National Security (State Threats) Bill

Lord Alton of Liverpool Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 23rd June 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, no one should be under any illusion about the dangers facing the United Kingdom, principally from Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Whether it is assassins hunting down and murdering Alexander Litvinenko, or attempting to kill Sergei Skripal in Salisbury; the attack on the Prime Minister’s London home; the hate-driven scourge of antisemitism; cyber attacks—recall North Korea’s crippling cyber attack on the National Health Service in 2017—hacking and false narratives poisoning minds through social media; the presence of Chinese spies, even inside the Government and Parliament, with two more sentenced last week; or bounties on the heads of British residents and coercive sanctions on parliamentarians, it is clear that these are dangerous times.

I have the honour to chair the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Across several reports, we have highlighted threats to both national security and the human rights of our citizens—two sides of the same coin. We condemned the failure to bring to justice 400 British citizens who enlisted in ISIS, committed genocide against Yazidis and other minorities in northern Iraq, and then returned to the United Kingdom. Not one of them has been prosecuted for genocide or crimes against humanity. How many of them have the Government assessed as a future security threat?

As we have heard, MI5’s chief says that threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, with over 20 Iranian-inspired plots to kill, maim or kidnap on our sovereign territory. Perhaps more than anything else, the depredations of that barbaric Iranian dictatorship have been reflected in our debate today and driven the need for these new measures. Having been sanctioned by Iran in October 2022, along with the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others, I might be forgiven for saying—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said earlier—that this Bill has been a long time coming.

Back in April 2001, I initiated the first of several debates, dozens of Parliamentary Questions and many cross-party meetings about Iran’s egregious violations of human rights, its nuclear threat, its proclaimed wish to eradicate the State of Israel, its export of terror, and the pernicious role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, both here and in Iran. In the 2025 JCHR report on transnational repression, which was debated in your Lordships’ House on 26 February, we highlighted appalling attacks on pro-democracy activists and journalists, some of whom had been forced to flee the country and one of whom had been left bleeding on the street after an attempted assassination. Even if we cannot go as far as Sweden, where TNR is defined and illegal, I would like transnational repression to appear on the face of the Bill, at least as an aggravating factor.

Since its foundation in 1979, the Iranian regime has been based on two pillars: domestic oppression and the export of terrorism and chaos abroad. Death sentences issued by the revolutionary courts have led to endless waves of executions—some 2,159 in the last 12 months. Let us also recall the death of 22 year-old Mahsa Amini, who was arrested by the morality police for wearing clothes that had been disapproved of by the theocratic regime.

In 2023, I spoke in favour of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that called for the proscription of the IRGC, and I was happy to support the Opposition when they moved similar amendments. I recognise that there is a difference between proscription and designation, and I welcome the steps taken in this Bill, but may I ask the Minister about the letter that was sent to him on 26 June by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and which was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey? It was sent to the Home Secretary with a copy sent to the Minister. Today, I received a response from the Minister; I am grateful to him for that, but it arrived only about two hours ago. I would be grateful if he would agree to place copies in the Libraries of both Houses and circulate it to everyone who has participated in today’s debate. The response the Government have sent is important, because it deals effectively with some of the points raised by the JCHR probing the power to designate a body on the basis that it involved “foreign power threat activity”, despite there being no link in these circumstances between that body and any foreign power. We ask that consideration be given to an amendment to ensure that, under new Section 33A, only activity linked to a foreign power can be relied upon to satisfy the test for designation. We also asked about “Assisting a designated body”, about “Obtaining … material benefits from a designated body”, and for greater clarity on the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

It was suggested in the House of Commons that there is inconsistency in the thresholds and a more lenient treatment of hostile states than of terrorists—it has been referred to during our debate today as well. Is that so and can it be remedied? I want also to ask about the point raised by my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich and others in the debate about humanitarian organisations operating where state-linked actors exercise territorial control. I draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, to the letter that was sent to the Home Secretary by the chair of the International Development Select Committee, the admirable Sarah Champion MP.

In a letter to me, the International Red Cross asked for an amendment so that

“The offences established in Section 17 shall not apply to exclusively humanitarian activities carried out by impartial humanitarian organisations in accordance with international law”.


I echo the remarks of others and hope that issue might be addressed before next Tuesday. It would be passing strange if Red Cross humanitarian work were to be compromised while more than 13 organisations masquerading as charities can stoke the fires of hatred and threaten community cohesion. Why are we not using this Bill to take powers to close them down?

And what about China, a point referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and others? Recall the collapsed spy case and last week’s convictions of CCP regime spies. The Bill should enable Ministers to close the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, a point I referred to yesterday in Questions. It is a spy hub, a cat’s cradle of spies and malign actors; we should have a power to close it down.

Ten months after the JCHR’s unanimous recommendation to put China on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme, which we do for Russia and Iran, it has not happened. Will trade deals always trump security, human rights and even genocide? The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, referred to the point the head of GCHQ made about

“a genuine and increasing cyber risk”

—her words—and how GCHQ devotes

“more resource to China than any other … mission”,

while Parliament has been warned of infiltration of our universities and threats to our liberties via mass surveillance from Hikvision and other cameras. Chinese-made EVs incorporating Chinese cellular modules, along with SIM cards or software, raise significant espionage and national security concerns, with internet-connected vehicles described as a hostile state’s “smartphone on wheels”.

The Joint Committee is currently looking at AI and human rights. I hope the Government are also looking at the way that AI and software and internet powers can be used to undermine our public debates and indeed our security. I hope that before next Tuesday, we can have the opportunity—more than the six hours that was provided in the House of Commons—to debate these questions. I hope we will be able to come to some agreement around some of the concerns that remain.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Life and diaries are fluid, but it will be before Committee, Report and Third Reading of the Bill next week. So it will not be after that. It will be before that. As we speak, representations and diaries are being co-ordinated. I will leave it at that.

The sixth vital point, which was raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Doocey and Lady Tyler of Enfield, and the noble Lords, Lord Barrow and Lord Carlile, is the issue of whether there will be a review. That is a valid and significant point but, as has been pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, the National Security Act 2023 already gives the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation the right to oversight and mandates them to carry out an annual review of the operations of the provisions of the Bill. I hope that is sufficient to head off at the pass an amendment on this issue, not because an amendment would be right or wrong or unnecessary but because the Bill is already covered by the National Security Act on those particular points.

The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, mentioned in passing the question whether the offence of assisting a designated body would not capture non-UK nationals. I say to him that a non-UK national planning an attack in the UK from overseas would be materially assisting activities taking place in the UK. It is the activities of the designated body, such as an attack in the UK, that determine whether assistance is captured. The Bill also introduces the designated body condition, which allows the existing National Security Act offences to apply to activity linked to designated bodies, not just to foreign states.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, continues, correctly, to chew at my ankles about the issue of transnational repression. I would argue that the Bill will make it easier to achieve prosecutions where there is a designated body, such as a proxy organisation, involved in transnational repression. We will continue, as I said yesterday in our Statement, to try to tackle transnational repression in a number of ways.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful for the opportunity to chew at the noble Minister’s ankles again. I want to ask him specifically whether he will continue the discussions that the Security Minister’s office has been having about the United Front Work Department that acts on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, which would not be covered by the terms of the Bill. Although I agree that he would not want to put actors on the face of the Bill, the generic issues that it involves should be there. Perhaps he could also take the opportunity of confirming whether he will circulate the reply that he has sent to me on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to Members who have spoken in today’s debate.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Absolutely. I will make sure that the reply I gave to the noble Lord in recent times is sent out, because this is moving at a fast pace and we are trying to get the matter sorted. I will do that for the noble Lord, and I will refer the points that he has made to the Security Minister.

My noble friend Lady Dacres rightly mentioned the question of diaspora. The power is actor agnostic and applies equally to all individuals in the UK, so we are not targeting any particular diaspora. It targets conduct that is carried out for a purpose prejudicial to the UK’s safety.

The question of—I use this phrase guardedly—“useful idiots” was quoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and echoed by my noble friend Lady Gill. The new offences concern various thresholds for criminals to be caught. For example, criminals can be caught by the offence of assisting a designated body where they ought to know that their conduct is materially existing a designated body. However, it is also important to put on the record for the noble Baroness that criminals do not need to know that a group has been designated for offences to be committed. I hope that deals with the issue of “useful idiots”—I call them terrorists, but “useful idiots” is also a reasonable phrase that we can attribute to them.

My noble friend Lady Gill and the noble Lord, Lord Docherty of Milngavie, mentioned the issue of how cryptocurrency used by designated bodies or individuals can be held more accountable. The Government have already committed to tackling all forms of economic crime, including the misuse of crypto assets. All UK crypto asset firms are now required to register with the Financial Conduct Authority to comply with money-laundering legislation. We have also strengthened law enforcement through the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and we are now going to go further with the introduction of further measures, including the Financial Conduct Authority delivering a new crypto asset regulatory regime, UK crypto asset firms being required to conduct due diligence and the financial services Bill 2026 introducing targeted powers to allow more crypto asset recovery powers.

I am trying to cover all the points that noble Lords have mentioned in the time available, and I hope I have done so, but I will read Hansard and, if there are further points, I will respond to them. What I want to do, and this is the key point, is get the Bill through to Royal Assent so the Home Secretary can determine how she uses its powers to deal with the issues that have been raised on the Floor of the House today. That is an important measure. I want to ensure that, between now and next Tuesday, we deal with those points and get a consensus to pass the Bill, make it an Act, get it to His Majesty the King to give Royal Assent and then, as a matter of some urgency, determine how we tackle the many threats that are facing this country at the moment.

I thank noble Lords for their engagement and the expertise that they have brought to this debate today. Ultimately, I commend the Bill for Second Reading, and I hope that the House will support it tonight.