Lord Ashton of Hyde
Main Page: Lord Ashton of Hyde (Non-affiliated - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Ashton of Hyde's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I do not wish to see Clause 12 stand part of the Bill. We have other amendments in the group, and we intend to oppose the question that Schedule 3 be the third schedule to the Bill. I have some amendments to Schedule 3 as I am not entirely confident that the Minister will instantly accede to our amendments to and arguments on the schedule.
These provisions are about closing premises if it is thought that illegal working is taking place, followed by the possibility of compliance orders. It seems to us that these are something of a sledgehammer set of provisions. If anyone should be allowed to wield a sledgehammer, it should be the courts, not the Executive. A lot of this Bill—as we have said before and, I dare say, will say again—is about sending messages, which we do not think is the purpose of legislation.
The Bill would give immigration officers powers to close an employer’s premises for up to 48 hours when they are satisfied on reasonable grounds that the employer is employing an illegal worker. He might, of course, not necessarily actually be an illegal worker, but someone that the immigration officer has reasonable cause to believe is not entitled to work. I accept the phrase “reasonable cause” but, by definition, “reasonable cause” is not fact. A closure notice can lead on a pretty fast track to a compliance order being imposed for up to two years, which is a matter for the court. It seems to me that any closure, including the initial closure, should be a matter for the court. What happens when there are mistakes, poor decisions or bad judgment on the part of an immigration officer? The consequences for an employer can be considerable to both his reputation and financially, as they can be for the employees legally working for a business and, indeed, for other separate businesses operating from the same premises. Why is this measure required, given the criminal sanctions proposed for illegally employing someone? What safeguards are provided to ensure that this power is not used oppressively? What records will be made of the decision-making process and will they be disclosed to the owner of the premises?
As I said, I have tabled specific amendments to Schedule 3. Paragraph 1(12) requires an immigration officer to consult anyone he thinks is appropriate before issuing a closure notice. Amendment 135 would require consultation—which, of course, in this context would mean discussion before issuing the notice—with, as a minimum, the employer, people who live on the premises and anyone who has an interest in the premises.
Amendment 146 was tabled following debate in the Commons on paragraph 15(3)(d) of Schedule 3, which is about the possibility of compensation for loss being ordered by the court if, having regard to all the circumstances, the court is satisfied that it is appropriate. The discussion was around whether other criteria must also be satisfied. The Government consider that the word “and” should be included at the end of the relevant provision, not “or”. This is clearly an important point. The ability to order compensation for an employer is restricted, as are the circumstances in which compensation can be paid to third parties—the sort of third parties I have mentioned—who would be adversely affected. Therefore, I am not happy with the Government’s amendment, but at least it will bring clarity.
If the Secretary of State has presented inaccurate information to the court which has led the court to make an order which it would not otherwise have made, or the Secretary of State has acted in an oppressive manner or otherwise wrongfully, will the court have the power to order the payment of compensation or damages without having to start separate proceedings? And if not, why not? The government amendments remove all possibility of compensation for losses incurred as a result of an illegal working closure notice if that notice has been cancelled. It seems likely that where a notice has been issued wrongly, the Home Office should move to cancel it. I ask these questions to seek clarification on these provisions.
My Lords, it might be helpful for noble Lords if I speak now to the government amendments to explain them and come to the noble Baroness’s amendments and the stand part debate at the end.
Government Amendments 136 to 145 and 147 have been tabled in respect of illegal working closure notices and compliance orders. They are technical matters, although they also clarify the circumstances in which a person may apply to the courts for compensation where they allege they have suffered financial loss as a consequence of an illegal working closure notice.
Amendment 136 clarifies that an immigration officer may cancel a closure notice only if either the employer operating at the premises is not employing any illegal workers, or the employer does not have an unspent conviction for the offence of knowingly employing an illegal worker, or has not received a civil penalty for employing an illegal worker which is less than three years old or which remains unpaid. This is because these are the circumstances in which a closure notice may be served, according to Schedule 3, paragraph 1(3) and (6).
Amendment 137 corrects an incorrect cross-reference. Amendment 139 excludes compensation from being available where a notice has been cancelled due to the employer being able to evidence compliance with right-to-work checks only after the notice has been issued. This is to ensure that any deliberate delay by the employer is not incentivised in the knowledge that they could still claim compensation. Amendments 140, 141 and 142 simply delete unnecessary references.
Amendments 143 and 144 make it clear that a compensation order may be made only when there has been a mistake of fact as to the conditions in paragraph 1(3) or 1(6) being satisfied. Employers will be given an opportunity to demonstrate that they have conducted right-to-work checks in relation to any illegal workers found before there is any decision to serve a closure notice. The court has discretion to award compensation where these specified conditions have not been satisfied and the claimant has suffered financial loss in consequence of a closure notice.
Following debate in the other place, Amendment 145 simply confirms that the relevant paragraph has a conjunctive construction. In case some noble Lords do not understand that, it means that we add an “and” to the penultimate sub-paragraph, which means that all the conditions must be satisfied
Amendments 138 and 147 omit paragraph 15(4) as it was felt this contributed to the ambiguity raised in debate in the other place. By preventing compensation for financial loss in relation to a person’s work, it could have been read to prevent all compensation for financial loss in relation to a closure notice, such as the earnings of illegal and legal workers. I can assure the Committee that that is not the Government’s intention. Therefore, the government amendments clarify that the compensation mechanism will apply in cases of mistake on specified grounds. I beg to move.
My Lords, at the risk of being a pedant, I point out that, strictly, these amendments are not moved; they are spoken to at this time. They are moved only in the order in which they appear in the Marshalled List.
My Lords, I thank the two noble Baronesses who have spoken. I start by making the general point that these powers will be used only for repeat offenders. They will not be used widely; they are for the most egregious offenders. As well as employing illegal workers, they must already have had illegal working penalties or convictions.
Clause 12, which gives effect to Schedule 3, sets out the regime for illegal working closure notices and illegal working compliance orders. The clause and schedule provide new powers to deal with businesses that repeatedly flout the law by employing illegal workers. The intention is to use them in the most serious cases, as I have just indicated, where civil penalties or previous convictions have failed to change employer behaviour. Such employers may also be exploiting their workers, including legal workers, by not paying the minimum wage or by breaking health and safety legislation. When immigration officers conduct an enforcement visit under existing powers to an employer’s premises, any illegal workers identified may be arrested and the employer may be liable to pay a civil penalty or to prosecution for an offence. Despite this, the employer may continue to use illegal workers who are not apprehended at the time of the visit or who are recruited subsequently. Furthermore, some businesses dissolve to evade sanctions and then reopen in a new name and continue their non-compliance as before. My notes tell me that this is often referred to as “phoenixism” and that may be so. The provisions are designed to break this cycle of non-compliant business behaviour.
The provisions create a new power for immigration officers to close premises for up to 48 hours in certain cases, where the employer or a connected person in relation to the employer has previously faced sanctions for employing illegal workers. An application must be made to a court for an illegal working compliance order, unless the closure notice is cancelled. This compliance order may extend the closure of the premises or make any order the court decides is appropriate to prevent an employer operating at the premises from employing an illegal worker. This might include ordering the business to perform right-to-work checks to ensure that illegal workers are not employed, or to permit immigration officers to enter the premises to ensure that the employer is complying with illegal working rules.
These provisions are loosely modelled on the power to close premises associated with nuisance or disorder, which is in Part 4 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Let me reassure the House that this power will be subject to appropriate safeguards and its use will not be considered lightly. It is designed to be used as a last resort in the most serious cases, where established methods of securing compliance have been unsuccessful, by limiting the duration of the closure notice that may be served by immigration officers; by making the courts responsible for determining whether a compliance order should be imposed; by providing a right of appeal against a compliance order; and by providing a mechanism to apply for compensation, should mistakes be made, we believe that Schedule 3 provides appropriate judicial oversight of the use of these powers and sufficient safeguards and remedies for those who feel that they have been treated unfairly.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, talked about what records will be kept and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, talked about the transparency in the process. Guidance may be published under paragraph 16 of Schedule 3, after appropriate consultation, which would provide for guidance for immigration officers in respect of how their immigration powers should be exercised and recorded. We will ensure that immigration officers make operational records in their pocket notebooks, as is standard practice, and that this is supported by guidance issued under paragraph 16. The Home Office will monitor compliance as a matter of course.
On the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the compensation mechanism in paragraph 15 does not apply where the court has made an order, since an adversely affected party should, in this case, appeal the order. The court, on hearing an appeal, may make any order it considers appropriate under paragraph 9(5) and this might include the award of compensation. The noble Baroness also asked whether compensation should be payable when inaccurate information is presented to a court by an immigration officer. If a court considers that the conditions for issuing the notice under paragraph 1(3) or paragraph 1(6) were not satisfied, the court may award compensation to a claimant who has suffered financial loss, if it considers it is appropriate. The compensation mechanism in paragraph 15(3), as I have just said, does not apply when the court has made an order, since the adversely affected party should appeal the order. Compensation may be payable at the discretion of the court if the immigration officer supplied inaccurate information to the court as to whether any illegal workers were present at the property or if the employer had not previously been convicted of an immigration offence or received an immigration penalty. Compensation may also be payable when the immigration officer has not used reasonable efforts to notify people who live at or have an interest in the property.
As to the point that the initial closure order should be issued by a court and not an immigration officer, the Government respectfully disagree. We think that the immediacy of the present approach is designed to serve as a deterrent to employers who have repeatedly flouted illegal working rules. The present approach allows for the trigger conditions to be applied to a particular moment in time. Imposing a requirement for an initial court order would give the employer an opportunity to hide their illegal working, including through dissolving the company.
The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned that she thought the powers were oppressive and contrary to the rule of law. I point out that the closure of a business premises by law enforcement officers is not unprecedented and the proposal in this Bill, including the safeguards, is modelled on the approach taken in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As a result of those remarks, I hope that in due course the noble Baroness will accept that Clause 12 and Schedule 3, to which it gives effect, should remain part of the Bill.
Turning to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, Amendment 135 would require the immigration officer to consult the employer,
“people who live on the premises … and … any person who has an interest in the premises”.
The officer will already be required by Schedule 3 to consult any person they think appropriate before issuing a closure notice, and this may include many of those interested parties. In addition, immigration officers are already required to make reasonable efforts to inform any person who lives on the premises and any person who has an interest in the premises that the notice is going to be issued. A requirement to also consult such people—who, I remind noble Lords, have already committed an illegal working offence—seems an unnecessary additional requirement. Also, paragraph 1 makes it clear that a closure notice cannot prohibit access to premises to any person who habitually lives on the premises.
The amendment also requires the employer to be consulted. I can reassure noble Lords that employers will be given an opportunity to demonstrate that they have complied with the law in this area. The decision to serve a closure notice will not be taken lightly. If the employer can produce evidence that right-to-work checks have been undertaken, Schedule 3 makes it clear that the notice must not be issued, or if such evidence is produced after the notice has been issued, the notice may be cancelled. The whole purpose of serving the closure notice is because the business has repeatedly flouted the law in this area. It will be a serious case where the established civil penalty scheme or previous convictions have not prevented continued illegal behaviour.
Amendment 146 would have the effect of always giving the court the discretion to award compensation, even where immigration officers have acted lawfully and the claimant was responsible for illegal working on the premises. This would frustrate the objective of the proposed scheme of closure notices, which is to strengthen our ability to deal with repeat offenders involved in the use of illegal workers. It would be inappropriate to provide the facility for such persons to obtain compensation for financial loss where the immigration authorities have acted correctly in closing their premises.
In the light of my explanation of these provisions, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able not to press her amendments.
My Lords, perhaps I might ask my noble friend a couple of questions. He said several times that this is to deal with people who are repeat offenders—the most serious offenders—but paragraph 1(6) requires only one offence. As with certain members of the Government who make mistakes in employing illegal workers from time to time, as do many people, it seems unfair to lump them in with people who are deliberately flouting immigration rules. It sounds very much from what my noble friend is saying that the guidance would require many more offences to have been committed than just the one in the previous three years. I would be comforted if he could reinforce that that is the case and say why paragraph 1(6) says only once.
The other thing that I wanted to raise with him is the conjunction between paragraph 1(3) and 1(11). Surely if the person who is employing gets even a few moments’ prior notice that this procedure is about to be activated, he has a “Lord Sugar” defence—all he has to say is, “You’re fired”, and he is no longer employing anyone.
My Lords, in answer to the first question, the whole point is that it is not just sub-paragraph (6) that has to be taken into account before a closure notice is provided; it is in combination with sub-paragraph (3). The condition is that an employer is employing someone illegally and, in sub-paragraph (6), they have to have previously been convicted of an offence. If an immigration officer suspects that illegal working is going on, they can apply for the closure notice if, and only if, sub-paragraph (6) also applies where they have previous convictions in respect of illegal working.
On my noble friend’s second point about giving notice, that is precisely why for the first 24 hours, which may be extended to 48 hours, we feel that an immediate closure notice can be served, before the court is applied to, to prevent employers doing things which would enable them to continue employing illegal workers. The fact that we can do it immediately, albeit for only up to 48 hours, is an important factor in clamping down on this offence.
My Lords, when paragraph 1(11) says,
“An illegal working closure notice may be issued only if reasonable efforts have been made to inform”,
that surely says that the person who is running the premises has to be told beforehand that a notice is to be issued and therefore there is a small space of time in which people can be disemployed. I agree that a company could not be closed. I understand how sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) work together, but sub-paragraph (6) is the bit that covers the previous convictions and, in my opinion, it does not match the words of my noble friend that this is for the most serious offences and the really rogue offenders. This catches anyone who has made one mistake beforehand. If we are giving the Executive this power, which I do not disapprove of in extreme cases, we should restrict it to extreme cases and not include a person who makes a second mistake within three years, which in the retail industry is not hard to do.
My Lords, we are talking about illegal working by illegal immigrants. It is just a question of what you define as serious. In our view, with employers who have previously been convicted of illegal working offences and who are suspected of employing illegal workers, we regard that as serious. I think it is a question of definition whether you have to have had one, two or three convictions before it applies. At the moment that is where we consider it should be and we consider that serious.
With regard to my noble friend’s earlier point, sub-paragraph (11) says that there is a duty to inform,
“people who live on the premises”—
not necessarily the employer—but we think it is reasonable that people who live on a premises should be informed that a premises might be closed.
My Lords, that is exactly the point about the written words matching the oral words which has been concerning me about paragraph 1(6). I do not know whether the Minister can answer this question now. If there has been a conviction, leaving aside for the moment how many offences there have been, and it is a spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, it does not apply. But if there has been at any time a requirement to pay a penalty following an illegal working closure notice, and failure to pay that penalty, does that fall within the reference to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act? I suspect it does not. In other words, although there might be a spent conviction, the non-payment of a penalty notice could blight your business for ever. I am not suggesting that penalty notices should not be paid.
I think that the noble Baroness has made my point for me. If there is a civil penalty and businesses do not pay it, they are not the sort of business which we would necessarily feel that this clause should not apply to. On the concern that the printed words do not match the oral words, I am very happy to write to the noble Baroness to confirm that what I said is correct—and we are of course happy to discuss this at any time afterwards. But in the mean time, I would be grateful if she would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part.
My Lords, I am not suggesting that the Minister is misrepresenting the Government’s intention. I want to see the intention reproduced on paper. A civil penalty should, at the very least for this purpose, be on all fours with a conviction. After all, it is lighter than a conviction. For it to bite for ever and ever, and come up to bite you in 15 years’ time or whatever, seems inappropriate.
Is the noble Baroness saying that if you do not pay a civil penalty for 15 years, you should get away with it?
My Lords, if you can—in the Minister’s words—get away with a conviction because of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which is well-respected legislation, then you should be able to get away with not paying a penalty in the terms in which we are discussing them. I am not advocating law-breaking or the non-payment of penalties; I am sure that the Minister really understands that.
I do understand, and it might be appropriate to continue this discussion between ourselves later, outside the Chamber.
My Lords, I do not wish to continue that bit of the discussion, but perhaps I might put into a future discussion a question on payment of compensation. The Minister referred to the court being able to pay compensation. Under paragraph 9, it can make any order it regards as appropriate—but a separate paragraph 15, on compensation, requires an application to be made. I think he said that guidance would be given under paragraph 9(5) but I am not sure how paragraphs 9 and 15 work together. I do not expect an answer now; that would not be fair. But I would be grateful if I could have some clarity—others may understand it perfectly—as to how those two paragraphs work together.
I will not test the patience of the Committee by responding to other points. No doubt the Question on Clause 12 is about to be put. We will not at this moment object to it.
The short answer is no. We have an asylum system which does not work as fast as people would like, but let us improve the system. The obvious answer is to process the claims more quickly and then this question would not arise. However, I would go back to the original, existing system.
My Lords, this is an emotive issue. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, these are not new arguments. In fact, I think they were had on the last Immigration Act and possibly in immigration Bills before that. Of course, it is an emotive issue and everyone has sympathy with the plight of some of the people whom we are talking about. It is a difficult line to draw and we have to draw a balance.
I have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of allowing permission to work where an asylum claim is still outstanding after six months, removing the caveat that any delay must not be of the asylum seeker’s own making, and lifting restrictions on the types of employment available. The amendments would radically change existing permission-to-work arrangements for asylum seekers and the Government are not convinced that that is sensible. As a general rule, the Government believe that it is not appropriate to allow asylum seekers to work. It is important that we protect the resident labour market for those lawfully present in the UK.
Did the Minister listen to the employment statistics announced by one of our Ministers three weeks ago? She said that there were 200,000 job vacancies in the UK.
I am not aware of those statistics, but I will take a look at them.
There are about 600,000 vacancies in the UK, and there always are. It is frictional unemployment. The only way that you can take another job is if a job is vacant.
We will come to employment in a moment.
It is important that we protect the resident labour market for those lawfully present in the UK and discourage those not in need of protection from claiming asylum for economic reasons. There are provisions in the Immigration Rules to allow non-EEA nationals to come to the UK to take up employment where there are no suitable resident workers available, and which give priority to those coming to fill roles included on the list of shortage occupations published by the Home Office. These arrangements are subject to numerical limits. This ensures that the employment meets our needs for skilled labour and benefits the UK economy. This approach prioritises access to employment and business opportunities for those lawfully in the UK, including recognised refugees. It will undermine this approach if non-EEA nationals can bypass employment restrictions by claiming asylum, particularly where that claim is clearly without merit.
There has been much comment, including tonight from the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about historic delays in decision-making in the Home Office, but this has been brought under control. The Home Office met its public commitment to decide straightforward asylum claims lodged before April 2014 by 31 March 2015, and to decide all straightforward claims lodged from 1 April 2014 within six months. About 85% of cases are straightforward. This means that the vast majority of asylum claims are decided quickly. While awaiting a decision, asylum seekers are provided with free accommodation and a cash allowance to cover essential living needs—I will come on to the detail of that in response to the noble Lord, Lord Alton—if they would otherwise be destitute. They can also undertake volunteering activities while their claim is outstanding. I am not relying on volunteering as a primary argument, and it will not be financially beneficial, but it will help with integration, making friends, learning the language, maintaining skills and so forth. I will also deal with the noble Lord’s question about volunteering in a moment.
The Government believe that the current policy strikes the right balance. If a claim remains undecided after 12 months, for reasons outside their control, the person can apply for permission to work. That is a fair and reasonable policy and is consistent with our obligations under EU law. It also assists genuine refugees. It is common knowledge that some people make unfounded asylum claims. The reasons why can be difficult to establish, but it is reasonable to assume that some do so because of the benefits, real or perceived, that they think they will gain. Earlier access to employment risks making asylum more attractive for those who are otherwise not eligible to work in the UK.
Providing more generous employment opportunities for those who claim asylum therefore creates a risk of more unfounded claims. An increase in the number of such claims would slow down the processing of genuine claims and undermine our progress towards a fair and efficient asylum system. The Government do not believe that that is a risk worth taking.
I said that I would address the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, about voluntary work and volunteering. Asylum seekers can undertake voluntary activity, but it must not amount to unpaid work. They cannot be paid for it and it cannot be undertaken on a contractual basis. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, asked a straightforward question about whether asylum seekers would be caught by Clause 8 and the offence of illegal working. The right to work is a different question from whether you are in the UK lawfully and it is better if I write to the noble Baroness and send copies to interested Peers to confirm how Clause 8 will affect asylum seekers.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Hamwee, talked about other countries that allow asylum seekers to work that had fewer asylum claims and whether reducing the period would act as a pull factor for asylum seekers. Germany, which was mentioned by the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and others, allows asylum seekers to work after three months and the highest number of applicants were registered in Germany in 2015, including thousands of migrants from the western Balkans who are economic migrants and rarely qualify for asylum. Germany has the highest asylum intake in the EU.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about the permission to work, which is limited to the shortage occupation list. The list is based on expert advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee. It comprises skilled jobs where there is an identified national shortage that it is sensible to fill, at least in part, through immigration. The restriction ensures that the employment meets our needs for skilled labour and benefits the UK economy. Under EU law, we are entitled to prioritise access to work for UK and EEA citizens over asylum seekers. Limiting access for those granted permission to work to employment on the shortage occupation list is an effective mechanism for achieving that. However, those granted refugee status have unrestricted access to the labour market.
The noble Baroness also mentioned the recent news about red doors. As the Immigration Minister told the other place today, we have commissioned an urgent review and officials will be travelling to Middlesbrough tomorrow to begin that.
The noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Alton, talked about the support package that is made available to asylum seekers. Nobody is pretending that they will live in anything like the lap of luxury, but it is not a random amount. The £36.95 per week is in addition to free furnished accommodation, with utility bills and council tax paid; and the weekly cash allowance is designed to meet essential living needs. It is reviewed every year using evidence-based methodology and we are satisfied that we provide enough to meet essential needs. The current level is for each person in the household—the asylum seeker and any dependant—and of course they have access to NHS healthcare and all minor children are legally entitled to free primary and secondary education.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked how many asylum seekers had been awaiting a decision for at least six months. There are around 3,500. As I have said, the delays that have happened before have been brought under control and we have met our public commitments.
The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, talked about Red Cross food parcels. The British Red Cross has produced a report on the problems of destitution faced by asylum seekers which is based on 56 cases, but for the most part these were not asylum seekers. Some 46 of the 56 were failed asylum seekers, people the courts agreed did not need our protection.
As I said at the beginning, this is an emotive issue. The Government do not believe that the risk entailed in reducing the period is worth it. In light of the points I have made, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to agree to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, in response to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, the Minister referred to the nature of voluntary work. I think we may need a little more detail on that, and perhaps it would be a good idea if he wrote to noble Lords. It is an important point because voluntary organisations and the people who work for them need to be very clear about their position on this matter.
I completely agree that it is an important point and I will be happy to write to the noble Lord and others who have spoken on this after our session in Committee today.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Can he be clear in that response on the distinction that is being made between voluntary activity and voluntary work, which I found very difficult to understand, and I am sure that many in the field will find it perplexing too. Their worry will be that either they as organisations or some of those asylum seekers who are involved in voluntary activities could find themselves prejudiced against or even prosecuted. These are significant issues that need to be addressed in some detail.
I take the point from the noble Lord, and that is why it would be better if our response was written down once we had had a chance to think about it carefully and get our definitions right. I will circulate the response and put a copy in the Library of the House so that voluntary organisations know where they are.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. When applications for asylum take longer than six months, being allowed to work is a reasonable objective. I thank the noble Lord for his response and I look forward to the letter on the points we have just discussed. Some powerful speeches have been made, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and many others. Surviving on £5 a day is an impossible hardship and it has to be endured for many months. As my noble friend Lady Lister said, the risk is that these people will be driven into the illegal work market where the risk of exploitation is even greater.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned the issue of the red doors in Middlesbrough. It is unbelievable and I hope that the Government will take very firm action, but let us make sure that we do not end up just painting all the doors blue next time. I make that point because this has to be dealt with properly. It is a scandal and an absolute disgrace. With that, and with my thanks for other comments made by the noble Lord, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.