Oral Answers to Questions
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 5 months ago)
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Mr Wallace
Taiwan is obviously a clear and growing point of tension in the Pacific. I regularly speak to our allies, both in NATO and further afield, about those tensions. Here in the United Kingdom we are reminded of Hong Kong’s recent experience and what the read-across could mean for other people who are trying to live freely and within the rule of law. The UK’s position is that the problems between Taiwan and China should be resolved through peaceful and diplomatic means.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
This week marks the passing of that doughty Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament campaigner ex-Monsignor Bruce Kent. While paying their due respect, will the Government nevertheless reassert the fact that, as long as other countries have nuclear weapons, Britain must never give up its nuclear deterrent?
Mr Wallace
I remember, in my formative years politically, asking the late Mr Bruce Kent a question when I was at school. I do not think I asked the question very well, and I do not think he answered it very well, either. The reality is that Britain’s position is one of multilateral disarmament. It is not a position of unilateral nuclear disarmament.
NATO and International Security
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 6 months ago)
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Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Thank you very much for calling me to speak so early, Mr Deputy Speaker. When one has discussed these sorts of subjects for a very long time, it becomes rather difficult to avoid simply saying the same things over and over again. On the principle of trying to say at least one new thing that I have not contributed to a previous debate, I wish to refer to the role of formerly neutral states in the formation of NATO.
It comes as something of a shock to me to realise that it was in 1975—substantially before the admirable defence spokesman for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald), was even born—that I had a conversation with the late, great strategic historian Professor Sir Michael Howard on the proposed subject of my doctoral studies, which was how the British empire, as it still was at the time, prepared to adopt a strategy for after the defeat of Germany and Japan, and how the possible revival of German and Japanese threats gave way to a confrontation with our erstwhile allies, the Russians. What I was surprised to find was that the first thinking about this went back to the end of 1941: Trygve Lie, the Foreign Minister-in-exile of the Norwegian Government, made an approach to the British Foreign Office and was soon joined by the Foreign Ministers in exile of Belgium and the Netherlands. What did Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway all have in common? It was that in 1940 they had all been neutral, and in 1940 they had all been invaded and occupied nevertheless.
The proposal that those three Foreign Ministers put forward, which in the fullness of time led to the Brussels treaty and eventually the formation of NATO, was that Britain should be offered strategic bases in their countries once they had been liberated, and once the war was over, so that they could never again be occupied, despite their pacific intentions, by another European power.
Therefore, there is a certain appropriateness in the decision now of two countries—Finland and Sweden—with a tremendous history of neutrality, albeit strongly armed neutrality for purposes of self-protection, to apply now to NATO in order to prevent themselves being exposed and suffering the fate that Ukraine looked as if it was going to suffer, and which Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands had suffered in 1940.
That leads me to the only other point that I will make in this short contribution, which I have said before and will continue to say. Despite many years of thinking about these matters, all I can come up with in the end are three concepts summarised in half a dozen words. The three concepts are: deterrence, which is carried out by nuclear weapons primarily; containment, which is carried out by conventional weapons primarily until such time as the potential enemy has had a chance to evolve or implode, but either way until it can no longer cause a threat; and, finally, the unpredictability of future conflicts—the unpredictability of when or if they will arise, and the unpredictability of what will happen when they do arise.
My mind goes back to 24 February, the day of the invasion, when there was an exchange with the Prime Minister on the Floor of the House. At that stage, the best suggestion that I could make—at that time, let us face it, none of us expected Ukraine to resist as successfully and as courageously as it has so far been able to resist—was at least to offer a Ukrainian Government-in-exile a home here in Britain if their country became, as appeared likely, overwhelmed by massive Russian firepower. So far at least, there is every sign that such an offer will not have to be made. The lesson that we must take away from that is that we must always have a full range of military preparedness, because we do not know what the threat will be, we do not know when it will arise, and we do not know how it will turn out when it happens.
I end by saying, as I have said so many times before, that as recently as the mid-1980s we used to spend 4.5% to 5.1% of our gross domestic product on defence. Several years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we were still spending 3.5% of GDP on defence. Successive Defence Committees have now called—even before the present crisis arose—that we should raise our target not from the minimum of 2% of GDP, but to at least 3% of GDP. It is a matter of priority. What has happened to Ukraine shows where our priorities must lie.
Ukraine Update
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 7 months ago)
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Mr Wallace
On the Harpoon missiles, we are not currently providing them. Our Harpoon missiles are launched from ships, and very few nations launch Harpoon missiles from land—I do not think any do nowadays. There is a lot of media around this invasion and not a day goes by on which I do not have to counter stories that have somehow appeared. I think some of them are made up. The AS-90s going to Ukraine was another story—it appeared in the Express this weekend—but no, they are not. I do not know where that story came from, but it is not true.
On Brimstone missiles, we made a commitment 18 months or two years ago, when we were selling a fast-attack patrol boat to Ukraine, that we would sell it armed with maritime Brimstone missiles. Those ships are not yet in the country; they have not yet been purchased or delivered. However, if we decide to provide Brimstones in whatever guise, I will inform Members of this House when we do so. I will not close that off as an opportunity; it is a perfectly legitimate thing. There are different sophistications between block 1, which is just land Brimstone, and the at-sea developments that we have never bought. They have a range of capabilities. First and foremost, if we do provide Brimstone, we will look to provide it for the land, using stock that we already hold, but not as yet for the sea.
What more can we do for our eastern colleagues? I always advise colleagues of the Joint Expeditionary Force—many Members present already know about it—which is a tremendous group of the 10 Nordic countries. I recently asked colleagues from around the House to the dinner when we had the JEF summit here in the UK. The JEF is composed of the Scandinavian and Baltic states, the United Kingdom and Iceland. It is a tremendous grouping of people. Some people describe them as the beer-drinking nations; I am less charitable and describe them as the nations with probably the worst weather in Europe—that is what uniquely binds us together. We are the doers in Europe; we get on and do, we share, and we exercise and train together. The JEF also involves Finland and Sweden. I think it is a very good group.
As for 45 Commando in Arbroath, they have done and are doing an excellent job in Poland, as the hon. Gentleman said. They are incredibly professional, and there is more work for them to do.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
It is clear that the supply and use of missiles has turned military assets such as ships, aircraft and tanks into costly losses and liabilities. The one gap appears to be artillery. I know the Secretary of State said that we are supplying some artillery, but as earlier episodes show, the counter to a weapons system is not necessarily the same weapons system but a missile to destroy it. What can be done to prevent Russia from using artillery to raze cities to the ground without engaging Ukrainian forces properly, which is the one area in which it still seems to be succeeding?
Mr Wallace
My right hon. Friend has put his finger right on the heart of the current race. The race is on to equip the Ukrainians with the same long-range capabilities that Russia has, so that they are not outranged and pinned down. That is why we started first and foremost by sourcing 152 mm around the world—Soviet calibre—so they can keep going with that.
In parallel, we and a number of nations are exploring providing either 105 mm, which is our main lightweight gun, and the 155 mm in more mobile versions than the big armoured AS90s. One thing that this modern battlefield is showing is that people had better move quickly once they have fired their guns, because they can be very quickly found by pretty cheap off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles. Exactly as my right hon. Friend said, there is a race on in parallel. We have now seen a number of eastern countries providing 155 mm howitzers; that unlocks NATO ammunition. We will play our part and make sure it gets to them.
In addition, the intelligence around artillery has to be improved, so we are exploring counter-battery radar, so that as soon as Russia fires a shell at you, you know exactly where it came from, and you can return the favour.
War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation Scheme Payments
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 8 months ago)
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Leo Docherty
We will pursue that immediately. I am grateful to the right hon. Lady for the opportunity.
We will seek to improve speed and quality. We will not be just tinkering in the way we improve things; we are serious, because we know that we will be judged on our failures in this regard. I will briefly mention contributions by other hon. Members before I get on to putting some of the broader issues in context.
I was grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (James Sunderland), who has a long-standing interest in this field. He talked about our moral responsibility to veterans—I agree with him—and his interesting ideas about the role of the VAPCs offer food for thought. The hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts (Ms Qaisar) raised the very concerning case of her constituent, and mentioned the good work of the Scottish Veterans Commissioner. I join her in commending that role.
The hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston (Justin Madders) also raised a constituent’s case, and spoke about the convoluted nature of the process. I accept that that is the case, and that is exactly what we want to change by moving away from the paper process. The hon Member—my honourable friend—for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes) mentioned the important role of service charities, but I would argue that they augment the role of the state rather than replacing it, and we should be very proud of that.
The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) rightly highlighted his concerns about his constituents in Northern Ireland. I look forward to visiting him there soon. The hon. Member for Glasgow North West (Carol Monaghan) called for the reformation of the war pensions system, and that is exactly what we are getting after. I was grateful for the variety of comments made by the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Barnsley East (Stephanie Peacock), who made a range of points, some of which I will address now.
First, I must set the context. We must bear it in mind that Veterans UK makes 106,000 monthly payments to recipients of the war pensions scheme and the armed forces compensation scheme. Those payments are tax free and linked to inflation through the consumer prices index. There are around 6,500 applications and 1,000 appeals and reconsiderations currently being processed. I am just trying to give a sense of the scale.
All that costs Her Majesty’s Government £736.3 million a year, £652 million under the war pensions scheme and £84.3 million under the armed forces compensation scheme. It is an operation of huge scale, and justifiably so, because it recognises the scale of the service of our magnificent veterans’ community, which comprises more than 2 million people, but in an organisation of that size there will of course be some cases that do not get the appropriate level of service.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Will the Minister find time to update the House on the progress of a small-scale matter but an important one—the cohort of about 250 war widows who lost their pensions on co-habitational remarriage and did not get them back when the law changed?
Leo Docherty
My right hon. Friend has been a long-standing campaigner on this. I hope we are making progress and I look forward to meeting him soon to update him.
Of the 106,000 awards, 154 complaints were received, so that is a 0.1% failure rate. Of course any failure is unsatisfactory and we want to reduce that number to absolutely zero, but I am just trying to give a sense of the scale of the system. The staff at Norcross are working their hardest in difficult conditions, and they do receive significant numbers of thank-yous, so I should put that on the record. It is a real problem that they are working with an antiquated system of paper records from many different sources of information that they have to bring together. The armed forces compensation scheme now has an average target time to resolve cases of 90 days, which is being met, and the war pensions scheme has an average target time of 127 days, which is falling short, but that is because they are trying to get rid of the backlog, which we all seek to clear, as the hon. Member for Ellesmere Port and Neston asked. We should do that with empathy and thoroughness. The future will be better. We recognise that we can do more. That is why we are injecting £40 million into digitising both schemes, which will result in a quicker process. The pilot that has just taken place resulted in something that previously took six weeks with the paper system now taking six hours. We hope that the new digital system will launch at the end of 2023.
In tandem with those mechanical and procedural improvements, we are cognisant that we must inject more empathy into the process. Veterans UK is therefore conducting lived-experience roundtables bringing together veterans directly with its staff to hear about their service and adjusting their customer service style accordingly. On that note, I invite the hon. Member for Midlothian, on the back of this debate, if he would like to engage with the staff at Vets UK to try to be a part of the solution. We would be very grateful and I would look forward to affording that opportunity.
We are determined to improve the service to all those in receipt of payments from both schemes because they deserve nothing less than a first-rate service, as they deserve the gratitude and respect of the whole nation.
Oral Answers to Questions
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 8 months ago)
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James Heappey
There is a constant regeneration of forces. As two battle groups are committed to Estonia, more battle groups need to embark on the training pipeline to make sure that we have contingent land forces at readiness. Similarly, ships have been deployed to the two NATO standing maritime groups and to Exercise Cold Response. We continue to generate further ships to give more choice and options thereafter, if requested by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Similarly, with the Typhoons and F-35s, a large amount has been committed as part of the initial response force, but we are generating more to have them at our disposal, if SACEUR asks for more.
The hon. Gentleman asks about the money right now. All of it seems to be being met by the Treasury; long may that continue.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Given that we should help the Ukrainian armed forces by all legitimate means short of war, will Ministers press our NATO allies on the fact that the rather artificial distinction between defensive and offensive weaponry should be swept away when requests for equipment are received, because when a country is fighting on its own territory, having been invaded, all its weaponry is defensive?
James Heappey
My right hon. Friend makes an excellent point. It suits our purpose to refer to the equipment that we are providing in the context of the defensive role it can play, but defence intelligence over the weekend reflected on the fact that the armoured column to the north-west of Kyiv has been pushed back in recent days, because small bands of determined people are manoeuvring with lethal weapons systems. That is forcing the Russians to move back into a place where they feel that they can defend themselves better. These are defensive bits of equipment. That, I think, is the right message to send to the Kremlin. If, in the ingenuity of the Ukrainian armed forces, they do something more, that is good on Ukraine.
Jeremy Quin
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. I think I wrote to her last in November of last year on that issue. I am afraid we have not moved on yet and we are still studying exactly what radar configurations will be required, but it is actively being looked at and I certainly commit to updating her when I can give her an assurance one way or the other.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
James Heappey
My right hon. Friend knows that I have been engaged in this matter for him for some time. I am told from my phone that the high commissioner has now reached out to explain the situation. For the benefit of the wider House, the challenge is that for those who arrive in Pakistan with eligibility to come to the UK under whichever Government scheme they are intending to use, but have not entered Pakistan legally, the Pakistan Government are taking a view on limiting our ability to process those people. We are working hard to persuade the Pakistan Government to take a different approach.
Defence Supplementary Estimate 2021-22
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 8 months ago)
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Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Not for the first time and, I am sure, not for the last time, the House has cause to be grateful to the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar) for reaching across the party divide in support of the strongest possible defence of this country and the strongest possible support for NATO. It is in that spirit, as a former Chairman of the Defence Committee, that I acknowledge the stalwart support he has given to successive holders of that post. This is an opportunity for defence-minded parliamentarians to give some initial reaction to the colossal and extraordinary events of the past fortnight in the context of what Britain was going to spend on defence, and what it should spend on defence in future.
In June 1950, five years after the end of world war two and following a time of mass demobilisation, the Korean war broke out. The effect of that conflict, quite apart from the terrible consequences for the people living in Korea, was to cause a huge reassessment of the amount of national effort that must be invested in defence in the United Kingdom. That led to a reconsideration of the level of defence expenditure, and I suggest that the seismic events of the past two weeks should lead to a similar reassessment of what we are prepared to invest in defence in the United Kingdom in the 21st century. We cannot conduct this debate as if nothing serious has happened to transform the situation in the past two weeks.
Although it is very early and the outcome of the conflict is still very much in doubt, I suggest it is possible to come tentatively to about half a dozen conclusions, and I will run through them very quickly. First, I think we can say that the advanced public messaging by the United States, NATO, the United Kingdom and other allies has been outstanding. It has prevented President Putin from seizing the narrative. By predicting accurately in advance what he was going to do, it has completely undermined his potential disinformation campaign. Every pronouncement that we hear from the Kremlin is so ludicrously at odds with reality that it cuts no ice at all, except with those totally indoctrinated.
Secondly, the events of the past fortnight dispel any illusions we might have had about the nature of our Russian adversary. As has been said rightly many times by those on the Front Bench, that is not the Russian people, but the people in control of that great, but benighted country. We must remember that people such as President Putin are the direct descendants of the regime whose ideology led them to kill millions of their own people in the decades in which Leninism and bolshevism held sway. Although the communist doctrine has collapsed, the mindset, the imperialism and the brutality have not. I have previously described President Putin in uncomplimentary terms, and I think it is worth repeating them. This man is a cynical, sneering psychopath. He does not care how many people he kills, as long as he gets his own way. Anyone thinking that there is a way to reason with these people, rather than deter, contain or, if necessary, defeat them, is living in a world of fantasy.
Thirdly, in light of Ukraine’s decision to give up—admittedly it was not a system it could operate at the time, but given time it could have done so—the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which it inherited from the former Soviet Union, any lingering doubts about the wisdom of the United Kingdom continuing to possess a strategic nuclear deterrent as long as Russia does so have finally been put to bed.
Peter Grant
I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that we do not have a problem with the issue; we have a problem with nuclear weapons. Is he not aware that as a matter of international law, as a successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia was the legal owner of those nuclear weapons? It was entitled to take them away. Ukraine would have been in breach of the law to try to hold on to them.
Dr Lewis
Yes, and I am also aware that as a result of Ukraine’s decision to give up those nuclear weapons, Russia guaranteed the security and the borders of Ukraine. If the hon. Gentleman is going to throw international law at me, all I can say to him is that, if he thinks that those sorts of manoeuvres and unilateral renunciations are the way to stop someone being attacked and destroyed by a ruthless adversary, it should be a long time indeed before he and people who think like him have any influence on the way in which we choose to keep the peace—by deterrence—so that we do not end up in a situation like Ukraine.
Fourthly, this horrible situation should establish whether and to what extent economic sanctions can force an aggressor to desist. It is often said that the world has become more interdependent. We will never see a more extreme example of democratic countries seeking to use economic pressures to force an aggressor to desist. If that fails to work in this instance, it will be a further argument for increased investment in hard defence capability, because that particular aspect of hoping to be able to turn war into an outmoded concept will, sadly, have been disproved. I hope that it does play a part in stopping Russia from proceeding, but I am not holding my breath.
Fifthly, the conflict has exposed the folly of fuel dependence on hostile countries and raised questions about the wisdom of a policy of unilateral net zero targets by democracies regardless of what much larger countries, that are not democracies, do. I am not seeking to pick an argument with the environmentalists; I am merely saying that there is a parallel with the question of unilateral or one-sided nuclear disarmament, because if we achieve net zero at tremendous cost to ourselves while much larger hostile countries simply flout the commitments that they have given, we will have taken that pain for no benefit to anyone. Targets must be multilateral if they are going to do anything other than weaken our ability to protect ourselves.
The last of the six lessons is that the conflict has killed the idea that conventional aggression by one state against another is an outmoded 20th-century concept. Time and again, people such as the right hon. Member for Warley on the Opposition Benches and my right hon. and hon. Friends present on the Conservative Benches have raised the question of what an appropriate level of defence investment should be, only to be told from on high, “You’ve got to realise that there are new forms of warfare. The next war will not be fought much with conventional armed forces. It will be fought in cyber-space or even in space itself.” Of course, there are new and serious threats—potentially fatal threats—in those two newer areas of conflict, but they are additional threats. They are not substitutes for the threats that we have always faced and continue to face from conventional armed forces.
Bob Stewart
I thank my right hon. Friend—who is a good friend and is gallant, because he was a midshipman once—for allowing me to intervene. One thing that the Russians are showing is that to take territory, people have to put boots on it. But, guess what? We are chucking our boots out. That is appalling and we must reverse that decision.
Sir Robert Syms
There are one or two other lessons from the current conflict. One is the impact of mobile phone cameras and psychological ops on the way in which a country communicates with itself and the world, and I think we could learn from that. I think we have lost a lot of the skills that we had in the second world war and when we were facing the Soviet Union, and this is one area we need to look at.
Dr Lewis
I quite agree with both my right hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) and my hon. Friend.
Bearing in mind your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will conclude with one point about the budget itself. During the period in which I chaired the Defence Committee, we produced two reports—one in 2016 called “Shifting the goalposts?” and the other an update to that report in 2019—with the purpose of setting very firmly on the record what the proportion of GDP spent on defence had been historically on a like-for-like basis. It is a fact that, in the aftermath of the Korean war, defence spending as a proportion of GDP at one point was as high as 7%. In about 1963, it crossed over with spending on welfare at 6%. That was all a long time ago, but as recently as the 1980s the spending on health, education and defence was roughly the same at just over 4% of GDP.
Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)
My right hon. Friend, I and probably everybody present in the Chamber have been calling since we have been Members of Parliament for much higher defence spending. I think that is accepted. However, does he agree with me that once that higher level of spending is determined, we should not necessarily link it to GDP, because economies can go up and down? There have to be real-terms increases once that higher figure is decided, otherwise the armed forces will not know where they are and it will be difficult to plan.
Dr Lewis
I do agree with that point; using GDP percentages has always been only a very rough and ready guide.
What was absolutely shocking was the way in which, given that even within half a dozen years of the downfall of the Berlin wall—as late as 1993-94—we were still spending 3.1% on the old method of calculation and 3.6% on the new method of calculation, whereby the MOD is allowed to include certain things we never used to include, it then became an argument as to whether we would even manage to achieve 2% of GDP. Our expectations have been managed down so far that when, even in recent times, a number of us have called for 3% to be a target, it was regarded as being completely out of reach. It should not be out of reach. The sort of effort we put into defending this country is the most important investment we can make, so 3% of GDP should now be seen not as a target or as a minimum, but as a stepping stone on the way to a realistic investment to meet the threat that never really went away, the reality of which in Ukraine has now been proclaimed for all the world to see.
Oral Answers to Questions
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 9 months ago)
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Mr Speaker
I call the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Dr Julian Lewis.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
What lessons have our Government drawn from the consequences for Ukraine of its decision in 1994 unilaterally to give up all the nuclear weapons that it had inherited from the Soviet Union in return for assurances on a piece of paper?
Mr Wallace
That shows that we must ensure that the Budapest memorandum—the signature between Russia and Ukraine in 1994—is stuck to. Russia should honour all the treaties that it has signed as well as its statements to ensure that mutual recognition of each other’s security is upheld. If it does not do that, as my right hon. Friend rightly says, that opens up all sorts of questions about how much of Russia’s word we can trust. If we cannot trust its word, I am afraid that it is a dangerous place to be in Europe.
Mr Wallace
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to point out the challenge with the French, as effectively the framework nation, withdrawing from Mali and the woeful state of the Malian Government’s relationship with the Wagner Group, which has put us in a very difficult position.
The United Kingdom is obviously deployed in the UN multidimensional integrated stabilisation mission in Mali—MINUSMA—alongside the Germans and the Swedes, and we are now reviewing our next steps. The United Kingdom is, of course, committed to the UN effort as a good UN citizen, and we will do what we can to help west Africa. The right hon. Gentleman is, however, right to point out the corrosive and destabilising influence of the Wagner Group, which raises many questions. We will keep that under review and return to the House with more details.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Mr Wallace
I think I win the bet for predicting my right hon. Friend’s question. It is absolutely clear, as I have always said, that our defence budget and our defence disposition should be based on the threat. If the threat changes, we should be perfectly open to considering changes, and we will. I will certainly pray him in aid if I make the case.
We should also recognise that the NATO alliance, collectively, well outspends Russia. All 30 nations together spend hundreds of billions of pounds on defence, way above what Russia spends. That is the strength of the alliance, and it is why we need 30 members. That is why we can make a difference to Russia.
Ukraine
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 9 months ago)
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Mr Wallace
The Defence Command Paper published last year set out plans to establish, and grow to a significant size, the National Cyber Force, the UK’s offensive cyber-capability that will complement our defensive capability. That is a joint GCHQ and Defence agency that will be based in north-west England. It has already been established and is starting to grow. I cannot comment on the operations that it will undertake, but I am a soldier and I was always taught that the best part of defence is offence.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
What will the Government do to try to impress on President Putin that even if he invades the rest of Ukraine without military comeback on behalf of Ukraine, it would be a fatal error for him to think that he could then invade an outlying NATO state—one of the Baltic states, for example—without an attack on one rightly being considered to be an attack on all NATO members?
Mr Wallace
President Putin’s publicly stated view is that by potentially dealing with Ukraine, or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, he is in fact saving us all from a future war; he wrongly asserts that if Ukraine joined NATO, Ukraine would then attack Crimea and Donbas, and that would trigger a NATO response. My right hon. Friend is an expert on NATO and knows that is a fantasy scenario, but it could potentially be used as a justification. It is therefore important that we demonstrate that although Ukraine is not in NATO, we can do our best to protect its right to choose; and it is also important that we make it crystal clear to the President of Russia that if he tries this with NATO partners, no matter how big or small, article 5 is a reality.
Ukraine
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Wallace
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right on his last point. I was the Security Minister when Salisbury happened. This is not about normalising relations, but about opening a line of dialogue so that we can hopefully address a range of issues. The GRU belongs to the Russian Ministry of Defence, and I will not be forgetting that in any way, but I do not fear anything by engaging with my counterpart. On his point about ethnic nationalism, it is something that in the UK is against our DNA, because of the lessons we have seen over hundreds of years. People would be wise not to believe that that article that the President wrote is the right course of action; the course of action is through dialogue and addressing the here and now, not harking back to snippets of history.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
Mr Putin knows that NATO will not start world war three to defend Ukraine, but has he been made aware of precisely what non-military sanctions will follow? For example, are Finland or Sweden likely to proceed with an application to join NATO, as has been suggested?
Mr Wallace
First, there is a basket of sanctions that are prepared both by the United Kingdom and the United States. Indeed, the EU is addressing and formulating a package and, obviously, Sweden and Finland would be part of that. I cannot speak for Sweden and Finland about whether they would join NATO. One of the fundamentals of NATO is the open door policy. We have been clear on that, but, as I have said, I am even more clear that defending a country to choose is actually more important often than what it chooses. We enhance and work our relationship with Finland and Sweden through the joint expeditionary force, which is 11 nations—Scandinavian and Nordic, and Britain—working together and exercising together in the defence world. That is brilliant: it binds together the EU, NATO and other members to make sure that we can deter by being as professional as possible with our armed forces.
Oral Answers to Questions
Julian Lewis Excerpts(2 years, 10 months ago)
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Jeremy Quin
There is a whole raft of measures. I have met the hon. Gentleman and he is aware from reading the report of what has been set out. We immediately accepted the vast majority of recommendations. There are about two recommendations that need to be worked on, but the intent is there and our intent is to adopt them. One of the most important aspects is to make certain that all people with a view on safety are part of the decision making process, so that everyone with a view has an opportunity to air it and everyone is listened to with respect. We are also putting health and safety input into the highest ranks of the decision making process, so that major decisions cannot be made, either by Ministers or by other parts of the organisation, without that health and safety input right at the top of the organisation. These measures will help to ensure that such a situation does not reoccur.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)
Clearly the movement of any vulnerable Afghan or British national from Afghanistan to the UK requires the co-operation of a third country. In the UK’s case, this has mostly been through Pakistan and we are very grateful to our friends in Islamabad for working with us. More than 2,000 people have come to the UK since the end of Operation Pitting, and we continue to work with partners in the region to facilitate the exit of more, through more routes.
Dr Lewis
It is worth noting that the last speech Jack made to the House of Commons was on this very subject of standing by our friends in Afghanistan.
Given the unhealthy closeness of ties between parts of the Pakistani state and the Afghan Taliban, what assurances and assistance will the Minister give to Afghans in hiding in Pakistan, who may have been issued with UK visas, that they will not be deported back to Afghanistan by the Pakistani authorities when they present themselves at an airport, instead of being permitted to fly to the United Kingdom?
James Heappey
My right hon. Friend will know that we are flirting with operational detail that may be best kept private, but he and all colleagues should reassure those with whom they are in touch that everybody who has arrived in Pakistan with the correct paperwork has been facilitated by the British high commission to leave the country successfully. The challenge, as he might expect, is for those who do not have papers, which is a very live conversation not just with Islamabad but with our friends in other capitals around the region.