Residential Leasehold

Lord Bach Excerpts

Wednesday 17th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I assure the noble Baroness that the Government are doing everything they can. They are making sure that, as she has said, the perpetrator pays, and they have put large amounts of money into this. It takes time to work through the remediation of these buildings, but we are working at pace and pushing the industry the whole time to ensure that it makes these buildings safe as soon as possible.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

The Minister agrees that some leaseholders will need advice, but who is going to pay for that advice? Do the Government think they might extend legal aid to cover it?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

No, we do not intend to extend legal aid. For leaseholders who are considering what to do in future, we have made it very clear that it will be in this Parliament, and they just need to wait and take advice at this time until we can get these changes in place.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, and I am sure that we can cover those issues in more depth at the round table. I think it is worth bearing in mind that if the local councils themselves have any doubts or reservations about the appropriateness of giving voting rights to an individual, they do not have to go down that road. It would be only by agreement that this would happen. They would see a value and a purpose in granting such rights.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

What could the value be in an outsider—someone who is not elected as part of the authority—having a vote? Perhaps the Minister can give us some examples of it being valuable for them to vote. Their advice, of course, would be important and the traditions of local government are that that advice would be listened to. But I think a vote is the thing that some of us find difficult to accept.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

I gave one example, which was a district council that might have particular interests; another might be a university. An integrated care partnership might have major interests in what was being debated or decided. There could be circumstances where a vote by a representative of such organisations could be seen as the right thing to do in the circumstances. Again, I think this is worth my following up in subsequent discussions. I sense that there is considerable uncertainty and hesitation about this provision.

In summary, the Government’s view is that the course proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would undermine a combined authority’s ability to work in collaboration with local stakeholders, in the fullest sense, and experts who can contribute positively to the working of the combined authority and collectively ensure the best outcomes for the area and its residents. I hope that my explanatory comments are helpful, as far as they go, although I am conscious that they will not have satisfied noble Lords entirely. For the time being, I hope too that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, will feel able to withdraw Amendment 70.

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Without good local transport services, there can be no levelling up for the poorest, the oldest and the youngest. I remind noble Lords that we need to be looking at the future, and we need to be providing these services for young people to get to jobs, to training and to education, if we are to level up for the future. Buses are a key part of that.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by congratulating the clerks who made up this group—it is an astonishing achievement to have managed to get so many completely separate issues all in one group. I am afraid that I am going to make life more difficult for the Front-Benchers, particularly for the noble Baroness the Minister, by moving from one subject to another—but here we are; I will do my best.

I ought to remind the Committee that I am a former police and crime commissioner for Leicestershire and Rutland. I have a clause stand part notice in my name for Clause 59, which we will not reach for many sessions, probably. I thank noble Lords who have added their names to that notice. My noble friend Lord Hunt, at the end of his speech, talked about Clause 59; I very much hope that the Government will listen. Even if my words are fairly harsh, they are not addressed at Ministers here; obviously it is not their responsibility, as such, but the Government’s responsibility that we are landed with Clause 59, which really is not a worthy clause in a Bill of this kind. It should never have been in this Bill; it is a mean, short clause in a large, important Bill and it has absolutely nothing to do with levelling up or grand plans for the future of our country.

It is for one reason only, as has been stated: merely to ensure that one mayor of the West Midlands Combined Authority—Conservative, as it happens—can become the police and crime commissioner for the West Midlands police force area whenever he really wants to. All he has to do is ask the Government, who are his own party, of course. He does not have to consult with anybody, unlike under Clause 58—for which there is also a stand part notice—where consultation is at least mandatory. In effect, he just has to wake up one morning and say to himself, “Oh, I fancy being police and crime commissioner today; I’ll have a word with a Minister”. Then, without much ado, he will be. In fact, he has, to use modern parlance, fancied it for a long time. Unfortunately, for him, there is a combination of the present law, which demands democratic consent from the combined authority members and from the constituent authorities—the councils that make up the combined authority—and, annoyingly for the mayor, the electorate who have voted on four separate occasions for a Labour police and crime commissioner. “How dare they”, says the mayor, and the Government follow suit by putting in this clause.

First, the present law sought to be amended by Clause 59—namely, the need for majority support from the combined authority and support from all the councils that make up the combined authority, the constituent authorities—was put into the 2009 Act by the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. For the Government of the day, and for all of us, it represented a sensible, democratic and consensual approach. Of course a mayor can become police and crime commissioner, if he or she has general support—as has happened in Manchester and West Yorkshire. However, it did stop a mayor from grabbing that position without local support. In the West Midlands, that support is not forthcoming. Now, seven years on—only seven years—the same Government wish to change all that and give the mayor a free ride, effectively.

Secondly, the electorate in the West Midlands has voted every time, as it happens, for a Labour police and crime commissioner, most recently in May 2021, on the very same day that they voted for a Conservative mayor. There is no suggestion that the two position holders, the mayor and the police and crime commissioner, have not worked well together. Both were elected, so I ask the Minister, what is the argument for change? What is the argument to nullify the result of an election, effectively, if it does not happen to suit one party?

This clause is there only, I submit, for the West Midlands mayor. Ironically, if he becomes police and crime commissioner, he will no doubt appoint a deputy who will do most of the work but will not have been elected by anybody. Police and crime commissioners, whether we like them or loathe them, were actually set up by the Government of the day to do a particular job for their public. One of the selling points by the Government when this controversial Bill was put before Parliament was that it would be the public who would elect police and crime commissioners, and that gave them some mandate. This clause represents a real lessening of democracy. It is usually only authoritarian regimes that make laws to abolish the results of democratic elections that they do not happen to like or do not suit them. Surely, we are better than that.

At Second Reading, the Minister did not have time to deal with the points I am making now. In no way is that a criticism: she had much too much to do, given the number of speakers and different points that were made at Second Reading. Now we are in Committee, I would be grateful if she would be kind enough to listen to the following questions and give me answers. First, what is the purpose of this clause if it is not to nullify the results of an election held 22 months ago? Secondly, what is wrong with the principle of having broad consent for change, which was the Government’s policy right up to now? Thirdly, why is there no consultation for the mayor before he makes his application? He does not need to consult under the new provision. Lastly, should the Government not think again about how undemocratic, chilling and unnecessary this clause looks? Its departure from the Bill would, I believe, be well received by all people of good will who believe in local democracy and think it rather shocking that an election result can be overturned merely because the party that lost it does not like it.

[Lord Scriven (LD)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the probing Amendments 89 and 90, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about the role of local government and the NHS. I speak as somebody who has been an NHS manager—I think I said previously that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was in the higher echelons of NHS management when I was a mere trainee. I have also been a local government council leader and recently I have been an NHS non-executive director.

There were clear issues as we went through the Health and Care Act. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, it seems like we are having the same discussion. It is not that we want to say, “We told you so”, but the structures that have been set up and the cultures and behaviours of the two organisations mean that they are incompatible with what we all want to achieve, which is a localised and systematic approach to dealing with people who go through the NHS and care system to improve health and reduce health inequalities between areas.

The NHS, by structure, looks up. It looks up to NHS England and the department. The way that the funding goes means that the levers that the Secretary of State or the senior directors of NHS England can pull will mean that NHS staff, in terms of managers and leaders, will look up and will respond to a top-down approach. The culture within the NHS is top-down, top-down, top-down. Local authorities, and particularly local councillors, look out. They look out to their area: that is who they serve, that is who, predominantly, gives them their marching orders—not somebody above them from a national organisation and a central ministerial area of government.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments covers a number of matters relating to combined county authorities, combined authorities and local authorities, including NHS functions, the conferral of additional functions on combined authority mayors, the fair funding review, trade union liaison and bus services.

I start with Amendments 89 and 90, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. Together, they would require the Secretary of State to publish reports on proposals for the devolution of health functions to authorities and subsequent reports at 24-month intervals. I hope I can reassure the noble Lord and other noble Lords that the existing provisions for reporting on the conferral of health functions on to a local authority, combined authority or combined county authority are sufficient. The regulations that would confer health functions on to a local area would be accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum setting out why the functions are to be conferred. The regulations also require parliamentary approval, giving Parliament the opportunity to consider the impact of such a conferral of functions. Also, under Section 1 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act, the Secretary of State has to publish an annual report about devolution, including listing any functions—including health functions—devolved to areas in the preceding 12 months.

The noble Lord’s explanatory statements say that these amendments are intended to probe our

“commitment to transferring NHS responsibilities to local government”.

To clarify, our devolution legislation is enabling legislation. Where an area is interested in the conferral of health functions on to a combined authority, local authority or combined county authority, it is possible to do this via secondary legislation. To date, the only area that has taken up this opportunity is the Greater Manchester combined authority, as we have debated; however, in principle, other devolution bids can include these same requests.

Section 18 of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016 sets out which health functions can and cannot be devolved. As noble Lords have mentioned, the kinds of functions that can be devolved include the joint local commissioning of health services. In contrast, the kinds of functions that cannot be devolved include, as noble Lords might expect, health service regulatory functions vested in national regulatory bodies responsible for such functions. Let me be clear: the devolution of health functions does not alter the Secretary of State’s core duties in relation to the NHS. As this Government have consistently made clear, they are and remain a priority for us.

Amendment 91, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, would require the Government to co-operate with trade unions representing employees of combined county authorities that have responsibilities for transport. I support the noble Baroness’s sentiment here that it is important that we engage with trade unions representing transport employees of CCAs. It will, however, be the combined county authority itself as the employer that will be involved in recognising and collectively bargaining with any trade union representing staff at that workplace.

The Secretary of State will not be party to that relationship. Therefore, placing an additional requirement on the Secretary of State to co-operate with a trade union representing those staff risks undermining the relationship between the combined county authority, as the employer, and the trade union. I do not think that this would be appropriate; it is for local agreement. More generally, the Secretary of State consults with a large number of groups, including trade unions, on issues that affect local transport in combined county authority areas.

I shall move on to the Clause 58 stand part debate. Turning to the issues raised by the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, Lord Shipley and Lord Bach, and other noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman of Ullock, Clause 58 introduces a new process enabling mayors of combined authorities to take on new public authority functions via a request to the Secretary of State to deepen devolution, in order to remove barriers and give our local leaders more powers to drive the economic, social and environmental improvements locally that their residents, businesses and areas need. It is, however, deliberately limited in scope.

The provision relates only to the transfer of other public authority functions; namely, those currently carried out and funded by organisations other than local authorities such as government departments or their agencies. It makes no change to the consent regime for the transfer of local authority functions, as set out in the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, because we fully recognise that local agreement is key to successfully transferring such functions either to be delivered across a wider geographical area by a combined authority or, in some circumstances, to be exercised by the mayor individually.

We have also included an additional safeguard on the use of this provision to make sure that the voice of local authorities is still heard. In making any request for new functions to the Secretary of State, mayors will need to set out the views of their constituent councils and then provide a rationale for proceeding, if any of them disagree. More broadly, this clause also retains the long-established principle that we have had for all combined authority legislation that deepens devolution through new powers; that is, that it must be subject to what has often been referred to as to the triple-lock of consents. It must be consented to locally—in this case, by the mayor with the input from the constituent councils—agreed by the Secretary of State and approved by Parliament. I hope my explanation provides noble Lords with further information such that they could reconsider their opposition to this clause.

On Clause 59, raised by the noble Lords, Lord Bach, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Shipley, and many others, the levelling up White Paper, which was consulted on widely, included reference to mayors of combined authorities taking on police and crime commissioner functions where policing boundaries were coterminous with those of the combined authority. It also committed the Government to taking steps to remove the barriers to more combined authority mayors taking on PCC functions. Clause 59 amends the existing provision by removing the requirements of consent from the combined authority and its constituent councils to the transfer of the PCC functions to be exercised by the mayor. This will enable the Secretary of State to make an order providing for a combined authority mayor to take on PCC functions for the combined authority’s area, subject to mayoral consent only.

PCC functions can be exercised only by the mayor. Combined authorities and their constituent councils have no role in the exercise of PCC functions. Therefore, the clause makes it clear that only mayoral consent is required for a transfer. These changes are designed to enable more mayors to take on PCC functions where this has been agreed; for example, within a devolution deal, in line with our White Paper commitment. The transfer of PCC functions to a combined authority mayor would not only preserve the democratic accountability established by the PCC model but can also offer wider levers to prevent crime. Powerful local mayors—

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. I thank her for what she has said so far, but I want to ask her why there is no need for consultation of any kind under Clause 59. She praised the consultation that was necessary under Clause 58 and made it part of her argument. Why is there none in Clause 59?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, that is because, as I said, the role of the PCC does not impinge on the roles of the constituency councils. It is purely a role for the mayor. When you are looking at things to do with health, you are probably including the care roles of many councils.

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

Each district council has to have a community safety committee, which is made up of district councillors, others and the local police—it is very much involved in policing. As has been said earlier, and used as an argument by the Government, every police and crime panel must have someone from each district council in the police force area. There is a clear link between the constituent councils. Given that link is so important, how can the Minister really argue that on Clause 58 consultation is necessary but on Clause 59 it has nothing to do with the districts or the county?

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I did not say it has nothing to do with the districts or the county—

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Bach Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 17th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bach (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the House that I am a former police and crime commissioner for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. I am going to talk about something a bit different.

By any standards, this is a major Bill dealing with big issues for the future of our country. It will need substantial scrutiny. However, it is not an infrequent experience that, hidden away among the many clauses and schedules of such a Bill, there are occasional proposals that are, in reality, nothing much more than crude and petty political point-scoring. These are not easy to spot because they are all written up in the same parliamentary language. Alas, this Bill is no exception. I do not think I have seen a more egregious example of this than Clause 59. My short speech will be limited to explaining why I make this claim and why I hope that this clause will, in due course, be dealt with in the usual effective manner when the House comes across an unprincipled piece of what I say is parliamentary opportunism.

When combined authorities were set up, legislation was carefully drafted to see that valid and sensitive democratic interests were protected at the same time as mayors came into their own. If a mayor of a combined authority wished to take over the functions of the police and crime commissioner, they could do that by getting the consent of the combined authority itself and of the constituent councils too. This protected the rights of properly elected councillors. That support, based on consent, was attained in Manchester and West Yorkshire, where the system is working well. So why do we need Clause 59, which totally removes the right of combined authorities and constituent councils even to be consulted, and gives a mayor the sole, unfettered powers to take over that role?

I am afraid the answer is simple and depressing, and I hate to have to say it, but it is obvious. The Conservative Government want the mayor in the West Midlands to become the police and crime commissioner. Unfortunately for them, as recently as 20 months ago, the electorate voted for a Labour police and crime commissioner for the fourth election in a row. Equally unfortunately, a majority of members of the combined authority do not want this to happen. How do the Government get around this problem? Do they do it by seeking to change the law and, at the same time, quietly but efficiently and effectively take power away from the electorate? It is only in the West Midlands that this is a problem, but somehow it is worth a clause. This is not a course of action worthy of any Government. The clause should be removed from the Bill during the course of these proceedings.