Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Monday 25th March 2024 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The terrible terrorist attack in Moscow reminds us that jihadi extremism has not disappeared. Given its ideology, its reach and its strength, does the Secretary of State agree that ISIS-K is just as much of a threat to the west as it is to Russia?

[James Heappey]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. There is a perception that Daesh has gone away. The Daesh core is cooped up in prisons in northern Syria, but Daesh affiliates are growing alarmingly quickly in other parts of the world. The attack in Moscow is a reminder to us all that we must continue to focus on the counter-terror threat as well as on the state threat.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Monday 11th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Today marks the anniversary of 9/11, and while our focus now has returned to state aggression, does the Minister agree that the threat of Islamic extremism—whether home-grown or from abroad—remains and that our defence posture should reflect that?

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Although the focus of the MOD and so many other parts of the Government has increasingly been on hostile state actors over the last few years, today more than any is a reminder of the threat of violent extremism. I pay tribute to the hundreds of men and women around the UK armed forces who are deployed on missions countering violence and extremism as I speak.

Global Military Operations

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Wednesday 14th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered global military operations.

It is fantastic to be able to have this debate on global military operations in Government time. Looking back in Hansard—as I have done on many occasions—I noted that there was once a time when the House had an annual debate on each of the three services. Those debates were well subscribed and Members enjoyed them. While of late we have had a number of opportunities to discuss Ukraine specifically, I think it is some time since we have had the chance to discuss the totality of military operations around the world. I look forward to hearing speeches which, I suspect, will range across geographies and issues. It will be great to hear defence matters considered so widely and prominently—

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

rose—

[James Heappey]

—not least by my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am sorry to intervene so early, but my right hon. Friend has raised an important aspect of the debate: namely, the mechanics of what we are discussing. I was pleased to hear him refer to the debates that we have had in the past, when there was more of a steady drumbeat. I hope that his words—which, I am sure, will be repeated by other Members, and I look to the Chair as well—will be heard, and I hope that the message that we need more debates and a greater understanding of what is going on in the world and our role in it can be sent to the usual channels, so that that can actually happen.

[James Heappey]

My right hon. Friend is entirely right, but he need not worry: the Ministry of Defence is a favourite of the Whips Office. Whenever the Whips come calling for us to take the opportunity to debate defence matters in the House, we are only too keen to do so, and I am delighted to have been provided with that time today.

The “Integrated Review Refresh 2023”, published in March, was clear about what we needed to do to respond to the deteriorating global security situation. It was about shaping the global strategic environment, increasing our focus on deterrence and defence, addressing the vulnerabilities that leave our nation exposed, and investing in the UK’s unique strengths. Defence is obviously at the centre of that ambition.

Ukraine has dominated defence matters over the past couple of years, so I thought I should make some mention of that, given the work that the UK has been doing in supporting the Ukrainians in their fight back against the Russian illegal invasion. Really, the update that it falls on me to provide to the House is that there is no update to give. Instead, I offer a word of caution. These are the very early stages of a necessarily complex plan, given the scale of the challenge that Ukraine faces. It will take a number of weeks until anyone can make a credible assessment of the success of the offensive. But it is under way; that much is clear. It is clear that there have been some early gains for the Ukrainians. In some parts of the Russian line, the regiments are performing credibly and holding their ground, but in many other parts of the line there is evidence of abandonment and mutiny.

But that should in no way encourage us to believe this is some war movie that ends with a wonderful, glorious, decisive victory. That might happen; it is perfectly possible, as the Ukrainians have shown time and again that they are brilliant at exceeding what normal military laws should expect. But it is also possible that a successful counter-offensive will still bring with it the requirement to go again next year. It matters enormously to our Ukrainian friends—just as it is important that Putin hears—that the international donor community is ready to rearm, retrain and go again next year, and the year after and the year after. If Putin thinks he can wait out the west, he is wrong. This counter-offensive will be successful—of that I am sure—but whether it will be decisively successful does not matter, in so much as the international community is ready to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

It is heartening to hear that from my hon. Friend, and I agree with him. The most obvious route through which we achieve Euro-Atlantic security is NATO, but where the EU has a successful mission running, we should be perfectly willing to work with and within that mission to achieve mutual foreign policy aims. Similarly, there are plenty of parts of the world where the EU is already the framework, where the UK has no wish to be a framework in its own right but does have an interest, and again, I can see opportunity for the UK to work with and within the EU mission—take, for example, Mozambique, although I offer that as a for instance rather than any promise.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for the opportunity to pursue that important point. The trade and co-operation agreement, the Brexit deal, did not primarily include security. While recognising that NATO is the cornerstone of European security, the European Union plays a role in other aspects of non-state security across Europe, so would my right hon. Friend be minded to look at an opportunity for us to endeavour to strengthen our relationship and co-operation with the EU on that front?

[James Heappey]

Undoubtedly so; my right hon. Friend is correct. For all those countries who are on a Euro-Atlantic pathway, their aspiration tends to be NATO first, because they consider the security risks to be greatest, but for all of them that Euro-Atlantic pathway invariably means both NATO and EU membership. Whatever our views on Brexit, it is churlish to ignore that, and for countries in the western Balkans or the Caucasus who want to move away from their traditional sphere and towards the Euro-Atlantic one, we should be supportive of both their NATO and their EU aspirations.

The danger, with nearly half an hour gone, is that an awful lot of ambassadors will read Hansard tomorrow with concern about the absence of their country and region from my speech. I will sit down quickly so that the Opposition have the opportunity to respond and Members have the opportunity to contribute, but if time allowed, I would have gone on at length about the continued importance of the middle east and all our partners in that region—we value their friendship and partnership enormously. We recognise the role that we have to play in continuing to contribute to security there. We are concerned about the security challenge in the high north and continue to work with partners to address that. We recognise our responsibility to maintain a presence in the Antarctic. Quite frankly, I could probably have spoken for an hour and a half and still not covered the totality of global military operations, but 28 minutes is more than enough, so I will sit down.

Top Secret Document Leaks

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Tuesday 18th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State to make a statement on the leaking of top secret military documents.

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

The unauthorised disclosure of classified US documents discovered last week was clearly a concerning development. The Defence Secretary spoke to his opposite number in the US last week and has been kept closely informed since. He is in Washington this week for a long-planned briefing to the House Foreign Affairs Committee as well as for other bilateral meetings. Clearly, while there, he has been able to discuss things further with Secretary Lloyd Austin and others. The US Department of Defence and intelligence community are currently conducting their own investigation to determine the validity of those documents and the circumstances under which they were leaked.

The UK commends the swift action taken by US law enforcement to investigate and respond to the leak, including the arrest of a suspect. As the Secretary of State, the US Department of Defence and the French Ministry of Defence have already said, not all of this information apparently leaked is accurate. Colleagues will be frustrated, I know, that I am unable to tell them which bits are inaccurate as these are sensitive intelligence matters, but it is important, nonetheless, to stress the need for caution when reporting what has apparently been leaked. Obviously, the investigation is now a matter for the US legal system.

As the refreshed integrated review set out earlier this year, the US remains the UK’s most important ally and partner. The depth of the UK’s relationship with the US remains an absolutely essential pillar of our security. We remain committed to supporting Ukraine’s armed forces in response to Russia’s illegal invasion. Ukraine has repeatedly shown us its determination and resilience in the face of Russia’s barbaric invasion, and, as we have said, we are working in lockstep with allies through forums such as the G7 and NATO, and efforts such as the UK-led international fund for Ukraine, to get Ukraine the firepower that it needs to rapidly regain its territory.

[Mr Ellwood]

I thank the Minister for his statement.

Mr Speaker, may I begin with a declaration of interest that is pertinent to this subject? I am a dual US national born in the USA and I hold a US passport. I have grown up increasingly appreciating the value and, indeed, the importance of the unique and incredible bond that we have with our most trusted and valued security ally. However, when a security leak of this magnitude takes place, it should not prevent the legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic from seeking assurances—such as the Minister is giving us today—about the fall-out from the scale of top secret information that is now in the public domain and from the changes that may be considered to significantly limit the chances such an event being repeated. I ask the Minister not to hide behind that general veneer of secrecy here, but to be frank with the House about the process. Mass data are accumulated from a multitude of sources. This is then summarised to provide relevant information, and analysis of that information forms the intelligence picture. That is then presented to decision makers, and can then lead to action that might limit or alter the behaviour of an adversary to close down a threat or indeed inform and persuade other nations to join our cause.

I am pleased to hear that the Minister and the Secretary of State are speaking with their counterparts, but does the Minister believe that too many eyes now have general access to sensitive intelligence, with the pendulum of sharing files swinging too far after 9/11? Is there now too much information—almost by default—now classified as top secret? For example, if Egypt is intending to supply missiles to Russia, surely the world should know about that. If a Russian Su-27 jet did deliberately attempt to fire a missile at an RAF Rivet Joint over the Black sea last September, it was an act of war, and the details should surely be publicised, not hidden away in intelligence files. We certainly must avoid another Daniel Ellsberg situation.

As the world enters a dangerous chapter, we slide, potentially, into another cold war. The parameters for sharing and acting on pooled intelligence must surely be overhauled, so that they are fit for purpose. America, is our closest security ally, absolutely, but if a vital aspect of our relationship requires reviewing or addressing, surely we should have the confidence to do just that.

[James Heappey]

As my right hon. Friend notes, the apparently leaked documents are in the public domain. However, that does not change their classification and thus the degree to which any UK Minister or official can comment on their content, so I will not be commenting on specifics of the examples he raised, nor any others over the course of this urgent question. He is absolutely right in setting out the process by which information is gathered, assimilated and presented to decision makers; he is absolutely right that the breadth and scale of information in this data age is enormous; and he is absolutely right that one of the key decisions that any organisation with intelligence at its core has to make is how to allow access to that information so that the relevant people can use it to make good decisions.

My right hon. Friend asserts that perhaps too many eyes now have access to that information. I think that is a matter for different Departments in different countries to consider. As you would imagine, Mr Speaker, the MOD has looked at our own processes as a consequence of what happened last week. We have to place huge trust in our vetting processes to ensure that those who routinely have access to classified information have been risk-managed appropriately. Even beyond that, within the vetted workforce there is a very necessary compartmentalisation of information, so that only those who need to see things to do their jobs see them.

That said, what we are learning in the information age, when it is about getting ahead of the other side’s narrative, is that it is very useful to be able to think quickly about the information we have. There is thus a balance to strike between being overly compartmentalised and being in a position where people can be well informed and quickly make decisions in a way that meets the speed of relevance in modern competition. Suffice to say, and I hope my right hon. Friend and the House will be reassured, that of course the permanent secretary, on seeing what happened in the Department of Defence last week, has had a good look at what is going on inside the MOD to make sure that, if we have any lessons to learn, we do so.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Monday 30th January 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Speaking of budgets and Ukraine, may I invite the Minister to respond to comments from the United States—our closest security ally—which tally with the Defence Committee’s findings that the conflict in Ukraine has exposed serious shortfalls in the war-fighting capability of the British Army? This is not about the professionalism of individuals, units or formations; it is about overall combat strength and the equipment they use, as well as the ability to meet increasing demands caused by the deteriorating threat picture.

[James Heappey]

I am not sure that the United States has said anything about the official development assistance budget recently, but if you will indulge me, Mr Speaker, that is a wider point of news—[Interruption.] Thank you. Everybody is clear, and the Secretary of State has said many times—as have I and other ministerial colleagues —that serial underinvestment in the Army over decades has led to the point where the Army is in urgent need of recapitalisation. The Chancellor and the Prime Minister get that, and there is a Budget coming.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Monday 12th December 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Select Committee on Defence.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The UK has led by example with its military assistance to Ukraine, but may I invite the UK to step forward again? Until now, the west has publicly stated that it is for Ukraine to determine on what terms Russia is defeated. It is their country and, of course, Ukraine’s objectives are fundamental, but this approach effectively outsources our Russia foreign policy and ignores the wider long-term threat Moscow now poses to all of Europe. Do we accept that this is no isolated invasion? Russia is returning to type by expanding its influence across Europe, by weaponising oil, gas and grain, and by increasingly drawing Iran and Belarus into the fight. This is a European war and it is in our economic and security interests to put out this fire. Our Russia foreign policy should reflect that.

[James Heappey]

I agree, but I do not think the response to Ukraine is the totality of the UK’s foreign policy on Russia. Russia is a challenge not only across the European continent but beyond. My right hon. Friend is right that Russia is using grain as a weapon and as leverage across the global south, so the UK must seek to address Russia’s malign activity globally while continuing to do everything we are doing to ensure that the war in Ukraine ends on terms acceptable to President Zelensky.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Monday 7th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The defence Command Paper states:

“China poses a complex, systemic challenge.”

But we recently learned that RAF veterans have been lured to China to assist with its own air force training, and today’s response to my written parliamentary question confirms that Chinese officer cadets have recently been attending courses at Sandhurst, Shrivenham and Cranwell. Will the Secretary of State confirm that we will update our security strategy towards China, and will the law be changed to prevent former RAF pilots from being recruited by the Chinese military?

[James Heappey]

It is a couple of days since I signed off the response to my right hon. Friend’s question, but from memory it related to a few years ago, albeit within the five that his question referred to. We have since revised our policy on Chinese attendance on key courses, but it is important to note that in none of those courses is anything taught or compromised that might be above the threshold of the Official Secrets Act.

Migrant Crossings: Role of the Military

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Tuesday 18th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con) (Urgent Question)]

To ask the Minister for the Armed Forces to make a statement on the migrant channel issues and the role of the military.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

Unacceptable numbers of people continue to make these dangerous channel crossings, and last November’s tragic deaths serve as the strongest reminder of the need to stop them. The Government have been exploring every avenue to prevent further crossings, and have now appointed the Ministry of Defence to take operational primacy for cross-channel counter-migration operations. That will mean a much larger and more visible role for the Royal Navy in operational planning, asset co-ordination and operational delivery.

As the Home Secretary explained during Home Office questions yesterday, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence have worked closely on countering the small boats challenge through the military aid to civilian authorities process. Throughout the last 12 months Defence has provided a range of support, including the provision of surveillance aircraft, additional accommodation and planning expertise, and has assisted in the delivery of trials for novel tactics to help Border Force and the Home Office to better interdict and deter migrant vessels.

Details of how Defence will deliver and maintain the primacy of cross-channel counter-migration operations are currently being worked through. The Government’s objective is that no one should arrive illegally in the United Kingdom on their own terms, and all vessels transporting illegal migrants across the channel must therefore be intercepted before, or as, they land. Defence is committed to delivering that step change. Details of how it will be achieved will be made known in due course, but the House can be reassured that the MOD is working hand in hand with the Home Secretary and her Department to achieve this goal while ensuring the safety of all individuals involved and protecting other Defence priority output.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful to the Minister for that clarification.

We are rightly proud of our armed forces, who watch our backs and defend our interests across the world, and who are equipped and trained to step forward and assist other Government Departments in times of emergency. However, the bigger picture is clear to see. Our world is becoming more dangerous and more complex, and demands on our military—not least the Royal Navy—are increasing. The integrated review maps out the importance to the UK economy of retaining the freedom of the seas, increasingly challenged by China, Russia and, indeed, Iran. The Defence Committee’s recent review of the Royal Navy concluded that it is now too small to meet its current commitments in the Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, in the Gulf, off east Africa, in the Caribbean and in the Arctic, and, of course, with the tilt to the Indo-Pacific. Yet here we are introducing another task: co-ordinating the migrant crossing response, which is normally the responsibility of the Home Office.

As the Minister said, the migrant channel issue is complex and is not likely to go away soon. It is not an acute emergency, so why is the Navy being drawn in, even in this limited capacity? I say “limited”; the Minister spoke of “operational primacy”, and he is now responsible for it. There is a real danger of mission creep, with further navel assets being sucked into this challenge. Please will the Minister explain who will pay for this mission, what success looks like, and how long the task will last?

This tactic may, on the face of it, look popular, with 28,000 migrants now crossing every year—“send in the Navy to sort it out”—but it is not the strategy that will solve the problem of the movement of migrants. We need first to break up the gangs who encourage migrants in the first place, and secondly to help restore governance and security in the very countries from which these people are fleeing—places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Somalia. Ironically, those are parts of the world where we have used our own hard power to intervene but then departed before there was enduring stability, and now families are fleeing towards Europe.

Unless the fires are put out at source, we will never reduce the numbers. We need a broader strategy than simply tasking the Navy to the channel, which will not be the answer.

[James Heappey]

I thank my right hon. Friend for elaborating on his urgent question. I take issue with his point that the Navy has to make a binary choice between work at home and work overseas. Ships are deployed all over the world right now, and other ships are making ready to set to sea in response to whatever crises may unfold in the Euro-Atlantic over the coming weeks.

In addition, there is capacity to do as we do year round, which is to deploy naval resources into the channel for purposes such as fishery protection and, indeed, securing our border. That is an important point. The purpose of our nation’s armed forces is to secure the UK’s national security interests both at home and abroad, and I would argue that deploying our armed forces to ensure that our borders are robust is a perfectly appropriate use of them. Indeed, as I know my right hon. Friend is very aware, there are parts of Europe right now in which state-sponsored illegal migration is being used as a sub-threshold weapon of competition. I am not suggesting for a second that the migration across the channel is that right now but, in the absence of robust defence of our borders, it could be in the future, and the MOD therefore has a perfectly reasonable role to play in ensuring that our borders are robustly protected.

My right hon. Friend specifically asked about pay. Clearly this will be a multi-agency effort under Royal Navy command. Where agencies are already doing things in the channel, they will continue to be funded by the Departments that own them.

Success is that we do not allow anybody to land in the UK on their own terms. For how long? Until the deterrent effect is achieved and the cross-channel route for small boats collapses.

There is a limit to my right hon. Friend’s question, which is the role of the Royal Navy and the military within the channel—that is what I am here to answer today—but I completely agree that this is just one part of a wider system. Indeed, he is right to note that the MOD has plenty of equity in providing stability in countries such as Iraq and in the Sahel, where the majority of migrants are coming from, and we are engaged in that.

Nobody is pretending that the presence of a rear admiral and a few extra Royal Navy ships solves this issue. It is regrettable that only part of the Government’s solution should appear in the papers, and I will do my best to answer any questions my right hon. Friend asks.

UK Military Personnel Serving Overseas: Vaccination

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Wednesday 23rd June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the vaccination of UK military personnel serving overseas.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

As soon as our hugely successful covid vaccination programme was launched, I wanted to ensure that our armed forces would have access to vaccines as quickly as possible, so we tasked the Department with ensuring that nobody would be disadvantaged by serving our country abroad. This means people would be offered vaccinations no later than they would have at home, and that those who needed to would be vaccinated before they left the UK.

Our critical outputs, including the continuous-at-sea deterrent crew and the quick reaction alert air crew, have rightly been prioritised. We have also in recent days completed 100% vaccination for our carrier strike group. I can confirm today that sufficient vaccines for all of our people in all overseas locations have now been dispatched. We are in the process of getting the few remaining people who are awaiting their vaccines their jabs. For those on active operations overseas, we have administered first doses of vaccine to 95% of those eligible and 61% of them have had their second dose. I can assure the House that every single eligible person across Defence, at home or abroad, will have been offered at least their first vaccine dose by 19 July, in line with the national programme.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for that reply but it does miss out a lot of detail. It gives me no pleasure whatsoever during Armed Forces Week, when we celebrate the military’s invaluable contribution to our nation, to raise this urgent question as to why we do not have a bespoke vaccination programme for our personnel who are deployed overseas.

In our national battle to tackle covid here in the UK, we have relied on our military from the start—in building Nightingales, driving ambulances, mass testing and, of course, running hundreds of vaccination centres across the country—and yet, when we ask them to return to their day job, those deployed overseas are not fully vaccinated. A reported outbreak of 80 cases in our recent UN mission to Mali illustrates the dangerous consequences. This outbreak would have devastated our operational capability and, indeed, the safety of the mission.

It is standard protocol to inoculate prior to deployment. If we protect our troops against yellow fever, anthrax, malaria, typhoid and a host of other infectious diseases, why not covid when we have these vaccines now? Our NATO allies are doing just that. The USA, France, Holland and Germany all have fully vaccinated their deployed troops, so why have we not? I understand that our NATO partners have in fact expressed concern that the Queen Elizabeth battle group departed without all personnel having received two vaccines and, indeed, our Gulf allies have also registered their concern that our personnel based in their stations abroad are without the vaccines.

This is an easy call to get right, but it is also an irresponsible one to get wrong and arguably a potential breach of the armed forces covenant and our duty of care to our valiant armed forces. However, the picture would be incomplete without registering the MOD’s internal attempts to address this. We must make that clear, but I hope that Whitehall is now listening, and I am sure that the country would want to see key worker status granted to all personnel currently overseas. That is what would resolve this issue. With this challenge now out in the open, in supporting this call, can I ask the MOD to fully vaccinate all our sailors, soldiers and air personnel as a matter of urgency?

[James Heappey]

I thank my right hon. Friend for asking the urgent question. I have not had any representations from NATO partners or Gulf partners sharing any concerns over our vaccination programme, so he may wish to share with me or my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State any such representations that he has received so that we can discuss those with our colleagues in other Ministries of Defence. I am also slightly surprised that the MOD’s vaccination programme has become such a matter of urgent attention for him and others in the House, because we have had a series of parliamentary questions on this matter over the last six months, and in all of them, we have been very clear that the MOD’s position is that people would receive their vaccinations overseas in line with their age cohort here in the UK.

[Mr Ellwood]

That was wrong. It was absolutely wrong.

[James Heappey]

Whether that was right or wrong can be a matter of debate, but the MOD position has been very clear throughout. I happen to believe that it is the right decision, because there was no decision to prioritise other professions beyond those within the NHS—military medics, it is important to say, were all vaccinated as a matter of priority alongside their NHS colleagues while they were working in high-risk covid environments.

The other thing that I would just pick up on in my right hon. Friend’s response to my initial answer is his assertion that 80 people on our deployment to Mali had covid. That is simply not the case. The correct figure, as was answered in a parliamentary question last week, is that cumulatively, since the deployment began, 24 people have tested positive for covid. If you will indulge the detail of that, Madam Deputy Speaker, there were six positive tests in March, two in April and one in May for the Chinook detachment, and two in December, six in January, one in February and six in March for the long range reconnaissance group.

Afghanistan

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Tuesday 20th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on Afghanistan.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

Following the shocking attacks of September 11 2001, NATO allies invoked article 5 of the Washington treaty. An attack on one was an attack on us all. In Afghanistan over the two decades since, NATO has shown extraordinary resolve in a country where the soldiering is tough and operational success is very hard won. Some 150,610 UK service personnel have served in Afghanistan over the last 20 years. Hundreds of our troops have suffered life-changing injuries, and 457 of our young men and women have made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of our country. I pay tribute to their service and their sacrifice. They will not be forgotten.

I served in Afghanistan on two tours—the first, to Kabul in 2005; and the second, to Sangin, in 2009. My battalion lost 13 men on that second tour, with many more killed in our wider battlegroup. I have friends who will walk on prosthetic limbs for the rest of their lives, and I know people who suffered severe mental pain that tragically caused them to subsequently take their own lives. Like every other Afghanistan veteran, when I heard NATO’s decision last week, I could not help but ask myself whether it was all worth it.

We went into Afghanistan to disrupt a global terrorist threat and to deny al-Qaeda the opportunity to use that nation as a base for mounting further international attacks. In that mission, we were successful. By fighting the insurgency in its heartlands in the south and east of the country, NATO created space for the machinery of the Afghan government to be established and strengthened. Afghan civil society flourished. Schools reopened and girls enjoyed education just as boys did. There is a vibrant and free media. Women are not only valued and respected but are working in Afghan academia, healthcare and politics. Over 20 years we have developed and then partnered the brave men and women of the Afghan national security forces. They are now a proud army with the capacity to keep the peace in Afghanistan if empowered to do so by future Governments in Kabul.

Those of us who have served very rarely get to reflect on an absolute victory; only in the most binary of state-on-state wars can the military instrument alone be decisive. But two generations of Afghan children have now grown up with access to education. The Afghan people have tasted freedom and democracy, and they have an expectation of what life in their country should be like in the future. The Taliban, apparently, have no appetite to be an international pariah like they were in the late ‘90s. Our endeavours over the past two decades have created those conditions and have given Afghanistan every chance of maintaining peace within its own borders. We will continue to support the Afghan Government in delivering that, but our military could not stay in Afghanistan indefinitely, and so we will leave, in line with NATO allies, by September. Nothing in the future of Afghanistan is guaranteed, but the bravery, determination and sacrifice of so many British soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen has given Afghanistan every possible chance of success.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

Sending our troops into conflict is the biggest decision that any Prime Minister has to make. The strategic objective must be clear, yet we now withdraw from Afghanistan, after enormous cost and human sacrifice, with the country heading towards another civil war and the Taliban on the ascent. I have visited the country many times. This cannot be the exit strategy that we ever envisaged.

Our nation and our military deserve answers. I request a Chilcot-style inquiry so that we can learn the lessons of what went wrong. How did we squander the relative peace of the first four years? Why were the Taliban excluded from the peace talks in 2001—a fundamental error that could have brought stability early on? Why did we adopt an over-centralised western model of governance? Why were we too slow in building up Afghan security forces, up to a paltry 26,000 five years after the invasion? Why was Pakistan allowed to harbour and train the Taliban for so long? More widely, did the ease of the initial Afghan invasion lead to an over-confidence by the US for it to then invade Iraq, meaning that we had to fight on two fronts? Should we take responsibility for the Taliban’s emergence in the first place after the US abandoned Afghanistan once the Soviets had left? Where was the British thought leadership—our situational awareness that might have influenced US strategic thinking? As we have learned in Northern Ireland, you cannot defeat the enemy by military means alone.

If we depart completely, a dangerous part of the world becomes more dangerous as the Taliban assumes control of the bulk of the country and once again gives sanctuary to extremist groups. Our brave military served with honour, but they were let down by poor strategic judgments that if politicians today do not understand and learn from, will impede our confidence to step forward and stand up to extremism and authoritarianism in the future. There are so many questions and it is the Government’s duty to respond.

[James Heappey]

I thank my right hon. Friend for calling for this urgent question. I do not entirely share his analysis of what would have happened next. The relatively benign, by Afghan standards, security situation in the country at the moment is not the norm; it is the consequence of the accommodation that the US and the Taliban had come to last year. That means, in effect, that there are three options for the international community. One is to prepare for a fighting season this summer once the 1 May deadline expires. The second is to come to a new accommodation with the Taliban that effectively removes all of the political imperative to reaching a solution. The third is to agree that, effectively, the military mission is done and that what remains now is a political one, and the way to accelerate that is to force the hand and agree to leave as we have done.

My right hon. Friend asks some great questions about the route to being in Afghanistan and the prosecution of the campaign thereafter. I think that those of us who have served, as he has done, take some solace from the way that these things are considered deliberately after the event. It is not for me to agree to such an inquiry right now, but one would hope that the lessons would be learned. I do not necessarily accept all of his analysis of how the campaign has played out, but obviously we have reached the point where the military mission has effectively culminated and what remains is a requirement for politics. To keep our people there indefinitely with 1 May approaching does not seem to me to be the right use of the military instrument.

Strength of the UK’s Armed Forces

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Wednesday 14th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

I thank the shadow Secretary of State for the tribute he paid to the Duke of Edinburgh—one with which I very much agree, and I know all of my colleagues in the Ministry of Defence do too. The military are taking great pride in their preparations for his funeral on Saturday, where they hope to give him the send-off he deserves.

I welcome this debate. We live in a new age of systemic competition where information, data and technology shape conflict every bit as much as ships, tanks and fighter jets. Military hardware can be undermined by cyber-attacks or by the severing of undersea cables, while the use of proxy forces and other covert and deniable activities makes it harder to determine when the threshold of war has been crossed. So we have to think about defence differently.

“The Integrated Operating Concept 2025”, published last year, changes the way we think about our response to conflict. No longer can we have a contingent force sat in the UK waiting for the fight. Instead we must be operating persistently around the globe in forging partnerships, building capacity, tackling insecurity and competing with our adversaries. Make no mistake, however: we recognise that we cannot be upstream of every potential conflict and that we must therefore not only be able to operate but able to fight.

We can all be nostalgic over the force structures that won the wars of yesteryear. Undoubtedly there is a comfort in looking out of the window and seeing row upon row of the capabilities that have kept us safe in the past. But as surely as hoof became wheel and sail gave way to steam, we should all be clear that technology is moving on quickly and industrial capabilities will no longer get the job done alone. We have a duty to the British men and women of our armed forces not to indulge in a game of military bingo, obsessed with the metrics of previous conflicts. Instead we must keep adapting to the threat, because the reality is that if we fail to change, we will be defeated.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend talks about adapting to the threat. We have the technological advantage in Afghanistan, yet Afghanistan has been seen as a failure—something he is more familiar with than many in this House. Now that the United States has declared that it is going to withdraw its troops, could he confirm what will happen to the British troops that are based there?

[James Heappey]

As the shadow Secretary of State noted, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is not able to respond to this debate in person because he is at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, along with my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. The decisions on this are being taken this afternoon in Brussels. I hope that my right hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not pre-empt that, but I am certain that either the Defence Secretary or the Foreign Secretary will want to notify the House with appropriate urgency if and when such a decision has been made.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend for his intervention, but I do not agree with his analysis. In this part of my speech I am setting out the conventional war-fighting capabilities because the shadow Secretary of State set out a very pessimistic view of what they would be, but the reality is that the key change being made through the integrated review and Defence Command Paper is to enhance the capabilities my right hon. Friend rightly stresses will be in most demand as we address the challenges of tomorrow, and they are the ones that exist below the threshold of conflict. If he will indulge me, in a couple of minutes he will hear some of the things that I think might answer his question in more detail.

That is why we are investing heavily in the national cyber force, bringing together the resources of the Ministry of Defence and the intelligence community to deceive, degrade, deny, disrupt and destroy targets in and through cyber-space. It is also why we have established a new space command that will enhance our military surveillance and communication capabilities from space, assist in the co-ordination of commercial space operations and lead the development of new low and high orbit capabilities.

Moreover, we know that the threats to UK interests, both in space and in cyberspace, are not just from ones and zeroes. Our adversaries are investing in capabilities that put our undersea fibre-optic cables and our satellites at physical risk as well, so we need the ability to protect and defend our interests in the depths of the oceans and in the heights of space.

Nor are we alone in seeking to modernise. Our adversaries as well as our allies are making rapid headway, and some of the most cutting-edge capabilities are now commercially available, meaning that the highest grade technology is no longer the preserve of the best resourced militaries. So we are investing to stay ahead of the curve and recover our technological edge, putting aside at least £6.6 billion for research and development to supercharge innovation in the next generation of disruptive capabilities, from directed energy weapons to swarming drones.

But it is not just about what you’ve got; it is what you do with it. I have already set out the vision of the integrated operating concept, and over the next year or two the Ministry of Defence will be expanding our forward presence around the world as we shift from a contingent force waiting for the fight to one that operates and competes constantly. In the land domain, some of our most effective work is with small specialised infantry teams developing the capacity of partner forces in the parts of the world that cause us concern. We are reinforcing that success through the creation of the special operations-capable rangers and thus doubling the size of our partnering force. Our fighting brigades, meanwhile, will move to higher readiness so that they can deploy and operate more quickly. They will also gain capabilities that allow them to engage their enemy at greater range, thus reflecting the lessons on close combat learned from recent conflicts in northern Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.

[Mr Ellwood]

I need to clarify the difference between what the rangers will do and what our Royal Marines do, because the Royal Marines are concerned that they are being put out of a job. Everything that my hon. Friend has just described could be done by the Royal Marines. Let us take an example in Mozambique. Were we to put this rangers brigade in, who would replace them after five or six months? Where is the endurance capability that our armed forces need to provide?

[James Heappey]

I am afraid that my right hon. Friend is not right in what he thinks the rangers will do. The distinction is that 16 Air Assault, the Parachute Regiment and 3 Commando Brigade, as high-readiness contingent forces who are there to fight at short notice in hostile contested environments such as the ones he describes, still do exactly that from the air or the sea, depending on whether it is 16 Air Assault or 3 Commando. The rangers will be a special operations-capable partnering force designed to train, advise, assist and accompany partner forces in conflicts around the world, not to be a fighting force in and of themselves. That distinction is one that we have observed from the success of the US Green Berets, which have been very successful, and we are looking forward to having that as part of the toolkit for the UK armed forces in the future.

Needless to say, in increasing readiness and being able to operate more quickly, there is still a requirement for war-fighting mass, and that leads to a long overdue revisiting of what we ask of our reservists. I am very much looking forward to the publication of the reserve forces 2030 review, and I am confident that in the discussion that follows we will come out with an exciting proposition of what it means to serve in the reserve and what value that can add as we generate war-fighting mass.

In the air, we have created a joint squadron with Qatar, and we are looking at how this concept can be extended further with other partner air forces, as well as offering world-leading flying training to helicopter and fast jet pilots from our allies around the world. Meanwhile, investment in the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, in the E-7 airborne command and control, in the Protector uncrewed surveillance and strike platform and in a network of airfields from which we can operate the full range of RAF capabilities, enhances our capacity to understand our adversaries, find them quickly and strike them wherever they are, all around the globe.

At sea, we have had forward deployed ships in the Caribbean and the Falklands for a number of years, and I can announce to the House that last week HMS Trent arrived in Gibraltar, where she will now be permanently based in order to service the UK’s interests in both the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. Later in the year, a further offshore patrol vessel will sail for the Indo-Pacific, where she will also be permanently forward based. The maritime forward presence is further enhanced by the restoration of our high-readiness global carrier strike capability and the new littoral response groups providing an at-sea high readiness amphibious response force on NATO’s northern and southern flanks.

However, let there be no misunderstanding: we are clear-eyed on the realities of geography. We are a Euro-Atlantic power and deeply invested in the security of Europe. NATO is the cornerstone of our national security, so our priority is our partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations and the security of our own backyard, but it is naive in the extreme to think that that means we can ignore insecurity and instability on Europe’s southern flank in sub-Saharan Africa and the middle east.

The UK interest is threatened by violent extremism in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the horn of Africa, and so too is it threatened by Russian proxies massing in Libya and Syria, but those are not problems that would be solved by 10,000 troops on the ground in any one of those places. The lessons of the last two decades show that we must work intelligently to tackle instability upstream and through regional partners. We simply cannot muscle our way to a solution in those places with all-out hard power. Our contribution on those conflicts in the future must be smarter and must develop a capability that will endure even after our mission is inevitably over.

We should also be clear that meeting our global trading ambitions requires both the capacity and the will to protect our sea lines of communication and the wider UK interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Opposition have wrongly characterised that as a switch in emphasis from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it is a recognition that we have the capability, the capacity and the political will to flex hard power into a part of the world where the UK’s strategic interest is growing quickly, so that we can strengthen our alliances, protect our interests and promote adherence to a rules-based international system.

The integrated review and the Defence Command Paper represent the boldest change in foreign, defence and security policy for 30 years, and it is entirely right that we are here debating them today. I know that there is disagreement on both sides of the House about some of the judgments that we have made, but the requirement is to produce a force that is credible: one that can actually fight in the complex and highly digitised battlespace of tomorrow. Some capabilities have run their course, and there can be no room for sentiment in keeping them when they simply are not relevant any more.

Ultimately, this all comes down to two key questions: first, are we offering the men and women of our armed forces exciting opportunities and the equipment they deserve; and secondly, and most important, does all this make the UK safer? I have already looked servicemen and women in the eye and explained to them our vision for our armed forces and the way they will operate, and so too have my ministerial colleagues and the senior military leaderships of all three services. Our people get this: they understand the need for change, and they want it. The reality is that they can see, and I can see, that because of this transformation, our armed forces will be stronger, more capable and therefore better able to protect our country in the decades ahead.

UN Mission in Mali: Armed Forces Deployment

Debate between James Heappey and Tobias Ellwood

Wednesday 9th December 2020 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his positive response to the statement. As we were saying in the Remembrance Day debate a few weeks ago, as people deploy on missions such as this it matters enormously to see support on both sides of the House for what they are going out to do. He rightly asked some questions that I will do my best to answer, starting with, of course, an intent to regularly update the House either verbally—although that met with no support from my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart)—or otherwise on the progress of the mission and the threat as it evolves.

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to pick up on the line in my statement that says that this mission is not without risk. This is a dangerous part of the world in which to be operating. It is because it is such a dangerous part of the world that the case for being there as part of a peacekeeping force is so easily made. We should be clear that, despite all the training, all the equipment and all the mitigations that we will put in place—I will explain some of those in a second—our troops are accepting a risk to life and limb in serving in the Sahel, and we thank them for that. We genuinely believe that it is in the interests of the UK and the people of Mali that we contribute to that mission.

We have recognised that in previous deployments perhaps there has been a gung-ho willingness to expand the mission quickly and get on with things without fully understanding the realities of the threat on the ground and how that manifests itself in relation to military operations. In this first rotation—the first six months—we will be expecting the Light Dragoons battle group to deploy and to find its way in the immediate vicinity of Gao, the city in which the UN camp where they will be based is. If, over time, we come to understand that they can operate at range, we will consider that on its merits, depending on the mission design from the UN force commander. Our intention is to find our way slowly, to build our confidence and our understanding, and then to grow the mission, within the confines of MINUSMA. It is important to stress that there is no UK agency in being able just to decide what we do; we are under the command of the UN force commander.

The right hon. Gentleman asked me about the camp. It is a brand-new camp, and it is indeed in the UN super-camp at Gao. That camp is protected by a German early warning system called MANTIS—the modular, automatic and network capable targeting and interception system—which picks up the IDF, or indirect fire attack, which the right hon. Gentleman mentioned in his reply. That allows people in the camp to take cover and adopt all of their drills when there is incoming indirect fire. Sadly, as a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, I know that that is just the reality of being in camps in those places, but these early warning systems give people great confidence that they can find cover before the rounds start landing.

This is, indeed, a complex mission. The UN’s mission is made all the more challenging as a consequence of the changing political tides in Mali—there was a coup only four months ago—and that means that the military mission, as designed by the UN force commander, and the political mission have some work to do to evolve and to react to those new political realities in Mali, hence our caution over the speed at which we unleashed the Light Dragoons on their mission. We want to see how things develop, and we will update the right hon. Gentleman and colleagues as that happens.

There is no scope to widen the size of our force; we are limited by what the UN requires of us. There is also no scope for us to decide unilaterally, as the United Kingdom, that we want to do more; we are within the UN’s mission. MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane are entirely separate; there is no opportunity to flex one from the other, as to do so would be to break the rules on UN peacekeeping contingents. In any case, the missions are so different; Barkhane is a more offensive, counter-terrorism operation, chasing both JNIM—Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin—and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara around not only Mali, but Burkina Faso and Niger. MINUSMA is a Mali-only peacekeeping operation led by the UN.

Finally, the right hon. Gentleman asked me about funding. We are talking about £80 million over three years, which is indeed funded by the conflict, stability and security fund. It will matter enormously to people deploying on this operation to see the tone of these exchanges. Our intention is to keep the House informed as best as we can. This is a dangerous mission, but our people are well-trained and well-equipped. They are ready and they are up for it, and I wish them a good tour.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I join the Opposition and our Front-Bench team in wishing our forces well and a very safe tour. The Minister speaks about wanting to increase our profile in the Sahel. The west has been without resolve in that area; this has been a hidden conflict. I am pleased that we want to close down this permissive environment, which he spoke about, of extremism, criminality, human trafficking and regional conflict spilling out beyond the Sahel. However, I hope that that commitment is matched by a greater western resolve to tackle the underlying causes of those issues, because we will not solve the challenges there through military means alone.

I must tell the Minister—I am pleased that the Defence Secretary is in his place— that I am sorry to learn that as we have in the Sahel taken a step forward with greater resolve, here we are taking a retrograde step with talk of reductions to our reserve forces and to their training. They are the very people who are the in-fill to the regular forces that go out to these places; I have not been on an operational overseas tour where I did not have reservists under my command as well. I say to the Minister that I hope that as we step forward with greater resolve on the international stage we will think more carefully about these cuts to our reserves.

[James Heappey]

I am delighted to say that there are a number of reservists within the deployment to Mali. Their skillset is well valued and they will do a great job. The Secretary of State and other Ministry of Defence Ministers have, like me, all served alongside our fantastic reservists in various theatres over the course of our military service. Their value is undeniable and they are an integral part of the force. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) is right to say that to some degree this is a hidden conflict, although with the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq we now have the largest western troop deployment on earth in the Sahel. However, it is incomplete, no matter what the size of the force, unless a political and diplomatic effort goes around that response. He is right to encourage, not just here in our diplomatic and aid effort, but within the UN and across all the troop-contributing nations, the political effort to match the military one.