Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it was quite difficult to sit here and listen to that, but I will come to that. I very strongly support Amendment 369, and I do so with a real sense of fury that we are in this position, that we actually have to do this, and that it is not obvious to any Government that in a democracy we need the right to protest to be protected. To engage in peaceful protest means irritating other people. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but, unfortunately, what he said just now was complete and utter nonsense.

Over recent years, we have seen a real erosion of protest rights through one Bill after another. I sat here and watched it all and protested at every single move. Each was justified on a narrow, technical or operational point but, taken together, they amounted to a clear political direction—making protests harder, riskier and much easier to shut down.

Amendment 369 does not invent new rights. It states in clear and accessible language that peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right and that public authorities have a duty to respect, protect and facilitate that right.

Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB seek to qualify that right by reference to whether members of the public are “hindered”, experience “inconvenience” or are able to go about “their daily business”. These amendments fundamentally misunderstand the nature of protest. Almost all meaningful protest causes some degree of hindrance or inconvenience. If it does not, it is very easy to ignore. From the suffragettes to trade unionists to civil rights campaigners, protest has always disrupted business as usual, precisely because that is how attention is drawn to injustice. For example, proscribing Palestine Action was such a stupid move by the Government and has caused more problems for them and the police than if they had just left it alone and arrested its members for criminal damage and similar.

I come back to these embarrassing amendments. It is not just the problem of their intent, which I disagree very strongly with, but their vagueness. Terms such as “hindered” and “inconvenience” are entirely undefined. Being delayed by five minutes could be an inconvenience. Noise could be an inconvenience. Simply being reminded of a cause that one disagrees with could, for some, be considered an inconvenience. If those concepts become legal thresholds for restricting protest, the right itself becomes meaningless.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, used the phrase “in the real world”. I live in the real world, and I understand what protest does and why it is needed. Under these amendments, any protest that is visible, noisy or effective could be banned on the basis that someone somewhere was inconvenienced. Democracy is by its nature sometimes noisy, disruptive and inconvenient. It is very inconvenient being here at night debating these issues, quite honestly, in a moderately cold Chamber.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

Moderately?

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

All right, in a cold Chamber.

If we prioritise convenience over conscience, we should not be surprised when people feel shut out of political decision-making altogether. For those reasons, I support Amendments 369 and 371. In essence, protest law is a terrible mess, and we have got here by a long series of government decisions and government weirdnesses. The whole thing is confusing for the police, as we have been told by senior police officers. It means that police officers make mistakes based on their own judgment. That is a terrible thing to happen in a democracy. Let us get this into the Bill to make clear exactly what a democracy looks like.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for bringing forward these amendments. The importance of peaceful protest in a free and democratic society is of course a principle supported by all noble Lords. I want to be clear at the outset that no one on the Benches on this side questions either the legitimacy or the constitutional right to protest.

I first turn to Amendment 369, which seeks to place an express statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986. This amendment risks solving a problem that does not exist. That is our belief. The right to protest is already deeply embedded in our constitutional and legal framework, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has so carefully explained. It is recognised in common law, it long predates our membership of the European Convention on Human Rights and it has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts as a fundamental freedom in our democratic tradition. Crucially, this right has never been absolute. Historically, it has always existed alongside the equally important duties of the state to maintain public order, protect public safety and safeguard the rights and freedoms of others. That careful balance has evolved over centuries through common law and legislation. It is not at all clear that reinstating the right to protest in statutory form would add meaningful protection beyond what already exists.

There is a real risk that codifying such a broad and long-standing right in statue could have unintended consequences. By setting out open-ended duties on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate protest, the amendment would inevitably invite further litigation and judicial interpretation. Decisions about the proper balance between protest rights and competing public interests, such as disruption to essential services or public safety, could increasingly be determined in the courts rather than by Parliament or accountable Ministers. That risks further frustrating the will of the Executive and of Parliament. I do not believe that placing an express right to protest into statute is either necessary or desirable. Our system has functioned for generations without such a provision and it is not evident that this long-standing settlement is now deficient.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require an independent review of the existing legislative framework governing protest. We on these Benches are unconvinced of the case for such a review. The Acts listed have been subject to extensive parliamentary scrutiny and their compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights has been debated at length in both Houses. We do not support proposed new subsection (5) in this amendment, which would require the review to have regard to the impacts of legislation on the exercise of rights under the ECHR. The ECHR is already subject to unwelcome litigation which brings about perverse outcomes that were never intended at its commencement: there are plenty of examples of that. An additional independent review would be unnecessarily burdensome and duplicative, consuming time and public resources without a clear or compelling purpose. For these reasons, we on these Benches do not support either amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response and to further discussion of how best to uphold both the right to protest and the rule of law in a balanced and proportionate way.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope it does not surprise noble Lords if I confess that I have been on the odd protest in my time. I have quite enjoyed the freedom to have a protest. I have protested against the apartheid Government, against the National Front and, if the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, will bear with me, against his Government when he served as a Minister.

The right to peaceful protest is an important part of our democratic society. It is a long-standing tradition in this country that people are free to gather together and demonstrate their views, provided they do so within the law. This Government are committed to protecting and preserving that right. I hope that that gives some succour to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Strasburger, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and indeed others who have spoken in favour.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his case for the two amendments on public order. Amendment 369 seeks to introduce a statutory right to protest into the Public Order Act 1986, along with a duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate that right. I understand the concerns that he has put and I accept and appreciate those concerns, but, as has been said, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, these protections are already firmly established in UK law. Public authorities are required under the Human Rights Act 1998, passed by a previous Government in which I was pleased to serve, to act in accordance with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly set out in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, as has been said by a number of noble Lords today, including the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Davies of Gower, and as set out in the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, these rights are qualified. This point is illustrated by Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. On that qualification, I am not going to get into the argument between the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Blencathra, but for the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and others who have argued for the amendment today, the key point is that that right, as has been said, can be restricted only where restriction is lawful, proportionate and justified. The right to peaceful protest is also recognised under the common law and creating a separate statutory provision risks duplicating existing protections, which could lead to confusion in how the law is interpreted and applied. It might also complicate operational policing without offering any additional legal safeguards.

I have to say that I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, that there is a fundamental right to protest. But I respectfully submit, as I think he argued in his contribution, that the amendment would not strengthen that commitments and might indeed introduce uncertainty into the law. That is a very valid and important point, because existing legislation under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Articles 10 and 11, qualified rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, set out the issues that again were ably outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the right to protest exists: it is one that I cherish and have exercised myself and may even exercise myself again in the future, who knows? It is an important right, but his amendment would cause confusion and water down the ability to provide that security of protest under the existing legislation. Therefore, I ask him ultimately to not press it further.

I turn to Amendment 371, which would require the Government to commission an independent review of the existing protest legislation within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, said that the Government called the review post the tabling of this amendment. We proposed the review on 5 October last year. The Home Secretary announced an independent review of public order and hate crime legislation on 5 October last year and I suggest that Amendment 371, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would essentially be what the Government have already ordered and would, if agreed today, negate the purpose of what the Government have already ordered and extend the review that we have already ordered still further by establishing that review in law.

We announced the review on 5 October because of the very issues that all noble Lords have mentioned about balancing the right to peaceful protest and the right to enjoy non-harassment, the right to potentially go to a synagogue, or the right to go about your daily business. Those issues are extremely important, which is why the Home Secretary has appointed the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, KC, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, as one of the people to undertake the review. His independence and expertise will ensure a rigorous, impartial review. He will have the help and support of former assistant chief constable Owen Weatherill, who brings operational experience from his role with the National Police Chiefs’ Council as lead for civil contingencies and national mobilisation. That independent review reaffirms this Government’s ongoing commitment to keep public order legislation under review.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

I am sorry to intervene so late. Could the Minister please confirm whether the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, will consider the issue I was raising, which was the incoherence and overlap between the various pieces of legislation on protest?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The terms of the noble Lord’s review have been published and they are available to the Committee now. The review will examine whether current public order legislation is fit for purpose in the light of contemporary protest tactics, community impacts and the need to safeguard democracy. It will examine how effectively police are using the powers available to them. It will consider whether further measures are needed to reassure the communities who are most affected by current tensions, while respecting the right to protest. Those are all important issues. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, expects to submit the review to the Home Secretary by spring 2026 and, in doing so, will give an overview of all the legislation that is in place.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, commented on Palestine Action and the right to protest of Palestine Action. I want to reaffirm that both the House of Commons and this House had an opportunity to vote in favour or against that legislation. Both the House of Commons and this House voted in favour of the legislation, which is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, police officers are implementing the legislation that was passed by both Houses. As I recall, although I cannot remember the exact figures, a number of Members of this House voted against that order, including Members from my own side. It was a difficult debate in July. It was a free vote; many Members voted against it in the Commons and this House, but both measures were passed in both Houses.

It is not illegal for anybody to go outside now and campaign against the Israeli Government or any actions by the Israeli Government, or to campaign in favour of the Palestine organisations that are seeking to change the status quo in that part of the Middle East. What is illegal is to show support for an organisation that I, Ministers and the Government, on advice from the security services and others, determined was engaged in activities that crossed the threshold of the Terrorism Act. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is well aware of the complexities of that, as a former adviser, but that was the advice we got.

If an organisation is breaching the threshold for terrorism, it is the duty of this Government to act, and that is what we did in those circumstances. So I want to place on record again, for clarity, that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, can go outside tonight and campaign for a Palestine state and against the Israeli Government, and no police will arrest him or, as he mentioned, any grandparent, teacher or professional. But if he goes out and supports Palestine Action, which has been determined to have crossed the threshold of the Terrorism Act, he will face the full force of the law. If he does not like the law, he can try to change it, but that is the law passed by both Houses and therefore the police have a duty to uphold it. It does not stop peaceful protest.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I would love to reopen the Palestine Action debate, because I was the person who pushed for the vote and, as we exited the Chamber, several Peers said to me, “This is going to cause trouble”. So people knew.

However, on the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, can the Minister say whether the noble Lord set the time limit or whether the Government did, because it seems a lot of work for such a short time?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I always try to be helpful to the House. I was not directly party to the issue with the Home Secretary and the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, about the time limit, so I cannot say with any certainty whether the Home Secretary said to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to do it by April, or the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said that he will deliver it by April. If the noble Baroness wants me to write to her to make that point, I will do so.

The key thing at the heart of Amendment 371 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is that it provides for the review to be undertaken within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the review we are doing currently will have been completed by April 2026.

[Lord Walney (CB)]

Many of us in this Committee would be absolutely amazed if the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, stuck to his timetable of being able to publish something next month. He does not need to take four years, as I did, but it is a ferociously tight timetable.

If you follow the logic of those arguing that people who were protesting in support of Palestine Action should not face legal charge, is it not the case that they would then have to say that support for any terrorist organisation, if it was so-called peaceful, should be allowed—so you should be able to peacefully give your support for Hamas or any violent organisation? If that is their argument they need to properly say it, because many people would have problems with that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Walney, on that point. The right to free speech is extremely important, and there is no stopping the right to free speech about the issue of Palestine in any way, shape or form. If a determination is made under the Terrorism Act 2000 that an organisation has crossed that threshold, the Government have a duty to act on that, which is what we have done in this case. With due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, I just did not want to allow the comments he made to colour the position on a protest around Palestine. He can protest around that, but he cannot support an organisation that still has some outstanding court cases and has undertaken some severe action to date.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

May I press the Minister on that? I quite understand his analysis of the law: that the Palestine Action group became a proscribed organisation when Parliament said it should and, as a result of that, it follows from the terms of the Terrorism Act that there were and are continuing to be prosecutions of people who express support by perhaps sitting wearing a placard, or by wearing an item of clothing that expresses such support.

The proscription is of course the subject of challenge in the courts here and may well be the subject of challenge in the European Court of Human Rights, so I will say nothing further about that. But subject to that, have the Government not had any concern about the fact that because of the way the Terrorism Act works, the proscription of any organisation means that any expression of support, as the noble Lord said —however peaceable or however others might regard it as simply peaceable protest—renders it illegal and renders the person expressing such support liable to being prosecuted? Do the Government not feel that this is a reason for having a review of the validity and sense of the law in this area, where the Terrorism Act carries, as it stands, that unfortunate consequence?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

We have strayed, with due respect to all noble Lords, slightly wider than the amendment. I just wanted to make the point about Palestine Action because the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, mentioned it.

The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, is looking at all aspects of prosecution and all aspects relating to legislation. We keep all matters under review at all times.

The 2000 Act sets down certain criteria. That threshold was passed and crossed in this case. I defended that in this House, and the House supported it on a cross-party basis. That is political life. The noble Lord can move an amendment at any time to strike that legislation down, if he wishes to.

I hope that the noble Lords will not press the amendments before us today. The right to peaceful protest is vital. The Government support it. The Government are making changes still to allow that right but also to try to get a fair balance so that communities and others can also enjoy life when a protest occurs. We have the wider review from the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, which will report in due course and which will colour, no doubt, further discussions. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I will be as brief as I can. On the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, I welcome his support for the principle of Amendment 369, but our amendment does fully respect the rights and freedoms of others and does so expressly in proposed new subsection (3)(c). That does not mean that any inconvenience to citizens should be accepted as a reason for restricting the right to protest. I make the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and others have made: that nearly all protests cause some inconvenience and noise without unduly infringing the rights of others. I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that, certainly as they are framed, his amendments smack of intolerance in their failure to countenance any inconvenience.

All noble Lords have accepted that the rights of neither side of the argument are absolute—the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Goodman, made the same point. I believe, along with others, that the toleration of some inconvenience is the price of the democratic right to protest.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is absolutely right that we have the ECHR rights, and he knows that I regard them as of critical importance. He makes the point—supported by the others, and it would be echoed by me—that Amendment 369, in part, duplicates the ECHR rights; I am bound to say that I do not regard it as likely that there will be satellite litigation about the difference between the two sets of rights. One point that bears on his argument is that the statement in domestic legislation that directly bears on the right to protest—whereas the Article 10 and Article 11 rights do bear on it but not as directly as our amendment —is of great importance. But that is only part of the picture.

I am also absolutely clear that I am not criticising and have at no stage criticised the police for enforcing the law. Indeed, as it happens, I take the contrary view. I do not believe that the police should have discretion not to enforce the law except on quite serious grounds of convenience.

I criticise the fact—I say it is relevant, when the Minister said it was not relevant—that the need for reconsideration of the Terrorism Act in the light of what has happened, and it has left us in the position that peaceful protest can lead to prosecutions that are unintended, means that a full review is necessary. I, of course, welcome the review of noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and I welcome the fact that the Government have put that in train, but a further full review over a longer period is necessary.

However, the absolutely crucial point about the need for Amendment 369 is the one the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made: it would impose an express statutory duty on public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest, which is not anywhere in the ECHR. There may be resource implications to that, but it only reflects the importance we place on preserving democracy and the right to protest along with it.

For the time being, I will of course seek leave to withdraw the amendment, but I will reconsider the position between now and Report, having regard to the support I have received from some quarters around the House, but not universally.