European Commission: National Parliaments

John Redwood Excerpts

Tuesday 10th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

Last night we debated the similar issue of the Commission’s work programme for this year. The programme expresses commitments to better regulation and to focusing on the big things that the European Union needs to do, and that leads us to the issues of subsidiarity and proportionality. Over the years, there has been much talk in the European Union of subsidiarity—a concept whose origins lie in Catholic social teaching—but few would claim that the EU has abided by the notion that it should act only when it has to, and should otherwise leave things to the Governments of member states.

The Minister gave the example of the agency workers directive. In fact, the CBI reached an agreement with the TUC on that directive, and I think that the record should show their participation in order to present the complete picture.

As the Minister said, we are debating two reports, the one on subsidiarity and the one on relations with national Parliaments. They concern the interaction between the EU and national Parliaments, and, specifically, the use of reasoned opinions on EU proposals when, for instance, Parliaments come together to invoke the yellow card procedure—that is, to ask the Commission to think again about one of its proposals. According to the reports, 621 written opinions, including reasoned opinions, were submitted by national Parliaments in 2013, down slightly from 663 the year before. The most common subjects were the proposal to establish the European Public Prosecutor's Office, regulations covering the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, maritime spatial planning, access to ports, and matters relating to Europol. Opinions from 20 Parliaments were received on the EPPO proposals, of which 13 were reasoned opinions, triggering the yellow card procedure.

The European Scrutiny Committee has understandably voiced its frustration that the triggering of that procedure did not result in the Commission’s either withdrawing the proposal or changing it radically. That has, of course, prompted further debate about a range of different procedures going by the names of differently coloured cards—not just yellow but orange, red and even green cards, which will allow Parliaments to initiate proposals if they so wish. If a system is established whereby national Parliaments are given a voice and can come together to lodge reasoned opinions or objections, it is important that those objections are taken seriously and not simply ignored.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Let us say that a really important issue to the British people causes them to vote in a new Government who promise to do what they want on it, and then that Government are advised it is against European law. What right should this House have to say, “This is the will of the British people”?

[Mr McFadden]

The procedures we are talking about here are in line with European law. I think what the right hon. Gentleman is driving at is the question of vetoes, and we do not have vetoes. It is important for clarity, as well as the political debate between us, to be clear that these yellow card procedures are not national Parliament vetoes of the kind he may be referring to, and there is a difference between the two.

The objections to the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office focused on the Commission’s own interpretation of subsidiarity, the comparison between the new proposals and the arrangements already in place and the question of whether this proposal would add value in combating fraud. The House of Lords has issued a report on this matter, and it gave the following verdict:

“We fear that under the Commission’s proposed model an EPPO enjoying exclusive competence for PIF crimes”—

financial fraud in the European Union—

“would be in danger of being overwhelmed by its workload, and its structure would not be sufficiently robust to enable it to monitor its investigations and prosecutions in the Member States. We see a similar problem with the Presidency’s alternative proposal. The evidence we received on the proposed introduction of a collegiate structure into the EPPO overwhelmingly suggests that this would complicate the prosecution of these crimes even further.”

Its reservations about the proposal were clear, and we shared many of them, although for the sake of clarity and completeness I should say that that does not mean that we on the Opposition Benches object to all European involvement in matters of criminal justice. Without rehearsing debates in the House on the European arrest warrant—that may be to the relief of all—we believe that that measure does have a useful role to play in combating crime both here and elsewhere in the EU.

Following all these exchanges and the rejection of the yellow card procedure by the Commission, there have been proposals from a number of Parliaments, including the Dutch and Danish Parliaments as well as our own, for reforms to the yellow card procedure. We welcome the Commission’s willingness, indicated by Mr Juncker, to establish a working group on the role of national Parliaments in the EU, but it is important that that is a serious process and that it takes the suggestions for different reforms seriously. We would also endorse the sentiment in the Government’s response to the reports about the value of Commissioners appearing before national Parliaments to explain and answer questions on the Commission’s actions and policies. We would like to see more of that in the future.

The important point is that, however many opinions are submitted or whatever the architecture of the yellow card procedure, it will be seen to be of little value if it is simply ignored. To refer to the question of the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood), we do not seek to turn the legal basis of the EU on its head or make demands which are incompatible with membership, but we do believe that dialogue between the Commission and national Parliaments must take seriously not only the sum of correspondence over the course of a year but its content.

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[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

This debate is central to what we do here in Parliament and to the promises that various parties will make to their electors as we leave this place shortly and go into a general election.

It used to be a fundamental principle of the House of Commons that no House of Commons properly elected could bind a successor House of Commons. That was a fundamental part of the British people’s liberties, because they have to trust a House of Commons for up to five years to legislate and govern on their behalf, and they can do so safe in the knowledge that if we—those in government—do not please, they can dismiss us at the following general election and elect a new group of people who can change all that they did not like about the laws and conduct of government of the Government whom they have just removed. But our membership of the European Economic Community, now the Union, has increasingly damaged, undermined and overwhelmed that essential precept, which was the guarantee of our liberties as the British people, because now there are huge areas of work that are under European law and European control. Those parties that go out from this House into the general election and, for example, offer a better deal on energy may well come back and discover that what they have offered is quite impossible under the strict and far-reaching rules on energy that now come from the European Union.

Yesterday, we did not have time to debate in the House the energy package, but within the proposals we were being asked to approve in the Commission’s work programme was a strategic framework for energy policy that, in turn, will spawn an enormous amount of detailed regulation and legislation, making energy a European competence almost completely. Therefore, more or less anything that the main political parties say about what they wish to do on energy policy during the next five years will be possible only if it just happens that what they wish to do is entirely in agreement with and legal under this massive amount of law and regulation that is partly in place already and will come forward in ever-increasing volumes under the strategic framework and further legal policy, and that is but one area.

A couple of other big areas that will be much debated in the election are welfare and border and migration policy. Again, anything that parties say in our general election has to go through the European test. Will changes in benefits that parties wish to see be legal or possible under the European Union? May we not find that we are completely bound by predecessor Parliaments because they have signed up to legal requirements under European law that make it impossible for the House any longer to control our own welfare policy?

Yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Europe encouraged me with his optimism because he said that welfare remained a national UK matter, but there is plenty of evidence that it already is not in many respects. All sorts of policies have been looked at that I am told would fall foul of European law and regulation. It is quite obvious, again, looking at the European Union’s work programme, that it will intensify its activity in this area and make it even more difficult for a national Parliament to express the wish that it wants in its laws on welfare. The same is true of border controls, where we are signed up to the free movement of peoples and that is now being ever more generously interpreted as giving the EU carte blanche and substantial control over border and migration policy throughout the EU.

We find ourselves in the position of debating today yellow cards and red cards to try to assert the will of national Parliaments, but it comes nowhere near the task that we need to undertake as we seek to reshape our relationship with the EU. Even having a red card, where national Parliaments collectively can block a new proposal, does nothing to tackle the problem that we have this vast panoply of law already agreed, sometimes many years ago, which may prevent a national Parliament from reflecting the will of its people. If we have to get all or most of the other member states’ national Parliaments to agree, that could still be extremely difficult, and an individual member state, which had an overwhelmingly strong national view on the subject, might be thwarted because it just did not happen to be something that worried the other member states.

We need to pause over this. I remember the excellent words of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in his Bloomberg speech. The Bloomberg speech wisely said that the fount of political authority in any European member state, but certainly in the United Kingdom, rests with the national electorate through the national Parliament, and that, I think, is still right. We see that in the recent conflicts and rows in a country such as Greece, which is under even more European control than we are by being part of the euro. The Prime Minister reasoned that this country needs to negotiate a new relationship with the EU that recognises that on really important things—I would have thought that welfare, borders and energy were really important things—if necessary, the national Parliament can assert and interpret the will of the British people. There should be some mechanism by which we can then do as we wish, reflecting the will of the people.

We see at the moment the tragedy of Greece, where these conflicts are much further advanced because the European Union is much more intrusive on a euro member than on the United Kingdom. We have witnessed some very interesting things. Those on both Front Benches need to listen to and study this very carefully, because their futures, as well as the future of our country, are very much at stake. The first remarkable thing is that in the most recent Greek general election the two former traditional main parties—the equivalents of Labour and Conservative—polled 33% between them. Those parties, until recently, alternated in government. They had got into that parlous state because whatever they wanted to do in the interests of Greece was blocked, modified or amended because, in practice, decisions were made by the euro group, the European Central Bank and the troika they came to hate. So the Greek people said, “It doesn’t make any difference which of you two we have. The socialists can’t be socialists and the capitalists can’t be capitalists. You all end up with the same euro policy that is driving the Greek economy into the mire.” The poor Greeks have lost almost a quarter of their national output since 2007. That this can happen in an advanced western country is mind blowing. Half their young people are out of work as a result of these policies.

The two main parties had nothing to offer because they either had to go along with the euro scheme in all its details or promise to disagree, but only in the full knowledge that they would not be allowed to do so and do anything different. Then the Greek people elected into government a challenger party, with no experience of government, saying that it intended to break the rules of the euro: it did not want the troika arriving and telling them how to govern their country and did not intend to accept the bank details and loan packages that had been drawn up by the previous regimes. We now see this gripping and gruelling conflict where the euro area and the EU are telling Greece, “Well, we’ve got news for you: these are the rules. We don’t mind that your electorate have just rejected it all. We don’t care that you’ve elected into government a party that completely disagrees with us. You have no power in this. You the Greek people, you the Greek Parliament and you the Greek Government have to accept these rules, because those are the club rules.”

We heard a mild version of that attitude from the shadow spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), when I asked him whether, on a mighty issue that matters a great deal to the British people, there should be a right for us in this House to reflect their view and legislate accordingly. He said no, there should be no such right, and we have to follow all the rules of the European scheme.

Throughout past years, when those rules related just to trading arrangements or industrial regulation, they could be irritating or vexatious, but they were not going to become game changers that mobilised the whole British people against the whole scheme of the European Union. However, when the European Union rules start to influence things that matter a great deal to people—their welfare system, their benefits system, their borders or their migration—that might start to create a much bigger reaction. When European rules and requirements have a devastating impact on an economy and employment prospects—fortunately not in this country, because we have kept out of that bit—that completely transforms the politics of that country, and we see the politics of impotence, the politics of protest and the politics of frustration.

I do not want our country to go down that route. That is why I say that we need to negotiate now, before we get to that stage, an arrangement—not just a yellow card or a red card in conjunction with other member states—for us, the United Kingdom, to say that we are still a vibrant democracy. We need to be able to say that if something matters a great deal to the British people and if it has been approved in a general election, this House can take action even if it means disagreeing with the rules of the European Union. By all means, we can try to negotiate an arrangement case by case, but where we cannot do that, we need an override—an opportunity to say, “This thing matters too much to our democracy.” If we do not have that very simple change, we no longer have in this country a successful and vibrant democracy that can guarantee stability and guarantee to deliver what the British people want.

[Graham Stringer]

I agree with the basic thrust of the right hon. Gentleman’s argument, but is not most of what he is suggesting impossible? Most of the rules governing the European Union are bound up in treaties that require 28 countries to decide to change them, and that is simply not going to happen. Much as I agree with his aspirations, I am afraid that they will not come about, will they?

[Mr Redwood]

The hon. Gentleman may be right, so I hope that the British people have a referendum in which they may decide that they cannot live under such a regime without change. I would certainly vote to leave if flexibility cannot be built into the system along the lines that I have mentioned. He is a distinguished politician both locally and nationally, and surely he recognises that when we need fundamental change, we have to make the case for it and be optimistic.

I am not completely pessimistic because I do not believe that only Britain needs such a change. If this were just Britain being difficult—the island nation, on the edge of the European Union, whose traditions are old-fashioned and whose idea that Parliament really matters is now old hat because we have moved into a new world—I do not think we would win, but this is live, desperate politics for very large parts of the euro area.

The issue is live politics for what remains of the governing parties of the euro area because the path trodden by the two leading parties in Greece, whose jobs have been taken by Syriza, could be trodden by the two leading Spanish parties given the rise of Podemos and by the Italian parties given the rise of the Five Star movement and all the other pressure movements in Italy. Those countries are not immune to an insurgency challenge like the one in Greece. That sort of thing can start to concentrate the minds of other member states of the European Union and their Governments. One thing I have learned about Governments over the years is that they quite like staying in power. When they feel that there will be a very strong electoral challenge to them, they may begin by condemning it—saying it is irrational, unpleasant and all those kinds of thing—but if they think it is going to win, they have to do a deal with it, understand why people feel as they do and make some movement.

My strong advice to the whole European Union is that it needs to do a deal with the people who disagree with it, because the scheme is not working for all those people in the euro area. It needs to change policy, and it should do so before politics changes it. I do not want our country, which matters most to me, to get anywhere near such a point. I am pleased to have been part of the forces in this country that kept us out of the euro, which meant that we missed the worst—this country has a reasonable economic recovery that is completely unrelated to the continent, with its long recession and deep troubles in the southern territories—but as I see my country sucked into common policies on energy, borders, foreign affairs and welfare, I think that we might be sucked in too far and have exactly the same problems on those issues that the euro area is already experiencing on the central matter of economics.

I urge Ministers to take this seriously and to re-read the words of the Bloomberg speech. I urge the Opposition to join us, because they aspire to govern this country. One day they may come up with really popular policies and be elected on that basis, and what a tragedy it would be if they discovered that they could not enact those policies because they were illegal under European law. That could happen just as much to the Labour party as to the Conservative party.

These are not some private arguments among Conservatives in some secret club of Eurosceptics held in the privacy of the House of Commons; these are mighty arguments about the future of our continent and our country and about the nature of democracy itself. Accountability still rests with a national Parliament, not with the European institutions. If there is to be trust between politicians and the people, the national Parliament must be able to deliver when the people speak. We are in danger of that no longer being true, which is why a yellow card and a red card are not sufficient. It is also why we need to answer the question: how do the British people vote for what they want and how do an elected Government in Britain deliver it if it disagrees with European rules?

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg (North East Somerset) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Luton North (Kelvin Hopkins), who speaks such sense on these matters. It was also interesting to hear about his holiday plans for the summer, and I hope that he will tell us more about them in future debates.

I turn immediately to the wording of the motion. Her Majesty’s Government like to say all the right things and do all the wrong ones. Let us look at the end of the motion, which proposes that the House

“welcomes the Government’s commitment to increasing the power of national parliaments in EU decision-making by strengthening and, where possible, enhancing current provisions.”

It sounds splendid that we in the national Parliaments should have an increased role and that there should be proper scrutiny within this House. But let us look further into the Order Paper, where we find the European business and the debates set down to take place on the Floor of the House. We had one yesterday. How generous of Her Majesty’s Government to allow us, after months of delay, to debate an issue that had been suggested for debate by the European Scrutiny Committee!

Turning to the future European business, however, we see that no time or date has been set for the first debate in the list, on the free movement of EU citizens, despite its having being asked for more than a year ago. Debate No. 2 would be on strategic guidelines for EU justice and home affairs to 2020. Debate No. 3— [Interruption.] Bless you! Debate No. 3 would be on the rule of law in EU member states. Debate No. 4 should be on ports, a highly controversial matter awaiting the discussion that was suspended in the Committee because the Government had not got their act together. No. 5 is the topic that we are discussing now. No. 6 should cover the EU budget 2014, which is not a minor matter. Indeed, it is rather important. When we discuss our own Budget, we have four days of debate on it, yet we are not even given 90 minutes for the EU budget. No. 7 on the list is the EU charter of fundamental rights. So there are six further debates that we have not been given, yet today we are debating the Government’s wonderful commitment to increasing parliamentary scrutiny of European matters.

There is a saying that fine words butter no parsnips. We get a lot of fine words from Her Majesty’s Government but the parsnips remain distinctly unbuttered, and as I represent a dairying constituency, I think it is about time we had some butter and got the debates that the European Scrutiny Committee has been asking for. There is a considerable lack of wisdom in this approach—this contumely towards the House. These debates take place in an atmosphere of considerable cross-party consensus. Those on the Opposition Front Bench rarely cause any trouble in European debates, and the motions that are tabled are normally so anodyne that it is hard to oppose them. The Government broadly say that they are in favour of motherhood, apple pie and democracy while giving away as many of our freedoms as they can, as quickly as possible. Furthermore, these debates do not end up being front-page news.

Where the Government get into trouble, however, is through their lack of willingness to go along with what the European Scrutiny Committee has asked for. At that point, they run into procedural difficulties. We saw that in spades over the European arrest warrant, and we thought that the Government might have learnt the error of their ways and realised that trying to obstruct the procedures of the House of Commons is an error. They might have found from yesterday’s experience, when an amendment was tabled on a subject that the Government did not want us to discuss, that the House would get its way in the end. It did so because, fortunately, we have a robust Speaker who ensures that the House gets what it wants in the end. That is much to be welcomed. However, there should not be this constant battle between the European Scrutiny Committee and the Government to get that which the Standing Orders of the House of Commons require. The Government come out with ridiculous promises and fine words but simply fail to deliver on their promises.

[Mr Redwood]

Could it be that the Government believe their own propaganda? We are faced with having two Governments for the price of three in this country, a European Government and a United Kingdom Government, but the Government fondly believe that they are the sole Government and have not recognised that there is a much bigger Government over there doing a lot of their work for them. They do not want us to look at that.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My right hon. Friend makes the interesting suggestion that the Government are naive and foolish, and that is one way of looking at it. My view is that they are deliberate in their attempt to subvert the will of the House of Commons and its efforts to debate things. My right hon. Friend is a generous and kindly figure, for which he is renowned across the land, whereas I am afraid that I am perhaps rather more hard-nosed on this occasion and think that there is a desire to run away from debate. I do not know where that desire comes from. It is fundamentally unhealthy and undemocratic and the Government must understand that many of us will complain if this continues to happen.

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[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I would hardly have begun my speech if I were going to go through all the intricacies it might be necessary to cover, but I do not want to upset my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester, who has a serious matter to discuss that concerns my constituency.

The Government must bear in mind the fact that the debate is truncated thanks to the good nature of members of the European Scrutiny Committee and the Whips scurrying around asking whether we would be kindly. It has not been truncated because there is not a great deal to discuss. When the answer comes back that we are not interested as we do not take the full time, that will be an untruth. I am glad to see that the Minister for Europe is looking in my direction and notes that, because he never says anything other than the truth. I have great confidence in his intellect, if not always in the answers that come from it.

Proportionality and subsidiarity are of considerable importance. I am slightly suspicious of subsidiarity because, as the shadow Minister the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden) has said, it comes from the teaching of the Catholic Church. The holy mother Church, to which I belong, is a great, illustrious and historic institution, but if it is known for one thing other than its piety, it is its centralisation of power. It therefore strikes me that, if subsidiarity has been thought up by the holy mother Church, it is more likely to be to do with reinforcing the authority of the Holy See and of the papacy in particular than with spreading it far and wide. I happen to think that, in the case of the Church, that is a thoroughly good thing.

[Mr Redwood]

Is it not the other way round? We want this House to be able to do the big things. We do not want to be left with the crumbs from the table—we want the main meal.

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend and I was coming on to that.

The heart of the matter is the question of where we think democracy lies in the European Union. Does it lie in the Commission? The answer, in fairly short order, is no. Every country has a commissioner and, as the hon. Member for Luton North has said, commissioners from very small countries sometimes get very important briefs. It was the Maltese Commissioner who finally decided whether neonicotinoids could be legal across the whole of the European Union. Malta has a population of about 250,000—which is tiny in proportion to ours, let alone that of the whole of the EU—and it was someone representing them who made a decision for all of us without any democratic accountability because the Council could not come to a decision.

There is no election for European Commissioners—they are appointed by their home Governments. The President of the Commission represents Luxembourg, which is hardly the great bulwark of population and importance for which one might hope. It is not exactly the Texas, or even the Illinois, of the European Union. Relatively minor figures from their own domestic functions are put forward as commissioners, with no support from, or knowledge of, the people living in the other member states. Before he became a commissioner, very few people in the United Kingdom could have named the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg. There is no democratic accountability in the Commission.

Perhaps there is democratic accountability in the European Parliament, but, if there is, it is of a most extraordinary kind. The d’Hondt system for electing people is most unsatisfactory and means that most people have no clue who their MEP is. It is very difficult to seek redress of grievance through the European Parliament in the way our constituents can seek redress of grievance through this House. Indeed, one of my concerns about the whole European project is that it denies our constituents that proper redress of grievance that they can get through the House of Commons.

Crucially, the European Parliament cannot have democratic accountability because it does not represent a single people. When the issue of unemployment in Greece, Spain and Portugal came up in yesterday’s debate, it was absolutely instructive that there was a complete lack of concern for unemployment in the other member states of the European Union. There is not a feeling that somebody unemployed in Greece is as important as somebody unemployed in Newcastle. Until we have that fellow feeling—the feeling that they are one people with us—there cannot be a proper democracy. The jargon, clearly, is that without a demos there cannot be democracy and there is not a single European people. Therefore, even if the European Parliament had Members who anyone knew about, and even if it was elected on a system that anyone thought was a reasonable system to elect people on, it would still not have proper democratic representation because it does not represent a single people.

That brings us to the Commission, which I think is the closest we get to democracy in the European Union. The Ministers represent their Governments and those Governments have to command majorities in their respective Houses of Parliament. That brings us back to exactly where we want to be: the democratic rights of Parliament and what Parliament should be able to do within the overall system and context of the European Union. Ultimately, democratic accountability within Europe—that thin thread of accountability that exists—is through the Commission to Parliaments.

Commission Work Programme 2015

John Redwood Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I do not want to pre-empt tomorrow’s debate on the European Union’s relations with national Parliaments and the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. My hon. Friend is right to identify this as a challenging agenda and to indicate that the European Parliament, in particular, is likely to be resistant to the idea of a stronger voice for national Parliaments, but I think that he is too pessimistic in his assessment of Frans Timmermans. After all, it was during Mr Timmermans’s tenure as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands that the Dutch came forward with a number of specific proposals for strengthening the role of national Parliaments in holding EU decisions to account. I take heart from the fact that we have in this powerful role within the Commission somebody who has previously gone on the record to say that the guiding principle should be, “Europe where necessary, but national where possible”, and who has been very sympathetic to ideas for strengthening the role of national Parliaments.

The Commission has set out a clear intention to be more strategic and to act in a smaller number of areas where there is real added value for the EU. It has also said that it wants to demonstrate a particularly strong focus on jobs, growth and European competitiveness, which are objectives that the Government strongly support. The Commission has pledged to create a closer partnership with member state Governments and national Parliaments. We can see some evidence of the Commission’s approach by looking at some of the numbers in the work programme. The work programme includes just 23 legislative and non-legislative policy initiatives and—importantly— 80 measures proposed for either withdrawal or modification.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does the Minister not note that most of the measures being withdrawn are either obsolete, having been superseded by a measure that has already gone through, or being withdrawn in favour of a more ambitious proposal? It is complete nonsense to say that the Commission is giving up power and wishes to do less. This is a massive work programme and the 80 measures are just a con trick.

[Mr Lidington]

I think that my right hon. Friend is being too pessimistic. As I said earlier, the test will be whether at the end of five years we can look back and say that the Commission has delivered in practice what its words indicated at the start of its tenure. I completely accept that there is a real problem with the Commission’s working culture, which, to be fair, like many national Government Departments, tends to judge success by the output of new law and new regulation, rather than the quality of what is actually done on a number of core priorities.

I was pleased to note that the Commission confirmed this weekend that 73 of the measures proposed for withdrawal have now been formally withdrawn. By comparison, the 2014 work programme proposed 29 new initiatives and prioritised a further 26 measures for adoption, and in 2010 there were some 300 new measures proposed. This work programme is focused on fewer measures, and on measures that will encourage growth and jobs, deepen the single market, conclude trade agreements and improve regulation, freeing up business from unnecessary regulatory burdens. The Government welcome that new focus.

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[Mr Lidington]

As I told my hon. Friend when I last gave evidence to his Committee, the Government take decisions collectively and it would not be right for me to go into detail about internal Government communications. I will come to the issues raised by the amendment shortly, but first I want to say more about the importance of the proposed work on economic affairs and competitiveness.

The United Kingdom has long argued for ambitious trade deals. The ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and EU-Japan negotiations could benefit this country annually by more than £15 billion, so the comprehensive stocktake of trade policy proposed by the Commission is welcome.

The EU’s greatest achievement—the single market—is still very far from complete, so we are pleased that the Commission plans to push liberalisation in sectors that could boost GDP the most, such as construction and professional services. We want EU legislation to enable the dynamic development of the future economy by supporting and not hindering a continent-wide digital single market. If that is done right, in a way that encourages the growth of online trade—both retail and business to business—it could generate €250 billion over the lifetime of this Commission.

We also support the Commission’s vision of a well-regulated and integrated capital markets union of all 28 member states that maximises the benefits of capital markets and non-bank financing for the real economy. Lord Hill’s recent Green Paper on the subject spelled out the approach he plans to take, and the Government will, of course, engage with his team as the policy is developed further.

We welcome the fact that the Commission intends to consider a range of approaches, and not just legislation, to develop Europe’s capital markets, and that much of that will be delivered through member state and industry action, rather than through EU-level law or regulation.

[Mr Redwood]

Will the Minister comment on the investment programme, which is said to be significant? How much of it is a spending commitment by the European institutions from their levies on member states, and how much will be done by gearing and leverage through guarantees and loans?

[Mr Lidington]

If I get the chance, I will give my right hon. Friend the exact figures at the end of the debate, but only a relatively small amount of the European fund for strategic investments—the so-called Juncker package—is derived from reallocating parts of the existing EU budget. The majority of the proposed €315 billion for the EFSI relies very much on private sector input on the basis of gearing.

Perhaps my right hon. Friend will be reassured to know that when I visited the European Investment Bank recently to discuss its approach to the programme, it was very firm in saying that it took very seriously its responsibility to its shareholders—the member states—and that it would exercise its responsibilities as a bank, that there would be due diligence, that it was not prepared simply to wave projects through on the basis that any sector or country deserved a particular slice, and that it would look at the real economic benefit that each proposal for capital investment offered to Europe as well as to the member state.

One of the sectors that we think could benefit from the EFSI is energy, where there is a need for work on interconnectors that would not only make more possible a genuine single internal market in European energy, but meet the strategic objective of trying to reduce European energy dependence on Russia. We think that the Commission communication on energy union is an important step towards not only strengthening Europe’s energy security, but decarbonising our economies and deepening the internal energy market.

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[Mr McFadden]

I do not believe that that is what I said. I am interested in the hon. Gentleman’s intervention, because I thought that the issue for him was principally parliamentary sovereignty, rather than the free movement of people. Perhaps he has shifted his position, and I should stand corrected.

The Minister outlined the position on the numbers in the measures. I noted the scepticism with which the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) greeted the numbers. I do not propose to go over that ground as the Minister has done so, but on the face of it the Commission is proposing a narrower, more focused programme—under 10 headings and 23 specific measures —than it has in the past.

At the top of the Commission’s agenda is something we would all welcome—an emphasis on growth and jobs. In a continent still struggling to recover from the financial crisis, it is right to have such an emphasis and focus on the very high level of youth unemployment, on doing what is right on the big issues, and on less interference in and over-regulation of issues that do not need it.

In his speech in London last week, Mr Timmermans, the vice-president of the Commission, said:

“It is incredibly important that we follow through on limiting the initiatives we take to those areas where EU action is urgent and needed. For too long we worked on the premise of doing things because they were nice to do; I want to work on the premise that we do it because we need to do it, because Member States can’t do it by themselves alone. There needs to be added value of acting on a European scale.”

I very much welcome that emphasis from Commissioner Timmermans, and I hope that it is followed through in reality as well as in the written plan.

[Mr Redwood]

As the right hon. Gentleman is such a fan of all this interference, will he say which of the 23 measures will actually reduce the shocking levels of youth unemployment, which are the curse of Europe thanks to the idiotic policies of this Union?

[Mr McFadden]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for painting me as a fan of all the measures before I have even spoken about them. One measure that could help to create jobs would be a properly negotiated free trade agreement between the EU and the United States. That has the potential to help our exporters and create jobs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

I very much agree with my right hon. Friend. The Italian Foreign Minister told me that of the estimated 270,000 illegal migrants who landed in the EU last year, 170,000 landed in Italy. This cannot be a problem for just one member state, because it is broader than that. I shall be interested to hear the Minister’s views on our Government’s input in dealing with both the consequences and causes of this problem.

Concerns have been raised about what is not in the programme. The Minister wrote to the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee about the air quality package and the circular economy package. Concerns about that have been raised by Members of the European Parliament as well. A number of Select Committee Chairs have written to the Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee on the matter. It is therefore clear that there is a lot in the work programme that will concern the House.

Before I end, I want to turn to the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) and his colleagues on the European Scrutiny Committee. It asks that the Government ask the Commission to develop policies relating to the free movement of citizens. That is something that the Labour party has put forward, and before Christmas my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds West (Rachel Reeves) produced proposals that related to how free movement interacts with access to benefits and public goods. We would like the Commission to work with member states on that, because access to benefits and public goods is not an issue just for the UK but for other member states. We saw that in the recent European Court judgment on the Dano case, which was initiated in Germany and affected a lady who it was judged did not have the right to access social security benefits. We have an interplay between a founding principle of the European Union and social security systems that are national in nature, and it is right that we discuss work in that area with the Commission.

[Mr Redwood]

When the right hon. Gentleman said that Italy should not be expected to handle the problem of migrants to Italy on its own, is he recommending burden sharing? Is he saying that other member states should take a share of those migrants through a common policy?

[Mr McFadden]

It has already been agreed that Triton will be a European programme and not just an Italian one—the right hon. Gentleman is a little behind the pace if he thinks that is a new departure, because it has already been agreed. The question is about the resources given to the programme and whether it is capable of meeting the task it faces. I remind him of the terrible figure given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East of the number of people who have drowned in the Mediterranean over the past couple of years.

[Mr Redwood]

rose—

[Mr McFadden]

I have already given way to the right hon. Gentleman.

In conclusion, I believe that this work programme is a step forward from previous ones. It is closer to British priorities and reflects much of what we want to see, although we do not endorse everything in it and some of it does not apply to us. Like all such programmes, it is only a plan on paper and it will remain to be seen whether the Commission delivers as it has promised. It is certainly urgent that it does deliver to meet real and urgent priorities, and ensure that the European Union works in the interests of its citizens over the next five years. Whatever the plan says on paper, that is ultimately how it will be judged.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir William Cash]

My hon. Friend is right in every respect and we have all the transcripts to prove it, including from various Secretaries of State. It is effectively an example of decisions being taken behind closed doors in smoke-free rooms. Those are the new modernising methods of government. I disapprove of them and so does my Committee, as shown by the fact that we tabled this amendment.

Let us move on and accept that we are now able to debate free movement; I particularly want to concentrate on EU migration and benefits in that context. I wrote a letter to the Prime Minister on 18 November, which was 10 days before he made his speech at JCB in Staffordshire on the question of free movement, and I drew attention to the fact that I believed we were faced with a real problem. However much we might want to make certain changes, unless we were prepared to dig in and make this Parliament supreme on matters of such vital national interest, we would not get the necessary changes because some of them required treaty change and others required overriding the charter of fundamental rights. Although the Prime Minister accepted in questions after his speech that some of those matters would require treaty change, in reality that is not on offer in any substantial way from the other member states.

The principle of free movement is embedded in the ideology and principles of the other member states, and particularly the European institutions and European Commission, despite how that may affect us as a small island with a greatly increasing population and pressures on social housing and education—the list is endless. Unlike other member states such as France, Germany and Spain that have large land masses and can absorb many more people, we simply cannot do so. It is therefore a matter of vital national interest—quite apart from questions that I will mention in a moment about abuse of the system—that has led us to a position where we have desperately wanted to put our foot down. Some of us believe that we should override European legislation and the charter of fundamental rights by using the “notwithstanding” formula—that is notwithstanding the European Communities Act 1972, which is past legislation as I have said many times before—so that we can ensure that our Supreme Court obeys the laws of this Parliament which is elected by our voters in general elections.

When the election comes—it is only a matter of 60 days or so—this issue will be at the centre of gravity in that election, and we will be asked whether we will take the necessary steps in line with what voters insist on. I am afraid the answer to that question is that there will be no treaty change or overriding of the charter, and when I have asked Ministers and the Prime Minister whether they will use the “notwithstanding” formula, I have been told no.

[Mr Redwood]

On the narrower point of benefits, the Minister gave us encouraging news that we have control of our benefits system, as that is a reserved matter under the treaties. Does my hon. Friend recollect that on several occasions Ministers have been unable to change our benefits system in the way the British public want because of European legal blockages?

[Sir William Cash]

That is completely right. People think—in elements of the BBC and elsewhere, I suspect—that this is somehow a matter of policy, and that by using the right words one can change the effect of European law. No, we cannot. We have to pass legislation. There has to be a majority in this House to override European laws and regulations. It is, ultimately and tragically, a legal framework rather than just simply a question of policy based on the wishes of voters, as expressed by their representatives in Parliament. This has only fairly recently begun to gain traction with some people in the public arena, but not sufficiently, I am afraid, to achieve the kind of impartial analysis I believe is needed, for example in the BBC. Without going into this now, I have invited—in fact, I have effectively forced—the director-general and the editor-in-chief of the BBC to appear before my Committee to explain this problem in the kind of language that ordinary people can understand. That will take place on Wednesday afternoon at 2.30 pm, for those who want to take note.

The Prime Minister’s speech had a lot in it, which demonstrated the extent to which he wants to try to resolve many of these questions. That is undeniable, but the question we have to address, and to which I now turn, is the extent to which it would require treaty change or otherwise—that is the acid test.

My first general remark is that the package includes only one proposal that directly limits or imposes a quota on the number of EU migrants. This would relate to future accessions and so could be part of normal negotiations. However, to impose a direct limit on migration from existing member states would certainly require treaty change.

My second general comment is that many of the relevant treaty obligations have already been interpreted in this context by the European Court of Justice. The Court plays a huge, vital and exceptional role, and cannot be appealed against. It has already interpreted these matters as providing limitation on the action that member states can take in this area. Indeed, the recent case of Dano, which is frequently referred to—the Foreign Secretary referred to it on “The Andrew Marr Show” only this weekend—demonstrates that the Court can change its approach.

However, some of the judgments mentioned are long-standing, well-entrenched and engage charter rights. Any change along the lines suggested by the Prime Minister would therefore not be sufficiently strong, to the extent that they rely on the Court of Justice changing its established jurisprudence. That is why we want the Commission to take account of these points—these are the issues. The European Commission is the legal guardian of the treaties. The point I am making in this speech is that, in order to change the law to ensure that we can actually deal properly with the problems that come from free movement, we have to persuade the Commission, in its work programme, to take account of such relevant questions. It could be inferred from what the Prime Minister had to say that he accepted that some treaty change would be required—and in fact, when he was asked questions, he accepted that towards the end—but there are a number of real problems, and I will now turn to them.

The first problem that the European Commission will have to consider in its work programme is a stronger power to refuse entry and to deport criminals. The free movement directive, which the European Commission has to enforce, requires decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis on the grounds permissible by the treaty. That provision reflects Court of Justice jurisprudence extending across a wide range of treaty rights, including the freedom to travel to other member states to receive services, which is highly relevant to the work programme. It is likely that any significant stronger action will require treaty change, particularly if it detracts from the requirement derived from the principle of proportionality to look at each individual case.

Secondly, I believe a ban on re-entry for those who have abused EU rights may be possible, as this falls within the public policy exception to the treaty right of free movement. However, there are again questions of proportionality.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

This debate is a disgrace. This is a massive work programme with huge implications for the British people and our own country, yet we have been given 90 minutes. I can now make only a few of the points I wanted to make because two of my colleagues rightly wish to join in.

The Minister told us that he was delighted that this was a small and compressed programme of just 23 measures. These measures are huge for the jobs, growth and investment area. There are proposals that will have a direct impact on the economies of the European Union. In the section on economic and monetary union, two new taxes are proposed—a common consolidated corporation tax and a financial transactions tax. The Minister did not even mention them: I believe that they will be opposing them for the United Kingdom. One would have thought that a couple of major European taxes might have been worth a mention.

Nobody has had a chance to discuss the energy union proposals, which will directly impact on the United Kingdom. It is put down as one measure, but it is a whole raft of measures. The one that is scored is a strategic framework, but the strategic framework will lead on to a massive programme of regulation and legislation. The Minister obliquely referred to the idea that we want to integrate the market. Why do we wish to integrate it? Why do we wish to integrate the United Kingdom’s rather different energy market—we are an island with access to a lot of its own energy—with the continent of Europe, which has a terrible geopolitical problem because it has made itself so dependent on Russian gas.

As if that was not enough, my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) rightly said that migration and border controls—one of the leading issues in the run-up to the general election—is at the core of this work programme. That is exactly right.

I found rather surprising the Minister’s remarks about our legal opportunities for benefit reform. It seems to me that most of the proposals for solving our difficulties on benefits for migrants in the United Kingdom would be illegal under the current treaty. I have been going on about this for years and have recommended to Ministers that they put our benefits on a contributory basis and that they should be paid only if people have paid in for a specified number of years and/or have been in full-time education in the United Kingdom between the ages of five and 16, so that all British people would qualify, without it being discriminatory on grounds of country. If we did that, we could make the changes we want, but Ministers do not respond. They pretend that they can make these other changes, but they have not delivered them all and I think they will discover that a lot of them are illegal.

The economic programme should be much more urgent. I find it extraordinary that the Labour party can come here and show no anger or passion about the mass unemployment on the continent. If there were anything like 50% youth unemployment in Britain today or 25% general unemployment, Labour Members would be outraged and they would be here in their hundreds—not just three Members as now.

[Kelvin Hopkins]

rose—

[Mr Redwood]

I am sorry, but I do not have time. The hon. Gentleman wants to make his own speech.

Labour would be outraged, but because this is happening on the continent of Europe and is the result of the euro and economic union policies from which we have rightly opted out, they do not seem to care less. They just accept that it has to happen. I think this House should be deeply angry about the mass unemployment on the continent and deeply angry about the permanent recession that has hurt certain countries. We should be deeply angry about the shambles that is the euro, which is doing so much damage to prosperity, opportunity and life hopes. We have no time to discuss any of that because we have been given only 90 minutes.

Nigeria

John Redwood Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Swire]

No one living outside the affected areas in Nigeria should believe for one minute that they are immune to the possible terrorist activities of Boko Haram. As I said, there is an election in February, and presumably there are those who wish to campaign in this large chunk of the country in the north. It is a problem for Nigeria. Yes, we certainly wish that its institutions were stronger, but I think that both the Nigerian Government and the international community are absolutely certain that Boko Haram needs to be routed out, and quickly, before it does further damage within the country and to its vulnerable neighbours.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I agree entirely with what the Minister and the shadow Minister have said. I particularly agree with the Government’s decision not to intervene in Nigeria directly with military force. Will the Minister explain, though, why the west is right to try to use military force in Syria and Iraq, in rather similar situations, but not in Nigeria?

[Mr Swire]

We have deployed assistance to Nigeria and we will continue to do so, particularly on the intelligence side. I repeat that Nigeria is one of the richest countries in Africa and it spends 20% of its own budget on defence expenditure. In the normal course of events, it should be able to handle these things itself, but it cannot, and that is why we are providing assistance to enable it to do so. Drawing any parallel between what is going on in Syria and Iraq is not useful, if I may say so. This is something localised to Nigeria, and we want to prevent it from spreading across other parts of Africa.

EU Reform

John Redwood Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Germans’ problem now is that to make a success of their single currency, they need a political union with massive transfers of money from the rich parts to the poor parts of the union, as we have in the sterling currency union or as exists in the dollar currency union, but that is exactly the kind of system that the United Kingdom would never accept, and that is why, at the crossroads, we need a different relationship?

[Sir William Cash]

That is completely right. We need a different relationship with the EU as a whole that also includes the eurozone, because the eurozone, which is causing so much of the dislocation in Europe, is dominated by Germany, and the German financial and fiscal policies, which I have described already, have that enormous impact in destabilising the eurozone.

This is where I really part company with statements made by some members—senior members—of our Government. I am referring to the consequences of the eurozone. We were told at the time when it was evolving, with the banking union and all the rest of it, that it was, in effect, a natural course of events that we could not prevent. Actually, it has created the very instability that is most likely to lead to the destruction of the European Union itself. That is the problem. It is not just a negative view that I am trying to put across; it is the fact that it is destabilising Europe. It is creating problems of a kind that can get completely out of control, with catastrophic consequences not only for this country but for Europe as a whole. That is why the argument that I am seeking to advance is that actually this is a real problem for Europe as a whole. It is not anti-European to be pro-democracy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

I rise to talk about two large European powers that are both, in their own ways, reluctant Europeans. It is well known that the United Kingdom made an historic and important decision, under the previous Labour Government, not to join the euro. Many of us campaigned actively for that decision. We strongly believed that if the United Kingdom joined the euro it could probably bring the currency down. It would be extremely damaging to our own economy and financial system. How glad I am that we prevailed on that Government. If the United Kingdom had been in the euro at the time of the great banking crash of 2007-08, we would have brought the euro down. The House may remember that it was the United Kingdom that brought down the euro’s progenitor, the exchange rate mechanism, which a previous Government mistakenly went into. Just as the forces of the Great British trading economy—an international economy with a strong dollar base—brought down the ERM, so I think we would have brought down the euro.

Now that we have made that historic decision, I see no intention on the part of any serious force in the United Kingdom to reverse it. I am pleased at that. I confidently predict that no party with any serious chance of winning a single seat in the Westminster Parliament in 2015 will campaign on the UK joining the euro between 2015 and 2020. I confidently predict that the same will be true if we have a general election in 2020. I do not see the mood changing. We have learned our lesson. We have understood that it will not work as an economic project.

We understood also that it does not work from the point of view of our democracy. As soon as a country begins to share a currency with other member states of the EU it must share many other things. Those countries are on a long journey towards a united states of Europe. They are discovering that they will need to share their policy on tax and public spending. It is no longer possible for people in Spain, Italy or Greece to think that they have a democratic right to choose their level of public spending, public borrowing or taxation. They are under increasingly tough controls from the centre. Germany is right about that: strong financial discipline is needed in a currency union if it is to work.

That is exactly the kind of control that the United Kingdom would never accept. I do not see parties of the left accepting that Europe should tell us to spend less; and I do not see parties of the right accepting that Europe should expect us to tax more. Indeed, some of us on the right would not want to be told to spend less in certain areas; and some on the left would not want to be told to tax more, in certain ways. We as a democracy say that the fount of our democracy is the elected Members of this Parliament; and that controlling taxation and our budget are central to our great national story. Our mother of Parliaments emerged to control the finances of the King and to say to the King or Queen, “You shall not tax more—or not without redress of grievance, or without our having a say over how the money is spent.” That is why the United Kingdom will rightly remain a reluctant European. We cannot accept the continuing pressure from the logic of the euro, that we should give away those fundamental birthrights—the democratic right to elect people to tax and spend, and change them if they tax and spend too little or too much, or in the wrong way.

I remember, as part of the anti-euro campaign, hitting on the phrase that joining a single currency would be like sharing a bank account with the neighbours. I used to say that I get on well with my neighbours. We have Christmas drinks and the odd summer party, and enjoy each others’ company. However, I do not know about other hon. Members, but I am not ready to share a bank account with my neighbours. I just have this feeling that if I were the prudent one, when I wanted to draw out some of my money to spend, the neighbours would have spent it. They might have wanted a fancier house, and taken out a big mortgage; then when I wanted a mortgage I would discover that our mortgage capacity had already been used up. That is exactly what being in a single currency is like. My opponents in those debates used to look for what was wrong with my analogy. I thought it was broadly right, but even I thought it might be a little bit of a try-on. Now that we have seen the euro scheme I realise that it was completely apt. That is exactly the position of countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain, in relation to Germany. Germany says “We do not want you using the collective mortgage, because we know you will borrow more, and we have got to do the saving.”

There is therefore an unhealthy tension, which is why I must talk about two reluctant Europeans. The other big power in Europe that is proving to be reluctant about the scheme of full European integration, providing the political backing to the single currency, is none other than Germany itself. At the very time when some Germans presume to lecture the United Kingdom on being a reluctant European—a very counterproductive thing to do, because it encourages Euroscepticism no end when Germans lecture us in that way—we find that Germany is busily trying to restrain the others from the impelling political logic of the euro, which must be to complete the political union to provide the backing to the currency.

If we exchange banknotes in the United Kingdom, we see on the banknote a symbol of our country. We see the monarch’s portrait. It is there partly because we like our monarch, but also as a symbol that the whole taxable capacity, the whole parliamentary and political weight, and the whole authority of the United Kingdom Parliament stands behind that banknote. People trust it, trade it and use it because they know that that is true. In time of crisis Parliament stands behind the Bank of England; the Bank of England stands behind the banknote; and the taxable capacity of the country is there for whatever crisis might arise. The problem with the euro is that there is as yet no symbol or political union to stand behind the banknote. That is why it has been subject to crisis after crisis. Pictures of bridges had to be used on the notes, and they could not be like any actual bridge to be found anywhere in Europe, because that might offend people. An Italian bridge might mean the Spaniards would be jealous; or perhaps they would be grateful that their bridge was not being pledged on the banknote—I do not know. There would have been tension or difficulties even over choosing the symbols for the banknote, so they had to choose something more anodyne.

There is a much bigger and more important political reality behind that; we are discovering that the full taxable capacity of the German state does not yet stand fully behind the euro, and that the rich and successful countries do not want to pool their riches and success with the poorer countries in the Union. Until they do, the currency will be crisis-stricken. The development of a second euro has already happened. The second euro was the Cypriot euro. Unbelievably in a first-world currency, people who had been foolish enough to deposit euros in a Cyprus bank could not take them out. When it was allowed, they were not worth €1; they were devalued before people could have their money back. That had to happen because the German taxable capacity would not stand behind the Cypriot bank. There is no way that, if a city or part of the United Kingdom—it would be invidious to give names—got into balance of payments or financial difficulties, people’s pounds, deposited in a bank in a part of the United Kingdom, would be first frozen and then devalued before they could be taken out. Everyone would rightly be scandalised and think it absurd. Yet that happened in the eurozone, because our reluctant European, Germany, would not stand behind the euro.

My prediction is that Germany is on a slow but inevitable march to standing behind the euro. In a way, I hope it is, because I wish the euro well and it needs to be a grown-up currency with proper transfers behind it; but the more Germany is on that movement towards being the paymaster, founder and discipline-provider of the euro area, the less possible it is for Britain to belong to that system. That is why I welcome the magnificent contribution that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), has once again made to our national debate, and why I hope people are listening outside the Chamber, in addition to those who have kindly come to listen. Today’s debate is about the mighty subject of our generation. We wish our continent and the euro area well, but the United Kingdom must now find a new relationship. Just as surely as Germany needs to become the centrepiece of the political union to make a proper reality of the euro, so the United Kingdom, unwilling and unable to join it, will need a new, looser and different relationship with that emerging superpower—which will be not an armed superpower but an economic one, with, at last, the taxable capacity of Germany standing behind the rest.

It is important for that to happen quickly. I do not want to live in a Europe where there is practically no growth year after year and where there are sometimes rather bad crashes. I do not want to live in a Europe where the banking system is still riven by difficulty and disaster because there is not full support from the euro-area in the way we would expect from an integrated economic zone. I want to live in a Europe that is more vibrant, more exciting and more interesting.

I am very pleased that my country has stayed out of the euro; I am very pleased that, with our own financial and monetary policies, we now have a growth rate of which we can be proud and that gives our people hope; and I am very pleased that unemployment is coming down. It would make things so much easier for us if Europe had a growth rate of which we could be proud, if its unemployment rate was coming down and if it could offer hope to its young people. Europe cannot do that unless it either completes its currency union properly or breaks it up as soon as possible. We cannot join Europe in the former, and we do not wish to lecture it on the latter, so can we please get on with negotiating a relationship that works for Britain? Can we privately, not publicly, remind Germany that if she wishes this mighty project to work, she has to commit herself to it as fully as we have to disengaging?

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In 1997 it was an act of rebellion for a Conservative candidate in the general election to campaign against the UK joining the single currency. Indeed, I had to resign my post at Conservative central office in order to do so. In the lifetime of this Parliament it was also an act of rebellion for a Conservative Member to vote for an in/out referendum. Both those rebellions are now seen as core Conservative commitments, and even the Labour party and many others, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) said in his outstanding speech, would not dream of going to the electorate pledging themselves to trying to join the single European currency. That shows that, over time, progress can be made in opening people’s eyes to what is at stake with Britain’s troubled relationship with the European Union.

On two grounds in particular, no one could be better qualified to introduce such a debate than my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). First, as we have heard, his father won the military cross but also lost his life fighting to liberate France from German occupation in 1944. Secondly, although of course I knew that he is Chair of the European Scrutiny Committee, I did not learn until today that he has served on that Committee scrutinising Euro-legislation for the last 30 years, which is an exercise in self-flagellation bordering on the heroic.

There seem to be two strands to the idea of Germany in Europe, and the first strand appears to have something in common with what used to be said in the early years of NATO, which, as we all know, was once described as being designed

“to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.

In other words the idea was that, because Germany had twice brought world war to the European continent, the best way of preventing it happening again was to tie Germany into multinational alliances and institutions. That is one point of view; the other point of view is that it is not only about trying to prevent war in Europe. The question is whether it is an alternative way for Germany to exercise the sort of power and control in Europe that she failed to get by other means in those two terrible conflicts. I do not know which of those two strands is the primary motivation among German democratic politicians. Some of them may indeed be afraid of their country’s past being repeated; others may actually covet ways of gaining, through peaceful methods involving the slow absorption of other countries that are gradually drawn into the EU net, the sort of influence that they failed to gain in the past.

In the 1970s I studied the theory of international relations under the great Professor Sir Michael Howard, as he now is. One of the topics I studied was integration theory. The idea was that countries could be made to merge with each other not by telling them directly what the end product would be, but by drawing them through imperceptible degrees and through the exercise and creation of new common functions into an ever-closer relationship, so that they did not realise where they were going until they had already arrived at their destination.

I must admit that I was sceptical. I thought that countries might start on that path but that at some point they would wake up, realise the destination, decide that they did not want it and turn back. I admit that I have had to qualify my scepticism over the subsequent decades because, time and again, I have seen our country being drawn down that route. I wish I had £5 for every time somebody involved with the European project has said, “The high point”—or the high-water mark, or something else of that sort—“of European integration has now been reached.” Funnily enough, there is always one high-water mark after another. Frankly, I am getting fed up with it.

[Mr Redwood]

Has my hon. Friend also noticed that each successive federalising treaty has been explained to us as representing no serious transfer of power of any kind? How is it that we have so little power left?

[Dr Lewis]

Indeed. The process has become such a habit that the mask slips very rarely; but there was one notable occasion when the mask did slip. On new year’s eve just over a decade ago, when the European single currency was about to come into force, I saw the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, being interviewed at midnight, and he was asked the following question: “This is a political project, isn’t it?” For once he let the mask slip, and he smiled beatifically and said, “It is an entirely political project.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Robertson. I congratulate my near neighbour in the west midlands, the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash), on securing the debate. I also greet the Minister for Europe, the right hon. Member for Aylesbury (Mr Lidington), with whom this is my first proper exchange since I took up this post a few weeks ago, and I thank all the right hon. and hon. Members who have contributed to the debate.

I have found the debate extremely interesting and revealing. It has been revealing to me because it has illustrated the plight of the Minister and the Prime Minister, for which I have some sympathy. As I have listened to the hon. Member for Stone, the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) and the other hon. Members who have spoken, I have found myself asking what kind of renegotiation by the Prime Minister could possibly satisfy them, other than one leading to Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union. I would be grateful if the Minister addressed himself to that question in summing up. I have sympathy for the Prime Minister in the task that he has set himself, given the yardsticks set for him in this debate by his hon. and dear Friends.

As the hon. Member for Stone said, we had some interesting exchanges yesterday with the Bundestag’s Committee on the Affairs of the European Union, whose members have been visiting the UK this week. This debate is timely in a sense, because both of our countries are major members of the European Union but we look at the European Union through different eyes.

It is sometimes said that for Britain, EU membership is purely transactional. I hesitate to endorse that verdict. I think it is a mistake to ignore the commitment to democracy, equality, human rights and the peaceful resolution of problems that comes with membership. It is an achievement of no small significance that today it is almost inconceivable that two member states of the European Union could go to war with one another. Given what is happening on the fringes of the European Union, it would be wrong for us to dismiss that achievement.

Britain and Germany have different histories, and we look at the issue through different eyes, but there is an aspect of common values to it, as well as a purely transactional one. On a day-to-day basis, as I am sure the Minister will confirm, Britain and Germany have much in common in our approach to the European Union. In ordinary working meetings of the Council of Ministers, British and German Ministers often agree.

Of course, as this debate has rightly outlined, we do not always face the same issues. Germany is a member of the eurozone; indeed, it is the lead guarantor. The UK is not, and is highly unlikely to join the euro, meaning that Germany faces issues, such as banking union and fiscal compacts with other member states, that we in the UK sometimes do not, and we are not part of some of those agreements. We sometimes have a distinct approach to economic and financial issues. Given our rule and the size of the financial sector in the UK, and its global reach relative to the rest of our economy, it is absolutely right that we should reserve the right to take a distinctive approach on some of those issues.

[Mr Redwood]

Does that not mean that we need a new relationship? Does the right hon. Gentleman not see that, according to his logic, we cannot be in the room when a lot of financial matters are discussed because we are not part of the compacts relating to the euro?

[Mr McFadden]

The euro has been in place for some time. During that period, London’s financial strength has if anything grown, not diminished. I would not agree with the right hon. Gentleman if he suggested that being outside the euro somehow meant that we could not play a constructive role within the EU.

[Mr Redwood]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr McFadden]

I will press on, if the right hon. Gentleman does not mind.

Another issue that has arisen in this debate is the free movement of people, which has been at the heart of discussion in the UK in recent months about our relationship with the EU. I have looked up the figures. Eurostat, for example, calculates that net migration from elsewhere in the EU in 2012 was 230,000 for Germany and 82,000 for the UK. It is important to give some context to the view that everyone from everywhere else in the EU is always migrating to the UK. That is not the case. There are significant migration flows into both Germany and Britain, and it is important to have a debate in both countries about the rules under which EU migration should operate.

The Government have made certain announcements about restricting access to benefits for some EU migrants, and my own party agrees that access to benefits should be conditional. Most EU migrants come to work and not to claim—the recent report by University college London showed that overall, they are net contributors—but of course it is not just an issue of accounting. It is important that we have rules that are seen to be fair, and that operate in fairness to our own citizens as well as to those who come here. Today, in my party, the shadow Home Secretary announced that we believe that an EU migration fund should be established to help local areas that find themselves under particular pressure due to freedom of movement. If freedom of movement is to remain a core principle, it is reasonable for member states to ask for some help from the EU budget to help communities adjust where there are consequences for local areas.

I believe that on this question, Britain and Germany have much in common. I do not believe that Germany wants the rules for access to benefits to be abused; a case came to the European Court of Justice the other day. The Prime Minister has taken us into new territory. He is now talking not just about conditionality for benefits under freedom of movement but about changing the principle of free movement itself. That approach appears to have been rebuffed by Chancellor Merkel, with the Der Spiegel report that she sees it as a red line that she would not cross, and that at that point she would stop her efforts to keep Britain in the European Union. It would be one thing if I thought that the Prime Minister’s shift in strategy had been carefully thought out, but he appears to have crossed the line with little thought for what it will mean for his renegotiation. Can the Minister tell us how many member states have told him that they support reform of the principle of free movement since the Prime Minister made his announcement?

Of course some Back Benchers, and perhaps some Conservative Members in this room, will be pleased by the shift because they may not want the Prime Minister’s renegotiation to succeed. Perhaps glory for them is defined not by a successful renegotiation but by one that fails, leading to UK withdrawal from the EU. I am afraid that there I must part company with the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who said that we might all be united in our view today. It is not a consensus shared by me or my party.

There are major British interests, in terms of jobs, employment rights and investment, in getting it right and in remaining part of the EU. What we are seeing is a governmental strategy, if one can call it that, which is led more by party management and trying to keep happy the party members who agree with the hon. Member for Stone than by our national interests. The danger for the Minister and the Government is that if he and his colleagues keep standing at the edge of the cliff and making demands in order that they will not jump, eventually other member states will stop their efforts to stop them from jumping and say, “Go ahead, and be our guest.”

European Union (Referendum) Bill

John Redwood Excerpts

Friday 17th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. I want to hear the hon. Gentleman, but I cannot hear him for those who are either shouting him down or cheering him on. Whichever it be, I want to hear the hon. Gentleman.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

May I support my hon. Friend’s excellent point by asking whether he has noticed that there is only one Liberal Democrat in the Chamber? I presume that the Liberal Democrats are ashamed of trying to stop the British people having a vote on this issue, and ashamed of the U-turn they have performed. They once believed in an in/out referendum, but now that there is a chance of our having one, they will not support it.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

John Redwood Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Alexander]

It ill behoves the hon. Gentleman to suggest that there is any meaningful comparison between what we are witnessing in Scotland and what is taking place in Iraq. When he has had the opportunity to reflect on the wisdom and sense of the remarks that he has made, I hope he will think again. There are unique and specific challenges facing Iraq that are wholly different from those we are facing in the United Kingdom. They reflect the particular circumstances of that country and the challenges that it faces today. If his point is that we need to find a way for a more inclusive approach to be taken to the politics within Iraq, I think we can agree with each other. I am not sure that I can go much further than that.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Perhaps I could try to clarify the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay). Is not the issue in Iraq that in large areas of the country, people do not accept the state or the democratic system because they do not think that it speaks to them and they do not think that there is a peaceful means of change? How will we persuade them that there is a peaceful, democratic answer?

[Mr Alexander]

Again, I think that the question is revealing. It is not for us in the House of Commons or in the west to persuade those people; it is for the politics of Iraq to move in the direction that we on both sides of the House wish it to move in. That places a premium on domestic, political leadership. It is deeply regrettable that Prime Minister Maliki succumbed to the forces of division, rather than showing the kind of leadership that we all wanted to see and creating unity. However, that is not a test for the Opposition or even for our Government; it is primarily a test for the Government in Baghdad. I sincerely hope that they will show themselves capable of rising to that test in the months ahead.

On Syria, no one would deny that there were differences of opinion across the House on the proposed military action to target President Assad’s chemical weapons facilities 12 months ago. However, even those who supported military action accept that the decision that was before the House a year ago in August was not a choice between ending or prolonging the conflict. It is the continuation of the conflict, rather than the form it has taken, that has allowed Syrian territory to be used as a training and recruiting base for ISIL. That is why the Opposition have argued that the priority for the international community must be to refocus attention on achieving a transitional agreement in Syria of the type that was anticipated in the Geneva II process. That is the only way to facilitate a more co-ordinated Syrian front that is dedicated to combating the threat of ISIL within the sovereign territory of Syria.

Humanitarian support for the countries affected by the turmoil in Iraq and Syria is vital. I hope that the Minister who winds up the debate will address the Opposition’s calls for a more comprehensive package of support for Jordan—a country that has one of the longest land borders with Iraqi ISIL-held territory and an even longer border with Syria in the north.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Clarke]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend—and I am sure the research behind his point will be checked—but I really think that in 2014, in the circumstances of today, to assert that the Executive has the unfettered right to take part in military action without getting the approval of the House is simply indefensible. I would personally be outraged by it.

[Mr Redwood]

rose—

[Mr Clarke]

I can give way only one more time, so I shall give way to my right hon. Friend.

[Mr Redwood]

I am grateful, but surely the point is that on the previous occasions of great wars, the House was in agreement, so there was no need for a Division. If the Opposition had opposed the decision, there would have been a vote.

[Mr Clarke]

I hope that on this occasion, too, we could reach such a political consensus in the House of Commons and across the country and that our debates about the use of armed force would lead to no significant division. That would be an ideal outcome, but I think that a controversial use of military force in yet another attempt to intervene in the Arab spring—whether it be this time with Shi’ite allies, this time with Sunni allies or this time with whatever outrageous group has emerged—requires a vote.

In principle, I am all in favour of using military force when it is unavoidable and in the vital national interest. I agree that ISIL is one of the most barbaric and outrageous organisations that has emerged on this planet for some considerable time, so I have no moral scruple whatever about the proper use of military force against them. I would like to see them degraded and destroyed. However, when the House votes and debates this sort of action on whatever occasion, experience shows that we must now have a much clearer idea of our objective. Our objective is not only to protect our security; it involves consideration of what will contribute to the restoration of stability and normality across the region. It means consideration of what will command the support of sane Muslims, sane Shi’a and sane Sunni; what will get sufficient support from the regional powers, as well as from the western powers; what kind of order we are trying to put in place. I hope that that does not get narrowed down to consideration of whether or not we should join the Americans in air strikes on particular installations before or after the mid-term elections in the United States.

John Kerry is engaged in a vital mission which goes to the heart of what I have just said. He is trying to put together a regional alliance. In that regard—I agree with those who have hinted at this—we have to rethink where we are starting from. A regional alliance must include some people with whom we have been enemies, and with whom we have very serious issues on other fronts, because the widest possible support is required.

The key players, obviously, are Iran and Saudi Arabia. They are the two great powers of the region. Many of the troubles have actually been caused by people acting as proxies for the interests of those two states. They have far more influence on the ground, and on events, than we in the west are likely to have. They know far more about what is going on. I have been a member of the National Security Council for the last two years, and I know the limits of our actual knowledge of events on the ground in this region. I know that we are constantly surprised by the latest utterly extraordinary and unpredictable turn of events that sweeps over what we have done. With Iran go Assad and Hezbollah, which is a close ally. The Shi’ite militias in Iraq, which we call the Iraqi Government, are also very influenced by the Iranians..

We just have to accept—without in any way resiling from our criticism about getting involved—that the Saudi Arabians really must deal with the Qatari problem of the people whom they support, and also—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex (Sir Nicholas Soames) said a moment ago—make absolutely clear that they are not supporting, in any way, fringe groups which, in the long term, are as much of a danger to Saudi and Gulf interests as they are to our own.

Turkey is a vital player. It is still the nearest that we have to a moderate Islamic Government. It has huge direct interests; it is threatened; and it is essential to have at least its complicity in what we do, and, I would hope, its support as well. Egypt is also a vital player. It has recovered from the outrageous threats of the Arab dawn by restoring political dictatorship, but it is nevertheless a key player. Russia must be kept onside, because it is also of influence.

I am not sure that the states of Iraq and Syria will ever exist again as we know them, but I do think that we need a political strategy in order to ensure that some kind of long-term stability will replace the anarchy that we have helped to create so far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

I agree with the Government that it would be a folly for western powers such as Britain to barge in, cowboy-like, and lead the fight against ISIL; but we do have unique military, surveillance and intelligence capabilities which those on the front line do not have, and which should be deployed if—and only if—they request it. That has been the case in northern Iraq with the request from the Iraqi Government, the Kurds and the minorities which risk extermination by ISIL, and—very significantly, if covertly —from Iran. The fact that Iran has given its de facto blessing to US air strikes is of seismic importance. It opens up an opportunity for future engagement and collaboration which could be transformative for the whole region, including, possibly, Israel-Palestine. We also agree on the need to help local Iraqi and Kurdish forces to defeat ISIL by air strikes, supplying military equipment and other military and intelligence support, which has clearly been the only force capable of stemming ISIL’s remorseless and ruthless advance.

That brings us to the elephant in the room: Syria. ISIL will not be defeated if it is constantly allowed to regroup there, because it is from its Syrian bases that it has launched into Iraq. It must be confronted and defeated in Syria too, and, like it or not, that means engagement with the Syrian regime. No one disagrees that Assad is a barbarous, blood-soaked dictator; but he heads the Syrian Government, and he is backed by approximately 40% of the population. Surely, by now at least, the United Kingdom Government and the United States must acknowledge that he is not going to be defeated—not because the Prime Minister was prevented by this House from getting his way with air strikes and, before that, with arming Assad’s opponents, and not because the House said no to pulling Britain into the quagmire of the Syrian civil war, trapped between Sunni and Shi’a, between ISIL and Assad, between Saudis and Iranians in their proxy conflict. Contrary to the line peddled, regrettably, by the Foreign Secretary today, there is no prospect of achieving a transition in Syria without negotiating with Assad and his regime, especially with Russia standing behind it. Our failure to understand that is a major reason why the civil war has been so prolonged, and why ISIL has been allowed to flourish.

[Mr Redwood]

What kind of morality is it that says that if a bully is a successful bully, we should want to be friends with him, and completely stand on its head the policy of trying to get rid of him?

[Mr Hain]

It is not about befriending Assad; it is about the reality of moving forward. If we do not recognise the reality, we will not move forward, but will continue to shout and scream and oppose to no effect at all.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

We should talk more and bomb less. I say that as someone who wants us to have strong defences. I want our country to play a leading role in the world and to be available, with the UN and allies, or if necessary on our own, to reinforce our values. I accept that there are occasions when we have to fight a just war. We were right to liberate Kuwait with our allies, and we were right to liberate the Falklands, but we need to ask ourselves some hard questions about some of the military interventions we have made under Governments of both parties in recent years.

I am glad that the Government accept that we can go to war only if the House approves such action, which I think has always been the case, and I am glad that they recognise that that is the most serious thing we can do. We have the power, collectively, to authorise our troops to go to kill other people in a foreign country. That is a very serious thing to do, and it should be done only after full debate and, if necessary, on a vote of the House to show that it has at least majority approval—it is even better when there is consensus.

To guide the Government, whether we are approaching such a position again or not, they should ask themselves these questions. First, are they sure that diplomacy and politics have broken down completely and that there is no further scope for diplomacy and politics to carry the problem forward and try to make it better? War is not a good answer. It is what happens when politics and diplomacy fail.

Secondly, after we win a war—even if we have had a great victory, as the allies had in 1918—we need to go back to politics and diplomacy and get it right. Otherwise, we might find that we have created a worse monster that requires yet more conflict, as we are in danger of proving in the middle east. The west has the power to get rid of a regime it does not like, but it does not necessarily have the power to support and create a democratic regime in its place that has the acceptance of enough people in the country to keep it together and make it a better place. It is not a win if we get rid of a nasty dictator and replace them with warring bands who kill even more people.

We need to get the Government to ask whether diplomacy has failed and whether the situation is one in which the use of force, if successful, is likely to make the situation better. If we are going to use force, can we please have a diplomatic and political strategy for the aftermath of successful military engagement? We need to know what military success looks like, but more importantly, we need to know how military success leads to a happier country, democratic values, tolerance and toleration, and all the things we believe in. When we inject more weapons and fighting into a situation, we normally make people not more tolerant, but more intolerant. We make them not happier, but more resentful. We also do enormous damage to their economy, so there are fewer ways for the people who believe in peace and our values to earn an honest living, carry on a normal life and create the kind of society we would like to live in.

If the previous two questions have been answered in the right way—if diplomacy cannot work, and if force might make things better—the third question our Government should ask before using force is this: do we have the force necessary to do the task? We must not send our forces into battle if there is a danger or a serious risk that they cannot win. We do not have that luxury when we are defending our country, but when we are deciding whether to intervene somewhere else, we have the luxury of asking whether we can win, or whether we can win with the right allies. We should want the odds to be very heavily tipped in favour of success if we are interfering in somebody else’s country.

There are common characteristics to the current conflicts and civil wars. Ukraine, Libya, Syria and Iraq all have the same basic problem: fledgling or difficult democracies do not command the support of all the people in the country. Many people believe that their state does not have the right borders. Many people believe that their current Government, be it a tyrant or an allegedly democratic Government, do not speak for all the people or protect the minorities. Many people inside Ukraine, Iraq or Libya do not believe that there is a solution for them inside their countries as they are currently constituted.

Surely, as the mother of Parliaments, with our democracy and our knowledge that one proceeds by debates, argument and votes, not bullets and bombs, we need to put a lot more effort into talking those people through how democracy works and into trying to work with them to see whether it is possible to get consent from enough people to these arbitrary borders, which were probably drawn on the map by us 100 years ago under very different circumstances, or whether they need to have ballots, as Scotland currently is, to see whether they want to remain in these countries. I am not going to presume and I do not have the time to redraw lines on maps, as that must come from the politicians in those localities, but the tools to solve these problems are arguments, discussions, debates, pamphlets, the internet and votes—what we believe in—not bombs and bullets. We should be very careful before we either supply them with more bombs and bullets or go in thinking that we know the right people to kill.

Ukraine

John Redwood Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

There is a connection. I said in my statement that I think Russia is fearful about the establishment of more fully fledged democracy and rule of law in its neighbourhood. There are domestic implications for Russia. That is part of the explanation for its actions and I think that is the wrong course for Russia to be embarked on. In the long term, a more open economy, better relations with its neighbours and a better functioning democracy in its own country would be in its own best interests.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Are contingency plans now in place to import energy from the United States and elsewhere if Russia decides to escalate the situation and interrupts the gas supply to European countries?

[Mr Hague]

As I mentioned earlier, some things would require long-term changes in infrastructure, but changes are taking place already. Today, Ukraine and Slovakia have signed an agreement for what is called a reverse flow of gas into Ukraine from European countries. Taken with other agreements, that means that Ukraine could now receive about 17 billion cubic metres of gas in total from the EU and other European countries. Changes are therefore already being made, but major changes in infrastructure will take years.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Redwood Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Will the Government support an independent Crimea if its people vote for that in a referendum, because presumably the Government will support an independent Scotland if its people choose to be independent?

[Mr Hague]

Here in this House and in the United Kingdom we believe in freedom, democracy and self-determination around the world, but my right hon. Friend will recall that the referendum in Scotland is taking place with the agreement of this House and of the Government of the United Kingdom as a whole. Under the Ukrainian constitution, that would be the proper arrangement in Crimea as well.

Ukraine, Syria and Iran

John Redwood Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

Since I am trying to make sure that in the long term we can work with Russia on this, the hon. Gentleman will understand that I have put things in a slightly different way from the words that he is using. It is of course important to have Russia’s co-operation and support in achieving long-term stability and recognition of democracy in a country such as Ukraine. We should always work together on securing that and we should always talk to Russia about those matters.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that it would be wrong to lend money to Ukraine before she has a stable democratic Government in charge and one that has the respect of the people, and before she has an economic plan that might work? The British people will not thank him if we lend Ukraine money that we do not get back and the economic crisis there gets worse.

[Mr Hague]

I do not think that anyone in the IMF will want to lend money that there would be little chance of getting back, so the readiness to undertake economic reforms—for instance, any observer of the economics of Ukraine would see that gas price reform is necessary—will be important in Ukraine agreeing an IMF package. That will require some difficult political choices in Ukraine. Nevertheless, there is an urgent need for this, so it is a question of how quickly a new Government in Ukraine can supply the necessary political will.

Syria

John Redwood Excerpts

Monday 13th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

It is an indictment of the international community—I will readily agree with that—and I have often spoken myself of the failure of the UN Security Council and the international community. Nevertheless, that is a failure with which we have to work, because as we have found before, with the vetoing of resolutions at the UN Security Council, we are not able to win agreement in the UN Security Council for far less radical or interventionist measures than what the hon. Lady is calling for. Therefore, we have to tackle the situation in other ways: to relieve humanitarian suffering in all the ways I have described; to promote a political settlement, working with Russia wherever we can; and to ensure that the chemical weapons are disposed of. Yes, there would have been earlier solutions, but they were not practical at the Security Council, so they would not have been legal and would not have commanded international support.

[Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)]

If we cannot guarantee safe delivery of non-lethal supplies, would it not be particularly unwise and foolish to start delivering weapons into this cauldron? Is it not right to concentrate on diplomacy, which is not compatible with war?

[Mr Hague]

As my right hon. Friend knows, we are very much concentrating on the diplomacy. As my statement reflects, I am not proposing lethal supplies—I have always been clear that we would come to this House and have a vote if we were going to do that—but there is a role for non-lethal supplies, if they can be safely delivered and controlled, that save lives and help a moderate opposition to function, because without them diplomacy will not work. If it is only extremists and the Assad regime, diplomacy will never succeed, so there is a role for our support for the moderate opposition in that regard, but we must have confidence in how such supplies will be used.