, that an internal review has already been launched and that the work is continuing. Whereas this amendment concerns specifically the case of detention following charge, the review covers all the legislation where 17 year-olds are treated as adults in the criminal justice system. It includes, for example, Section 65 of PACE, which relates to the age at which a person can give their independent consent to the taking of fingerprints, impressions of footwear, and intimate and non-intimate samples at the police station.

The Home Office review also covers the consequential changes that would need to be made to other legislation should 17 year-olds be regarded as juveniles. For example, an amendment to Section 37(15) of PACE, which is the proposition here, would also require amendments to the Children (Secure Accommodation) Regulations 1991, the Bail Act 1976, the regulations of 1991, the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, and so on. These are just some examples, for which other departments have responsibility. Those examples demonstrate the breadth and complexity of the legislation, which needs to be properly thought through before change is made.

It is of the utmost importance that any change in the law is workable in practice and not merely symbolic. We need to be sure, for example, that local authority accommodation will be available to 17 year-olds were the law to be changed, that adequate transportation exists and that police officers are trained properly to understand the requirements of this change. The appropriate adult change, which has been referred to, is considerably less complicated operationally than that which is the subject of this amendment. Any amendment to primary legislation needs to be subject to proper consultation, appropriate consideration and full scrutiny by Parliament. This amendment, though laudable in its aims, represents, we respectfully say, a somewhat hurried approach to the issue of how we treat people at the age of 17 at the front end of the criminal justice system.

The noble Baroness, Lady Howe, referred to the police’s knowledge of young people in dealing with 17 year-olds. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, tried to elicit a contribution from my noble friend Lord Paddick as to the unsuitability of the police to deal with 17 year-olds.

[Lord Beecham]

In fairness, I was not saying that the police were not suitable but that it is placing an undue burden upon them. That is a rather different point.

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[Lord Faulks]

I defer to the noble Lord’s experience in that regard, although the new format of the driving licence makes it slightly less destructible than its predecessor. I maintain nevertheless that the courts do have access to the DVLA records, so, when trying a motoring offence, a single justice will have the information even if the defendant does not produce a driving licence at all. I am therefore confident that the safeguards we have built into this procedure make the amendment unnecessary.

Amendment 50AA would remove the provision that a court can decide a case under the single justice procedure other than in open court. That would undermine one of the main drivers behind this policy. We consider the time wasted and costs incurred in requiring magistrates to sit in open court and decide cases disproportionate in the type of straightforward, low-level cases that this procedure will apply to. Safeguards are in place to enable a prosecutor to ensure a case is heard in open court by issuing a requisition and a defendant to ensure the same by indicating his or her wishes in response to the single justice procedure notice. I reassure the noble Lord that the fact that a case is heard under the single justice procedure will not impact on the court’s duty to ensure that proceedings are open and transparent. The press and public will continue to have access to information about these cases, as they do now.

Amendment 50C would allow a single justice to hear and consider evidence from a party to the case if they turn up when the single justice is considering the case. In practice, parties will not know when a case will be considered by a single justice under this new procedure, so it is extremely unlikely that this situation would occur. However, there is a risk that it could be seen as encouraging prosecutors to turn up and assist the court. That could be perceived as unfair and unequal, particularly if the case was being heard other than in open court. We could not allow evidence to be heard by a magistrate when a single justice was making a decision, as that would lead to unfairness if the other party had not been given the opportunity to consider that evidence. In any case, there is clear provision in the Bill stating that when a person wants to be heard by a magistrates’ court, they are perfectly able to request a hearing.

Amendment 51B would introduce a legislative requirement to publish in advance details of cases to be heard under the single justice procedure and to publish the outcome of these cases. It is, of course, vital that the media and the public continue to have access to information on these cases under the new single justice procedure. However, the appropriate place for such provisions is within the Criminal Procedure Rules. Those make it clear that certain specified information must be made available to journalists and other members of the public on request. The rules also allow the court to make certain additional case information available to third parties on request. The Criminal Procedure Rule Committee will be invited to review the Criminal Procedure Rules to make sure that they are fit for purpose for the single justice procedure.

I can reassure the noble Lord that the fact that a case is heard under the single justice procedure will not impact on the court’s duty to ensure the proceedings are open and transparent. The press and public will continue to have access to information about cases, as they do now. There is a protocol in place between Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, the Newspaper Society and the Society of Editors whereby magistrates’ courts routinely make written lists of cases and results available to local media, most often by e-mail. This arrangement will continue.

Amendment 52A introduces another condition on which a defendant can make a statutory declaration so that, in addition to being unaware of the proceedings, the defendant can state that they did not understand the information contained in the single justice procedure notice and the accompanying documents. This deals with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about things such as language difficulties. The associated documentation sent to defendants under the single justice procedure will be no more complex that the documentation which is currently sent in this type of case; indeed, we are confident that the flexibility afforded by this new procedure will enable us to make the whole system for these cases more easily understood by defendants. As with the existing process, prosecutors have developed strategies to identify those who may require further assistance and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service is also considering, as part of implementation planning, how it will continue to discharge its duty to provide assistance to unrepresented defendants. The provisions, as set out, provide magistrates’ courts with the flexibility they need to operate the single magistrate procedure effectively while ensuring that the rights of defendants are protected.

I will say a little more about the suggestion put forward by the noble Lord about the availability of information on case outcomes. I agree that the information should be available as soon as possible after the trial has concluded. In both cases, the noble Lord suggests that this should be within 21 days. However, such detailed procedure should not be contained within the legislation itself. As I said earlier, the appropriate place for such detail is within the Criminal Procedure Rules.

We know that journalists and the general public seldom attend to watch this type of hearing and this is the reason behind the protocol to which I referred. As to the listing, we accept that it is vital for there to be access to information and we anticipate that cases will initially be listed in the same court buildings as they are at the moment. This arrangement with local media will replicate exactly what currently happens in practice. In future, we will want to take advantage of the fact that consideration of cases in writing can happen anywhere, and maximise the efficiency that can be derived from this greater flexibility. In doing so, we will want to maintain flexibility and transparency.

There are opportunities, as part of the criminal justice system digitisation agenda, to look more radically at how we can use the opportunities of digital to preserve and perhaps enhance open justice. It is our intention to make case information available on a self-service basis and enable the press and public to access cases in real time and follow the progress of the digital process online in a more meaningful way than they can at present. The rule committee will be invited to review the rules to ensure they are fit for purpose for the single justice procedure. I am sure that such a review will want to take into account the proposals made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. Any necessary amendments can be made, subject to annulment by either House of Parliament in the usual way.

I hope that, in the course of rather too long a response to those amendments, I have been able to allay any concerns and explain the thinking behind the single justice procedure. With that reassurance, I hope noble Lords will not press the amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

That was a very thorough response for which I am extremely grateful, but one thought has just occurred to me in relation to some of the noble Lord’s later remarks. I may be wrong, but I understand that it is possible that some of these cases will be taken, as it were, to some other court and thus will not necessarily be heard in the place where the offence was committed. Perhaps I have misunderstood the noble Lord, but if that is right, does that not make the question of the openness of the process in terms of recording the outcome more difficult? There will not be a local reporter in, say, Newcastle for a case that has been transferred from there to Middlesbrough. Perhaps the noble Lord could look into this because I would be interested to hear his views on it. I think that it would be regrettable. If we are to have this process, it should be based in the local court where the offence occurred and where it would normally be dealt with.

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[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, Amendment 63A is designed to provide clarity about the operation of Section 22A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, inserted by Section 176 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which made low-value shop theft a summary offence. Your Lordships may recall that although theft from a shop of property valued at £200 or less became a summary offence, the defendant’s right to elect to be tried by the Crown Court was retained. Where it is exercised, Section 22A provides that the case is to be sent to the Crown Court. The basis on which the magistrates’ court would now do so is that once the defendant has elected, as the court has no option but to send to the Crown Court, the offence becomes indictable only and falls to be sent there on that basis under Section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Amendment 63A provides absolute clarity about the basis on which such a sending takes place as it is not sufficiently clear in the legislation. It makes clear that a low-value shoplifting case in which the defendant elects is to be treated in the same manner as an either way offence in which the defendant has elected. The magistrates’ courts will still be obliged to send the case to the Crown Court where the defendant elects and will continue to do so under Section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act. Amendments 84A and 84B provide for that change to come into effect two months after the Bill is passed. Amendment 63F is required to put beyond doubt the role of the court in relation to the imposition of the criminal courts charge.

The Serious Crime Bill includes a provision that amends Section 13 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make clear that the imposition of the confiscation order should not be taken into account when the court makes a victim surcharge order. That is because the court has no discretion over whether to impose victim surcharge, or how much. In a similar way, the court’s charge will be imposed by the court in any case where an adult is convicted of a criminal offence and the charge levels will be specified in secondary legislation. Amendment 63F therefore makes a similar change to Section 13 of the Proceeds of Crime Act to include the criminal court’s charge as an order in relation to which the imposition of a confiscation order should not be taken into account. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for explaining the amendments. I am not quite sure what difficulties have been occasioned by the subject of the first amendment, in particular, or whether this proposal will make any difference in the real world. Could the noble Lord kindly explain it a little further? Unless he can show that it has, in fact, led to difficulties, I am somewhat puzzled.

In respect of the second matter, I suppose the question of consistency is relevant. I wonder whether there has been any review of the impact of the victim surcharge order in relation to outstanding fines. This, of course, deals with the confiscation order but, as we have established, there is a huge backlog of confiscation orders that have not been enforced and fines that have not been collected. While this is a tidying-up exercise, the practical effect may be negligible unless considerably greater efforts are made to enforce both fines and confiscation orders. Perhaps the noble Lord will enlighten us as to what the Government will do about the substantial backlog running into, as I recall, something like £2 billion under these heads. Otherwise, this will become a cosmetic change, with no real likelihood of the grave current situation being improved. In fact, unless additional resources are provided, matters will potentially get worse since efforts are presumably not now being made which would be brought into the scope of the provisions on confiscation. That might be an added case load which there seems little realistic prospect of achieving. Perhaps the noble Lord could clarify, in respect of both these matters, where the Government are and, more particularly, what they will do to make sense of the confiscation order procedure under whatever head it takes.

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord asked whether any problems have arisen. We are not aware of any, but the purpose of the amendment is simply to clarify the position for the purposes of a good law. The Government’s view on the existing drafting is that, after election for trial, this offence is sent up under Section 51(2) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The noble Lord is no doubt anxious to know the answer to the question. This is not stated clearly in the 2013 Act and the interpretation has consequences which, although not significant in practice, make little sense. One example is low-level shoplifting cases where the defendant, as elected, would be brought within the ambit of the unduly lenient sentence scheme. The present amendment clarifies the position and avoids the consequences; it is the simplest way to deal with the issue.

Amendment 63F is simply a consequential amendment to remove any possible doubt as to whether the court has any discretion over imposing the criminal courts charge or the level of that charge. It would not be appropriate for courts to exercise discretion over a charge that directly contributes to the funding of the courts, but we will consider the role of charging in the next group of amendments. If I may, I will deal then with the questions of charging and victim surcharge and the appropriateness of those.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

It is certainly the case that the court should know, as far as possible, the level of outstanding fines. I understand the practical difficulties that can be encountered by courts but, with great respect to the noble Lord, we are concerned here with a definite, fixed cost in relation to the particular nature of the offence, which will not depend on fines outstanding. That is not a question—reasonable though it is—that arises on consideration of these amendments.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am struck by the direct relationship between the speed with which the Minister is racing through his brief and the embarrassment he no doubt feels at the material he is giving to the Committee. I cannot believe that the good and noble Lord is really convinced of the case he has been asked to put. That would not surprise me, because much of what we have heard is simply beyond credence. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, in a very powerful speech, made the essential point that—among other things—the court should have discretion on the amount. None of us is any the wiser about what kind of sums we are talking about. The Minister certainly has given no examples, except to say that it will be related somehow to the cost of the individual case. How is that to be calculated? On what basis will that be apportioned? Are we just talking about the cost of prosecution? That can be covered anyway, under the existing framework. Are we talking about a contribution to the cost of maintaining the court building or the cost of the judicial salaries in a higher court? There is no indication of how this cost is to be calculated and then passed on.

Equally, although the noble Lord rightly pointed out the provision in the Bill that the Lord Chancellor will prescribe the class of case to which the charge will apply, he has given no indication tonight—and I do not think that it was done in the other place either—of what kind of cases are envisaged. Why do we not know which cases are likely to be included? What will be the process, if any, for parliamentary approval of the classes as prescribed by the Lord Chancellor? Will Parliament be permitted any consideration in this, or will it simply be a matter of the Lord Chancellor’s fiat?

The Minister’s suggestion that it would be improper for the court to determine the amount because that would somehow reflect a vested interest on its part is simply risible. It is an absurd suggestion. The notion that magistrates or High Court judges will be influenced to make rather larger requirements of prisoners because that will somehow affect them, or the court system, is an insult to both the judiciary and the magistracy. It cannot be something that the noble Lord seriously believes. His scriptwriters need to go back to wherever they were taught their craft.

In addition, and worryingly, the Minister suggested that there is no deterrent effect because the charge will be imposed only long after a plea was entered. That is absurd. The fact that the court is in a position to impose a charge is known to the defendant before he appears there; it certainly ought to be. Of course, it may influence a defendant as to the nature of a plea, particularly in the case of an appeal.

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[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble Lord suggesting that in order to bring in a provision saying that one cannot recover damages if one is fundamentally dishonest, that is simply serving the interests of the insurance industry?

[Lord Beecham]

Of course it is not simply serving the interests of the insurance industry, but it is serving its interests and there is no reason why the insurance industry should not lobby to that effect. But let us not be unrealistic. I repeat that it is perfectly proper for the noble Lord to make his case, and I have no criticism of him whatever. My criticism is of the Government. In any event, there are a number of questions about the situation, as created by the Bill.

First, why single out personal injury claims? There are many damages claims to which such a provision might apply. There are claims, for example, of breach of contract over the supply of goods or services, damages to property or professional negligence. Indeed, paradoxically or ironically, the driver of a car might be caught by this provision in respect of a personal injury claim arising out of an accident but not if he claims only for damages to the vehicle. Where is the logic in that? In fairness to the noble Lord, he quoted an example of a potential for a claim other than a personal injury claim. But that is not what the Bill says; it concentrates purely on the aspect of personal injuries.

The second question is why, particularly given the drastic consequences, should the balance of probabilities test apply only to something that after all amounts to fraud, and is capable, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, of being prosecuted? In that event, it should be prosecuted if it is committed, but a different standard of proof would apply to the treatment of the conduct, deplorable as it is, in a civil claim as opposed to a criminal claim. As we have also heard, claimants, in addition to the possibility of prosecution, which would be amply justified, could face contempt of court proceedings in which again the applicant for the contempt case must prove fraud beyond reasonable doubt. I do not think that different standards of proof should apply to the same conduct in this context.

The third question is on why the entire claim should be struck out instead of judicial discretion being exercised to reduce damages or penalise the claimant in costs. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has dealt very effectively with an example in which that situation might occur. The fourth question is whether the Government have considered the impact on third parties, notably the National Health Service, which in personal injury claims can recover treatment costs from the person causing the injury. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, was ahead of me, not for the first time, and was quite right to say that if the defendant escapes scot-free because of some misconduct on the part of the claimant in relation to part of his claim, it is the health service—and the taxpayer generally—that will suffer.

The fifth question is: what is meant by fundamental dishonesty? The CPR, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out, coined the phrase in relation to qualified one-way cost shifting when a party loses the protection of QOCS if he has been found to have behaved in this way. However, as far as I am aware, there has been only one unreported case. It may be the case to which the noble Lord referred; it rings a bell. I think it was the case of Cotton. That is the only one that has so far come to light since the provision came in. I assume that the Minister will confirm that the Bill’s provisions have the same meaning, as far as that is ascertainable, as the Civil Procedure Rules.

The sixth question is: yet again, why are the Government seeking to fetter judicial discretion? This is one of the most fundamental points. In Fairclough Homes Ltd v Summers in 2012, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke, said:

“It is for the court, not parliament to protect the court’s process. The power to strike out is not a power to punish but to protect the court’s process”

The Supreme Court said that its already existing power to strike out,

“should be exercised where it is just and proportionate to do so which is likely to be only in very exceptional circumstances”.

The court referred to other ways of punishing fraudulent claimants in costs, criminal or contempt proceedings.

Let me be clear: the Opposition are not in favour of tolerating, let alone encouraging, fraudulent claims whether or not the fundamental dishonesty applies to the whole claim or any part of it. To that extent, all of us who have spoken tonight—the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Marks, myself and no doubt the Minister are absolutely agreed. But the Opposition are content to allow the courts to deal with any abuse, both in determining the issues of damages and costs and in pursuing criminal proceedings when they are appropriate, and would regard that as applicable to all kinds of claims, not just personal injury claims. That would be illogical, in my submission. The Minister may wish to take that back as a matter to consider. I do not see why personal injury claims should be singled out for this particular treatment.

There is certainly a need to deal with people who abuse the system, but in my submission what is proposed here goes too far and leaves too little discretion to the courts, which are really capable of dealing with it. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions of all noble Lords to this useful discussion of Clause 45. Until the conclusion of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I was beginning to wonder whether he thought that there should be any problem with people grossly exaggerating or being fundamentally dishonest in pursuing their personal injury claims. However, by the end I realised that the party opposite is not in favour of that, although he asked why we singled out personal injury claims.

The answer to the noble Lord’s question was provided very elegantly by my noble friend Lord Hunt. There has been—and the Government seek to address this by this clause—an epidemic of people claiming in circumstances that most right-thinking people would find deeply unattractive. The Supreme Court recently in the case of Fairclough had to deal with this particular issue, which the Government seek to address in Clause 45. So it is a particular problem that is troubling most people in society generally, with the so-called compensation culture, but also with a specific problem that has come before the courts. We suggest that it is entirely appropriate for the Government to endeavour to address this difficult problem; indeed, the Supreme Court found it difficult to find a satisfactory answer.

I am grateful for some of the constructive suggestions that have been made about how the clause ought best to have been drafted. At the moment, it requires the court to dismiss in its entirety any personal injury claim when it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the claimant has been fundamentally dishonest, unless it would cause substantial injustice to the claimant to do so. That is of particular relevance when the claimant has grossly exaggerated his claim, and in cases where the claimant has colluded with another person in a fraudulent claim relating to the same incident—also, sadly, a far too common feature of the whole claims industry at the moment.

This is part of a series of measures taken by the Government to discourage fraudulent and exaggerated claims, which arise often in motor accident cases and so-called “trips and slips” claims. Such claims cause substantial harm to society as a whole, not least in increasing the insurance premiums that motorists have to pay. I notice that the noble Lord criticised the Government; I think that the inference was that they were in some way in league with the insurance industry. We are talking here about insurance premiums paid by members of the public. These cases also eat up valuable resources of local and public authorities and employers, which could otherwise be used for the benefit of business and in providing services to the public.

Under the current law, the courts have discretion to dismiss a claim in cases of dishonesty, but will do so only in very exceptional circumstances, and will generally still award the claimant compensation in relation to the “genuine” element of the claim. The Government simply do not believe that people who behave in a fundamentally dishonest way—and I will come to address the adverb in a moment—by grossly exaggerating their own claim or colluding should be allowed to benefit by getting compensation in spite of their deceit. Clause 45 seeks to strengthen the law so that dismissal of the entire claim should become the norm in such cases. However, at the same time, it recognises that the dismissal of the claim will not always be appropriate and gives the court the discretion not to do so where it would cause substantial injustice to the claimant. To that extent, some of the remarks of my noble friend Lord Marks were entirely apposite. The clause gives the court some flexibility to ensure that the provision is applied fairly and proportionately.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks and others would considerably weaken the effect of the clause by simply giving the court a wide discretion were it satisfied that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest, which would enable it to either dismiss the claim, reduce the amount of damages or to do neither. That would make it much less likely that those provisions would be used, even in cases where the claimant has clearly been fundamentally dishonest. I do not believe that that would be appropriate. We do not believe that people who behave in a fundamentally dishonest way should be able to benefit by getting compensation regardless.

I assure the Committee that the way that the clause is drafted should not result in the courts using the measures lightly. Civil courts do not make findings of dishonesty lightly in any event; clear evidence is required. The sanction imposed by the clause—the denial of compensation to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled—is a serious one and will be imposed only where the dishonesty is fundamental; that is, where it goes to the heart of the claim. That was very much what my noble friend said about what it was aimed at.

Of course, “fundamental” has an echo in the Civil Procedure Rules and the qualified, one-way costs shifting. An adverb to qualify a concept such as dishonesty is not linguistically attractive, but if we ask a jury to decide a question such as dishonesty, or ask a judge to decide whether someone has been fundamentally dishonest, it is well within the capacity of any judge. They will know exactly what the clause is aimed at—not the minor inaccuracy about bus fares or the like, but something that goes to the heart. I do not suggest that it wins many prizes for elegance, but it sends the right message to the judge.

The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, who has enormous experience in this area, reflect the fact that in his view, any degree of dishonesty, unless the court is satisfied that dismissal would cause substantial injustice to the claimant, would be sufficient. It is a difficult balancing act, but we do not believe that that would be proportionate or practical. The sanction imposed by the clause is a serious one—denial of compensation to which prima facie somebody is entitled—and we believe that it should be imposed only where it goes to the heart of a claim. It would be disproportionate to require a claim to be dismissed in its entirety. It would also not be practical as it would be likely to lead to a large number of disputes between the parties over whether the claimant had or had not dishonestly exaggerated the claim. There is potential for it to impede settlements, leading to an increase in contested litigation.

My noble friend is quite right; the Government hope it will act significantly to deter people from bringing claims or exaggerating in any way at all. The fact that there may not be many reported cases about fundamental dishonesty and the QOCS scenario may be an indication that the concept does not engender great difficulties for judges applying it in practice, and therefore, there is no need for reported cases.

It should not be forgotten that the courts still have powers available—for example, the awards of costs to penalise claimants whose behaviour falls short of financial dishonesty—if it considers the sanction is merited. We consider that the courts will be able to apply the test. In addition, supplementary provisions are included to ensure that the sanctions imposed on the claimant are proportionate. Subsections (6) and (7) ensure that in the event of subsequent proceedings against the claimant for contempt or criminal prosecution, the court has a full picture of the consequences of the dishonest conduct for the claimant when deciding what punishment to impose.

Subsection (5) ensures that when a court dismisses a claim under this clause, it can award costs against the claimant only to the extent that these exceed the damages that would otherwise have been awarded. I thought that I understood what that meant, but I hear what my noble friend says about it, and what my noble friend Lord Marks says about it, and if it is not as clear as it might be I will take that back to consider the drafting before Report. The intention is to limit the extent. We think that that is what it says, but I will definitely take that back and consider it.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I have clearly upset the noble Lord. It certainly was not my intention to do so. We have a very long association, going back to the time when we were involved in the inner city partnership in Newcastle. We have always got on very well. I intended no imputation whatever upon the noble Lord. I do think that the insurance industry, as an industry, has been overpersuasive with the present Administration, in particular with the Conservative Party.

However, that is no reflection on the noble Lord. I made it clear that he has behaved with complete propriety, as he always has. I am sorry if I have upset him; I can say no more than that. I apologise if that has been the effect—it was certainly not intended. I look forward to engaging in civilised conflict with him from time to time over this and other measures in the spirit that we have enjoyed hitherto. I certainly would not like him to leave the Chamber tonight feeling that I have cast any slur or imputation upon him. He is widely recognised as extremely able and a man who has devoted a great part of his life to public service. I would not wish in any way to detract from his record or his sincerity.

[Lord Faulks]

I want to ask the noble Lord about that comment. He redirected his fire at the Government and said they had been improperly influenced by the insurance industry. Perhaps he can assist the Committee as to the basis of that allegation and how it is relevant to the amendment that the Committee has before it tonight.

[Lord Beecham]

I was trying to say that the Government have frequently changed the law in relation to claims, not just with regard to tonight’s amendment but on a range of issues in a way that adversely affects claimants and generally favours insurers. Whenever the Labour Party makes a proposition that affects working people and trade unions, it is accused of being in the pockets of trade union leaders, dancing to Len McCluskey’s tune. If that is a legitimate comment for the Conservative Party to make about the Labour Party, it is quite legitimate for us to point to some of those industries—not just the insurance industry; there are others—that seem to be willing to fund the Conservative Party, whether or not that involve tennis matches with the Prime Minister.

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[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am very happy to support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment and I take it that the Government will accede to it. It is a very sensible change.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, Amendment 68 would have the effect of allowing the President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court to make written representations to Parliament about the Supreme Court and its jurisdiction in the same way as the Lord Chief Justice of any part of the United Kingdom is able to do under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has used the provision under Section 5 of the 2005 Act to lay before Parliament his annual report, which highlights his accountability for oversight of the judiciary in England and Wales.

Amendment 69 would have the effect of allowing the United Kingdom Supreme Court the flexibility to appoint judges to the supplementary panel within two years of their retirement, providing they are under the age of 75.

First, I should very much like to thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for all his work on these issues and for being so patient in waiting for this amendment to be reached at such a late stage. Given his background, he is of course well placed to speak with authority on these matters. I know that he has been working closely with the judiciary on these amendments and he has also recently written to me regarding them.

The Government understand the rationale behind the amendments. However, before we can agree to make such changes, we will need to consider the matter and the impacts of the proposed changes further and discuss them in more detail with the President of the Supreme Court, the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord President of the Court of Session and the Lord Chief Justice for Northern Ireland. I will also be happy to have further discussions with the noble and learned Lord about the amendments and will respond fully to his letter shortly. On that basis, I hope that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, after the late excitement, we come to the more mundane world of driving while disqualified.

Clause 26, which we do not oppose, deals with what might be described only as another Grayling gimmick: the imposition of a maximum 10-year sentence for causing death while driving when disqualified—not for causing death through dangerous or careless driving while disqualified but for causing death while driving when disqualified. It is a measure of the significance of the amendment that there were 13 convictions in the past year for the offence of causing death when driving while disqualified or without insurance or a licence. This was not really a major problem. What the Government failed to do was to consider the real problem of the number of members of the public who drive while disqualified whether or not they are involved in other road traffic offences, particularly offences which cause injury. It is that problem with which this amendment deals. The current situation is that the maximum sentence is six months’ imprisonment only.

The question of causing death while driving under disqualification, now to attract a 10-year sentence, stands oddly with a five-year maximum sentence for causing death by careless driving and a two-year sentence for causing death while driving without a licence. Some 7,000 people are convicted every year for driving while disqualified. In my submission and that of the Opposition the sentence of six months is clearly inadequate for that offence. The amendment therefore proposes that the offence should carry a maximum of two years’ imprisonment and be treated as either way: it could be tried in a magistrates’ court or a higher court if necessary. That seems an appropriate way of dealing with an offence of this kind and I hope that the Government will reflect on it and accept the suggestion, if not today then on Report. We must do something to discourage the prevalence of the serious offence of driving while disqualified. At the moment, particularly given the very substantial sentence imposed under Clause 26, that looks inadequate and needs to be remedied. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has explained, would make the current summary-only offence of driving while disqualified an either-way offence. That would mean that the offence, currently dealt with by magistrates, could also be tried by the Crown Court with a jury, and the Crown Court would have a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment available. I know that an identical amendment was tabled on Report in the other place, but let me explain what the Government propose to do in relation to driving offences.

This Bill already contains proposals, welcomed from all sides, to increase the maximum penalty for causing death by driving while disqualified to 10 years’ imprisonment and to create a new offence of causing serious injury while driving while disqualified with a maximum penalty of four years. That was a pressing issue which the Government wanted to address, and we have done so in this Bill.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and the question of disqualified drivers generally is of concern to the Government and all in this House. We want to ensure that we are doing what we can to keep our roads safe. Those who are disqualified from driving should not be on the road, and those who flout the law should be dealt with appropriately by the courts. I stress that where a person decides to drive when they have been disqualified and their driving is also bad, the CPS has a range of other offences it can charge—for example, dangerous driving, which is already an either-way offence with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.

However, the Government are not ruling out doing exactly what the amendment seeks to achieve. We have already made it clear that we will carry out a wider review of the offences and penalties for driving offences over the coming months. We want to look at the sentencing framework for driving offences as a whole and to address the various concerns that I know many noble Lords and the public have about specific aspects of the law in this area.

I know that my right honourable friend Jeremy Wright has already made it clear that the review would look at the specific issue of driving while disqualified. We also want to look at the most effective ways of ensuring that repeat offenders are prevented from driving and do not pose a risk to the public in future.

Noble Lords will recognise that while we can make changes to specific offences where there is a pressing need to correct a gap in the law, as we have done with the causing death and serious injury offences, looking at the wider range of offences and the rationale for the entire sentencing framework needs careful consideration and should be done over a longer period.

I hope that my undertaking that the Government are looking at the driving while disqualified offence in the wider context of its relation to other offences and sanctions will reassure the noble Lord, and that he will feel able to withdraw this amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

I am grateful for the Minister’s indication. What he said underlines the legitimacy of the charge of gesture politics laid at the door of the Secretary of State, because he said that there is now to be an intensive review of the range of driving offences. It is absolutely right that that should be the case, but for an offence that was committed 13 times last year it was found necessary to amend the Bill in advance of the review to which the Minister referred. It is lamentable that Parliament, and this Bill in particular, should be used to make a mere gesture of that kind when the Government have already decided upon a proper, thorough review of these serious matters. Having said that, the assurance that the Minister has given satisfies me and the Opposition. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord’s amendment, but I have a slightly left-field suggestion to make. Part of the problem the Government appear to have is the process of dealing with applications—possible costs and all the rest of it. Would it not be possible, instead of requiring people to apply on behalf of the deceased, for the Government to legislate to disregard the convictions of anybody convicted for conduct which would not now be an offence? That would not involve individual applications, their processing and all the rest of it, but would be a blanket amnesty for anything which would not now be a criminal offence. I put forward that suggestion for consideration. I do not expect the Minister to leap at it with any more enthusiasm than he usually leaps at my suggestions. I see the noble Lord is nodding that he too may be interested in it. It is a suggestion he might care to look at. Perhaps we can consider it on Report.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this has been a short, very well informed and powerful debate. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Sharkey and others for all they have done relating to Alan Turing and to the amendment to the Protection of Freedoms Act. That Act reflected the Government’s determination that people’s lives should not be unfairly blighted by historical convictions for consensual gay sex with people aged over 16. The House is grateful too to my noble friend Lord Lexden for his usual accurate and illuminating historical analysis of the origins of this sad state of affairs, which gave rise to so many convictions and caused so much unhappiness.

A disregard results in a person’s relevant convictions being removed from the records held by the police and the courts. Those convictions will therefore no longer appear on a criminal records check and the individual never has to declare them, in any circumstances. However—this is where the amendment is concerned—where someone has died, the intended effect of these provisions would apply. The provisions in the Protection of Freedoms Act are designed to help living individuals get on with their lives free of the stigma of the disregarded offence. I fully appreciate and sympathise with the intention behind the amendment, but the Government are concerned that there would not be a practical benefit to the change. A disregard would not allow the applicant, on behalf of a deceased person, to say that the deceased person was incorrectly convicted, nor that he or she has received a pardon. It is important to remember the rationale that lies behind this. The objective of the Protection of Freedoms Act, in disregarding certain offences, is that they should no longer affect a person’s life or career. The intention is to support living people who are disadvantaged when they apply for work, rather than to set the record straight.

The Government are still concerned that such an amendment would introduce a disproportionate burden on public resources; reference was made to a similar answer given from the Dispatch Box, not by me but by another Minister. For living people, the Protection of Freedoms Act will amend the data used for criminal records checks for living people. When someone is deceased, the offence is more likely to have taken place prior to the establishment of the National Policing Improvement Agency’s names database. Identifying appropriate records would be a lengthy, expensive and uncertain task. There is less certainty that any records can be identified, and those that are found may be insufficient to be sure that offences were consensual and with a person aged over 16.

The Government are concerned this would place a disproportionate burden on existing resources at the Home Office and on the police service. My noble friend Lord Sharkey referred to the answer he was given by a Home Office Minister to a question about the number of people who had made applications, following the estimate of 16,000. I am told that it is true it has now risen to 192 from 185. However, noble Lords will appreciate that departments are operating under severe financial restrictions. While we believe that the cost of dealing with applications from those whose lives continue to be affected is justified in the current climate, we cannot agree that costs, which we believe will be significantly higher for each application, could be justified in trying to deal with the records of those who have died. In our view, the limited resources should be directed at those who continue to have difficulties as a result of their conviction or caution for these offences. I need hardly stress that there is a difference between a pardon and a disregard.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made an interesting, bold suggestion. He rightly predicted that I was unlikely to swallow the suggestion from the Dispatch Box, sincerely though it was made. My initial reaction is that, if there were to be a blanket amnesty, as I think he was proposing, we would need to go through this case by case to establish whether this act was consensual and therefore within the scope of the Act.

Therefore, while having considerable sympathy with all that lies behind the amendment, the Government are still not in a position to accept it as tabled by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. However, I appreciate that there is a feeling that something ought to be done to right a historic injustice. I can certainly—without, I hope, raising any expectations—at least agree to facilitate a meeting with the Minister to discuss this matter further. However, I emphasise that I cannot raise expectations and the position at the moment is precisely as I have outlined it. In those circumstances, notwithstanding the arguments that have been put forward, I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

I am happy to deal with that amendment; in the interests of economy, that seems a sensible suggestion. The amendment raises a concern about how the enhanced and tailored provision offered by a secure college might influence the behaviour of the courts when making sentencing decisions in respect of children and young people—so-called up-tariffing, as it has been referred to in other contexts.

We have seen a fall in the number of children and young people sentenced to custody in recent years. I hope noble Lords will be reassured that statute and international convention already provide that a custodial sentence must be imposed only as a measure of last resort. Statute provides that such a sentence may be imposed only where the offence is,

“so serious that neither a community sentence nor a fine alone can be justified”.

That is referenced in the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s current guideline, Overarching Principles—Sentencing Youths, which goes on to explain that even when a threshold for a custodial sentence is crossed, a court is not required to impose it. Before deciding whether to impose a custodial sentence on a young offender, the court must ensure that all statutory tests are satisfied, taking into account the circumstances, age and maturity of the young offender. Those tests are that the offender cannot properly be dealt with by a fine alone or by a youth rehabilitation order; that a youth rehabilitation order with intensive supervision and surveillance, or with fostering, cannot be justified; and that custody is a last resort. To demonstrate that the statutory tests have been followed, the court must, in addition, state its reasons for being satisfied that the offences are so serious that no other sanction is appropriate other than the custodial sentence.

As regards the length of the sentence, the court, again by statute, is required to set the shortest term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and those overarching principles I referred to earlier set out guidance on how the judiciary should approach deciding the length of the sentence for children and young people. Furthermore, courts will no doubt be aware that due to the variation in needs and vulnerabilities among children in custody, there is a range of provision. They certainly should be aware. As my noble friend Lady Linklater will know, there are secure children’s homes, secure training centres and young offender institutions, as well as, in future, we hope, secure colleges.

When sentencing children and young people, the court can determine only the type of sentence to be imposed and its length. The decision on which type of establishment a child or young person is placed in is taken by the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, rather than by the court. Its experienced placement service considers factors specific to the young offender—for example, their age and needs.

Finally, the noble Baroness noted that the amendment would have the wider effect of fettering the discretion of the independent Sentencing Council by stipulating precisely what its guidelines should say. That is a road which I am sure noble Lords would not wish us to go down.

I hope, therefore, that I have assuaged noble Lords’ concerns sufficiently for them not to press this amendment also.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I look forward to whiling away the long Summer Recess by reading the Minister’s helpful replies in Hansard, and his even more helpful letters, which will no doubt find their way to me and to other noble Lords. It is, however, necessary to say that what we are being effectively invited to do is to sign a blank cheque to as yet unknown operators of an entirely new institution conceived on the basis of no evidence and with no clear idea of how it is to operate.

In a particularly sensitive area of penal policy, indeed social policy, that is simply unsatisfactory, and I have no doubt that many of us—from different parts of the House—will wish to return to these matters on Report. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I must confess that I am somewhat puzzled by the position outlined in the JCHR report and what the noble Lord, Lord Lester, referred to as the Government’s recent pronouncements on it. As he rightly said, the report indicated that the Government would be awaiting the outcome of the appeal in McLoughlin before updating the Committee of Ministers of the actions that they plan to take to implement the Vinter judgment—which implies that the Government are planning to implement the Vinter judgment, but in ways as yet undetermined.

I am sure that the Minister will be able to enlighten us about whether that is in fact the Government’s intention and, if so, what approach they will be taking. If they are awaiting the outcome of that appeal before coming to a conclusion, that is not an unreasonable position for them to take, but the underlying question is whether they intend to implement the Vinter judgment as indicated in whatever decision the Supreme Court ultimately makes on the details of the McLoughlin appeal.

I am also uncertain about the interesting reference that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, made to a wider meaning of “compassion” and whether that would be a criterion for release. Is that something that the Government are in fact contemplating? Might that form part of their response to the Committee of Ministers in relation to Vinter?

These are difficult cases, and one must hope that we can reach the position where we are not in conflict with the court but that, nevertheless, the balancing interest of public safety is also given due weight. For the Opposition’s part, we await the Government’s response in general and the Minister’s response in particular this afternoon.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I fully understand what lies behind this amendment, which seeks to provide a review mechanism for whole life order prisoners. Mention has been made of hope and redemption, and understandably so. This issue has indeed been raised previously in your Lordships’ House and we were reminded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, who has been wholly consistent on this subject, in particular of the debate which he initiated during the passage of the LASPO Bill on 9 February 2012. I am also conscious of what was described by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, as the distinguished support that has been provided for this amendment.

However, I really doubt whether the noble Lords supporting this amendment or the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which suggested it, truly meant to give the Parole Board a sentencing function in the way that the amendment suggests. There is no precedent for this and nothing in the amendment indicates how it might approach the task of replacing a whole life order with a determinate minimum term. There is a real risk that, were this to be the law, it would put the Parole Board in potential conflict with the judiciary—or at least, set up a tension—which would hardly be desirable.

I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, mentioned the protection of the public and the nature of a whole life order, because the Committee should not forget that such an order is imposed only where the court is satisfied that the offence is so exceptionally serious that the sentence is justified for the purposes of punishment and deterrence. In those circumstances, the court is fully aware that the offender will then face spending the rest of his or her life in prison, so we are talking about the most serious offences. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, referred to that in his equivalent experience in Scotland.

The key concern expressed by your Lordships is to put a clear scheme for review in place for whole life orders. This issue has come to the fore following the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Vinter case, when it found last year that whole life orders without a review mechanism are incompatible with Article 3 of the convention at the point of sentence. However, as has been referred to in the debate, since then there has been domestic litigation and the Government now consider that the Court of Appeal has settled the domestic position in relation to whole life order prisoners. Earlier this year, a specially constituted Court of Appeal heard the cases of McLoughlin, Newell and others, whole life order prisoners who were appealing their sentences including on the grounds of incompatibility with Article 3. The court determined two crucial issues: that whole life orders can and should be imposed in the most exceptionally serious cases; and that the operation of Section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, which deals with release on compassionate grounds, was sufficient to render a whole life order reducible.

The Court of Appeal confirmed that the Secretary of State has a duty to exercise his or, as the case may be, her powers under Section 30 compatibly with Article 3 and must consider all circumstances relevant to release on compassionate grounds. The Court of Appeal found that there was no lack of clarity as to the applicable domestic law. The judgment explained that the power of review under Section 30 arises if there are “exceptional circumstances”—a term which the court found to be of sufficient certainty in itself and which will be applied on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the Court of Appeal said that “compassionate grounds” should be read in that manner:

“It is a term with a wide meaning that can be elucidated, as is the way the common law develops, on a case by case basis”.

The Court of Appeal therefore concluded that domestic law provides the offender with the possibility of release in exceptional circumstances such that the just punishment originally imposed is no longer justifiable. The court also said:

“We find it difficult to specify in advance what such circumstances might be, given that the heinous nature of the original crime justly required punishment by imprisonment for life. But circumstances can and do change in exceptional cases. The interpretation of s.30 we have set out provides for that possibility and hence gives to each … prisoner the possibility of exceptional release”.

The Court of Appeal, presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, was uniquely placed—authoritatively and conclusively, the Government suggest—to explain how domestic law operates. It has done so in the manner that I acknowledged earlier. As a result, the Government consider that there is no further action that we need to take to give the clarity provided by that judgment.

The Newell appeal has not been allowed, so there is no outstanding domestic litigation following the McLoughlin and Newell case action report. The report sent to the Committee of Ministers sets out the Government’s position. We would not of course simply have said that we should await the Supreme Court position, but it would be idle for a Government to say that they would ignore a decision of the Supreme Court. Had the matter reached that court, the Government would have been mindful of our obligations, but in fact that particular road is now closed.

The Court of Appeal having considered the matter, with its particular experience both of whole life sentences and of the dynamism of the common law to deal with the situations that naturally concern noble Lords, we conclude that the amendment is unnecessary. Notwithstanding its distinguished support and the strength of feeling, we invite the noble Lord to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, we are debating once again the position of current IPP prisoners. The Government abolished that sentence in the LASPO Act 2012, for reasons I need not rehearse. We replaced them with immediate effect so that no further IPPs can now be imposed on offenders convicted after December 2012, regardless of the date of offending. That, as I think noble Lords would agree, is a major step forward. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said in the course of his address to your Lordships that the Government who preceded ours had not given the Parole Board sufficient resources. What he failed to do was to acknowledge that it was his Government who brought in this scheme, which has been so much criticised. That scheme has resulted in a number of people being imprisoned and still being in prison; this Government repealed that provision.

However, in respect of IPP sentences already imposed, our position remains that it would not be right or appropriate retrospectively to alter sentences that had been lawfully imposed prior to the abolition of IPPs, particularly because in this case those sentences were imposed with public protection issues in mind. Consequently, prisoners serving IPP sentences are not released unless the Parole Board authorises it.

A number of questions were posed about the Parole Board’s resources, including those from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. In answer to an earlier amendment, when I think the noble Lord was not in his place, I set out to the Committee the fact that the Government were well aware of the demands, temporary and in future, being presented to them. They had given further resources and were intending to be nimble in responding to the demands that were and would be placed upon them.

[Lord Beecham]

I am sorry to intervene at this point but, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, was not in the Chamber when this matter was discussed before, would the Minister care to address the point that I made to him that the Parole Board’s estimate of the increased demand was £10 million a year, which is equivalent to the total budget, while the Government’s provision is proposed to be £3 million? How does that square with the assurance that he is trying to give to the noble Lord?

[Lord Faulks]

The Government and the Parole Board, as the noble Lord would expect, are in frequent communication. It is difficult to be precise about these figures; an estimate is simply that. I assure the noble Lord that the figures in so far as they can be reached are the result of a number of conversations that have taken place regarding predictions about the demand. It is the Government’s position that we are providing the appropriate support for the Parole Board now and its estimate of what will be required in future. I also said—

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 14th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this amendment was provoked by a disturbing article in the Guardian on 1 July, based on the recently published report of the inquiry into children and the police by the All-Party Group on Children, chaired by my noble friend Lady Massey. It appears that, in 22 police forces that replied to a request for information, 1,136 children under the age of 10—well below the age of criminal responsibility —were subject to stop and search between 2009 and 2013. The Met could not supply figures for 2009-11. The number of children under the age of 18 subject to this process across 26 forces exceeded 1 million.

There have been reports on this issue in the past, including one in November 2009 relating to children from BME backgrounds, and one in January 2010 on searches of 11 year-olds. In January this year, it was reported that 500 such searches had been carried out in Scotland on children under the age of 10, including 72 on children aged only seven or younger. It is apparent that there is no effective code of practice governing the carrying out of such searches, or even of properly recording them. For example, police forces were unable to say how many looked-after children had been stopped and searched. Some forces do not even record a child’s name, address and date of birth, although some do. Only 20 of the forces had separate custody facilities for children in their police stations.

The Home Office has reviewed stop-and-search powers, but the all-party group’s inquiry suggested a number of improvements relating to the collection of data, including ethnicity, and specific guidance on safeguarding and child protection, especially for vulnerable children in care or at risk of abuse or exploitation. When a child is taken to a police station for the purposes of a search, he or she has a right to have a parent present. Some forces make an effort to take a child home before searching.

The Bill contains a welcome provision in Clause 20 to require an appropriate adult to be present when a caution is given to an offender under the age of 17. The amendment, which is designed as a probing amendment, would extend that principle to stop and search so that an appropriate adult would have to be present, particularly during the search. The stopping is not necessary something an appropriate adult would be present for, but the search, which is a more personal intervention, should be in the presence of an appropriate adult. As it stands, the amendment applies to children under the age of 10, but perhaps thought should be given as to whether that age remains too low—after all, it is below the age of criminal responsibility. In Scotland, consensual searches—searches the child simply agrees to—will now no longer be carried out on children aged under 12.

I hope the Minister will agree to consider this amendment and come back on Report possibly with an improved version. It seems important that this process, if it has to be undertaken, should be undertaken in as sensitive a way as possible, preferably in the presence of a parent, but, if not, at least of an appropriate person independent of the police force. I hope the Minister will look kindly on the suggestion and perhaps work with the Opposition to see whether we can reach an agreed position on it. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for drawing the Committee’s attention to this issue. The purpose of the amendment is to extend the safeguards provided in PACE codes of practice C and H, covering custody procedures, to provide children under the age of 10 with an appropriate adult in public settings where a stop and search is carried out. While this is a laudable aim, the Government do not consider the amendment desirable, as we consider the existing provisions in law and codes of practice are sufficient for the purposes of ensuring that children are treated appropriately. For instance, there are already important safeguards attached to Section 1 stop and searches. These include the obligation on the police to provide key information to the person being searched about the purpose of the search and the grounds for searching, and ensuring that the person subject to the search understands the procedure. In addition, a person can be detained for the search only for as long as is reasonably required to allow the search to be carried out. Therefore, the period of time for which an individual can be held for the search is strictly limited and proportionate.

Indeed, in terms of the time that individuals are detained, were there to be a requirement for an appropriate adult to be called in a stop and search context, this would require the police to arrange for provision in all public settings and at all times, which would entail detaining children for significant and disproportionate periods of time. This would also mean a significant strain on police time and resources.

There is also Section 11 of the Children Act 2004, which places the police under an obligation to make arrangements to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when exercising their functions. The statutory guidance accompanying this duty requires the police to ensure that appropriate training is in place to enable police to deal appropriately with children.

In respect of the police’s use of stop and search, those are just some of the safeguards in place which apply to children, and they are entirely appropriate given the nature of the procedure.

The principal function of an appropriate adult is to explain and demystify the criminal process at the police station following arrest and detention. For example, the police interview, the meaning of the caution, the individual’s rights within the police station context and so on would need to be explained. However, these considerations do not apply to a brief stop and search encounter, which is about confirming or allaying a police officer’s reasonable suspicion that an individual may be in possession of something they should not.

I am aware that this proposed measure was mentioned in the recent All-Party Parliamentary Group for Children report on children, published this month. The group’s initial report stated that,

“APPGC Officers will continue to consider recommendations on the stop and search of under-10s for our final report, including ... whether”,

stop and search,

“should only occur in the presence of an appropriate adult, carer or parent or in the family home”.

In answer to the noble Lord, the Government will consider the group’s conclusions in its final report on this matter, but for now, without adequate consideration and consultation, we are not convinced that this measure should be introduced in legislation.

Finally, on 30 April, as the noble Lord said, the Home Secretary announced a comprehensive package of measures designed to reform the way that stop and search is used. The measures are designed to ensure that these powers are used fairly and effectively and in a way that engenders community confidence. These measures should impact positively on all sections of the community, including children. For these reasons, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I confess to being somewhat disappointed by the Minister’s response. We are talking here essentially about very young children, and much of what he said would be relevant certainly to adults and possibly to adolescents, but children aged 10 or under will be going through a process that is not systematic and with apparently no clear national guidance on how these things are to be conducted. Indeed, as I said, the fact that even the recording of what has happened is not uniform suggests that there is certainly a need for a coherent code. I also still urge consideration to be given to the suggestion in the amendment that an appropriate adult be available, particularly for younger children.

I do not know what timescale the Minister envisages for the production of any further guidance or indeed how long it will take the APPG to produce a second report. However, even if it is not possible before Report to reach a conclusion on whether the parliamentary group believes that it is necessary to amend the Bill, I hope that we can emerge from this whole process with a coherent approach in which the issues that the APPG has raised are addressed and in which legislation or guidance is uniformly adopted by all relevant agencies, including of course the various police forces.

I particularly invite the Minister to look at the Scottish experience. Scotland has taken a very clear decision, which is in any event quite different from the one that we now apply here. I hope that there will be some conversation with interested agencies north of the border, irrespective of the outcome of the referendum, in order to ensure that the best possible practice is implemented when we are dealing with children of this age in England and Wales. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment at this stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his introduction to this amendment. Of course, he is right to identify the increasing danger of fraud in the cybersphere, something acknowledged in the Serious Crime Act. He was also right to refer to the fact that there are other offences that deal with fraud—in particular, the Fraud Act 2006, which already includes offences that would apply to anyone who assumes a false or non-existent identity to commit fraud. In particular, Section 2 sets out the crime of fraud by false representation, which would cover a person pretending to be someone else for the purposes of making a gain for himself or another.

While identity theft is not in itself a criminal offence, the use of a false identity for fraud purposes is. Therefore, the amendment as drafted has difficulties, because it would also apply to innocent persons—for example, to persons who collect a parcel using their relative’s identification from the post office, which is currently permitted. However, the Government take the issue of identity crime extremely seriously and are pursuing a number of initiatives to prevent it. A multiagency strategic group, led by the Home Office, has been formed to reduce the threat to the United Kingdom. The group is engaged in a range of activity to tackle the problem, such as strengthening the issuing processes of government documents, improving data-sharing of false identities, and taking down websites that offer false documents for sale. There is a national policing identity crime champion. The City of London Police is leading this work and is currently developing an identity crime strategic threat assessment, working closely with the National Crime Agency.

The Government recognise that there are often particular challenges in dealing with the consequences of identity theft. These challenges relate to the difficulty of identifying and catching offenders, rather than to a lack in the criminal law. The Government are working with banks and credit card companies, promoting technical solutions to the problem and working to help the victims of such crimes. We are working with the credit reference agencies to provide a free service for anyone who has had their personal details used fraudulently. The credit reference agencies liaise with each other and the banks to restore compromised personal credit records. The service can be accessed by contacting Experian, Equifax or Callcredit. We are also addressing the scale of this issue and establishing identity crime trends over time, through the Crime Survey for England and Wales.

We are not in any way complacent but I hope that my response to the noble Lord’s very real and appropriate concerns about identity crime has satisfied him that the Government are well aware of the issue and are responding appropriately. In those circumstances, I respectfully ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

I will, of course, withdraw the amendment. However, if I may say so, I am slightly disappointed by the Minister’s rather complacent tone in relation to where we are in this situation. I do not detect a properly co-ordinated response between the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice where the police service is concerned. This matter bears further examination. If, as the noble Lord says, it is currently under consideration, I wonder whether there is any possibility of a report being made before we get to Report stage. If that is not the case, I will be tempted to bring something back at that point. However, I am happy to enter into further discussions in the light of any progress made by the Government in drawing their various strands together. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Legal Services Act 2007 (Appeals from Licensing Authority Decisions) (Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys and Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 1st July 2014 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, first, on the designation order, the purpose of the order is to designate the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales—ICAEW—as an approved regulator under the Legal Services Act 2007 for the reserved legal activity of probate activities. I should also say that, if this is approved, a further order will be laid in the near future to designate the institute as a licensing authority for probate activities, which will mean that it will be able to license alternative business structures. This should help to promote increased competition and innovation in the legal services market.

The Legal Services Act 2007 established a new regulatory framework for legal services. Among the key aims of the Act was to deliver a more effective and competitive market. The Act contains eight regulatory objectives which include protecting and promoting the public interest; protecting and promoting the interests of consumers; and improving access to justice. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales is a regulator and professional membership body for the accountancy profession in England and Wales. It provides leadership and practical support to its UK and international members and professional standards are maintained through working closely with Governments, regulators and the industry. It also undertakes education and training to support students studying to become chartered accountants.

The institute applied to the Legal Services Board in December 2012 to be designated as an approved regulator for probate activities. It also applied simultaneously to be designated as a licensing authority for probate activities. During 2013, the Legal Services Board very carefully and rigorously tested the institute’s proposals against the criteria in the 2007 Act. The Legal Services Board has also taken care to assess that the institute has both the capacity and the capability to undertake a regulatory role in the legal services sector. The board took advice from the mandatory consultees, as required by the 2007 Act. These are the Lord Chief Justice, the Legal Services Consumer Panel and the Office of Fair Trading—now the Competition and Markets Authority. The board additionally consulted the Financial Reporting Council and the Insolvency Service.

The Legal Services Board took care to ensure that the governance arrangements proposed by the institute are suitably robust in ensuring that its regulatory arrangements are independent from its representative functions, which is a key element of the 2007 Act. This is an important point, on which concerns were raised during the consultation, but the board has tested this issue and is fully satisfied that the arrangements that the institute has set out for its new probate committee will allow it to exercise the regulatory functions in a way that is not prejudiced by the institute’s representative functions. The Legal Services Board is fully satisfied that the institute has in place the safeguards required to regulate authorised bodies and protect the providers and users of such bodies. The Government accept that assessment.

The Government recognise the importance of the legal services market and want to encourage its growth. We believe that designating a new regulator, which has the appropriate safeguards for consumer protection, will help to achieve this. As for consultation, some issues were raised when the proposals were consulted on. The then Lord Chief Justice had long-standing general concerns that regulatory competition would have a detrimental effect on standards. The Legal Services Board was aware of these concerns and addressed them by setting out how the 2007 Act aims to achieve a more effective and competitive market, thereby improving standards. The Legal Services Consumer Panel strongly welcomed the application by the institute but was concerned that the institute was initially not proposing to have a majority of lay members on the probate committee or disciplinary committee. In response to the panel, the institute redrafted its regulations so that the probate committee was made up of a majority of lay members. The Office of Fair Trading had no objections. The Law Society wrote to the Legal Services Board to express concerns, in particular, as I have already noted, about the governance arrangements being proposed by the institute. The Legal Services Board copied this letter to the institute, which responded in detail to all the concerns that the Law Society had raised. The LSB was content with the response and the governance arrangements.

As I have also already mentioned, the Legal Services Board consulted the Financial Reporting Council and the Insolvency Service. Both the Financial Reporting Council and the Insolvency Service noted that the institute takes its regulatory responsibilities very seriously and supported the applications.

I appreciate that some might argue that the Government should not be pressing ahead with this and that an accountancy regulator should not be permitted to regulate legal services. Some may even suggest that there will be a lowering of standards, or a diminution of consumer protection. We do not accept these arguments. The Legal Services Board is satisfied that there will be no lowering of standards or lessening of consumer protection, and the Government agree. I am satisfied that the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales will be a highly capable and effective regulator in the legal services market. Its entry to this field will help contribute to the growth of the legal services market and bring further innovations, leading to benefits to consumers of legal services.

I turn now to the appeals orders. Noble Lords may be aware that the licensing regime for alternative business structures, as contained in the 2007 Act, became operational on 6 October 2011. In brief, alternative business structures are bodies that carry on reserved legal activities and are partly or wholly owned or controlled by non-lawyers.

In relation to that regime, as I have said previously, the ICAEW has applied to the Legal Services Board to be designated as a licensing authority. The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys—CIPA—and the Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys—ITMA—also made a joint application to the Legal Services Board to be designated as licensing authorities. Members of the Committee may be aware that the Legal Services Board made recommendations on 6 December, and earlier this year the Minister responsible for legal services agreed to make the following orders designating the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, the Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales as licensing authorities under the Legal Services Act 2007.

In accordance with that Act, before CIPA, ITMA and ICAEW can be designated as licensing authorities by order of the Lord Chancellor, it is necessary for there to be an appellate body with the power to hear appeals against its decisions made in relation to alternative business structures.

The purpose of these orders is to make provision for the First-tier Tribunal to act as the appellate body for the purpose of appeals from those three bodies in their capacity as licensing authorities. As required by the 2007 Act, these orders are made on the recommendation of the Legal Services Board, following public consultation.

In summary, the two appeals orders make provision: for the First-tier Tribunal to have the power to hear appeals from the decisions of ICAEW under Part 5 of the 2007 Act and its licensing rules and to hear appeals from the decisions of CIPA and ITMA, acting jointly or separately, under Part 5 of the 2007 Act and their licensing rules; for the orders that the First-tier Tribunal may make on appeals from decisions made by those bodies under their licensing rules; and for modifying the Legal Services Act 2007 so that these appeals fit into the existing structure of onward appeals from the First-tier Tribunal to the Upper Tribunal.

These orders have been brought before the House at the earliest opportunity, following recommendations from the Legal Services Board on 2 May. If approved, the orders will provide individuals and businesses that are subject to licensing decisions of the Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, the Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys and the ICAEW with an opportunity to appeal those decisions through an independent and impartial appellate body. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, having safely navigated the rather stormy waters of the Second Reading of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill yesterday, it is a pleasure to renew acquaintance with the Minister over these crucially important statutory instruments. One or two questions occur to me about them.

The first is that we are talking effectively about alternative business structures, which are clearly well regulated. I do not know whether this is possible, but supposing that within a single alternative business structure you had both lawyers and accountants, what would be the appropriate framework? Would the professional body of which an individual within such a structure might be a member have a jurisdiction? Or is there an overarching mechanism for the structure as a whole as opposed to the individuals who work within it?

Secondly, grants of probate are issued to executors. My understanding is that if the executors chose to employ someone who is not part of a regulated profession, of course none of these safeguards would apply. Is it the intention of either the Government or the relevant bodies—I presume it would certainly be that of the latter, but it would also be sensible for the Government—to promote the use of properly regulated structures for these purposes? Having said that, I mentioned to the Minister before we began this Committee that I know of a solicitor who many years ago charged something like £90,000 in fees on an estate that was valued at just over £100,000. The regulatory body disposed of him in due course, but he was nevertheless guilty of an offence and seriously defrauding his client. The existence of a regulatory body itself does not necessarily mean that everything will be well.

There is one other matter, which may be slightly tangential. I am assuming that other accountancy bodies may be in a position to apply to be recognised for the same purposes as the chartered institute. In that connection, I have some involvement with an organisation called the Association of International Accountants. It is a non-commercial relationship; I just happen to know some of the people involved and I was recently asked to host a dinner in this House in lieu of my noble friend Lord Sawyer, which I did. The organisation is having some difficulties, not in this particular context, but in the more general context of being recognised for certain other purposes. It may not be possible for him to give me one at the moment, but I would like an assurance from the Minister that, if such a body were to apply to be recognised for the same purposes as the chartered institute, the same process that the chartered institute has successfully undergone would be available to it.

There is a feeling on the part of the Association of International Accountants that the two main accountancy bodies in this country—the chartered institute and whatever the appropriate body is for certified accountants—are, in one particular area, effectively operating a duopoly from which this association is excluded. I asked a Written Question about this some time ago, to which I received a not terribly helpful reply from the point of view of the association. An assurance that they would be treated on an equal footing in terms of passing whatever tests are necessary to be included in this would perhaps be of some comfort to them. Having said that, I cannot see anything to object to in these orders and we are perfectly content to see them go through.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the questions that I have been asked by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who rightly says that regulation and discipline are no absolute guarantee against unprofessional, to put it mildly, practice on the part of a professional in whatever their particular role is. The Legal Services Board has been given by Parliament the task of approving as a regulator these various bodies. As your Lordships will be aware, the scope of their activities is limited. In terms of protection of the consumer, it was important that the effective arrangements were in place to ensure that members co-operated with the legal ombudsman. The Government also had to be satisfied that appropriate client protection arrangements were in place for any body designated as an approved regulator. The Legal Services Board undertook a detailed analysis and was satisfied with the arrangements of the probate compensation scheme, and the requirement for all authorised firms and accredited probate firms to hold professional indemnity insurance. That should protect someone in whatever particular professional role they perform within an alternative business structure.

In terms of these now multidisciplinary practices, there may well be lawyers working with what one used to regard as an accountancy firm. As I understand it, their work within the accountancy firm would be regulated in the way of the accountancy firm licensed to perform these particular activities, but if they were solicitors, for example, their activities would also be regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority as the disciplinary body. In so far as there can be protection for the individual, that will be ensured by these new arrangements.

[Lord Beecham]

In view of what the Minister has said, it is right that there should be professional indemnity insurance but that is basically for professional negligence. Certainly, the Law Society—as I know from the experience of having to contribute to these things—has occasionally to step in, not just in cases of professional negligence but also in cases of dishonesty, to compensate the clients of solicitors. Is it a condition of these bodies being recognised as regulatory bodies that they should assume responsibilities in that context of compensating those who have been defrauded of their entitlement as opposed to in claims for professional negligence? Again, it may not be possible to answer that question now but it would be interesting to find out.

[Lord Faulks]

I think that it would. I would be happy to write further with details about the arrangements. As I understand it, the Legal Services Board needed to be satisfied of the capacity for individuals to be compensated if mistakes were made in non-contentious probate. For historical reasons, probate is a reserved activity; hence the need for this whole process. The Legal Services Board was satisfied about professional indemnity insurance.

If I sound somewhat hesitant, the noble Lord will appreciate that Parliament has designated the Legal Services Board as the regulator. This is not directly the Government’s approval; it is the Legal Services Board’s approval. They have created this body, and the body has gone through the process. The Government have to be satisfied that the Legal Services Board has gone through the necessary process of consultation and satisfied itself of the adequacy of protection, for example, for consumers, and all the other aspects to which I referred in opening, but they do not have a separate governmental role. We do not think that there has been any inadequacy in the process of this approval. Essentially, the Legal Services Board, having been given that task, has satisfied itself. If an individual chooses a regulated person to undertake their probate, they naturally have protection and redress. As the noble Lord says, individuals have the choice of whether to undertake their own probate, in which case they do not, which is a matter of consumer choice. Further to what I said about lawyers and accountants within a single ABS, that will, of course, depend on which regulator licensed the alternative business structure. However, I understand that entity regulation applies over individual regulation, although, as I say, the individual may have some additional professional obligations of the sort that I described.

I do not think that I can answer from the Dispatch Box the other question that the noble Lord asked in relation to international firms. However, I will try to write him a more helpful letter than the one that apparently he received on a previous occasion.

[Lord Beecham]

I am grateful to the Minister for that. However, to be clear, the Association of International Accountants is not just a body of international accountants; it is a body with many UK members and some overseas members as well. It is therefore not operating solely in the international sphere. However, as I say, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his offer.

[Lord Faulks]

I hope that, subject to my providing further information by letter, I have satisfied the noble Lord. The debate has enabled me to put on record the importance of the alternative business structure and of the Government encouraging growth and innovation in the legal services market generally through these means. The order designated the ICAEW as a new approved regulator, which demonstrates our commitment to it. I hope that the debate has demonstrated the importance of the appeals order, which naturally needs to exist to support the effective operation of the ABS scheme. The appeals orders form a key component of the licensing arrangements. I commend these orders to the Committee.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 30th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I understand the noble Lord’s mathematics and on the current numbers there would be a logic behind them, but this is a pathfinder college and as such we are not committed to going further. However, it may well be that we will be moving in that direction. If your Lordships’ House or Parliament does not share our vision for secure colleges, the construction of the next generation of facilities will have to take place within the existing framework for young offender institutions in secure training centres. But we believe that a fresh approach and a new framework will provide a better way of ensuring that our planned new institutions educate and rehabilitate more effectively than the existing ones.

A great deal of anxiety has been expressed about the rules, in particular the use of force. In answer to my noble friend Lord Carlile, private providers will not be able to make up their own rules on the use of force, and it is not true that they will be able to do so. Rules on the use of force will be clearly set out in the secure college rules and we have committed to consult not just on the rules but on the content of the rules.

[Lord Beecham]

Can the noble Lord confirm that the rules will be subject to parliamentary approval?

[Lord Faulks]

They will be part of the consultation in the course of amendment but not specifically subject to parliamentary approval as such. I say that subject to correction, but I think that that is the position. My noble friend Lady Berridge asked about reporting restrictions and made an important point about the youth court. I can confirm that the Government are looking carefully at that particular issue.

The question of juror research was raised by noble Lord, Lord Blair, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. I have some sympathy with the point about the need for greater understanding of what is or is not permitted in terms of research into juries. I cannot commit the resources of the Ministry of Justice to provide the information being sought, but I will take this back and try to provide some form of clarity. Professor Cheryl Thomas appears to encounter no difficulty in analysing the information and I think the contrary argument is that any other information tends to be anecdotal. It does seem to me that simply to accept that jury trial is the right answer without proper examination is not a proper approach to this matter. I also note the comments made by the noble and learned Lord about Lord Roskill’s commission all those years ago, and I take his point about the reduction in costs. Sooner or later, viscerally attached though we are in this country to trial by jury, that does not obviate the need to examine and re-examine whether it is appropriate in all circumstances. As he quite rightly said, the Defamation Act 2013 is a recent example of where trial by jury is no longer to be available.

Perhaps I may conclude with some comments on Part 4. To say that this part was not entirely welcomed would be something of an understatement. Noble Lords have made some remarkable speeches in the course of the debate and it is absolutely clear that the relevant clauses will be subject to the degree of scrutiny that one would expect on a series of provisions of this sort. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me if I keep my remarks short and respond in detail to the many amendments that I expect to receive on these matters in due course.

It was suggested that there had not been much growth in judicial review as most of them were either immigration or asylum judicial reviews. I would like to set out to the House that, as is shown in the published national statistics, the number of civil judicial reviews, not including immigration and asylum claims, increased by 27% between 2000 and 2013, albeit that we accept that such claims continue to represent a small proportion of the total number of claims. However, the Government continue to believe that there are fundamental issues with how judicial reviews are brought that require proportionate reform. Although I know there was little support for these changes, I think it was accepted that from time to time this area of law can need examination, re-examination and amendment. I said in opening and I repeat now that it is no part of the Government's approach to this that judicial review is not a vital part of the checks on administrative action, whether on central or local government or other arms of the state. We are concerned by these various provisions to restrict the costs of obtaining judicial review and to ensure that interveners’ participation in reviews is at least more circumscribed than it is at the moment. I accept that interveners can provide valuable assistance in judicial reviews having—I declare an interest—taken part by representing one of the parties and on more than one occasion acting for an intervener. However, there has been a proliferation of interventions. If one looks at reported cases now, almost any case at Appeal Court level appears to attract a considerable level of intervention and some of it is duplicated. It often takes the form of very lengthy skeleton arguments and many volumes of authorities. Although judges do their best to make economic use of the available material, all parties involved in the case are thereby put to the expense of having to deal with the magnitude of the contributions made by interveners.

While I do not reject the proposition that interveners can add value, we must look at the cost consequences of those who use judicial review as a form of campaign. That word was used during the course of the debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton. Campaigning organisations have an enormous value, but it should not be thought that judicial review is simply a method of campaigning. Judicial review is concerned with unlawful activity: it is not just another way of expressing the various objectives of a campaign.

[Lord Beecham]

Does the Minister accept that no intervention can take place without the leave of the court? What he is saying is surely somewhat derogatory of the decision of the judges to permit interventions.

[Lord Faulks]

My answer to that is that the hypothetical Mr Justice Beecham on a busy list is told that there might be an intervention of one sort. He may not be able to anticipate the level of the intervention that is then forthcoming in terms of its size and the number of others who intervene. The noble Lord scowls, but I am endeavouring to answer his question so perhaps he should not do so. Then, in due course, a hearing takes place by which time an enormous amount of material can be provided and the scope of the case can expand. This is not an evil, but it ought to be controlled. It is difficult without continuity of the judges involved in this to control it in the way that it should be.

Crime and Courts Act 2013 (County Court and Family Court: Consequential Provision) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 16th June 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I am glad that in just under four years’ membership of the House, I have at last been able to persuade the Government to do something. I hope that this is the start of a trend for the last 12 months of the Government’s life. I would not dissent from the Minister’s proposal in these amendments, but I feel it is necessary to reflect a little on what is happening in the family court system because some worrying factors are emerging.

I cannot now recall whether the Minister was in his place in the Chamber during that part of the debate on the Queen’s Speech in which I spoke. I have no doubt that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, will be replying in due course to some of the points I made, but some of them were around the business of the family court and, in particular, how the court is now operating. I am not speaking so much about the geographical location aspect—although that is a factor of some concern because now we have designated courts hearing these matters as opposed to just the local magistrates’ court which previously would have dealt with matters—but more particularly of the impact of the legal aid changes.

The Minister rightly referred to the fact that there is some legal aid available but, as noble Lords might recall, there was an extensive argument about the fact that a significant number of cases would fall outside the scope of legal aid, and it would appear that that is beginning to have a significant impact in turn, as was predicted, on the number of litigants in person in family court matters. I think the figure nationally has now risen to 52%. In the north-east, 61% of people in the family court are now unrepresented. That is apparently already causing significant delays to develop. Given the particularly sensitive area in which these cases are brought—disputes in the family are necessarily sensitive—that is an extremely unwelcome development. Of course, I cannot ask the Minister today to give any assurances about that matter, but I hope that he can say that the Government will be looking at the impact in terms of delay and the administration of justice in this sensitive area and will assess the position. It seems to me that that need not wait much longer because the legal aid impact has now been perceptible for some time, as these figures demonstrate. I hope the Government will take a look at the number of cases and the length of delays that are occurring and at whether any action can be taken to put that right because without that the reorganisation of the court structure will not achieve its objectives, which were to simplify the system and to make it more accessible and more efficient. That cannot be the case if unrepresented parties are clogging the courts, requiring adjournments and requiring the court effectively to intervene to run the case, as it were, when previously the parties would have had representatives who were capable of doing that and perhaps even of negotiating properly before the matter reached the court.

Having said that, we do not object to the order as laid but hope that the matters I have referred to today, which others have raised elsewhere, can be looked at and a response ultimately given.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who modestly did not acknowledge his own part in one part of the changes that we are proposing by this statutory instrument. As to litigants in person and the problems that they could cause in family justice, as the noble Lord would expect, I cannot comment on particular local difficulties. I understood him to be saying that his quarrel was not so much with the structure as with the practical difficulties that could be encountered by unrepresented litigants, with possible delays that might flow from that.

The Government want to help people to reach their own agreements outside court, when that is appropriate or safe. It is the case, and always has been, that people have to attend court on occasions, and the Government are taking a number of steps to assist litigants in person. We have provided funding to, among others, the Royal Courts of Justice and the Citizens Advice Bureau to develop and expand what is known as CourtNav—an application that helps selected users to complete applications to the courts in an effective way—and to Advicenow, to update a number of its guides, as well as to the Personal Support Unit, to provide free independent assistance to people facing proceedings without legal representation in civil and family courts. The Courts Service and the Ministry of Justice have also provided easy-to-understand practical information about family mediation, making an application to court and attending hearings. This has included updating leaflets available to court users and a number of videos have been made available online. I am sure that the noble Lord would like to have a look at those videos to assess their quality.

Judicial training is being delivered to support the implementation of the new private law programme—and this is an important feature. A key focus of the training is to ensure that judges, magistrates and legal advisers are better equipped to support litigants in person through the court process. I do not pretend that judges would not on the whole prefer litigants to be competently and well represented by lawyers, but as noble Lords are aware we are operating on a restricted budget and cuts have had to be made.

As to the number of litigants in person in family proceedings, I cannot give precise figures, but there have always been litigants in person in the family justice system. It is true that Her Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service data show a reduction in private law children disposals where both parties were represented in October to December of 2013, compared with the same period the previous year. Although the number of litigants in person has increased since LASPO came into effect, available data show that the time that cases are taking has remained steady. In private law, the average number of weeks to disposals remains steady at 16 to 18 weeks, but the Government are monitoring the situation and continue to do so very closely. The noble Lord is right to raise the issue—it is a source of anxiety—but I reassure him and other noble Lords that the Government are well aware of potential problems and will keep a close eye on the matter.

To sum up the statutory instrument, the order provides the vires by which legal aid may be provided for advocacy in a family court. It allows the Legal Aid Agency to provide legal aid for advocacy in the small number of cases that may still be before the family court under the old Access to Justice Act 1999, and it also allows interest to be automatically carried on certain orders made by the family court in the same way as it would have been carried when such orders were made by county courts. I commend the order to the Committee.

Transfer of Tribunal Functions (Mobile Homes Act 2013 and Miscellaneous Amendments) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 16th June 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I must follow the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, in declaring an interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and as a former leader of the same council for, if I may say so, quite a bit longer than the noble Lord. I have a certain sympathy with his view on this order to the extent that we are talking essentially about commercial organisations bearing the cost. The implication behind the noble Lord’s question is clear enough: is this a sufficient amount? If it were to fall on the occupier of a mobile home, I would be somewhat concerned about that. If the intention is that it should fall on the owner of the site as a commercial proposition, I think he makes a significant point. I am glad that he has made it because my only reservation about this order would have been to point to the split infinitive in the Explanatory Note.

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for the learned contribution from the north-east and for the grammatical point made so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. On the question of costs, as the Explanatory Note states, the position is that the fee of £155 is for making an application to the Property Chamber relating to a dispute over a mobile home. It is set at the same level as the fee applied to applications which follow similar tribunal processes for other applications. There are circumstances in which fee remissions can be obtained, but they are available only to individuals. On 7 October last the Government introduced reforms to the scheme of fee remissions in the courts and tribunals, and the purpose was to reduce the cost of the scheme to the taxpayer while ensuring that fee remissions were better targeted at those who cannot afford to pay the fee. They introduced a single fee remission scheme across the HM Courts and Tribunals Service, which is a simplified means test based on a gross monthly income and disposable capital test.

The question arises as to whether the costs payable in these cases should act as a deterrent to elderly residents. I think that, perhaps contrary to the sense of the debate so far, those concerned with these disputes are often people who would not normally venture into a court of any sort. This is to provide a relatively cost-neutral risk for those who want to resolve what can be quite highly charged disputes about their homes without great expense and involving the paraphernalia of lawyers. In fact, in answer to the question put by noble friend Lord Shipley, the fees reflect only the costs of the tribunal, not of the local authority. I accept his point that that means that there are a number of costs which are not reflected in that overall fee. What lies behind it is the provision of the sort of service I have endeavoured to describe.

So as further to assist those who might feel that they are receiving somewhat oppressive treatment from the site owners, and sadly there are some instances of that, the procedural rules contain provisions for cost awards if the tribunal considers that a party has acted unreasonably, although of course that is a judicial decision based on the particular facts of the case. Generally, however, costs are not awarded in the Property Chamber and parties meet their own expenses in bringing a case. These hearings are conducted by tribunal members who are experienced in the area and help unrepresented parties to frame questions where necessary, so clearly it is a cheap and, I hope, effective way of resolving disputes. However, I accept entirely what lies behind the question put by my noble friend Lord Shipley, which is that there is a cost involved which is borne by the local authority.

I hope that that deals with the points made by noble Lords. However unsatisfactory this might be to local authorities from the financial point of view, they are at least in the position of knowing that a useful service is being provided to those who are often in a vulnerable position in society. That is because those who acquire park homes, as they are known, often have little by way of rights and do not have clear contracts. Despite the fact that quite a lot of money is involved in these homes, there is nothing like the same security that someone would have if they were acquiring a house by the normal conveyancing route. This tribunal is providing an extremely useful and important source of remedy to help often vulnerable people.

To summarise, this order will make the changes necessary to transfer the functions conferred on the defunct residential property tribunals to the Property Chamber, so appeals against licensing decisions can be determined by the First-tier Tribunal. I commend this draft order to the Committee.

Law Commission

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 12th May 2014 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Did the party opposite avail the Conservative Party of such an opportunity when they were in power?

[Lord Beecham]

I have no idea, but I am not bound by every decision, right or wrong, made by the previous Government. I hope that they did. I might equally ask, did the noble Lord’s party ask for such a facility? I assume he does not know that either. Let us start from a clean sheet, and suggest that it is an innovation that would be worth pursuing, whatever the Government of the day. It is not a political issue: there is nothing between us politically in this agenda.

The second thing sits rather oddly with the following paragraph of the triennial review report:

“The continuing pressures on public finances will add to these challenges”.

I wonder why that should be the case, unless the commission’s manpower has been reduced, or the capacity within Government departments to deal with it has been reduced. For the most part, these are not expenditure-related Bills. The report goes on:

“This has brought to the fore the need to clarify the Commission’s funding model so that clear principles are established. To live within its means the Commission will need to be flexible and agile and will have to make difficult choices about the projects it takes on”.

Yes, but I repeat: is the financing a real issue? I have spoken for 13 minutes; I shall be very quick now.

My last point is that the Lord Chancellor currently produces a report on behalf of the Government as a whole. There does not seem to be a proper connection between the relevant departments and the Ministry of Justice in the course of the consideration of implementing these programmes. It seems to me to be necessary for there to be a single body, and it may well be the MoJ, to oversee the whole process from the government side. That is where the delays seem to occur. There may or may not be good reasons for them but no one on the government side seems to be taking responsibility for the overall programme. If they did that, we might not have the disappointment that has been voiced by other noble Lords today, and we might have a better realisation of the commission’s objectives, which the Government certainly share, in principle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

I did not raise the issue of rent control; I was talking specifically about security of tenure.

[Lord Faulks]

There is a complete answer to the concerns which the noble Lord was raising; perhaps I will not indulge myself by going into it now. Suffice it to say that the whole question is extremely difficult. I hope that he will accept that we operate continuously in a challenging economic environment. We have made significant progress in implementing the commission’s proposals. This Government, as, I am sure, does the party opposite, hold the Law Commission in very high regard. We continue to work with constructively with it. We have made great progress and can demonstrate by what has happened and what continues to happen the continued relevance and resilience of the commission’s work.

Transforming Rehabilitation: Mental Health

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 6th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

There is an obligation to treat offenders and non-offenders the same. The circumstances in which they come to be treated may be different. Those who are in prison may suffer from a number of different mental illnesses. Their treatment is the responsibility of NHS England. Of course, there are complications with the delivery of treatment in the community as well, but there is no absolute difference in the treatment that is appropriate to you when you are an offender in prison or out of prison or are an ordinary member of the public. Clearly there are matters of co-ordination that the noble Baroness would say are not sufficiently attended to.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

Between 2010 and September 2012, 86% of the prison and probation-related work contracted out to the private sector by NOMS went to G4S, Serco and Sodexo. If the Minister is so confident of the performance of these contractors in this important and sensitive area, why has the Ministry of Justice refused to disclose the figures for the succeeding year, even after an FoI request from the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies? Is he aware that just three third-sector organisations accounted for two-thirds of the third-sector expenditure in the same field?

[Lord Faulks]

I cannot comment on the details of the noble Lord’s question, but I assure him that neither of those two organisations are part of the CRC delivery, as he may well be aware. The CRC contracts are being drawn up and will be in operation by 2015. This matter was fully debated before both Houses of Parliament and we believe that any difficulties should be capable of being found in the stress-testing that is currently being undergone.

County Court Remedies Regulations 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 7th April 2014 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument revokes and replaces the County Court Remedies Regulations 1991—the 1991 regulations. A draft was laid before Parliament on 10 March 2014 and is also being debated in the other place today. Subject to your Lordships’ consideration, the real change that will be made by this instrument concerns the county court’s jurisdiction in respect of applications for freezing orders. A freezing order is an interlocutory injunction that restrains a party in civil proceedings from disposing of or dealing with their own assets before judgment can be obtained or enforced. They are usually sought before proceedings are issued when the claimant fears that the defendant is likely to dispose of assets before proceedings are issued. However, a freezing order may be sought at any time during the course of proceedings and after judgment has been obtained.

The purpose of this instrument is to remove the current limitations that restrict the county court from issuing freezing orders. It will enable the county court to make freezing orders in all cases and enable claimants to make their applications for a freezing order in the court where their substantive cases are being heard. This may be at the High Court or, from 22 April, a county court hearing centre. The Committee will note, however, that the draft regulations do not lift the restrictions that prohibit the county court from granting a search order, which is an order—often known as an Anton Piller—requiring a party to admit another party to premises for the purpose of preserving evidence. The draft regulations therefore retain the current prohibition placed on search orders. The aim of the reform is to rebalance jurisdiction between the High Court and the county court and to make optimum use of judicial resources by widening, where appropriate, the jurisdiction of the county court, while enabling High Court judges to focus on cases that require a greater level of expertise.

Before setting out further details about this instrument and why the Government are taking this action, I will briefly explain some background to the reform. In March 2011, we set out our policy to reform the structure of the civil courts in a series of proposals in the public consultation document, Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More Proportionate System. Those proposals were based on some of the recommendations made by Sir Henry Brooke, a retired Lord Justice of Appeal, in his report Should the Civil Courts be Unified?, published in August 2008. The recommendations, which included permitting the county court to grant pre-judgment freezing orders, were aimed at improving the administration of civil justice and providing a more efficient use of judicial resources. In endorsing that recommendation, the Judicial Executive Board, which was chaired by the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, commented that it would introduce flexibility and obviate the need for technical transfers between the High Court and the county courts. The instrument under consideration today accordingly reflects Sir Henry’s recommendation in this regard.

I will now set out the problem with the current jurisdiction of the courts in relation to freezing orders and why the Government are taking this action. Currently, under the 1991 regulations, the county court’s jurisdiction to make freezing orders is limited to making orders for the purpose of preserving property that forms or may form the subject matter of proceedings, or to preserve assets following judgment, but prior to execution of that judgment.

Those limitations do not apply if the order is made by a Court of Appeal judge or a judge of the High Court sitting in the county court or a mercantile judge in respect of proceedings in the Central London County Court mercantile list. Save in those circumstances, the county court is prohibited from making pre-judgment freezing orders. In all other cases, if a freezing order is required in county court proceedings, the application must be made to the High Court, even though the substantive case is being heard in the county court.

The result is that in county court proceedings where a claimant wants to apply for a freezing order to prevent the defendant from moving or disposing of his assets, the claimant will have to apply to the Chancery Division of the High Court at the Royal Courts of Justice in London, the London Mercantile Court or the nearest local district registry. In doing so, the county court would have to transfer the case to the relevant court to consider the freezing-order application. Once the application is determined, the court will transfer the case back to the county court.

The implication of the current procedure is that claimants—for example, estate agents suing for small amounts of unpaid commission—have either to inundate the mercantile courts with applications for pre-judgment freezing orders or to apply to the Chancery Division of the High Court or a local district registry. That increases the workload of the High Court, which is unnecessary, particularly as the High Court should not be the point of entry for comparatively low-value claims for what could be a simple and straightforward case. Also, those transfers often result in delays not only in dealing with a particular freezing-order application, but in dealing with all cases promptly.

The Government are committed to providing an effective and efficient civil justice system with a flexible judiciary that is deployed in the most appropriate way. In view of the time and costs associated with issuing and allocating freezing-order applications in the High Court and the time taken to transfer the substantive cases, consider them and then transfer them back to the county court and the potential costs to parties, the Government considered that the jurisdiction of the county court to grant freezing orders ought to be extended. It was on that basis that the Government consulted on the proposal in its 2011 Solving Disputes consultation paper. Ninety per cent of respondents, who included legal practitioners, members of the judiciary, judicial bodies and regulatory bodies, were in support, on the basis that only suitably experienced and qualified circuit judges of the county courts should be given the jurisdiction.

In view of that overwhelming support, the Government announced their intention to enable the county court to grant freezing orders in all cases under its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction will be extended to circuit judges who have been nominated by the Lord Chief Justice. Consequently, the statutory instrument before us today gives effect to that commitment by revoking the 1991 regulations and, in doing so, removing the current limitations, to enable the county court to make freezing orders in all cases.

The changes brought by this statutory instrument support the Government’s commitment to an effective and efficient civil justice and courts system. We consider that the current position is disproportionate and that unnecessary costs are incurred. It follows that the current restriction on the county court’s jurisdiction to grant freezing orders constitutes a restriction on access to justice for court users. Consequently, it is our intention to lift those restrictions to broaden the county court’s jurisdiction in this regard to improve access to justice while optimising the use of judicial resources. That would mean that court users can have their freezing-order applications considered in the court where their substantive cases are being heard.

Invariably, this should contribute to a reduction in the volume of transfers from the county court to the High Court and the number of applications considered in the High Court. It would thereby provide efficiency benefits for the courts, since less time and fewer administrative and judicial resources would be needed to allocate these applications and transfer the substantive cases to the High Court. For the same reasons, court users could experience a more streamlined service and a reduction in transfers. As one respondent pointed out:

“Any power to help enforcement is a good move. Having to apply to the High Court often many miles away or in London can be wasteful in costs and time. There is no reason for a Circuit Judge not to deal with these applications”.

I therefore commend these draft regulations to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I had anticipated that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, would speak, which would have made me even more the lowest-ranked member of the legal profession to have spoken today, but I defer in any event to the Minister’s legal knowledge and expertise. As already indicated, I have no particular problem with this instrument.

However, it is ironic that the title of the response to the public consultation, which is not in itself a very brief title, is Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More Proportionate System. It is ironic because the original report on which the regulations are based was, as the Minister pointed out, published in 2008. It has taken three years from the publication of the response to bring forward the proposals before us today. This seems to be an example of the Bleak House style of legislation: you take an eternity to produce a response. That is not the fault of this particular Government; it seems to me characteristic of the way, perhaps in particular in legal affairs, matters take an inordinate time to be resolved. One thinks of the length of time it takes for any Law Commission report to come forward in the form of legislation. It is something perhaps that the Government could look at.

On the substance of the order, there is no particular problem, but I have just one question to ask about it. To begin with, it struck me that, even if there was an argument about the decision that might be taken by one of the newly appointed circuit judges as opposed to a High Court judge, there is of course in any event a right of appeal, so that those decisions can be challenged. However, I notice that, just four days ago, it was announced that the Supreme Court, following a hearing in the Court of Appeal, will now hear the case of Ablyazov, where the assets frozen amounted to some £40 million—this is not freezing a vehicle or goods; it is a very substantial sum of money. I wonder whether any consideration has been given to a threshold above which it might be expected that a case will still go to the High Court. I am not saying that circuit judges would be incapable of dealing with cases involving £40 million or more, but there might be some questions to be asked about that. Of course, even if people were dissatisfied with an order made by such a judge, there would still be the right of appeal, but I wonder whether consideration was given to some threshold above which a higher court judge might in the first instance be asked to make a determination. That is an aspect that might be kept under review. Subject to that, we would not quibble with the instrument before us.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the observations from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who, as ever, is far too modest about his skill and expertise. On consultation, there was quite a hiatus following the original publication of the Brooke report. The consultation was deep and wide, involving all the appropriate parties—judicial and legal bodies, regulatory bodies, representative bodies, such as civil court users, local authorities, mediation and mediation advocates, academics, citizens advice bureaux, financial organisations, government departments and members of the public. It took a little time for the Government to produce their response, which was published in 2012, but since that time they have taken forward the Brooke recommendations to implement the single county court in the Crime and Courts Act 2013. In the light of the changes being made to the county court as a result of that legislation, we considered that it was appropriate for this and other Brooke recommendations to come into force on the implementation of the single county court.

On the second point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, I think that he may have somewhat misunderstood the purport of this instrument. Of course, it extends the jurisdiction of the county court, but if it is attached to a money claim, the ceiling is £100,000, so that his scenario of £40 million would not come within the county court’s jurisdiction. It is always alarming to freeze a sum of that nature but, if there is a freezing order, as he will know, it may be ex parte originally, but there is always the possibility of the respondent coming back to court to modify, discharge or vary it or to apply exceptions to the order. Therefore, it is not as draconian a remedy as it seems, but it is an essential remedy sometimes to stop the dissipation of assets. The purpose of this extension of jurisdiction is to make sure that that valuable remedy exists whether the claim is £40 million or a much more modest sum. It allows there to be convenience for court users and it gives judges, who will have the necessary training, as wide a jurisdiction as required to enable those who seek to ensure that their assets, which they have a reasonable and proper expectation of recovering, are not frittered away and dissipated without justification. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord.

Senior Judiciary: Women

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

This is a difficult problem and the more that I have read about it the more difficult I think it is. It was much debated during the passage of the 2013 Act. The Government are doing their best to encourage diversity but the problem probably starts much earlier, in the structure of the relative professions. The number of women applicants for High Court positions is, sadly, still relatively low. That is less the case in the lower judiciary. The position is that there is one woman in the Supreme Court, and 19 out of 108 High Court judges are women, as are seven out of 38 Lords Justices in the Court of Appeal. This is a regrettable state of affairs and, clearly, we hope that things change.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare a paternal interest since my daughter sits as a part-time district judge. Given the high proportion of women among criminal and family law practitioners in particular, will the Government rethink the position that they set out in their response to the Transforming Legal Aid consultation in which, in relation to the need to promote diversity, they said that even if the reform of legal aid were,

“to make the attainment of the objectives more difficult, we consider that the changes are necessary and justified”?

Will the Government accept that they have a responsibility in this area, rather than simply asserting, as they did in the same response, that for underrepresented groups like women and BME aspirants, the primary responsibility is that of the Bar and the solicitors’ profession?

[Lord Faulks]

I agree with the noble Lord that the primary responsibility is for the professions: the Bar Standards Board and the Solicitors Regulation Authority. The question of legal aid, we submit, is not the right instrument in order to encourage diversity. The provision of legal aid depends upon trying to target those most in need of legal aid in accordance with the available budget.

Justice: Academic Research on Jury Decision-making

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 12th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

In answer to the first Question, I indicated that the Ministry of Justice is considering the Law Commission’s recommendation and will of course bear in mind what is said there. The safeguards identified in that report are the same safeguards as exist at the moment. We remain open to persuasion. A Bill will in due course be coming to your Lordships’ House containing various provisions about juries. It is possible that there may be some amendment to that effect.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, in addition to the recommendations about research, the Law Commission has proposed the creation of some new offences that apply to juries in the light of current developments, particularly in technology, and that better guidance be given, not merely in the form referred to in the question of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. Are the Government in a position to respond to them, and to the recent suggestion by the Lord Chief Justice that in serious fraud cases, for example, a different method might be instituted which would mean that juries would not try such cases?

[Lord Faulks]

As to the latter question, as the noble Lord will know, that is no new suggestion. It dates back as long ago as when the Roskill commission made suggestions to that effect. There are no current plans to remove trial by jury. As to other changes in the jury system and legislating to that effect, the noble Lord may be aware that there are provisions in Part 3 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill dealing with, among other things, questions of electronic communication devices and the restriction on them and the restriction on jurors using the internet to obtain information during the course of the trial, which can of course compromise a fair trial, which is in no one’s interest.

Justice: Cautions

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I agree with the right reverent Prelate. There is a great case for restorative justice in appropriate cases, and it is indeed an option for it to be part of the conditional caution. There is increasing approval in this House and outside of its use.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, with a nod to the next Question from the noble Lord, Lord Horam, given the apparent increase in the use of cautions by police forces in the past few years, might it be desirable for the Office for National Statistics to look at the figures for reported crime and for cautions? People may well be suspicious that the recorded crime statistics are depressed by the use of cautions.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the House may be interested to know that the use of out of court disposals rose significantly between 2003 and 2007 but has fallen significantly since 2007 and continues to fall under this Government. The use of cautions is at its lowest point for almost 30 years, and nearly at half the level seen in 2007. Furthermore, crime continues to fall. Recorded crime is down by more than 10% under this Government and the independent Crime Survey for England and Wales shows crime is at its lowest level since records began.

Offender Rehabilitation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 11th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Before the noble Lord sits down, could he help the House with how he sees the form of the amendment? Does he interpret it as requiring almost any change, of any sort, in the probation service to come before Parliament?

[Lord Beecham]

That is not my interpretation of it. That could have been levied against the amendment originally moved by my noble friend, but this amendment makes it clear that we are talking about a national change to the structure of the service, not every individual detail. It is consistent with the description I have already read to the House—quoting Hansard—from the Home Secretary at the time, about the requirement for parliamentary approval for changes of the very kind that the Government are promoting without having sought such approval.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this has been an excellent and important debate. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said that he wanted a debate on the probation service and he has got one. However, there have been a number of criticisms of the Government’s approach. Among other things, they are said to have delayed but then gone too fast. It is said they have not been sufficiently transparent and that the contract management is not sufficiently secure or not prospectively secure. I will deal with some of these criticisms without wearying the House too much. I have dealt with them in a number of meetings and documents sent to noble Lords but, for the convenience of those who may not have had those documents—or had a chance to read them—I will try and summarise some of our answers.

Since my noble friend Lord McNally committed to placing documents in the House Library, we have deposited 12 sets of letters, papers and publications about the reforms, including most recently all the draft contracts for the new CRCs. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, raised the question of how CRCs will interact with statutory and non-statutory partnerships. We published a consultation paper about this and all his concerns are now reflected in the operating model.

Many Peers raised concerns about big private providers outmanoeuvring smaller charities. We have made changes to the number of contract areas to allow for smaller bidders; placed a cap of 25% on market share; engaged with potential tier 2 and tier 3 organisations so that 800 are now registered; and we have decided to accept the suggestion made by my noble friend Lord Marks to set up an independent institute.

It is said that the approach has lacked transparency and there was reference in debate to the risk register. Both this and the previous Government have agreed that there is a strong interest for the Government in having a safe place to formulate and develop policies for extensive reform. To remove that space and to challenge and manage risks internally would risk damaging confidence in the programme and could lead to a culture where risks are not even raised and properly managed through fear of the implications of doing so.

I should emphasise that the risk register is by no means a list of things that will happen, only of things that might conceivably happen if we take no action and we should therefore plan for and mitigate the possibility of happening. That is simply good management. The risks are given an inherent score: the score when the risk is first identified without any controls or mitigations in place, and a current score with controls in place. A target score is also agreed. Risks are reported weekly to the departmental board, and throughout the course of the programme Ministers have been kept closely informed of emerging risks and actions being taken to mitigate them. Programme officials regularly meet Ministers—on average twice weekly—on various aspects of the programme, as well as having close and regular informal contact with Ministers’ private offices.

It is said that there is a lack of clarity about the costing of these reforms. The Cabinet Office and Her Majesty’s Treasury are full members of the programme board before the reforms and attend regular monthly meetings. They have been closely involved with our decision regarding the launch and the invitation to negotiate. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury approved the payment mechanism, the launch of the invitation to negotiate and the outline business case. The programme has been given Treasury approval.

The question of scrutiny was raised. How, the question was effectively asked, will we make sure that the new system is open to public and parliamentary scrutiny? The reform system will be regulated and held to account through a combination of independent inspection, audit and commercial account management. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation will inspect services delivered by both the National Probation Service and contracted sectors. NOMS will have the right to audit CRC delivery, and the CRC contracts will also allow the National Audit Office access to CRCs’ financial systems where public reassurance is needed.

The audit schedule in the draft contracts, which the NAO approved and commented that it provides far-reaching audit powers, provides NOMS with wide powers of access to information, IT premises and personnel, including emergency audit. The NAO scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament and holds government departments to account for the way they use public money by reporting the results of its audits direct to Parliament.

There was a suggestion that staff were not being well managed and that some of them, at least, were reporting to individual noble Lords that they were unhappy with the process of transition which will inevitably happen. We have transition managers working with every probation trust, whose sole role is to be the link between the MoJ and trusts. There are weekly updates sent to probation chiefs; weekly teleconferences are held with senior leaders; testing and pilots of key elements of the programme have been and are taking place; and experts from probation have been seconded to the programme to add their valuable experience.

In addition, the new heads of CRCs have now been appointed and meet on the MoJ’s sounding board, which is helping to manage the transition process. The Secretary of State corresponds regularly with probation chiefs both through letters and via video message. Ministers and the programme management regularly visit trusts and maintain informal contact with probation chiefs throughout the programme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 2, I shall speak also to Amendments 3 to 17 and 19 to 25. Although this is a relatively large group of amendments, most make minor or technical changes to the Bill and I will try to deal with them as concisely as I can.

I will start with the most noteworthy amendments in this group. Amendment 15 focuses on restorative justice. As I said earlier, I know that there is support across the House for the important role that restorative justice can play both in helping victims to move on from crime and in rehabilitating offenders. The amendment makes explicit that rehabilitative activities carried out under a community order, suspended sentence order or post-sentence supervision can include restorative justice. Noble Lords may already have spotted that this amendment is very similar to one originally tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. Having debated the issue once again in the other place, the Government have been persuaded that it would be helpful to make explicit in the Bill our intention that rehabilitative activities can include restorative justice activities. This reflects the Government’s desire to see much greater use of restorative justice in appropriate cases. I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord for first raising this issue and I hope that your Lordships’ House will welcome this statutory foundation for the use of restorative justice as part of the rehabilitation offered to offenders.

Amendments 2, 3, 4, 9 and 22 also pick up on an issue first raised in your Lordships’ House, this time by my noble friend Lady Linklater. Together the amendments deal with young offenders who are imprisoned for serious offences as a juvenile but are then released after they have turned 18. The Bill provides that this group of offenders, like others released from short sentences, will receive 12 months of supervision after release. The amendments make it clear that this supervision can be delivered either by an adult probation provider or by a youth offending team—YOT—as the Bill already provides for detention and training orders. There will be circumstances where a YOT may be better placed to deal with the needs of a young adult offender and it is absolutely right that the Bill should give flexibility to allow for this. In that way we can avoid the cliff edge of a sudden transition from youth to adult services. Again, I pay tribute to my noble friend for having championed this issue during the Bill’s original passage through the House.

Amendments 11, 12, 19 and 20 focus on drug testing requirements imposed as part of licence or the new post-release supervision period. Currently, an offender released on licence can be required to submit to compulsory testing in cases where the offender’s conviction offence is on a trigger list. The trigger offences are those crimes that are most likely to be linked to misuse of drugs. They include theft and fraud offences as well as drug offences.

Since the introduction of the Bill, we have looked in more detail at the evidence on drug use by prisoners in the Government’s Surveying Prisoner Crime Reduction survey. It suggests, as one might expect, that there is a strong correlation between prisoners who report use of class A or class B drugs before sentence and those who go on to reoffend. However, it also suggests that using the trigger offence as a filter omits around half of all prisoners who are class A drug users and the majority of those who are class B drug users. In short, where an offence is not on the trigger list but is linked to the offender’s use of illegal drugs, there is no power to require the offender to take drug tests where that would support their rehabilitation. Similarly, in a scenario where a persistent offender who is abusing drugs commits an offence that this time happens not to be on the trigger list, there is no testing power either after they are released from custody.

These amendments replace the trigger offence threshold with a new, two-limbed test: first, the offender has a propensity to misuse specified class A or B drugs; and, secondly, the misuse by the offender of any specified class A or B drug caused or contributed to any offence of which he has been convicted, or is likely to cause or contribute to the commission of further offences. That mirrors the threshold in place for the drug appointment requirement also contained within the current Bill. It continues to provide safeguards to ensure that testing requirements are not imposed in inappropriate cases.

Amendments 14, 16, 17, 21, 24 and 25 collectively allow for the transfer of the post-sentence supervision period created by the Bill to Scotland, Northern Ireland and other UK jurisdictions. Currently, terms of imprisonment and associated licence periods after release can be transferred to and from UK jurisdictions under provisions in the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. That can happen on a restricted basis, where the sentencing provisions of the exporting jurisdiction apply in the receiving jurisdiction, or it can happen on an unrestricted basis, where the offender transfers on to an equivalent sentence in the receiving jurisdiction’s legislation. This gives flexibility for both the exporting and receiving jurisdiction to agree a transfer in the way that is most appropriate for an individual case.

These amendments make the necessary changes to the law to allow for post-sentence supervision, the supervision default order that is available as a sanction for breach of that supervision and the new drug appointment requirement to be transferred to other UK jurisdictions. The Government have worked very closely with the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to agree the detail of these amendments. We have agreed with both Administrations that we will work with them in advance of commencement to review the existing operational guidance that exists on transfer of sentences. The existing position, where all transfers are agreed between the relevant jurisdictions, and where jurisdictions retain the right to refuse transfers, will continue.

Finally, Amendments 5 to 8, 10, 13 and 23 are technical changes to the clauses of the Bill that deal with consecutive sentences, drug appointments and fixed-term recall. They simply make clarifications to the way in which the clauses are drafted rather than any changes of substance. I can provide further details if any noble Lord has a particular question about them. However, to keep our proceedings concise, at this point I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am happy to confirm the Opposition’s support for these amendments and I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation of them.

Access to Justice Act 1999 (Destination of Appeals) (Family Proceedings) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 3rd March 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Faulks]

Yes, I will certainly write in so far as I do not answer all the issues raised by the noble Lords, Lord Jones and Lord Beecham. I fear that I will not be able to answer all the points, but I hope that I can at least reassure the noble Lord that the magistracy will still be involved in the matter, as it was before, and will not lose its expertise—it will simply be called something different. There is some reallocation of its tasks, but not a loss of its important role.

The closure of courts generally is a different issue from that which we are considering. There are always difficult arguments on the cost of having a court that is infrequently used as against the convenience for local people. We are of course anxious that the quality of decision-making should be high and that there should be convenience, and we do not anticipate that there will be a radical change in individual cases. The noble Lord mentioned the position in Llanelli, where he feared that there would not be enough local expertise. I am assured that there would not be a radical transfer unless the court service was satisfied that there was the appropriate level of expertise in a local area.

I turn to issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. He said that he was concerned that there had not yet been a specific route for the appeals identified. I indicated in the course of my remarks that they would be set out in a statutory instrument under Section 31D of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984, which would be made by the Lord Chief Justice or his nominated officer after consultation with the Family Procedure Rule Committee and with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor. The rules are made with the consultation of the committee, which includes expert practitioners, justices’ clerks and judges. It also includes a representative of the court users, so it should be possible before the appropriate tier of appeal is finalised for all interested parties to have an opportunity to have their views reflected in the designation. Although I understand the noble Lord’s anxiety, it is unlikely that he will find the organisation of appeals in any sense out of sync with the construction of appeals that exist generally in civil procedure—that is, there will be an appeal from a court to a higher level of court and, depending on where the initial allocation begins, a superior court will then come to consider the relevant appeal.

The noble Lord, Lord Jones, asked a question about the consultation with the Magistrates’ Association, which was very helpfully answered by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who was able to confirm that it had been consulted. The statutory obligation was to consult the family practitioners’ rules committee, which comprises representatives of the lay magistracy, justices’ clerks and a number of judges, so it would have been included in any event in that consultation.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, asked about payments to charity. I am told that the amendment to Section 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 will mean that the family court will be able to order a party to make a payment to a charity. This mirrors the current position in the civil courts and applies where a party has been represented free of charge. It will be for the court in the individual case to determine to which charity the payment should be made. I hope that that answers that point. The noble Lord also made a point about the increase in costs and the fees for divorce going up. Yes, if it is dealt with at a lower level then I understand his point about that. A final decision has not yet been made on whether to increase the fees for divorce, although this matter was consulted on. I will certainly take back his observations.

Perhaps I have not quite sufficiently answered the question about the general sufficiency of the numbers of justices’ clerks. It is actually the case that the assistant justices’ clerks will be doing most of the work in courts. There are about 1,400 of them and the justices’ clerks are managers, so there is one in each area. There are 26. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service has assured Ministers that there will be sufficient justices’ clerks to perform the various functions which they are able to do as a result of this designation.

I think that I have answered most of the questions—no, I have not.

[Lord Beecham]

There is just the question of interest, upon which the Minister might care to write to me. I presume that he has not been briefed on that yet by those behind him.

[Lord Faulks]

The position is that I cannot give an answer, I am disappointed to say, but we will definitely write on that issue. I hope that the noble Lord will be satisfied with the answer.

I am grateful for the helpful questions from noble Lords and, notwithstanding the reservations in the points that have been helpfully made, I hope that your Lordships will agree that these draft instruments are an important step in simplifying the family court system and making it more accessible to families.

Public Bodies (Merger of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 24th February 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham]

I must begin by apologising to the noble and learned Lord. I had not noticed that he was here and obviously intended to speak; I apologise for that.

As I said, try as I might—and I certainly tried—I cannot find anything much to object to in the 19 pages of the order or, indeed, the 134 amendments embodied in it. The principle is clearly right and it is sensible to combine the two positions. However, although this does not quite fall within the Minister’s brief, there are still questions to be asked about the operation of the service as a whole, particularly in relation to staffing.

Of course we are only talking about part of HMRC for the purposes of the order, but within HMRC there have been significant staff reductions. To be precise, 1,697 staff left in 2012-13. That forms part of a significant reduction in funding of HMRC amounting to about £2 billion, or 16.5%, by 2015. The Chancellor’s reinvestment, as it were, of £154 million, which was announced with a flourish a couple of years ago, will not make much of an impact on that massive cut.

The question arises, therefore, about the implications for staffing on what had been the HMRC function. Will the staff be protected, or will there be reductions? The record of HMRC in recovering moneys is clearly not very good. The Public Accounts Committee criticised it for collecting more than £1 billion a year less in December 2012 than it would have done, had it had the relevant staff.

Another question in relation to staffing is: will those who will be employed in the completely unified structure be paid comparably to those with whom they will no doubt be locking horns in the private sector? For that matter, is there much of a two-way flow between the department as it is now constituted and the private sector? I am not talking about the prosecution side thus far, as far as I am aware, but concerns have been expressed about people coming to work for the Inland Revenue from the private sector and then going back to the private sector and so on. I am not asking the Minister to answer this today, but it would be helpful if he would let us know the position in relation to movement inward and outward of staffing, particularly on the Inland Revenue side.

One of the concerns raised—I do not think with any great force in the consultation—was about the need to maintain within the prosecution side expertise of Inland Revenue matters. The Government seem to be satisfied on that, and I am not challenging that assertion, but it underlines the need to keep an eye on matters. No doubt the Government will be reviewing the situation as it progresses.

A further point relates to the third arm of prosecutions in this country, which is the Serious Fraud Office, which comes under the aegis of the Attorney-General and is separate from the DPP and HMRC, which we are now discussing. Given the somewhat challenging history of the SFO in recent years, I wonder whether it might be opportune at some time to consider a further merger between that department and the structure that we are formally approving today. I am not suggesting that the Minister can give an immediate response to that, but it is something that his colleagues could look into. In principle, it might seem sensible to have a seamless prosecution service dealing with serious fraud and tax fraud and the other matters that come under the direct surveillance of the DPP.

Having said that, we certainly do not object to this order and wish the fully combined departments well in their endeavours on behalf of the public and the taxpayer.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful for the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for bringing to the debate his experience from Scotland and for endorsing the desirability of this move from that vantage point. As well as making certain economies, we think that it will prevent potential demarcation disputes of the sort to which he referred.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, as ever, probes slightly beyond the scope of the statutory instrument, as I am sure he would be the first to accept. On the question of staffing and training, there is perhaps one aspect with which I can help the Committee. The legislation removes the barriers to the staff of the CPS and the staff of the RCPO from working on mixed duties.

The question of training is relevant. The HMRC prosecution work will remain for the immediate future within the CPS central fraud division, which prosecutes cases nationally. Expertise already exists within the division and the new staff are trained internally. Where any HMRC work is to be devolved, this will be managed carefully and appropriate training and support will be provided.

I am given to understand that RCPO is entirely separate from HMRC, and there have been no staff reductions as a direct result of the merger. I anticipate that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, was talking of staff reductions more generally, but I can confirm that, in so far as the issue of the statutory instrument is concerned, there are no such reductions.

As always, I will take back his remarks and observations generally about the Serious Fraud Office and whether or not further consolidations might be made with profit, as well as his observations generally about staffing and the involvement of the private sector. I am grateful for those contributions.

We submit that the draft order is a modest but worthwhile measure. In effect, it will complete what was unfinished business and should enable improvements and efficiency to take place. I commend it to the Committee.

Legal Aid

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 11th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The answer to the noble and learned Lord is that it depends very much on the context in which “exceptional” is used. The context in which it is used in this particular section is by specific reference to the European Convention on Human Rights.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, in answer to a recent Written Question from me, the Minister said that there had been 1,130 applications, of which 35 were granted, not the figures that he has given today. Be that as it may, what was the Government’s estimate of the number of successful applications and what did they anticipate would be the proportion of successful applications? Given that it has taken 14 months to reach a decision to grant legal aid in an important inquest case in which counsel appeared four times without any certainty of being paid, will the Government publish details of the times taken to determine applications?

[Lord Faulks]

In answer to the second part of the noble Lord’s question, the Government will be happy to publish the times taken. Indeed, I think that the noble Lord will be pleasantly surprised at how quickly these applications are being processed. In answer to the first part of his question, it was expected that some 3,700 would be funded each year. As I said in answer to an earlier question, it is somewhat mysterious as to why so few have qualified. Each case is considered separately by the Legal Aid Agency in accordance with guidelines given by the Lord Chancellor. All those doing this work are experienced and all of them follow the guidelines.

Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 10th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, I briefly take the opportunity to thank the Law Commission for making possible the reforms contained in the Bill. I also express the Government’s gratitude to the noble Lords who served my predecessor, my noble friend Lord McNally, on the Special Public Bill Committee, under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Committee in thanking the several witnesses who provided evidence on the Bill, including Professor Elizabeth Cooke, who many times throughout the course of the Bill provided invaluable expertise on the areas of law that it covers.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I join the Minister in expressing thanks, particularly to Professor Cooke and her colleagues on the Law Commission and all those experts in the law who were so helpful to the Committee. It was almost a pleasure to revisit issues like hotchpot, remainder and the like, with which the noble Lord and I were last acquainted many years ago—more years ago in my case than in his. Their involvement proved the value of that procedure. That being the case, given what was said earlier about leasehold enfranchisement and commonhold, I would commend the use of the Law Commission in that connection, and I hope that the commission might prove as successful in reviewing that issue as it has on this. We are indebted to all those who participated, including the noble Lord, Lord McNally, who struggled along with the rest of us through the earlier stages of the Bill, and to the present Minister, who took over with considerable aplomb.

[Lord Faulks]

I acknowledge what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has said. Indeed, his own contributions to the debates are notable. I also thank the Bill team, whom I now see in their place, for providing such valuable assistance.

Bill passed and sent to the Commons.

Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 10th February 2014 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless person, known as the Dublin III arrangements. Under these arrangements, the United Kingdom can apply for another member state to consider an asylum application, and provide appropriate protection if that application is successful, where an individual’s first point of entry to the European Union is that other member state but an application for asylum is made in the United Kingdom.

Under these arrangements, a member state is required, if the financial means of the individual and merits of the case justify it, to provide free legal assistance and representation in relation to an appeal or review of certain decisions made under Dublin III. The Dublin III arrangements replace those set out in Council Regulations (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, known as Dublin II. We have in this country routinely provided legal aid in relation to Dublin II matters.

The key difference between the old and the new arrangements, from the Ministry of Justice’s perspective, is that the requirement to provide free legal assistance for certain appeals, which in the UK is met through judicial review, is made explicit. The explicit provision in Dublin III for legal aid also prescribes a merits test, particular to it, that is to be applied. These regulations amend the Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2013 to give effect to the particular merits test. The merits criteria are tests which the Director of Legal Aid Casework must apply in deciding whether an individual qualifies for civil legal services.

The amendment before us today allows for the merits test set out in Dublin III to apply—namely that the prospects of success of an individual case must be judged to be greater than,

“no tangible prospect of success”.

The instrument therefore makes provision to ensure that we meet our international obligations but changes nothing else. Noble Lords will be aware that the Ministry of Justice laid an urgency statement alongside this instrument, in order that it could come into force without delay, as per the procedures set out in Section 41(9) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.

Due to an administrative oversight, my officials at the Ministry of Justice failed to recognise that there was a subtle difference between the merits test prescribed in Dublin III and the existing tests more generally applied to applications for judicial review. In the case of judicial review, the prospects of success must be at least moderate. By the time this oversight was recognised, insufficient time remained to make the necessary changes via the standard draft affirmative procedure. The urgency procedure was used to ensure that the appropriate test applied from the point when the Dublin III arrangements came into effect, on 1 January this year. This means that there was no risk of an individual being unfairly disadvantaged by having the incorrect test applied to their application for legal aid, hence the urgency. I hope that my explanation has been of assistance to noble Lords. I commend this instrument to the Committee and beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a rare opportunity for me to congratulate the Government on breaking the habits of this Parliament’s lifetime on access to legal aid. It is only 12 days since we had a debate about prison law and entered into a discussion about borderline cases for legal aid, when the noble Lord was vigorously supported by precisely no members of the Government—nor, indeed, anybody else—in a debate in which 15 Members were exercised about the restrictions on legal aid and the merits criteria under which these decisions will be taken.

However, on this occasion, the Government have not only done better than that, they have also refrained from stigmatising European legislation as an outrage to our constitution which should not be implemented if at all possible. For that small mercy, I am sure that we are grateful. Perhaps the noble Lord would like to convey to his Secretary of State the fact that a move towards something less stringent than the previous formulation about “no tangible prospect of success”, which is effectively what we are ending up with in other areas, would also be better applied to the remaining legal aid jurisdiction and not just that which is invoked by the European treaty and Dublin III. Having said that, we very much welcome the regulations.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, congratulations being in short supply in the context of legal aid, I gratefully accept them from the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. I will pass on his comments on the lack of stigmatisation of European legislation and his suggestion to amend the merits test. I am sure that the Secretary of State will read carefully his comments in Hansard.

There is little more for me to add, except that this should enable no injustice to be done. Legal aid should be available. The urgency, while regrettable, has been explained to the Committee. In those circumstances, I commend this instrument.

Tribunal Security Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 10th February 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a perfectly sensible change to the rules to provide for security on tribunal premises. I do not expect the Minister to be able to answer the one or two questions I have immediately, but it would be interesting to know whether there is a record of any significant incidents in which the presence of a security officer with these powers would have made a difference. It would be interesting to know how many problems have arisen or are arising, and how that compares with the other courts. That said, it is clearly sensible to have these provisions. However, can the Minister say how the Government intend to proceed in terms of the employment of such staff? Will they be seeking to contract this operation out, like so much else of the administration of justice, to contractors such as G4S and Serco? Or will it be done, as it were, in-house?

Secondly, will they, in any event, ensure that staff employed on this important task are paid at least a living wage? I fear that people may be employed on part-time, minimum-wage conditions. Given the nature of the job, that would be entirely unjustified. It would be helpful to know, if not now then subsequently, what the Government’s attitude would be, whether it is providing the services directly or contracting them out. Subject to these observations, I very much endorse the regulations.

[Lord Faulks]

Contrary to his expectation, I think I can answer some of the questions posed by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.

In the reporting period from April 2013 to 31 December 2013, a total of 75 security incidents were reported from tribunal venues and hearing centres. Those incidents are classified in a number of ways. Examples include verbal abuse, verbal threats and unauthorised access through to security systems or loss of ID. I do not have any further breakdown, but I hope that gives the noble Lord at least some idea of the scale. I also do not have information comparing that with security incidents at courts, but it can be seen that it is a substantial potential threat, and the noble Lord has been good enough to acknowledge that it is appropriate to make this change. Of course, it was not possible under the 2003 Act until the Tribunals Service was brought within the overall control of the Courts Service.

I turn to the questions around employment. Important pre-employment checks will be made on contractors—and there will be independent contractors—to assess their suitability to work within the organisation. I am instructed that the guards will be provided by G4S and Mitie. Some tribunal venues and hearing centres are covered by the PRIME contract. The contract has input from the Department for Work and Pensions and is managed by a private organisation, Telereal Trillium. The guards will be supplied to these sites by G4S or Mitie depending on their geographical location, and the template seen across the court sites will be used to manage security within tribunal venues and hearing centres.

As part of the employment process, the relevant contractor will undertake pre-employment checks to assess applicants’ suitability to work within their organisation, including obtaining references, interviews and so on. Before designation—the word apparently used in this context—HMCTS undertakes further suitability checks to confirm the identity of the individual. Checks are made of disclosure and barring service certificates, and an assessment is made of the appropriate level of training required. The assessment of this suitability is part of the designation process, with assurances going to the Lord Chancellor. As part of the application process, all potential designates must hold a current Security Industry Authority licence and have completed training on conflict management and physical intervention. There is also continuing monitoring of employees’ ability, but I will not provide all the details now.

I noticed that the noble Lord’s eyebrows were raised slightly by the reference to G4S. He may be thinking back to the question of electronic monitoring and tagging. The tagging contract is not linked to the provision of security on court sites; rather, it is managed by a separate department within G4S. I hope that that provides some assurance for the noble Lord.

[Lord Beecham]

Will the noble Lord respond to the questions about the conditions of the staff in terms of earnings, zero hour contracts and so on?

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for reminding me about the question of the living wage. I do not have any details on the precise wages, but I will write to him.

Prisons: Deaths of Young People

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 6th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the noble Baroness identifies a matter of great concern to the Government. Under-18s are considered in various ways, through the work of the Youth Justice Board and the NOMS review of the assessment, care in custody and teamwork process—the acronym ACCT will be familiar to the noble Baroness and to the House. However, we intend to learn from this review as applied to this age group.

I entirely accept that suicide in any circumstances is a tragedy. We are concerned to focus on the early days in custody, when young offenders are particularly vulnerable. All prisoners will receive an initial health screening within 24 hours of reception and there will be an initial assessment of their risk of self-harm. If the prisoner is identified as being at particular risk, the assessment will take place within 24 hours and governors must ensure that arrangements are in place for staff to monitor prisoner safety and well-being throughout the first night in the prison. It is right to say that there is a disproportionate occurrence of suicide during the early stages of custody, so the suicide prevention strategy will be specifically targeted at that stage.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government have drawn attention to the problem of the deaths of young people in custody. I welcome the Minister’s announcement today, although I continue to share some of the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. There is continuing concern about the incidence of self-harm and suicide among women prisoners, who form 5% of the prison population but account for one-third of the incidence of self-harm and four times the number of suicides as men. They are 36 times more likely to commit suicide or die of an accidental overdose of drugs in the first two weeks after release. It is time for a radical change of policy in relation to the imprisonment of women and especially in the practice of segregation.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, we have been working hard to improve support for women in prison. We have issued gender-specific standards in all areas of prison regimes, including training for staff working with female offenders in prisons, which has now been extended to service providers in the community. New search arrangements ending routine full searching for women prisoners have also been introduced. The House will know that there are six mother and baby units in England and Wales which provide an overall capacity of 64 places.

I am slightly surprised at the noble Lord’s statistics. He is right that my research into this matter shows that women are disproportionately more likely to self-harm than men, relative to their occupation of prisons. Fortunately, the self-harm, compared with men’s self-harm, does not tend to be as serious, and does not usually require hospitalisation, although I do not suggest for a moment that any self-harm is not a significant factor. The statistics that I have been given do not indicate that women form a large part of those who have been responsible for self-inflicted deaths. I will write to the noble Lord with statistics. I hesitate to bandy them across the Dispatch Box but I do not think he is quite right.

Inheritance and Trustees’ Powers Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 3rd February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

I follow the noble Baroness to take a little further our discussion on the impact of Clause 1 and the amendments. If I understand the noble Lord correctly, there are two situations. One will be governed by one rate of interest, as specified in Clause 1, and the other will be covered by these amendments. This raises a further question of why there should not be consistency, in terms of the interest to be calculated, in respect of what appear to be two separate situations. If they are not separate situations, there is a degree of confusion; if they are separate, there needs to be a rationale for having two different rates of interests. I invite the noble Lord to consider that before Third Reading. It may or may not need tidying up. On the face of it, there seems to be something slightly awry with the position we will be in when the amendment is passed.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I accept the invitations from both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord to consider their points and come back, if necessary, at Third Reading.

Criminal Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 29th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, it is once again necessary for me to thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for putting down a Motion of Regret about a set of regulations on legal aid. I also express my gratitude to all noble Lords who have spoken so powerfully tonight about the regulations and the potential damage that they will do.

I begin by citing three examples of successful cases for which legal aid was, but will no longer be, available. I am indebted to the Howard League for supplying the relevant information. The first was a mother and baby case of the kind referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. A Spanish mother, who spoke no English, was informed after sentence that her baby would be removed and placed into care because it was not known whether she would be allowed to remain with the child when she returned to Spain. Her lawyers ascertained that she would, and the decision was reversed.

In the second case, a prisoner with severe learning disabilities could not do offending behaviour courses. Experts in the prison recommended he be transferred to hospital for treatment, but nothing happened until his lawyer commissioned an independent report and persuaded the authorities to transfer him to hospital. Such a sentence case will now be out of scope.

In the third case, a 17 year-old suffering from ADHD and learning difficulties underwent psychiatric therapy in a secure training centre, but the local authority refused to respond to a request for a needs assessment under Section 17 of the Children Act until legal intervention by the Howard League. Resettlement cases of this kind will also be out of scope. I remind your Lordships that the cost of keeping such an offender in custody could be as much as £200,000 a year.

Those are but a few sample cases. The regulations which are the subject of this regret Motion are merely the latest example of this Government’s repeated assaults on the legal aid system and access to justice, pushed through by a Lord Chancellor indifferent to their effects and unheeding of the warnings from the judiciary, practitioners, and charities and voluntary organisations. Time after time the criticisms of bodies such as the Justice Select Committee, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights are brushed aside. Impact analyses are vestigial in many cases, and imperfect in most.

Such is clearly the case with the proposals we are debating tonight. Not only are the measures deeply flawed but the process is tainted. Paragraph after paragraph of the Joint Committee on Human Rights report highlights these systemic failures. After their initial consultation, the Government abandoned proposals to exclude two areas from legal aid, namely where the Parole Board considers whether to order release and in relation to the calculation of sentence when the release date is in dispute. That is welcome, but as paragraph 154 of the report sets out, two new matters were excluded from legal aid—contrary to the express intention set out in the consultation that legal aid would continue to be available—namely, the areas of sentence planning and pre-tariff reviews. There was no subsequent consultation on these changes.

At paragraph 163, the committee dismissed the Lord Chancellor’s assertion that legal aid was being abused by prisoners complaining about what prison they were confined in, or about prison conditions, saying, damningly and accurately,

“legal aid is already unavailable for such claims”.

At paragraph 168, it pointed up the hollowness of the Government’s claim that judicial review would be available given the restrictions being imposed on the number of cases firms might bring and the limitations of the exceptional funding regime. At paragraph 169, it asked the Government to consider the combined effect of the residence test and the exceptional funding criteria and invited them to explain,

“how access to justice rights will be maintained where both policies are in operation”.

What is the Government’s response to that very significant question?

The Government airily dismissed the concerns on internal prison complaints but, as we have heard, the Chief Inspector of Prisons is quoted at paragraph 174 as finding the response “disappointing”. He emphasised the problems of prisoners with disabilities, especially mental health problems, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, pointed out, warned that prisoner confidence in the complaints system was crucial to prison safety. As recent events have demonstrated, prison safety is a real concern. Similarly, at paragraph 174, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman voiced concerns, especially about his lack of statutory independence that the Lord Chancellor has promised to rectify. I must ask the Minister when the legislation, urgently pressed for by the committee at paragraph 177, will be enacted.

At paragraph 181 the committee identified the need for public funding,

“to prevent infringements of prisoners’ right of access to court arising in practice”.

From paragraphs 182 to 188, it identified serious issues for prisoners with mental health problems, the vast majority exemplified by the chief inspector’s remarks in the case mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, about segregation, in particular of women prisoners. In parenthesis, when I asked a question about women prisoners being held in segregation the reply that I received from the Ministry of Justice was that it was too costly to obtain the details of the numbers and length of time such women had been so confined. To his credit, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, agreed that the answer was ridiculous and procured the relevant information.

At paragraph 188, the Joint Committee noted that since 2010 the majority of treatment cases were mental health cases and it was not satisfied that these prisoners would be able to use the complaints procedure effectively. It recommended that the LAA retain the ability to grant funding for these cases where the implications for access to justice are clear. Noble Lords will not need reminding that the majority of prisoners suffer from mental health disorders: 70% of one or more mental health disorders for adults, 90% for young offenders. Again, what is the Government’s response to the case of prisoners suffering from these disorders? In relation to mother and baby cases, of which there are mercifully few, the committee called for an exemption in cases where legal representation would be desirable. Will the Government not accede to this request?

The concerns are echoed in relation to young offenders, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, where, as the committee pointed out at paragraph 205, such matters, including in particular resettlement cases, are being removed even before the Government respond to their consultation paper, Transforming Youth Custody. Trenchantly at paragraph 206 the committee disagreed that advocacy services and internal complaints systems would be effective and asserted that:

“This could leave young people vulnerable and deny them their rights”.

This would be not least in key areas such as,

“housing law, social care law and public law”.

Moreover, it dismissed the young offender’s right to judicial review, which was raised by the Government, since a young offender would require a litigation friend to pursue the action; it cannot be brought by a minor on his own initiative. It urged the retention of young offender cases within scope, specifically resettlement cases. Finally, at paragraphs 213 and 218, as referred to by my noble friend Lord Bach, it recommended reconsideration of the position in relation to Parole Board hearings and categorisation cases. This is a formidable catalogue of concerns about, and in many cases outright opposition to, what the Government are doing.

Once again, the Minister will shortly stand at the Dispatch Box, like Horatius on the bridge, with no troops behind him. There is not a single voice that has been raised in this Chamber tonight in support of the Government’s position. It would be unfair to suggest that the Minister, who was a member of the JCHR and presumably agreed with its report, has changed his mind now that he has taken if not the Queen’s shilling, then at least the Lord Chancellor’s shilling, if only because he is not being paid a shilling or indeed anything else for the job that he has undertaken. But I hope that he can prevail upon the Government to think again, and quickly, about the direction and extent of travel reflected in these regulations.

I commend to him in particular the response of the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law to these issues. The centre does not,

“share the Government’s view that treatment cases will never be of sufficient priority to justify the use of public funds, or that sentencing matters such as categorisation and segregation are considered incapable of warranting legal aid”.

Importantly, it dismisses the so-called “adequate alternatives” to which the Government refer—for example, the complaints system and the ombudsman—as “first ports of call”, in the MoJ’s phrase, for four substantial reasons.

First, as per the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, whom I welcome back to the side of the angels after his digression over the issues of miscarriages of justice and compensation, the courts require alternative remedies to be exhausted before seeking judicial review, so legal aid would not be the first port of call. Secondly, under the regulations, the non-judicial remedies would be the only point of call. Thirdly,

“the rule of law requires the possibility, at least as a last resort, of recourse to independent courts”,

and, fourthly,

“rule-of-law imperative is particularly compelling in settings—of which prisons are a paradigm example—in which individuals are subject to the exercise of highly coercive public law powers”.

The centre concluded by affirming that,

“judicial review has exerted a profound and positive influence upon the prison system in recent decades … the nature of any state’s prison system … is a key barometer of the rule of law”.

Tellingly, it adds:

“It is inevitable that the proposals, if implemented, would substantially undermine the valuable role played by courts in this area. If one of public law’s core functions is to safeguard vulnerable individuals against misuses of state authority, then it is hard to think of a more fundamental assault upon the capacity of public law to perform such a role”—

and all the more so when the custodial services are contracted out to oligopolies such as G4S and Serco.

What answer does the Minister have to this critique? Does he agree with the words uttered by Winston Churchill—who has already been quoted here tonight—as Home Secretary in 1910, when he said:

“A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights … even of convicted criminals against the State … tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerating processes … are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and criminals mark and measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and are the sign and proof of the living virtue in it”?—[Official Report, Commons, 20/7/1910; col. 1354.]

Is the Minister, and are the Government, willing to disavow Churchill’s characteristically eloquent formulation of principle for the sake of a possible, but actually unlikely, saving of £4 million a year?

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that I can rise to the challenge of the “calm and dispassionate” response to which the noble Lord referred in his closing remarks. This has been a wide-ranging debate, involving very distinguished speakers with great knowledge and awareness of many of the issues which these regulations raise. I hope that the House will forgive me if, in the course of this dinner-hour debate, I do not respond to all the many criticisms that have been made but try to focus on the effect of the regulations and on why the Government have seen fit to bring them into effect.

I will begin by saying something about the wider context of the instrument. It is worth noting that spending on criminal legal aid for prison law in England and Wales has increased markedly in recent years, from around £1 million in 2001-02 to around £22 million in 2012-13.

Legal aid is a vital part of our justice system. However, limited public resources need to be targeted at those who need them most. With departments across government being asked to reduce their expenditure, legal aid cannot be immune. The legal aid scheme is paid for by the taxpayer, and we have to demonstrate to the public and hard-working families that we have scrutinised every aspect of legal aid spending to ensure that it can be justified. Unless the legal aid scheme is targeted at the people and cases where funding is most needed, it will not command public confidence. It was with this aim in mind that the Government proposed a number of changes to legal aid in England and Wales in April 2013. Following public consultation and careful consideration of the responses, the decision was taken to restrict the scope of criminal legal aid for prison law, among other reforms.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but at paragraph 175 of its report the committee says specifically:

“the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman … told us about his concerns with the Government’s proposal, particularly in relation to his lack of statutory independence and his office’s ability to deal with any increased workload”.

How does the Minister square that with the assurance that he has just given?

[Lord Faulks]

The assurance that I have just given is that the Government take the view that it will be rare that there will be any need to refer to the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman. However, the Ministry of Justice intends to put the PPO on a statutory footing as soon as legislative time permits. I note that the Joint Committee on Human Rights noted—and this must be in the same section to which the noble Lord referred—that the PPO has himself “acknowledged that his recommendations”, while not binding, are in fact “always accepted”.

There was understandable anxiety about mental health issues and learning difficulties for young offenders. The Government are of course extremely concerned with young offenders and their rehabilitation. I could give a detailed response, but that would be outside the scope of this debate, which is concerned with legal aid. That issue is a matter of continuing concern to the House, and indeed to the Government, just as the position with mental health issues is also a concern. I accept that many prisoners have a background with mental health issues.

Noble Lords may ask what is done to screen prisoners for mental health problems. As part of the early days in custody process, all prisoners are risk-assessed for potential harm to themselves and to others and from others. All incoming prisoners are given a medical examination to identify any short-term or long-term physical or mental health needs, including disability, drug or alcohol issues, and to ensure that follow-up action is taken.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

Before the Minister sits down, can he tell the House if and when the Government will be publishing their response to the Joint Committee report of 13 December?

[Lord Faulks]

I cannot I am afraid give an exact date for that, but I shall take back the noble Lord’s concern and I will write to him when I have information. Of course, it is a matter that will be taken very seriously at the Ministry of Justice.

County Court Jurisdiction Order 2014

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 28th January 2014 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, this statutory instrument revokes and replaces the County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1981. A draft was laid before Parliament on 18 December 2013. Subject to your Lordships’ approval, the substantive change made by this instrument concerns the county court’s jurisdiction in respect of equity proceedings. Equity proceedings, which are specified in Section 23 of the County Courts Act 1984, include the administration of the estate of a deceased person, the execution or declaration of a trust, the dissolution or winding up of a partnership and the foreclosure or redemption of mortgages.

The purpose of this instrument is to increase the relevant financial limit in the 1981 order from £30,000 to £350,000 to extend the equity jurisdiction of the county court. This will mean that the county court may hear and determine equity proceedings up to a value of £350,000. We do not intend to change the current financial limits with regard to the county court’s jurisdiction in respect of other proceedings which are also specified in the 1981 order.

There are two objectives underlying this reform. The first is to optimise the use of judicial resources by ensuring that, where appropriate, cases are determined at the most appropriate level of the court system, commensurate with value and complexity. This will contribute to rebalancing jurisdiction between the High Court and the county court, where they both have concurrent jurisdiction, enabling the High Court to focus on those complex matters that genuinely require its expertise. The second objective is to reduce the number of equity proceedings that are transferred from the High Court to the county courts, and therefore reduce waiting times so that disputes are resolved expeditiously and with proportionate costs and procedures for court users. This, in turn, will contribute to promoting public confidence in the operation of our courts.

Before setting out further details about this instrument and why the Government are taking this action, I will briefly explain some background to the reform. The Government are committed to providing an effective and efficient civil justice system with a flexible judiciary that is deployed in the most appropriate way. As part of this, we set out our policy to reform the structure of the civil courts in a series of proposals in the public consultation document, Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More Proportionate System, published by the Government in March 2011.

Those proposals were based on some of the recommendations made by Sir Henry Brooke, a retired Lord Justice of Appeal, in his report, Should the Civil Courts be Unified?, published in August 2008. His recommendations were aimed at improving the administration of civil justice and providing a more efficient use of judicial resources. The Brooke recommendations included the establishment of a single county court for England and Wales and the repeal of the requirement for the Lord Chief Justice to seek the Lord Chancellor’s agreement in deploying High Court judiciary to the county court. Both of these recommendations were approved by Parliament in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and will be implemented by the Government in April 2014.

By statutory instruments shortly to be brought before Parliament, the Government also propose, subject to approval of the House, to implement three more Brooke recommendations, which are: extending the jurisdiction to grant freezing orders to the county court; bringing certain specialist proceedings under the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court; and increasing the financial limit below which non-personal injury claims and certain Chancery proceedings may not be commenced in the High Court from £25,000 to £100,000. Finally, of course, subject to the approval of the House, we also intend to implement in April 2014 the Brooke recommendation on equity jurisdiction that is before your Lordships today.

With that background in mind, I will set out the problem with the current financial limit of the equity jurisdiction and why the Government are taking this action. Section 23 of the County Courts Act 1984 gives the county court concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court to hear and determine those equity proceedings specified in that section, subject to the “county court limit”. Proceedings may be transferred between the county court and High Court, subject to provisions in Sections 40 and 42 of the County Courts Act 1984 and criteria set out in Part 30 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

The county court limit, set by the 1981 order, requires that equity proceedings above a value of £30,000 be commenced in the High Court. The rationale for the financial limit is to provide a benchmark which will ensure that only appropriate cases, mainly those with relatively high financial value and complexity, are heard in the High Court, thereby limiting the volume of cases issued there. Over time, however, the value of the £30,000 financial limit has fallen in real terms, as the rising cost of properties has rendered it far less effective than was originally envisaged.

In 1981, when the limit was set, average house prices were only around £25,000, which meant that the county courts were able to hear the majority of property disputes involving equity. However, since 1981, house prices in the UK have increased by more than 600% in nominal terms, so that, by 2013, average house prices in the UK had risen to more than £175,000, which is seven times their value in 1981, and to around £345,000 in London. The financial limit, therefore, has not kept pace with the rising cost of house prices and has become detached from contemporary property values, which have risen dramatically since the £30,000 limit was set. This has resulted in many cases of relatively low complexity being heard unnecessarily in the High Court. In some instances, cases are issued in the High Court only to be transferred to the county court because the issues are straightforward. In view of the administrative and judicial time taken to allocate these cases in the High Court and the time taken to reconsider them for transfer and the transfer itself, these transfers often result in delays in dealing not only with that particular case but with other cases.

Following the Brooke recommendations, the Judicial Executive Board, chaired by the then Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, considered the evidence and concluded that the financial limit of the equity jurisdiction of the county court should be raised from £30,000 to £350,000. The report was then presented to the Government for consideration and implementation. On the strength of the evidence and of further engagement with the judiciary, the Government consulted on the proposal in their Solving Disputes consultation paper. A majority of respondents, who included legal practitioners, members of the judiciary, judicial bodies and regulatory bodies, was in support of an increase to £350,000. In view of the overwhelming support from consultees, the Government announced their intention to increase the financial limit to £350,000.

This statutory instrument seeks to give effect to that commitment. The changes introduced by it support the Government’s commitment to an effective and efficient civil justice and courts system. We consider that the £30,000 financial limit set by the 1981 order is too low. Consequently, with your Lordships’ approval, we will increase the financial limit which divides the equity jurisdiction between the High Court and the county courts from £30,000 to £350,000. The increase would mean that more equity proceedings are issued and dealt with in the county courts and may be transferred to the High Court only if they are complex. It could potentially reduce the volume of transfers from the High Court to the county courts, thereby providing efficiency benefits for the courts as less time and fewer administrative and judicial resources will be needed to allocate and transfer these cases to the appropriate court.

Court users, on the other hand, could experience a more streamlined service and a reduction in hand-offs between jurisdictions. This is because more equity proceedings will be issued in the county courts rather than the High Court, which would lead to fewer cases being transferred from the High Court to the county court, and the time taken to consider cases for transfer—and the transfer itself—would be reduced. I therefore commend this instrument to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, try as I might—and I have tried—I cannot really find anything to object to in this order. However, there are one or two points to make.

I entirely agree that the consultation shows, and it is right that the Government have acted on it, that the equity jurisdiction should be increased. I have not practised much in the field of equity in my time as a solicitor, and I refer to my entry in the register of interests in that respect, although I studied equity at university with the then editor of Snell’s Equity, Mr Paul Baker, as he then was, later Judge Baker. It was therefore a subject with which I engaged at an earlier, though unpaid, stage of my legal career.

While there is nothing wrong with the order, the process by which we have received it seems inordinately long. The Minister referred to the fact that it stems from a report from 2008. The Government’s first consultation paper was issued in March 2011. It was a 12-week consultation period. The Government’s response was in February 2012, and it has taken them a year since publishing the response to produce this fairly straightforward order. This is not a political matter. It does, however, suggest either that the department is overworked and understaffed, or that it is congenitally incapable of producing fairly simple material in a reasonable time. Either way, there is a bit more to concern us about the process than there is about the change.

I was slightly amused by the notion that the real objective of this was to enhance public confidence in the system. I cannot speak for the noble Lord’s experience, which is of a different level from mine but, in my 45 years of practice, I do not recall anybody expressing their lack of confidence in the system—particularly in the procedures in the county court. That seems rather an ephemeral reason for a sensible change.

I will make two more constructive points, thereby briefly breaking the habit of a parliamentary lifetime. First, I suggest there should be some mechanism by which the level could be periodically inflated without the necessity for prolonged consultations and a ritualistic procedure such as we are going through today. Why should not the Government say that, every five years, the limit would be increased by the rate of inflation or something of that kind—there might be a simpler way of going about things—unless they concluded that it would not be sensible to do that, in which case they would at that point come back?

The second issue is of a different order, about the system as a whole and how it might be made more efficient. Here I declare a paternal interest, because my question is about the role of deputy part-time district judges who sit in the county court dealing with a wide range of matters. Have the Government looked, or are they looking, at the distribution of cases between the full-time county court judiciary and the part-time judiciary, and at whether one or the other might be augmented in order to facilitate the kind of access and quicker turnaround of cases, which the order should help in one, admittedly fairly narrow, field? I do not expect the Minister to give an answer off the cuff to that, but perhaps the department could look at it—and perhaps the Minister could look at it personally, with his obviously rich experience of the courts. It might be a way of improving the system and possibly even saving some taxpayers’ money as well. Having said that, I have no objection to the order and trust that it will prove effective in assisting litigants, containing costs and helping the system work more efficiently.

Justice: Non-custodial Sentences

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Thursday 23rd January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

I believe that there will be an announcement shortly on that but I am unable to give the noble Baroness precise details at this moment. When information is available, I will write to her.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, given the risks to the public, highlighted by my noble friend’s supplementary question, and the potential difficulties in managing offenders whose risk category may change, why are the Government not properly piloting their controversial changes to the probation service, as urged by the most recent report of the Justice Select Committee? Is there not a real risk of the Lord Chancellor proceeding in haste and the community and victims of crime repenting at leisure?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the Government believe that it would not be desirable to introduce a sentencing reform in one part of the country but not another. To do so would risk postcode justice, with some offenders getting different sentences to others. Similarly, having competing services in any one area of the country is not a viable approach if we want to extend supervision to short-sentenced offenders. In every other respect we are carrying out extensive local testing of the reforms in no fewer than 14 probation trusts. The 21 CRCs—community rehabilitation companies—that we are creating will remain in public sector ownership until the conclusion of the competition. This gives us further opportunities to carry on testing and refine the system.

Costs in Criminal Cases (Legal Costs) (Exceptions) Regulations 2013

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 20th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

At this hour of the night, I am quite prepared to accept any correction of the arithmetic. The Government, of course, are never prepared to accept a correction of their arithmetic.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their very generous welcome to me. It is a daunting position to find yourself in. I know that, despite the generosity of the welcome, there will be no lack of rigour in the examination to which I am put as a representative of the Government and I look forward to receiving the many useful contributions characterised by those today, which, I am likely to be advised, will be forthcoming in the next weeks and months.

This debate has ranged far and wide, perhaps rather further than the strict terms of the two Motions envisaged. For example, there have been general laments about the Government’s approach to legal aid from the noble Lord, Lord Bach. There has been reference by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to the difficult interpretation of Section 2 of the Human Rights Act and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, to the need for high-quality judicial assistance. All these are important points, but I hope that the House will forgive me if I do not deal with all those points but try to concentrate more specifically on the issues that concern these regulations.

One of the main themes of the debate was the fear that the lack of legal aid for these borderline cases will result in some form of ossification of the common law—that it will not develop in the absence of legal aid for such borderline cases. It is worth remembering that the common law develops in a number of different ways, sometimes with cases which one would not expect to result in a change in the law. The Government believe that prospect of success—the test that is applied—remains a useful and sound test and that a 50% prospect of success is a reasonable one and should not result in cases not being brought and the law not developing.

Individual cases were mentioned, including Pinnock, Smith v Ministry of Defence, Purdy, Pretty and Anufrijeva, to name but a few, all of which were important cases. Of course, the Government are not in a position to comment on individual cases, or precisely on the funding arrangements that may have existed in those cases. There may be other cases which have not resulted in success or in the development of the law. The Government remain doubtful that the change which these regulations will bring about will prevent cases being brought in areas where the law will develop and has developed. One of the ways in which the law has developed is through the Human Rights Act, and it shows little sign of standing still in that regard.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked particularly about the impact on housing cases. I recognise the serious consequences that can ensue from housing cases—the potential for someone to lose their home. Indeed, there are all sorts of cases where there may be serious consequences. But there always has to be an assessment of the merits of a case—that has been well established in the granting of legal aid—and it has been a fundamental part of the scheme since its inception.

The noble Lord also questioned the accuracy of the savings which are put forward. The Government’s best estimate is £1 million. An impact assessment estimated that 100 fewer cases would be funded. As was made clear in the methodology, those were rounded figures. Further supporting data consisting of a breakdown by category of law have been included in the updated impact assessment published alongside the consultation response. While the estimate is based on 2011-12 data, I can assure the House that it is consistent with more recent data; that is, the data from 2012 and 2013. The noble Lord also made reference to the criticism of the regulation by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.

The cases which may be included are those where there is a dispute over law or expert evidence. I mentioned that there may still be legal aid where it is as yet impossible to assess the prospect of success, but the Government have been frank that they consider it reasonable in principle that 50% should be the touchstone. We suggest to the House that it is a very reasonable and rather modest prospect of success when one bears in mind the sort of decisions that somebody paying privately might make in deciding whether to pursue litigation. Indeed, many would say that 50% was rather a modest prospect of success and very few privately paying citizens are much enthused or encouraged by the fact that their case raises an interesting point of law. They may well find that that is a less enticing prospect than the fact that they risk losing the case.

Several noble Lords made reference to the fact that there might be some form of inequality of arms because many of the cases were brought against government, either local government or government in one department or another. The Government’s position regarding litigation is that they take into account a broad range of factors when deciding whether to defend or appeal legal challenges, including the prospects of success and the potential costs versus benefits of that action. However, it would be simplistic to say that the Government simply took advantage, as it were, of their overall position in deciding their approach to litigation. It is already a principle of the current scheme that most cases, even those concerning issues of high importance, must have a reasonable prospect of success in order to warrant public funding, and there has to be an assessment of merits and a decision must be made.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The noble Lord said that the party opposite is not yet convinced of the need for CMPs, and he made various suggestions about possible guidance or a definition that would assist on the question of national security. Does it follow that if there were further guidance or a better definition of national security along the lines he suggested, that would go some way to satisfying whatever needs to be satisfied in terms of the party opposite’s potential opposition to CMPs?

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, we are capable of simple arithmetic, and it may be that, in reality, the Government will get their way on the principle. We will keep an open mind through Report stage and listen carefully to what the Government say. At the end of that process, we may or may not accept the case. If it is the wish of this House—in the first instance—and of Parliament as a whole to proceed with closed material procedures, we might come to what one could call the last-resort position of looking at how best to limit any application of the new procedure and how to make the best of the situation, in the interests of justice and the traditions that this country has espoused for centuries. It would be making the best of what we currently consider is a very bad job. However, we are open to evidence. There is not a great deal of evidence at the moment, although there has been some to which Mr Anderson referred—the three cases which seem to have persuaded him that there is a need for such a procedure. However, as I reminded the House the other night, he also said that the Government’s proposals were disproportionate and suggested measures that would have some mitigating effect on the process, if it were to be implemented.

That is the position of the Opposition. We are not taking a premature stance on this. It would be interesting to know, for example, whether the special advocates have, as suggested, actually been shown the files of the independent adviser who is to be consulted, or whether the process is going to take place at all, and what the view of the special advocates is. Your Lordships will recall that they were very critical. Almost all of them signed up to criticism of the proposals as they stood. In evidence to the Select Committee, Mr McCullough said that he would welcome the opportunity, if it were given, to look at the cases that seemed to have persuaded Mr Anderson to accept the principle, given that, as he made clear, he continued to think there would be only a limited number of cases. At the very least, the amendment has allowed us to look at ways in which such cases might be restricted to a small number, against criteria that, although not statutory, might be developed while the Bill is making its way through Parliament.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 17th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I share with noble Lords who have proposed this amendment the desire that there should be public confidence in the system. However, like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I do not think that this is the solution. It is true of course that there are circumstances in which it is desirable, if not essential, that one judge should hear one part of the proceedings and another should hear another part, but the question of it being desirable, as it were, to have separate judges is a different matter. In fact, there is quite a strong argument that there should be greater continuity. The days of having one judge hearing preliminary issues and summonses and then the matter moving on to another judge have to some extent been changed in the Commercial Court, the Technology and Construction Court and in many cases in the county courts, so that if possible there is the same judge with a grip on the case right from the beginning.

On the face of it there is considerable advantage to having continuity unless, of course, the process is going to result in injustice to the litigant. We are talking in the context of CMPs with a claimant who may feel that injustice is being done to him or her by virtue of the possibility of closed material provisions. All I can say is that if I were in the position of that claimant, I would much prefer the judge who first heard and no doubt scrutinised the application under Clause 6 to conduct the case throughout in order to make sure that there is fairness, to show the flexibility we discussed in the last session of this Committee, and to deal with what might arise in accordance with the guidance given by the Bill in such a way as to provide justice. Although I wholly understand what motivates the amendment, I fear that it is not going to achieve what it is intended to.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, as I said, I have a good deal of sympathy for the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and I am particularly seized of the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Ultimately it comes down to a question of the public perception of a situation where you have what appear to be secret trials at the behest of the Government of the day. That puts the case in a different category from other kinds of case where there is perhaps a lesser degree of public interest or concern about the nature of the proceedings as a whole.

Cases of this kind are distinguishable from the kind of case that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf—another, if I may say, eminent Newcastle holder of high judicial office—referred to. There is a distinction to be made with cases where a judge can put matters out of his mind, and no doubt judges would be able to do so. However, I suspect that the public will be more concerned, to the degree that they are at all concerned about these things, in a case of this kind where we are talking in effect about closed procedures and what can be described loosely but not entirely inaccurately as secret trials.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Wednesday 7th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this amendment deals with education. It is right to say that, having consulted—although perhaps not initially—the Department for Education, the Government have amended their original proposals to bring special educational needs within scope. I very much welcome that.

However, there are significant problems in the education world that require assistance. These include school exclusions, admissions issues and bullying. In fact, at the moment there is a significant workload that potentially falls within scope. If the Government do not move their position, some 2,800 fewer clients will be given advice on educational law matters, and a small number—only 70 but for them it is important—would fail to obtain representation on such matters.

Clearly there are potentially significant issues around admissions which affect different categories of children disproportionately; for example, refugee and asylum-seeker children, for whom there is often a difficulty in obtaining places. Sometimes by definition these children arrive mid-year; they do not always arrive at convenient times for the academic year. Sometimes schools may have difficulty in admitting pupils with perhaps little educational experience or poor language skills. Equally, some of these children are more susceptible to bullying and racism than perhaps would normally be the case.

In any event, bullying is not confined to that group. It is common, unfortunately, in many schools. Some years ago, Bullying UK discovered that 87 per cent of parents sampled reported that children had been bullied. Of course, these will not all be serious matters but there will be cases where sometimes it is necessary for people to seek assistance and redress for incidents of that kind.

The Government consulted on all these matters publicly. They restricted their changes to the proposals to special educational needs. However, given that there is not a vast number of cases, where there are difficulties of this kind it seems proper that legal advice—and, if necessary, in a very small number of cases, representation —should be available. Again, we are talking about children. They have cropped up regularly this evening and in earlier debates as a group that we have to have special regard for.

Again, I hope that the Government will consider building on their welcome amendment on special educational needs to afford the possibility of advice and representation to these other categories. That would be welcome to those who suffer from bullying and would assist the education system in dealing with what can be very difficult problems. I beg to move.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, perhaps I might intervene briefly on this matter. I have experienced quite a number of cases involving educational law and I notice that this amendment is very widely drawn, potentially embracing all sorts of disputes.

It has to be said that the support of legal aid for educational law disputes has not been the finest hour of the LSC. In particular, I can speak from experience of three cases in the Supreme Court and a whole rash of cases alleging educational negligence, almost none of which were successful, which cost the taxpayer an enormous amount of money. Although well intentioned on the part of the claimants, these cases turned out to be expensive, unsuccessful and, quite frankly, misconceived.

I am very concerned about the width of this amendment, notwithstanding the fact that there are some areas, which I think are covered by the government amendment, where it is plainly appropriate that there should be support.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, Amendment 20 would bring back into scope all education matters not already covered by Schedule 1. We have retained legal aid for any educational case that involves a contravention of the Equality Act 2010, such as cases concerning disability discrimination. We have also retained current legal aid funding for appeals on special educational needs matters and for educational judicial reviews. In practice, this amendment would retain legal aid for all education matters. The judgment we have made in prioritising funding is that SEN, discrimination and judicial review are of the highest priority and that advice on such matters as exclusions and damages claims are not.

Where parents are not satisfied with an admissions refusal, they can appeal to an independent panel. This requires them to set out in writing why they disagree with the admissions decision and why they think that the admissions arrangements have not been followed correctly. These are not usually legal arguments. Parents who wish to challenge a temporary or permanent exclusion may do so by writing a letter to the school governors setting out their reasons for challenging the exclusion. If parents are unhappy with the decision to permanently exclude their child, they will be able to appeal.

From September 2012, such an appeal will be to the independent review panel. The Department for Education will fund the children’s legal centre to provide advice to parents on appeals to the independent review panel both online and through a telephone advice line. Parents can also appeal to the First-tier Tribunal if the appeal concerns disability discrimination and legal aid is being retained for advice and assistance in such cases.

Advice is also available on admission and exclusion matters from the Advisory Centre for Education and the Children’s Legal Centre. Education negligence claims have been excluded from scope, along with most other damages claims, because we do not consider that claims for money will generally be of the highest priority. We have therefore focused legal aid on only those money claims which concern a significant breach of human rights, an abuse of a position of power by a public authority, an abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or sexual assault. The vast majority of education negligence claims will not fall under one of these three headings. For many meritorious cases, a conditional fee agreement will provide a suitable alternative funding arrangement. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that we have focused resources on education cases of the highest priority and that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

The two technical government amendments in this group fulfil the promise we made in Committee concerning SEN provisions. These amendments ensure that SEN matters are fully within the scope of the Bill and, specifically, that learning difficulty assessments are captured by our provisions on scope. As we stated in Committee, the Government accept that the existing wording in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 does not cover the provision of advice and assistance in relation to the making of learning difficulty assessments under the Learning and Skills Act 2000 for 16 to 25 year-olds. These amendments ensure that these services are brought within the Bill’s scope.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

Although I accept the general points made by the noble Lord about the general undesirability of short sentences, does he accept that there are some cases where the clang of the prison door really is the only answer for repeated minor offences? Notwithstanding all the valuable points about how little can be achieved, something can sometimes be achieved in some circumstances by the very fact of incarceration.

[Lord Beecham]

I think that that is right, and indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said very much the same. It is quite possible, within the ambit of the amendment, to achieve that objective. There may well be cases where what some call the “short sharp shock” may work. I think it will work in probably only a relatively small number of cases, but the option should certainly be open.

As I say, I have some reservations about the second amendment, but I wholly endorse the first one. This is a matter that we need to continue to evaluate, but above all we need to ensure that the probation service in particular is given the resources that it needs to work with offenders so as to avoid not only the social and individual harm that is done but also the enormous cost to the public purse of reoffending, where the rates remain unduly high.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Beecham and Lord Faulks

Monday 16th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this has been a very thoughtful debate, and that owes much to the fact that so many of those who have participated have experience, either legal or medical, of cases of this kind. They are certainly among the most difficult that either clinicians or lawyers have to deal with. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, referred to the rather alarming statistic that 10 per cent of National Health Service patients in any year suffer from clinical negligence. That ought to concern all of us, especially those with responsibility for the health service.

However, it is also right to point out that this does not give rise to a spate of litigation. In view of the numbers of people who must suffer from clinical negligence, the fact that only around 10,000 or 11,000 cases a year receive legal advice, and of those only about 3,500 proceed to receive legal aid for representation, completely contradicts the assumption that there is a compensation culture—certainly in this area of law and, many of us would argue, generally. There is no compensation culture. However, it is a measure of the scale of the need for representation that of the successful legal aid cases—some 1,500 cases adjudicated in, I think, 2009-10—the average period during which these cases were pursued was as long as 55 months. That might partly be a reflection of the complexity of the evidence, or partly of the fact that you cannot really settle a case until the prognosis becomes clearer, until a client’s needs are defined, particularly in the case of children who suffer perinatal injuries or other forms of clinical negligence. Obviously their future lives cannot be predicted with any certainty at too early a stage. However, it also owes something, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out, to the reluctance of authorities—the NHS bodies and, I suppose, private bodies—to admit liability.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, would the noble Lord confirm that one of the causes of delays is that in complicated cases—we have been concerned with perinatal injuries—there are a number of different experts who have to report? One expert is not enough; you have an obstetrician and you may have a paediatric neurologist, a neonatologist, a neuroradiologist, a midwife and possibly even a geneticist. Trying to make sure that all those experts bring their expertise to bear at the same time and co-ordinate can itself be a reason for delay and therefore for the complexity of these cases.