(10 months, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberWe know about this in the first place because of the work undertaken by the Government to fully understand the cyber-security risks facing this country. We are better prepared than most countries around the world. None the less, in respect of the red- rated systems, we are developing remediation plans, all of which will be in place by next year. We are tracking progress and are confident that we will achieve over £1 billion in efficiency savings, in addition to achieving greater resilience by next year.
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Lady will know that this was dealt with by the permanent secretary at the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and the contract was published on Contracts Finder. It has always been the case that Ministers receive support in respect of their conduct in office after they have left office. That was extended to Ministers in the Conservative party and the Labour party. I will add that it is a good job that we did not extend it to former Leaders of the Opposition given the millions of pounds being spent by the Labour party defending itself against allegations of antisemitism.
(4 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes a very good point, but I suspect that seven years is a massive overestimate. Like our telephones, this technology changes every 18 months. Seven years is the achievement of an Einstein of this sector. That is point No. 1: our expert argument in the UK is that we are the only ones in step. That is not an argument that stands up very often.
My second point, to which my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) referred earlier, is that this is a national security issue. The most recent debates on national security in this House in the past decade or so have been about terrorism, rather than potential massive conflicts between major powers. The House will remember that the IRA always used to say that we have to be lucky all the time, but they had to be lucky only once. That is a demonstration of the sort of analysis we must apply to security issues. Let us consider the Government’s argument. Let us imagine that the Government are right and we are wrong, but we do what we want to do. The worst case is that we spend a little more money and we introduce a technology, possibly better technology, maybe a year or two later. That is the worst-case outcome for our analysis. But if we are right and they are wrong, and we do what they say, the outcome will be to allow the undermining of our complete national infrastructure. This is not just a telecoms system; it is fundamental to the lifeblood of our entire national infrastructure. On a security analysis approach, it is just plum wrong.
Finally—this is designed to help the Secretary of State—there is the argument about time. I confess that I probably take the hardest line in our group on timing. My view is simple: we should separate this into two pieces. One is what happens about new installations. In my view, since they are called high risk vendors—the clue is in the name—there should be no more installations. I can see no loss in not installing another single piece of Huawei equipment. The argument that it cannot be done by anybody else has been proven by several speakers so far to be completely without foundation. My argument to the Secretary of State is that when he stands up, he must tell us whether his proposal involves continuing to put in place Huawei kit that we will then have to take out in our move to zero. On that basis, I am afraid it is very clear that the Back Benchers are right and the Government are wrong.
Connectivity is the lifeblood of any modern digital economy. It is vital if we are to create the conditions where anyone can succeed and thrive, regardless of their background or their postcode. The Bill is crucial if we are to deliver that. It is one of a number of steps that the Government are taking to increase connectivity speeds, reduce costs and create the right environment to encourage investment. The Bill is a crucial plank in delivering the manifesto commitments, on which we on the Conservative Benches stood and were elected three months ago, to deliver broadband to the whole of the UK and to support the levelling up agenda. However, I have concerns that some of the amendments would undermine that work. They could mean the UK risks losing out on the economic benefits of nationwide access to faster broadband networks and that many families living in blocks of flats would not be able to benefit from new broadband services.
It has been clear from the debate so far that there is one principal amendment at stake, amendment 1, in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). Amendments 4 and 5, which I will deal with together, relate to high-risk vendors. The first point I would like to make is that I genuinely understand concerns, which many hon. Members have raised with me, that they have not had the time to consider these issues or to scrutinise them properly. The reason for that is that we will be bringing forward a Bill—as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said, my first task as Secretary of State is to convince the House on the approach to high-risk vendors—on telecoms security, which will enable the House to consider all these points. We will bring forward that legislation before the summer recess, so all hon. Members will be able to debate these points extensively. There will be opportunities for amendments to be made and an opportunity for the whole House to consider all these issues at great length. I will proceed to set out the steps that have led us to this point and the further steps that we are announcing today.
I assure hon. Gentlemen that I will give way if they allow me to proceed a little more, because I want to set out the context, which may address some of the points that they intend to raise.
We will of course keep the 35% cap under review and, over time, our intention is to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors as the process of market diversification takes place. We want to get to a position where we do not have to use high-risk vendors in our telecoms networks at all, but to do that, we have to work with our Five Eyes and other partners to develop new supply chain capacity in our critical national infrastructure. I can tell the House that we will do that in this Parliament.
We are not in a position today to set out a specific date or timetable for reaching no high-risk vendors. That would require a new decision to be taken by the National Security Council, but we will continue to engage with hon. Members over the weeks ahead.
I will make a final point and then I will give way to Members. Hon. Members will have the opportunity to discuss controls on high-risk vendors when the Government bring forward legislation. I confirm that we will do that before the summer and that there will be an opportunity for colleagues to engage fully on how and when the commitments will be implemented. That will include the National Cyber Security Centre ensuring—exceptionally—that it will give evidence to parliamentary Committees, in addition to the Intelligence and Security Committee.
I think we are all in agreement—certainly on the Government side of the House, and I believe that many Opposition Members also agree—that in an ideal world, there will be no need for any high-risk vendors at all. However, what we have to do, as a first step to getting to that point and within this Parliament, is ensure that we have developed the supply chain capacity. The point has been made by many right hon. and hon. Members that there is a lack of capacity on the supply side at the moment. That is why we are making this very strong commitment—by the way, this relates to the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis)—which will involve considerable expenditure by the Government to ensure that we work with our Five Eyes and other partners to develop new supply chain capacity in our political and national infrastructure in this Parliament, so that we can then commence the process of ensuring that we move away from high-risk vendors.
Point No. 1: there is unavailable capacity—well, Ericsson says that that is not true. It said that at Davos earlier this year and Samsung says that it is not true, but if we want proof of that, the Australians, who denied Huawei, already have 5G operations in Sydney and Melbourne being put together and the fastest 5G operations in the world exist already in America. There is not the shortage that the Minister claims.
I understand the point that my right hon. Friend is making, but I hope that he would accept that at the moment, aside from Huawei, there is Ericsson and Nokia, which we are currently reliant on, and we need to enhance that capacity. That is why the Government are committing today to ensuring that within this Parliament, we work with our Five Eyes and other partners to ensure that we develop the extra capacity.