Crime and Policing Bill

Earl of Lytton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I too support Amendment 286A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, to which I also would have added my name if I had been slightly more efficient. The right reverend Prelate and I need to do better from now on. I acknowledge and thank the NSPCC and declare my interest as a teacher. To quote Keeping Children Safe in Education, which we have to read every year, child protection is everybody’s responsibility.

I was surprised to hear that this issue was not already completely covered. As we have heard now and in previous groups, it is essential that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated, they should face strong criminal penalties. Actions like these can delay, and sometimes outright deny, victims their access to justice and the vital support needed to help them recover from such abuse.

The much-quoted Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse uncovered instances in which teachers were transferred to another school with no police referral, after a student was told: “You must not tell the police. We will handle it in-house”. Priests were moved from parish to parish, and there were examples of local authorities destroying files relating to allegations, which survivors perceived as part of a cover-up.

These are actions that can and do continue to happen across our society. While Clause 79 introduces a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone under the mandatory reporting duty from making a report, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed. This is because Clause 79 is built on the mandatory reporting duty and requires the act of concealment directly to involve someone under that duty. This proposal is separate from applying criminal sanctions directly to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse in Clause 72, which I fear could create a defensive fear and blame-based child protection sector that criminalises those who lack the knowledge and training to report effectively. However, intentionally taking actions to cover up child sexual abuse cannot be tolerated and should be criminalised. I believe that this amendment strikes the balance.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill. I must say that, in the presence of such expertise, I find myself entirely inadequate for the purpose. At Second Reading, I raised a question about the interaction of Clause 80 with the clauses that precede it. I profess no track record on matters of child protection, but I thoroughly subscribe to the principle of the duty to report contained in this section of the Bill. Because of its profound significance, it certainly has my full support.

However, I have come to the matter through a rather different route: the way in which crimes are recorded and, in particular, why they may not be recorded accurately or at all. My point is quite simple and revolves around the reliable translation of the definition in Clause 72(1)—namely, a reason to believe that

“a child sex offence may have been committed (at any time)”—

into some sort of recording and/or further action. We cannot know what those reasons to believe might be, so variable is the range of circumstances, as we heard earlier. I note that “reasonable belief” has no definable limit, and nor should it have. However, it may very likely be based on the reporter’s knowledge, training, experience, powers of observation and so on, rather than hard evidence. Here is the point: otherwise, were that not the case, Clause 72 would surely have been differently worded.

I certainly expect that all such professionals involved with safeguarding in mind would have acute sensitivity in this area and, in reporting their beliefs, would themselves be believed as an evidential source. My concern is that their belief alone may still not be enough to generate action without further and better evidence. I think in particular of a situation where the child who is the subject of their belief is uncommunicative, if the information is partly second-hand, if it is about a child not in their immediate charge, and the myriad ways in which this information of relevance can come about. Then, the only purpose of reporting would be to get the matters into some sort of system for follow-up monitoring and investigations which necessarily involve the devotion of resources to confirm the commission of an offence or ultimately dispose of it on the basis that nothing sinister has actually occurred.

Therefore, reporting gets us only so far. What then? What is the follow-up process to be? Clause 80 does not actually tell us but makes a leap to police crime recording, in accordance with “applicable policy and procedure”—presumably meaning the Home Office guidance and the practices within the particular force concerned, attuned to local circumstances, resources and priorities within its area. This, as far as I can see, is the only backstop follow-up from the reporting of reasonable belief under the Bill. As such, its commendable aims are yoked to a general crime reporting principle that applies some way further down the line.

I hope I do not suffer from some sort of hallucinatory process in all of this, but I seek to plug a gap in which reasonable belief in any given instance is not guaranteed to pass the evidential standard for the purposes of police or, for that matter, any other recording of suspected crime. This is because the balance of probabilities test underlying the crime reporting guidance embodies a clear tendency towards such an evidential base. Home Office guidance places the duty on the reporting officer as to what they think has happened in the commission of a crime, not necessarily what the person reporting thinks. Any different approach, especially one involving time and energy in instances of hazy information in the circumstances described, might be difficult to get across the line.

My concern, notwithstanding the current focus on child sexual abuse in the press and everywhere else, is that things might easily erode over the long run and default to standard practices consistent with available finances, manpower and, not least, political pressures to show effective reduction in crime. This was highlighted by the Public Administration Select Committee in its June 2014 report, Caught Red-handed. Its findings were also associated with the demotion of police crime recordings and their removal for national statistics purposes.

The gap I see in the legislative architecture before us matters because of the special attention needed to protect young people. If we are now moving on to a situation where previous failings to protect the vulnerable from things too awful to contemplate are really a thing of the past, with better outcomes going forward, then, as I pointed out at Second Reading, Clause 80 risks merely undoing the policy objectives of Clauses 72 to 79.

Rather than tinker around with the detail, it seemed more appropriate to remove Clause 80 altogether—hence my intention for us to debate whether Clause 80 stands part—and simply leave in place the duty to report and the penalty for obstructing this duty. That would lead, I hope, to the establishment by the relevant duty holders, via their multi agency safeguarding processes, of other follow-up protocols to manage and monitor concerns falling outside police crime recording parameters, but on a structured basis. Otherwise, I cannot conceive of any route to ensure follow-up measures and resources being devoted to mere reasonable belief that does not require an evidential test for crime recording. Therefore, this needs a framework.

Crime and Policing Bill

Earl of Lytton Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, I very much welcome the opportunity to discuss the matters in this Bill and welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to the Front Bench. She is obviously used to dealing with gargantuan matters, such as those to do with my profession and the RICS, in her previous capacity, and I wish her well in her endeavours in chewing through this 400-page Bill.

My first point relates to anti-social behaviour. In my experience of inter-neighbour matters, the distinction between perpetrator and victim is seldom absolute—a point made by my noble friend Lord Russell of Liverpool. When I encounter instances of an ASB order made in such terms that normal life is actually impeded—and then the so-called victim proceeds to indulge in exactly the same sort of behaviour that has been prevented for his neighbour—I know that something is not right. There needs to be a better balance and there need to be order-making powers, and enforcement ought to be subject to better rules, competence and oversight.

My second point relates to Clauses 72, 79 and 80, principally regarding the duty to report suspected sex abuse of children. I fully support that duty, particularly in so far as it is applied to the persons listed as being under the duty to report. It should have consequences for those who culpably fail to report or who obstruct that duty.

This follows the prima facie principle that victims should be heard and believed and that a report of a matter involving a commission of a crime, as defined by law, should be so recorded unless there is credible evidence to the contrary, particularly in the context of young people. Once on a record in the system, the matter then demands attention and conscious process, including, one hopes, some support to the victim. That is until such time as additional verifiable information dictates otherwise. Outside that recording system, there is nothing—no practical form of subsidiary watch-list or anything like that—so spotting a trend, pattern or commonality in the data, outside a formal record, seems to me to depend on chance recognition by an official.

So far so good, but then Clause 80 proceeds to start unravelling things by effectively deferring to the balance-of-probabilities, evidence-based approach inherent in police procedures and Home Office counting rules. I believe this is incompatible with the intent and aim of Clauses 72 and 79. Suspicions, which is what we are talking about reporting, almost inevitably lack hard evidence. If, say, the recording officer of police does not happen to be satisfied as to the evidence, and therefore does not believe it can be reliably stated to be a crime that has been committed on his or her balance of probabilities test—as suggested in guidance or as directed by the senior officer—it may not get recorded. Not only does this court perversity, because recorded crime is related to police performance, but it risks repetition of precisely the outcomes of the Bradford child sexual exploitation case, when vulnerable young people were not believed and criminal enterprise went unchecked. In my view, Clause 80 requires a rethink or simply deleting. I note that this may have wider implications for the way in which crime is recorded and acted upon.

My final point relates to Part 9. Other noble Lords have made impassioned comments, so I am not alone in sensing that there is a degree of tendency to administrative overreach—even a politically thin-skinned reaction at times—in the cumulative measures eroding the right to demonstrate. I very much relate to the comments of the noble Baronesses, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer and Lady Cash, and I hope that, between us, we can get a better balance of what we actually mean by allowing people the necessary freedom and opportunity to vent their emotions and campaign and demonstrate safely.

Product Regulation and Metrology Bill [HL]

Earl of Lytton Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th November 2024 Grand Committee

Moved by

[The Earl of Lytton]

46: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause—
“Construction product safety: regulations and requirements(1) Within twelve months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must, by regulations under section 1, make provision to reduce risks as defined in section 1(4) presented by construction products.(2) For the purposes of this section, construction products include, but are not limited to, any components used in the construction of buildings, such as external cladding.(3) Within twelve months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must also make provision about construction product requirements by regulations under section 2.(4) Regulations under subsection (3) must set out requirements for the production, use, marking, marketing, testing, approval and provision of information (including information about risk) of construction products.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment intends to probe whether the Secretary of State will use powers under sections 1 and 2 to regulate products used in construction.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, members of the Committee will be aware that there are concerns relating to the suitability and safety of construction products, especially in the light of the Grenfell phase 2 report, and will know my professional interest in this area.

First, I pay tribute to the clerks in the Public Bill Office for their help in drafting this amendment, although its objectives and the rationale behind it are entirely my responsibility. I consider that the amendment speaks for itself in probing the Government’s intentions and resolve in bringing construction products specifically within the Bill’s scope, although they are not excluded, either by the Long Title or by the matters listed in the Schedule. My underlying purpose is to clarify this Bill’s specific focus in the objective regulation of a construction-related product’s inherent characteristics rather the nature of its use, particularly in combination with other products. To put it another way, it is concerned with the regulation, testing, certification and marketing of products for their specific stated use and application—namely, the aims of the Bill.

The British Board of Agrément—the BBA—is one of the main industry certifying bodies for construction products. In virtually all the BBA certificates I have looked at, it is made clear that the approval is for the specific use and application as presented. This is logical because behind every approval is an assessment or test of some kind that will be specific as to the proposed use. However, we know from the Grenfell phase 2 report how things can be misrepresented. Of course, none of this prevents misuse of some sort, or abuse, but it starts to clarify responsibility as applying to those who have true agency in the specification and use of products, especially where fire safety is concerned. I hope this gives the Minister an opportunity to confirm that, so far, I have got this right.

At the meeting with the noble Lord, Lord Leong, and officials, for which I thank him, it was suggested that while the provisions of the Bill cover construction products, in all probability any regulations would be made under a different legislative provision, such as the Building Safety Act 2022—so I looked in that Act for the word “regulation”. I got 650 hits, which sounds a bit like Henry VIII on steroids, I am bound to observe. I alighted on paragraph 10(1) of Schedule 11 to that Act which states:

“For the purposes of this Schedule, “safety-critical products” means construction products which are included in a list contained in construction products regulations”.


It is getting a bit circular, I suspect. Sub-paragraph (2) states:

“A construction product may only be included in a list under sub-paragraph (1) if … in the view of the Secretary of State any failure of the product would risk causing death or serious injury to any person”.


I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that I am right in believing that this is the relevant regulation-making measure that might be used in the Building Safety Act to implement some of the provisions of this Bill, if they are not implemented directly. If so, it has to be noted that the Building Safety Act relates to critical life-safety risks to persons, first and foremost. The Bill does not use that metric, so I consider that the relationship between this Bill and the BSA, for example, needs further clarification.

It has long been my professional assessment that if a building is robust, occupant safety is likely to be assured as well, but focusing on critical fire risk which interests itself only with occupants’ risks consigning them to significant risks of an emotional and financial nature if the building lacks durability and is effectively considered expendable. In terms of human life, that is absolutely the right approach, and I get that, but in terms of mercantile practice and peace of mind, it is a philosophy with gaps, especially if the general Building Safety Act approach is one of proportionality or tolerable risk—although I question by whose objective standards those might be measured, but that is another question.

So if I am correct, even allowing for the point that a building is not “product” as a term of art, why regulate such an important matter as construction products to be used in a residential block via different standards as compared with, say, those for a fridge-freezer or a washing machine? As set out in Clause 1(4)(c), we are concerned with a product that could “reasonably be foreseen” to cause damage to property. How is that, in the case of buildings under the BSA, a proportionate or tolerable risk to life? In the Government’s view, does the latter include the former? If so, I would be delighted to get confirmation of that; it is something that I tried to get hold of right the way through the then Building Safety Bill’s time before us. If not, how does the BSA afford the implementation of product safety in construction products?

Note if you will that the assemblage of products and processes used as someone’s home represents their place of safety. It is often their largest investment; it is also often incomparably more valuable an entity than most consumer products, both to them and in market terms. So standards and regulation matter very much. I invite the Minister to enlighten the Committee on this apparent legislative inconsistency.

Had this amendment been debated earlier in the evening, I might have been tempted at this point to have a little rant about British Standards being set behind a paywall—as well as the invidious nature of that when they are also embedded in regulation; the regulation is open source but the BS is not—but I will leave that matter in part to one side for the moment. I appreciate that some of the points I have mentioned go beyond what I discussed in the meeting with the Minister so, if he is unable to answer them right now, perhaps he could write to me before the next stage of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Fox (LD)]

I will briefly respond to the noble Earl. He is right to raise this issue, which is clearly important; we look forward to seeing how the Government respond to it. There are serious issues that need to be addressed somewhere. As has been observed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and others, the open nature of this Bill offers an opportunity for things like this to be properly discussed and to be, if not solved in this way, perhaps solved in another way.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very good to respond to this debate. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, sees that there is some advantage in the way that we have drafted the Bill.

I thank the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, for raising what is a really important matter. We all recognise that there are failings in the system by which construction products are tested, assured and made available for sale. The noble Earl described his amendment as probing whether the Government are prepared to use the powers in Clauses 1 and 2 to regulate products used in construction. The noble Earl has huge professional expertise. He referred to the BBA and the specific approval given but warned of the risk of misuse; I very much take that point.

The straightforward answer is that we think this issue is very important. We intend to bring forward robust regulatory reforms in order to provide confidence in the construction products regime and to ensure that only safe products are used in buildings and infrastructure. To that end, we also intend to ensure that the testing and assessment of products’ conformity must be undertaken by those who are competent, impartial and effectively held to account. We have committed to working with the sector on system-wide reform, including examining the institutions that play a key role in the construction products regime, so that businesses and, in particular, consumers can have confidence in the products and services they purchase. The proposed new clause to be inserted after Clause 2, through the noble Earl’s Amendment 46, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to use the powers and to make provision for construction products regulations within a year of Royal Assent of the Bill.

I turn now to the Building Safety Act 2022, about which the noble Earl made some interesting points. That Act already includes powers to introduce construction product requirements and regulations. We are exploring how best to use those available powers, including their sufficiency—I take his point on that—as part of considering system-wide reform. He will know that since the Grenfell tragedy in 2017 some action has been taken on construction products, but we know that more needs to be done.

In December 2018, regulations came into force that banned the use of combustible materials in and on the external walls of buildings over 18 metres. The national regulator for construction products was established in 2021 and leads on market surveillance and enforcement of construction product regulation across the UK.

The Government extended the period of recognition of CE marking for construction products in September this year to give the industry sufficient certainty to support supply chains and to allow time to address the inadequacies across the wider construction products regime, but we recognise that this action is piecemeal and does not go far enough. We have confirmed that we will respond to the Grenfell inquiry within six months. We are also committed to bringing forward proposals for system-wide reform of the construction products regulatory regime.

I have listened very carefully to the noble Earl’s analysis of the Building Safety Act and his suggestion that it is not sufficient for our purposes. We are considering this and I will write to him in some detail about the points he has raised. But to be fair to him, I have to say that this Bill does not specifically exclude construction products and that there could be an opportunity to use the Bill powers in the future should we discover that the Building Safety Act 2022 may be insufficient.

I hope that he will accept this as a positive response to the issues he has raised.

[The Earl of Lytton (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for that reply and I am certainly prepared to accept what he says in relation to the Government’s intentions. I will need to consider very carefully what he has said, particularly if he is writing to me—I am grateful for that offer. I will consider things in the light of that.

Without further ado and given the hour, I simply beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 46 withdrawn