All 8 Earl Howe contributions to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019

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Mon 29th Oct 2018
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Mon 29th Oct 2018
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Earl Howe Excerpts
Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018

(5 years, 5 months ago)

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Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 131-II Second marshalled list for Committee (PDF) - (29 Oct 2018)
Lord Carlile of Berriew Portrait Lord Carlile of Berriew
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My Lords, I understand that this clause is one of several in the Bill intended to deal with the speedy march of technology. The previous legislation particularly had in mind the downloading of material. There is now no need to download material at all. This is intended to deal with the practice of streaming, which not only has become ubiquitous but can now be done at lightning speed. My own internet system was uprated a couple of days ago and I am almost blinded by the speed at which, in the morning, I can get on my telephone whatever I wish to view on my exercise bike. That gives more detail than is probably welcome in this House, but it happens in moments. It is important to tackle the issue of streaming by updating the legislation.

With deference to the Opposition Front Bench, the phrase “pattern of behaviour” is breathtakingly vague and would never pass muster in any court of law as something which could be judged with any certainty. I urge the Minister to reject that phrase. I cite an example which I have seen of legitimate use being made of the kind of material the Committee is looking at. I do not want to embarrass the university concerned by naming it, but I took part in a seminar in the very good law faculty of a very good university in which second-year undergraduates had been asked to look at material online in order to assess the effect that they thought it would have on people who were looking at it out of curiosity, rather than as part of their study. The professor who was supervising this had, of course, informed the local counterterrorism unit that it was going to be done, because he wished to avoid difficulty. That unit welcomed what he was doing, because it was interested in the reaction of 18, 19 and 20 year-olds to material that is usually judged by people with PhDs, police officers or the security service. It gave a new viewpoint on this material and I was privileged to take part. However, it is an absurd notion that something like that would be prosecuted.

This clause extends the existing reasonable excuse defence under Section 58(3) to the new type of material which is available and which the Committee is considering now. As a result of the decision of your Lordships’ House in R v J and R v G in 2009, it has been made absolutely clear that,

“the defence of reasonable excuse must be an objectively verifiable reasonable excuse to be determined by the jury in the light of the particular facts and circumstances”,

of the case. Also, where the evidential burden is raised by the defence—in other words, the defendant says, “I have a reasonable excuse”—the defendant does not have to prove it. The prosecution then has to make the jury sure that the excuse that the defendant has offered is not reasonable. That in itself is a sufficient existing protection, without these amendments.

Further, and with great respect to as experienced a police officer as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I appeal to noble Lords who are looking for theoretical cases in which an arrest or prosecution may take place. The police do occasionally exercise their common sense and not arrest someone where it would be patently absurd to do so. Most of the time they do just that. A two-code test has just been reaffirmed in the publication—by the outgoing DPP on the last day of her period of service—of a new Code for Crown Prosecutors. It emphasises the dual-code test which requires not only that there should be evidence that a jury might accept but also that it is in the public interest to prosecute. The discretion of prosecutors is an important part of our unwritten constitution that is often overlooked but should not be, as is the protection offered by juries, which are plainly not going to convict someone like my friend the university professor who engaged his students in the very valuable exercise that I described. This provision is entirely proportionate and simply updates a piece of law that sometimes causes difficulties because we do not always keep it up to date.

Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
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My Lords, these amendments seek, in various ways, to raise the threshold for the offence of viewing material over the internet provided for in new Section 58(1)(c) of the Terrorism Act 2000. Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seeks to restore the concept of a pattern of behaviour which was, as he pointed out, inherent in the so-called three clicks version of the offence as originally introduced in the House of Commons. Amendments 12 and 13, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would introduce a requirement to prove not just that the material being accessed is likely to be useful to a terrorist but that it was accessed by the individual with the intention of using it for terrorist purposes.

In responding to Amendment 11, it may assist the Committee if I explain that the intention behind the original three clicks provision was to ensure proportionality, and to provide a safeguard for those who might inadvertently access terrorist material by ensuring that there was a pattern of behaviour in accessing such material. However, we recognised the difficulties underlying that approach, and the uncertainty around how it would be implemented. Having reflected on the concerns that were raised about the three clicks provision, we believe that the reasonable excuse defence is the better way of proceeding. Introducing a pattern of behaviour test would recreate many of the same issues we faced with the three clicks provision. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said on that issue. For example, it would beg questions such as how many viewings were required to constitute a pattern of behaviour and over what period such viewings would need to take place. Indeed, a pattern of behaviour test arguably introduces a greater degree of legal uncertainty than the three clicks test and, for that reason, I respectfully suggest that it is best avoided.

Amendments 12 and 13 would very significantly raise the threshold for the offence, and would alter its fundamental purpose. Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which Clause 3 amends, is a preparatory offence, rather than one aimed at the actual planning or commission of terrorist acts. It has a lower maximum sentence than other offences covering more developed terrorist activity, which can attract up to life imprisonment. I suggest to the noble Baroness that, in that sense, it is not comparable to the offence in Clause 2. The Section 58 offence, as amended by the Bill, is formulated so as to catch people who make a record of, or who view online, information likely to be useful to a terrorist, without requiring them to have actually used that information for a terrorist purpose or to intend to do so. This is in itself harmful behaviour, and such people can pose a very real threat to public safety. I do not agree with the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, of the changing of the guard. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, hit the nail on the head again when he spoke about what is reasonable for the authorities to suppose in all the circumstances.

If there is evidence that the individual is preparing or committing an act of terrorism, or is assisting another person to do so, then they would be likely to meet the threshold for a more serious offence, such as Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which covers the preparation of terrorist acts, and for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment. As such, a requirement to prove terrorist intent would effectively render unusable the new limb of the Section 58 offence that Clause 3 will insert. This is because the offence would be moved into territory that is already well covered by existing offences and could not be used for its intended purpose so that the police and courts would remain powerless to act against individuals accessing very serious terrorist material online.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has suggested that her amendments are intended in part to address her concern that the offence will inappropriately criminalise those who seek out terrorist information through foolishness, inquisitiveness or curiosity, without intending to do harm. I have sympathy for that concern. The Government have been clear that this offence is aimed at those of a terrorist mindset and we do not wish to cast its net unnecessarily widely. However, I cannot agree with the noble Baroness’s suggestion that this is the best way to address the concern.

For the reasons that I have set out, these amendments would fundamentally undermine the purpose of the offence, and would go much further than I believe is intended in narrowing its application. We consider that the existing “reasonable excuse” approach is a better and more appropriate means of doing so, together with the normal CPS tests of whether there is evidence that would provide a reasonable prospect of conviction, and whether prosecution would be in the public interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said. This is particularly so, because the question of whether it is legitimate for someone to intentionally seek out serious and potentially very harmful terrorist material, through foolishness or inquisitiveness, will be very fact-specific and particularly prone to grey areas. It needs to be considered on the basis of all the circumstances and all the evidence in any particular case.

While clearly there will be cases of this type, where prosecution will not be appropriate, it will certainly not be responsible to provide a blanket exemption for any person to access any quantity of terrorist information and be able to rely on such an exemption, whatever the potential harm associated with their activities. I hope, having heard my explanation, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be content to withdraw his amendment, and that the noble Baroness, when it comes to her turn, will be content not to press hers.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick
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I would like to explain my concerns to the Minister. In order for a police officer to make an arrest, all the police officer will need is a reasonable cause to suspect that the person is committing the offence. Therefore, the “reasonable excuse” defence provided in the Bill does not come into play. I accept that no Crown prosecutor would prosecute something that is clearly an innocent mistake, for example by someone clicking on to information. But my concern is that there is nothing to stop a police officer arresting a person, and the person being detained, until there is detailed consideration about whether this is a grey area, or whether it is reasonable or not.

Can the Minister give me any reassurance, other than what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has said about most police officers being reasonable? The particular offence that I am thinking of, which is no longer on the statute book—Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 —of being a suspected person,

“loitering with intent to commit an indictable offence”,

was routinely abused by the police in order to arrest people who were innocently going about their business. I am concerned that offences like this, which are very widely drawn and rely on a “reasonable excuse” defence, do not protect the innocent person from arrest and detention by the police.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I bring the noble Lord back to the issue that I flagged—that a judgment needs to be made in all the circumstances of the particular case. I turn the question back to the noble Lord. We are dealing with the viewing of material that must have a clear link to terrorism, and must be objectively capable of being useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.

One has also to bear in mind what the existing offence consists of. How does the noble Lord think the proposed new offence differs in its substance or its degree of seriousness from the offence already established in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000? How does accessing this kind of harmful material by way of a streamed video differ from accessing it by way of a download or a book? Have we seen examples over the last 18 years of people being wrongfully hauled to the police station as a result of innocent activity? I am not aware that we have.

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Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick
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My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, although I have some reservations about all of them now that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has spoken. However, I have concerns about Amendment 14, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for the reasons I have expressed in previous groups about having a blanket exemption for journalism and academic research. A terrorist could access information with the intention of committing a terrorist act but could claim that it was for the purposes of journalism or academic research. Surely the acid test should be the intention of that person, not the content of the material.

I have added my name to Amendment 15, in the names of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, although I accept what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with his wisdom and legal background. Obviously the intention of the amendments is to suggest that the law is not clear here about what would amount to a reasonable excuse. Perhaps the mechanism suggested in the amendments is not the right one, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has alluded to, maybe the approach outlined in amendments that we will consider shortly is the right one. However, there is concern about what would amount to a reasonable excuse under this clause.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, there have been calls both in your Lordships’ House and in the House of Commons to place on the face of the Bill a definition of legitimate activity that would not be caught by the Section 58 offence as amended or to specify categories of reasonable excuse. The Government’s position on this issue is well rehearsed, including in our response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Noble Lords opposite have clearly been following this debate closely, because Amendment 15 proposes a slightly different approach, and Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, follows a similar path.

Rather than seek to write exemptions or examples of reasonable excuses into the Bill, as Amendment 14 seeks to do, Amendments 15 and 16 instead seek to place a requirement on the Government to publish guidance on the same matters. I commend noble Lords for their constructive approach in seeking alternative solutions, and I hope that they will find my response to their suggestions similarly constructive, even if I am not able to support these amendments.

The Government’s starting point on this issue is that Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 already contains a well-established safeguard, in the form of a reasonable excuse defence, for those with a legitimate reason to access terrorist material. As a result of Section 118 of the 2000 Act, if a person raises this defence, the court must assume that it is satisfied unless the prosecution can disprove it beyond reasonable doubt. We will debate the operation of Section 118 when we come to Amendment 18 in a later group.

Where a person has a reasonable excuse, a prosecution should not in fact commence, because the case would not pass the Crown Prosecution Service threshold tests of being in the public interest and of there being a realistic prospect of conviction. This safeguard has operated successfully in relation to Section 58 since that offence was first created in 2000, and it reflects the approach taken across the criminal law, where many other offences with a similar defence also do not list specific categories of reasonable excuse. As such, it is well understood by the police, the CPS and the courts. It will continue to apply equally to the offence as amended by Clause 3, and it will not be narrowed or reduced in any way.

This is an important safeguard, and I understand the intention of the noble Lord and the noble Baroness in seeking to put its effect even further beyond doubt, whether through the amendment of Clause 3 or through guidance to be published under it. However, it is my view that, whichever route is taken, it is simply not necessary. Furthermore, such an approach could in fact have the unintended and unhelpful consequence of unsettling the current position, and of reducing rather than increasing clarity. I hope the Committee will indulge me while I explain why this could be the case.

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Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
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I am sorry, but I am driven to say to the Minister that, as an ex-archaeologist, we have a saying: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Just because you do not have the evidence, that does not mean it has not happened. Does that help the Minister?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I expect it does, but I shall need to get my mind around the point.

Of course, the statement made by the noble Baroness has to be right, but I come back to the fact that, in practice, we have not seen any miscarriages of justice against journalists or academics, or indeed any arrests. It is therefore incumbent upon us to ask why that is so, given the certainty with which some have predicted that exactly these consequences will flow from Clause 3. Could it be because the safeguards I have outlined were operating successfully? My suggestion is that this is the case. Furthermore, as the very same safeguards will continue to apply to Section 58 as amended by Clause 3, and as Clause 3 will neither narrow them in any way nor broaden the types of material caught by Section 58, I suggest that we can take considerable comfort from this.

As well as questioning the practical necessity for these amendments, I also have some concerns about the form of Amendments 15 and 16, which require the Secretary of State to issue guidance. To place such a requirement on the Home Secretary would be novel and arguably inappropriate—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the point extremely well. While the Home Office has issued guidance on matters such as the operation of police powers, it is not normal to do so on how to apply investigative and prosecutorial discretion in the context of a specific offence and where there are criminal consequences for individuals affected. If such guidance is to be issued, I therefore question whether this is properly a matter for the Home Secretary. This concern could, of course, be remedied by placing the duty on someone else, such as the Director of Public Prosecutions. However, as I have sought to explain, we remain to be convinced that an amendment to Section 58 of this kind is needed.

Finally, it is worth noting that Section 58 falls within the statutory remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, and this will provide a further important safeguard for its operation as amended by the Bill. I am aware that the former independent reviewer, Max Hill QC, does not agree with every aspect of the Government’s approach to Clause 3. He is, of course, an extremely eminent person whose views should be taken into account. But I would point out that successive independent reviewers have never raised a concern that Section 58 in its current form is having a chilling effect, or is otherwise not being used appropriately, despite its application, as I have said, to the bulk of journalistic and academic research into Section 58 material for much of the period it has been in force.

I hope that I have been able clearly to set out the Government’s position on these matters, and to persuade the noble Lord opposite to withdraw his well-intentioned but, in my view, unnecessary amendment.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, before the noble Lord responds, I was wondering, as the Minister was speaking, why the Government decided to include new subsection (3A). It applies only to the subsection (3) but, if it is required for that subsection, was there something in the operation of the earlier provisions of Section 58 that has prompted this? New subsection (3A) provides that:

“The cases in which a person has a reasonable excuse ... include (but are not limited to) those in which … the person did not know, and had no reason to believe, that the document or record in question contained … information … likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism.”


The Minister may not be able to respond to that now, but it goes to the heart of the debate.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I recognise the noble Baroness’s point. I understand that that provision went into the Bill when the three clicks provision came out. It was intended to provide a measure of reassurance in substitution for the three clicks idea that someone who acted in complete ignorance would not be caught. Frankly, one can argue it both ways—to leave it in the Bill or to take it out—but, on balance, we felt that it was right to put it in the Bill for that added measure of reassurance.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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That is an interesting response and I will have to think about it. I share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, not to involve the Executive where it should not tread. There could be parliamentary scrutiny. We have become possibly too reliant on codes of this and that to flesh out what lies underneath legislation—it is not something I much like, and I have obviously been sucked into it. So we could have parliamentary scrutiny if we had a statutory instrument, but we could also list in the Bill the sorts of examples we have talked about, in the way that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, seeks to do in Clause 4. I think that that is a particularly good way of going about it.

I do not suppose the Minister can answer this, but his reference to the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation prompts me to ask about progress in appointing the new reviewer. He is indicating that he cannot answer, and I did not expect him to, but it is a point that was worth making at some stage in this debate.

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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, Clause 4 provides a new offence of entering or remaining in a designated area overseas. The offence includes a reasonable excuse defence, but these amendments seek to augment that defence, either by providing for an exhaustive list of reasonable excuses or by introducing a prior authorisation regime. I make no apology for the fact that the new offence strengthens the powers available to the police and prosecutors to tackle the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters: it will underline and support the Government’s travel advice, deter would-be foreign fighters and provide an additional means of prosecuting those who none the less do travel.

In framing the offence, we have sought to achieve clarity and workability alongside proportionality. As the prosecution will simply be for breach of a ban on travel to an area associated with a high level of terrorist risk, we believe we have achieved the right balance. The new measure will alleviate some of the difficulties we have seen in obtaining admissible evidence from conflict zones in unstable or failed states, and in pursuing prosecutions for terrorist offences against returning foreign fighters. The Government of course recognise that in exceptional cases, some individuals will have a legitimate reason—such as journalism, to deliver humanitarian aid or compassionate family circumstances—to enter a designated area. There is no argument about that.

This is, therefore, not a blanket ban on travel, and the offence of entering a designated area is not one of strict liability. In keeping with the long-standing approach to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which Clause 3 of this Bill amends, and many other offences in UK criminal law where similar issues arise, the offence includes a reasonable excuse defence. I will not detain the Committee with the full details of how the burden of proof mechanism will operate and why we think it is the right approach, as we will come on to that when we debate Amendment 18 in the next group. However, I will say that we have considered these issues very carefully and listened to the points that have been made in this House and elsewhere. We want to approach this in a constructive way. We consider that our approach strikes the right balance between, on the one hand, ensuring an effective and workable power, both legally and operationally, and on the other ensuring that the power is proportionate and provides adequate safeguards.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, her Amendments 21 and 22 would introduce a different approach to dealing with cases in which a person has a legitimate reason to enter a designated area: they would introduce a power for the Secretary of State to preauthorise individuals to enter a designated area and to make regulations setting out the process and criteria for this. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the constructive approach she has taken, and I understand her wish to ensure that individuals are able to travel for legitimate reasons without facing prosecution. As she explained, her proposal would borrow from the Danish model, which includes a similar preauthorisation scheme. That is a model we considered, and indeed discussed with the Danish Government. We also discussed with the Australian Government the approach taken in their legislation, which adopts a model which includes an exhaustive list of exemptions and a power to add to that list. The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, seek to replicate this model.

As I said, following this consideration we concluded that the reasonable excuse approach is the most appropriate one. It already exists elsewhere in this Bill and in the Terrorism Act 2000, into which the designated area offence will be inserted, as well as in a broad range of other offences in UK criminal law. It is well understood and is routinely applied by the police, the CPS and the courts, there is clear case law on its application and it provides a proven, powerful and effective safeguard against inappropriate arrests, prosecutions and convictions. In deciding against a pre-authorisation scheme, we had in mind that any designated area is likely to be one to which the Government are recommending against travelling for any purpose. I hope the noble Baroness will agree, on reflection, that it would be inconsistent with that advice, and indeed would undermine it, if the Government none the less issued permission to travel to the area on application.

Apart from sending out those sorts of mixed messages, a system of that kind would be cumbersome and difficult to operate in a sufficiently effective and agile way to provide adequate assurance to the police and security services about a traveller’s intentions, and to provide the traveller with a sufficiently prompt and clear authorisation. Of course, it could be open to abuse, whether by those who would seek to overload and undermine the system with vexatious applications, or perhaps more particularly by those who would seek authorisation to travel under cover of legitimate purposes, but whose intentions are to engage in terrorism once they enter the area.

The Government recognise that this is a difficult issue, and we have been careful to ensure that this power does not infringe disproportionately on individuals’ rights, or on the valuable humanitarian work done by charities and NGOs. However, we are also deeply mindful of the strategic threat to public safety that can be and has been posed by individuals who travel overseas to join terrorist organisations and participate in conflicts, particularly those who have joined the Syrian conflict. It is right that we provide the police and the courts with the powers they need properly to respond to that threat, and to keep the public safe. Our firm view is that the reasonable excuse approach taken in Clause 4 is the right one. However, I have heard, loud and clear, the calls for greater certainty for humanitarian workers and others.

That said, I am concerned that the approach proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Rosser, is too rigid. The legal issue it raises is the age-old problem of the list included in statute. While I recognise that the amendment is modelled on the Australian legislation, I am instinctively uneasy about legislating for an exhaustive list of reasonable excuses—albeit one that could be amended by means of regulations. It is clear from the case law that the question of whether a particular excuse is reasonable will be highly dependent on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The statute could offer guidance in the form of an indicative list, but it really cannot shut out what might be a legitimate reasonable excuse through an exhaustive list. The regulation-making power in the amendment does not adequately remedy this difficulty, I fear. I am therefore more receptive to the approach proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Attlee in their Amendments 19 and 20.

I will of course take away the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the Golan Heights and similar areas in Israel. However, I hope he will forgive me if I do not give him a categorical assurance regarding his particular examples. What I can say is that decisions to designate areas will be based on a careful assessment of all relevant information. This will include sensitive intelligence as well as open source information, and a careful assessment of necessity and proportionality. I agree with him that it seems very unlikely that the UK would seek to designate any area within a well governed liberal democracy such as Israel. That is probably as far as I can or ought to go at the Dispatch Box.

To sum up, I recognise the strength of feeling on this issue in the Committee. I can therefore undertake, together with my Home Office colleagues, to reflect carefully on the debate on these amendments in advance of Report, and with that assurance I ask the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to withdraw his amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Debate

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Department: Ministry of Defence

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 29th October 2018

(5 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 131-II Second marshalled list for Committee (PDF) - (29 Oct 2018)
Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD)
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Perhaps I can ask both the noble Lord and the Minister a question: first, one to the Minister. Is the requirement for proof found in any other provision for reasonable excuse? I have been looking during the past few minutes; I could not find an example, but I did not get my iPad out to start reading through the whole of the Terrorism Act.

Secondly, I see the attraction of the term “state”. On who has to show what and in what order, we have been referred to Section 118 of the Terrorism Act. The terminology of that is “adducing evidence”. I am not sure whether the term “state” used by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is intended to be the equivalent of “adduce evidence”.

Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
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My Lords, as we have discussed, the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area, which would be inserted as a new Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000 by Clause 4, is subject to a reasonable excuse defence. We have already debated the circumstances which might give rise to a reasonable excuse and how these should be catered for within the Bill.

Amendment 18 addresses a different aspect of that provision: the question of how much the evidence is required to establish a defence to the new offence. Related to this is the question of whom the evidential burden is placed on. Section 118 of the 2000 Act sets out how the evidential burden applies to a number of defences to criminal offences within the 2000 Act, including the new designated area offence.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is concerned that the current drafting of new Section 58B(2), which contains the defence to the designated area offence, is out of step with the existing provision in Section 118 of the 2000 Act and will place a greater burden on defendants to make out a reasonable excuse than is envisaged by Section 118.

I understand and respect the noble Lord’s wish to ensure that defendants facing a charge under Section 58B are not placed in a worse position than those charged under other offences with a similar reasonable excuse defence. However, I hope that I can allay that concern and provide a clear assurance that this will not be the case if I explain how Section 118 interacts with the defence to the new Section 58B offence.

The wording used in the defence, which refers to a defendant proving that he or she had a reasonable excuse, is the exact same formulation used elsewhere in various defences to offences contained in the 2000 Act, including the defence to the Section 58 offence amended by Clause 3. It is vital to recognise that this reference in the defence to “prove” should not be read on its own; rather it is subject to the operation of Section 118, which makes further provision on what is required to prove a defence in this context.

Specifically, Section 118 provides that if a defendant,

“adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”—

the matter that has to be proved under the wording of the defence—

“the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.

This, together with relevant case law, has the effect that if a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support a suggestion that he or she has a reasonable excuse, then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that defence, which it must do to the normal criminal standard—beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to do so, then the jury must assume that the defence is made out.

The precise extent and nature of evidence required on the part of the defendant to invoke the defence in the first instance will be a matter for juries to determine in individual cases. Parliament has set a threshold which is not particularly high; all that is needed is,

“evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”.

In practice, a trial judge would be cautious to rule out any proposed defence unless it was plainly incapable of being judged by a jury as a reasonable one. In relation to new Section 58B(2), the evidential burden placed on the defendant will not be any greater than that required in relation to any of the other offences to which Section 118 applies. Furthermore, were Section 118 to continue to apply to new Section 58B(2), the amendment would have no impact in practice. Whether new Section 58B(2) refers to the defendant stating or proving the defence, under Section 118, it will still be for the jury to decide whether the prosecution has disproved the defence beyond reasonable doubt.

Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge (CB)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I am extremely troubled by the idea that new Section 58B(2) should have a different form of wording from Section 118. It is a recipe for chaos in the court. Can we not simply address the amendment, take out “prove” and use the words in Section 118?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I was seeking to make the point that we must not diverge from the wording used originally, otherwise it would cause confusion.

Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is exactly how it reads. Any judge looking at this will say, “Good heavens, here is a situation in which, under the counterterrorism Act, the defendant has to prove his defence—not adduce evidence so that the matter can be raised for the prosecution to disprove”. When I read this I thought it must be a typing error, but I knew that that could not be the case.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has raised this, I cannot ignore what he has said. If he will allow, after this Committee stage, I will take advice and be in touch with him.

Earl Attlee Portrait Earl Attlee (Con)
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My Lords, did not my noble friend the Minister state that other similar offences were drafted in the same way?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. “Prove” is used in some six other sections of the 2000 Act, including Sections 57, 58 and 58A, so it is not inconsistent with the generality. However, as the noble and learned Lord has picked this out, I can do no other than to take the point very seriously, and I undertake to do so. If he will suspend his scepticism for a moment, I want to make the point that, in addition to creating an inconsistency between the designated area offence and others with a similar reasonable excuse defence, this would also unsettle a well-established legal position with which the courts and prosecutors are very familiar, and on which there is clear case law.

I very much hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment, subject to the undertaking that I have just given.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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Before the noble Lord responds, I am not sure whether I heard the Minister correctly. It sounded as if he said that the requirement for proof elsewhere was proof on behalf of the prosecution. I may well have misheard him, but I am making the point now because that would not be an answer to this point, which is about proof by the defendant.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, if I misspoke or misread, I apologise. I was seeking to say that, as long as a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support whatever suggestion he is making—that he has a reasonable excuse—then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that to the criminal standard.

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Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge
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I agree and have nothing to add.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has helpfully explained, these amendments relate to the legal test for designating an area under Clause 4. That test currently requires that it be necessary for purposes connected with protecting the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict UK nationals or residents from entering or remaining in the area. The noble Lord’s amendments would add a second limb to this test, which would require that a proscribed terrorist organisation is engaging in armed conflict within the area to be designated.

It is clear from the noble Lord’s explanation that the purpose of these amendments is to help ensure that designations are proportionate and that they are made only in circumstances where they are genuinely necessary. As the noble Lord has explained, they would more closely follow the approach taken in Australian and Danish law, where those countries have established similar powers.

I completely understand the sentiment and the intention behind these amendments. Nevertheless, I respectfully disagree that they are necessary to secure this outcome. I also do not consider that the UK is bound to follow the approach taken by other countries, which may have different legal frameworks and may be facing different configurations of terrorist threat, rather than seeking the approach that works best for us. As your Lordships would expect, when drafting Clause 4, we looked carefully at the approaches taken by Australia and Denmark, including the legal test for designating an area. We have concluded that the right approach for the UK, and the one that would provide the greatest flexibility while still providing a proper safeguard for proportionality, is the one currently set out in the Bill.

We have no doubt that in most cases in which it might be appropriate to designate an area in future, it is likely that a proscribed organisation will be engaging in armed conflict. Certainly, that has been the experience with the Syrian conflict, which is the closest analogy we have for the type of scenario in which we might wish to use the power. However, we are keen to ensure that the power is sufficiently flexible to be used in currently unforeseen future scenarios.

It is plausible that in the future, there could be an armed conflict or some other situation in an area which gives rise to a clear terrorism-related risk, on the basis of which it is appropriate to restrict travel by UK nationals or residents, but in which a proscribed terrorist organisation is not currently involved. This might be because a grouping of terrorists operating in the area cannot clearly be defined as an organisation. Or it might be because the situation has evolved rapidly—perhaps with an organisation emerging and quickly becoming involved in fighting—and it is necessary to restrict travel urgently before it has been possible to proscribe the organisation. It is also plausible that we may know from sensitive intelligence about the involvement of a specific proscribed organisation in a conflict, but as such intelligence cannot be revealed in public, it may not be possible to prove the organisation’s involvement on open material alone.

As the noble Lord will be aware, regulations designating an area are subject to the made affirmative procedure. As such, Home Office Ministers will need to come to Parliament to explain the basis for the designation, and it would then be for both Houses to decide whether to approve the regulations based on that explanation. In this regard, I note the recommendation by the Delegated Powers Committee that the Home Secretary should be required to lay before Parliament a Statement setting out the reasons why he considers that the condition for designation is met in the case at hand. We are ready to give that recommendation sympathetic consideration ahead of Report.

Given the considerations I have outlined, and the clear and robust necessity test that is already contained within Clause 4, I hope the noble Lord will be persuaded to withdraw his amendment, at least for the time being.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich
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I thank the Minister for his thoughtful response. It made me wish that we had had a full consultation on this novel offence prior to the introduction of the Bill, or at the very least that we had not seen it introduced to the Bill at such a late stage. However, we are where we are. I concede nothing but will consider carefully what the Minister has said.

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Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick (LD)
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My Lords, I support Amendments 26 and 27 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. The rigour that these amendments bring is similar to that in the amendments that the noble Lord will attempt to introduce when we get to proscribed organisations. It seems something that he feels, from his experience as a former reviewer of terrorism legislation, is very much lacking.

Amendment 29 appears to be perhaps a way of getting round the problem of there being intelligence that cannot be put into the public domain around decisions made in connection with this clause, in that the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has the necessary clearance to review that evidence. Perhaps the noble Earl could comment on that.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, Amendments 26 and 27 would add to the existing requirement in the Bill that the Secretary of State keep under review any designation made under Clause 4 and revoke it if the legal test for designation is no longer met in respect of it. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, explained, they would specify that such reviews must take place on an annual basis and would prescribe the options open to the Secretary of State when conducting such a review, as well as requiring the outcome of the review to be published.

I should start by saying that I am in full agreement with the principle that any designation under Clause 4 should not be indefinite, that it should be kept under review and that it should be revoked as soon as it is no longer necessary.

In saying that, perhaps I can take the opportunity to correct something stated by my noble friend Lady Williams when she said earlier that the list of proscribed organisations is subject to regular review. This was an inadvertent slip by my noble friend, for which, on her behalf, I apologise. I understand that she has already approached noble Lords privately to make that correction, but I do so on the record.

Where I depart from the noble Lord’s views, much as I respect them, is that I believe the current drafting of the Bill is the most effective way of delivering the objective. In particular, I cannot agree that a rigid requirement for an annual review is needed or is appropriate. I say that, first, because the type of situation in which this power is expected to be used may be fluid and rapidly evolving, but it may equally be one where there is an obvious and enduring threat. In the former case, an agile review, more frequent than once a year, may be appropriate—I accept that the amendment would not preclude this. In the latter case, an annual review may simply be unnecessary, and may be a poor use of the time and resources of those in government and the security and intelligence agencies tasked with protecting us from the terrorist threat.

I note in this regard that the Australian legislation sunsets a designation after three years, but with the option of an area being redesignated. If we were to go down this road—as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, seeks to do with his Amendment 28—three years strikes me as more appropriate in this context compared with the annual review provided for in these amendments. Once again I have in mind the Syrian example, where the nature and extent of the threat, and the involvement and intent of UK nationals and residents, is self-evident and has indeed been proactively publicised by its protagonists over an extended period of time.

However, secondly, I say this because, regardless of its frequency, a formal review process at a fixed point is not likely to be appropriate. In all cases where the level of terrorist threat is so high that it is appropriate to designate an area under Clause 4, as your Lordships would expect, the Government and the security and intelligence agencies will keep the situation in that area under extremely close and continuous review.

This will be a comprehensive ongoing assessment across the full spectrum of government. It will involve consideration and ongoing review of every aspect of the Government’s response to the situation, including their use of legal powers and any designation under Clause 4. In reality, this is a closer and more effective consideration than that envisaged by the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. It will enable the Government readily to identify if the situation on the ground has changed such that the legal test for designating the area is no longer met, and to take prompt action should this be the case.

I remain to be persuaded that the more elaborate annual process provided for in these amendments would serve the public interest, or would be an effective use of resources, or would lead to any more rigorous or effective a review of whether a designation remains necessary. As I have indicated, I can see more merit in a backstop three-year sunset clause with the option of redesignation. I am ready to consider this option further ahead of Report.

Amendment 29 would require that before a Motion to Approve any designation regulations may be tabled, the regulations must have been reviewed by the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the committee must have laid before both Houses a report providing a recommendation on whether the regulations should be approved.

I recognise and appreciate the constructive spirit in which this amendment is intended and I am happy to make clear that I share the view that Parliament should have as well informed a debate as possible on any regulations made under this power. However, I am not persuaded that involving the Intelligence and Security Committee in this way is the right approach or would be an appropriate extension of the committee’s role, which is what it would amount to. The Intelligence and Security Committee has a specific statutory remit under Section 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, which focuses on the administration and operation of the intelligence agencies. This is extended to certain aspects of the Government’s activities in relation to intelligence or security matters by means of a memorandum of understanding agreed under Section 2(2) of the 2013 Act.

Section 2(3) of the 2013 Act specifically excludes from the committee’s remit any matter that is,

“part of any ongoing intelligence or security operation”.

This clearly and intentionally establishes the committee’s role as one of retrospective oversight and review—not one of real-time authorisation, approval or review of operational decisions or the use of powers.

This reflects the long-standing principle that national security and the exercise of executive powers in this area is a matter for the Government of the day. There should of course be effective and robust oversight of decisions the Government have made—including, where appropriate, by the Intelligence and Security Committee and, in the case of this power, through debates in Parliament on any regulations designating an area, as well as by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. However, that is of a very different nature from the role proposed for the Intelligence and Security Committee in this amendment, which would be a significant extension of the committee’s role. I do not know if it is one that the committee would necessarily welcome, and it is not one that the Government consider appropriate.

Setting aside more fundamental questions of principle, I can see the amendment also giving rise to difficult practical issues—for example, around the speed with which the committee would need to prepare reports given the need for regulations to be approved within 40 sitting days; and around the extent of redactions that might be needed in such reports to protect sensitive intelligence, which might have informed the committee’s considerations but which could not be shared more widely to inform the consideration by Parliament.

I am, however, happy to give a clear assurance that the Government will always provide Parliament with as much information as possible about the reasons why any designation under Clause 4 is necessary. This will, of course, be constrained to some extent by the need to protect sensitive intelligence which cannot be revealed in public. However we recognise that this does not mean that Parliament will simply take on trust that a designation is necessary. We will always need to make a clear case for it.

I hope these arguments have reassured noble Lords that the current drafting of the Bill will deliver the outcomes they seek. I hope too that the Committee will take comfort from the fact that we will consider further Amendment 28. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Portrait Lord Anderson of Ipswich
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I thank the Minister for his very courteous response. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for her welcome and frank correction. I think we are now agreed that the former practice of annual review of proscribed organisations conducted by the Home Office was discontinued in 2013-14. I am not aware of such a practice ever being adopted by the Northern Ireland Office—but we may come to that in due course.

I thought the Minister might respond to my amendment by suggesting it unthinkable in practice that reviews of area designations would be any less frequent than once a year. He made the point, with which I agree entirely, that one sometimes has to be quite agile. Indeed, my amendment was consistent with reviews taking place, where necessary, on a more than annual basis. With respect, I found it harder to agree with the Minister where he referred to the type of enduring threat which I think he was saying might justify a review as seldom as once every three years. This is a very heavy new power, unprecedented as far as I know in our history, whereby British citizens are simply prohibited from traveling to certain parts of the world. I ask the Minister to consider whether it can really be the case either that no timed review of this power should be required or that, if a time is to be affixed to it, it should be an interval as great as every three years. That seems a very long time for these important rights of travel to be withheld. I hope that I do not sound discourteous, but the Minister will understand that I still have concerns. None the less, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Stunell Portrait Lord Stunell (LD)
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I should like to add to the remarks of my noble friend Lady Hamwee by making two points. First, if one looks at the current situation in Syria, there are clearly many women there who do not have the freedom to leave. Will they have committed an offence simply by virtue of being held as virtual or real captives? These are aspects which need to be looked at quite seriously.

I want also to make the darker point that, at the moment, we are focusing on the Middle East and terrorism as we appreciate it there. However, if this legislation had been in force in 1936 or 1937, I wonder what would have been the realpolitik of designated areas within Spain. We need to understand that legislation passed for one reason can sometimes be adapted and used in a completely unforeseen way or, as I am perhaps suggesting, in a foreseeable way. I would like to hear what the noble Earl might have to say about these two points.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, it is probably best if I write to the noble Baroness in response to her specific questions. The broad answer is that we have thought of the practicalities. As regards informing people who are already in the designated area that it has been designated and that they therefore have 28 days to leave, there would be FCO travel advice that would almost certainly have pre-existed the designation. The regulations would be given significant publicity, including as part of the requested debate of the designation regulations. There would be a notice on the government website and we would consider other methods of publicity depending on the area being designated.

On the question of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, about innocent people who have already been caught up in events and the situation within a designated area, the reasonable excuse defence would kick in. As we said in our earlier debates, where it is perfectly obvious that someone is in a designated area for an innocent reason, it is almost unthinkable that the authorities would spend time trying to make a case against them. Their reasonable excuse would be advanced and the circumstances of the case, if they are innocent, would be obvious from the outset. As I have said, we have had the reasonable excuse defence in place for 18 years and, as far as I am aware, there have been no instances of innocent people being arrested or convicted.

That is as far as I can go at the moment, although I am conscious that I have not completely covered the issues raised. However, I will write and copy my letter to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, when the Minister writes, could he confirm that the “one month” in new Section 58B(3)(b) is 28 days? He said 28 days; the wording is “one month”. I am sure somewhere we are told whether it is a calendar month or 28 days, but perhaps he could let us know.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I must correct myself. I did not mean a lunar month; I meant a calendar month.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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So it could be different depending on the month.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Ministry of Defence

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 31st October 2018

(5 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 131-II Second marshalled list for Committee (PDF) - (29 Oct 2018)
Lord Judge Portrait Lord Judge (CB)
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My Lords, before I address Amendment 33 let me go back to the debate on Monday when we were discussing Amendment 18 and new Section 58B(2). I fear that during the discussions I misunderstood something said by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. I understood him to be saying that the Act produced two different ways of approaching the burden of proof. I have reread Hansard and I misunderstood him—it is entirely my fault—and I objected to that. I would go on objecting to it if that was what he said, but it was not. I have studied the Bill and I find on page 83 that he is right and that the burden of proof in relation to any offence created by Section 58B(2) is in fact on the prosecution. I therefore apologise to the noble Earl—I am sorry that I misunderstood him—and to the extent that I misled the House, I apologise to the House. However, I just add that it would be so much more helpful if Acts of Parliament said what they meant, instead of telling us to look at whatever page it is to find the answer.

I want to add a word, in spite of the difference of view expressed here: we have to be careful about this provision. I am not going to take sides in relation to what may be a very serious offence or a very minor offence, but can we just reflect on this? Every citizen is presumed to know the law; every visitor to this country is presumed to know the law that applies in this country. Of course we do not: look at me, I got new Section 58B(2) wrong and I am supposed to know the law. The more serious point is that there is a basis and a quid pro quo for this. The quid pro quo is that the criminal law should be clear. I am expected to know the law and to obey the law: it should, at least, be clear what it is I am expected to obey.

We are all supposed to know the law here; every citizen of every country, applying the same presumption, is presumed to know the law in the country of which he is a citizen or to which he is a visitor. There will be occasions—perhaps I need to be less emphatic: there may be occasions—when something is not unlawful in a different country to our own. We have different rules. Bullfighting is unlawful in this country, but would we prosecute a Spanish toreador coming here for breaking what we would regard as our law which is not unlawful under their law? The Bill risks criminalising a citizen of another country for doing something that is not unlawful in that country.

Of course terrorism is unlawful—it is unlawful everywhere, you do not need a book of law to tell you that—but there may be minor matters, in relative terms, which we criminalise here but are not unlawful by the laws of a different country. We need to be careful not to extend the criminal law further than it should go.

Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
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My Lords, as we have heard Clause 6 adds a number of further offences to the existing list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, which extends extraterritorial jurisdiction over those offences. This will ensure that UK courts are able to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters who travel to the UK, having joined terrorist groups and become involved in conflicts or other terrorist activity overseas. It will also ensure that we are able to prosecute people who base themselves overseas and seek to radicalise people—the general public or targeted individuals—in the UK. It is this latter category of radicalisers, and propagandists on behalf of terrorist organisations, that the noble Baroness’s amendments deal with.

Section 13(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 contains the offence of displaying in a public place an item of clothing or other article such as a flag, in circumstances which,

“arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”.

As a result of Clause 2, it will also contain, at new subsection (1A), the offence of publishing an image of such an article in the same circumstances.

Extraterritorial jurisdiction is most relevant to Section 13, and in particular to the offence the Bill will add at new subsection (1A), in a case where a person located overseas publishes images of flags or logos associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation. We have seen in the Syrian conflict that Daesh has run a slick and effective online propaganda operation, which has included exactly this type of activity—publishing images on social media and other online platforms, aimed at promoting the group, its ideology and its methods, to individuals around the world, including in the UK. Other terrorist groups, in other parts of the world, do the same.

It has been a recurring theme of the debates on the Bill that this is a downside of the rapid development of online technologies in recent years. Although people have been connected and brought together in myriad positive ways, and the world has been opened up, those who would do us harm have been equally quick to exploit the opportunities of the digital age. Terrorists are no exception, and we need to update our laws to keep pace with the evolving threat. The online world simply does not respect national boundaries in the traditional sense, nor does it pay heed to geographical distance. Where this gifts radicalisers the opportunity to reach across the world to target vulnerable people in the UK, it is absolutely right that the UK Government respond by ensuring that our courts have the ability to deal with that. There is a clear operational case to justify this measure.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has explained that her concern is that a person could find themselves prosecuted in the UK, having acted in support of an organisation that is not proscribed in the country where the conduct took place, and therefore having no awareness or expectation that they could be held criminally responsible. I respect the principled stance taken by the noble Baroness but, respectfully, I do not agree that it would be right to either simply remove this provision, as Amendment 31 would do, or limit its application, as Amendment 33 would do. The reality is that there is no universal and internationally agreed list of proscribed organisations, and there is no realistic prospect of one being implemented. Even if there were, the kinds of countries in which terrorist organisations are most likely to be based are those that are the least likely to sign up to and implement such an international rules-based system.

Despite this, terrorists are travelling and communicating across international boundaries, in a way which poses a direct threat to the safety of the public in the UK and elsewhere. Given this, we should not deny our courts the ability to act against such individuals if they return or travel to the UK, pending the adoption of such an international list, and we should ensure that the powers available are flexible and not unduly restricted. To proceed as the noble Baroness advocates would risk sacrificing public safety and justice in the pursuit of a frankly unrealistic ideal.

It is right that we should be able to prosecute those who travel overseas to join terrorist organisations, and who publish propaganda in support of those groups, seeking to radicalise others back in the UK or elsewhere. That is the nub of the matter. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was absolutely spot on in the way that he characterised these provisions. Such crimes are most likely to be committed in areas of conflict and instability, within failed states that may not have functioning systems of government with effective jurisdiction over their own territory, or in countries where there may not be clearly defined or well-developed terrorism laws equivalent to those in the UK, or which may simply take a different approach. Those are not good reasons to ignore the threat posed on UK soil by people who have published propaganda in support of terrorist groups while overseas. Simply put, foreign terrorist fighters should not be able to evade justice because the country that they travelled to, or hail from, does not have a proscription system equivalent to that of the UK.

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Moved by
32: Clause 6, page 5, line 16, at end insert—
“(cza) an offence under section 12(1) or (1A) of that Act (inviting or expressing support for proscribed organisation);”
Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, Clause 6 will add a number of further terrorism offences to the list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, as I have already explained, to which extraterritorial jurisdiction—or ETJ—applies. This means that individuals can be prosecuted in the UK courts for conduct that took place outside the UK which would have been unlawful under an offence listed at Section 17 had it taken place here.

Following further consideration, we have identified two additional offences where it would be right to extend ETJ to ensure that the full range of relevant terrorism offences is covered. These are, first, the offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation at Section 12(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and, secondly, the offence of expressing an opinion or belief in support of a proscribed organisation, reckless as to whether another person will be encouraged to support the organisation, which Clause 1 will insert into the 2000 Act as new Section 12(1A). Extending ETJ to these offences will help to tackle radicalisation, particularly by people who have travelled from the UK to join a terrorist organisation and reach back to the UK to spread its propaganda and promote its aims. This will allow prosecution in a case where, for example, someone overseas is in contact with a person in the UK, who may be a vulnerable person such as a child, and is either deliberately or recklessly encouraging them to support a particular proscribed organisation, such as Daesh.

Clause 6 received broad support in the House of Commons and, with the exception of the extension of ETJ to the Section 13 offence which we have just debated, has also been supported in this House. None the less, I hope that your Lordships will be persuaded that it is the right approach to ensure that we have as comprehensive coverage as possible of terrorist offences that might be committed overseas, subject to the normal safeguards, so that we can protect the public in this country. I commend this amendment to the Committee on that basis.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, since the Joint Committee on Human Rights is meeting at this moment it has not been possible to take its view on this amendment but I think it must follow from my comments on Clause 1 that it would not be enthusiastic, as these provisions obviously have to be read together. I was amused that the Minister said, as did the noble Baroness’s letter to noble Lords of 24 October, that the Government have identified further offences. They are not quite offences yet, are they? It would perhaps be fairer to say that the amendment is consequential on Clause, but that is a minor point.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser
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I shall be very brief. I await the Government’s response to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, with interest.

I would like to pursue another point he raised in his contribution. Bearing in mind that this amendment, which adds offences, is coming in at a very late stage in proceedings, is this a result of a perceived oversight on the Government’s part or does it represent a significant rethink of policy?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have responded to this proposed amendment. We are very conscious that it is less than ideal to bring in an amendment of this kind at this stage of the Bill’s passage. If we had been able to do so at an earlier stage, it would have been much better.

Having said that, we felt that it was, on balance, right to introduce this change rather than not introduce it. I recognise the reservation expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on that score. He also expressed the reservation that we heard on the previous group of amendments about applying extraterritorial jurisdiction to those who are not UK citizens or UK residents. I have already said that as a general rule I respect that point of principle. However, I put it to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness that what we are seeking to do here is not any different in concept from what we sought to do at the beginning of the Bill.

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Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser
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This amendment, moved by the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and to which my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark are also attached, is another which reflects a recommendation from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. One of the key aspects of the Bill is the proposed increase in maximum sentences for a number of terrorist offences. This was one—but only one—of our reasons for raising concerns about the prospect of innocent parties falling foul of some offences.

The JCHR said that the increases in sentences do not appear to be supported by evidence to suggest that they are justified or proportionate. The committee was particularly concerned that a sentence of 15 years could be imposed for an offence of viewing terrorist material online—even more so in the light of amendments on Report in the Commons that might make a single viewing sufficient for such an offence to be deemed to have been committed. As has already been said, the committee asked the Home Office for the evidence on which it based its decision that the current maximum sentences were insufficient and why it considered the proposed higher maximum sentences to be necessary and proportionate.

The reply from the Home Office, as set out in the JCHR report, stated, among other things:

“The division between preliminary terrorist activity and attack planning is increasingly blurred”.


It did not, according to the committee, explain why existing sentencing powers were inadequate. I hope, like others, that the Government will address this point on existing sentencing powers in their response, as well as the specific terms of the amendment, reflecting the view of the JCHR, which deletes the increase in the maximum sentence from 10 years to 15 years for the “collection of information” offence provided for in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, Clause 7 increases the maximum sentences for a number of terrorism offences to ensure that the available punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the crime. That is the point that I urge noble Lords to focus on in this debate. A key aspect of the review of our terrorism laws announced by the Prime Minister following last year’s attacks, of which the Bill is the product, was looking again at the courts’ sentencing powers to ensure that they are sufficient to respond to the threat and keep the public safe. The clear conclusion was that sentencing needs to be updated and strengthened, and the Bill contains a package of measures to deliver that, including Clause 7. However, I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have queried whether these changes need to be made and have suggested that such changes are unnecessary and disproportionate. However, I sincerely hope that in responding to such concerns I can explain why the Government believe that Clause 7 as drafted is a necessary, proportionate and timely response to the contemporary terrorist threat.

Since the offences in question were first introduced, in some cases 12 years ago and in others 18 years ago, the terrorist threat has evolved significantly. Its source has shifted and diversified, its methods have developed and it has been quick to exploit modern online technology. Both its extent and its severity have maintained an upwards trajectory, and the intelligence services consider that in recent years there has been an enduring shift in the nature of the threat, rather than just a spike. We can be under no illusion: the scale of the threat we face today is unprecedented and, sadly, more attacks are likely.

In particular, we have seen increases in the scale of radicalisation and changes in its methodology and patterns. The growth of the internet has brought new and powerful ways for people to connect with each other, and to share ideas and information, which have brought great benefits to the vast majority of the public. But they have also brought new opportunities to those who would do us harm, increasing the ability of terrorists both to access and to disseminate unlawful terrorist information and training material, propaganda, and incitement to hatred and violence—and to do so, potentially, to a wide audience. Indeed, those who seek to recruit and to inspire or direct individuals to carry out attacks have never found it easier to identify and connect with would-be terrorists, often across international borders, and those who are embarking on the path of radicalisation have never found it easier to access material, to communicate with terrorist individuals and organisations, and to receive encouragement or direction which will move them further and more quickly along that path.

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Lord Davies of Stamford Portrait Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)
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I think that the noble Earl would carry the whole House in saying that terrorism has become a greater threat to our society in the last 10 years and that Parliament should do something about this serious matter. I, for one, would be open to persuasion—as, I suspect, would many others in this House—that what is required, among other things, is to strengthen the hands of the courts and to give them the ability to increase the sentences that they impose for terrorist or terrorist-related offences.

However, I have noticed that the Minister has not even begun to answer the quite significant questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lord Rosser, about the principle on which this increase in sentences has been decided—if you like, the multiple which is being applied to existing sentences. What is the origin of this? The Minister mentioned the review. Has the review set out exactly what the increased sentences should be, and if so, on what basis has it come to that conclusion? Did it decide on a universal multiple? From the figures of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, it sounded as though it was about 50%. Is that applied across the board, or was it decided that a different multiple should be applied to different types of sentence, and if so, on what principle? I do not sense that we have heard enough about the methodology that the Government have used to come up with the proposals that they have put before the House today.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I am sorry that the noble Lord did not take one of the central points that I was trying to convey: that the review into this area, instigated by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, concluded that the kinds of offences that we are considering preparatory to terrorism—which in 2000 and 2006, when the previous Terrorism Acts were passed, were not considered to be as heinous as terrorism offences themselves—were given sentencing structures that reflected that point of view; but that since that time, the intensity and scope of terrorist acts has so increased that it is necessary to treat those former, lesser offences as much more serious and harmful than before. In that context, it is to enable society as a whole, through legislation, to make a more emphatic statement, through sentencing guidelines, of the seriousness of those offences.

Lord Davies of Stamford Portrait Lord Davies of Stamford
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I did not ask the noble Earl to repeat what he has said to the House before. The question I asked is very specific: on what principle had these precise multiples been arrived at?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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There is always a judgment to be made. Once one has reached the conclusion that I have just articulated, there is indeed scope for argument about whether the increase should take place at all—we believe that it should—and, if so, to what extent. The Government have taken a view. We are putting it to Parliament and we believe it strikes the right balance in this context.

Lord Thomas of Gresford Portrait Lord Thomas of Gresford
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The guidelines which came into effect on 27 April this year, a few months ago, were arrived at following consultation and a request for comment. They were considered by the Justice Committee in the House of Commons. What is the review to which the noble Earl is referring? What was its date? Was it not before the Sentencing Council at that time?

I assume that the noble Earl would expect the Sentencing Council to go back to its guidelines in the light of what he has said and the lack of principle to which the noble Lord referred a moment ago, and review the appropriate sentencing. These sentencing guidelines set out six steps for a judge to take before he announces the sentence. They are detailed, categorise the nature of the crime and consider what aggravating or mitigating circumstances there are. There are six steps to getting to a decision. They were all set out on 27 April this year. As the Prime Minister would say, what has changed? Is it the review? If so, what is this review?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, it may be helpful to the noble Lord and the Committee if I quote part of a press release which the Sentencing Council issued on 28 March this year when it launched the publication of the new sentencing guidelines for terrorism offences:

“In terms of the impact on sentencing levels, it is likely that in relation to some offences, such as the offences of preparing terrorist acts and building explosive devices, there will be increases in sentence for lower level offences. These are the kinds of situations where preparations might not be as well developed or an offender may be offering a small amount of assistance to others. The Council decided that, when considering these actions in the current climate, where a terrorist act could be planned in a very short time period, using readily available items such as vehicles as weapons, combined with online extremist material providing encouragement and inspiration, these lower-level offences are more serious than they have previously been perceived”.


Max Hill QC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, when he gave evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, said:

“The other aspect which is partly to do with the passage of time as well is that the sentencing powers of those few experienced senior judges who deal with terrorism cases are capable of helpful review … There are examples where a higher discretionary maximum may be appropriate. It is not my purpose to talk about individual cases, but the Choudary case, which I have mentioned, might be a case in point. Some commentators were surprised at the sentence that he received, given the gravity of his offending, but the judge applied the statutory maximum, discounted in the various ways that he is enjoined to do. It seems to me that there is an argument for a higher discretionary maximum”.


That is the context in which the Government have taken the view that they have. I hope that is helpful.

Lord Thomas of Gresford Portrait Lord Thomas of Gresford
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The March press statement was an explanation of the guidelines which were to come into effect on 27 April. It was not looking beyond those guidelines to some future date. Indeed, the noble Earl has not referred to the review that he quoted to us a short time ago—what it is, when it was published and whether it was before the Sentencing Council came to its conclusions. Its March justification for an increase in sentencing power was not for something that might happen now, but because it was increasing the level of sentences with its guidelines in April. What has happened since then?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, the Sentencing Council’s new guidelines for terrorism offences came into force, as the noble Lord rightly says, on 27 April. In its consultation on the draft guidelines, the council was able to anticipate the proposed increases. Consequently, we believe it will not be a difficult task for the council to modify the guidelines once the Bill is enacted, and the Government will of course work with the council on those increases. Any changes to sentencing will only be made following parliamentary debate and approval.

Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser
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Unless I am getting confused, which is quite possible, as I understand it the Security Minister, when the Bill was in the Commons, said,

“we have kept the Sentencing Council apprised of the provisions in the Bill, and the chairman has indicated that the council plans to revisit the guidelines once the Bill has completed its parliamentary passage”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Committee, 3/7/18; col. 105.]

Is that still the Government’s position?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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That is exactly the position. I sense no resistance from the Sentencing Council to that approach and I think it is eminently practicable. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, about the review, it was announced by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister in June 2017. It is an internal government review and as such was not published, but I have informed the Committee today of some of the conclusions that it reached.

Lord Thomas of Gresford Portrait Lord Thomas of Gresford
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It follows from that that the review was prior to the Sentencing Council coming to its decision in March and April of this year, so its members must have had that material before them. Nothing has happened between April and now that would justify this increase. From what the Minister says, I assume that he is expecting the Sentencing Council to double the sentences that it proposed in April—that is the basis of the increase in sentences from seven years to 15 years. That gives more scope for the judge to do justice, and consequently the Minister would be expecting the Sentencing Council to double its sentences.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, what I had better do is take advice on the timelines that were involved in all this and clarify that to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate; I would not wish to give the wrong impression about the sequence of events. What I am saying is that the Sentencing Council’s new guidelines, which came into force on 27 April, are capable of being updated, and we believe that that is not a difficult task for the council to do once the Bill is enacted. We will consult with the council to that end, as appropriate.

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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I am sorry to keep the Minister on his feet for longer than I am sure he wants. I ask that when the exercise that he has promised is undertaken, he also investigates what evidence there was to justify the sentences. He has mentioned in particular the views of the police and the CPS. Was any evidence taken from any members of the judiciary responsible for sentencing in terrorist cases where they felt that their powers were insufficient under the existing sentences?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My understanding is that the consultation that took place was a wide one, but I can clarify that point having taken advice on it. It is of course not for the Sentencing Council to comment on or recommend statutory maximums; it issues guidance on the application of currently existing maximums. That clarification is important.

Lord Davies of Stamford Portrait Lord Davies of Stamford
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The Minister has been very helpful to the Committee, but would it not solve an awful lot of problems if he were to publish the review on which these revised sentencing guidelines were based so that we could all see what arguments were adduced and how the conclusions were arrived at that are reflected in the draft Bill before us?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I am happy to take that request away with me and investigate whether it is possible.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, I too had written down not just “timelines” but “evidence to the review”. I do not think one can disregard that. The Minister also referred to lower-level offences, which were commented on by the Sentencing Council, but we seem to have slid away from that.

The Minister put great emphasis on the need to—I hope I am quoting him correctly—strengthen the ability of the police and the agencies in the criminal justice system to intervene. I do not think anyone has queried the seriousness of the offences that we are discussing, nor have we queried the powers. That has not been the thrust of the argument.

The Minister has not disputed the mean average of three years and four months. Of course, I appreciate that any average is an average, so there are much higher periods and much lower ones, but 10 years seems to send a pretty clear message, which was the term that he used, and it leaves a lot of headroom above the average. Three years and four months is quite a shortfall from 10 years. Unless there is a big increase in that, there will be an even greater shortfall from 15 years. I would have thought that that sent a rather dangerous message. The message that I take is the one from the very recent sentencing guidelines, whose consideration, as a matter of common sense, must have been taken into account in preparing the Bill—or should have been.

I think we have more discussion to come on this issue. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Carlile of Berriew Portrait Lord Carlile of Berriew
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In fact, the Government have a working relationship with the senior judiciary, which is often conducted at a fairly subtle level. The Attorney-General, it is to be hoped, has reasonably frequent conversations with the senior judiciary, but one would not expect the content of those conversations to be published. I apprehend that this matter has been considered fairly carefully in the usual way, and I am sure that we can trust Ministers when they say that there is evidence in their view for extended sentences of this kind.

I was going to add that there seems quite a clear analogy between sexual offences and terrorist offences, save that the evidence for extended sentences in terrorism offences may be much clearer than in sexual offences. When a judge is sentencing someone for a sexual offence, he will often have a clear apprehension drawn, for example, from the probation officer’s pre-sentence report and from the evidence in the case that the person concerned, usually male, represents a serious risk to children for an unknown period. The person is then sent to prison and courses are offered which they may or may not follow. The judge will often have an indication at the time of sentence as to the likely willingness of the individual to follow such a course, and that may influence the judge’s decision on whether to impose an extended sentence, usually for the protection of children.

A terrorism case may come before a court to defend someone like—he is not unique—Anjem Choudary. He has a clear intention, depicted on numerous occasions, to ignore those who criticise what he has been doing and to continue to attempt, in the subtle way that he follows, to radicalise others. There are other cases of a similar kind, but it is not very difficult for the judge to form the conclusion that the person is someone from whom the public needs to be protected by the special measure of an extended sentence. That is not only empirically defensible but meets public concern, which is reflected in the attempt to modernise these provisions in these clauses.

I urge noble Lords to support the spirit behind these clauses and to support the clauses in the knowledge that judges have never been lavish in their passing of extended sentences. In my experience and observation, when it happens it is usually done with great care and much concern by the judges, who start from an impartial standpoint before passing sentence.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, Clause 9 amends provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which, among other things, enables a criminal court in England and Wales to impose extended sentences of imprisonment and sentences for offenders of particular concern. Clause 9 adds further terrorism offences to the list of offences for which the court can impose these sentences. Similarly, Clauses 10 and 11 make analogous changes to the equivalent extended sentences provided for in Scotland and Northern Ireland. I should point out, however, that neither jurisdiction has the equivalent of sentences for offenders of particular concern.

To put the provisions of these clauses in context, it may assist the Committee if I first explain, as briefly and clearly as I can, the nature of these extended sentences as they operate in England and Wales. There are two types of sentence relevant here. The first is the extended sentence of imprisonment, usually known as an extended determinate sentence. The second is a special custodial sentence for certain offenders of particular concern. Taking the extended determinate sentence first, these sentences are available in respect of the sexual and violent offences listed in Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act. The sentence can however be imposed only if certain statutory conditions are met. The court must consider the offender “dangerous”, under a test set out in the 2003 Act. That test requires the court to find that the offender presents a significant risk of causing serious harm to the public through committing further specified offences.

If the offender commits one of the specific offences and is considered dangerous, the court may impose an extended determinate sentence. An extended determinate sentence is a custodial term which has two parts. The first is the appropriate custodial term commensurate with the seriousness of the offence, and the second is an extended licence period on supervision in the community. Under current provisions of the 2003 Act, the court may impose this extended licence for up to five years for a violent offence and up to eight years for a sexual offence.

The 2003 Act also makes particular provision about the release on licence of offenders serving an extended determinate sentence. Offenders will be considered for release on licence by the Parole Board once the offender has served two-thirds of the appropriate custodial term. This should be compared with the automatic release at the halfway point in sentence for standard determinate sentences. The offender will be released automatically at the end of the appropriate custodial term if the Parole Board has not already directed release. On release, the offender will be subject to an extended period of supervision on licence.

If a court does not find that an offender is dangerous to the point where it imposes a life sentence or an extended determinate sentence, it must impose a sentence for offenders of particular concern. This sentence must be imposed if the offender is convicted of an offence listed in Schedule 18A to the 2003 Act. The list of offences in Schedule 18A reflects why sentences for offenders of particular concern were created: to remove automatic release for terrorism and child sex offences, which would have applied to a standard determinate sentence.

A sentence for an offender of particular concern, similar to an extended determinate sentence, has two parts: first, the appropriate custodial term, and secondly, the licence period. The effect of a sentence for an offender of particular concern is that the release point set at half way through the sentence is not automatic, but is at the discretion of the Parole Board. If not released at the halfway point, the offender may serve all of their sentence in custody, and on release must serve a minimum of 12 months on licence. That is a brief but—I hope noble Lords will agree—necessary summary of the current sentences.

I turn now to how Clause 9 amends those sentences. Currently, the list of relevant violent offences for which an extended determinate sentence can be imposed—set out in Part 1 of Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act—includes a number of terrorism offences. Clause 9(5) takes those offences from Part 1 of Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act and places them in a new Part 3, created to deal specifically with terrorism offences.

As well as shifting the existing terrorism offences into a new terrorism category, Clause 9 adds additional terrorism offences to the list. These are:

“membership of a proscribed organisation”,

covered by Section 11 of the 2000 Act;

“inviting support for a proscribed organisation”,

under Section 12 of the 2000 Act; wearing the uniform of or displaying an article associated with a proscribed organisation, under Section 13 of the 2000 Act; collection of information useful to a terrorist, under Section 58 of the 2000 Act;

“publishing information about members of the armed forces etc”,

under Section 58A of the 2000 Act; encouragement of terrorism, under Section 1 of the 2006 Act; dissemination of terrorist publications, under Section 2 of the 2006 Act; and,

“attendance at a place used for terrorist training”,

under Section 8 of the 2006 Act. Clause 9 also applies an eight-year maximum extended licence period for terrorism offences. This is an increase from the five-year maximum available for violent offences but is now in line with the eight-year maximum period for sexual offences.

In summary, for extended determinate sentences, Clause 9 creates a new specific list of applicable terrorism offences, adds new terrorism offences to that list, and increases the maximum extended licence period from five to eight years.

For the sentences of particular concern, Clause 9 adds the same eight additional terrorism offences to the list in Schedule 18A to the 2003 Act, meaning that the court, if it does not impose an extended determinate sentence, must impose a sentence for an offender of particular concern.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018

(5 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 131-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF) - (12 Nov 2018)
Lord Woolf Portrait Lord Woolf (CB)
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My Lords, I intervene here only because—like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and, for the reasons she has given, I think the matter requires clarification.

Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment and I understand both her concern and that of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, I stress, as the Government did in their response to the Joint Committee’s first report on the Bill, that this measure to enable biometric data to be retained when an individual is arrested under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—PACE—for a qualifying terrorist offence is both proportionate and necessary to help protect the public.

Schedule 2 contains amendments to the laws governing the retention, review and deletion of fingerprints and DNA profiles by the police for counterterrorism purposes. This is a complex area of law, and it may assist the Committee if I first spend a short while explaining the current position. The relevant statutory framework was introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, which established the principle that the biometric data of people who have not been convicted of any offence should no longer be kept indefinitely. This means that for the vast majority of people who are arrested and whose fingerprints and DNA are taken by the police, that biometric data will be promptly deleted if they are not convicted. This system is overseen by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, currently Professor Paul Wiles.

When passing the 2012 Act, Parliament recognised that it would be irresponsible, and would put the public at risk, to make this a blanket requirement in every case, regardless of the risk the individual might pose. So it made limited and tightly circumscribed provision for biometrics to be retained for limited periods in certain circumstances in the absence of a conviction. For example, if a person is arrested using the general power of arrest in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and is charged with a qualifying sexual, violent or terrorist offence, but is not ultimately convicted, it was recognised that there may be a range of reasons why they were not convicted and that they could still pose a risk of harm to the public, despite the discontinuance of the case.

In these circumstances it would be inappropriate, and indeed complacent, to ignore this risk to public safety and to require the police to immediately and automatically delete the individual’s DNA profile and fingerprints once a case is discontinued or the suspect is acquitted. The 2012 Act in these circumstances provides for a clearly limited three-year retention period before the data must be deleted. Similarly, if a person is arrested on suspicion of being a terrorist under the Terrorism Act 2000, whether or not they are subsequently charged, there is also a three-year retention period. This means that the police are better able to identify whether the individual is involved in terrorism, or other activity that poses a threat to the public, during that period. But it also means that the individual’s biometrics will not simply be held indefinitely.

In counterterrorism cases a person’s biometric data can be retained beyond the point when it would otherwise have to be deleted only if the chief officer of police of the area in which the material was taken personally considers that this is necessary for national security purposes. In these circumstances he or she can make a national security determination—or NSD—authorising retention for a further limited period, subject to a maximum of two years currently, and renewable if retention continues to be necessary. NSDs will, of course, be made only where it is proportionate to do so. This determination must then be reviewed and approved by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order deletion of the data if he is not satisfied that the determination is necessary. An NSD can be renewed for a further period, but only if the legal tests continue to be met and if the commissioner approves the renewed NSD. The assessment is made on the basis of intelligence and other relevant information about the threat the individual poses. We shall, of course, come to national security determinations in the next group of amendments, but it is helpful to provide an overview of these provisions up front to inform the debate on Amendment 47.

The amendments to existing legislation contained in Schedule 2 do not depart from these principles. Rather, they are intended to strike a better balance between on the one hand enabling the police to use fingerprints and DNA in an agile and effective way to support terrorism investigations and protect the public, and on the other ensuring that this continues to be subject to proportionate safeguards, regular case-by-case review and robust independent oversight.

We should not underestimate the value of biometric data in helping to secure convictions in terrorism cases. Such information played a vital role in the conviction in June of this year of Khalid Ali. Noble Lords will recall that Ali was arrested not far from this House and was subsequently convicted of terrorism offences, including his involvement in the use of explosive devices against coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Paragraph 2 of Schedule 2—which Amendment 47 would delete—will harmonise the retention periods for biometric data obtained when an individual is arrested on suspicion of terrorism, but not subsequently charged, under PACE and the Terrorism Act 2000. At present, an individual arrested under the Terrorism Act may have their biometric data automatically retained for three years. However, this automatic retention would not be available if the same individual were arrested in relation to the exact same activity under PACE.

In a terrorism case, retention for national security purposes would require the police to make an NSD with the approval of the Biometrics Commissioner, or would otherwise require the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner under Section 63G of PACE if retention was necessary solely for the prevention or detection of crime generally. However, the noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that this inconsistency between the retention regimes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Terrorism Act 2000 would remain. This could therefore result in the situation where the police are deprived of information that could prove vital to keep the public safe. The measure as drafted will remove this anomaly and ensure a consistent approach to the retention of biometric data for all those arrested on suspicion of terrorism, by providing for the same retention period regardless of the power of arrest used.

I do not accept the noble Baroness’s argument that this is a race to the bottom in terms of civil liberties. I say that because, as the Committee would expect, we have consulted the Biometrics Commissioner about this and other provisions in Schedule 2. In relation to this particular provision, perhaps I may read out what Professor Wiles has said:

“In my 2017 Annual Report I mentioned several issues that I thought the Government might wish to consider reviewing as part of the CT legislation review ordered by the Prime Minister ... I … noted in my Report my concerns about the police applying for ‘pre-emptive’ NSDs, often where a person has been arrested under PACE on suspicion of a terrorism offence. It is proposed in the CT Bill to allow biometric material taken after a PACE arrest for a terrorism offence to be retained automatically for three years (with the possibility of extending this period by making an NSD), as is already the case for the biometrics of those arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences under TACT”—


that is, the Terrorism Act. He goes on:

“It seems to me to be a sensible approach to bring the retention periods for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences into line”.


Given that authoritative opinion, which we sought expressly from the Biometrics Commissioner, and his view that this aspect of the Bill adopts a “sensible approach”, I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, the Biometrics Commissioner’s response does not seem to go to the question of oversight. As I have heard and read it, it is about the period of retention. I am not sure, but the Minister may be saying that through this amendment I have produced another failure to make the two regimes consistent, and that would certainly be an oversight on my part. If the commissioner has powers of oversight under PACE, that immediately throws into question the proportionality, and maybe the necessity, of this Bill’s provision in omitting the oversight.

What the Minister has had to say will require careful reading and I will do that. However, there has been a temptation to slide from the issue of oversight into other aspects of the arrangements, and I am not sure that the Committee has quite been answered. We will look at it, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for explaining that the amendments seek to strike out the provisions in Schedule 2 extending the maximum duration of a national security determination from two years to five years. In responding to her previous amendment, I explained to the Committee the circumstances in which such a determination can be made. I will not cover that ground again but I reiterate that all such determinations are reviewed by the independent Biometrics Commissioner, who may order the deletion of a person’s fingerprints and DNA profile if he is not satisfied that a determination is necessary.

Schedule 2 extends the maximum length of a national security determination from two years to five years. In his most recent report, the Biometrics Commissioner commented that in some cases,

“the evidence/intelligence against the relevant individuals is such that they could be granted for longer than two years”,

and suggested that the Government may want to consider legislating on this issue. We have considered the issue carefully and agree that it would be appropriate to introduce a longer maximum period. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, because his comments put this issue in its proper context.

Operational experience has shown that the current two-year length is too short in many cases and that those involved in terrorism—such that it is necessary and proportionate for the police to retain their biometric data—will often pose a more enduring threat than this. The views of those who embrace terrorism can be very entrenched. Individuals who hold such views can disengage and re-engage in terrorism unpredictably and without warning over a period longer than two years, and so can pose an ongoing risk. Individuals who travel overseas to engage in terrorist training or fighting may remain there for more than two years and are likely to pose a particularly high risk to the public on their return. There is a broad range of circumstances in which a person who presents a terrorist risk today may continue to pose a sufficient risk in two years’ time such that it will still be necessary and proportionate for the police to retain their fingerprints and DNA to help them identify if the person continues to engage or re-engages in terrorism.

This provision will therefore ensure that if a chief officer reasonably judges that the case before him or her is such a case, they will be able to authorise retention for a period of up to five years if this is necessary and proportionate. I emphasise that this will be the maximum period; it will be open to the chief officer to specify a shorter period if they consider that more proportionate. In every case, the NSD will need, as now, to be reviewed and approved by the Biometrics Commissioner, who has the power to order deletion of the data if he is not satisfied that its retention is necessary.

This measure will retain the key principle that biometric data should not be retained indefinitely where the individual has not been convicted. It will continue to provide that ongoing retention should be authorised at a senior level on a case-by-case basis, and subject to approval by the independent Biometrics Commissioner. Where ongoing retention is approved, this will not be open-ended but will continue for a finite period, with review and further authorisation needed if it is to be extended beyond the expiry of the NSD. But it will strike a better balance between these important safeguards, on the one hand, and, on the other, enabling the police to use biometrics to support terrorism investigations and identify suspects without placing a disproportionate burden on themselves. The increased maximum length of an NSD will ensure that, in appropriate cases, the police do not have to review cases and reaffirm necessity and proportionality more frequently than is necessary.

I hope that I have been able to explain the operational challenge which this provision is intended to address in a proportionate manner and to reassure the noble Baroness that we are not removing the important oversight of all national security determinations by the Biometrics Commissioner. For that reason and the others that I have advanced, I ask her to consider withdrawing her amendment.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, as the Minister said on the previous amendment, these amendments have to be read with that one. NSDs and their oversight are to some extent part and parcel of the same debate. As my noble friend said, it is perhaps a debate about convenience or inconvenience. It would probably be naive of me not to accept that there is an issue of resources here, but balancing how resources are applied and human rights does not always produce immediately obvious answers. This may be a matter of fine detail or where we place the line—that, too, can be a challenge.

Thinking of challenges and listening to what the Minister had to say about the period not necessarily being two years, I wonder how an individual would challenge the period applied and how many times over recent years NSDs have been of less than two years. That may be something that the Minister is able to tell me after today’s debate. For now, looking at these two groups of amendments together, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Rosser Portrait Lord Rosser
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Much of this Bill is about the appropriate balance between liberty and security in the present climate, where acts of terrorism are a reality rather than a distant or remote possibility. The differences of view over some parts of this Bill are in effect over where that appropriate balance between liberty and security should lie, since I presume that we are all in agreement with the principle that there has to be such a balance. Amendment 53A is also about where that balance should lie.

Clause 18 and Schedule 2 amend existing powers to retain fingerprints and DNA samples for counterterrorism purposes. The amendment would enable a person whose fingerprints and DNA profiles are retained under a power amended by Schedule 2 to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for the data to be deleted.

The amendment highlights and addresses two scenarios. The first is where there has been a mistake, such as over identity, place or any material fact or in the intelligence. The second scenario is where a person has been arrested but not charged for the offence. Under the terms of the amendment, an application can be made to the commissioner for the destruction of data where one of those two scenarios has been met as well as the requirement that the retention of the data has not been previously authorised by the commissioner or a court of law.

On receiving an appeal from the person whose biometric data has been retained, the commissioner would then be required to seek representations from the relevant chief officer of police as to whether the data should be destroyed, with the commissioner having to determine the appeal within three months.

If people’s data are retained in circumstances where a mistake might have been made or where they have not ultimately been charged with an offence, they should be able to appeal to have it destroyed. That right of appeal is surely quite important. At present, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act states that biometric data must be deleted by the police if it was taken where,

“the arrest was unlawful or based on mistaken identity”.

As far as I can see, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act does not provide for a personal right to appeal, which is what this amendment would give. This is surely an important principle. This amendment does not overturn the principle that there should be a period of automatic retention following a lawful and correct arrest on suspicion of terrorism. Indeed, it does not remove anything from Schedule 2.

Under Schedule 2, the time period for national security determination is amended. An NSD allows a chief police officer to determine that it is necessary and proportionate to extend the retention period for biometric data for the purposes of national security for an extra two years to five years, where it would otherwise be destroyed. An increased period of five years is a long time to retain the data of persons who have never been charged with a crime, particularly in the absence of a right of appeal. The amendment seeks to provide such an appeal through the Biometric Commissioner, who would make a decision on retention of data or otherwise based on whether it was necessary and proportionate to do so.

I hope that the Government will feel able to accept that, in the changed circumstances provided for in the Bill, the right of appeal being sought in this amendment should be taken up. I beg to move.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, this amendment would provide for a person whose fingerprints and DNA profile are retained under a power amended by Schedule 2 to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for the data to be deleted if the commissioner or a court have not previously authorised its retention.

One of the circumstances in which this new process would apply is where an individual had been arrested or charged as a result of a mistake, such as mistaken identity. I am pleased to be able to tell the noble Lord that existing legislation already addresses such cases of mistaken identity, providing a stronger safeguard, in fact, than the one he is proposing. Section 63D(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, provides that biometric data must be deleted by the police, without the individual needing to appeal, if it was taken as a result of an unlawful arrest, or an arrest based on mistaken identity. Given this existing provision, I believe that this aspect of the amendment is not necessary.

The second limb of the amendment covers cases where a person has been arrested but not charged with an offence. Of course, we touched on this ground in debating Amendment 47, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. As I indicated in response to that earlier debate, the Government’s view is that where someone has been lawfully arrested for a terrorism offence but not charged with that offence, it is none the less appropriate, necessary and proportionate that their fingerprints and DNA profile are retained by the police for three years. That approach has been firmly established for some years, through the Terrorism Act 2000, and we are now extending it to cover persons arrested for exactly the same terrorism offences under PACE. Consequently, I am not persuaded that we should now introduce a right of appeal to the Biometric Commissioner in such cases.

I stress that the Bill does not depart from the principle established by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 that the biometric data of a person who is arrested but not charged should not normally be retained indefinitely, as had previously been the case. In passing this legislation in 2012, Parliament recognised, rightly in my view, that in certain circumstances it is appropriate and in the public interest for biometric data to be retained for limited periods in the absence of a conviction. This includes when an individual is arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of being a terrorist but is not subsequently charged. The law provides for a three-year automatic retention period in this situation. However, the retention of biometric data for any longer than this would require a national security determination to be made by a chief officer of police and approved by the independent Biometrics Commissioner.

As we have already debated, Schedule 2 makes an equivalent provision for a case where the same person may be arrested on suspicion of the same terrorist activity but under the general power of arrest in PACE. The flexibility to arrest an individual under the Terrorism Act or PACE is a decision to be taken by the police, one which will be based on operational considerations. It is a gap in legislation that the same biometric retention rules do not follow the two powers of arrest in terrorism cases, despite the fact that there may otherwise be no material difference between two such cases. Schedule 2 closes that gap. While I support the principle that biometrics taken following a mistaken or unlawful arrest should be deleted—that is the position at law already—I am afraid I cannot agree that we should remove the equally well-established principle that there should be a limited period of automatic retention following a lawful and correct arrest on suspicion of terrorism.

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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for again setting out his arguments in favour of establishing a national identity register. I give way to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy.

Lord Kennedy of Southwark Portrait Lord Kennedy of Southwark
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

That is very kind. It is my fault. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was going to jump up—but obviously he did not in the end. The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, raises an important point with his amendment and it is important that we have this discussion. We have moved on from identity cards—that was a policy that my party certainly at one time supported—but our data is held by all sorts of organisations. In many cases non-government organisations have more data and know more about us than government organisations. As the noble Lord said, his amendment calls only for the possibility and desirability of a review. In that sense, I hope that he will get a reasonable response from the noble Earl.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

Once again, I thank my noble friend for the amendment. As he will recall, in 2010 the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition decided to end the identity card scheme and the associated national identity register because it was expensive and represented a substantial erosion of civil liberties—and I have to tell him that this Government have no plans to revisit that decision. There are good reasons for that. We have not seen any evidence that a national identity number or database would offer greater protection against terrorism or greater control at the border. There is no evidence that it would have prevented the 2017 terrorist attacks in the UK, and it has not prevented the attacks in France and Belgium, where national identity registers are in place. If my noble friend’s concern relates to people entering this country from abroad, I simply say that the UK is not in the Schengen area: we retain full control of our border and can carry out the necessary checks on those entering the UK.

UK citizens’ biometric data that is already held is stored in different government databases for specific purposes, with strict rules on how they can be used and retained. We cannot foresee any benefits that would justify the expense of introducing a national identity number for everyone in the country linked to a centrally held database which, if it were biometric, would presumably hold the biometric data of all of us indefinitely—an idea which, as I mentioned earlier, Parliament has expressly rejected. Protecting the public and keeping citizens safe is a priority for the Government. We are making big investments to those ends. We believe that the investment that we are making in better security, better use of intelligence and cybersecurity is a more effective use of our resources.

Lord Campbell-Savours Portrait Lord Campbell-Savours
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The Minister referred to some terror attacks early on in his contribution. Would he accept that, if the United States Government had held DNA material at the time of 9/11, it would have been flagged up when those criminals embarked on the planes, which led to the disaster? If it had been flagged up, they would have been stopped from getting on the plane.

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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has made a very pertinent point in this context. I am not capable of debating that particular terrorist atrocity because I do not know all the circumstances surrounding it. One of the shortcomings I do know of was a distinct lack of process in admitting passengers on to planes in New York, which might still have been the case even if a DNA register had been in operation in the United States. So we can try to particularise this argument, but I have yet to see evidence that the terrorist attacks we have seen recently on these shores, or indeed in France and Belgium, could have been prevented by a system such as the one proposed by my noble friend. So, against that background, I hope that, having again aired this issue, my noble friend will be content, at least at this stage, to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Marlesford Portrait Lord Marlesford
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The answer is that at this stage I will withdraw the amendment. It is, I believe, a totally valid point. I know that the Home Office is opposed to it. I know that it does not like these things. I just go back to the example of the 10 years it took to get the firearm thing. This will come. It is inevitable. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, says, basically no legitimate person is frightened of having their identity known. We do not live in a dictatorship. We cannot behave as though apparatus that would be useful for a dictatorship should not be provided in case we have a dictatorship. We are fighting a battle against terrorism. We are fighting on many fronts and this is something that could be useful. I find it extraordinary that the Home Office will not even look at it. However, as I said, for the moment I will withdraw the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018

(5 years, 4 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 131-IV Fourth marshalled list for Committee (PDF) - (12 Nov 2018)
Lord Marlesford Portrait Lord Marlesford (Con)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, in this country we allow, quite rightly, UK passport holders to be in the possession of passports of other countries—not just one but two or three; whatever is needed. When someone applies for a UK passport, they are required to declare what other passports they hold. But, astonishingly, this information is not kept in any sort of central database and still less is it available to border officers whose responsibility it is to examine the passports of those entering or leaving the UK. This is why my noble friend the Minister had to tell me, in a Written Answer on 16 April this year, when I asked about a register of second passports:

“No statistical information is available showing whether British citizens hold another citizenship”.


About five years ago I was tipped off by a member of the Security Service that its operations were made much more difficult by the fact that UK citizens were using their UK passport to travel to one destination and then another passport to get up to mischief, perhaps, in third countries. This was and is particularly relevant to would-be jihadists who travel to Pakistan, for example, and then attend training camps or indeed join al-Qaeda, ISIS or some other terrorist organisation in other countries. I raised this point a couple of years ago with Cressida Dick, the present Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who was at that time responsible for anti-terrorist operations. She expressed astonishment that border control officers were not automatically alerted to other passports held when a UK passport was electronically scrutinised at the point of entry.

My Amendment 61 is exceedingly modest. It asks merely that the Government require dual nationals to declare other passports and that this information,

“should be made available to border security staff and other relevant national authorities via a centralised database”.

In fact, it is even more modest because all I am asking them to do is to study whether this is a sensible idea. That is not asking very much.

This would be no more difficult or complicated than many other centralised databases, such as the DVLA for vehicle licences and all the rest of it, and the National Firearms Licensing Management System—the central firearms register—which I caused to be introduced under Section 29 of the Firearms (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1997, which finally came into operation in September 2007, and is working very well. I checked quite recently with my own county firearms officer.

The Government have previously used three arguments to oppose what I am proposing. The first is that it would be an infringement of civil liberties. My answer to that is that such a concept of civil liberties is wholly outdated in an age when we are all subject to intense and often intrusive surveillance by foreign powers such as Russia and, rather more efficiently, China. The second is that there could be no way of enforcing the declaration of other passports. That of course has a simple remedy, which is—if it is declared to be deliberate and pernicious—the forfeiture of a UK passport when that is discovered. Noble Lords in the Committee might have their own view on this but I am quite sure that the great majority of second passport holders would have not the slightest objection to this being known to the authorities. After all, we all have to put up with a lot of inconvenient baggage examination under existing counterterrorism operations.

Nor should we neglect the possibility of connivance by Home Office staff in committing terrorist or other serious criminal offences, whether in connection with passports or border control. The Minister will be well aware that in the last 12 years no fewer than 54 members of Home Office staff have been sent to prison, sometimes for long periods—nine or 11 years. In a recent case Shamsu Iqbal, an official in the immigration department of the Home Office, was sentenced in April to 15 years for misconduct in public office. Sometimes this connivance involves selling visas or trafficking in passports, assisting illegal immigration, forgery, bribery, money laundering and other serious matters. Only today the newspapers are carrying a report of a Mr Pellett, an officer in the Home Office Border Force, who has just been found guilty of assisting criminal gangs with smuggling in weapons and drugs at Dover. I suggest that the Home Office really cannot argue that we can rely on its existing standards of efficiency, let alone integrity, in the protection of our borders.

The third argument is that we should have confidence in the Home Office’s intelligence-led processes and not concern ourselves with these matters. I am sure that my noble friend does not feel this but I think that Home Office officials regard me as pretty impertinent to be talking about these matters. On that I would simply say: it is now 12 years since the noble Lord, Lord Reid, declared when he was Home Secretary that the Home Office was not fit for purpose, while only this month the House of Commons Select Committee concluded, in the matter of my right honourable friend Amber Rudd, that the Home Office had lost its grip. This simple and modest proposal is necessary for national security. I believe that it will improve the Bill and I hope that the Government will show that they have some inclination to get a grip by adopting it. I beg to move.

Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for raising this matter and I acknowledge his long-standing interest in this issue. I share his aim of preventing those who may be of interest on the grounds of terrorism, serious crime or hostile activity from avoiding detection at the border. But before I reply substantively to him, I believe the Home Office to be blessed with many, many committed, honourable and very able civil servants. It is wrong for this Committee to gain the impression that it is somehow shot through with those who would seek to disobey the law. That is not my experience and it is certainly not the experience of my noble friend the Minister or, I dare say, any of your Lordships in this House who have had dealings with the Home Office.

Holding dual national status is perfectly lawful in the UK and it is not a barrier to acquiring British citizenship or obtaining a British passport. When making such applications, dual nationals are required to provide the Home Office with details of any foreign passports or other nationality held. Such information will assist in the assessment of the application, including, in the case of an application for naturalisation, the assessment of any grounds for refusal based upon conduct through past or present activities.

The request for dual national passport information is also necessary in understanding whether a person is using one name for all official purposes. The UK, through the Home Office, has also instituted a policy that a person must have one name for all official purposes and that this is reflected in biometric residence permits, naturalisation and registration documents and passports. This policy is in place not only for travel purposes but to frustrate the use of multiple names for access to goods and services. This, together with other measures in place, minimises the ability of a British citizen to manipulate travel documents to travel into and out of the UK and other countries undetected for terrorism, trafficking and other criminal activities.

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Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My concern is that this is repressive legislation, and we are already finding that peaceful protest is heavily affected by other parts of terrorism legislation. I therefore think that this would have an impact as well.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for setting out the case for her proposed new clause. I would like to reassure her that the provisions in the Bill will not impact on an individual’s right to peacefully protest. Let me say without ifs or buts that this is a right central to a free and democratic society such as ours, and one which we would all seek to uphold and defend.

The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, argued at Second Reading that,

“there is no liberty without security”.—[Official Report, 9/10/18; col. 27.]

With due respect to the noble Baroness, I am inclined to agree.

The measures in the Bill are intended to ensure that the fundamental rights and values held so dearly by the vast majority of individuals in this country are upheld, and that people are able to express their views and stand up for what they believe in in the face of a malign and growing terrorist threat. While we saw the ultimate expression of these hateful views in Finsbury Park, Westminster, London Bridge and Manchester, these attitudes also undermine the cohesion of our communities, restrict our freedoms and diminish our rights, in particular those of women and girls.

I should make it clear that the type of conduct that the Bill’s provisions are aimed at concerns support for proscribed organisations—those which are, by definition, concerned with terrorism. There is a clear public interest in stymieing support for terrorist organisations, since the more support they have, the stronger their capacity to engage in terrorism. The Bill’s provisions, however, would not extend to support for other organisations that are not proscribed, or indeed to expressions of support for causes that are neither terrorism nor otherwise illegal.

Tackling the evil ideology of extremism is one of the greatest challenges of our time, and we need a new approach to identifying, exposing and defeating it. This year, to step up the fight against extremists, we established the independent Commission for Countering Extremism, which will be crucial to bringing new drive and innovative thinking to all our efforts to tackle extremism. Our published charter sets out the commission’s status as a transparent organisation operating independently from government, and provides it with a clear remit to support the Government in identifying and confronting extremist ideology in all its forms, whether Islamist, far and extreme right-wing, violent or non-violent. It also confirms that the commission will have no remit on counterterrorism policies, including Prevent. In its first year, the commission is engaging widely and openly and is undertaking an intensive evidence-gathering phase to inform the advice to government on new policies to counter extremism. This will include revisiting the extremism definition. The commission has now engaged with over 400 experts and activists and, in September, published the terms of reference for its study, which will be informed by an open public consultation, evidence from government and further research. I urge everyone to engage with the commission in this vital effort.

Peaceful protest is a vital part of a democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and to demonstrate their views, however uncomfortable these may be to the majority of us, provided that they do so within the law. Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the ECHR form the basis of an individual’s right to participate in peaceful protest. There is, of course, a balance to be struck. Protesters’ rights need to be balanced with the rights of others to go about their business without fear of intimidation or serious disruption to the community. Rights to peaceful protest do not extend to violent or threatening behaviour and the police have powers to deal with any such acts. However, these powers are not contained within counterterrorism legislation, but in the Public Order Act 1986. Under that Act, chief officers of police may impose conditions on assemblies and public processions to prevent serious public disorder, serious damage to property, or serious disruption to the life of the community. The directions can relate to the duration, location and size of any demonstration. If the police assess that a march will cause serious public disorder, despite conditions being set, they can apply to the local council for an order prohibiting the holding of a public procession for a period of up to three months. The council must obtain the consent of the Home Secretary before making a banning order. In the London area, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner would need to apply to the Home Secretary for consent to ban the march.

The police must not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly, except to the extent allowed by Article 11(2) of the ECHR. They must not impose unreasonable, indirect restrictions on persons exercising their rights to peaceful assembly, such as imposing a condition on the location of a protest which effectively negates the purpose of the protest. Pre-emptive measures taken by the police which restrict the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly will be subject to particular scrutiny. In certain circumstances, the police have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully. This applies where there is a threat of disruption or disorder from others. This does not mean that there is an absolute duty to protect those who want to protest, but the police must take reasonable measures in particular circumstances.

Following debate in Committee in the House of Commons, my colleague the Security Minister undertook to consider amendments designed to prevent charges being levied on the organisers of a public procession or assembly, should an anti-terrorism traffic regulation order be required to protect such an event. The Government brought forward an amendment to Clause 15 to achieve this, so as not to restrict the right to peaceful protest, as we believe that people should not be charged to exercise these fundamental human rights.

Prior to introduction of the Bill in the House of Commons, the Home Secretary made a statement that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights—a view which my noble friend shared when the Bill was introduced to this House. Given all this, and the scrutiny the Bill has received during its passage through both Houses and by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Constitution Committee, I am not persuaded that the consultation exercise envisaged by Amendment 62 is necessary.

I hope that, with that somewhat lengthy explanation, and having had this opportunity to debate this important topic, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment for the time being.

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Portrait Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Marlesford Portrait Lord Marlesford
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, in putting down this amendment, I am not particularly concerned with what the power should be for stopping people, nor am I concerned with the way powers are used and the various matters that have been discussed about the retention of information. All I am concerned with is to make it more efficient than it appears to be under the Bill as drafted.

Paragraph 3(b) of Schedule 3 states that a person questioned under paragraph 1 or 2 must,

“give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes P’s identity”.

It is an incredibly amateur way of doing things. Nowadays we have much better methods of establishing people’s identity. DNA is probably one of the best. It is now wholly unintrusive—you no longer have to take a blood sample or anything like that. You can simply take a swab. All I am suggesting is that the Bill should give those officers who feel it necessary to try to establish or record an identity the means of doing so in a much more certain way. This is a very limited proposal. I am merely suggesting that a tool should be included in this schedule.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I hope I can reassure my noble friend Lord Marlesford at least in part. As he has explained, Amendment 67A would allow an examining officer, during the course of a Schedule 3 ports examination, to require a person to provide a DNA sample. This would be in addition to the powers available to these officers to request information and identity documents.

The ability to establish a person’s identity is undoubtedly an important aspect of an examination to determine whether that individual is or has been engaged in a hostile activity. I therefore highlight to my noble friend that these powers already allow for the taking of fingerprints and samples to help to ascertain a person’s identity. Paragraphs 27 and 35 currently allow for the taking of fingerprints and samples where a person has been detained. This biometric information can also be taken from the detainee without their consent but only at a police station and if authorised by a superintendent who is satisfied that it is necessary in order to assist in determining whether the detainee is or has been engaged in a hostile activity, or to ascertain the detainee’s identity.

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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

The argument is that the police and the authorities believe they have all the powers that they need already, and that those powers enable them to detain a person, if they think it is necessary and if that decision is confirmed in the way that I described, in order to assist in determining whether the detainee has been engaged in a hostile activity or, as relevant to my noble friend’s amendment, to ascertain the detainee’s identity. If a suspicion arose about the individual’s identity, the detention process could offer a way through to enable the DNA sample to be taken.

Lord Marlesford Portrait Lord Marlesford
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I hoped that my noble friend would realise that what I am proposing is the use of the DNA capability in circumstances where it is not necessary—at that stage, at any rate—to detain people. This almost goes back to the point that I made on Monday on the need to have identity numbers with secure biometrics—I never envisaged that the establishment of identity should be able to be done only when someone was detained. Being detained is a much more serious matter than merely asking someone to give a method of establishing their identity. That is where I am sure that not my noble friend but perhaps the Home Office misunderstands what I am trying to say. I do not know whether my noble friend would like to say anything further.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

I am grateful to my noble friend. Possibly the answer is for me to write to him after this Committee sitting. My feeling would be that to require someone who was not detained to supply a DNA sample would cross a civil liberties line that many would find uncomfortable. In my judgment, it should therefore be only for those detained—obviously you are detained only for a good reason—to be required to supply such a sample.

Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

I agree with the Minister on the civil liberties issue. The other problem is that taking a DNA sample would assist in identifying who the individual was only if that person’s DNA had already been taken and was on the database. I do not think we have many Russian spies’ DNA that we would then be able to use to identify that they were hostile actors by taking a DNA sample from them. It is only a small proportion of the UK population who have been arrested and convicted and whose DNA would therefore appear on the database. So, in addition to the infringement of civil liberties of completely innocent people having to provide DNA samples, the proposed measure would be of limited benefit because of the limited nature of the existing DNA database against which the DNA sample could be compared.

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Moved by
70: Schedule 3, page 43, line 29, at end insert “, other than an article in respect of which an authorisation is granted under paragraph 13A”
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Clause 25: Extent
Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I do not wish to detain the Committee for long on this clause, but I would like to put a couple of points on the record about the devolution implications of this Bill. Counterterrorism and national security are reserved matters in Scotland and Wales and excepted matters in Northern Ireland. Consequently, in the view of the UK Government, none of the provisions in the Bill relates to matters within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales or Northern Ireland Assembly. None the less, we recognise that there will be an impact on devolved criminal justice agencies in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and on local authorities in Scotland and Wales. Consequently, we have consulted the devolved Administrations extensively throughout the preparation of the Bill and, subsequently, during its parliamentary passage.

I am very grateful for the collaborative approach adopted by the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Department of Justice towards this Bill, so that we can ensure that it is fit for purpose in Scotland and Northern Ireland, recognising that those parts of the UK have a criminal justice system distinct from that in England and Wales. There are two provisions in the Bill that impact on the executive competence of the Scottish Ministers, namely those relating to the power to charge for an anti-terrorism traffic regulation order in Clause 15 and the amendment to the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 in Schedule 4. I am therefore also grateful to the Scottish Government for taking forward a legislative consent Motion in relation to these provisions; the Motion is due to be debated in the Scottish Parliament later this month. With that, I beg to move that Clause 25 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25 agreed.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Ministry of Defence

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 3rd December 2018

(5 years, 3 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 142-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (29 Nov 2018)
Moved by
6: Clause 3, page 2, line 44, at end insert “, or
(b) the person’s action or possession was for the purposes of—(i) carrying out work as a journalist, or(ii) academic research.”
Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
- Hansard - -

My Lords, we have had detailed and insightful debates on Clause 3, particularly on the operation of the “reasonable excuse” defence in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which Clause 3 amends. Amendment 6 responds to arguments made in both Houses that we should provide greater certainty that particular categories of legitimate activity will constitute a reasonable excuse.

As I explained previously—and as my right honourable friend the Minister for Security and Economic Crime explained in the House of Commons—it is clear that those engaged in legitimate journalism and academic research have been able to rely on the “reasonable excuse” defence provided by the Section 58 offence in its present form since it was passed in 2000. The Government have been equally clear that this will continue to be the case under Section 58 as it will be amended by Clause 3.

We have also set out the longstanding legal position, codified by the Appellate Committee of this House in a 2008 judgment, that it is for the jury to determine whether a particular excuse in a particular case is reasonable on the basis of all the evidence in that case. Such a determination will always be highly fact-specific; it is not possible to prescribe particular exemptions or reasonable excuses in advance and in the abstract. The Government have therefore taken the approach until now that it has not been necessary to write these categories of reasonable excuse into the Bill.

However, we have heard the points made by your Lordships and reflected on the concerns raised. We recognise that the Government’s assurances have not satisfied noble Lords thus far as to the protection afforded to journalists and academics by Section 58, and which will apply following Section 58 as amended by the Bill. It is clear that the Government need to go further and provide greater assurance. In that spirit, we tabled Amendment 6.

The amendment will make it clear in the Bill that it will be a reasonable excuse for a person to access terrorist material falling under Section 58 for the purposes of academic research and carrying out work as a journalist. This will apply both to the existing limbs of Section 58—that is, the collection, possession or making a record of such material—and the new limb of viewing material online, which Clause 3 will insert. The amendment will underline and put beyond doubt the position already set out by the Government. I hope that it will be welcomed by your Lordships as providing the necessary assurance to those working in the fields of journalism and academia who have a legitimate reason to access terrorist material.

The amendment has been carefully drafted so as to complement, rather than overturn, the existing legal position relating to reasonable excuses. Clause 3(4) already provides one example of a case that may constitute a reasonable excuse, which is where the defendant did not know and had no reason to believe that the material in question contained information likely to be useful to a terrorist. The amendment expands on that to additionally provide the two examples I mentioned.

I stress that this is an indicative rather than exhaustive list of cases that may constitute a reasonable excuse, and it will remain open to defendants to advance other types of reasonable excuse. This will ensure that we retain the flexibility to cover other unforeseen circumstances that may arise, and that we do not inadvertently close off the “reasonable excuse” defence to those who may have an equally reasonable excuse of a different nature. I appreciate this construction is not self-evident from the Government’s amendment, so I understand why the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, tabled Amendment 7. But key here are the words,

“but are not limited to”,

in new subsection (3A) of Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. That qualification will apply to the new paragraph (b) inserted by the Government’s amendment. All will become clear once the Bill is reprinted after Report.

Amendment 6 does not provide an absolute and automatic exemption for any person who states that they are a journalist or academic. That would not be appropriate, and it would move away from the position established in case law by this House. In Committee, a number of your Lordships highlighted the difficulties in legislating to differentiate legitimate journalism from that which may be carried out by a person with more nefarious intentions, whether as a cover for their true activities or as a platform to propagate their terrorist views. The approach we are taking will ensure that juries will be able to make such distinctions in individual cases, based on the particular facts.

I hope that Amendment 6 will be welcomed as addressing the concerns that have been raised, and as offering a meaningful compromise to those noble Lords who have raised them. I commend it to the House and I beg to move.

Amendment 7 (to Amendment 6)

Moved by
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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
- Hansard - -

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, especially for the supportive comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Attlee, but also for the very helpful remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I shall endeavour to cover all questions that have been put.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked a drafting question. She asked where paragraph (a) will actually fall in the text. I can tell her that paragraph (a) will begin with the words after line 40 on page 2, so I hope that it will run in the broad way rather than the narrow way in which she hoped it would.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

The last words of line 40 read,

“in which at the time”

and the next line starts, “of the person’s action”. As I said, I identified two places in line 40 where paragraph (a) might be inserted. It is a drafting point but also a point of substance, because where paragraph (a) starts actually affects the whole of the point. Can the Minister give a little more assistance?

Earl Attlee Portrait Earl Attlee
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, perhaps if my noble friend the Minister is not absolutely certain on this point we could return to it at Third Reading to clarify the drafting amendment.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I was not as precise as I should have been. The words after,

“(but are not limited to) those in which”,

will become paragraph (a). So it will read,

“(but are not limited to) those in which (a) at the time of the person’s action or possession, the person did not know”,

et cetera. Paragraph (b) will follow after line 44. I hope that that clarifies the point.

My noble friend Lord Lothian asked a series of very reasonable questions about the meaning of the words “journalist” and “academic”. The distinction between journalism that constitutes a reasonable excuse and that which does not, for the purpose of this offence, will inevitably be highly fact-specific. As several noble Lords commented in earlier debates on the Bill, it is just not possible to provide in advance an exhaustive definition of a journalist or of a legitimate journalist. This is something that we are clear needs to be determined by a jury in particular cases on the basis of all the evidence. We have made it clear that our amendment adds an indicative list of categories of reasonable excuse and does not provide either an exhaustive list or an absolute exemption. It is important to remember that juries will retain their existing discretion to decide whether a particular excuse is reasonable on a case-by-case basis. The same logic would apply to the meaning of the word “academic”. The category of person that my noble friend described might or might not be considered by a jury to be an academic: it would depend on the facts of the case. The jury might consider that there was still a reasonable excuse for a particular individual. I hope that that is helpful.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation because it answers my point and deals with my amendment. I am sorry to have been tedious and to have consolidated my reputation for pedantry—the noble Lord, Lord Harris, says that is impossible—but I think it was a substantive point. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Lord Carlile of Berriew Portrait Lord Carlile of Berriew
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My Lords, with great respect to my noble friend, and indeed to my noble and learned friend on my right, I wonder why one needs to say something twice in the same statute.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, Amendment 10 returns us to an area on which we have previously had helpful and extensive debates: namely, the question of how much evidence is required to establish a reasonable excuse defence under Clause 4, on whom the burden of proof falls and how this is set out in the legislation. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly said, these issues have previously caused some uncertainty as they require Clause 4 to be read in conjunction with Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which sets out how the burden of proof applies to a number of defences to criminal offences within the 2000 Act including, but not limited to, the new designated area offence. It may therefore be helpful if I remind your Lordships of how these provisions operate.

The approach taken in relation to proving a reasonable excuse defence under Clause 4, which inserts the designated area offence into the Terrorism Act 2000, is the exact same formulation that is used elsewhere in various defences to offences contained in the 2000 Act, including the defence to the Section 58 offence which is amended by Clause 3. Clause 4 refers to a defendant proving that they have “a reasonable excuse”. We must then turn to Section 118, which makes further provision on what is required to “prove” a defence in this context. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has previously raised a concern that the wording of the two provisions might be out of step, and that Clause 4 might place a greater burden on defendants to make out a reasonable excuse than is envisaged by Section 118. I have addressed this in previous debates and have written to him following our most recent debate in Committee. I hope that I have been able to reassure him that this is definitely not the case.

Section 118 provides that if a defendant,

“adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”—

that is to say, the matter has to be proved under the wording of the defence—

“the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.

This, together with relevant case law, has the effect that if a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support a suggestion that he or she has a reasonable excuse, the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that defence, which it must do to the normal criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”. If the prosecution fails to do so, the jury must assume that the defence is made out.

Amendment 10 would insert this wording from Section 118 into Clause 4. The noble Lord has suggested that this would make the operation of Clause 4 clearer and would put beyond doubt what is required of a defendant to establish a reasonable excuse defence. I have every sympathy with the noble Lord’s desire for clarity. This is not the most straightforward of the Bill’s provisions, requiring as it does two different provisions in the 2000 Act to be read in conjunction, but I can assure him that there was a good reason for drafting it in this way. It is very simply that, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, Section 118 makes the same provision in relation to eight other provisions in the 2000 Act which include similar defences. Each of those defences points back to the same single place—Section 118—rather than including eight repetitions of the same wording in eight different places. This is a standard drafting practice where a common principle governs the operation of multiple provisions. It is considered to be the best way of providing clarity and consistency, and of not unnecessarily adding to the length and complexity of legislation.

In practice, the noble Lord’s amendment would have little or no impact on the operation of the reasonable excuse defence as it would simply duplicate the wording of Section 118, which already has effect. However, I must respectfully say that I am unable to support the amendment. As I have set out, the formulation used in the Bill as drafted, and in the 2000 Act, reflects normal drafting practice, and I do not see that there is sufficient reason to depart from this in relation to Clause 4. The courts have successfully operated Section 118 for 18 years in respect of the eight existing offences in the 2000 Act to which it also applies without anyone complaining that its effect is unclear or uncertain. There is clear case law and a settled and well-understood position.

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Moved by
11: Clause 4, page 3, line 19, at end insert—
“(3A) The cases in which a person has a reasonable excuse for the purposes of subsection (2) include (but are not limited to) those where—(a) the person enters, or remains in, a designated area involuntarily, or (b) the person enters, or remains in, a designated area for or in connection with one or more of the purposes mentioned in subsection (3B).(3B) The purposes are—(a) providing aid of a humanitarian nature;(b) satisfying an obligation to appear before a court or other body exercising judicial power;(c) carrying out work for the government of a country other than the United Kingdom (including service in or with the country’s armed forces);(d) carrying out work for the United Nations or an agency of the United Nations;(e) carrying out work as a journalist;(f) attending the funeral of a relative or visiting a relative who is terminally ill;(g) providing care for a relative who is unable to care for themselves without such assistance.(3C) But a person has a reasonable excuse for entering or remaining in a designated area by virtue of subsection (3A)(b) only if—(a) the person enters or remains in the area exclusively for or in connection with one or more of the purposes mentioned in subsection (3B), or(b) in a case where the person enters or remains in the area for or in connection with any other purpose or purposes (in addition to one or more of the purposes mentioned in subsection (3B)), the other purpose or purposes also provide a reasonable excuse for doing so.(3D) For the purposes of subsection (3B)—(a) the reference to the provision of aid of a humanitarian nature does not include the provision of aid in contravention of internationally recognised principles and standards applicable to the provision of humanitarian aid;(b) references to the carrying out of work do not include the carrying out of any act which constitutes an offence in a part of the United Kingdom or would do so if the act occurred in a part of the United Kingdom.”
Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, the government amendments in this group will make a number of changes to Clause 4. Clause 4 provides a power for the Secretary of State to designate an area outside the UK which he may exercise if it is necessary, for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to restrict UK nationals and residents from entering or remaining in that area. It will be a criminal offence for a UK national or resident to enter or remain in a designated area without a reasonable excuse.

Much of the debate on Clause 4 has, of course, focused on that reasonable excuse defence, both on its application in various scenarios where a person might have a legitimate reason to enter or remain in a designated area, and on the certainty which will be provided to such a person that they will not subsequently be prosecuted.

The points of principle here and the legal position are very similar to those which we have already debated on the reasonable excuse defence in relation to Clause 3. I will therefore not detain your Lordships by repeating myself, save to say that the Government are equally clear that, under Clause 4, individuals with a legitimate reason to enter a designated area of the kind we have been discussing will have a reasonable excuse.

However, I undertook at the conclusion of Committee to reflect on the concerns that had been raised that the existing approach might not provide adequate certainty and assurance. We have also engaged with representatives of the charitable sector, who have made points similar to those made in this House. Following this reflection, we have concluded that we should bring forward amendments to provide further assurance that those with a legitimate reason to enter a designated area will have a reasonable excuse. I trust that this will be welcome news to your Lordships.

Amendment 11 therefore introduces an indicative list of cases which may give rise to a reasonable excuse. Similarly to that which we have introduced to Clause 3 through Amendment 6, which we have just debated, it is not an exhaustive list, and it will be open to defendants to advance other categories of reasonable excuse. It will ultimately be up to the jury to determine whether a particular excuse is reasonable, on the basis of all the evidence in that case.

This will provide significantly greater assurance to legitimate travellers, but it will not preclude those who travel to designated areas for terrorist purposes under cover of, for example, journalism or charitable work from being prosecuted. Defendants will also not be able to rely on a reasonable excuse defence if they travel for a legitimate purpose and then engage in other activity which is not legitimate while within the designated area.

The categories of reasonable excuse provided by the amendment are: where the person enters or remains in the designated area involuntarily because, for example, they are detained; to carry out work as a journalist; to provide humanitarian aid; to attend the funeral of a relative or to visit a terminally ill relative; to provide care to a relative who is unable to care for themselves without such assistance; to satisfy an obligation to appear before a court; or to work for a foreign Government, the UN or an agency of the UN. This indicative list of reasonable excuses adds to the existing automatic exception for those who are working for or on behalf of the Crown. Where this list refers to a relative, Amendment 16 defines this as a spouse or civil partner, sibling, ancestor or lineal descendant.

A further area on which greater assurance has been sought is reviews of designations. As drafted, the Bill requires the Secretary of State to keep under review whether the condition for designating an area continues to be met, and to revoke the designation if he considers that it is no longer met. The Government have been clear that this will be a meaningful and ongoing review. I reiterate the point that in the kind of exceptional scenario in which this power is likely to be used, the Government will invariably pay very close attention to the circumstances on the ground, and will keep their response across every aspect of the system under continuous review and subject to recalibration as necessary.

Several noble Lords tabled amendments for Committee which would have tightened this further by introducing either a requirement for annual reviews of designations, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, or a sunsetting provision so that regulations designating an area would cease to have effect after three years, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. This latter approach would mirror the equivalent Australian legislation. I indicated in those debates that I considered an annual review to be unnecessary to ensure rigorous and effective review of designations, and that this would not serve the public interest or be an effective use of resources. I have reflected further and, with all respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I remain of that opinion.

However, I also indicated that I could see merit in the suggestion of a three-year backstop sunset period, with the option to make new regulations designating the same area if that is appropriate. I undertook to consider this ahead of Report. Following that consideration, I find myself persuaded that this would be a sensible and helpful addition to the Bill, and Amendment 18 therefore introduces such a provision. As a result, regulations designating an area will automatically cease to have effect and will fall away after three years. The amendment makes it clear that this is without prejudice to further regulations being made designating the same or a similar area. Any new regulations would of course then be subject to approval by Parliament. This will provide a powerful extra safeguard to ensure that the designation of an area cannot be indefinite, and that this power will be used to manage risk only in exceptional circumstances. While regulations remain in force, they will also be subject to the existing requirement that they be kept under review and that they be revoked sooner than after three years if the condition for designating the area is no longer met.

Amendments 20 and 21 implement recommendations made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House in their report on the Bill. Amendment 20 requires the Secretary of State, when laying regulations before Parliament designating an area, to issue a statement setting out the reasons why he considers that the legal test for designation is met in relation to that area. The Government have always been clear that we will provide an explanation to Parliament of why we seek to designate any area under this power, and we are happy to place a requirement to do this in the Bill.

Amendment 21 makes any regulations revoking a designation subject to the negative resolution procedure. Under the Bill as drafted, regulations that purely revoke an existing designation would not be subject to any parliamentary approval and would simply come into force immediately upon being laid. The Government took that approach on the basis that lifting the designation of an area, and therefore also the operation of the criminal offence in relation to entering it, would have no adverse impact on any person. The committee wisely identified that lifting a designation could in fact have an impact on those for whose protection the area was designated—that is to say, the public. On that basis the committee recommended that such regulations should actually be subject to negative resolution in both Houses. The Government are persuaded of the committee’s view on this matter and are happy to implement its recommendation. I am grateful to your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its scrutiny of the Bill and for its assistance in improving it in these two respects.

I am also most grateful to noble Lords, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for their contributions to the debates on this important but sensitive new power and for their assistance in identifying the sensible improvements that the Government are bringing forward today in response to those debates. I hope your Lordships will be happy to support these government amendments.

There are a number of other amendments in this group, including amendments to the government amendments. I will wait to hear what noble Lords have to say about Amendments 12, 13, 14, 17 and 19 before responding. For now, I beg to move Amendment 11.

Amendment 12 (to Amendment 11)

Moved by
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Lord Paddick Portrait Lord Paddick
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My Lords, very briefly, I completely agree with my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who has addressed all the amendments in this group other than Amendment 15. I have added my name to Amendment 15 and made clear my reasons for supporting it during our debate on the second group of amendments. I do not wish to add further to my comments.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has argued for the expansion of the Government’s list of indicative reasonable excuses to include peacekeeping and visiting a very seriously ill relative. I understood her not to have spoken to her Amendment 14, which proposed that we include in Clause 4 a power to further add to the list of reasonable excuses by regulations—I hope I was right in understanding that.

The first point I make is to stress again that this is an indicative and not an exhaustive list. I am not suggesting that the amendments from the noble Baroness are without merit, but, in a phrase, we need to draw the line somewhere. I firmly believe that Amendment 11 draws it in the right place. In this regard, we have taken into account the Australian precedent. Trying to put more and more situations beyond doubt—the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton—is simply unnecessary in this context. As I have argued before, we are consciously not creating an exhaustive list of reasonable excuses; it would be quite wrong to try. Juries will be able to make up their own minds on the reasonableness of particular excuses in the light of the circumstances of the case.

I entirely accept the importance of peacebuilding activity, and I am sure noble Lords would agree with me that it is vital that such activity continues. However, as I have explained, the government amendment does not preclude a person advancing this or any other category of reasonable excuse. I am of the view that legitimate peacebuilding activity could very well be a reasonable excuse. However, I must say again that it will ultimately be up to the jury to determine whether a particular excuse is reasonable on the basis of all the evidence.

Much the same arguments apply to Amendment 13, which would add visiting a seriously ill relative to the list of reasonable excuses. I am not sure how fruitful it would be to get into a debate about the difference between being “seriously ill” and “terminally ill”. Again, the line has to be drawn somewhere. Given that the Foreign Office would inevitably advise against any travel to a designated area, it is right that we set the bar at a high level. But I say again that it would be open to any person to advance as a reasonable excuse the fact that he or she was visiting a seriously ill relative.

Amendment 17 seeks to place on the Home Secretary a duty to lay before Parliament an annual report on the outcome of the review of a designation. This amendment misunderstands the nature of the duty on the Home Secretary to keep a designation under review. The requirement does not imply a set piece review with a beginning and an end, culminating in a report which can then be published.

Rather, the ongoing duty to keep a designation under review will ensure that, as the situation on the ground changes, the Government can react and make a judgment, as and when required, as to whether to alter any designation to reflect a change in the threat. However, I reassure the noble Baroness that, should the Government need to amend a designation, that will require a new regulation to be made, which in turn, by virtue of Amendment 20, would require the Secretary of State to issue a statement setting out the reasons why he considers that the legal test for designation is met.

The noble Baroness referred to international humanitarian standards. As she said, there are various commonly recognised international humanitarian standards. The point to appreciate is that the government amendment provides flexibility and future-proofs against developments in this area. She may know, for example, that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provides guidance on principles and standards relating to humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. I say to the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, that the concerns he expressed are satisfactorily addressed by government Amendment 11 as well as by the explanations that I have already given for the provisions of Clause 4 in Committee.

Amendment 15 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is in many ways similar to government Amendment 11. There is, however, a key difference, as he carefully explained. This is not an indicative list of reasonable excuses, but an exhaustive list of exclusions from the offence. We have already debated the difference between these two approaches when we considered Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in an earlier group, but it may be helpful to remind ourselves of the issues in play.

I reiterate that under either approach a person returning to the UK from a designated area abroad would not have immunity from investigation and possible prosecution. The police would still need to investigate to determine whether, under one approach, an offence had been committed or, under the other approach, whether the person has a reasonable excuse such that the investigation can be discontinued. It is worth noting that the police have been extremely clear for some time—since well before this new power was introduced—that any person returning from Syria who has travelled there for any reason can expect to be investigated to establish what risk, if any, they may pose. That is simply common sense given the level of risk associated with such areas.

That would likely also be the approach in any future scenario analogous to the Syrian example in which an area might be designated under Clause 4, whether or not an area is in fact designated. While I appreciate that the intention of the noble Lord’s amendment is to provide greater comfort and assurance to legitimate travellers so that humanitarian aid workers, for example, would not have the prospect of police investigation hanging over them, that would not in fact be the result. The only circumstances in which it could be achieved would be if we were to go further still and provide for any person who travels to a designated area simply to declare that they did so for a specified legitimate purpose, thus unilaterally providing themselves with immunity from any investigation or prosecution. However, that would be wide open to abuse by those who travel for terrorist purposes and would render the new power in the offence entirely unusable.

That leads on to my second point. I have explained that the noble Lord’s amendment would make little difference from the perspective of a potential defendant, and I appreciate that that may beg the question why we should not then accept it. That is simply because the Government’s preferred approach in providing for a reasonable excuse defence fits better with the grain of the Terrorism Act 2000. That approach has been in place for 18 years in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which Clause 3 of the Bill amends as well as other provisions in the 2000 Act. As I previously said on the noble Lord’s closely related suggestions for changes to the burden of proof for these offences, which we have already debated today, that approach is well understood by the police, prosecutors and the courts, and clear case law on it is provided by the then Appellate Committee of this House, no less. It has not resulted in judicial concerns, inappropriate prosecutions, upheld appeals or any credible complaints that it has been unfair or inappropriate in its operation. I therefore reiterate that we are not approaching these matters from a neutral starting position. Rather, if we were to adopt the noble Lord’s amendment, we would be choosing to depart from the settled, long-standing position in relation to the Terrorism Act 2000, and I am simply not persuaded that there is any need or good reason to do so.

Furthermore, I am concerned that in unsettling that existing position we could create more uncertainty for defendants and judges in relation to Clause 4, not less, and we could also call into question the currently settled approach that the courts take to Section 58 of the 2000 Act as well as other provisions for similar offences, creating instability and uncertainty in our ability to prosecute serious terrorists. Those strike me as quite undesirable outcomes and risks that we should not run.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked me what would count as proof that an aid worker was employed by a legitimate NGO. The police have been clear that they will investigate any person returning from Syria to establish what risk they may pose. That would likely be the case in relation to any area designated under Clause 4, including investigating whether an offence has been committed under Clause 4. It will be an operational decision for the police as to how they would conduct that investigation and what proof they would seek. It is not possible for me to set out those considerations in advance.

Finally, Amendment 19, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, would provide for the sunsetting of any regulations after two years rather than three. He seeks to split the difference between the one year he advocated in Committee and the three years proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Again, this comes down to judgment. There is clearly no absolute right or wrong in this case; it is just that, on balance, the Government consider that three years is the right timeframe. Again, I pray in aid the Australian criminal code and, as I have already indicated, if the situation changes after six months, a year or two years, the Government would inevitably want to review the regulations well before the three-year period was up. The Government agree with the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in Committee that three years is the appropriate period and I hope that other noble Lords are similarly persuaded. I realise that he has shifted his position since Committee, but I hope that on reflection he will feel content to revert to his original view.

I invite the House to agree with the government amendments in this group and I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, not to move his Amendment 15. If he is minded to do so, I invite the House to reject it.

Amendments 12 (to Amendment 11) withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 3rd December 2018

(5 years, 3 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 142-I Marshalled list for Report (PDF) - (29 Nov 2018)
Moved by
24: Clause 6, page 5, line 17, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (commission of offences abroad) is amended as follows.(1A) Subsection (2) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (4) below.”
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Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 25. Clause 6 will add a number of further terrorism offences to the list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, to which extraterritorial jurisdiction, or ETJ, applies. This means that individuals can be prosecuted in UK courts for conduct that took place outside the UK which would have been unlawful under an offence listed at Section 17 had it taken place here. This will ensure that UK courts are able to prosecute terrorist fighters who travel to or return to the UK having joined terrorist groups and become involved in conflicts or other terrorist activity overseas. It will also ensure that we are able to prosecute people who base themselves overseas and seek to radicalise people in the UK.

In relation to this latter category of radicalisers, Section 13(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 contains the offence of displaying in a public place an item of clothing or other article, such as a flag, in circumstances which arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. As a result of Clause 2 it will also contain, at new subsection (1A), the offence of publishing an image of such an article in the same circumstances. As currently drafted, the effect of Clause 6 is that a person could potentially be prosecuted under Section 13 in the UK, having displayed while in another country the flag of a terrorist organisation that is proscribed in the UK but not in that country. This is something about which the Joint Committee on Human Rights has raised concerns, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled amendments on behalf of the JCHR in Committee which would have removed the Section 13 offence from the ETJ provisions entirely, or alternatively would have limited ETJ in relation to Section 13 to UK nationals and residents only.

These amendments return to issues on which we have had extensive and helpful debates. I have set out very clearly and at some length the Government’s position on why this power is needed, but it is worth reminding ourselves of two key points. First, we have seen modern terrorist groups, such as Daesh, use slick and effective online propaganda, including activity covered by the Section 12 and 13 offences, which has been aimed at radicalising people in the UK, building support for terrorist organisations and ideology, and encouraging terrorist attacks in the name of such organisations. This activity is not currently within the jurisdiction of the UK courts where it occurs in another country, but as we have seen in the Syrian context, it can give rise to a very real and immediate threat within the UK. For this reason it is imperative that we extend ETJ to these offences, and that we do so in an effective and workable way which does not unduly limit the ability of UK courts to deal with serious terrorist activity. This is the effect of Clause 6.

However, I have considered and reflected carefully on the points raised previously by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on behalf of the JCHR, and by other noble Lords, about the breadth of Clause 6 as currently drafted, and I have recognised the strength of feeling on this issue. While I remain of the view that the safeguards I outlined in Committee will ensure that the power is used in a proportionate way, I accept that this has not provided sufficient assurance to your Lordships. I have therefore concluded that the extension of ETJ to the Section 12 and 13 proscription offences should be limited to cases where the individual is a UK national or resident, in line with the amendment proposed in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Amendments 24 and 25 in my noble friend’s name deliver this. Although the noble Baroness’s earlier amendment focused on Section 13, the same principle arises in relation to Section 12 of the 2000 Act, which criminalises invitations of support for a proscribed organisation, and as a result of Clause 2 will also cover reckless statements of support. The government amendments therefore extend this limitation to both Sections 12 and 13. This will ensure that it will still be possible to prosecute in the UK courts a person who has travelled from the UK to join a terrorist organisation, and who has become involved in propaganda on behalf of the organisation while they are overseas. But it will exclude the type of case about which the noble Baroness has raised concerns, where a foreign national acts in support of an organisation which is not proscribed in his or her country—for example, if a Lebanese national living in Lebanon displays a flag associated with the military wing of Hezbollah or invites support for that wing of the organisation. These amendments will put beyond doubt that such a person will not be liable to be arrested or prosecuted should they subsequently travel to the UK.

I hope that these are welcome amendments and will answer the concerns that have been raised by a number of your Lordships. I beg to move.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD)
- Hansard - - - Excerpts

My Lords, I am indeed very grateful for the Government’s amendments and their consideration of the points that have been made in Committee as well as by the committee, and at previous stages. They are very significant indeed. Amendment 26 is attributed to the Government on the groupings list but I will put that right. It would provide that, in connection with what we dealt with earlier today, the offences under paragraphs (ca) and (cb) will be relevant only where the actions are an offence in the country where they took place.

In Committee the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who was very careful to be neutral about this, cautioned the Committee to take care:

“The Bill risks criminalising a citizen of another country for doing something that is not unlawful in that country … there may be minor matters, in relative terms, which we criminalise here but are not unlawful by the laws of a different country. We need to be careful not to extend the criminal law further than it should go”.—[Official Report, 31/10/18; col. 1368.]


The government amendments have indeed dealt with one aspect—the “who”, if I can put it that way—but not with the “what”.

The Government may say that dealing with the “who”—who may be guilty of an offence—is enough. I urge them to make a further change to the Bill to make it complete. Of course, I am aware of the safeguards referred to by the Minister in Committee. He has alluded to them today, and I do not discount them, but whether these new offences should be brought within extraterritorial jurisdiction if they are not an offence in the country where they took place deserves further consideration. The offences in Section 17, as it stands, are all high-level offences. I do not want to spend too long on this at this time of night, but following my noble friend Lord Alderdice I pose the question: do we want to deter UK nationals who have done offensive—I say that in a rather wide sense—and possibly pretty stupid things abroad from coming back to this country? There is a view that they should be allowed to stay out there and fester. I do not take that view. I think we would want to see them come back and become part of British society. That is why I tabled this amendment.
Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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Amendment 26 seeks to place a different limitation on the ETJ power in relation to the proscription offences at Sections 12 and 13 of the 2000 Act which would limit it to cases where the offending activity would also constitute an offence in the country where it occurred. I mentioned earlier one key rationale for the new powers we are seeking, which is that terrorist groups use propaganda as a means of radicalising people in this country while basing themselves abroad.

Additionally, it is a fact that terrorist groups are by their nature most likely to be based in areas of conflict and instability where there may not be functioning systems of government or criminal justice, or clearly defined and well-developed terrorism laws equivalent to those in the UK. This means that it is entirely possible for a person to act in support of a potentially very serious terrorist organisation outside the UK and for the laws in that part of the world to criminalise that activity in a different way from the UK, or potentially not at all. This is not a reason to take no action against that person if they travel or return to the UK, if prosecution would otherwise be possible and appropriate. We must engage with the world and the terrorist threat as it is, rather than as we would ideally like it to be, and it would simply not be responsible to tie the hands of the police and the courts in this way. I share the noble Baroness’s wish that those who return to this country should repent, be reformed and form part of the society in which we all live and which we enjoy, but I say that without prejudice to the point I have just made that if they have acted in a way that profoundly harmed the people of this country, they should be brought to book.

I am afraid Amendment 26 would run a coach and horses through the idea that I have put forward, and it would most likely mean that it would not be possible to prosecute at all people who have engaged in such activity in places such as Syria. We might as well simply strike this provision from the Bill in its entirety if we are going to go down that road. For this reason I am unable to support the noble Baroness’s Amendment 26.

Amendment 24 agreed.
Moved by
25: Clause 6, page 5, line 31, at end insert—
“( ) In subsection (3), after “citizen” insert “(subject to subsection (3A))”.( ) After subsection (3) insert— “(3A) Subsection (1) applies in the case of an offence falling within subsection (2)(ca) or (cb) only if at the time of committing the offence the person is a United Kingdom national or a United Kingdom resident.(3B) In subsection (3A)—“United Kingdom national” means an individual who is—(a) a British citizen, a British overseas territories citizen, a British National (Overseas) or a British Overseas citizen,(b) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 is a British subject, or(c) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act;“United Kingdom resident” means an individual who is resident in the United Kingdom.””
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Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, the JCHR proposed a number of amendments on the subject of biometrics for the last stage. The Minister gave a long reply, quoting the Biometrics Commissioner’s support for bringing the periods for retention of data for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences into line with arrests under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. At that stage, it seemed to me that this did not go to the question of oversight by the commissioner, and I still do not think that has really been dealt with.

I confess that I had to go by way of Beachy Head and along the byways of PACE to arrive at Amendment 30, so I am well prepared for criticisms of the drafting. However, it is intended to ensure that the retention of biometric data for a terrorism offence has consent from the commissioner. I am entirely open to a different way of achieving that end, but I am certain in my own mind that, whatever the basis of arrest, the retention of data should require this consent. I beg to move.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has made clear, this amendment returns to one of the issues raised in the reports on the Bill by the Joint Committee on Human Rights: the rules governing the retention of biometric data in national security cases. I am sorry that the noble Baroness remains unpersuaded by my previous response. I will do my best to be more persuasive today.

Without going over too much ground, it may be helpful if I briefly reiterate that Schedule 2 amends the laws that govern the retention, review and deletion of fingerprints and DNA profiles by the police for national security purposes. The intention of these provisions is to strike a better balance between on the one hand enabling the police to use fingerprints and DNA in an agile and effective way to support terrorism investigations and protect the public, and on the other ensuring that the retention of DNA and fingerprints continues to be proportionate and subject to appropriate safeguards. Schedule 2 delivers this and, importantly, it retains proportionate safeguards, including regular case-by-case review and the robust independent oversight provided by the Biometrics Commissioner.

The noble Baroness’s amendment would amend paragraph 2 of Schedule 2, which harmonises the retention periods for biometric data obtained when an individual is arrested on suspicion of terrorism, but not subsequently charged, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000. Paragraph 2 does so by providing for biometric data to be retained for an automatic period of three years when an individual is arrested under PACE for a qualifying terrorist offence.

As the noble Baroness is aware, currently an individual arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 may have their biometric data automatically retained for three years. But the same automatic retention would not be available if the same individual were arrested in relation to the exact same activity under PACE. Rather, in that case, ongoing retention for national security purposes would require the police to make a national security determination with the approval of the Biometrics Commissioner, or would otherwise require the consent of the Biometrics Commissioner under Section 63G of PACE if retention were solely for the prevention or detection of crime generally.

Our position on this is that having two different retention regimes in such cases is quite simply anomalous. The Bill will provide for a more consistent approach to the retention of biometric data for all those arrested on suspicion of terrorism by providing for the same retention period in otherwise identical terrorism cases regardless of the power of arrest used. This is a proportionate and logical change.

The noble Baroness’s amendment would mean that this inconsistency between the two retention regimes would persist. Particularly against the backdrop of the heightened threat picture we face today, I am clear that it is important that the police are not deprived of information that could prove vital to keeping the public safe. That is what underlies a lot of what we seek without removing, as I emphasised earlier, the safeguards that are in place.

As noble Lords would expect, we consulted the Biometrics Commissioner on this provision. He is clear that he supports the measure, and I quoted his words last time. The noble Baroness’s amendment would have the effect not of modifying or improving this aspect of Schedule 2 but of effectively nullifying the provision and preserving the current anomaly. That disparity is not sustainable and I see no good reason for continuing it.

I sense that I have not persuaded the noble Baroness in what I have said, but I hope that she can at least see the logic of the Government’s position and perhaps, on reflection, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, I think we want the same thing, but I confess that I do not understand how the Government have got here. The noble Earl did indeed quote the commissioner last time, but it seemed to me that that was on a different point. Perhaps I may check this. I think he is saying that the oversight through an NSD is equivalent to the oversight applied by PACE. I do not know whether he is able to answer that, but I am finding it difficult to understand how they are in fact exactly equivalent in the way that he is telling the House.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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The strict answer to the question put by the noble Baroness is that the two Acts provide for different kinds of retention regimes, one where it is automatic for three years under certain conditions and the other where the Biometrics Commissioner has to give his permission; namely, under PACE. The point I was making was that that applies in cases which are otherwise identical and that it is simply anomalous to have that difference. The Biometrics Commissioner has actually said that it would be,

“a sensible approach to bring the retention periods for arrest on suspicion of terrorism offences in line”.

If he is relaxed about it, I cannot see that we should not be either.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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I have the Official Report of when the noble Earl quoted that last time, and it seemed to me then that that was about the retention period, not quite about the role of the commissioner. I do not think that we are going to make further progress and at this time of night it would be inappropriate for me to labour the point. It may be my fault for failing to follow the details. As I say, I have had to go by way of Beachy Head to get to the amendment that I put down. I beg leave to withdraw it.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Debate

Full Debate: Read Full Debate
Department: Ministry of Defence

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Earl Howe Excerpts
3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th January 2019

(5 years, 2 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 153-I Marshalled list for Third Reading (PDF) - (14 Jan 2019)
Moved by
1: Clause 4, page 3, line 11, at beginning insert “Subject to subsections (3) and (4),”
Earl Howe Portrait The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
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My Lords, I will also speak to the other government amendments in this group.

Government Amendments 1 to 4 return to the issue of the proper scope of the new designated area offence provided for in Clause 4. I thank the Opposition for their constructive approach to this provision. It was clear from our earlier debates that there was general support for the principle of a designated area offence to help protect the public from a real terrorist threat, such as we have seen as a result of UK nationals and residents travelling to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq. The area of dispute was how we protect those who have a legitimate reason for travelling to a designated area.

On Report, the Government sought to provide greater reassurance by building on the existing reasonable excuse defence and setting out an indicative list of such excuses. However, your Lordships preferred an alternative approach, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which excludes from the scope of the offence travel to a designated area for one or more specified purposes. The list of such specified purposes matched the Government’s list of indicative reasonable excuses, but with a power to amend the list of specified purposes by regulations.

It is clear that, while the Opposition and the Government took different approaches to the challenge, we were ultimately striving to achieve the same result. I am pleased to say that, on reflection, the Government are content to accept the approach put forward in the Opposition’s amendment. Having consulted our operational partners, we consider that this change would not materially affect the operation of the offence. Indeed, noble Lords will recall that, on Report, I indicated that, from the perspective of an individual returning to the UK from a designated area, the two approaches would, in one sense, not look very different. Either way, the police would still need to investigate to determine whether, under one approach, an exclusion from the offence applied or, under the other, whether the subject of the investigation had a reasonable excuse.

I also reminded your Lordships that the police have made very clear that they will investigate any person returning from Syria to establish what risk they may pose to the public, given the high level of terrorist threat associated with that region. It seems reasonable to expect that this is likely to be the position in relation to any area that might be designated in the future under this power, as part of the police’s basic responsibility for protecting the public. This is aside from the question of whether a person returning from such an area may have had a legitimate reason for travelling under Clause 4. I accept, however, that an individual with a legitimate reason for travelling to a designated area would take greater comfort from knowing that they had not committed the offence in the first place than from knowing that they had a defence to the offence.

The Government must ensure that the law is as clear as it can be. These four amendments will help to achieve this. Amendment 1 is intended to make explicit in the Bill that there are exemptions from the offence—namely that an individual would not commit an offence if they leave a designated area within one month of the area being designated; that an individual enters or remains in a designated area involuntarily; or that an individual enters or remains in such an area in connection with one or more specified purposes.

Amendments 2 and 4 simply ensure that, consistent with the drafting of the Terrorism Act 2000, the parliamentary procedure for the new regulation-making power is set out in Section 123 of that Act rather than in new Section 58B. This in no way changes the operation of the regulation-making power or the parliamentary process for approving regulations made under it.

Finally, Amendment 3 provides for a definition of “terminally ill” where a person enters a designated area to visit a terminally ill relative. This point was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on Report. This amendment will provide greater clarity for individuals who may pray in aid this reason for travelling to a designated area.

Lord Foulkes of Cumnock Portrait Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)
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Before the Minister sits down, I want to raise a particular point about the amendment: why six months? Why was six months chosen rather than three months, a year or any other period? I wondered whether there was a clear medical or legal reason for that or whether it was just taken out of the hat. What is behind the choice of six months in particular?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I am advised that it is in line with provisions in other Acts. If the noble Lord will allow, I will write to him on which they are, as I do not have that information. Essentially, it was a matter of drawing a line at some point. One cannot legislate for every type of terminal illness; it seemed a reasonable line to draw.

In summary, these changes are merely intended to refine and polish the amendment agreed by the House on Report. I hope noble Lords will agree that they reflect the collaborative approach that has characterised the passage of the Bill. I beg to move.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff Portrait Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
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My Lords, I beg the indulgence and forgiveness of the House because I have not been involved in previous stages of the Bill, but the amendment concerns terminal illness, and I should declare that that is my specialty. It may be helpful to the Minister if I explain that the DS1500 benefits are where the six-month definition has come from—we are going back many years. If someone is deemed likely to die within six months in this country, they become eligible for DS1500 benefits, which is a special fast-track benefit.

However, the problem with the six months is that it is impossible to predict. All the evidence is that you cannot accurately predict whether someone’s prognosis is longer or shorter; it is really a best guess. Therefore, I completely accept the humanitarian rationale behind the amendment, but it is important that the Minister clarifies that this provision is six months with treatment available wherever that person is. I raise that because, to take the example of an insulin-dependent diabetic, if they stop their insulin and already have complications, they will die within six months, but if they carry on with their insulin, they may well live for many years.

It is important to clarify on the record that they are expected to be terminally ill given that they have accessed the treatment available wherever they are. I fully accept that in some parts of the world there is very little treatment available for a lot of diseases, but there is a very wide range of conditions which are fatal in a short time if they are not treated, and I should hate the Government to be caught out by any manipulation.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I am grateful to the noble Baroness. The example she cites illustrates very well that whether the exemption applies will depend very much on the facts of the individual case and would ultimately be for a jury to determine, if a case got that far. In her example, it would need to be established whether drugs were available for the person or not and the likelihood of their being available. She will notice that the wording is very carefully drawn to say that if, at the time, the person suffers from a progressive disease and their death in consequence of that disease can reasonably be expected within six months—it is that reasonable belief that we need to focus on. It is possible, of course, that the exemption could come under one of the other headings in the amendment: for example, for aid of a humanitarian nature.

Lord Sentamu Portrait The Archbishop of York
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My Lords, will the Minister contemplate another example? Megrahi was sent from a Scottish jail back to Libya and expected to die within a short period, but he lived for longer than six months. What if someone was here and the same thing applied? President Pinochet was allowed to go back. Everybody expected him to die but he walked off the plane and lived for quite some time. So the six-month period could become a problem. One needs to find a way of describing it in another way. People have died within six months but some have lived longer. Can the noble Earl help us with that quandary?

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I am grateful to the most reverend Primate. Again, we come down to the words “reasonable belief”. If it is reasonable to believe that somebody is about to die within the six-month period, I feel sure that the police will not argue that point to the nth degree.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee (LD)
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My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and the Government for pursuing the point. I looked at this for some time and came to the view that the words “reasonably be expected” were the best that one could provide to cover circumstances that cannot be listed in detail. Indeed, I confess that having complained throughout the Bill’s progress that I did not want to rely on the CPS tests, the police’s common sense and all the rest of it, I will do so on this one. I thank him.

However, I want to raise another point and I hope the Minister is aware of it—I emailed the Bill team about it yesterday. I am happy with the drafting amendments, which are to do with regulations, but given the supplementary delegated powers memo, I thought that I should pursue the issue of peacebuilding as a reasonable excuse. The paragraph of the memorandum dealing with “reasonable excuse defence” gives,

“purposes of a peacebuilding nature”,

as a possible example of a purpose that can be referred to as a reasonable excuse. I referred to peacebuilding at the previous stage, on 3 December, and the noble Earl said:

“I entirely accept the importance of peacebuilding activity … the government amendment does not preclude a person advancing this or any other category of reasonable excuse. I am of the view that legitimate peacebuilding activity could very well be a reasonable excuse”—[Official Report, 3/12/18; col. 860]—


but that it was up to a jury.

The debate continued and, as the House is aware, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which we supported, was agreed on a Division. Therefore, the point rather floated away. Essentially, I hope the noble Earl can commit the Government today to considering adding peacebuilding when the Bill goes back to the Commons. It seems, from correspondence I have received since I emailed the Bill team, that peacebuilding may or may not be what is understood to be a humanitarian activity. There is a particular concern that—given that this is not something that we talk about and define every day—juries may be puzzled as to what it is and not understand its value. I am not sure whether that is a fair comment. However, it has been described to me as being “complementary to humanitarian aid” and covers a large range of activities, including mediation, support to the local community, justice and reconciliation, psychosocial support and research in the area. The Government have been considering this matter. It would complete the provisions in this area if it could be referred to specifically when the Bill is enacted.

Lord Judd Portrait Lord Judd (Lab)
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My Lords, I support very strongly indeed what has just been said. Having spent much of my life working with humanitarian agencies, I know that the importance of what has been said cannot be overemphasised. We must not slip into an attitude in which relief, when things have gone badly wrong, may be interminable and highly costly, apart from anything else. There is a real need in hot situations to be working at prevention.

In broad government statements we get very reassuring remarks about the importance of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The humanitarian agencies frequently find themselves involved in this and I think with all possible clarity that that is valid. They should not just be tolerated, they should be supported by the Government and others. That is significant because anything that either intentionally or unintentionally detracts from the commitment in that area would be very unfortunate.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Judd. I beg your pardon. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, should speak first.

Lord Kennedy of Southwark Portrait Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
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My Lords, I rise briefly to say that I support the amendments before us. I am pleased that the Government have listened to the proposal put by my noble friend Lord Rosser, who is unable to be with us today. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has raised an important issue as regards the medical terminology used, but the noble Earl has answered the point in terms of what can be expected. Generally, I support the amendments because they certainly clarify what we put forward in the first place and I thank the Government for listening in this case.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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My Lords, I am doubly grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I am sympathetic to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but only up to a certain point. Given that this is Third Reading, our starting point has to be that any further amendments to the Bill should be limited to those that are absolutely necessary to improve the drafting of the Bill in the light of the amendment agreed by the House at Report. I am not persuaded that adding to the list of exemptions from the offence properly falls within the category of amendments that we should now be contemplating at this late stage of the Bill, either today or when the Bill returns to the Commons to consider the Lords amendments.

However, I can assure the noble Baroness that the Government will keep the list of exempted purposes under review. The Bill now helpfully includes a power by regulations—a Henry VIII power to all intents and purposes—to add to the list of exempted purposes should it be appropriate to do so in the light of experience of operating the new offence. I am sure that officials in the Home Office will closely scrutinise the use of this power and will work with their colleagues in the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to determine if peacebuilding could usefully be added to the list of exempted reasons in the future.

But I need to make clear to all noble Lords that this is a nicety. In the absence of such an exemption the Government are clear that entering and remaining in a designated area for the purpose of engaging in peacebuilding would constitute a reasonable excuse. We have that all-encompassing provision, as the noble Baroness is aware, in the Bill. There is a problem associated with any approach that has within it a list of some kind, which is why we started out with a very short list indeed. Through our debates we persuaded ourselves that it would be helpful to augment the very short list that the Government started off with, but we have to ask ourselves where we stop.

I hope what I have said has offered some assurance to the noble Baroness and she understands that, while it would not be appropriate to add peacebuilding to the list of exemptions at the moment, that will not preclude us doing so in the future, should there be an operational imperative.

Baroness Hamwee Portrait Baroness Hamwee
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My Lords, to be rather blunt it is always frustrating when procedure gets in the way of substance. I ask the Minister to ensure that Home Office officials appreciate that “in the light of experience” should not just be what may happen when someone comes back and says, “I have been working on peacebuilding in Syria”. It is also about deterring NGOs from going into conflict or post-conflict areas to work on peacebuilding. That could be a consequence we do not want to see from the offence we have created in the Bill.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, but I hope too that she will recognise that the wording of the first purpose set out in this amendment,

“providing aid of a humanitarian nature”,

is quite broad. So humanitarian agencies of any kind could feel secure in going out for almost any humanitarian purpose one can devise.

Lord Garnier Portrait Lord Garnier (Con)
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Before my noble friend sits down, I caution that sometimes lists can become exclusive and that some good things are easier to recognise than to define. He ought to stick to the way the Bill is currently drafted and allow himself the freedom to consider rather more carefully, despite the charming way in which the noble Baroness has advanced her case.

Lord Judd Portrait Lord Judd
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My Lords, the Minister has been very helpful in the comments he has made and I most genuinely thank him for that. I just wonder whether it is possible for the Government and the Minister, when this legislation is given final consideration, to say some encouraging and positive things about the recognition of the courage and value of such work, so as to in no way whatsoever inhibit organisations that are able to make a positive contribution of this kind. Having been through this kind of situation, the trustees and leaders of the agencies concerned obviously give a great deal of deliberation to what they do and what is involved. To feel they are doing it in a climate of good will and not just acceptance is very important.

Earl Howe Portrait Earl Howe
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I accept the point the noble Lord has made. That is why the whole tone and flavour of this part of the amendment carries the implication he would wish, in particular the provision that talks about,

“carrying out work for the government of a country other than the United Kingdom … carrying out work for the United Nations or an agency of the United Nations”,

and so forth. It is clear that the value of work of this kind—whether carried out by an individual, an agency or a Government—is fully recognised. I am sure that point will not be lost on those whose job it is to implement the Bill.

Amendment 1 agreed.
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Moved by
2: Clause 4, page 4, leave out lines 15 to 17