Intelligence and Security Committee

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 21st November 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

For the sake of clarity, before some reporter’s pen runs away with him, will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that there was no suggestion in his remarks that UK intelligence services were responsible for the Stuxnet virus?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

Even our worst enemies have not suggested that, as far as I am aware. I of course entirely confirm that.

My final detailed point on the report relates to a part of our intelligence community that is hardly even mentioned in this House or anywhere else: Defence Intelligence. It is part of the Ministry of Defence, but its contribution and role is greatly underestimated, if not entirely unknown, in the wider world, a point we draw attention to on page 51 of the report:

“Defence Intelligence provides the largest single all-source assessment capability within the UK intelligence community.”

As it is part of the MOD, it has perhaps been more subject to resource reductions than the other intelligence agencies. The report states:

“The prospect of further cuts—combined with the impact of cuts to BBC Monitoring, on which DI relies heavily—therefore has potentially very serious long-term consequences for DI’s ability to support military operations”,

which everyone tends to know about,

“and for the UK intelligence community as a whole.”

I hope that the Government can give some careful thought to how Defence Intelligence’s unique contribution to the UK’s overall assessment capability can be properly protected. I suggest that it perhaps needs a higher profile and status in the intelligence community than it has traditionally had so that there can be wider awareness of the benefits it brings to the national interest.

I deal now with the intelligence aspects of the Government’s Green Paper, particularly the control principle and the ISC itself. As far as the control principle is concerned, many Members attending the debate will be aware that what I am referring to, and what the Green Paper refers to, is how we deal with intelligence received from other friendly intelligence services. Anyone who has any awareness of the intelligence situation will know that that is crucial to the UK, particularly our relationship with the United States. If the special relationship means anything, it means a dramatic amount of intelligence, which has continued for around 60 years and benefited the UK enormously. However, it concerns not only the United States; to a lesser degree, we share and receive intelligence from other friendly agencies as well. Fundamental to the system is the deep principle that intelligence shared with another intelligence agency will not be made available to any third party without the consent of the agency that gave it in the first place. That principle has overwhelmingly been respected, but there have been individual exceptions that caused great concern. Following the Binyam Mohamed case, the Court of Appeal decided that such information should be released in a limited set of circumstances, and that caused great concern in the United States and elsewhere. I and the Committee greatly welcome the Government’s determination to deal with the matter in a way that strikes a proper balance between the national security requirement and the interests of justice, because that is the crucial debate in these matters.

Some might imagine that the Binyam Mohamed case was a one-off and that the Green Paper is an overreaction to the problem. With all respect, the Committee’s view is that it is not an overreaction. Although the Court of Appeal’s verdict might have been different in that case, we are today dealing with a situation that is very different from that which existed in the past. Information on this is given in the Green Paper, so I will share briefly with the House what the Government say. The Green Paper refers to judicial review, and not simply with regard to intelligence, but more broadly how it has increased over the years:

“Recourse to judicial review has increased significantly in recent decades, from 160 applications in 1974 to 4,539 in 1998. By 2010 the number of applications had reached 10,548.”

Judicial review and the overruling of the Government’s view—perhaps rightly in many cases—have become a major part of our judicial process, rather than an exception.

The raising of intelligence matters in court has also been transformed dramatically in recent years. The same page of the Green Paper states that

“in the first 90 years of the Security Service’s existence”—

meaning MI5—

“no case impacting directly on that Service’s work reached the House of Lords. In the last 10 years there have been 14 such case in the House of Lords or the Supreme Court.”

That is no longer an exception, but increasingly something we must be aware of and decide whether the previous balance is the appropriate one in the wider national interest.

Another point of interest, and one I was unaware of until recently, is that one of the circumstances in which these matters are being raised is not the release of sensitive documents to help in UK legal cases, as sometimes happens, but often the request for the release of this information to assist legal proceedings in other countries. The Green Paper states on page 7:

“The Government has strained key international relationships and risked compromise of vital sources and techniques in no fewer than seven court cases in which the applicants sought sensitive UK Government-held but very often foreign government-originated information for disclosure into foreign legal proceedings.”

Of course, Binyam Mohamed was such an example, because his appearance before a United States military commission led to the application in the first place.

Against that background and as the report states, I and the Committee very much welcome the Government’s proposals to modernise the procedure and their recommendation that the United Kingdom use the closed material procedure and involve special advocates, as already occurs in several areas, to deal with such cases. The only alternative, traditionally, has been the public interest immunity approach, but that is a blockbuster approach, and if one secures such immunity one finds that none of the information can be seen by anyone.

At least under the special advocate procedure, the special advocate—someone who has been vetted to be able to inspect such sensitive material—will have the opportunity to see it on behalf of his or her client, and, although they will not be able to reveal detailed information, they will be able at least to take it into account when advising their client on judicial proceedings.

That is greatly welcome and a step forward, but the Committee wants to make this point. If these proposals are implemented, the situation will improve considerably, but they do not provide an absolute guarantee that no information can ever be released at the insistence of the court, a fact that the Government acknowledge. Page 21 of the Green Paper states that closed material proceedings, involving a special advocate,

“reduce the risk of damaging disclosure of sensitive material.”

Such proceedings do not remove the risk; they reduce it. Likewise, on the following page, the Green Paper states that a decision to allow a special advocate to be available can

“be reviewable by the trial judge on judicial review principles if the other side decides to challenge the Secretary of State’s decision.”

We are therefore dealing with a very curious situation. If the Government’s proposals are accepted, the balance will change, and that is good and healthy, but the significant possibility will remain that in very special circumstances a judge might take a different view on such matters and the information could be released, with all the consequences that might flow from that.

Those who take the interests of national security very seriously indeed, as I certainly do and I am sure everyone here does, accept that, at the end of the day in a country that believes in the rule of law, the courts—in most circumstances, if not all—have to have the final word. I wonder, however, whether the Government ought to consider the argument that the provisions in the Green Paper need to be further strengthened: a belt and braces approach, which would not be inconsistent with the rule of law but would certainly provide added reassurance.

The Government have been good enough to refer in their Green Paper to the way that approach might be taken, and paragraph 2.78 on page 33 states:

“It would be possible for Parliament to provide the courts with clearer guidance in statute”.

The proposal refers to public interest immunity cases, but it could apply to special advocate cases, and the Government go on to state in the next paragraph:

“One such presumption”—

written into statute as a “rebuttable presumption”—

“would be against disclosure of sensitive”—

national security—

“material owned by foreign governments, obtained via intelligence relationships working on the basis of the Control Principle.”

That is exactly what we need seriously to consider. It would not be inconsistent with the rule of law, because at the end of the day it would be a rebuttable presumption, and the court would determine whether the presumption were rebutted.

As we have always known, the courts, when they interpret the legislation of this House, not only look at the words of an Act but try to identify, if they can, Parliament’s intention in passing it. If the statute stated that there were such a presumption against the disclosure of intelligence received from a foreign, friendly Government, the court would be able at least to take that into account before it reached a final decision, so I and the Committee hope that the Government give that proposal serious consideration.

One of the main parts of not only our report but the Government’s Green Paper concerns the future of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and although I note that it is a major issue I will not detain the House for long, as I hope to conclude my remarks in at most another 10 or 15 minutes in order to allow everyone else who wishes to speak the chance to do so. It is, however, a crucial matter.

Over a period of some 17 or 18 years, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 has become outdated: it no longer accurately describes how the Committee operates. That is part of the problem; another part of the problem is that the Committee, if it is to conduct its oversight effectively, needs additional responsibility and power.

It is worth remembering that when the 1994 Act was passed, the intention was not only that oversight would be provided for the first time, but that the public would be reassured that it was independent oversight—and to some degree that reassurance has not yet been achieved. The public, when they look at the Act, see a Committee that is not a Committee of Parliament, although it is a Committee of parliamentarians, because we are all appointed by the Prime Minister, we report to the Prime Minister, and only through the Prime Minister do our reports eventually reach the House. That obviously calls our independence into question.

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

The House has to give its view, but I say to the right hon. Gentleman, who also serves on the Committee and has done so even longer than I have, that the Prime Minister has the last word. Although Prime Ministers have in practice never overruled the view of the House, they have the statutory power to do so. The House gives its advice, thus illustrating the difficulty in terms of the public’s view. That is the first problem.

The Committee, in its report, recommends—we are delighted that the Government have accepted it in principle—that the Committee become a Committee of Parliament. It is a joint Committee of the House of Commons and House of Lords, with two distinguished Members of the House of Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Lothian, but we recommend that its appointment procedure be very similar to that used by the Standards and Privileges Committee or by all Joint Committees of Parliament. Names would be presented to Parliament, but Parliament would be able to veto them if it disapproved. If it disapproved, the names would have to disappear, and only when Parliament was satisfied with the recommendations would appointments be made. Parliament would have—in a way that it does not, and has never had—the last word on both the Chairman of the Committee and its members, and it would properly be a Committee of Parliament, albeit obviously required to operate under slightly different procedures because of the secret information that we deal with. That is the first reform of a fundamental kind.

On the second reform, the 1994 Act states that the Committee has responsibility for policy, resources and administration, but it does not mention operations, a subject in which there is overwhelming public interest and in which, on a simple literal reading of the Act, we appear to have no involvement. People who ought to know better have recently asked, “How can the Committee operate effectively if it cannot even look at operations?” In reality, it has been looking at operations over the past few years, whether on the treatment of detainees, the Binyam Mohamed case or the use of intelligence during the Iraq war.

The Committee has been able to look at the raw material and to question agencies about operations, but that role does not appear in the Act. That needs to be revised. We suggest that, instead of listing the issues that the Committee can look at, the Act should be reformed and simply state that “the Committee should have oversight responsibility for all the activities of the intelligence agencies”, thereby including operations.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

On operations, does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that practice in the past has been—and is likely to be in the future—for the examination of particular operations to be retrospective and that there are very good reasons for that?

[Sir Malcolm Rifkind]

My hon. Friend raises a very important point. In making our recommendations to the Government—the matter is important to them as well—we acknowledge that we do not seek the level of responsibility that exists in the United States, where certain senior members of Congress have to be consulted in advance of an operation regarding what the intelligence agencies will be doing. They do not have the power to stop an operation, but they are informed about it, as they were, for example—so we understand—of that involving Osama bin Laden.

The ISC can see no public interest in such an approach. Having power without responsibility is bad enough, but to have responsibility without power is even worse. Our responsibility is to provide retrospective oversight, and the Government appear in principle to have accepted that, as long as we are dealing—as we agree we should be—with matters of significant national interest. That is right and proper. Many discussions will be needed about how that will be handled in practice, but the principle is of profound importance.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I begin by reassuring the shadow Home Secretary that, in my limited experience—I have been a member of the ISC for just over a year—such is the sense of cross-party common purpose on the Committee, I would have no difficulty in accepting as Chairman any of the Committee’s three excellent Labour members. However, such a thing is completely unnecessary given the outstanding chairmanship of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind)—[Hon. Members: “Hear hear!”] I am glad to hear Opposition Members’ endorsements.

In his opening remarks, my right hon. and learned Friend mentioned the totally discredited concept that history ended with the end of the cold war. Topics mentioned in the debate include the Olympics, cyber-security, general terrorism and the more traditional threat from more traditional enemies. In my somewhat disparate remarks, I shall try to touch on a few of them.

When dealing with any form of enemy of the democratic system, it is helpful to think in the ways and along the lines that they think—if we have such twisted minds, to which some of us must own up. Our initial reaction in respect of the Olympic games is to think, “There must be a huge extra effort to protect the games,” but what would terrorists planning a series of deadly attacks in the UK think? Would they think, “I must go straight away to the heart of the games, where the maximum security effort is bound to be concentrated,” or would they think, “There will be a huge concentration of effort on the security of the Olympic games in that fortnight, so there will be great opportunities to create mayhem in all sorts of other, less protected parts of the UK”?

Therefore, the problem facing the Security Service is that it cannot say, “With the extra effort we will put into protecting the Olympics, we will ease security measures elsewhere in the country.” The reality is that the holding of the Olympics in the UK is a considerable opportunity—I will not say that it is a heaven-sent opportunity, because it comes from a somewhat different direction—for terrorists to cause mayhem and to maximise the deadly effect of their perverted ideas carried into action. I often wonder whether it was sheer coincidence—it probably was—that the choice of London for the Olympics was announced just 24 hours before the 7/7 atrocities in 2005.

We need extra concentration because of what could be visited upon us during the Olympics, but there are also new technological threats, to which hon. Members have referred. Everybody has welcomed the increase in resources—£600 million net—to ensure greater cyber-security in future. There was concern in the past about a lack of ministerial responsibility for cyber-protection, so it comes as a great relief to the ISC and its members to know that the role will now be undertaken by the Cabinet Office, whose Ministers have a legendary reputation for the protection of sensitive information. Think about it. However, when we are considering—[Laughter.] They got there in the end. As Frankie Howerd used to say, don’t take a vote on it.

The Cabinet Office will be responsible for cyber-security, but that does not mean that it is the most suited Department to be responsible—nor has it been earmarked for the role—for the countering of the propaganda message that is used to generate recruits to the terrorist cause, which is closely related to cyber-warfare. We have heard a considerable amount about the attempts that have been made to decapitate al-Qaeda, which have enjoyed considerable success. However, we also know that attacks are increasingly lone-wolf attacks, when people self-start and trawl the internet, picking up messages and techniques that they turn into action, with deadly effect.

It is of the utmost importance that the Government seek to counter the message put out to mobilise, radicalise and turn into terrorists impressionable and sometimes unbalanced minds already in our society. It is incredibly difficult for a security service to track such people: it is much harder to track a lone-wolf potential attacker than somebody who is engaged with people abroad and part of an al-Qaeda-like organisation planning a much more sophisticated attack. We need to hear more—the Committee will make an effort to ensure that we do—of the efforts that the Government are making to neutralise the radicalising messages on the internet and put forward a counter-narrative so that people can understand the values of the society in which they live.

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman is extremely knowledgeable in this field because of his experience before entering Parliament, but does he share my concerns about the work of the Home Office’s research, information and communications unit, which the Committee has decided to consider much more closely? It is essential work but at the moment we have little information about what it is doing and its effectiveness.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted that the right hon. Lady makes that point. It is too early to have concerns about the work of the unit because we have not been able to examine it yet. The work that such a unit is designed to do is, as she said, of the utmost importance, and if it carries it out successfully the public at large might not know how successful it has been in supporting themes and counter-narrative ideologies in the media and internet to the benefit of people in our society who might otherwise become disaffected. However, unless one can examine the organisation’s work—within what is commonly called the ring of secrecy—one cannot be sure whether sufficient work is being done or about its quality.

On page 44, paragraph 156 of our report, the Committee stated:

“The difficulty of measuring the success of PREVENT work is most notable in the work of the Research, Information and Communications Unit…which was established in 2007 with the primary aim of ensuring consistency, across government, on Counter-Terrorism and counter-extremism messages and developing a coherent narrative to challenge extremist ideology. RICU is jointly funded by the Home Office and the Foreign Office. It currently has 22 full-time staff and its budget in 2010/11 was £4.25m (of which £0.3m was spent on research and £2.7m was spent on communication campaigns).”

That does not sound like an effort on the scale needed if we are seriously to counter the radicalising message of the enemies of our way of life.

Democratic societies are inherently resistant to Governments propagandising against organisations involving their own citizens, in an attempt to get a message across to their own people; but sometimes we have to understand that there are forms of warfare besides open warfare—for example, the propaganda and counter-propaganda warfare that went on during the long confrontation with Soviet communism. During that period, in 1948, a Labour Government set up the Foreign Office’s information research department, which remained in existence until 1977 under Governments of both complexions, until unfortunately another Labour Government decided to do away with it. That organisation operated on a considerable scale, and its particular strength was that it made available to opinion-formers the detailed facts that enabled strong cases for what was good about British society to be made on a non-partisan, non-party political basis. I believe—I think that the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) shares my belief—that an effort on a similar scale might be necessary in the future.

On the Committee’s operations, I can reassure the Home Secretary: she said that we need to consider the resource implications of the Committee expanding its work to consider operational matters; but I am not sure that there are many resource implications, because as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington said, we are asking not to change what we do but simply to formalise what we already do. We are not asking to look over the shoulder of the intelligence and security services at what they are doing while they are doing it—in an operational sense—although they sometimes choose to give us glimpses of that, which obviously we treat with appropriate discretion. Instead, we wish to be assured that when something becomes contentious, the ISC can review the matter and decide whether proper procedures were followed, whether mistakes were made or whether we can help the security and intelligence services by giving them a clean bill of health.

I shall take an example at random. It is known that over the years the approach of Governments towards Libya changed completely. Under the Labour Government, there was a policy—I am sure that its proponents would argue that it was a legitimate line to pursue—of trying to bring Libya back into the fold. For example, when Libya declared its intention to abandon its chemical weapons stocks—we now know that it still had some, although we do not know whether that was because it had not finished getting rid of them or because it was concealing them and cheating on its promises—it was regarded as quite a coup, quite a triumph for the security and intelligence services

It now appears, however, that along the way the degree of co-operation between some of our agencies and some Libyan agencies might have crossed the line. If it did, for example in the rendition of two people, as has been reported, we will need a means of finding out why that line was crossed, which agencies crossed it, who, if anybody, was responsible—was it the Government, was it the agencies?—and whether there are lessons to be learned that we can help to articulate. If the Committee is not given the power to review such operations, many people will rightly ask, “What’s the use of having a Committee of parliamentarians, whose job is supposedly to supervise the security and intelligence services, if when something highly controversial appears to have happened, it cannot, does not or will not look into it?”

I want to refer to one or two of the slightly more traditional threats. It was interesting to hear that the agencies still think that we should not, in our rightful concern about international terrorism, forget that the country remains an intelligence target for countries such as Russia and China. One of the things that worry me the more I focus on it is the possibility that some countries could steal our technology, use it to undercut our competitiveness and then buy their way into our infrastructure in this country. This would be of great strategic value to them in future. I will say no more about that for the moment, but I hope that others might feel it appropriate to do so later in the debate.

Finally, I warmly welcome the proposal in the justice Green Paper to prevent the control order principle being breached. Irrespective of what piece of intelligence was disclosed in court, we must never forget that if we undermine the trust between ourselves and our principal intelligence allies on that issue, we undermine it on every issue. However, it also behoves us to remind our intelligence partners that when they engage in methods and techniques such as Guantanamo Bay and water-boarding, they open up not only themselves but their allies to challenges in court that make such problems much more salient, in respect of the evidence that a judge might feel had to be disclosed. It is a question of exercising two-way restraint: we do not wish to breach the confidence of our allies, but our allies must not breach the standards to which our intelligence services rightly apply themselves.

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[Dr Julian Lewis]

Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on, he might wish to draw the House’s attention to paragraph 33 of the report, which states:

“The Security Service has told the Committee that the numbers of individuals involved with the current republican terrorist groups is around half the number that were active in the Provisional IRA”.

That is a very considerable number, is it not?

[Paul Goggins]

It is, although it is also fair to say that there are degrees of involvement. Although there may be some latent support at a fairly local level for certain individuals, the number of active people who are determined on violence in pursuit of their aims is probably still fairly limited. None the less, they are increasingly dangerous in what they do, and they need to be dealt with. That is why, as I am sure the hon. Gentleman will agree, the 34% increase in investment in the past couple of years in the Security Service’s work on Northern Ireland terrorism is welcome.

There have been some positive developments, and it is important to record them in this debate. The devolution of policing and justice, of course, was a very important step in April last year. The PSNI and the Security Service have worked very well together in a new relationship over the past few years, which has borne great fruit. Only recently—this is outside the period covered by the report, but it is none the less important—Michael Campbell was convicted in Lithuania and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment there. That was the product of some very good work, and those involved should be commended and congratulated.

I warmly welcome the Green Paper, which others have already analysed. Frankly, it takes political courage to come forward with such a Green Paper. The territory is complex and the document is hardly a vote-winner, but it is essential that we grapple with such issues and seek to try to resolve them on a cross-party basis, because they are important. The Binyam Mohamed case was clearly a major breach of the control principle and, as we have reported in our report this year, when we went to the United States and met our colleagues and counterparts there it was clear that they were shaken by this development. Although they reiterated time and again the value that they attach to the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom on intelligence and security, they made it absolutely clear that they must know that their intelligence is safe in our hands. If they cannot trust us, it would be a very negative development.

We all agree that we want a system of open justice. Article 6, on the right to a fair trial, is a vital part of our system. As far as possible, of course, defendants and suspects should have the gist of the case against them outlined and given to them, but the problem is that the “gist” is starting to become virtually the whole case, which makes things very difficult. When evidence includes highly sensitive information, there must be a way of protecting it. Ministers have an obligation to ensure that they uphold article 6, but they also have article 2 obligations to the people who are the source of the intelligence that enables Ministers to act. Those people must be protected, too, because if Ministers were to reveal such information and thereby the identity of the sources, who might then be imperilled, it would be a terrible development. It is vital that both sources and the wider public are protected.

I welcome the proposals in the Green Paper on the closed material procedures, but, as others have said, they must be made as tight as possible. In the end, the court will always have the last word and make the ultimate decision, but it is for Parliament now to make its views absolutely clear, through statutory guidance and through the consideration, as others have said, of the statutory presumption against disclosure of foreign intelligence material. All those safeguards should be considered, but, having had the courage to introduce this Green Paper and grapple with these issues, it is vital that we get it right. We will not get an early or easy second chance to do so, so it is essential that we make the best effort that we can now.

Let me make a final point on closed material procedures. We are familiar with the arguments about the control principle and more familiar with its application to immigration cases in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and to control orders—and TPIMs, when they are introduced. I caution the Minister, as we will increasingly need clarity on the recall of convicted terrorists who are out of prison on licence. I want to emphasise the importance of that. It is already an issue in Northern Ireland, and it will become increasingly important across the rest of the UK. When intelligence raises concerns about the continued involvement in terrorism of someone who has served their sentence and is now out in the community on licence, although that intelligence might not be able to be used further to convict that individual, it must be possible to use it to ensure that they go back into prison and continue their sentence so that the public are protected. That is another important test that the Minister will need to set himself when he comes up with the ultimate solution to the issues raised in the Green Paper.

Finally, I warmly welcome what the Green Paper has to say about the future role and remit of the Committee. I am not personally persuaded by the argument put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) that the Chair of the Committee should always be from the Opposition party, and there was a good exchange involving my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen in which the arguments were advanced. It is important that the individual who is in the Chair of the Committee should be respected by not only its members but more widely across Parliament and the agencies. The Chair should have the expertise and leadership to create consensus, which is at the core of all this work. We have that in our current Chair, and whether or not a future Chair is from the Opposition or Government party, those are the key credentials that that individual must have.

I welcome the proposal that the Committee should be a Committee of Parliament, with all the safeguards that have been discussed. There should be a limited number of public sessions, which would help to explain more about the importance of the work of the intelligence and security agencies as well as that of the Committee. The remit of the Committee should run across not only policy, resources and administration, but all the work of the agencies. That already happens, and we need to ensure that it is formalised for the future.

It is also important that the Committee can not only request information but require it. As we make that move, it will place greater obligations on the Committee to ensure that it gets the information and that it knows that it has it, as well as that there is nothing missing. That means that we will need a deeper investigative capacity in the Committee. The agencies should ensure in every case that we get all the information that has been requested the first time rather than the second or third time.

Speaking personally, my first year as a member of the Committee has been fascinating and very enjoyable. I certainly look forward to the year ahead and the many challenges that lie in it. There will certainly be no let-up in those challenges, particularly with TPIMs coming into operation and the Olympic games coming to our capital city.

[Richard Ottaway (Croydon South) (Con)]

I apologise to the House for my late arrival and for missing the opening speeches, but the Foreign Affairs Committee has been sitting tonight. The President of Turkey is in town on a state visit and the Turkish Foreign Minister and Baroness Cathy Ashton, the High Representative of the EU, have given evidence to us.

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), who is one of the new members of the Committee. I had the privilege of serving on the Committee from 2005 to 2010 and I found it to be one of the most rewarding experiences of my parliamentary life. He is quite right that Northern Ireland has moved up the agenda in recent years and I agree with virtually every point he made in his speech.

As this is the first debate on such matters in this Parliament, may I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the staff of the ISC, who are of the highest possible calibre? There are not enough of them, but that is not their fault. I also pay tribute to the agencies for their hard work and the way in which they protect the freedoms that we all value. The Foreign Secretary rightly praised them in his speech last Wednesday and we can all join him in his praise.

I also want to thank the three Chairmen I served under during those five years. Although it is regrettable that there were three, they all discharged their responsibilities with diligence and enthusiasm and were all of a very high calibre. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) is the only Chairman we have in this Parliament, as a degree of continuity is essential.

This is the first time we have looked at the report from the outside, so to speak, and one change I have noted—I do not know whether it is my imagination—is that there seem to be fewer redactions than in the past, which we recommended in the previous Parliament. We wanted reports to flow better, and I think that has been achieved.

I share the concern about the drop in funding—a 10% cut would concern anybody. The agencies do not seem to be alarmed, but a 10% cut in staff at the Secret Intelligence Service would certainly alarm me.

We host the Olympic games next year and I see that the agencies feel they are well placed to manage risks. However, that sits a bit awkwardly with the revelations in the past couple of weeks, after the report was published, that a review of security is under way.

I agree with the Committee’s conclusions about cyber-security. The national security strategy puts cyber-security as a tier 1 risk, but under the present strategy an uprising in north Africa is a tier 3 risk, so I do not know how much weight one can put on these things. At the moment, we just take the world as we find it and try to address things.

The Committee has noted that the Foreign Affairs Committee managed to get some of the World Service cuts reversed and would like to see the same happen with BBC Monitoring. I completely agree with that but I point out to members of the Intelligence and Security Committee who are present that the Foreign Affairs Committee’s recommendation was initially rejected and that it took a debate under the Backbench Business Committee procedure to raise it again before the Government took that on board. We have seen the growing influence of the Backbench Business Committee, and I do not know whether the ISC wants to get down to that level—get deep down and dirty, as it were—but it may be something it has to do.

I also welcome the conclusions of the coroner who said, in relation to the report arising out of 7/7, that the ISC’s conclusions were “detailed and thorough”. The coroner also made some interesting recommendations about the use of photographs. I note that the Committee found that any discrepancies would not have changed its conclusions. That shows the calibre of the work being carried out by the ISC—if the coroner can describe the work as “detailed and thorough” and it can be said that conclusions would not have been affected. That is an important point to make in relation to those who were so critical of the reports when they came out.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am listening to my hon. Friend’s speech with great attention and I think that another word of praise could be said for the services themselves in that context. In the past, when they have found that they have inadvertently overlooked some piece of information, in providing that information to the ISC, they have not hesitated to own up to that fact even if it opened them up to criticism. It is incumbent on us to encourage them to do that and not to be deterred from doing it because it is a slight blot on their record when they do not get things right first time.

[Richard Ottaway]

I completely agree, and I have always been hugely impressed by the vast quantity of information. When there was just one needle in the haystack, they might not have found it the first time around but they did find it the second time around and quite rightly, as my hon. Friend says, produced it for the Committee.

On the Green Paper, may I support the point that was made about the handling of sensitive material, which I gather was mentioned by the Chairman of the ISC in his opening speech? The recommendations in the Green Paper are sensible and offer the best way of dealing with sensitive material, but I do not think it has to be instead of using a special advocate. It could well be in addition to using a special advocate and using the presumptions set out in the Green Paper.

Let me address the role of the Committee and the way it operates. Parliamentary oversight of a secret service is always going to have limitations. I do not think there is a silver bullet, regardless of whether the Committee is a Committee of the House. Let me give an illustration. The major foreign policy objective of our engagement in Afghanistan is to deny al-Qaeda and international terrorists a base from which to carry out their operations. During the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on Afghanistan, a number of witnesses told us that that is no longer a problem in Afghanistan, so at the Liaison Committee I asked the Prime Minister whether he was still receiving intelligence to that effect and he said he was. So, we are stuck with the same old problem that a major overseas deployment of the British Army and other armed services is based on intelligence that has not been subject to the scrutiny of the House. Those of us who were here at the time of the Iraq war know the problems that that can generate. This is an echo of the past. I have come up with a least-bad option and have written to the Chairman of the ISC to ask him to put it to the appropriate quarters when a suitable opportunity arrives and then to report to the House on the veracity of that information. I hope that, in the short term, that can be a way of dealing with the matter.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 10th October 2011 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

Again, I would point to the right hon. Gentleman’s colleagues in the Ministry of Justice, who obviously wrote the letter saying that Professor Fraser’s report came to the conclusion that there was no detriment to the detection of serious crime. As I have highlighted, Professor Fraser’s report was wide-ranging in scope. Needless to say, we have a difference of view on this important point.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In deciding whether to support the amendment or the Government tonight, I have to balance the loss of rights of those people who had crimes committed against them, or who may have crimes committed against them as a result of reducing the period of the retention of DNA from six years to three, against the injustice that might be visited on innocent people whose DNA is kept for three years longer than it otherwise would be. Can the Minister tell me, in words simple enough even for me to understand, what exactly the loss of human rights and the injustice will be to those innocent people who have their DNA kept for three years longer before it is wiped? Can he compare that with the suffering of victims who have crimes committed against them by people who will not be detected?

[James Brokenshire]

This is about getting the right people on the national DNA database. By that, I mean those who have been convicted of crimes. We should focus on those who have committed crimes; we should look at recidivism and getting persistent prolific offenders, those who have been in prison and those who have committed crimes on the national DNA database. Interestingly, that was not the approach of the previous Government; they were more fixated with keeping the innocent on the national DNA database. If we take the approach that I suggest, we can ensure that we focus attention where it is needed, and that we do our duty—this is something that I take very seriously—when it comes to protecting the public and ensuring that the police can do what is necessary. I certainly believe that the provisions before the House will enable the police to do that.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is very generous in giving way, particularly as he knows that this will not be a supportive question. With the greatest respect, he did not answer my question, which was: in practical, simple terms, in what way will these innocent people—let us accept that they are innocent—who will have their DNA kept on record for an extra three years suffer, or have their rights infringed? Can we compare that with the suffering and infringed rights of people who will otherwise have crimes committed against them by criminals who go unpunished?

[James Brokenshire]

When I look at the Members of Parliament who contact me about the DNA database, there are not huge stacks of correspondence relating to the retention of DNA. The correspondence relates to the many people who complain about their DNA remaining on the national DNA database when they are innocent of any crime, and who say how that offends them. Let us look at some of the cases involved. GeneWatch UK has been quite helpful in highlighting the issues. There is the 12-year-old schoolboy arrested for allegedly stealing a pack of Pokémon cards; the grandmother arrested for failing to return a football that was kicked into her garden; the 10-year-old victim of bullying who had a false accusation made against her; and the 14-year-old girl arrested for allegedly pinging another girl’s bra. Those people have been arrested; their DNA would be retained under the arrangements that the previous Government seemed to laud. That issue of injustice is very much at the heart of the matter.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Damian Green]

The Government continue to raise our concerns and the hon. Gentleman is right to be concerned about the case. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary both discussed the case with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov when he last visited the UK in February 2011. I understand that the official Russian investigation is due to report in August. As I have said, we are disappointed that it has taken so long but no doubt the hon. Gentleman and I can discuss more of the details when we have our meeting in a few days’ time.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does not the Minister understand that this man, who was a lawyer, was killed in jail by the Russian authorities? The case is similar to that of someone who was poisoned in this country, we believe, by someone who was subsequently elected as a Member of the Russian Parliament. Russia must understand that if it wants to be accepted as a modern state in the 21st century, this sort of gangsterism and state-murder will not be tolerated.

[Damian Green]

My hon. Friend expresses himself with great power and passion. It is important that all states around the world observe proper and civilised standards of behaviour and the British Government will certainly continue to impress that on Governments all around the world.

Prevent Strategy

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 7th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

In relation to my comments on the previous Government, we did a proper review of the Prevent strategy to identify those areas where change was necessary. We have done that, and I have brought to the House a number of areas where we believe the previous Government’s strategy was flawed and where it is necessary to make changes, which I have set out before the House today.

In relation to what is happening in education, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education is quite clear about the necessity of ensuring that values are indeed taught in our schools, but that that is done in a number of ways, including through the proper teaching of our history.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

During the cold war, Governments of Labour and Conservative persuasions differentiated between communists who were subversive and broke the law and communists who preached a totalitarian philosophy. Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is the job of the police and of the Security Service to deal with those Islamists or, as I prefer to call them, un-Islamic extremists who break the law, but that the job of Prevent must be to destroy the philosophical basis of the perversion of the religion that they seek to convey?

[Mrs May]

I certainly agree with my hon. Friend that we need to ensure that those who break the law are dealt with appropriately. We need to ensure also that we challenge the ideology—or, the perverse ideology—that people use to lure others down the road of radicalisation and into violent acts and into terrorism. In terms of the Prevent point of view and the very clear counter-terrorism aspect of the strategy that we have identified, that work will be done in a number of ways. In the Prevent strategy, we set out how we will deal with issues such as the internet and the use of the internet to radicalise people, but it will also be done through work with individuals who are identified as vulnerable.

Quilliam Foundation

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Tom Brake (Carshalton and Wallington) (LD)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), who has put forward a strong and effective case. He has made a very specific proposal that £150,000 should be provided by the Government. He made it clear that it should not be a blank cheque and specified that the funding would be for 12 months starting next month. What he did not do was to set out precisely what conditions and objectives might be attached, perhaps because he cannot conduct negotiations on Quilliam’s behalf, or he does not want to conduct negotiations here. He indicated clearly that at the end of the 12-month period, Quilliam would have to be self-financing, albeit perhaps having secured grants from Government for specific projects. However, other conditions might have to be attached if the Government were minded to go down that route.

The right hon. Gentleman made it clear that today’s discussion on the future funding of Quilliam is not just about the funding streams of that UK-based think-tank; it is about the Government’s current and developing policy stance on counter-terrorism—what we fund and why and how we should continue to move forward post-Prevent. Is our nation’s security to be based on ideology and on which groups emphasise or downplay certain aspects of Islam, or on reality and on the evidence of policies that have worked and continue to produce results?

As the right hon. Gentleman said, Quilliam’s funding streams are well documented and a loss of substantial funding early in its inception led to its being funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office, which illustrates exactly why there is a need for Quilliam to continue. It lost funding by being vocal in opposing extremism in whatever form and from whatever source. As he said, a funder withdrew support early on in Quilliam’s life as a reaction to the organisation’s stance against suicide bombings in Israel. Quilliam’s public stance on that issue was not particularly to do with Islam, but it was part of its consistent, clear and vocal opposition to all forms of terrorism. However, the resultant situation—Quilliam being funded largely by two Departments—clearly raises issues about bipartisanship and credibility.

Quilliam is not the only organisation that publicly and vociferously challenges extremism in all its guises, whether anti-Jewish, anti-Islam or anti-western; nor is it the only organisation in which former extremists have played an active part in educating peoples, Governments and policy makers on how to recognise and counter the type of radicalisation that results in extremist behaviours. The Street project in Brixton was previously funded by Prevent and has also experienced funding cuts. It is a non-sectarian group that works from a mosque and does measurable work in combating the kind of radicalisation that can lead to extremism. Similarly, the Cordoba Foundation has produced projects with a focus on preventing radicalism from becoming extremist action. In about a week’s time, an initiative called “Learning to be a Peacemaker” will be held in this place by an organisation called Initiatives of Change, which is also working in that field.

It is true, however, that Quilliam is distinct and unique in important respects. It is the only organisation that challenges extremist views and activities by effectively straddling both the Muslim perspective and the liberal, secular, mainstream vernacular of modern Britain. It represents the swathes of British Muslims who are Muslim by birth and culture first and foremost, but who understand and adhere to the division between Church and state, which is second nature to mainland Britain. Quilliam sits within the diverse and, at times, conflicting dialogue about Islam that is both acceptable and normal practice among faith-based Muslim groups, but unlike any other organisation of its size and impact, Quilliam also sits comfortably within the traditional western liberal dialogue, which separates to a large extent the personal faith of individuals and the secular, cultural interpretation of those personal faiths.

As the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East set out, Quilliam started life as a think-tank, but the very nature of its work—outreach in universities, and research and policy advice—is much more akin to that of an effective and proactive non-governmental organisation. Quilliam’s vocal stance against terrorism that claims to be inspired by Islam has had solid results, which are measurable. Accurately signposting Government to specific individuals with an inclination for extremist action is invaluable in our fight against terrorism. As the right hon. Gentleman said, it remains one of the few groups—occasionally the only group—that consistently challenge and publicly condemn terrorism, from whatever source. As it sits within the Muslim dialogue, it has first-hand access to, and shared understanding of, the dialogues taking place at grassroots level and online that can lead to extremist action. That position is unique and invaluable to the Government’s fight against terrorism.

However, the criticism levelled at Quilliam, and indirectly at the previous Government for funding the group, is worth examination and raises important questions that need to be addressed in relation to any decisions about funding. The first is about its perceived dominance of the mainstream view. Many individuals and organisations are discouraged by an organisation that purports to be the arbiter of what is, or is not, mainstream. That is further complicated by the coming to light of a list produced by Quilliam that seems to many to suggest that some other Muslim organisations, which consider themselves mainstream, are breeding grounds for civil unrest because of ideological perspectives shared to a greater or lesser extent with radical extremist groups.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman makes a serious point. However, is it not the case that when taking part in an ideological battle, all groups describe themselves as mainstream? Indeed, even Islamist extremists describe themselves as mainstream, because they are trying to say that everyone who disagrees with them is an apostate. There is nothing unusual, therefore, about Quilliam at one end of the spectrum calling itself mainstream, while other groups at the centre of the spectrum call themselves mainstream, and groups on the radical Islamist end of the spectrum call themselves mainstream. That is not really a valid criticism.

[Tom Brake]

The hon. Gentleman is very experienced in these matters. Maybe on that particular point we will have to disagree on whether my comment is appropriate.

The funding of a think-tank by the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will inevitably contribute to a perceived lack of plurality of voices heard by Government on how best to combat extremism. Lack of funding from other agencies will raise questions about how and whether Quilliam can critically engage with Government, and will cast doubts about its credibility as an independent body with the capacity to critique Government plans and policy on tackling radical extremism. It is true to say, however, that that position conveniently forgets the numerous groups that receive funding from the Government’s Prevent strategy to undertake or continue work to counteract extremist activity. It also overlooks the many Muslim groups that are frequently invited to put their views to Government, most recently a couple of months ago at a conference I hosted here with Murtaza Shibli, when we invited Muslim organisations to share opinions and advice on how best the Government can go forward with the post-Prevent agenda.

No one can doubt the achievements of Quilliam as an NGO. The debate about funding should, therefore, rightly concern itself with levels of funding at a time of financial austerity, and not about whether we should forgo that important insight into extremist narratives. Although I support the continued funding of this much-needed organisation, Quilliam, like other NGOs and agencies working under the vital remit of social cohesion, needs to look hard at how best to make effective decisions within tighter financial constraints. Quilliam also needs to continue to pursue other avenues of funding—as it is doing—to continue, with credibility, a bipartisan relationship with Government and other Muslim groups.

--- Later in debate ---

[Hazel Blears]

This did not become a significant issue until we were facing the current financial circumstances which pertain across Government. I certainly was not aware of a major drive, which was unsuccessful, to press Quilliam to find funds in other sectors. Clearly, the situation now is that economies need to be made. Quilliam has been put into that pot, but I want to explore with the Minister what other organisations are funded and what cuts have been made—I shall come shortly to the Research Information and Communications Unit. We need a better, broader picture of the total resources available, and what decisions have been made about funding priorities. In a few weeks, we are expecting the Prevent review, which will give us more insight into what the balance of organisations ought to be. We absolutely need a balance.

This is not a partisan issue by any measure—it transcends party politics. It relates to the security and safety of our country, and nothing can be more important than that. My right hon. and hon. Friends and I are pursuing the matter to try to get a reasonable settlement.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East said, I was the Minister with responsibility for counter-terrorism at the time of the 7 July 2005 bombings. Even now, I can feel the sense of devastation and shock that there was across the nation when that happened. People were asking who committed the bombings, why they would want to do that to innocent men and women and their families, and what led them to be prepared to take their own life to fulfil what they presumably believed to be their mission and destiny. I do not think that any of us really understood—we still do not—the many and varied factors that lead people down such a path, that lead them even to contemplate taking such steps.

We are better informed than we were then. Several organisations that have been active in this field have helped the Government and policy makers to come to a better analysis of the factors that lead people to extremism, but we do not have all the answers. I entirely accept that, although some of the measures in the Prevent programme were successful, some were less successful, but what we were doing in that area was innovative and, in many ways, experimental.

I have spoken to people in the United States, France, Germany and countries across western Europe who say that this country has been at the forefront of trying to drill down to determine what the factors of extremism are, and how to build resilience among young people so that they can resist such messages. My sense is that those other countries are just beginning to take the first steps. Indeed, that was reaffirmed for my right hon. Friend and me when we went to the United States just last week. Many of the Congressmen and women and Senators acknowledged that they are very much at the beginning of thinking about a counter-radicalisation strategy, whereas this country is well ahead. This country’s position has been aided enormously by the different groups that we have funded to help us. They have had programmes and have been able to develop an evidence base about the best way to counter extremism, and the Quilliam Foundation has been at the heart of that process for the past three years at least.

As everyone knows, Quilliam was formed by Ed Husain and Maajid Nawaz, both of whom had been in the grip of extremists. They had been right at the heart of Hizb ut-Tahrir and knew what it felt like to travel down that path. Therefore, their voices and the voices of others at Quilliam who have been able to set out the emotional process that happens to people on that journey have been enormously powerful and valuable in working out strategies to counter extremism. They were certainly instrumental, when I was the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in my decision to set up the Young Muslims Advisory Group and the Muslim Women’s Advisory Group.

It was the first time in this country that we had people at national level who were able to advise Ministers about what it felt like to be a young person in the community with strong feelings about foreign policy and contentious issues, and with the many pressures that face them at that time of their life. What could the Government do to try to help them to grow up with a sense of this country’s values but also, of course, their important personal identity and heritage? The Muslim Women’s Advisory Group was a fabulous opportunity to find out about women’s lives, and how women could influence the young men in their families to withstand the extremist narrative. We can celebrate the huge amount that we achieved, but, obviously, we have much more to do.

Going around the country after 7/7 with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East was probably one of the most testing experiences I personally have ever undergone. The sense of anger, bewilderment and shock in communities was palpable, but the message that came across to me time and again was that the overwhelming majority of people in the Muslim community totally rejected the violence that had taken place, and believed that killing innocent people was never justifiable. Unfortunately, the extremism that leads people to contemplate and sometimes adopt violence is with us now—there is no getting away from that—and is likely to be with us for many years to come. Life has changed, and we ought to recognise that the circumstances are very different. That is why it is so important that we have the capacity to tackle that ideology and the way in which people seek to groom others to take the path of violence.

I want to mention a report which I think is relevant to this debate. “Fear and HOPE”, which was published last week by the Searchlight Educational Trust, is about the new politics of identity. Many people who are susceptible to extremist narratives are struggling with their sense of identity: who am I, where do I fit in, where do I belong, what is my value set?

The report, which was based on 5,000 interviews of people across the country who were asked more than 90 questions, provides some fascinating results and evidence. What gives me optimism and hope is that there is widespread rejection of political violence. It is interesting that the vast majority of people who were questioned considered white anti-Muslim extremists to be as bad as Islamist extremists. That tells me that a core part of our communities and population are basically saying, “A plague on both your houses. We want no part of extremism, whether far-right extremism, Islamist extremism or anti-Semitism—we reject all that.”

It gives me great hope for the future that if we can build, sustain and make that heart of our community strong, it will empower and give confidence to young people to say, “I reject the extremist narrative. I reject such ideologies and share the broad values of this country.” That prize is so precious and valuable that the investment of £150,000 to enable Quilliam to move to other sources of funding over the next few months is a small price to pay, considering the scale of the challenge that we face. I absolutely agree with the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington that we need a broad range of organisations to help with the agenda at every part of the spectrum. It is without doubt that Quilliam has been prepared to be at one end of that spectrum, to speak out, not to be intimidated, and to state the case for pluralism, inclusion and British values of democracy, tolerance, free speech, and particularly the rights of women. It has been extremely effective in doing that.

Obviously, we must support other organisations, and I will come to that, but it is only three years since Quilliam was established, and to have gained its reputation in the world within that period marks it out as a special organisation that has helped us to build that evidence base. Its report on radicalisation on campuses was extremely good and contained a series of recommendations. We know that there is a problem on some of our university campuses, and the report’s practical recommendations could help us significantly. It produced a report on the use of the internet to promote Jihad. We are now seeing preachers such as al-Maliki on the internet urging people to take matters into their own hands without having a group around them, and to carry out individual acts of terrorism. That report on the use of the internet was a good piece of work. The role of television in influencing young minds is crucial.

Quilliam has produced excellent reports, and done project work—for example, its work in Pakistan, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East mentioned, which was funded by the Foreign Office, with road shows prepared in challenging and sometimes intimidating circumstances to make the case fearlessly. It has a tremendous record. It is seeking other sources of funding. It recognises that the current situation cannot continue ad infinitum, but it must be given the chance to do that work.

I have some questions for the Minister, and if he cannot answer them during the debate, I would appreciate it if he got back to me later. The Research Information and Communications Unit was established in the Office of Security and Counter-terrorism in the Home Office three or four years ago. My recollection is that that was a fairly well resourced unit. It received contributions from the Department for Communities and Local Government, the Home Office, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and it brought together a series of people with the skills to develop a counter-narrative, to publish documents, and to do research and much of the work that Quilliam has been doing.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I remember a conversation I had with a senior Minister about the setting-up of RICU. My understanding is that there was an analogy between it and the operation set up at the onset of the cold war to try to counter communist subversion and propaganda. Either such organisations do the work themselves, or they do the research and support other non-governmental organisations that will go on to the front line and fight the ideological battle. I do not think I have seen anything to suggest that RICU is fighting that battle under its own banner on the front line. If it is not doing that itself, why is it not perpetually committed to the support of other organisations such as Quilliam which are prepared to go into the front line?

[Hazel Blears]

The hon. Gentleman makes an excellent point, to which I hope the Minister will respond. The comparison between the funding of RICU and the funding that we are asking for in this debate would be illuminating. It is clear that there is a straightforward and simple al-Qaeda narrative, which is that the west is at war with Islam with a feeling of victimhood and grievance. That must be countered, and it is my understanding that that was a core part of RICU’s responsibilities. I would be grateful if the Minister let us know what its resources are, what the product is, what it has been working on and, indeed, whether it can fund other organisations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a privilege to follow that outstanding speech by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears). Her work and that of the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins) as Ministers on this topic excited the admiration of many of us when we were on the Opposition Benches. It continues to excite my admiration now that they are in opposition, but still fighting just as hard on this vital topic as they ever did when they were Ministers.

During the 1990s, I occasionally had the privilege of taking part in courses on public speaking, oratory and campaigning techniques with another member of the House of Commons who is now Mr Speaker. He always impressed on everyone who came to our courses that when making a speech one should have, at most, two main points, but preferably only one, with which to belabour one’s listeners over and over again, so that if they remembered nothing else about what one had said, they would remember that one point.

Here is my one point today. It is that countering hostile propaganda is not a commercial enterprise or undertaking. It requires sponsorship and support. It is absolute nonsense to say that people who are brave enough to put themselves in the front of an ideological battle should be selling their product on a commercial basis because that somehow means that their organisation is more vibrant.

If organisations that are fighting an ideological battle do not get support from the Government, they will need to get it from private sources. I know of no organisation during the cold war that fought these sorts of ideological campaigns—there were many such organisations; I was involved in several of them—that managed to make enough money to sustain itself as a going concern commercially. Such organisations had to find sponsorship. As I understand it, Quilliam has been rather particular about the sponsors it has sought. It could have taken money from undemocratic regimes but I believe that it turned down those offers. Although it might have agreed with those regimes on certain issues, it could not agree with the way that they rule their countries and peoples. Let us not fool ourselves into thinking that if Government funding is cut from an organisation, that organisation will somehow transform itself into a profit-making enterprise. It will not; that is not its function. The more time that activists in a counter-propaganda organisation spend raising funds, the less time they have available to do the job of countering radicalisation and extremism.

I hope that the Government will have the good sense to continue funding Quilliam because I am a little concerned about what may be going on under the surface. On the surface, as the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles said at the beginning of her remarks, we have an excellent speech from the Prime Minister stating that we must be tough on radicalism and that we must not compromise. We must not pretend that people who speak with a double voice, as it were, and say that they are against extremism on the one hand but treat it softly on the other, are the only people with whom we should deal. Although that sort of speech makes all the right sounds, in reality Government officials are kicking away the props that support what is undoubtedly one of the most high-profile and successful organisations in the field of counter-propaganda.

I use those words deliberately because this is a propaganda war involving propaganda by those who seek to radicalise, and counter-propaganda by those who seek to defeat and undermine their campaigns. That sort of work must not be undermined by paid Government officials at a time when the head of the Government says that we ought to do more of it.

Something strange is going on and I think I know what it is. Reference was made earlier to the important conference being held today at the Royal United Services Institute. I had hoped to attend that conference this morning, but I felt that this debate was rather more important. My mind went back to a previous conference held quite a few years ago at the RUSI, and a rather impressive Government speaker on counter-terrorism. I subsequently sought a briefing from that speaker, and the Government gave permission for me to have one. During the course of the conversation, I made the point that one clearly had to encourage moderate Muslims to stand up against minority activists, just as in so many other fields. Particularly during the cold war and student radicalism on campuses in other decades, it had been necessary for moderates to stand up for the silent majority against the noisy activist and—above all—unrepresentative minority. I was intrigued by what the expert official said. He replied, “That’s absolutely true: there is a gap between those who hold moderate values and those who hold extreme values. However, there is another gap between those who hold extreme values and those—a much smaller group—who are willing to turn their extreme values and views into extreme and violent action.”

It seems that the Government—perhaps I should say the establishment, as that remains the same when Governments change—have primarily signed up to focusing on the division between extremist people who do not intend to be violent, and extremist people who intend to be violent. There is some value in that approach, but I do not believe that it should be exclusive. If we depend on people in the Muslim community with extreme views to stand up against others from that community with extreme views who want to be violent, we will not get a happy outcome. We must promote moderate values in the Muslim community. Therefore, we need an organisation that is prepared not only to attack violent extremism, but to counter the pernicious ideology of those who might not be planning violence, but who foster an extreme ideological environment where some people will absorb sufficiently illiberal notions and end up turning to violence.

I am concerned about this issue because there are a couple of ways in which counter-propaganda organisations can work. Some such organisations can, and should, concentrate on changing minds. If we wish to try that, it is important to persuade people who are inclined towards fundamentalism that they are wrong, and to have organisations that are perhaps tolerated more happily than Quilliam within the Muslim ideological community. Those organisations can work on trying to change the minds of those who are already radical.

There is, however, another more important element that must not be neglected. We hope, and I genuinely believe, that the majority of people in the Muslim community—I would like to think the overwhelming majority—hold moderate beliefs and are not extremist at all. The problem is that of the three sectors—the moderate community, the extreme community that is not violent and the extreme splinter community that is violent—the Government machine focuses too much on the second two categories, to the exclusion of the first. The only way we will win an ideological battle or war is by mobilising the silent majority. The silent majority is a hackneyed phrase because we use it a lot. Nevertheless, we use it a lot because it is true; it has to be true, and if it were not we might as well give up on civilisation straight away. We need groups that are not necessarily involved in trying to change minds, but rather in trying to reinforce moderate views that already exist.

[Tom Brake]

Does the hon. Gentleman believe that it is unrealistic to expect Quilliam to secure funds from trusts or benefactors rather than from the Government?

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

It is not unrealistic and I made that explicit at the beginning of my speech. I said that if one does not get funds from the Government, one must get them from another sponsor. Ideally, one should have a range of funders, and the Government ought to be a part of that. My point is that if the Government have any sense, they will not withdraw funding in such a way that an organisation will collapse. If they believe that the organisation’s work is of sufficient value, they should ensure that it has secure funding before they begin to draw down their own funding stream. It is as simple as that.

I will conclude with one further point. It is my second point and I do not mind if hon. Members do not remember it, as long as they remember my first point. There are two types of counter-propaganda. There is counter-propaganda that is designed to persuade people to change their minds, and there is counter-propaganda that is designed to reinforce the moderate views that the silent majority already hold.

I shall give an example. When I was a youngster in the 1960s, a huge argument was going on about whether this country should continue to be defended by a nuclear deterrent. I was sure that it should continue to be defended by a nuclear deterrent, but time after time I would see people on the television and hear people on the radio saying, “No, that isn’t necessary.” I began to think, “Well, I’m only a teenager. What do I know about this?” I began to doubt my own commitment. Then one day, someone from another country was being interviewed on television and he made such a convincing case for the nuclear deterrent, and articulated so much better than I could, as a youngster, the case for what I believed already, that I thought, “Fine. I’m okay. That’s all I need to know. At least one other person in the world, brainier and more articulate than I am, has come to the same conclusion for the same reason.”

I believe that groups such as Quilliam both need to do the type of work that I have described and actually do that type of work. There are moderate Muslims who, because of the way in which radicalism and extremism dominate the narrative, will begin to doubt themselves—even though their own views are moderate. It is the job of a group such as Quilliam to show that when the extremists say, “We are mainstream and you are un-Islamic,” in fact the reverse is the case. To get that message across, people must be knowledgeable and professional, must have a huge amount of detail at their disposal and must have access to the airwaves, the printing presses and the internet.

I am very sorry that the Government, because they believe in persuading people to change their minds, are to kick away the support from an organisation that is dedicated to reinforcing people who do not need to change their minds, but need to be encouraged to speak up and need to be reassured that they are right and the extremists are wrong. This is not a commercial enterprise; it is a political fight. If the Government want to take the line that the organisation must be self-funding and self-supporting, let us ask ourselves this final question. How many Departments would be able to do their work if they had to raise the money to fund it themselves as a result of the product of their work, rather than their income stream coming from taxation? I think we would find that not a single Department—except perhaps the Ministry of fun—would survive such a proposition.

I believe that Quilliam’s work is essential. I believe that it is non-commercial. It has been supported thanks to the work of the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles and of the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East, whom I congratulate on initiating this very important debate. It is no coincidence that more than half the House of Commons members of the Intelligence and Security Committee are here making this case today, even though we are making it in our personal capacities, not as members of that Committee. I shall leave time for the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) to speak. I hope that the Government will take our message extremely seriously.

[Jim Dobbin (in the Chair)]

Order. I know that Mr McFadden has been very patient, but I must remind him that the Front-Bench responses to the debate start at 10.40.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for Immigration (Damian Green)]

In congratulating the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), let me say how grateful I am for the constructive way in which he made his suggestions and asked his questions; indeed, I am grateful for the constructive tone in which the whole debate has taken place. I am particularly grateful to have had the benefit of the experience of the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), who clearly grappled with these absolutely vital, difficult and sensitive issues when she worked in various Departments.

I should say at the outset that there is no doubt that Quilliam has done important work in support of counter-terrorism efforts in this country. Various Members on both sides have quoted the Prime Minister’s Munich speech, in which he set out the course that the Government will follow on counter-terrorism, and Quilliam continues to contribute to that. The Home Office understood the role that Quilliam could play when it helped the organisation get off the ground in 2008. Officials and Ministers provided it with extensive advice and assistance at that time.

The Home Office envisaged that Quilliam would be able to work in and with Muslim communities, and particularly with young people, challenging and exposing terrorist ideology and contributing to the aim of stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, to observe the distinction made by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis). The Home Office judged that, as former radical Islamists themselves, Quilliam’s founders would be able to draw on their own experiences to describe that ideology, explain why it might seem superficially compelling and demonstrate its incoherence. Quilliam subsequently developed a significant research function, and has published some papers on important issues, including radicalisation on the internet, in prisons and in further and higher education.

It is fair to say that, since 2008, Quilliam has developed a brand, a message and a clear public position. It is known not only in this country but overseas, notably in the USA. Throughout that period, both the Home Office and the Foreign Office provided Quilliam with significant financial assistance. Quilliam has received more Home Office Prevent funding than any other single organisation—nearly £1.2 million over the past three financial years. The Foreign Office has provided nearly £1.5 million in project funding over the same period.

Regarding funding for Quilliam and other organisations, Pakistan was mentioned and the important work that needs to be done there. Tackling radicalisation in Pakistan is clearly important but, to put it into context, there are nearly 100 organisations, large and small, supporting Prevent overseas. More than 20 of those are in Pakistan, many of them working anonymously for obvious security reasons. All of those are funded by the Foreign Office.

This financial year, the Home Office has provided Quilliam with six-figure funding. It has been invited to submit bids for project funding in the next financial year.

[Dr Lewis]

I wish Ministers would stop using the phrase, which has clearly been given to them, of six-figure funding. Six-figure funding can be from £100,000 to £999,000. There are big variations in it.

[Damian Green]

There are indeed, and I will come to exact figures in a second.

The funding provided to Quilliam has been unique, not only in its scale but in its scope. It has been used not just for projects and programmes but, exceptionally, for significant overheads and running costs. The Government agree that Quilliam deserved some support in the past, and we continue to believe that Quilliam is capable of useful work. However, following a review of all the organisations, projects and programmes supported as part of the Prevent strategy, Home Office Ministers have taken the decision to end funding for Quilliam’s running costs from the end of this financial year. Clearly, that is the heart and purpose of the debate.

I say to the right hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East that there is an offer on the table to Quilliam of tens of thousands of pounds to cover the next few months of basic operations. He and the array of distinguished ex-Ministers on the Opposition Benches will recognise that this not the place to conduct detailed financial negotiations. I want to assure him and everyone who has attended the debate that there is an offer. It would be foolish for me to start negotiating here; I will merely gently observe that the £150,000 transitional money referred to by several right hon. and hon. Members is actually more than the total Home Office money given to Quilliam over the past 12 months, as decided by the previous Government. I would not want anyone to leave the debate with the thought that £150,000 is a small percentage of what Quilliam might have expected to receive. It is actually more than the total budget received from the Home Office in the past year.

[Damian Green]

In December. My hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East asked for specific numbers. The trajectory of Home Office direct funding for Quilliam is quite clear. In 2008-09, it was £665,000; in 2009-10, it was £387,000; and in 2010-11, it was £145,000. There was a clear trend in the direction agreed with by everyone who has spoken in the debate: that is, that Quilliam does good work but that a think-tank of that kind should not be reliant for its core running costs on Government funding.

[Dr Lewis]

rose—

[Damian Green]

If my hon. Friend will excuse me, I need to make some progress, because others have asked interesting “in principle” questions, which I need to address. He himself gave the impression there was some kind of conspiracy afoot, and I wish to reject that.

Home Office Ministers have taken the decisions they have for three reasons. First, Quilliam has, as we all agree, evolved into a think-tank; it is no longer fulfilling the role for which it was originally funded by the previous Government. Secondly, Quilliam has continually committed to broadening its sources of funding and to becoming more self-reliant, and I think we agree that that needs to happen. Thirdly, Home Office Ministers believe that the Department can no longer make an exception for Quilliam by paying for its ongoing running costs as well as funding specific projects. The Home Office does not support any other think-tank on that basis, a point well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake).

Let me deal with each of those points in turn. As I have already said, the original purpose for which Quilliam was funded by Government was to work in and with Muslim communities to challenge the ideology of terrorism and extremism. In some cases, that has not been done as successfully as Ministers originally hoped. Since 2008, Quilliam has progressively engaged in a different and rather broader range of activities consistent with its declared intention of being a think-tank. It publishes work on a range of security issues, not confined to the narrower and hugely important issue of countering radicalisation. In doing so, I emphasise again, Quilliam makes important contributions to the overall debate.

Counter-terrorism

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 20th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Damian Green]

The right hon. Gentleman rather makes my point. I repeat that my right hon. Friend the Leader of the House said last week that the Home Secretary would make a statement next week, and I am now able to reveal that it will be next Wednesday, so he asks the correct question: why are we doing this now? We are doing it now because the right hon. Member for Morley and Outwood (Ed Balls) asked an urgent question and I have shocked him by giving a substantive answer. I make no apology for that.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Can my hon. Friend explain why this welcome announcement appeared prematurely in so many media outlets at the same time? We always criticised that when we were in opposition and I would have hoped we would take firm action against leaks now that we are in government.

[Damian Green]

I have no idea where that information came from. I can only say that nothing to do with any of this has ever come out from me or my office.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 19th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Damian Green]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. He will understand that, for obvious reasons, it is not the Government’s policy, and never has been the policy under any Government, to discuss whether an organisation is or is not under consideration for proscription. It would clearly be foolish for any Minister to give running commentaries on what is going on with individual organisations, so I do not propose to start now.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend said that this was the ninth in a series of proscriptions. Bearing in mind some of the reservations that were expressed at the time that the original legislation was enacted, can he reassure the House that there has been no sign of any previously proscribed organisations seeking to get round the proscription by such devices as changing their names?

[Damian Green]

Indeed, that is one of the activities that concerns Ministers and it is one of the things that has happened in the past. Organisations have sought to reappear under different names and have been re-proscribed. We are extremely aware of the very serious problem to which my hon. Friend refers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Green]

Thank you, Mr Speaker, and felicitations.

I am grateful to the House for the many important points raised and, in particular, for the tone of the debate on the key issue of the process. Clearly, the Government are exercising very serious powers, so it needs to be done carefully and kept under proper review. I assure hon. Members on both sides of the House that I very much share their feelings about that.

I should gently say to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood) that I am genuinely bemused by her point about the timeliness of the briefing given to the shadow Home Secretary. I understand that he asked for a briefing on Privy Council terms early this afternoon and received it later this afternoon. I genuinely do not know how much faster the Government could have been expected to react to that request, so I am puzzled by the point she made.

The hon. Lady asked a number of important questions, some of which were about the criteria and the process. Those legitimate questions were echoed by other hon. Members, not least by the hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) and my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake). There seems to be a slight misunderstanding involving the absolute nature of proscription for ever, because this arrangement is not like that. I think it will help all those who asked the questions if I simply go through what has to happen under the Terrorism Act 2000 for a body to be proscribed.

The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes

“that it is concerned in terrorism.”

What “concerned in terrorism” means under the Act is that an organisation

“(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism,

(b) prepares for terrorism,

(c) promotes or encourages terrorism”—

that includes “unlawful glorification”—

“or

(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”

If that statutory test is met, the Secretary of State will take into account other factors when deciding whether or not to proscribe. Those criteria are: the nature and scale of the organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the UK; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism.

Most importantly, the Home Secretary comes to this decision after having received advice from a cross-departmental group. That group reviews the proscription of all proscribed organisations on a rolling 12-month basis, so there is a permanent rolling programme of checking which groups are proscribed and whether it is appropriate to continue with the proscription. That seems to me to be a proper process, because I take the points made by hon. Members on both sides about how groups can change and how, in all these areas of this world, it is of course in the interests of the British Government and the British people not only to combat terrorism—that is clearly important—but to try to foster a democratic dialogue so that troubled countries can move into the democratic ambit.

I wish to answer some of the other detailed questions, in so far as I can. I was asked by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood and by my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington about TTP’s activities and presence in the UK. I am sure that the House will understand that I cannot comment on intelligence matters and details, but I can say that the TTP aspires to mount attacks in the west, as was demonstrated by its involvement in the failed Times square car bomb attack, and TTP leaders have publicly threatened the UK in the past. The group also threatens this country by targeting our interests and allied interests overseas: for instance, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack on the United Nations World Food Programme office in Islamabad in October 2009, which killed five people.

The hon. Lady rightly asked what the UK Government are doing to help to stabilise Pakistan. We actively engage the Government of Pakistan to implement political reform in the tribal areas. In addition, through the conflict prevention fund, the Foreign Office is spending £3.65 million a year on reducing the governance and security vacuum that evidently exists in that part of the world, improving Afghan-Pakistan relations and co-operation, and reducing insecurity in Balochistan. So we are playing a very active role.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am still not quite clear about one aspect. Surely the banning of an organisation in this country is carried out because there is reason to suspect that it is going to try to be active in this country. It is not simply a matter of trying to perform a terrorist act, which would be a crime in any case, but of trying to function in this country. Is there any evidence that either this group or its sympathisers are currently active in this country? There are of course all sorts of terrorist groups around the world that are not active in this country which we do not seek to add them to our own proscribed list.

[Damian Green]

If I were to answer my hon. Friend in detail, I would reveal intelligence information. I am sure that he, with his distinguished background in defence, would not want me to do that. I would refer him to the list of criteria I mentioned, which includes attacks on British citizens and British interests, along with those of our allies around the world. I think it would be beneficial if he studied those criteria carefully.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood asked about the review. I hope she is reassured not just by what I said about the rolling 12-month review programme, but by the fact that there is an appeal mechanism—first to the Home Secretary and then to an independent committee. The legislation allows for that. She asked whether the discretionary criteria are still appropriate, and we believe that they are. Counter-terrorism policy is, of course, kept permanently under review. She asked about the time scale; she will be aware that the Home Secretary is currently reviewing the most sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism and security powers and measures. It would be particularly inappropriate to speculate on the outcome of the review, as we are going to announce the findings shortly. I hope that the hon. Lady will be reassured by that.

The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) raised a particular case. I take his point, but say simply in response that the Government have a wide range of counter-terrorism tools at their disposal, including asset freezing, exclusion and so forth. It would obviously be improper for me to comment on an individual case.

Public Order Policing

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 13th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. I must just remind the House that in keeping with very long-standing convention, Members who were not here at the start of the Home Secretary’s statement should not expect to be called.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does the Home Secretary accept that it is just as unacceptable for violent extremists to be present at student demonstrations as it would be for provocative foreign preachers to be present in the country when they have threatened to burn the Koran?

[Mrs May]

My hon. Friend has very cleverly linked two issues in his question, but he tempts me down a route that I do not think it appropriate to go down at this point.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 6th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

My right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice was absolutely clear that there is no simple link between police numbers and levels of crime. Indeed, that view was reiterated last September by the right hon. Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw)—and perhaps the hon. Gentleman could have a conversation with him about this very point as they are sitting next to each other on the Opposition Benches.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

T9. In the WikiLeaks affair referred to earlier, was not the real problem that a low-level crime yielded such a high volume of confidential data? So is not the real lesson for the future that gigantic databases of this sort ought not to be created? Will the Home Secretary be spreading that lesson around relevant Departments?

[Mrs May]

As I said in response to an earlier question from my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell), the national security adviser has been in touch with Departments about the use of confidential information by the UK Government, asking them to review matters and provide him with assurances about their information security arrangements. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) will be aware that there is a balance to be achieved between the very real need for people to have access to information in order to be able to do their jobs properly and the need to restrict access to some of that information. That balance has to be achieved, and decisions are made on that basis.

Immigration

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 18th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Field]

I could not agree more. That is a valuable intervention. I would hope that in those 40-odd years, the sense of the community has developed. Although I think we should not put our sticky fingers into issues such as whether arranged marriages are suitable, quite a large number of people here are, in a sense, in the arranged marriage market. Much of the tension might dissipate if there were more arranged marriages from communities in this country rather than between people brought in from the Indian sub-continent. Unless those people have the ability to speak English, they might find that they are not treated in this country as we would wish them to be treated.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I always listen to the right hon. Gentleman with the greatest respect. I understand that he has concentrated his remarks on the factor of numbers, but will he also say something about the attitudes of the people who come into this country in the hope of finding a better life? My grandparents were immigrants and wanted to come here because they preferred life as they imagined it here and wanted to be part of this country. Is not the real problem not so much one of numbers, but of people coming here who do not like and might even hate the methods we have of governing ourselves and living in this country? What can we do about that?

[Mr Field]

The issue is about numbers and I do not want people to move away from it, because that is where the growing sense of agreement across the Chamber and in the country at large now lies. I would have put the intervention the other way round, if I had dared to make it. I would have asked why this country has had a political elite that has paid so little attention to our open borders for so long that they did not think it suitable to suggest that people coming here should develop a primary sense of loyalty to this country. I do not think we are in any position to moan when we were so careless that we did not have the confidence to lay down what citizenship in this country was about. I am against anyone trying to turn the debate against those who came here under those conditions by saying that we do not approve of their behaviour. Not only new arrivals but others, including many people in my constituency, feel disaffected, and of course we need to find ways of affirming their citizenship.

[Dr Lewis]

I will not try the House’s patience for too long, but I must tell the right hon. Gentleman, with respect, that I cannot quite accept what he has said. It is not necessarily the responsibility of the receiving country to lay down in advance something as basic as the fact that someone who moves to a country must have some respect and regard for the norms, customs and standards of that country. People who come here knowing what this country is like, and then proceed to dislike it and try to undermine its ways, have a degree of responsibility themselves. It cannot all be put down to the conditions on which they were admitted.

[Mr Field]

The hon. Gentleman changed his line during his intervention. He ended his intervention by saying that such people could not be wholly responsible, whereas he said at the beginning that they were wholly responsible. I do not think that we should duck the political failure of this place and of successive Governments who have not had their wits about them, and have not recognised that a country is in a new ballgame when it opens its doors to mass immigration. We were negligent, and that applies to both sides of the House of Commons.

Let me emphasise that I do not want the debate to turn against people on whom we placed no duties when they came here. We did not bother to teach the meaning of citizenship to people who have been based here for generations, including many in my constituency. The hon. Gentleman has touched on what is, in fact, a much wider question.