Veterans Care Sector: Government Role

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 25th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Johnny Mercer]

I agree with my hon. Friend, but I refer him to the evidence that I presented earlier: 85%—quite a significant proportion—of veterans do not believe that that is the case at the moment.

In looking at all this, I really struggle to put my finger on why any of it is so desperately hard for the Government to achieve. Nobody else is going to do it. The third sector cannot compel faux charities to cease. It cannot compel others to agree to a single point of contact or a common needs assessment. The issue needs leadership. It needs a small but strong Department with a Cabinet Minister whose single duty and career stands and falls on veterans care. It needs the Government to make the shift from talking a very good game on this agenda to actually delivering it. It needs a game-changing event such as Help for Heroes provided in 2007. It is in the Prime Minister’s gift to do this, and I again plead with her to listen this evening. There are always reasons not to do this, and I have heard them all, but they do not wash. Every other ally we fight alongside has tried different ways but has settled on creating a Department for veterans affairs, and we should do the same.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I rise simply to say that we must not give the impression that Help for Heroes suddenly burst on to the scene and that no one else has helped veterans. The Soldiers Charity, the Army Benevolent Fund, the Royal Air Force Benevolent Fund—all those charities have helped for a very long time, and they will continue to support our soldiers. We must not give such an impression about the people who have helped my soldiers from 35 years ago—they are still suffering—unlike Help for Heroes, which at least to start with did nothing for my men. I just want to ask hon. Members not to say that Help for Heroes was suddenly wonderful and that everyone else had not really got on with the job. They did: they cared, and they looked after our men and women for a very long time before 2007.

[Johnny Mercer]

I have persistently said that in the House. I use the Help for Heroes example because I want to pay tribute to Bryn and Emma, who have recently left it, as I believe that they changed the market when it comes to veterans care. Of course those in the charity sector have carried this burden for years and years, and people such as I and my hon. Friend will be enormously grateful to them for years to come.

In closing—I will close now, because I want to give the Minister more than the four minutes I left him to respond last time—this duty is not going to go away. I am afraid my voice will not grow weaker on this matter. I apologise to my many right hon. and hon. colleagues in this place for my persistence, which must appear tedious at times, but I ask them to bear with me, for they could not have had the experiences I have had—having seen and felt the sacrifice of our armed forces day after day, far from the public gaze—and give up this torch now.

I am privileged beyond anything I could have envisaged in those days when I fought alongside members of our armed forces, and I will use and abuse that privilege until the situation changes because they deserve it. Some lost everything as the Helmand sky faded from view and their name was added to the wall at the National Memorial Arboretum. Some lost body parts they would never recover. Too many lost their minds in a process that is ongoing today. They deserve a country and a Government who care. In a world that I sometimes find so incredibly selfish and cruel, they sacrificed themselves for the greater cause in the furtherance of this great nation of ours. I have not mentioned their families: the mother who wakes without her son, and the wife who wakes without her husband. I said this on my first day in the Chamber, and it will forever remain true:

“Theirs is the greatest sacrifice on the altar of this nation’s continuing freedom”.—[Official Report, 1 June 2015; Vol. 596, c. 375.]

We must never tire in our duty to them.

Thank you for allowing this debate tonight, Madam Deputy Speaker. I hope I will not have to repeat the exercise too many more times.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mark Lancaster]

To a degree, this goes back to the principle of the armed forces covenant, which is really an agreement between the nation as a whole and our veterans. I would hate to think that we had moved to a position where we were in effect delegating this responsibility to a single Department and allowing others to feel that it somehow was not their responsibility to play a role in supporting our veterans.

The current system, whereby responsibility for veterans is cross-government, is positive. Yes, more should be done to ensure that all are playing their part, but on balance I agree with my hon. Friend that a dedicated veterans Department would be a retrograde step. We need not look too far, when looking at things across the Atlantic, to see some of the problems there. They are not simply financial; the very complex way in which care is given to veterans can be diluted. We also have the advantage of the national health service, which is a very comprehensive health service. That is a very good medium for supporting our veterans.

[Bob Stewart]

I am listening very carefully to the Minister. I also have great respect for the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Johnny Mercer). I ask this question. You are the veterans Minister—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

Order. He is the veterans Minister.

[Bob Stewart]

Forgive me. I am getting carried away. My hon. Friend is the veterans Minister. As the veterans Minister, I take it that you actually have fingers in other Ministries, such as Health and Work and Pensions, and you make sure from your own efforts that veterans are well served, and you are the focus—

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Order. He is.

[Bob Stewart]

Forgive me—the Minister is the focus. I am getting seriously carried away—it is the fault of my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View. Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

[Mark Lancaster]

I am certainly the only Minister with the word “veterans” in his title and I am certainly prepared to say that I take the lead on veterans matters. I would argue, however, that all Ministers in government should have our veterans on their mind and do what they can to support them. So, yes I am happy to take the lead, yes I am happy to have the title in my portfolio, and yes I am happy to try to ensure that all my ministerial colleagues also show the same interest. However, I would not want to be Minister with sole responsibility for veterans, for the reasons I gave when I answered my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray).

I recognise that the Ministry of Defence has a responsibility to ensure that the transition from service to civilian life is as smooth as possible, allowing service personnel process to draw upon the vast array of transferable skills they have obtained in service, but I am not for one second saying that there is not more that could and should be done. I believe firmly that effective transition to civilian life is a major factor in ensuring effective care. I must emphasise that most service leavers transition well to civilian life through our robust and effective resettlement system known as the career transition partnership, which in 2014-15 helped 85% of service leavers to find sustainable employment within six months.

Despite that, I recognise that there is a small percentage of service leavers who do not make a smooth transition. These are the people we must work hard to identify and support. This is also why I am keen to include a question on veterans in the national census. That will help us to identify the veteran community. I assure my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View that I will continue to pursue this energetically with the Office for National Statistics and the chief statistician.

Liberation of Mosul

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Those are very valid concerns that arise from what is now becoming a warzone in and around Mosul. As I have said, the Iraqi Government are fully aware of the need to cope with any increase in the displaced population, to arrange transport for those who can get out of the city to safer areas and to be ready with additional tented accommodation—winter is coming—to house the others. There has been a great deal of planning all summer for this operation and its consequences—what we call the day after Mosul is liberated.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend know whether Iraqi and peshmerga field medical units are as far forward as possible, so that they can tend for the wounded on all sides when they come in, and quickly?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

On my recent visit to Erbil, I saw for myself some of the medical evacuation training that British troops are offering to the peshmerga, showing them how to get casualties away from the frontline as rapidly as possible. That has been a big part of the training that we have been able to offer. They are now relatively seasoned troops; they have been doing this kind of operation for many months in other towns and villages, both in the north of Iraq and along the Euphrates valley, although not on this scale. They certainly understand the importance of getting casualties off the battlefield as quickly as possible.

Type 26 Frigates: Clyde

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Tuesday 18th October 2016 Westminster Hall

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I certainly cannot disagree with my hon. Friend.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

To the hon. and gallant Gentleman, I certainly will.

[Bob Stewart]

Is it the Scottish National party’s policy to increase defence spending to something that in my view would be reasonable: 3% of gross national income? That way, we could provide more Type 26s, Type 23s and Type 45s.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I have great respect for the hon. and gallant Gentleman, but if we get rid of Trident we might actually be able to cover that.

In introducing this debate, I not only raise to a wider audience my own concerns about the continuing delays to the project, but echo the concerns of the Defence Committee and many prominent former senior Royal Navy officers. When the former First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord West, appeared before the Defence Committee at the start of June, the response to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman) was that the Ministry of Defence had run out of money for these ships. We were never really given an acceptable answer from the Minister’s Department. Indeed, Admiral Lord West pre-empted the MOD response by expressing the opinion that any contention by the MOD that the problems were principally with the design would be “economical with the actualité”.

Today I will go even further than Lord West and ask the Minister specifically to address the concerns that have been put to me that the scandal of the lack of any timetable for construction of the Type 26 actually masks a wider problem of a continuing lack of investment in the Clyde yards, putting their long-term future at risk and jeopardising the jobs and skills of thousands of workers at Govan and Scotstoun.

In the lead-up to the announcement of the plans for the Type 26 programme, the workers at those two yards were offered a clear quid pro quo. There would be a significant restructuring in the workforce, including job losses, but that would be offset by investments that would guarantee jobs for a generation. At the height of the referendum on Scottish independence, the Minister’s Department explicitly tied that investment to the no vote. There would be 13 Type 26 frigates built on the Clyde, in a brand new “frigate factory”, to protect the workers from the west of Scotland’s rather inclement weather.

When we heard last November in the strategic defence and security review that the number of Type 26s being built would be reduced still further, trade unions told my Scottish National party colleagues—and others, I am sure—that that was not a huge concern, because the infrastructure investment for building the Type 26 would ensure that the new general-purpose frigate would also be built on the Clyde. So the Clyde waited—and waited, and waited—until the planned date for the cutting of steel came and went, until it emerged that there was a £750 million gap in infrastructure investment and until it became clear that the UK Government were rubber-earing our questions about the GPFF being built on the Clyde.

This is a tale of underinvestment and neglect, and I can relate to it. Perhaps—just perhaps—this is a deliberate Tory strategy, and one that has form on the Clyde. The Minister may not remember the names of former Ministers; on these Benches, we will not forget one: that of Nicholas Ridley. When Jimmy Reid, the late patriot, presented the Ridley letters, which were written in 1969, to the Scottish Trade Union Congress, they proved that the Tory Government had outrageously planned the closure of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. By their inaction, this Government are following a well-trodden path in this regard. The Tories are making a political decision, rather than a strategic one.

In the context of current naval investment, the delay in building these vessels could be seen as excusable if there was an understanding that the ministerial promises to the highly skilled and dedicated workforce of these yards would be upheld. The fact is that these workers and my colleagues are all listening with increasing concern to the Government’s deafening silence on the subject of the GPFF, and although we appreciate that there is a shipbuilding strategy to come in November, the MOD must at least give reassurances before then.

However, even as workers on the Clyde work outside in all weathers, the Government have not been slow in coming through with investment elsewhere. In Barrow, those workers who are working on the multi-billion pound Successor programme to Trident are being kept dry by the Government investment there, which includes an indoor assembly hall. There could be no better illustration of my contention that every penny spent on Trident is a penny less spent on conventional defence. Trident costs have not always been part of the MOD budget, but now that they are, the Government’s intention to ring-fence the MOD budget and other budgets has led us to this inescapable conclusion.

It may not come as a surprise to hear that me say that, as I am a member of the Scottish National party, but I am echoing the assessment made by General Sir Richard Shirref in front of the Defence Committee last year, and the assessment of General Sir Richard Barrons, which was revealed in the Financial Times in September. Vital capabilities such as the Type 26 have been “withered by design”, as a result of the MOD priorities that place unusable weapons of mass destruction above the defence of the state. “Preserving the shop window” means workers on the Clyde worry about their job security as vital infrastructure investment is kept to a bare minimum.

I will end my opening speech by reiterating the two questions that I hope the Minister will address. First, how will the UK Government address the worrying gaps in national security caused by the ongoing failure of the MOD to build the Type 26 on time? Secondly, will the Minister give the workers of the Clyde a timetable for construction of the Type 26 and address their concerns about the total and complete lack of investment in infrastructure to support the GPFF, which would guarantee their job security beyond the medium term? I await the Minister’s answer; they await the Minister’s answer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Stephens (Glasgow South West) (SNP)]

It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. As the Member who has the privilege of representing the Govan shipyards, it is a pleasure to speak in this debate, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes) for securing it.

There remain a number of questions to be asked this afternoon, but possibly the simplest one can best be described as: does eight plus five equal 13? That is important, in understanding the history of where we are. As my hon. Friend the Member for West Dunbartonshire highlighted, the history started before the independence referendum, with promises of 13 Type 26 frigates. Last November, at the strategic defence and security review, we were given the assurance: “It’s okay. There won’t be 13 Type 26 frigates; there’ll be eight Type 26 frigates and five light, general purpose ones.” There is nothing to worry about, was the message given to the workforce on the Clyde. I ask that simple question because I know that the workforce on the Clyde and the trade unions are frustrated by and worried about the delays in the timetable for the Type 26. The original date for cutting steel was May 2016; it would be useful if the Minister could give reasons for the delay in the procurement. Despite 15 written questions, I have received no meaningful answers.

[Bob Stewart]

I do not think we need the Minister to answer that. The answer is that we had no money; that is why we had to cut down the number of Type 26 ships. [Interruption.] We did not have the money, and we have to cut our coat to suit our cloth.

[Chris Stephens]

The hon. Gentleman may say that, and I may come on to that point, but the Government have never confirmed that that is the reason for the delay, and it would be useful if they were to say that today. If he is correct that there was a lack of money, I am sure that there are Committees and hon. Members in the House who would want to ask what happened with the money.

Lord West suggested to the Defence Committee that the defence budget for shipbuilding was spent. In answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), he said:

“Shall I tell you what the problem is? Notwithstanding having said how much extra money there is for defence, in the near years there is not. There is almost no extra money available this year, and we are really strapped next year. The Government aren’t coming clean about that. I think if they did, people would understand.”

In answer to further questions, he outlined that delays can be costly in the long run. In response to the Chair of the Committee, he said:

“Every delay costs you money. These delays all cost money. You need a steady drumbeat of orders to keep high-tech industries going. Our complex surface warship building industry, like the submarine one, needs a steady drumbeat of orders.”

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 12th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

We would not be ordering any ships from the Clyde if Scotland had become independent last spring, because complex warships are only built in the United Kingdom. Let me be clear: this contract must be in the best interests of the taxpayer. I am aware of the need to sustain employment on the Clyde, which is why, last December, the strategic defence review announced the construction of two further offshore patrol vessels, in addition to the three that are currently being built on the Clyde.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Is it possible for the MOD to consider positioning Gibraltar as a home port for at least one of the Type 26 offshore patrol vessels, where the facilities are superb for them and they are in a very good position to operate?

[Michael Fallon]

That is a suggestion I will certainly consider. Gibraltar is a key base for the Royal Navy. I think last week we had two, possibly three, ships from the Royal Navy calling in on Gibraltar, and Gibraltar of course retains its affiliation to the Crown despite the recent referendum.

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Ann Clwyd]

When I come to the relevant section in my speech, the hon. Gentleman will get his answer.

We went to Switzerland, Norway and Belgium. We had a good case in Norway, and I travelled there several times to meet senior law officers. However, just as in Britain, there were lots of warm words, but there was no action. We were therefore trying hard to avoid a war; we thought there was an alternative. We tried to make the case—I made it in this Chamber over many years, and the hon. Gentleman would have heard it had he been here—that there were alternatives. Unfortunately, all the authorities prevaricated, and the issue dragged on without getting anywhere.

Meanwhile, our main funders, the Americans, were having a change of heart. The Clinton Administration had originally been enthusiastic, wanting us to campaign in the US as well as in Europe, but they suddenly changed their mind. They had moved to a policy of containment, not indictment, so our activities no longer really fitted in with their plans. However, the organisation had been set up in this country, so we continued collecting the evidence.

We turned our attention, in particular, to Tariq Aziz, because of his involvement in the taking of British hostages. People forget that British hostages were taken in Kuwait, and we never had proper answers about why they were there and why their plane landed there. Saddam Hussein had already taken Kuwait, and those people were taken as human shields.

I presented our evidence to the Attorney General, Lord Williams of Mostyn. I had several meetings with him and continually pressured members of his team to take action, because they were not moving fast enough. They kicked their heels for a number of years, and our top barrister could not understand why, given the evidence that we had presented. We had as much evidence as we could possibly need. Apart from getting a signed confession from Saddam Hussein in his own blood, there was nothing further, legally, we could have done.

I would occasionally spot Lord Williams at Westminster, and I would take off after him, chasing him down the corridors. He would frequently joke that he was having to duck into the gents to try to avoid me. One day he said, “I’ve got good news for Indict.” He said he was going to refer the case against Tariq Aziz to Scotland Yard. I looked at him and said, “You’re kicking it into the long grass,” but he denied that that was the case. The Indict team, which was obviously made up mainly of Iraqis, duly visited a Chief Superintendent Bunn in New Scotland Yard. We talked about the evidence we had and offered to help him by providing more, but we never heard a single word back. That is understandable in some ways; it was not Scotland Yard’s remit, and it had neither the resources nor the expertise, and certainly not the interest.

We came in for some ridicule from the British press —the typical tabloid fare, with cartoons of British bobbies apprehending Saddam Hussein—but a good opportunity was missed. I make that point because there were alternatives, but those alternatives, for whatever reasons, were not pursued in the way that I and many other Members would have wished.

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), who was of great assistance when we were looking at many of these matters. He was a very wise counsel, and he assisted the Iraqis in many ways.

I became aware of human rights atrocities in Iraq before I was a politician, in the 1970s. I met Iraqi students in Cardiff, and I am sure some of my Scottish friends will have met Iraqi students in Scotland. Some of those students had been imprisoned. I met a couple from Basra. One of them—he was a student activist—had been in prison and gone through a mock execution. I came to learn later on that that was only the tip of the iceberg.

In 1991, when I was the shadow Secretary of State for International Development, I stood up in Parliament and described what I had seen in the mountains of Iraq and Iran when the Kurds fled from Saddam’s helicopter gunships. Those scenes were appalling and typical of the attacks made by the Iraqi regime on Iraqis. Sometime later, I met an Iraqi who made the point that Saddam had killed hundreds of thousands of his own people. He said, “The biggest weapon of mass destruction was Saddam. Why did it take so long for him to be removed?” Many Kurds were killed during the genocidal Anfal campaign, including as a result of the barbarous use of chemical weapons in Halabja.

In 1988, I took some women Members of all parties to a London hospital to see a number of the horribly burned victims. Many people were killed brutally, in cold blood, in a maze of prison and torture chambers all over the country. Repression, abuse, ethnic cleansing and extra-judicial killings continued right up until 2003.

Saddam, without doubt, was a serious threat to domestic, regional and global stability. I had hoped that the international community could remove or neutralise him without force, but sanctions failed, international indictment never took place and UN Security Council resolutions were ignored time after time. All had been tried; all had failed. So from 1997 to 2003, I worked to get Saddam and leading members of his regime prosecuted under international law for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, on the basis of rock-solid witness testimony. The evidence was finally used in the trials of Saddam, Tariq Aziz and others when they eventually stood trial in Baghdad. I was very pleased to be there to witness some of those trials. I knew that our evidence was being used; I saw it in the rooms behind the chamber where they were being tried.

In February 2003, the Kurds were terrified that chemical weapons would be used against them again. I saw the rockets in mountains on the Iraqi-Kurdish border. From 2003 onwards, more secrets of this evil and despotic regime were revealed. I stood on a huge mound in the open air, on several acres in al-Hillah, near Babylon, where about 10,000 bodies were being disinterred from a mass grave, mostly Shi’a Muslims.

On one of more than 20 visits to Iraq as special envoy on human rights, I opened the first genocide museum in Kurdistan. It was snowing, the sky was black and people crammed into the building, where their relatives had been tortured, many to death. There were photos of skulls and shreds of clothing. Former detainees had written messages on the cell walls. Sometimes, the writing was in blood; sometimes, there were just marks to cross off the days of the week. One very old woman came up to me with a bit of plastic in her hand. I unwrapped it and saw three photos. They were of her husband and two sons, who had been killed in that place.

Over the past few days, since the report of the Chilcot inquiry, to which I gave evidence for a whole afternoon, very few voices of Iraqis have been heard. I have here the words of Dr Latif Rashid, who is currently the senior adviser to the Iraqi President. In 2003, he was appointed as Water Minister in Baghdad, and he was very successful. He managed, over a few years, to re-flood the marshes where the Marsh Arabs had been so cruelly displaced. This is what he says:

“It must be remembered that at the time not only did Prime Minister Blair and President Bush wish to remove Saddam Hussain from power in Iraq, but so did most of the entire spectrum of the Iraqi opposition (including Kurds, Arabs, Shia, and all other minorities that make up the Iraq) and most of the international community.

The Iraqi opposition lobbied Governments throughout the world, and we, as representatives of the Iraqi opposition, believe that Prime Minister Blair and President Bush were acting in response to the Iraqi people and to protect them, on the basis of evidence available at that time.

There was concrete evidence that Saddam Hussain was complicit and had instructed organised campaigns of genocide, torture, war, ethnic cleansing and use of chemical/biological weapons against the Iraqi population as well as neighbouring countries. We are still finding the mass graves of the nearly one million Iraqis murdered as a result of his actions.

Although Iraq currently has its problems, I believe they are the result of Iraqis themselves. We will always remain grateful for the support shown by Tony Blair, and the British Government and British Parliament at that time.”

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I have the utmost respect for the right hon. Lady for all the work she has done over the years to try to get evidence against this regime. It is incredible work, and I pay great tribute to her. I have one question. I have never really understood where the chemical weapons went—where did they go?

[Ann Clwyd]

That is a very interesting question. I can only speculate, as I am sure that the hon. Gentleman has done. There is evidence that some of them went to Syria, but there are still unanswered questions. The Kurds, in particular, truly believed that there were weapons of mass destruction. I myself never used that argument for intervention, because I did not know the answers. However, I did use the humanitarian argument, because I thought it was important that the world should not turn its face away from the horrors that were going on in Iraq.

I want to make a plea for continuing engagement with Iraq. The needs of the Iraqis are great. I, personally, have continued my association with Iraqis and with the Kurds. I am very well aware of their problems at this time, particularly the continuing threat of ISIS and Daesh. It is not true to say that such people did not exist in Iraq before the war. They existed in Kurdistan, for example, under the name of Ansar al-Islam, and at that time the Americans managed to get them out. We still need to protect the minorities of Iraq—there are so many of them. We have a responsibility to continue to assist that country in any way we can.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Nicolson (East Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) and hear the historical background from his perspective.

Two weeks ago, many of us spoke in a moving debate on the centenary of the battle of the Somme. Throughout these islands and beyond, the events of 100 years ago were commemorated, and one recurring theme in this House and elsewhere was the importance of treasuring the young lives of our soldiers. When we read about the senseless slaughter of the Somme, we like to think that we are more sophisticated and less gullible than previous generations—that we are more concerned with the lives of others, whether our own soldiers or civilians abroad. Yet in this House, in very recent history, we voted for a war that was an unpardonable folly.

On 18 March 2003, 411 MPs followed Tony Blair into the Aye Lobby, unleashing the forces of hell in Iraq; 139 of those MPs still serve in Parliament today. It must be difficult to live with that vote. But rather than accept personal responsibility, too many say, “If I had known then what I know now, I would never have voted for the war.” That is what I want to focus on, because I do not buy it. It is too easy a cop-out. Tony Blair has become so discredited that he is a convenient depository for shared guilt. “It was his golden oratory that bamboozled me,” say some MPs. They talk of seductive mendacity, or ask who could have questioned our security services in all their wisdom. They say that they believed Colin Powell and his illustrated talk at the UN with its cartoon mock-up of mobile laboratories on trucks and that they fell for his dire warnings that the secular Saddam Hussein was in cahoots with the fundamentalist Osama bin Laden, however culturally illiterate that claim was. It was just all so convincing, they say—if they had only known then what they know now. It is all nonsense.

We did know then much of what we know now, and if we did not, it was because we chose not to absorb the expert opinion available at the time. We knew then that Saddam Hussein had once possessed chemical weapons. He had used them in the 1980s against the Kurds, the Iranians and the Shi’a. However, we also knew that the implementation from 1991 until the war in 2003 of two no-fly zones, one in the north of Iraq and one in the south, prevented any further chemical attacks, as those chemical weapons could no longer be dropped. Even at their height, Saddam Hussein’s powers had limits. In 1991, 39 scud missiles were fired at Israel—I was there at the time, as a journalist. They were crudely targeted at Tel Aviv, and killed no one.

Even if Saddam Hussein could not fire his chemical weapons, might they somehow have become a threat on the battlefield? In the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf war, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was set up to inspect Iraqi weapons facilities. It maintained a presence in the country for several years. There was broad agreement among experts that Iraq was not an imminent threat. Those weapons that had been used against Iranian and Kurdish opponents had been destroyed or were degraded beyond use.

Let us remind ourselves of what the experts said at the time. Scott Ritter, a United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998, stated in 2002 that

“since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability has been verifiably eliminated… If Iraq was producing weapons…we would have…proof, plain and simple.”

Experts told us repeatedly that chemical weapons do not have a long shelf life. Ritter stated that Iraqi sarin and tabun had a shelf life of approximately five years. Botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about three years. As Members debated the war in this House, they knew that at the height of his powers Saddam had never had the capacity to fire chemical weapons long range and that, even if he had had that power, after years of no-fly zone restrictions and the passage of time, his weapons were degraded and beyond use.

[Bob Stewart]

I seem to recall that the hon. Gentleman and I were together in the television studios at the time and that we laughed at the mock-ups of the vehicles that he mentioned. We agreed that if those vehicles existed they could easily be photographed from the skies. We therefore thought that they could not exist: why would they need to make drawings of them when they would be able to get photographs of any actual vehicles?

[John Nicolson]

The hon. Gentleman remembers well. We did indeed sit together in television studios, because we journalists called in experts to ask them for their evidence. It was relatively easy, even as a journalist, to pick apart many of the absurd claims.

Of course, some journalists were screaming for war. The Sun ran the absurd headline “Brits 45mins from doom” about a supposed threat to troops in Cyprus. The Star wrote “Mad Saddam ready to attack: 45 minutes from a chemical war”. It was all nonsense. The journalists who wrote it knew that, but it was terrifying for some Members.

In January 2003, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication whatever that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or an active programme of chemical weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency at the time found

“no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq.”

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission said at the time that it

“did not find evidence of the continuation or resumption of programmes of weapons of mass destruction”.

However, US Vice-President Dick Cheney retorted that he believed that Saddam Hussein

“has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei”—

the director general of the IAEA at the time—

“frankly is wrong.”

Who were parliamentarians to believe—the chemical weapons experts, the missiles experts, the IAEA, or Dick Cheney, George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and the neo-cons? The House had to make up its mind.

In the run up to the Iraq war, I was working as a journalist, as the hon. Gentleman pointed out. Among other things, I was presenting a three-hour daily radio news programme. We had access to experts, as any news journalists do. We called them in and asked them to outline their evidence. Now, I am not a pacifist. I supported NATO action in Bosnia and Kosovo due to the imminent threat to life and the need to save civilians; in fact, I was on the flight back from Iraq—mentioned earlier—with the returning hostages who had fled from Saddam Hussein. However, during interviews with experts and academics in the run-up to the House’s vote, I saw clearly that the case for war was built on exaggeration and deceit. It was blindingly obvious.

Tony Blair frequently told this House and the British people that he was working towards disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. He repeatedly told the House that his aim was not regime change. The House could have been under no illusion about what it was being asked to vote on. Mr Blair said that Saddam was a “very brutal and repressive” leader but that the aim was

“disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, it is not regime change.”

Regime change was not the basis for war. The challenge for the House on the day of the debate was clear. Mr Blair was asking Members to vote on one basis and one basis alone: the imminent danger posed by Saddam’s weaponry.

What if all the experts talking in public were wrong? Was there an elevated group of experts—an inner core with extraordinary knowledge that was unavailable to the ordinary expert? As Members will recall, Tony Blair often said, “If only you could see what crosses my desk, you’d never doubt the danger that we are in and the pressing case for immediate action.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Docherty-Hughes (West Dunbartonshire) (SNP)]

I begin with a declaration of interest: my brother served on the frontline in the Iraq war, so the decision taken on the Floor of the House that night had a direct impact on both my family and his wife and two children.

I get concerned when we discuss Islam in this House and equate it with fanaticism and fundamentalism. Many belief systems are prone to fanaticism, and I am mindful that, before 9/11, the greatest terrorist act that the US had ever suffered took place in 2005, when a Christian fanatic killed 168 people and injured nearly 1,000 over a 16-block radius in Oklahoma. If Members wish to debate fanaticism, I wish that they would bring it to the Floor of the House and debate it in detail.

Just under three months ago, I and many other colleagues participated in a debate—I was grateful to be able to sum up for my party—that called for publication of the Chilcot report. I am glad, therefore, that we are now debating its publication. Like others, I am grateful to Sir John and all those who participated in its construction for their diligent work and the manner in which they carried out their examinations. I believe that the report will go down as one of the most important documents debated on the Floor of the House and will have far-reaching consequences. I agree with the hon. Member for Southend West (Sir David Amess), however, that it has sadly been overshadowed by the political events of the last couple of weeks.

The publication and conclusion of the report will come as some comfort to the families of Army personnel such as my own and to casualties in the conflict who have been waiting for answers for far too long about why we were taken to war. I praise those families who, like their loved ones, fought the good fight and never allowed this issue to be forgotten in their quest for justice and truth. The House must note their courage in seeking answers to the conflict. The report should and must send reverberations through the whole British establishment, which has been undermined by the decision to go to war. It must, if anything, enhance the debate about the nature of our constitutional democracy and the duties of Government in their attitude to war and peace.

The words

“I will be with you, whatever”

will be forever associated with the former Member for Sedgefield and will be his political epitaph, yet the phrase is much more than that. It will forever live in and scar the hearts of those families whose relations were casualties of the war, whether as members of our armed services or Iraqi civilians. That is the true legacy of

“I will be with you, whatever.”

That must never be allowed to be forgotten. It is a reminder to all representatives that our actions have wide-ranging consequences beyond this place and our own lives.

[Bob Stewart]

For me, that phrase really blows apart my belief that Prime Ministers, regardless of political persuasion, always act in the best interests of our country. It is deeply upsetting to think that that phrase was used in a memo to the US President.

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I am grateful for the intervention from the hon. and gallant Member, whose opinion I often taken on board. I will come to his point further in my speech.

The actions in the lead-up to the invasion had a detrimental and fundamental impact on confidence in our democracy and parliamentary system. We must use the report to rebuild that confidence and trust, as we risk so much if we do not. That is particularly critical as parliamentary democracy is being attacked across the world as we speak. The report raises damning and fundamental issues about the role of the Government in the run-up to the invasion. The duty of the Government is to carry out their responsibilities in a responsible and transparent manner. In matters of war and peace, that is particularly vital, but it is now clear that, in 2003, the actions of the former Member for Sedgefield flew in the face of that.

We are told that collective responsibility has underpinned our democracy for centuries, but, as the report outlines, that system was abused and ignored by the former Member for Sedgefield. His actions are a warning to the current and future Governments that the mechanism of government itself must not be twisted and subverted by an individual to meet their own delusional, self-appointed, God-like views and that full transparency and accountability must be always ensured. To ensure accountability and transparency, and for justice to be done, those who made the decision to go to war must be brought to order.

That is why, like many other Members, I will be fully supporting the contempt motion against the former Member for Sedgefield that the general public expect and which the House needs to demand. The international community must see justice done. There will be those who question the motion, given the former premier’s public apology, but I draw this conclusion from that apology: an act of contrition requires a heartfelt, sincere and full intention not to recommit that sin. In the light of the apology given by the former Member for Sedgefield, I would advise him to seek a longer counsel with his confessor in order that he might understand the full concept of an act of contrition.

In conclusion, I wish to consider the words of the former Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, George Reid, when a motion was placed before that place on this very matter:

“Above the doors of the Red Cross in Geneva, there is a phrase from Dostoevsky, which we should remember in time of war. It states that, in war, ‘Everyone is responsible to everyone for everything.’”

It reminds me of the journalist Michael Ware and his account of his time reporting the conflict: while we might wish to see peace and an end to war, only the dead see the end of war.

[Mrs Madeleine Moon (Bridgend) (Lab)]

A number of people have said today that the 2003 decision casts a long shadow, and indeed it does. There has been much talk about lessons learned and lessons needing to be learned, but I fear that this is largely about: “I was right and others were wrong”. There is a slightly self-righteous tone when people talk about where they stood on the vote in 2003 that I feel will not help us to make the decisions facing us, which are as serious, dangerous and consequential as any.

I was not in the House in 2003; I did not come in until 2005. At the time, I was one of those marching up and down and saying no to war. When I came in, I never in my wildest dreams thought that I would spend most of my time on defence matters, but I came into the Chamber one day and noticed a group of middle-aged men talking to another group of middle-aged men across the Chamber on perhaps one of the most important subjects facing the country. I thought, “I’m not having this”, and I went out of my way to teach myself defence. I have to say that that is necessary—unless someone has been in the armed forces, they have to go out and learn, find out how decisions are made, what equipment to use, how on earth a decision to go to war is implemented and how it is carried through. It is not enough to be a Member of Parliament and think that defence is something that can be dipped into. Sadly, too many right hon. and hon. Members think it is.

I do not feel that people have the right to criticise unless they have looked and questioned: what equipment are our people going to war with; how many of them are there; what is going to happen when the number of personnel we want to send is balanced against the number of personnel that can be met? We made a disastrous decision when we sent our people to Helmand, but nobody questioned it. We are not having a big two-day debate about that disaster. How many hon. Members have bothered to read any of the Defence Committee reports on anything? Quite honestly, I wonder how many Members have read the strategic defence and security review. How many Members have been worried and concerned at the paring back over and again of our armed forces? How many have been concerned about the cuts to the platforms that our armed forces will be able to utilise?

It is all very well to go back to 2003 and beat our breasts. It is all very well to spend seven years. Since I have been a Member, I have taken three decisions on going to war—and I spent a lot of time on all three of them. Libya was as great a disaster as Iraq. I spent a lot of time asking whether it was about regime change, and I was told, “No, it is not about regime change.” I do not believe that to be true—I think it was always about regime change. I asked what we were going to do about post-conflict reconstruction, because it was the big lesson from Iraq, and I was told, “We are not putting boots on the ground, so it isn’t an issue for us.”

[Bob Stewart]

The hon. Lady knows that I have deep respect for her, which will continue. I seem to recall, however, that we had little choice but to intervene in Libya, and I voted for it because I was terrified that people would be killed.

[Mrs Moon]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that most helpful intervention, because it takes us back to the exact same issue that people faced when dealing with Saddam Hussein. He led people down a track that really made intervention almost inevitable. He ignored all the UN missions and he was obstructive many times to the people who went in to look for weapons.

I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman was with us on the visit, but when we met a group of tribal elders in a room in Iraq, they told us that the last time they had been in it, they had been called there by Saddam to hear a report about the changes he was introducing to the health service in Iraq. Someone had stood up at that meeting and said not that he disagreed with it, not that he thought Saddam was wrong, but that a small change might make it slightly better. The man was marched out of the room and shot at the front door of the building. That is the world that we were trying to understand.

On that occasion, too, I asked why on earth Saddam did not simply say, “I have given up the weapons of mass destruction; I do not have any. I got rid of the chemical weapons; I do not have any.” I asked why he did not just step forward and say that. I was told, “Because he was more afraid of his own people than he was of you, so he had to convince not you but his own people that he had those weapons.” That, I was told, was why he kept that myth going—not for us, not because he was afraid of our invasion, but because he was afraid of his own people if they thought he showed any weakness.

The situation was exactly the same in Libya. Gaddafi made it impossible for hon. Members to feel that we could sit back and let him say, “I am going to slaughter those people in Benghazi,” which is what he said he was going to do. We acted, but look at the consequences. In seven years’ time, are people going to stand up and criticise us for that vote? Are they going to say self-righteously, “How dare you? You did not do enough on post-conflict reconstruction.” No, we did not; and, yes, it is a mess. There are so many lessons that we have to learn.

I have been to Iraq and to Afghanistan. As a member of the Defence Committee, I believe that if we send our personnel there, we have a responsibility to go ourselves, to see for ourselves and to talk to people on the frontline and ask them, “Have you got the right kit? Have you got the right equipment? Are you being looked after all right? What do we in Parliament need to change? Tell us and we will be your voice.” Those are the lessons we have to learn.

We need to be more robust in our understanding of defence. We have to be more responsible in understanding the tasks and the responsibilities we place in front of our armed forces. We do not want to be sitting here pontificating about whether Tony Blair was a liar, or whether a jolly big “but” continued underneath the sentence when he said:

“I will be with you, whatever.”

I want us to look much more at what we have learned and what we are going to do in the future. I doubt whether many Members have read it, but the Defence Committee recently put out a report about Russia—be afraid, be very afraid, because that is coming down the track.

NATO Warsaw Summit

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 11th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s first point, the defence of the United Kingdom is organised on a United Kingdom basis. He should be in absolutely no doubt about that.

On our relationship with Norway, yes, I had a bilateral meeting with the Norwegian Minister. We work extremely closely on defending our respective countries and are looking for further areas of co-operation, particularly in the light of our strategic defence review and Norway’s long-term plan, which was published more recently.

On maritime patrol aircraft, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will have caught up with this morning’s announcement that we are to purchase nine Boeing P-8 aircraft, as announced by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister with me at the Farnborough air show this morning. I hope it will not be too long before those patrol aircraft are able to help better protect our deterrent, as well as protect our aircraft carriers and conduct other tasks.

Non-proliferation was not subject matter for the Warsaw summit. We remain, in principle, committed to the search for a world without nuclear weapons. However, I have to say to the hon. Member and his party that there are 17,000 nuclear weapons out there and states that are trying to develop nuclear weapons. There remains the danger that others, such as non-state actors or terrorist groups, may try to get hold of nuclear weapons. That is why I will be inviting the House to vote next Monday to continue the principle of the nuclear deterrent that has served this country well and will protect it in the 2030s, 2040s and 2050s.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Let me say to my right hon. Friend how delighted I am that we have reaffirmed our commitment to the NATO alliance by sending the strong signal of using our troops on the ground in Estonia and Poland. Further, I thank him for making arrangements for French and Danish troops to join our battle group in Estonia. I speak as perhaps the only British officer to have commanded the 1st Parachute Battalion of the French Foreign Legion—albeit briefly.

[Michael Fallon]

The purpose of this deployment is to reassure our allies on the eastern border of NATO, as much as to make Russia think twice about any further aggression. I can tell my hon. Friend that our deployment in Estonia was warmly welcomed, not simply by Estonia but by the other Baltic states too. We are seeing now a coming together of the NATO countries and a commitment to each other’s formations, whether it is the very high-readiness joint taskforce or the enhanced forward presence. We particularly look forward to working with French and Danish troops alongside our battalion in Estonia next year.

Oral Answers to Questions

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 18th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

We partook in the Government-wide scheme launched on 1 February to try to ensure that our service personnel were aware that they could register, and we will do the same again through a defence information notice on the EU referendum that will be issued in May. Ultimately, it is down to individual service voters whether they register or vote.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

May I ask the Secretary of State, or perhaps my hon. and very gallant Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces—[Interruption] Gallant because she is in the Royal Navy reserves—to assure the House that no investigator used by Leigh Day or Public Interest Lawyers is paid for by the Ministry of Defence for any service?

Royal Naval Deployment: Mediterranean

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 7th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

May I ask my right hon. Friend about the rules for interception? For instance, what would happen if the people on these makeshift craft refused to get on board a royal naval vessel or, indeed, if the people traffickers opened fire on our sailors or marines?

[Michael Fallon]

It was certainly our experience last year that migrants in boats that were sinking or in distress very much welcomed the presence of the Royal Navy and were very eager to get on board the ships that we had deployed, because they knew that they would be safe. The traffickers appear to take very great care not to be on the vessels and have them launched by those who are being smuggled. Where they can be identified—this is where the monitoring and surveillance can assist—they can be charged and prosecuted, as they are being in parts of Turkey.

Iraq Historic Allegations Team

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Wednesday 27th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I congratulate my good friend, the hon. and gallant Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon), on securing the debate.

Just over 400 soldiers have contacted me. Most of them I have never met; some I knew from my service. I want to represent them in the short time I have, and I want two thoughts to be brought to the attention of the House. The first is that those soldiers feel they are being chased down by unscrupulous lawyers who do not give a damn about their wellbeing, some of whom seem to imply the soldiers are guilty before that is proven.

The soldiers feel extremely irritated that the Ministry of Defence seems to have set up an organisation to join with those lawyers to chase the soldiers down. I use the word “seem” because the soldiers do not understand why that is happening. We can spend all the time we like explaining and saying, “It’s because we’ve got to investigate things. We’ve got to do it properly, otherwise you’ll go to the International Criminal Court,” but our men and women in uniform do not accept that, so this is a communication problem.

My second thought is this. I have given evidence with my soldiers in Northern Ireland on murder charges and in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Our soldiers, our men, our women, our sailors, our airmen and our airwomen loathe doing that. They are frightened by having to appear in court in front of slippery-tongued lawyers who have a much better gift of the gab than they do. They feel they will slip up, and that terrifies them. Often, their thought is, “I’d much prefer to be on the frontline, under fire, than in this poxy court where no one seems to be on my side.”

The problem we have is trying to tell our servicemen and servicewomen that this is actually for their own benefit. I had to tell two soldiers, after they had been in a firefight, that they were being charged with murder in Ireland. They did not believe it was possible. I explained that the reason was to take them to court to prove they had acted under the law, so that they could never be prosecuted again.

I speak, I admit, with some emotion on behalf of our men and women, and I tell you this: we should listen to them and communicate better.

Armed Forces Bill

Bob Stewart Excerpts

Monday 11th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I had the sad duty of discharging a man administratively from my battalion. I really regretted it happening at the time, but I must urge caution about our going back in time to try to put right what was apparently right at the time but which was clearly wrong.

[Mark Lancaster]

I hear what my hon. Friend says. Of course there is balance in all such cases, but the moves in 2000 were absolutely right. They reflected a change in policy and a change in attitude in society.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Stewart]

Does my hon. Friend mean that 2,500 people are affected, or that 2,500 people may contract mesothelioma in the end, because I suspect that the number is much higher? I am slightly confused on that point.

[Danny Kinahan]

My hon. Friend is right to ask that question, because I went through exactly the same thought process when I received those figures. I am told that 2,500 people may be affected. However, many more will have served on all those different submarines, and indeed in the various tanks. The onus is on the Ministry of Defence to work out exactly which ships and what equipment contained the threat of asbestos, find out how to contact the people affected and then get the message to them. That is really what we are pushing for. We are keen to make sure that the MOD also looks at other illnesses that may well be hiding in the background of those who have worked with depleted uranium or had carbon monoxide poisoning.

We should always be thinking of how we look after our armed services, not just those who serve but their families, well into the future. We must set that example for everyone who has joined the services. It is a fantastic career that I myself have thoroughly benefited from. They must know that their families will be looked after and that we will look at all the risks well into the future. We want this to be dealt with very quickly and to make sure that there is a good campaign that ensures that everyone is informed. We must keep an open mind and think about how we will look after all our armed services and their families into the future.