Baroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have Amendments 78 to 91 in this group, in which there are also two government amendments. I am sorry that they are not the sort of all-singing, all-dancing amendments with which one might like to start the day’s proceedings, but they are important.
Schedule 1 provides for changes to licensing related to illegal working and covers licensed premises and personal licences. The Licensing Act 2003 sets out licensing objectives. They are the prevention of crime and disorder, public safety, the prevention of public nuisance and the protection of children from harm. It seems to us that they cover the ground pretty well and they have been found to do so, particularly when taken with the local administration of licensing which sets it in the local context. I dare say that the Minister will say that illegal working—the subject of the schedule—is a crime, but we have already explained our view that the schedule is futile at best, dangerous at worst and has unlooked-for consequences. I will not repeat those arguments now. If a crime is committed, then whether that specific crime needs a schedule is one of the overarching questions.
Amendments 78 and 79 would retain the Secretary of State’s right to be notified of an application for a licence and to object to that application along with the occupants of 25 Acacia Avenue, those next door to the Bull public house and so on, but it would delete the immigration officer’s right to enter to see—those are the words of the Bill—whether an immigration offence is being committed. In our view, the licensing objective should be about particular individuals and premises and whether they are appropriate for a licence to be granted. Apart from the substantive objections, this schedule produces a lot of bureaucracy. Is it not enough that the Secretary of State has a right to object to the grant of the licence? If the licensee has been employing one or two people without the right to work, it is possible that there may have been confusion, difficulties of checking and so on, so there is a great possibility for mistakes. That is very different from an operation being dependent on an almost entirely unentitled or illegal workforce.
I have mentioned public houses, but I know that there is also concern in, for instance, the curry house trade that these provisions will cause considerable disruption to their operation. What consultation has there been with various relevant organisations, including within the licensed trade? A lot of small businesses stand to be affected by this. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has analysed Home Office lists of penalties imposed for illegal working and says that many of them relate to small businesses. It asks a pertinent question about whether that is because they employ illegal workers more often or because they are targeted more often. Also, for immigration officers to be able to enter premises on something of a fishing expedition without the need for suspicion is a wide power.
Amendments 80 and 83 may look as if I am seeking to extend the powers of the Secretary of State; I am not. This is to probe how the powers will operate and, again, to ask what consultation there has been. The police can already object to the transfer of a licence because it would undermine the crime prevention objective in the exceptional circumstances of a case, so presumably the Home Office has experience of this and should be able to help me with that question. I also ask whether this right for the police is not enough in itself without extending a similar right to the Secretary of State.
Amendments 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88 and 90 would change “appropriate” to “necessary”, which is the term used in the 2003 Act. For instance, it would be “necessary” to reject an application under that Act for the crime prevention objective. To change that term to being “appropriate” to reject it for these objectives seems to give a discretion to the Secretary of State that is wider than we are accustomed to in current licensing law, and which I am unconvinced about.
Amendments 86 and 89 are also about the scope for the Secretary of State’s discretion. They mean that the Secretary of State must be satisfied—I will give that much on the basis of reasonableness—that refusing a licence or the continuation of one is necessary to prevent illegal working, not just that the grant of a licence would prejudice the prevention of illegal working, as the schedule says.
Lastly, and rather differently, there is Amendment 91. The schedule provides that on appeal the magistrates cannot consider whether, after the original decision that is the subject of the appeal, an individual has actually been granted leave to enter or remain in the UK. Why is this necessary? What happens if the individual is granted leave to enter or leave to remain but his initial application for a licence has been turned down? Does he in those circumstances have to make a fresh application for a licence, which will carry with it costs as well as difficulties in running a business, and indeed for employees of that applicant? I will hear what the Minister has to say about his amendments, but I beg to move.
My Lords, I support what might be seen as the rather technical points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I am looking particularly at Amendments 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90. Where it is the practice in earlier legislation to use the word “necessary”, it seems inappropriate to use the word “appropriate”. One should keep to similar phraseology in legislation unless there is some very strong view to change it. “Appropriate”, as the noble Baroness says, gives a very wide degree of discretion—far greater than necessary—and I cannot at the moment see why it is necessary to have it wider than that. The other points—refusing continuation of a licence and so on—are similar. They are perhaps technical but, when they are worked on the ground, they have considerable force, and I am rather concerned to be broadening out what it does not seem necessary so to broaden.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for speaking to her amendments. Before coming to the questions that have been asked, I will briefly speak to Amendments 92 and 93 in my name. Schedule 1 to the Bill concerns the powers to prevent illegal working in premises licensed to sell alcohol or provide late-night refreshment in England and Wales. These are two technical amendments to Schedule 1 which aim to ensure that those who have applied for a premises licence or a personal licence for the sale of alcohol or the provision of late-night refreshment, and who have not had a decision on that licence application before these provisions have commenced, will have their application determined on the basis of the licensing law in force at the time they made their licensing application.
Amendments 78 to 91 are proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Schedule 1 integrates protection against illegal working into the existing licensing regime, including by adding the Home Secretary to the list of responsible authorities for the purpose of the Licensing Act, by making the prevention of illegal working an objective of the licensing regime and by requiring licence applicants to have the requisite right to work. The amendments proposed by the noble Baroness would adjust the threshold at which the Secretary of State may object to a licensing application. They would permit a court to consider whether the appellant has been granted leave to enter or remain in the UK after the date of the decision being appealed against, in effect duplicating the proper role of the tribunal—the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. The amendments would also make changes to the proposed “entitlement to work” definition from the Licensing Act 2003 to prevent immigration status and, in particular, the lack of it being relevant to alcohol or late-night refreshment licensing decisions.
We do not believe that these amendments would achieve the objective of preventing illegal working in this high-risk sector. They would not provide the necessary clarity for licensing authorities or the Home Office in respect of the proposed power to withhold personal and premises licences based on the absence of the applicant’s right to work in this sector or concerns about the risk of illegal working in the premises concerned. They would also result in inconsistency with the standards employed in the wider licensing framework. Changes made by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 have given licensing authorities greater power to tackle alcohol-related crime and disorder, and it is appropriate that the same level of evidence and discretion is also afforded in respect of the prevention of illegal working.
The Home Office decision to object to the issue of a premises licence to prevent illegal working will not be taken lightly. Schedule 1 makes it clear that the Secretary of State may object only where she is satisfied that the exceptional circumstances of the case are such that issuing a licence would be prejudicial to preventing illegal working. Schedule 1 also provides the necessary clarity on the circumstances in which a person’s immigration status should render them ineligible to hold a licence to sell alcohol. The proposed amendments would permit an individual to apply for a licence even though they are not permitted to work in the UK, or where their immigration status prevents their doing work related to licensable activity. This cannot be right. An applicant who has been refused a licence but is subsequently granted leave would simply need to make a fresh application and include the required information that provides evidence of immigration status.
Let me turn to some of the particular points that were made. The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, asked what evidence exists that this is a particular problem. Of the civil penalties served for illegal working in the year to June 2015, 82% were served on the retail industry or hotel, restaurant and leisure industry sectors. A large proportion of these sectors hold premises or personal alcohol licences. Enforcement activity is decided as a consequence of intelligence and does not affect only companies that employ a small number of employees.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked what consultation had taken place. The changes proposed to the Licensing Act in the Bill have been subject to consultation with interested partners, including licensing authorities, the police, and representatives of the licensed trade. The consultation was undertaken last summer via a number of workshops, which were attended by the Local Government Association, the Institute of Licensing, licensing officers from seven licensing authorities, representatives of the national policing lead on alcohol, and the police and crime commissioner lead on alcohol. The second workshop included industry partners such as the British Beer & Pub Association, the Association of Convenience Stores, the Wine and Spirit Trade Association and the Association of Licensed Multiple Retailers. These partners provided a significant contribution to shaping our proposals.
Let me turn to perhaps the most interesting point, raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, which is the subject of most of the amendments in this group: the use of the term “appropriate”. This was introduced across the licensing regime in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. We want the test in standards to be consistent across the two pieces of legislation. If we ended up with a differently worded test in the Bill before us, that might require consequential changes to the 2011 Act to bring them into line. I have listened carefully to the arguments that have been made and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on behalf of the Opposition, and I am very happy to look at this issue ahead of Report to see whether any change is needed. However, that is the rationale for the choice of language.
With that assurance, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendments, and in doing so I commend my amendments to the Committee.
I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken in support of my amendments. I have to say that my trigger finger on my iPad is not fast enough to have got into the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act. The Minister will understand that I will want to check whether it is on all fours in this regard. If it absolutely is, I might have to say, “You have got me there”.
The amendments have been described as technical. I do not think that they are; they are about people’s livelihoods, and that is why I am quite persistent with them. That was an impressive list of consultees who, we are told, helped to shape the proposal. I could not deduct whether they were shaping a proposal that they did not like and just making it a little better or whether they were going along with the proposal as it was put to them.
I will finish by saying that what I really do not want to see is a confusing of licensing and immigration—a point that crops up at a number of points in the Bill. They are separate issues and that is why I was so concerned. I am grateful to your Lordships for allowing me to indulge myself with this tranche of amendments, and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 78.
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in this group; most of them are amendments to the government amendments and most of them come in pairs.
Amendment 99A is the first amendment of these pairs and deals with the licensing authority having to set an expiry date for a licence for someone who has been granted limited leave to enter or remain in the UK. The Government are proposing that the licence period,
“must end at or before the end of the leave period”,
which could mean a significantly shorter time before the end of the leave period. My amendments would mean that the licence would end at the end of the leave period. It would be fairly obvious that I would want to ask why the Government think it necessary to make provision for it to end some time before the end of the leave period. Presumably, the licensing authority can grant a licence for a shorter period in any event. I can see the need that it should not go on beyond the end of the leave period, but why does it have to be less?
Amendment 99B is the first of the other pairs of amendments. If leave is extended, the licensing authority can set the duration of the licence, which must not be more than six months. Again, I would ask why. I am proposing that the licence should coincide with the leave period. I make the point that I made in the previous group of amendments that we are dealing with people’s livelihoods.
Amendment 117 is pretty much the same as the amendment in the previous group about whether an appeal, having been successful, can be entertained when a licence has been refused and is appealed on. I lost a grip of what the Minister said on that and will have to read Hansard, but he will probably have the same answer.
On Amendments 120 to 124, Schedule 2 provides for guidance from the Secretary of State to the licensing authorities in determining whether an applicant for a licence is disqualified because of his immigration status. My amendments amount to a requirement to consult with representatives of the licensing authorities, including Transport for London.
My Lords, this group comprises a large group of government amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and a number of amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It is clear that the government amendments are included to make matters clear and consistent across all relevant lines of legislation. That in itself is a good thing. But for me that further illustrates the point that this legislation has been rushed and ill thought out and these revisions should have been in the Bill from the start.
Also, the Secretary of State is given powers in these government amendments to amend fine amounts by secondary legislation. That may be perfectly acceptable in this case. But the Government like their secondary legislation, hiding behind the limited ability of Parliament to hold them to account in such circumstances, but that I think is a wider issue for the House.
I have looked at the amendments put down by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and with respect to Amendment 117, they have a good point to make. It is not unreasonable for the courts to take into account that, after the date of a decision being appealed against, the person has been granted leave to remain in or enter the UK.
I take it that the other amendments are probing in nature in order to assist the Committee in further understanding the intention of the Government and satisfying noble Lords that what is being proposed is achievable, and of course they can be retabled later in the course of the Bill if we think it necessary. I very much accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that these are important issues that concern people’s livelihoods.
My Lords, with the leave of House, perhaps I may respond to some points made by the Minister on these amendments. I will be very quick. As to the requirement as regards private hire licensing and alcohol licensing for an applicant who did not have leave at the point when the initial decision was made but gets leave in the interim period before an appeal, it is very hard on that applicant that the licensing of the appeal court—although “appeal” may not be quite the right term for what I am trying to say—cannot entertain the consideration of that situation. The applicant will incur costs and a delay. Businesses will be affected and third parties—employees—may be affected. Of everything I have heard, that concerns me particularly. I may be misunderstanding some of the procedures but, if I am misunderstanding them and the language is not completely clear, that could cause a problem for those who will have to operate them. I beg to move.
To clarify for the noble Baroness, I understand her point. My understanding is that what we are saying is that the applicant should not be making an application for a licence that extends beyond the period in which they have leave to remain in the country. Therefore, the point we are seeking to hold is that they should have the licence for the period which relates to the legal position that they have been given to be in the UK. We are trying to tie up those two points.
My Lords, I think I follow that—but what if the application for leave has initially been turned down on the basis of a mistake? That would leave the applicant for a licence in a difficult position. I do not think that it will benefit us to take this discussion further now, but I have no doubt that the Minister, in his usual very helpful way, will be able to undertake discussions between Committee and Report. I will certainly look at it again and perhaps we could pursue it.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I do not wish to see Clause 12 stand part of the Bill. We have other amendments in the group, and we intend to oppose the question that Schedule 3 be the third schedule to the Bill. I have some amendments to Schedule 3 as I am not entirely confident that the Minister will instantly accede to our amendments to and arguments on the schedule.
These provisions are about closing premises if it is thought that illegal working is taking place, followed by the possibility of compliance orders. It seems to us that these are something of a sledgehammer set of provisions. If anyone should be allowed to wield a sledgehammer, it should be the courts, not the Executive. A lot of this Bill—as we have said before and, I dare say, will say again—is about sending messages, which we do not think is the purpose of legislation.
The Bill would give immigration officers powers to close an employer’s premises for up to 48 hours when they are satisfied on reasonable grounds that the employer is employing an illegal worker. He might, of course, not necessarily actually be an illegal worker, but someone that the immigration officer has reasonable cause to believe is not entitled to work. I accept the phrase “reasonable cause” but, by definition, “reasonable cause” is not fact. A closure notice can lead on a pretty fast track to a compliance order being imposed for up to two years, which is a matter for the court. It seems to me that any closure, including the initial closure, should be a matter for the court. What happens when there are mistakes, poor decisions or bad judgment on the part of an immigration officer? The consequences for an employer can be considerable to both his reputation and financially, as they can be for the employees legally working for a business and, indeed, for other separate businesses operating from the same premises. Why is this measure required, given the criminal sanctions proposed for illegally employing someone? What safeguards are provided to ensure that this power is not used oppressively? What records will be made of the decision-making process and will they be disclosed to the owner of the premises?
As I said, I have tabled specific amendments to Schedule 3. Paragraph 1(12) requires an immigration officer to consult anyone he thinks is appropriate before issuing a closure notice. Amendment 135 would require consultation—which, of course, in this context would mean discussion before issuing the notice—with, as a minimum, the employer, people who live on the premises and anyone who has an interest in the premises.
Amendment 146 was tabled following debate in the Commons on paragraph 15(3)(d) of Schedule 3, which is about the possibility of compensation for loss being ordered by the court if, having regard to all the circumstances, the court is satisfied that it is appropriate. The discussion was around whether other criteria must also be satisfied. The Government consider that the word “and” should be included at the end of the relevant provision, not “or”. This is clearly an important point. The ability to order compensation for an employer is restricted, as are the circumstances in which compensation can be paid to third parties—the sort of third parties I have mentioned—who would be adversely affected. Therefore, I am not happy with the Government’s amendment, but at least it will bring clarity.
If the Secretary of State has presented inaccurate information to the court which has led the court to make an order which it would not otherwise have made, or the Secretary of State has acted in an oppressive manner or otherwise wrongfully, will the court have the power to order the payment of compensation or damages without having to start separate proceedings? And if not, why not? The government amendments remove all possibility of compensation for losses incurred as a result of an illegal working closure notice if that notice has been cancelled. It seems likely that where a notice has been issued wrongly, the Home Office should move to cancel it. I ask these questions to seek clarification on these provisions.
My Lords, it might be helpful for noble Lords if I speak now to the government amendments to explain them and come to the noble Baroness’s amendments and the stand part debate at the end.
Government Amendments 136 to 145 and 147 have been tabled in respect of illegal working closure notices and compliance orders. They are technical matters, although they also clarify the circumstances in which a person may apply to the courts for compensation where they allege they have suffered financial loss as a consequence of an illegal working closure notice.
Amendment 136 clarifies that an immigration officer may cancel a closure notice only if either the employer operating at the premises is not employing any illegal workers, or the employer does not have an unspent conviction for the offence of knowingly employing an illegal worker, or has not received a civil penalty for employing an illegal worker which is less than three years old or which remains unpaid. This is because these are the circumstances in which a closure notice may be served, according to Schedule 3, paragraph 1(3) and (6).
Amendment 137 corrects an incorrect cross-reference. Amendment 139 excludes compensation from being available where a notice has been cancelled due to the employer being able to evidence compliance with right-to-work checks only after the notice has been issued. This is to ensure that any deliberate delay by the employer is not incentivised in the knowledge that they could still claim compensation. Amendments 140, 141 and 142 simply delete unnecessary references.
Amendments 143 and 144 make it clear that a compensation order may be made only when there has been a mistake of fact as to the conditions in paragraph 1(3) or 1(6) being satisfied. Employers will be given an opportunity to demonstrate that they have conducted right-to-work checks in relation to any illegal workers found before there is any decision to serve a closure notice. The court has discretion to award compensation where these specified conditions have not been satisfied and the claimant has suffered financial loss in consequence of a closure notice.
Following debate in the other place, Amendment 145 simply confirms that the relevant paragraph has a conjunctive construction. In case some noble Lords do not understand that, it means that we add an “and” to the penultimate sub-paragraph, which means that all the conditions must be satisfied
Amendments 138 and 147 omit paragraph 15(4) as it was felt this contributed to the ambiguity raised in debate in the other place. By preventing compensation for financial loss in relation to a person’s work, it could have been read to prevent all compensation for financial loss in relation to a closure notice, such as the earnings of illegal and legal workers. I can assure the Committee that that is not the Government’s intention. Therefore, the government amendments clarify that the compensation mechanism will apply in cases of mistake on specified grounds. I beg to move.
My Lords, we are talking about illegal working by illegal immigrants. It is just a question of what you define as serious. In our view, with employers who have previously been convicted of illegal working offences and who are suspected of employing illegal workers, we regard that as serious. I think it is a question of definition whether you have to have had one, two or three convictions before it applies. At the moment that is where we consider it should be and we consider that serious.
With regard to my noble friend’s earlier point, sub-paragraph (11) says that there is a duty to inform,
“people who live on the premises”—
not necessarily the employer—but we think it is reasonable that people who live on a premises should be informed that a premises might be closed.
My Lords, that is exactly the point about the written words matching the oral words which has been concerning me about paragraph 1(6). I do not know whether the Minister can answer this question now. If there has been a conviction, leaving aside for the moment how many offences there have been, and it is a spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, it does not apply. But if there has been at any time a requirement to pay a penalty following an illegal working closure notice, and failure to pay that penalty, does that fall within the reference to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act? I suspect it does not. In other words, although there might be a spent conviction, the non-payment of a penalty notice could blight your business for ever. I am not suggesting that penalty notices should not be paid.
I think that the noble Baroness has made my point for me. If there is a civil penalty and businesses do not pay it, they are not the sort of business which we would necessarily feel that this clause should not apply to. On the concern that the printed words do not match the oral words, I am very happy to write to the noble Baroness to confirm that what I said is correct—and we are of course happy to discuss this at any time afterwards. But in the mean time, I would be grateful if she would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part.
My Lords, I am not suggesting that the Minister is misrepresenting the Government’s intention. I want to see the intention reproduced on paper. A civil penalty should, at the very least for this purpose, be on all fours with a conviction. After all, it is lighter than a conviction. For it to bite for ever and ever, and come up to bite you in 15 years’ time or whatever, seems inappropriate.
Is the noble Baroness saying that if you do not pay a civil penalty for 15 years, you should get away with it?
My Lords, if you can—in the Minister’s words—get away with a conviction because of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, which is well-respected legislation, then you should be able to get away with not paying a penalty in the terms in which we are discussing them. I am not advocating law-breaking or the non-payment of penalties; I am sure that the Minister really understands that.
I do understand, and it might be appropriate to continue this discussion between ourselves later, outside the Chamber.
My Lords, I do not wish to continue that bit of the discussion, but perhaps I might put into a future discussion a question on payment of compensation. The Minister referred to the court being able to pay compensation. Under paragraph 9, it can make any order it regards as appropriate—but a separate paragraph 15, on compensation, requires an application to be made. I think he said that guidance would be given under paragraph 9(5) but I am not sure how paragraphs 9 and 15 work together. I do not expect an answer now; that would not be fair. But I would be grateful if I could have some clarity—others may understand it perfectly—as to how those two paragraphs work together.
I will not test the patience of the Committee by responding to other points. No doubt the Question on Clause 12 is about to be put. We will not at this moment object to it.
My Lords, I wish to support Amendment 133, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and to say a word in support of my noble friend Lord Hylton’s Amendment 134B. In March last year, at the last gasp of the then Modern Slavery Bill, your Lordships voted down the amendment that my noble friend has referred to, which would of course have provided greater protection for domestic migrant labour in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, described. My noble friend Lord Hylton has of course persistently championed this cause, and this new legislation gives us an opportunity to rectify what is a long-standing injustice.
In March, those of us who divided the House pressed for the most basic of protections: first, the right to change employer but remain restricted to domestic work in one household; secondly, if in full-time work as a migrant domestic worker in a private household, the option to apply to renew the visa; and thirdly, in instances of slavery, a three-month visa to allow the workers to look for decent work. We argued that without these sorts of provisions, we would leave in place a system found repeatedly over the previous three years to facilitate exploitation, including trafficking of migrant domestic workers.
One of the foremost charities working with these groups, Kalayaan, described how such workers have literally sacrificed themselves to the well-being of their wider families. They do not self-protect in the way that someone with more choices would expect. Many explain that they are prepared to put up with any amount of mistreatment if they can provide for their children and ensure that the same will not happen to them. Kalayaan reports that 65% of the 120 domestic workers on the new visa who they saw between 6 April 2012 and 6 April 2014 did not even have their own rooms but shared children’s rooms or slept on the floor of communal areas, while 53% worked more than 16 hours a day and 60% were paid less than £50 a week.
In 2009, the Home Affairs Select Committee, quoting Kalayaan, said in its inquiry into trafficking that the visa issue was,
“‘the single most important issue’ in preventing the forced labour and trafficking of such workers”.
I recognise that the wholly unacceptable exploitation of domestic workers will not be entirely abolished by the acceptance of these amendments, but it would certainly be an improvement on the current situation.
In reply to the debate last March, the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Bates—urged Members of your Lordships’ House to resist our amendment and to await the outcome of the review of James Ewins, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has mentioned. The Minister said:
“Most crucially, the amendment is defective because a serious and considered piece of work is currently going through its process under the widely respected James Ewins. Our argument is that that should be allowed to take its course”.—[Official Report, 25/3/15; col. 1448.]
In the review, which followed the debate, Mr Ewins takes as his fundamental question,
“whether the current arrangements for the overseas domestic workers visa are sufficient to protect overseas domestic workers from abuse of their fundamental rights while they are working in the UK, which includes protecting them from abuse that amounts to modern slavery and human trafficking”.
We now have the result of that review, and Mr Ewins has recommended removing the visa tie:
“On the balance of the evidence currently available, this review finds that the existence of a tie to a specific employer and the absence of a universal right to change employer and apply for extensions of the visa are incompatible with the reasonable protection of overseas domestic workers while in the UK”.
He goes on to say:
“The review recommends that all overseas domestic workers be granted the right to change employer … and apply for annual extensions, provided they are in work as domestic workers in a private home”.
Who are the kind of people we are talking about? The Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit provides a number of examples, of which I will give only one, relating to the plight of an African national caught up in the cat’s-cradle of domestic labour exploitation. She entered the UK as a domestic worker under the rules in place before April 2012. Her visa has been extended a number of times and she has continued domestic work. She worked for an employer for over three years and was mistreated: she was paid less than promised, shouted at and rarely allowed to leave the house, and her passport was taken by her employers on arrival—the key point. She of course felt very scared. She managed to gain their agreement to a short holiday after the three years, and when she got her passport back, she changed employers. She was advised about the protection available under the national referral mechanism but has been reluctant to pursue this as she fears she will be sent home to her country of origin by the Home Office. The study shows that a common form of control is retention of documents, psychological abuse and restriction of movement.
However, domestic workers who are allowed to change employer can solve problems that arise with one employer by changing employment and moving away from the problem. The case also shows that the NRM will not be the right fit for everyone, even with advice. Individuals can be frightened of being perceived to cause trouble for others and of repercussions from that.
Although Amendment 133 has provided this welcome opportunity to debate what provision should be made for overseas domestic workers, this can all be achieved simply by amendments to the Immigration Rules, so the full range of options is open to the Government. Either way, Mr Ewins’s recommendations, which he identifies as the minimum necessary to protect overseas workers, should be implemented without delay as an essential first step towards comprehensive protection.
As my noble friend Lord Hylton said, he would go slightly further in Amendment 134B. Maybe these two ideas, which are not in conflict, could be taken together before Report. What is abundantly clear is that the Government must get on with resolving this issue and providing reasonable and basic protection to those caught up in a tangle of exploitation and coercion.
My Lords, I have my name to the first of this pair of amendments, but I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, on picking up some specifics from the report and spelling them out in his Amendment 134B. We must all thank James Ewins, who was promoted in my speech at Second Reading, according to the Official Report, to coming from the UN rather than Ewins—not an inappropriate promotion. We must also thank the organisations which gave evidence, which have worked so hard for so long and provided so much support to this group of workers.
I was not entirely clear from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, whether he and his party are behind the Ewins recommendations. His tone was certainly warm and supportive, but it may be that when I read his speech I will detect whether they would like them implemented in whole or in part. The Liberal Democrats regard the report and its recommendations as clear, considered, compassionate and to be implemented.
I will not repeat the arguments that have been made, with which I agree very much, but it is telling that Mr Ewins says that,
“this review has not taken such previous proposals as a starting point”,
but,
“has deliberately gone back to first principles and applied those principles to the evidence currently available. The fact that the conclusions accord to a considerable extent”—
not completely—
“with previous recommendations adds further weight to the argument in favour of the changes proposed”.
I, too, look forward to hearing how the changes he proposes are to be implemented.
My Lords, I share the condemnation of domestic slavery, which I am sure is shared by all Members of this House, and I strongly support those organisations that seek to help such workers. In doing so, I speak with some experience on the ground. I was the consul in Abu Dhabi and the consul-general in Saudi Arabia, which is where 50% of these applications come from.
Let me start, then, by welcoming the Modern Slavery Act, which seeks to tackle the worst cases of abuse, providing advice and support for those who seek to escape. However, what is now proposed goes well beyond that. The independent reviewer seems to be suggesting that any domestic servant who is not satisfied with his or her conditions will be able to change employer and then remain in the UK working legally for, I think he says, two years—others say without time limit. At the end of that period, he supposes, I think, that they would simply pack up and go home to their impoverished home country. That seems a very unlikely outcome. It is far more likely that they will continue to work here—illegally, if necessary—so that they can continue to send money home. In many respects, that is understandable, but we must recognise that if that situation were to develop, word would spread very quickly among domestic workers in a number of source countries and it would not be very long before we had a significant loophole in the immigration system.
I do not think that I understand the noble Lord’s point.
My Lords, I think that my question to the noble Lord may be the same as that asked by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. The noble Lord said that he knows that currently employers bring in domestic servants but lose them because they go on to other employment. If they come in on a tied visa, how can that be?
Well, they come in on a tied visa and then they do a runner and go and work for somebody else. The employer then goes back to his home country and puts in a visa next year for a new servant; he will claim, no doubt, that the servant has been working for a year, because that is one of the requirements, and come with his next servant. So the numbers will certainly increase. If you produce a loophole in these matters, they will increase very fast.
My Lords, Amendment 134 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Rosser, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, would allow those asylum applicants who have been waiting for longer than six months for a decision on their asylum application to be allowed to work. The latest immigration statistics show that about 3,600 applicants have been without an initial decision for longer than six months. The only exception that they are presently allowed is that after 12 months an asylum seeker can apply for permission to work, but only in national shortage occupations.
When this is compared to other countries in the EU, we are certainly not generous. All EU member states, with the exception of the UK and Ireland, permit applicants to work after nine months, and some have gone further: Belgium and Denmark permit work after six months, and in Germany it is after three months. For many asylum seekers, not being allowed to work means that they are unable to develop and maintain skills, and for professional people this can have a very difficult effect on their future employment prospects in this country, if in due course they are granted asylum status and allowed to work, or return to their country of origin or move elsewhere. Allowing asylum seekers to work after six months would also cut the cost to the taxpayer, as those who found work would no longer need to be supported by the taxpayer.
Amendment 134A, in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, would make a small but important change, allowing asylum seekers to work after 12 months as a matter of right without having to apply for permission. I support the aims of that amendment as well. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord has said, my name is to this amendment. I am particularly delighted that it has been moved from the Labour Front Bench since this was not something on which they felt able to support us during the last Parliament. This is something that we sought to achieve then even though we were part of the coalition Government. We have tabled this amendment to the Bill in these terms in the Commons. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Roberts of Llandudno will have a good deal to say on it, as he has had a Private Member’s Bill on the subject and argued for this proposition many times.
I will not take long, but I do not apologise for the fact that the arguments are not novel. According to the latest immigration statistics, I am told by the Refugee Council, over 3,600 applications for asylum have been without an initial decision for longer than six months. As the Refugee Council comments, when you take into account their dependants, that is nearly 5,000 people living on little over £5 a day in asylum support who are unable to work. It seems to us that applications should not drag on and, as the noble Lord said, six months, which is the Home Office target, is not overly ambitious. In any event, what is to be gained by a restriction that continues up to the 12-month point?
It seems that a lot is to be lost: contribution to the economy through work and taxation; savings for the state on asylum support; and, as for the individuals, the impact on their self-esteem, mental health, possible—probably likely—loss of skills, and the ability to find employment when the period comes to an end. It also seems that this restriction reinforces exclusion. For those who stay, their community integration is important and we should not delay it, because more than half of the asylum seekers who come here stay.
This is a very topical point, as a colleague, Suzanne Fletcher, who was a councillor in the north-east and who is still a very active Liberal Democrat, has been all over the media today on the issue of the red doors, on which the Times has reported—doors that were painted red so that the occupants could easily be identified as immigrants. Of course the Minister, James Brokenshire, immediately criticised that, and I believe that the Government are taking steps there. However, from the emails I have seen on this subject today, it has taken years of campaigning to bring this to attention. That shows what power the media have, because Suzanne had taken that matter to the National Audit Office and to one of the Select Committees in the other place.
Would relaxing the current restrictions be a pull factor? Is there evidence of that? I suspect not. If your reasons for coming here are economic rather than to seek asylum, I would have thought that six months would be quite a deterrent in itself.
Our Amendment 134A deals, as the noble Lord has said, with the 12-month period. Currently, if you are here for more than 12 months, although you may be able to work, your work is confined to the “shortage occupations” as designated by the Home Office—for the same reasons, of course, that could be applied to the six months. In addition, however, the list of shortage occupations, which I had a look at over the weekend, seems to be made up almost entirely of technical or professional occupations and often requires references from previous employers, which I suspect are by definition unavailable, or requires UK qualifications. Therefore, asylum seekers would not be likely to get such jobs, because the period of their stay is uncertain, even if they were qualified to do them. They are more likely to get low-skilled jobs that British citizens, frankly, are often unwilling to undertake.
My Lords, in supporting the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, may I first put in a request to the Minister, almost in parenthesis, for when he comes to reply? This relates to an issue that was raised on day one, which is the role of people who are involved in voluntary work and what the legal position is, because contradictory positions were expressed on day one. I was looking at some of the briefing material for today’s debate, particularly about a project called the Brushstrokes Community project in Smethwick in Birmingham, which has been providing services for refugees and asylum seekers for over 15 years. Brushstrokes described one asylum seeker who volunteered with the project for over a year before she received refugee status, and who continues to volunteer to this day. Last year she won an award as volunteer of the year in Sandwell. Another woman volunteered as a teaching assistant for around six months while awaiting the outcome of her application. She has now been granted refugee status and is on the path to fulfilling her aspiration of becoming a teacher in the United Kingdom. What is the legal situation of people who work in a voluntary capacity?
There are five substantial reasons why the arguments expressed so well by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, should commend themselves to your Lordships’ House. First, these amendments would provide asylum seekers with a route out of poverty. More than 3,600 asylum seekers have currently been waiting more than six months for an initial decision on their case, surviving on just £5 a day.
Secondly, it reduces the burden on the taxpayer, as asylum seekers who are able to work will not need to be supported for extended periods and will instead be able to contribute to the economy through increased tax revenues and consumer spending. It also safeguards their health and prevents them having to resort to irregular work in what some describe as the black economy.
Thirdly, it avoids the negative consequences of prolonged economic exclusion and forced inactivity. During my 18 years as a Member of another place representing an inner-city neighbourhood in Liverpool I often saw that kind of grinding poverty first hand: the detrimental impact on mental health and self-esteem, the break-up of marriages and families—many Members of your Lordships’ House are very familiar with these kinds of arguments. The dignity that work gives should never be underestimated.
Fourthly, what is the experience elsewhere in other European Union countries? With the exception of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, other European countries allow asylum seekers to work after nine months and 11 of them grant permission to work after six months or less if a decision has not been made on their asylum application. That has not been a bad experience—it works very well and has not been a pull factor, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was right to remind us.
Fifthly, for those asylum seekers who are eventually given permission to stay, avoiding an extended period outside the labour market is key to ensuring their long-term integration into UK society and encouraging them to be self-sufficient. Therefore, alleviating destitution amongst asylum seekers is a prerequisite if we believe in the upholding of a person’s human dignity. The right to work is fundamental to this and it also relieves the state of having to provide financial support.
In 2014, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, set out the defence of the Government’s policy when he said that asylum seekers are,
“provided with support and accommodation while we determine whether they need our protection and until they have exhausted the right of appeal”.—[Official Report, 17/3/14; col. 30.]
However, the reality is that £5 a day to meet their essential living needs of food, clothing, toiletries and transport and to pursue their asylum application—housing and utility bills are paid for separately for those who need it—is wholly inadequate. Which of us could survive on that kind of paltry sum? Therefore the asylum seeker loses, but so does the state. We must give asylum seekers a route out of poverty and help them not to become part of a dependency culture.
At the end of June 2015, more than 3,500 asylum seekers had been waiting more than six months for an initial decision. The Minister arranged an all-Peers meeting, which I was able to attend, and Mr James Brokenshire, the Minister, was also there. He of course said that the Government’s aim is to ensure that there are no people waiting for longer than six months. Can the Minister tell us just how many people are waiting for longer than six months and how long it will be before that objective is met?
I am told that an asylum seeker spends an average of around 18 months on Section 95 support. Asylum seekers who have to survive solely on this level of support for extended periods of time will suffer a negative impact on their mental and physical health.
While a Member of the Commons, Sarah Teather chaired a cross-party parliamentary inquiry into asylum support for children and young people. In January 2013 it found that,
“asylum seeking parents are prevented from working, leaving families dependent on state support. This means that parents are left powerless and lose their skills”—
a point to which the noble Baroness alluded—
“while children are left without positive role models. The government’s own research has highlighted that this can lead to high levels of unemployment and underemployment once a family gains refugee status”.
That inquiry took evidence from over 200 individuals and organisations, including local authorities and safeguarding boards, and specifically recommended that asylum seeking parents and young adults should be given permission to work if their claim for asylum had not been concluded in six months—the point of these amendments.
Let us be clear: by keeping them out of work, many experienced and professional asylum seekers are deskilled, and the time spent not working hinders the opportunity to develop a career. It prejudices the chance to get references for future employment, and it denies people the chance to gain experience. Mr Brokenshire said that this provision would,
“blur the distinction between economic migration and asylum”.—[Official Report, Commons, Immigration Bill Committee, 10/11/15; col. 461.]
But this amendment addresses that concern, because permission to work would apply only when the delay was not due to action taken by the applicant. I therefore hope that this amendment commends itself to the House.