My Lords, it is obvious that the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is important and goes to a number of aspects of the use of closed judgments. I think it is agreed that we are constantly trying to balance fairness and national security. It is self-evident that closed judgments contain material that should not be disclosed in the interests of national security. Of course, this is the only basis on which a judgment can be classified as closed. As is the practice in existing statutory regimes for CMPs, such as TPIMs and SIAC cases, judges will hand down an open judgment, in tandem with a closed judgment, that contains the parts of the judgment that can be disclosed without causing damage to national security.
In February 2010, special advocates raised concerns about accessing a searchable database of closed judgments. I hope this goes some way in answering the point raised by my noble friend Lady Berridge. The Government agree that it is important to ensure that those who are entitled to access closed judgments are able to do so efficiently and effectively. We have been consulting the Special Advocates Support Office on the creation, storage and dissemination of the head notes and are in the process of finalising arrangements. We anticipate that the database will be populated with all historic closed judgments by the end of the summer. I know that does not go the whole way, as some noble Lords have indicated, but I hope that I have indicated that we have addressed the concern that was raised and are making significant progress towards meeting it.
The next part of my remarks will probably reflect what was said by my noble friend Lord McNally in his response to my noble friend Lord Lester. It is the case that judges will put as much of their reasoning into the open as possible, including the statements of legal principle that are most likely to have cross-case relevance. It is the role of special advocates to make submissions about what material can properly go into the open judgment. If the court is persuaded that it would not harm national security, material will be included in an open judgment rather than a closed judgment.
However, it is not always possible to provide an open statement containing the information as it is described in this amendment. For example, the amendment suggests that it should reveal the length of the closed hearing, the number of witnesses and the nature of those witnesses, which could be damaging to national security. If in the judgment the summary said that the closed session lasted five days while members of the Security Service gave evidence, this would provide to the claimant the knowledge that the intelligence services held a lot of information on them when they may not have been aware of that fact. As already outlined, it will be up to special advocates and counsel for the Government to make submissions about whether material can be included in an open judgment or should remain closed, with the final decision being for the court, which will decide that material should be classified as closed only if its disclosure would be contrary to the interests of national security.
The amendment also requires the judge to declare whether national security was an issue in the proceedings. I believe that this is unnecessary. As we have made clear on a number of occasions in Committee, the Bill makes it clear that the only reason a court can go in to a closed session is that the disclosure of some material relevant to the case would damage national security.
The Lord Chancellor’s code of practice on the management of records, issued under Section 46 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, provides guidance on the management of records held by bodies subject to the Public Records Act 1958. Authorities are required to identify records worthy of permanent preservation and transfer them to the National Archives, a place of deposit for public records or the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, as appropriate. Authorities all need to consider whether parts of records might be released if the sensitive information were redacted— in other words, rendered invisible or blanked out. Information that has been redacted should be stored securely and should be returned to the parent record when the exemption has ceased to apply.
I heard what was said by my noble friends and by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Pannick, about when the national security considerations have in some respects flown off. I want to revisit this matter and discuss it with officials because I recognise the point that has been made. I am not going to pretend that there may be an easy answer to it, but if there is no longer a national security consideration, I see the force of what has been said. However, I have tried to describe the current arrangements for the storage and permanent preservation of records.
However, as things stand, it is up to the courts to decide the detail to include in their judgments. The Bill allows the judges to make these judgments with as much information available to them as possible, while ensuring that the interests of national security are not damaged. I do not believe that Parliament needs to go further and dictate to judges specific information that they are require to release, and I therefore do not believe that the many detailed parts of the amendment are necessary. I hope that in the light of that explanation, the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw the amendment.
I am very grateful to my noble and learned friend for his open-minded response, but there are two problems. One is the problem of legal certainty, which is how the public, lawyers and people who are not special advocates can know exactly what the law is. That problem is obviously a human rights convention problem as well as a common law problem. The second problem is about whose responsibility it would be to make sure, when secrecy has been lost and national security considerations are no longer there, that something is done to put a matter into the public domain. I am still puzzled about who would be responsible. The final point is: how can one get guidance to the courts to ensure a common approach? Is it contemplated that rules will be made through amendments to Clause 7 or that guidance will be given? Will the judges be consulted and so on? These are practical problems that are important to address. As I understand from the response of my noble and learned friend, he is open to thought and discussion about those kinds of practical matters.
My Lords, there were three points. First, I understand my noble friend’s point about the availability of judgments that are closed to people who are not special advocates. That is a difficult problem that I cannot readily see a solution to, given that the very reason why they are closed judgments is because of the sensitive nature of the information in them the disclosure of which could be damaging to national security.
The second point is very much one of detail. Who would determine whether there was, in fact, no longer a national security consideration? Where would the responsibility lie? That is the very issue that I want to consider, because how that would be addressed does not readily present itself to me. I sought to indicate that there is an issue here. I am not pretending for a moment that there is an easy answer, but the issue is important to consider.
On the third point that my noble friend makes about consistency, the difficulty—perhaps it is a reality rather than a difficulty—is that every case will be dealt with on its own individual circumstances. What goes into an open judgment or a closed judgment may well be the result of representations, debate and argument before the judge by special advocates. In those circumstances, it is difficult to ensure that there is rigid consistency because that might inhibit more openness in circumstances where a special advocate makes a compelling case that particular material ought to be included in an open, rather than a closed, judgment. It may be the counsel of perfection, or of the impossible, to think that there would be consistency when we are dealing with circumstances that can differ considerably from case to case. I think it must be left to the argument presented by counsel on both sides—special advocates and counsel for the Government—to determine what a judge puts into open judgment and what is put into closed judgment.
I hope that with those words, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will consider withdrawing the amendment.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for agreeing to give consideration to that particular aspect. There are two issues here. One is public confidence in the system, for which some information about the process—I am not talking about detailed information about the closed material itself—needs to be in the public domain. The second issue is that this should be done in a systematic way, perhaps by the equivalent of the 30-year rule for Cabinet papers and the like.
I am not suggesting for a moment that we should set out to prescribe a given period at this point, but at some point the option of disclosing material ought to be built into the system. This should not necessarily be with a particular time frame in mind, but be a process that is available to the Government of the day to determine, perhaps in conjunction with the courts, what information might be released and when. That is something that we might look at further on Report, in addition to the point that the Minister has agreed to take back. However, in the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends for tabling these amendments. The issue of the role of the judge in providing fairness during a close material procedure is important. As my noble friend Lord Marks said, we have been looking in our debates at the careful balancing exercise by a judge in these matters. As he has said and other noble Lords have indicated, the issue of public perception and public confidence is important too. I understand why my noble friend might consider it fairer to have a separate judge to deal with the applications for a declaration that a CMP should apply and on individual pieces of evidence. This is a matter about which my noble friend Lord Thomas has been particularly anxious. He raised it at Second Reading and he has raised it with me and with the Lord Chancellor. We have given careful consideration to it. He has had the advantage of being able to anticipate what I am about to say to him, but I would still like to say it and perhaps give some explanation as to why we are not being persuaded by the merits of the proposal.
It is better from the point of view of the administration of justice and judicial case management that the judge trying the case should be the judge who determines whether a CMP should be allowed and what materials should be heard in closed proceedings. That judge has a direct interest in ensuring that he or she oversees a fair trial process. In earlier debates it has been put to the Government that we have supplied insufficient room for judicial discretion and it seems to us that a single judge in charge of the entire process is more likely to guarantee judicial discretion than if the roles of disclosure and trial are compartmentalised.
My noble friend is right to say that there will be cases too when masters decide pre-trial issues. My anticipation of what is likely to happen is much as described by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and echoed by my noble friend Lord Faulks. It is more likely that these issues come up in the course of the proceedings. In TPIM cases, for example, there are disclosure issues at the beginning. There is an ongoing issue of disclosure. These will be addressed as the case goes on. Indeed, fresh issues may well arise mid-case. It was also pointed out that in cases where public interest immunity is asserted, this is normally dealt with by the judge hearing the case. I am not saying that it could not be dealt with as a preliminary issue but it very rarely is.
In addition, the whole point of the CMP provisions is to ensure that relevant but very sensitive evidence, which would otherwise be excluded from the proceedings under PII, is considered by the judge. It is not a question of the purpose of this being to exclude material altogether from consideration in the case. It is in fact the opposite: it is to allow it to be considered in some very exceptional circumstances. It is about allowing the judge to know the full facts, even if they cannot be shared with the claimant for reasons of potential damage to national security. There will usually be no question of the judge’s mind being swayed by evidence that ought not to be taken into account at all. It is about allowing the judge to take evidence into account.
My noble friend asked about intercept evidence. The provision in Clause 6 is to put to one side whether or not there would be an exclusion for intercept material in determining whether a party would be required to disclose material, but it is the intention of the Bill that intercept evidence should be permitted. The provision for this is in paragraph 9 of Schedule 2. It is of course a matter for the courts and an individual judge in a particular case as to what weight would be given to that evidence. I hope that answers the very specific question that my noble friend raised.
As I understood it, paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 refers to what the judge hears in the Section 6 proceedings. What I do not see, when he draws my attention to it, is that the judge can take into account intercept evidence in determining the issues between the parties in the trial. It seems to be quite wrong that you could take into account intercept evidence that you have heard in closed proceedings for the purposes of the trial when it would be inadmissible if the proceedings were not closed.
My Lords, I refer my noble friend to paragraph 9 and indicate that it is the intention that intercept evidence should be permitted before the court. We may wish to have a debate as to whether that is right or wrong—
Perhaps I may point out the problem that then arises. The press have been full of “secret trials” and so on, and now, if the noble and learned Lord is right, the Government are proposing a secret trial, because inadmissible evidence, which you could not adduce in any form in an open proceeding, whether it is sensitive or not—intercept evidence may not be sensitive; the methods of obtaining it may be but the evidence may not be—could not be introduced in an open trial. Yet the noble and learned Lord is saying that the judge can decide the case—not the Section 6 application but the case—on inadmissible evidence that he has heard in secret. What are the press going to make of that?
My Lords, I will no doubt be corrected if I have got this wrong but I think it is the case that it is currently permissible in some other areas where there are closed material proceedings. We may well wish to have a fuller debate on intercept evidence rather than dealing with it as part of a debate on whether there should be a separate disclosure judge. I confirm that in fact it is available in all other closed material proceedings, so this is keeping it in line with what happens elsewhere. No doubt we may return to this if my noble friend wants a more fundamental debate on the role of intercept evidence. I just point out what the position is with regard to the Bill, since he asked a specific question.
In any event, judges are accustomed to consider material for the purpose of making evidential and disclosure decisions. It is normal for judges at all levels to decide whether evidence is admissible and, if it is not, to put it out of their minds. I know that there has been some discussion about the extent to which that is possible. Obviously, it is the case in dealing with PII claims where PII is successfully asserted. My noble friend asked about the number of PII claims in criminal cases in magistrates’ courts. That is not really the point that we were seeking to make in the speaking note which he saw; rather we sought to make the point that in magistrates’ courts there must, day in, day out, be cases, not of PII, in which magistrates have to decide on the admissibility of evidence. The argument is heard before the magistrates as to whether particular evidence is admissible or not and, if it is not, they have to put it out of their minds. The point I was making is that there is no problem in principle, even in criminal cases in magistrates’ courts, for judges to decide issues of fact and law. There are cases, too, when they will have to put out of their minds evidence which they have deemed to be inadmissible.
A separate judge would make review of disclosure decisions as the case progresses cumbersome, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The disclosure judge would need to follow the progress of the case in order to understand potential implications for the fairness of proceedings before he or she was able to rule on disclosure issues, and that could cause delay. I accept that this is not the same as the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, earlier this evening, but some of the same considerations arise.
I take this opportunity to clarify what I said in an earlier exchange with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, when he said that the Bill will abolish juries. I think that I responded by saying that these are civil proceedings presided over by a single judge and do not relate to criminal proceedings where there would be a jury. For clarification and for the avoidance of doubt, the position is that the Bill amends the Senior Courts Act 1981, and its Northern Ireland equivalent, which contain a residual right to jury trial in some civil cases. I do not think that that was what the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, had in mind, but it is important to say that for completeness and clarification.
For the avoidance of doubt, I was involved in a case of false imprisonment tried as a civil case in the Royal Courts of Justice in front of a jury, and I am not aware that that possibility has been abolished.
For completeness, the Bill allows the court, however, to refuse an application for a jury where it is of the view that the trial will involve a CMP. Highly sensitive information clearly could not be shared with a jury without presenting serious national security concerns and risks, but the original point is that the Bill does not affect trial by jury in criminal cases, since the Bill does not relate to criminal cases. Of course, criminal cases have been adduced with regard to Northern Ireland, where the practice is to have a separate disclosure judge but in a very specific context—the trial of serious terrorist offences in a climate where there a real risk of paramilitary and community-based pressures on jurors and a history of terrorist threats against judges. There, it is a very valuable safeguard, but I do not believe that such considerations apply to CMPs in civil cases.
I reassure my noble friend who raised this matter earlier that although we have given them considerable consideration, we remain unpersuaded by the arguments for a separate disclosure judge. We believe that the approach we are proposing here will lead to fairness with the same judge involved in all aspects of the case. Therefore, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am not surprised, but I am very disappointed by that answer. I hope that things can settle down over the Recess so that the matter can be reconsidered. It seems obvious to me that it would be in the interests of justice for there to be a separate disclosure judge as I have described.
On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, of course issues can arise in the course of the case where what did not appear to be relevant becomes relevant. That can be covered—and one way of doing it would be to give the special advocate a watching brief throughout the case. Particularly if the Attorney-General is paying his expenses, there is no reason why he should not continue in that role, to watch how the case develops and to see if applications need to be made.
It must be in the public interest that disclosure should come at the proper time, early on in the proceedings before a case is ready for trial. At that point, as I indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, serious decisions are made: is this case one where you make or accept an offer, settle or negotiate? In what way can you shorten the cost and expense of a trial? Certainly in my experience, one always attempts to do that because a settlement may produce a better result than a judgment in your favour if you negotiate hard and well.
I wish I could expand a little further on this, but I am afraid I cannot. I ask leave to withdraw the amendment but hope that we will have further discussions on the matter and come back to it on Report.