Employment: Tax Policy

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Razzall. I agreed with some of what he had to say, which is a bonus for me today, so I am enormously grateful for his contribution. I am also grateful to my friend Lord Leigh for tabling this debate. Who knew that it was going to be so well timed? Like many others, I too will fall into the trap of focusing on the Budget because it is top of mind at the moment, and not in a good way.

I have to say, from listening to my noble friend Lord Leigh’s opening remarks, that he brings extraordinary expertise of commerce and the private sector, as of course do many other speakers in this short debate today, notably my noble friend Lord Petitgas and of course the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. Unfortunately, that is more than can be said of the current Chancellor and indeed the wider Cabinet—I think some analysis has been done, and private sector experience is somewhat lacking—so I hope that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, that some of the Labour Peers are promoted to positions of greatness such that they can share their private sector expertise, is taken up. It is definitely the case that there is private sector expertise on the Labour Benches; it just does not seem to have got up to the top levels.

Yesterday the new Labour Government raised the tax burden to the highest level in our country’s history. Despite making an outright promise not to raise taxes on people, they raised taxes on working people. In hiking the employers’ national insurance contributions—NICs for short—to raise a headline figure of £25 billion, the Government have committed a straightforward breach, according to the IFS, of their manifesto. Furthermore, there are numerous examples of the now Prime Minister and Chancellor promising before the election not to hike taxes. Can the Minister give the Committee any insight into how the discussions went when drafting the section of the manifesto about no increase in taxes on working people? Was it a cunning sleight of hand that left the words “national insurance contributions” unencumbered by the “employees’” qualifier, or was it just incompetence?

The noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, made an excellent contribution. I appreciate his comments about the last Government. As a Conservative, I can say that no one wants to see taxes go up—it is just not in our DNA.

I remember many debates when I was a Treasury Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, in opposition, would slam me for tax rises. I was going to come up with various quotes today about the number of times he has previously slammed me for tax rises, but I thought that would be really cruel.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

Could the noble Baroness not be bothered to do so?

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

No; my speech is already six minutes long, but I will do it next time.

Of course, at that time, we were dealing with the pandemic and its fallout, and the fallout from the energy price support we had given. Therefore, we had a very firm footing on which to raise taxes.

The Minister will try to bring out his fictitious black hole; I sincerely hope that he will not, given what the OBR has now said about it—I am starting to feel a bit embarrassed for him. Plainly and simply, promises have been broken, and we need to now think about what we can do to ensure growth in the private sector. The views of the private sector on this are now well known. Can the Minister share with me whether anyone in the private sector thinks the rise in employer NI is a good idea?

I want also to look at what the OBR has to say in its economic and fiscal outlook. My noble friend Lord Elliott is right. It is like beer, which is going down by 1p in a pint—that is huge, is it not?—and wine: the more you tax it, the less you get. The noble Lord, Lord Razzall, was very helpful in this regard. If you tax the film and creative industries less, they grow more. Unfortunately, we have seen taxes go up, so—surprise, surprise—the labour supply is forecast to come down by 0.2%. I do not know whether the Minister is happy with this, but I wonder what the Government will do to mitigate for those people who would otherwise have been in a good job.

But it is worse than that. Real earnings will then stall in 2026 and 2027, as firms rebuild their margins and pass on the costs of higher employer NICs. Real wages are not expected to resume growing in line with productivity until beyond the forecast horizon. What interventions will the Minister set out in terms of increasing productivity such that we can get some sort of real wage growth going?

It is not just the OBR that has an issue here; it is also HMRC, which reflects that 940,000 employers will lose an average of £800 per employee. This is not good news for employment, and it is not good news for growth. Labour’s No. 1 mission is to secure the highest sustained growth in the G7. I am an optimist, but this Budget literally has the forecasts for growth coming down. I cannot see how that is compatible with Labour’s No. 1 mission.

The noble Lord, Lord Razzall, asked for alternatives. I will give him two that are still on the table. First, if we increased productivity to pre-pandemic levels, we would get £20 billion a year. Secondly, reforms to adult welfare would save £34 billion a year. That was our plan; we did have a plan but, unfortunately, we were not able to put it in place.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, on securing this debate and on his opening speech. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions.

The manifesto this Government were elected on promised to invest in our public services and prioritise working people. Keeping those promises was at the core of yesterday’s Budget. Many noble Lords focused today on specific tax decisions made in the Budget, and the impact and analysis of those decisions as set out by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility. It may be helpful to noble Lords if I begin by explaining the background to the decisions we made.

First, in July, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, kindly mentioned, the Chancellor exposed a £22 billion black hole at the heart of the previous Government’s plans—a series of promises they made but had no money to deliver. This Government yesterday published a line-by-line breakdown of that £22 billion black hole, and the OBR published its own review of the circumstances surrounding the Spring Budget forecast.

For the benefit of the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, the OBR’s report says that the previous Government “did not provide” them “with all the information” that was available and that, had the OBR known about these

“undisclosed … pressures that have since come to light”,

its spring forecast would have been “materially different”.

Secondly, the country inherited not just broken public finances but broken public services too, with NHS waiting lists at record levels, schools literally crumbling, and rivers filled with waste. Yet, since 2021, there had been no spending review—no detailed plans for departmental spending set out beyond this year.

Thirdly, the previous Government had failed to budget for costs which they knew would materialise, including funding for compensation schemes for the infected blood scandal and the Post Office Horizon scandal.

Put together, these three things—the black hole in our public finances, the compensation payments which they did not fund and their failure to assess the scale of the challenges facing our public services—meant that, in order to meet our first fiscal rule, yesterday’s Budget needed to raise taxes by £40 billion.

So, we had in yesterday’s Budget some very difficult decisions to take in order to rebuild our public finances and our public services. In doing so, we made an important choice: to keep every single commitment we made on tax in our manifesto. We did not raise taxes on working people—their income tax, their national insurance or VAT—and we were able to go further, by not increasing fuel duty and by not extending the last Government’s freeze of income tax thresholds, which hit working people so hard, as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, mentioned.

Of course, in the circumstances I describe, any responsible Chancellor would need to take difficult decisions to raise the revenue required to fund our public services and to repair our public finances. So, in yesterday’s Budget, the Chancellor announced an increase in employers’ national insurance contributions by 1.2 percentage points to 15% from April, and that the secondary threshold would be reduced from £9,100 per year to £5,000.

We know that it is particularly important to protect our smallest companies, so we also increased the employment allowance from £5,000 to £10,500, meaning that 865,000 employers will not pay any national insurance at all next year, and over 1 million will pay the same or less than they did previously. In the Budget, we also increased the lower rate of capital gains tax from 10% to 18%, and the higher rate from 20% to 24%, which means that the UK will continue to have the lowest capital gains tax rate of any European G7 country.

Alongside these changes to the headline rates of capital gains tax, we are also maintaining the lifetime limit for business asset disposal relief at £1 million, to encourage entrepreneurs to invest in their businesses. Business asset disposal relief will remain at 10% this year before rising to 14% in April and 18% from 2026-27, maintaining a significant gap compared with the higher rate of capital gains tax.

We also published a Corporate Tax Roadmap, which confirms our commitment to cap the rate of corporation tax at 25%—the lowest in the G7—for the duration of this Parliament, while maintaining full expensing and the £1 million annual investment allowance and keeping the current rates for research and development reliefs to drive innovation.

The Budget also set out additional tax measures, including reforming inheritance tax and measures on tobacco duty, vehicle excise duty, air passenger duty and alcohol duty.

We also delivered on our other commitments, which some noble Lords addressed during this debate: to abolish the non-dom tax regime and replace it with a new residence-based scheme; a new approach to the way carried interest is taxed; reforms to the stamp duty land surcharge tax for second homes, and to the energy profits levy; and we introduced VAT on private school fees. In total, these changes—alongside our measures to tackle tax avoidance—will raise over £9 billion to support our public services and restore our public finances.

We are asking businesses to contribute more, and the Chancellor acknowledged in her speech that the impacts of this measure will be felt beyond businesses, too, as the OBR has set out and as noble Lords raised in today’s debate. In addition, as my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton observed, the employment rate will increase by 1.2 million over the forecast. These are, however, very difficult choices, and not ones that the Chancellor took lightly. But, in the circumstances we inherited, we believe they are the right choices to make.

Several noble Lords mentioned growth, and it was of course welcome that the OBR was so clear: this Budget will permanently increase the supply capacity of the economy, boosting long-term growth. However, there is of course much more to do.

It is important that we also consider in this debate the purpose of the difficult decisions we have taken on tax, which enable us not just to repair the public finances but to begin to rebuild our public services. It is worth noting that, in this debate, some noble Lords spoke in favour of some of this investment, but without supporting the taxation necessary to fund it. Because of the difficult decisions the Chancellor has taken on tax, day-to-day spending from 2024-25 onwards will grow by 1.5% in real terms, while total departmental spending, including capital spending, will grow by 1.7% in real terms.

In this, the first phase of the spending review, the Chancellor has prioritised day-to-day funding to deliver on our manifesto commitments. We will increase the core schools budget by £2.3 billion next year to support our pledge to hire thousands more teachers into key subjects; to triple investment in breakfast clubs to put them into thousands of schools; and to provide an additional £300 million to our further education colleges, while taking steps to transform the apprenticeship levy into a more flexible growth and skills levy.

We will deliver a real-terms funding increase for local government next year, including £1.3 billion of additional grant funding to deliver essential services and £200 million to tackle homelessness and rough sleeping. We are also providing funding to support public services and drive growth across Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, with the largest real-terms funding settlement since devolution delivering an additional £3.4 billion to the Scottish Government, £1.7 billion to the Welsh Government and £1.5 billion to the Northern Ireland Executive in 2025-26.

Finally, we are fixing the NHS after years of neglect. Because of the difficult decisions the Chancellor has taken on tax, which we are debating today, and because of our commitment to a new investment rule, yesterday’s Budget announced that we are now able to provide a £22.6 billion increase in the NHS budget over two years. That is the largest real-terms growth in NHS spending outside of Covid years since 2010. Many NHS buildings were left by the previous Government in a state of disrepair, so we will provide £1 billion of health capital investment next year to address the backlog of repairs and upgrades across the NHS estate. To increase capacity for tens of thousands more procedures next year, we are providing a further £1.5 billion for new beds in hospitals across the country and more than 1 million additional diagnostic tests, as well as new surgical hubs and diagnostic centres, so that the people waiting for treatment can get it as quickly as possible. Because of this record injection of funding, the thousands of additional beds that we will secure and the reforms that we are delivering in our NHS, we can now begin to bring waiting lists down more quickly and move towards our target of an 18-week waiting time by delivering our manifesto commitment for 40,000 extra elective appointments a week.

The difficult decisions on tax that we made in yesterday’s Budget, which have been debated here today, were made for a purpose. We made choices to rebuild the public finances and our public services, to invest in the national interest and to keep our manifesto commitment to prioritising working people. It is perfectly possible to make different choices, of course, but noble Lords should keep in mind that, at the last election, the country voted for change. They did not reject the previous Government so overwhelmingly because they thought the choices they had made were the right ones; they gave this Government a mandate to fix the foundations of our economy and to deliver the change they voted for.

As the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, observed, we did not hear very much about any credible alternative during this debate. We believe that any responsible Chancellor would have had to take action in the circumstances we faced, but, of course, it was possible to choose not to act. Some noble Lords may think that it would have been better to choose the path of irresponsibility and ignore the problems in the public finances altogether. If that is their choice, they should say so. I believe that the choices the Chancellor set out at the Budget are the right choices for our country, to repair our public finances, to protect working people, to fix our NHS and to rebuild Britain.

Other choices could have been made, of course, but let me be clear: not making the choices that we have made would make it impossible to protect working people; not funding public services in the way that we have would mean cuts to schools and hospitals; not supporting our investment rule would mean delaying or cancelling thousands of projects that drive growth across our country. We have made our choices—the only responsible choices—to protect working people, to fix the foundations of our economy and to invest in Britain’s future.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, if I may say so—he has a minute left—I am concerned that he is answering the wrong exam question, as he did not seem to mention employment. However, he did mention the NHS and the £22 billion for it. How much of that sum is the RDEL compensation for the public sector, which will not have to pay employers NI?

Also, I would like the Minister to write, if possible, to cover the question from my noble friend Lord Petitgas about any sector-by-sector analysis of the impact of this tax policy on employment.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I am very happy to write. I did mention employment: I set out that there would be an increase of 1.2 million over the course of the forecast. That is the question I was asked.

Fiscal Rules

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, over the next 24 hours the Chancellor is likely to break promises that she made to the British people in the run-up to the election, and I am in no doubt that that was always going to be the plan. This is why the Treasury team magicked up a fictional black hole—a black hole which, rather incredulously, contains spending decisions made by the current Government. This fictional black hole will be invoked once again at the Budget Statement tomorrow, to act as a fig leaf to cover tax rises which will put more juice into the phrase “taxing people until the pips squeak”. It is an audacious strategy, given its utter predictability, but my concern is for the people and businesses across the country who are just trying to get by and who will bear the brunt of Labour’s tax plans.

Tax rises are only part of the plan. The second part of the Chancellor’s plan is to increase borrowing—but how could she, given the fiscal rules? These are the fiscal rules that the Chancellor explicitly said she would not change. She stated that she would not “fiddle the figures” to get different debt figures. She confirmed that an incoming Labour Government

“will use the same models the government uses”.

Now the Chancellor has performed a screeching U-turn and broken her promise not to—in her words—fiddle the figures. The Chancellor has announced a £50 billion change to the UK’s fiscal rules; she announced this important change at a conference in the United States, not to Parliament. Can the Minister confirm that the announcement at a conference in the United States was made in haste to reassure the bond markets?

More worryingly, the country currently has new fiscal rules but no knowledge of what they actually are, because the Chancellor has failed to outline any details of what that new rule change involves. She also chose to make this announcement without an accompanying OBR report. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, will remember that the very first Act passed under this Labour Government was one which gave more power to the OBR to scrutinise the Government’s actions. Does he agree that these actions with respect to the fiscal rules do not abide by the spirit of what was in that first Act passed under this Government? We are left in a situation in which the UK does not have an operational definition of public debt. Can the Minister explain what definition of public debt the Government are currently providing to lenders?

There is a debate to be had about whether these changes to the fiscal rules make things better or worse, but what is absolutely clear is that fiddling with the debt rule does not magic up free money. Indeed, the independent Institute for Fiscal Studies has specifically warned that changing the UK’s debt rule to allow for higher borrowing is not free money. The IFS has cautioned that the Government’s new fiscal rule will cease to be a constraint on borrowing. Can the Minister explain how much new borrowing the Government intend to take on under these new rules, and how much the annual interest cost of that debt will be?

I have no doubt at all that this is all part of a plan dreamt up long before the general election, and the next episode in this sorry tale is to be released tomorrow.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches have long called for vital investment into infrastructure, not least to fix our crumbling hospitals and schools, to tackle the failings and gaps in our transport system, and to deliver the affordable housing needed by so many. Infrastructure investment, including private investment, must be scaled up to drive sustainable economic growth across the nation, including the green energy revolution. But fiscal responsibility remains crucial.

These Benches have argued before for the use of the public sector net fiscal liabilities as the appropriate measure to sit behind a borrowing rule, because it allows productive investment to be considered separately from day-to-day spending. I tried without success to persuade the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill of Gatley, to look more closely at this issue during the Conservative Government.

Changing the measure also means reshaping the borrowing rule and the guard-rails to make them appropriate to that new measure. This Statement so far offers only the vaguest language, so I hope very much that we will hear a proper discussion of the rules and the guard-rails tomorrow in the Budget. Will the draft charter for budget responsibility, which I understand should contain much of that, be among tomorrow’s documents?

There also seem to be a number of referees to oversee the rule and its implications, from the OBR to the national infrastructure and service transformation authority, an office for value for money and the NAO. How does this fit together and what oversight will be before Parliament?

We cannot have a repeat of the Truss mini-Budget, which nearly wrecked the public finances with £40 billion in unfunded tax cuts. Does the Minister agree that the Budget must be credible to the markets, the interest burden on our public finances must be tackled and, at the same time, we must make good our infrastructure deficit—investing to fix hospitals and schools but also driving economic growth? None of it is easy, but all of it is necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that the Labour Party manifesto was, in essence, just smoke and mirrors? There are smoke and mirrors surrounding not only the fiscal rule—I am still trying to understand his sentence about changing your own fiscal rules, but I will leave that there—but what a “working person” is. When one writes a manifesto, one does not do it such that one can get things round the British people; one should do it with clarity. I suspect that there is a certain lack of clarity in the Labour Party manifesto.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I fully sympathise with the noble Baroness that she struggles to understand the concept of keeping manifesto commitments. She will see in the Budget tomorrow that we will keep every manifesto commitment we made to the British people.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment would simply require the Secretary of State to review the impact of this Act on the size of the sovereign grant. I have tabled it as I feel that, as part of our consideration of the Crown Estate Bill, it is important to look at the direct link between the future planned growth of Crown Estate activities and the increase in profits that will result directly from the partnership with GB Energy, and the interlinked direct impact these changes will also have on the practical workings of the Sovereign Grant Act 2011.

The Sovereign Grant Act came into force on 1 April 2012 and changed the arrangements for funding Queen Elizabeth’s official duties. It consolidated four separate sources of funding into one new sovereign grant. The grant is intended to be a more permanent system than the previous one, which was reign specific. The sovereign grant is paid annually by His Majesty’s Treasury at a value indexed as a direct percentage of the revenues from the Crown Estate. It was initially set as an indexed percentage of 15%. The percentage is reviewed every five years by the royal trustees, made up of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Keeper of the Privy Purse. The level of the grant is protected by law from decreasing because of falling Crown Estate profits, as there were during the Covid pandemic. With annual accounts published by the Keeper of the Privy Purse and audited by the National Audit Office, the process promised to be more accountable. The level of the grant has risen in recent years to help fund, in part, a £369 million refurbishment of Buckingham Palace, which was approved by Parliament. After King Charles III’s accession to the Throne, the new King approved a statutory Order in Council to allow the existing sovereign grant provisions to continue throughout his reign.

This is all very well but, to come to the heart of the matter, my concern is the direct link between the profits that the Crown Estate makes and the calculation of the amount of the sovereign grant going forward. My request is that the direct link is discussed today, and I call on the Government to consider amending it. My amendment calling for an annual review was the closest wording I was able to table on this matter.

There is a world of difference between the direct binary link that we have now, where a set percentage of the Crown Estate’s revenues is used as the only calculation basis in determining the size of the sovereign grant, and the system that I would prefer, where the Government pay due regard to the Crown Estate’s revenues as part of the process of determining the size of the sovereign grant.

I have five areas of concern about the future of these arrangements after this Bill passes. First, my personal feeling is that the present calculation is somewhat obtuse and that the Sovereign Grant Act is not a particularly helpful or appropriate way of determining how, and at what level, we fund the Royal Family. The trouble with all this is that the attempt to link royal funding to the profits of the Crown Estate is a conjurer’s trick; it is an accounting sleight of hand. The two are not related at all. The Crown Estate’s profits are, and always have been, government funds.

I am not here to have a conversation about the role, purpose or future of the Royal Family; I am not anti-monarchy. Nor do I wish to discuss the appropriate levels of funding, as none of this is relevant to the Bill. Before us is a Bill that will see the Crown Estate allowed to borrow from the Treasury, subject to approval, and if all goes well this will result in rapid investment in, and growth at, the core of the Crown Estate’s business, that of leasing seabed plots for offshore floating and offshore wind developments. When the Crown Estate is at the heart of a rapid green energy revolution, and the sovereign grant is calculated as a percentage of revenue profits and reviewed only every five years, it is only sensible for us to take a moment to examine the potential impacts that this rapid growth will have on the calculation of the grant.

My second concern is that this rapid and exceptional period of Crown Estate growth was not foreseen when the 2011 grant Act was passed, and this makes future calculations more difficult.

Thirdly, I am worried that it may potentially put the King personally in a difficult position. Your Lordships should note that, in January 2023, the Keeper of the Privy Purse, speaking on behalf of the King, asked the Government to reduce the percentage used to calculate the sovereign grant so that the total did not include the income from new offshore wind leases, calculated to be worth £1 billion annually to the Crown Estate. The request was made by the King, out of his desire that the money described as a “windfall” could be best used for “wider public good” instead of funding the Royal Family during a cost of living crisis, which he had referred to only weeks earlier. In July last year, with further Crown Estate profits, the Government announced that the grant would be changed to 12% in the following year, down from 25%, while maintaining the same level payable.

It is my understanding that a further reduction is planned to come in through primary legislation following 2026-27. In the words of the Report of the Royal Trustees on the Sovereign Grant Review 2023,

“The Crown Estate’s Net Revenue Profits are expected to increase significantly in future years”.

The trustees’ projected figures show an increase from £442 million in 2022-23 to £1.05 billion in 2024-25. With predicted exceptional linear growth forecast for the foreseeable future, will we see newspaper headlines every year to the effect of “Exceptional growth in Crown Estate’s green energy brings huge profits to the King: the King kindly wishes that these are used for the public good”?

My fourth point is that the five-year review is inadequate in this period of exceptional continuous growth. I call on the Government to amend the 2011 Act to make the review annual.

My fifth and final point relates to what is a complex and confusing system that is not only poorly publicly understood but a hostage to fortune. The system is ripe for exploitation by those who are either against the energy transition, are supportive of the old energy architecture or simply wish to use the politicisation of the energy transition to spread disinformation and propaganda. This is my biggest worry. From the challenges to well-established basic climate science to deliberate attempts to undermine the transition to heat pumps and electric vehicles to miscalculations of costs, propaganda is, sadly, ever present. A system that can all too easily be used to link the green energy transition to extra funding to the Royal Family is ripe to be manipulated by those who wish to argue that the green transition will cost you more because all the benefits are funding the Royal Family. A highly effective government communications strategy that works in partnership, wins hearts and minds, extols the benefits and lower bills is essential to support the transition, and this link does not help with that.

The move to green energy and the financial support received by the Royal Family are uneasy bedfellows. I foresee this as an opportunity that will be exploited by those aimed against the transition. My humble opinion is that the calculation of the sovereign grant as a direct percentage of Crown Estate profits represents a weakness in the system that leaves us vulnerable to interference as we transition our power generation. My wish is simply that this Government consider amending the direct nature of this link and conduct an annual review of the sovereign grant during this period of rapid growth. My amendment is here simply to allow this conversation to take place. I look forward to hearing the opinion of your Lordships and the Minister’s response on these issues. I beg to move.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak briefly on this group. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, is not in this place and so was unable to speak to his amendment. I understand why the noble Earl, Lord Russell, has tabled his amendment, and I am grateful to him for his exposition of the background to it. On these Benches, we recognise the unusual role that the Crown Estate has in the stewardship of the assets held in the right of the Crown. We recognise, too, that the revenues from the assets do not belong to the sovereign, nor is any part of them payable directly to the monarch.

The issue here is one of communication. It must be—it is absolutely essential—that there be no perception of any direct financial link between the sovereign and any amounts received under the sovereign grant and the amount of revenue generated by the Crown Estate. Upon the announcement of the partnership with GB Energy, there was a perception from some of the more excitable end of the media that the sovereign was somehow party to, and specifically approving of, the arrangement. I encourage the Minister and commissioners of the Crown Estate to ensure that information in the public domain about the operation of the Crown Estate, but also any further partnerships that may come down the track, cannot possibly suggest any direct involvement from the sovereign and, therefore, that there should be no undue benefit accrued.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendment and I will seek to address some of the points that he has raised. This amendment would require the Government, within one year of the passing of this Act and annually thereafter, to lay before Parliament a report into the effect of this Act on the size of the sovereign grant. The Government agree that it is important that there is transparency in how the sovereign grant is affected by changes in Crown Estate profits. Indeed, the Sovereign Grant Act 2011 includes a number of requirements that provide for regular effective review and reporting to Parliament.

As the noble Earl observed, under the Act, the grant for each financial year is set by reference to the profits of the Crown Estate. In broad terms, under Section 6 of the Sovereign Grant Act it is currently the higher of 12% of the Crown Estate profits two years previously or the previous year’s grant. For example, the level of the grant for 2025-26 will be set at 12% of the profits the Crown Estate reported in its annual accounts for 2022-23, published in July.

Section 7 of the Sovereign Grant Act provides for regular reviews of the percentage used in calculation of the grant to ensure the grant remains at an appropriate level. These reviews are conducted by the three royal trustees—the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Keeper of the Privy Purse. The trustees must lay a copy of the report of their review before Parliament. The last review concluded in July last year and concluded that the reference rate should be reduced from 25% to 12%, reflecting an expected increase in the Crown Estate’s profits. The next review will commence in 2026, with a view to making any change to the grant calculation for 2027-28 onwards. As with previous reviews, it will consider both the future funding needs of the Royal Household and the likely future path of Crown Estate profits—including, of course, the effect of the Crown Estate Bill that we are debating today on those profits—to determine the appropriate percentage to use.

I should note in this context that the grant for 2026-27 will include the final tranche of funding for the current 10-year programme of reservicing of Buckingham Palace’s infrastructure. The percentage for 2027-28 onwards will therefore need to reflect the significant downward adjustment to the household’s funding requirements. The Sovereign Grant Act currently restricts the level of the grant itself being reduced from one year to the next. That provision was written into the Sovereign Grant Act to reflect the view that many of the duties of the Head of State cannot be abruptly stopped, and therefore it would not be appropriate to significantly reduce funding in response to a sudden drop in Crown Estate profits. That will, however, constrain the ability to reduce the grant by the likely appropriate amount once the reservicing of Buckingham Palace is complete. In 2016, when the previous Government agreed to provide funding for the resurfacing programme, they noted an intention to bring forward legislation to reset the level of the sovereign grant to an appropriate level once the reservicing works have been completed. I can confirm that it is also the intention of this Government.

Those statutory reviews therefore provide Parliament with a report of the impact of this Bill on the sovereign grant. They also provide a mechanism to ensure that additional Crown Estate profits do not lead to excessive funding for the Royal Household. Where that is not possible under the Sovereign Grant Act, the Government will legislate accordingly.

On reporting requirements, the Sovereign Grant Act also requires two further reports on the grant to be produced and laid before Parliament each year. First, Section 5 requires the royal trustees to produce a report annually stating the level of the grant for the following financial year and how that has been determined in line with a prescribed method set out in Section 6 of the Act. This report must be laid before Parliament. Secondly, Section 2 requires the Keeper of the Privy Purse to produce annual accounts relating to the Royal Household, including the use of the sovereign grant. In common with other central government bodies, the accounts are prepared in accordance with an accounts direction issued by the Treasury, audited by the National Audit Office and laid in Parliament. The Crown Estate Act 1961 also contains a requirement for the Crown Estate to produce an annual report and accounts.

The Government therefore agree that it is important that there is regular reporting to Parliament on how the changes in this Bill will impact the sovereign grant. As I have detailed, there is already a considerable set of statutory requirements in this respect and beyond.

Independent School Fees: VAT

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Monday 21st October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

The noble Lord asks about the assumptions we are making. As I said, we will set out our assessment of the expected impacts of this policy in the normal way by publishing a tax information impact note at the time of the Budget. At that point he can judge those assumptions for himself.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

According to the Government, VAT is a tax on consumption and therefore falls on the parents. Yet the Minister keeps saying that this consumption tax will be absorbed by the producer—the schools. Many noble Lords have pointed out today that schools cannot simply magic up lots of cash to mitigate against this consumption tax on the parents. Has he considered that he is undermining what a tax on the consumer actually is?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

The noble Baroness will know that how schools will fund this additional cost is a commercial decision for each school. Some schools have already announced a very wide range of fee increases, from zero to 5%, to 10%, up to, for example, Eton at 20% above the average expected VAT liability. This reflects the Government’s expectation that private schools will take steps to absorb a significant proportion of the new VAT liability.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 14th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am enormously grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken before me in this debate today. Predominantly, this is obviously around the devolution of powers over the Crown Estate in Wales to the Welsh Government. On these Benches, we have thought long and hard about this, and I hear the concerns of some noble Lords about how the devolved powers differ between Wales and Scotland and, indeed, Northern Ireland. But this is not a unique situation and I have concluded that I would encourage the Minister to resist any change at this time.

A number of noble Lords have raised certain challenges as to why this might be a good or a bad idea, and I look at this in a purely practical sense. If I look at the documents that have been provided and are available not only for the Crown Estate but also the Crown Estate’s relationship with GB Energy—the enormous commitment that the Crown Estate has made in terms of the amount of seabed licences it wishes to grant to enable energy generation by 2030—I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that change is coming and coming very significantly for the Crown Estate. In 10 years’ time, it is not going to look the same as it does now. Therefore, I think that we would introduce risk into what is already a very ambitious target set down by the Government to develop offshore wind should we be sidetracked by the desire to devolve limited powers over the Crown Estate at this time.

It is also worth bearing in mind that the Crown Estate is very clear in its documents—and I think the Committee will discuss this a bit more later—that it is an independent business and competes against the private sector. Splitting it at this time and taking out a chunk of the assets and going through all the procedures as to how you recognise those assets—as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley—and how you think about which revenue streams go where would be a sideshow.

I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, but I am going to run with it slightly. At the moment, the Labour-run Welsh Government do not have the best record of governance. Of course, that might improve in the future and progress may well be made, so I conclude by saying that we encourage the Minister to resist these amendments and we believe that they would be unwise at this time.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate in response to the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Wigley and Lord Hain, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Smith and Lady Humphreys. I hope to be able to explain the Government’s rationale for retaining the existing structure of the Crown Estate.

First, let me set out how the Crown Estate currently operates and why the Government believe this remains the best approach. The Crown Estate Act 1961 requires the Crown Estate commissioners to manage the Crown Estate as a commercial enterprise to enhance long-term value and generate profit and to do so with due regard to the requirements of good management. A key purpose of the 1961 Act was to repeal various detailed statutory provisions that had built up over 150 years previously which were hampering the effective management of the estate. By focusing the commissioners’ duties on enhancing the estate’s value and the returns generated, the commissioners have a clear objective for which they can be held to account.

While the Crown Estate has goals which under its own strategy align with wider national policy objectives, the 1961 Act provides the Crown Estate with independence and autonomy to set and achieve its goals. The Government believe that the Crown Estate should continue to operate in this way, as a commercial business independent from government, because it has shown itself to be a trusted and successful organisation, with a proven track record in effective management.

The Crown Estate is multibillion-pound public corporation, which is required to pay its profits into the UK Consolidated Fund each year, worth more than £4 billion over the past decade. Those revenues are then allocated to public service priorities by the Government, subject to the usual parliamentary controls. That is a valuable outcome, which we need to be careful not to undermine.

I turn to the amendments that deal with devolving the Crown Estate in Wales. I fully recognise that there are now two Labour Governments in the UK. While I believe that there is greater benefit for the people of Wales and the wider United Kingdom in retaining the Crown Estate’s current form, I shall of course continue to discuss these issues with the First Minister and the Secretary of State for Wales to ensure that Wales sees the full benefits of the Crown Estate and other forms of investment.

In response to the arguments made by noble Lords during this debate, I make a number of points. First, devolving the Crown Estate to Wales would most likely require the creation of a new entity to take on the role of the Crown Estate in Wales. This by definition would not benefit from the Crown Estate’s current substantial capability, capital and systems abilities. As my noble friend Lord Hain and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to, this would indeed further fragment the UK energy market by adding an additional entity and, as a consequence, it would risk damaging international investor confidence in UK renewables and disrupting the National Energy System Operator’s grid connectivity reform, which is taking a whole-systems approach to the planning of generation and network infrastructure. That reform aims to create a more efficient system and reduce the waiting times for generation projects to connect to the grid. The cumulative impact of these effects would likely delay the pathway to net zero by decades.

Furthermore, the Crown Estate’s marine investments are currently made on a portfolio-wide basis across England and Wales. To devolve to Wales would disrupt these existing investments, since they would need to be restructured to accommodate a Welsh-specific entity. Let me give two examples. The first is the Crown Estate’s £50 million supply chain accelerator, which will match-fund early stage projects related to offshore wind leasing round 5, and the £50 million investment in the offshore wind evidence and change programme, which brings together government bodies, the industry and key stakeholders from across the UK to better understand environmental impacts of offshore wind.

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I hope that we can make some progress on this. With the finances that we have, there is almost no way that anybody in this House could come up with the right set of ratios or constraints. We do not have a business plan or enough detailed forecasts. We really need the Treasury to put that in front of us.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments on the investment and borrowing powers in the Bill for the most part seeks to put in place limits on borrowing by the Crown Estate. I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, who introduced the group, and I agree with him that there should be a limit on the borrowing powers that the Government intend to extend to the Crown Estate commissioners.

I also associate myself with the comments made by both the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the absence of the business case and the draft framework agreement. This is not the first Treasury Bill where accompanying documents have not appeared, but this is a new Government.

I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising for his Amendment 8—I understand that the Committee will come back to his Amendment 9 separately—which seeks to probe the Government’s intention on borrowing. My noble friend made his points clearly: it is not just about this current Government, or the subsequent Government, but any future Government under whom there may need to be checks and balances in place to prevent the overleveraging of a very important group of national assets run by an independent company or organisation.

Extending the borrowing powers was planned by the previous Conservative Government, and we absolutely support the principle of the Bill. As I said on the previous group, the Crown Estate will be a very different organisation in 10 years and so has to do a lot of things very quickly. It is going to need money and there is an opportunity here. However, I am struggling to figure out how its relationships with GB Energy, on which I still lack clarity, and—one step removed—the national wealth fund, which I understand does not have as much money as was originally planned, will all fit together. Therefore, to protect the integrity of the Crown Estate it is important that a borrowing limit is put in place.

Previously, the Crown Estate commissioners were constrained by the 1961 Act, but we support other noble Lords who have spoken today on considering what the mechanism might be. Different noble Lords have proposed different mechanisms. I appreciate that the noble Earl, Lord Russell, picked a number, and I accept that that might be an outcome, but of course it is not really inflation-proofed; it would be in the Bill and therefore it might not be helpful in due course. I went away and thought about having 2% of total assets as the limit. If one looks at the portfolio as it stands for 2022-23—£15.5 billion—one sees that a 2% cap would represent a cash limit of around £310 million. That would be a more generous cap than that proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, but it is broadly equivalent to the “hundreds of millions”—I think that was the phrase—envisaged by the Minister. We are just trying to be helpful here, by putting a statutory footing underneath the Minister’s intention in any event.

Another thought I had was not only doing this as a percentage of total assets but giving Parliament some sort of say over a five-year horizon. I think this was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, was making, but in a separate way. I was not actually aware that borrowing forecasts appear in documents relating to the Crown Estate—maybe they do, and in any event it would be worthwhile to have a look at them. There is a significant loss of parliamentary oversight in this Bill. There is very little parliamentary oversight at all of the Crown Estate anyway, despite it holding some of our national assets, but the Bill takes even more of that parliamentary oversight away, which I will come to in a subsequent group.

I believe that there is an opportunity to add some oversight, and therefore I came up with the idea that Parliament should be required to pass regulations that set out, by year, a five-year borrowing cap. Parliament could do that every year quite simply. That would obviously give flexibility, and it would enable debates to happen about the Crown Estate and whether it was heading in the right direction. The Treasury could be challenged about its involvement—apparently there is a transparent relationship between the Treasury and the Crown Estate, although I have found no notes relating to that which would indicate such transparency. That was my other idea.

There are many ways that the House might decide on Report to put a limit on borrowings. I am happy to hear the views of the Minister; I very much hope that he will appreciate that many noble Lords are trying to help.

Briefly, my Amendment 10 picks up the point made by my noble friend Lord Howard about the situation where the Treasury is going to be lending to the Crown Estate, and that will be down as an asset, and then that money could circulate back and go into day-to-day government spending. To me, that seems slightly odd. It would be good to get some sort of commitment to ensure that that sort of mechanism is somehow broken.

I am grateful to all noble Lords, especially my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. I might come to his element about additionality when we come on to the reporting of the investment strategy of the Crown Estate in a later group.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions from all noble Lords on this group of amendments. I recognise that the issue of controls on borrowing is an important consideration, and I hope to offer some reassurance. I agree with very many of the points raised during this debate, in particular that controls on borrowing by the Crown Estate must be in place. I assure noble Lords that such controls will be set out in the memorandum of understanding that will be in place between the Crown Estate and the Treasury, and will be set at a loan to value ratio not to exceed 25%.

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Moved by

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

12: Clause 2, page 2, line 11, at end insert—
“5A The Chair of Commissioners and each Commissioner may not be appointed until the appointment has been scrutinised by the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons, or any successor committee.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would require the appointment of the Chair of Commissioners of The Crown Estate to be subject to scrutiny by the Treasury Select Committee.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

My Lords, my Amendments 12 and 36 focus broadly on the governance and management of the Crown Estate. Amendment 12 in my name seeks to introduce a process by which Parliament can scrutinise the appointment of new Crown Estate commissioners. If passed, the Bill will increase the number of commissioners from eight to 12. The Government have not given a clear reason for this change, arguing merely that the new number will bring the number of commissioners in line with best practice for modern corporate governance. Further information and thoughts on that from the Minister would be welcome. It would be interesting to hear what problems this change will solve, what particular skills he feels the Crown Estate is missing and why those additional four commissioners will deliver the change needed.

As many noble Lords have remarked already in Committee today, the Crown Estate bears the most enormous responsibility as the custodian of many of the nation’s important assets. That responsibility is significant, yet the level of parliamentary oversight—over not only the activity of the commissioners but their stewardship of these billions of pounds’ worth of incredibly important assets—is weak and has been further weakened by the Bill.

My Amendment 12 would give Parliament a role in scrutinising commissioner appointments to ensure that candidates were qualified for the role that they are anticipated to play. That would include the new commissioners who will be introduced after the Bill becomes law, as well as the chair of commissioners, for which I believe a recruitment process is currently under way. The chair of the commissioners will be an incredibly important role. Again, I believe it would be beneficial and reassuring to all parliamentarians if a committee—for example, the Treasury Select Committee—had the opportunity to question the candidate for that role before they took up the reins.

The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham identifies a specific issue when it comes to oversight. Commitments are made on behalf of the Crown Estate but there is no mechanism to ensure that those commitments are implemented. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will listen carefully to what my noble friend has to say, and will agree that the amendment in my noble friend’s name would improve the Bill.

Amendment 36 also seeks to improve parliamentary scrutiny of the governance of the Crown Estate, by ensuring that the disposal of assets owned by the Crown Estate is reported to the Treasury and then to Parliament. The Minister will know that I was concerned about this, as I asked in a meeting what restrictions there were over sale of assets. I did not receive a satisfactory response at all. Again, I note that the Crown Estate owns some of our most important landmarks. These are valuable pieces of land, buildings or indeed seabed, but they are not just valuable; they are iconic.

There is limited transparency to the decisions of the Crown Estate beyond the annual report. This measure is simply designed to ensure that Parliament has some visibility in the decision to dispose of assets. In this case, I picked an amount of £10 million, but it could be higher than that. This seeks to discourage the commissioners from taking inappropriate short-term decisions about the ownership of national landmarks, and indeed the natural environment, for short-term gain.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for his amendments in this group about creating public good, and I will listen with great interest to the response from the Minister. The spirit of my noble friend’s Amendment 19 aligns closely with my Amendments 37A, 37B and 37C in a later group, and will touch on that there.

Finally, I was interested to note the proposal from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, to grant the Crown Estate commissioners the power to grant leases in exchange for full or part ownership of any project. Again, that is something the Minister may wish to consider.

I hope the Minister will look carefully at these constructive amendments, and specifically confirm to the Committee whether he agrees that Parliament should have a greater role—or indeed, in my view, any role at all at this stage—in scrutinising the work of the Crown Estate. I beg to move.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It is a very good question, and I shall endeavour to find the answer and write to my noble friend.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords. That was an excellent debate and a lot of ground was covered. My favourite line of the debate came from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. She put her finger on it when she said that the Crown Estate was not a “cuddly organisation”. It does not need to be—it does not report to anybody, apart from its commissioners, and that is at the heart of the issue that I think many noble Lords are grappling with. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was pleased with my recent conversion to pre-appointment scrutiny. I cannot guarantee that that will continue. I understand a new leader is in the offing in my party, so who knows what will happen?

The amendment that I put down was a useful way of probing some thinking around why the number of commissioners had to go from eight to 12. The response from the Minister was the sort of management jargon I used to learn at business school about 25 years ago. I am not much the wiser, but I will go back to Hansard and study his words carefully. Pre-appointment scrutiny, for the chair in particular, would be a very small but important change, particularly as we are dealing not with a cuddly organisation but with one which happens to own and manage some very important and valuable national assets. Therein lies the tension, and that is my concern.

Turning to the points raised by my noble friend Lord Young, it was a forensic analysis. I am sure many noble Lords learned much from it, not least how to structure a really good argument, which has stumped the Minister. I am pleased that he is stumped because I am sure that he will go away and look at it—indeed, I implore him to do so, such that we do not have to return to this, at length, on Report.

I hope that my noble friend Lord Holmes feels satisfied by the Minister’s response to his amendments. On the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, I presume that both he and I are pleased that the Crown Estate can already do what he wants it to do. I agree with him that it sounds completely obvious.

I am afraid that I am not happy with the Minister’s response on the question of disposals; in fact, I am probably more concerned by his response than I was beforehand. I am not sure that the nation would expect the complexion of the assets held by the Crown Estate to significantly change, so we may well come back to that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will just make two very quick comments. First, there has been a clear message to the Minister that, in one way or another, this Committee feels strongly that we should have in statute an expression of the climate change, environmental and nature issues. That should not be seen as a criticism of the Crown Estate as it is today but simply says that this is so important that the Crown Estate should not be given the freedom to change its mind on those issues without the intervention of Parliament.

I do not want to put the Minister on the spot, but my second brief issue concerns a previous answer, when there may have been some confusion between the memorandum of understanding and the framework agreement. I do not ask him to do this now, but could he go back and look at those two rather different things, as we need to approach them both differently? That would be exceedingly helpful, but I do not want to put him on the spot at this moment.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to this group on the objectives and duties of the Crown Estate. Many of the amendments relate to climate change and nature, and many noble Lords have spoken who are much more knowledgeable about these topics than I am, so I do not propose to add further to those points. As set out in today’s list, one must follow the rules, but I look forward to hearing the thoughts of the Minister on that.

My Amendments 37A to 37C look at another important aspect of potential disruption caused by investments by the Crown Estate, which is to local economies and national economies when it comes to shipping. I am looking to the Minister to reassure me and your Lordships’ House that very important local and national economic activities are considered appropriately by the Crown Estate, and that it does not look at what it does in a narrow and short-term way but thinks about making the cake bigger for everybody over the longer term.

The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, made several points about the impact on commercial fishing: it should be quantified, consulted on and mitigated where possible, and I say the same for commercial shipping. Some 90% of our goods arrive by sea, and ports are often quite specialised in the goods they handle. Sadly, you cannot move a port, so you have to be quite careful not to obstruct well-established shipping lanes and ensure that the proximity of offshore developments does not cause excessive risk to vessels, particular larger vessels, were they ever to get into trouble. Comments on that would be greatly appreciated.

I did not put down an amendment on this, but it is strongly related. Where ports want to expand and they are surrounded by Crown Estate land, the balance of power is sometimes a little one sided. I would like some reassurance that the Crown Estate will act not only in its self-interest for short-term gain but will think about the longer term and growing the pie for the whole economy and the Crown Estate within that. I do not propose to add anything further at this point, and I look forward to hearing the views of the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords for their powerful arguments made during this debate. I will address the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Holmes, Lord Teverson and Lord Young, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hayman, Lady Young and Lady Vere, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, which all seek to make changes to the Crown Estate’s objectives and duties.

Before I move on, I will address two specific questions from the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, which I may not pick up in my subsequent remarks. He asked about conflicts of interest with leasing rounds. Under UK habitats regulations, the Crown Estate is deemed to be a competent authority for offshore wind leasing rounds. As such, it has a legal obligation to carry out a plan-level habitats regulation assessment for planned activities such as an offshore wind leasing round. It could be challenged through legal action if it fails to do this in line with the prescribed requirements.

The noble Lord also asked about the marine delivery route map’s interaction with the offshore wind report. The marine delivery route map gives the holistic context across sectors and sea users to support and inform individual sector delivery planning, while the offshore wind report offers technical insights and data, with both working in concert to ensure that offshore land development is efficient, sustainable and aligned with national and environmental goals.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also asked about a point of clarification. I will go away and check the questions she raises. Obviously, I apologise if I have inadvertently confused the two things she mentioned.

Amendments 14 and 28, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Holmes and Lord Teverson, and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, seek to introduce new duties for the Crown Estate to protect the condition of the seabed. Amendment 14 would require the Crown Estate commissioners to take steps to protect the seabed, which forms part of the Crown Estate, and would include a prohibition on all activities, business practices, leisure pursuits and other actions that permanently or temporarily cause damage to the seabed.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 14th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. I actually want to say something quite positive about the Government’s approach to this at the moment. I understand the issue completely: offshore wind is a complete waste of time if you cannot connect it to the consumers. That is obvious, and it has not been managed well. I very much welcome the Government’s commitment to achieve that in future, but we had on 1 October the foundation of the National Energy Systems Operator, whose whole role is to make sure that this works. When we passed the Energy Bill that set this up, we did not really give it enough power. It would be very good to hear from the Minister that that will be in progress and will actually happen.

Secondly, there is so much at risk for offshore developers. Yes, they can get their contract, their lease and their contract for difference in terms of the price for the low-carbon company. But at the end of the day, if developers do not believe that there is going to be a grid connection, they will not carry out their investment, so it is absolutely in everybody’s interest that we do this. A really good point has been made to the Minister, and I look forward to his assuring us that NESO— the new organisation from 1 October—will have some clout in government decision-making and will co-ordinate this effectively. It needs to have the power and influence to do so, rather than simply being an advisory organisation whose recommendations are ignored because of other private or public finance investment reasons.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for introducing his amendment, which leads this group, which is fundamentally concerned with the generation of energy on assets owned by the Crown Estate. This is even more important now that there is a formal relationship with GB Energy, which has been announced, although I accept that details of the relationship are quite thin on the ground. I entirely support the intention of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond to require the publication of a report on the potential for energy generation on the Crown Estate, and I draw attention to my Amendment 35, which would ensure that no new electricity generation licences are granted without confirmation that a corresponding grid connection exists.

The problem of grid capacity, connection and storage is real and important. In May of this year, a House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee report found that in order to achieve net zero targets,

“the transmission and distribution network must develop and expand alongside the growth in supply and demand”.

It concluded that renewable energy generation may be stunted by “slow grid connections” and “limited grid capacity”. That is the issue I am trying to fix, and that all noble Lords are very much focused on. The Government must continue to look at it urgently if they are to build on the previous Conservative Government’s progress toward our clean energy targets. However, it is not an easy task. Even Green Party parliamentarians have been known to be vociferously opposed to measures to boost national grid capacity. I hear a Liberal Democrat laughing, and I am not entirely sure that that is appropriate. However, in the face of that kind of opposition, I ask the Minister to reassure the House that the Government have a plan to get on with increasing our national grid capacity.

At this point, I think it worth pushing the Minister, although we will come back to this on a later group, on the partnership with Great British Energy, which was announced to great fanfare a few months ago. I am still at a loss to explain how the new partnership between the two organisations, the Crown Estate and Great British Energy, will work and what difference it will make; indeed, this is the point of my amendment.

When the previous Conservative Government announced in the 2023 Autumn Statement plans to work with the Crown Estate to increase offshore wind capacity, that was predicted to unlock a further 20 to 30 gigawatts of new offshore wind seabed rights by 2030—great; that seems very fair. The Government have claimed that this new partnership will

“cut the time it takes to get offshore wind projects operating and delivering power to homes by up to half”.

Okay, but their press release of 25 July 2024 stated:

“The Crown Estate estimates this partnership will lead to up to 20-30GW of new offshore wind developments reaching seabed lease stage by 2030”.


To coin a phrase, nothing has changed. What difference does the partnership with GB Energy actually make, or did the Crown Estate get it wrong when it was working with the previous Government? Noble Lords can see the issue I have here: I do not understand how the tie-up with GB Energy is going to benefit that organisation, the Crown Estate and, indeed, the nation.

That, among other reasons, is why I tabled Amendment 34, which also requires a report on the energy generation supported by the Crown Estate. Its scope is wider than Amendment 16 and it facilitates greater oversight via reporting. It requires the Crown Estate commissioners to report annually on not only the expected impact of the relationship between the Crown Estate and GB Energy, but the actual impact. It would also include the investment strategy for capital investment in the infrastructure, including port infrastructure. This is where I am confused, because when I speak to the port sector, it tells me that finances are not particularly an issue. In a report published last month, the British Ports Association recognised that the sheer scale and speed of the investment needed to meet the ports’ offshore energy ambitions is significant. However, it called for a carefully managed investment in ports that fills gaps in ports’ supply chains that cannot be met by the private sector. These gaps can be filled by, for example, the national wealth fund, the Crown Estate or Great British Energy. Can the Minister explain who is managing, and which organisation will be investing how much in what, and when? I, for one, am confused. It is right to get some insight into this now, and to monitor progress in the future.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I will address the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, both of which touch on the topic of energy. I will start by addressing Amendment 16, tabled by the noble Lord.

This amendment would require the Crown Estate to publish a report within 12 months on the potential for energy generation on the Crown Estate, covering onshore and offshore wind grid capacity and energy pricing. While the Government are not in principle opposed to the Crown Estate producing specific reports on energy generation on its own estate, it is not within its remit or ability to report on grid capacity or pricing. As I have set out previously, the national grid and relevant transmission and distribution network operators are responsible for the UK-wide strategy on grid connectivity, and the new National Energy Systems Operator will be responsible for creating a strategic spatial energy plan, which will provide future clarity on grid connectivity.

The Crown Estate has already published, in September, a 53-page report entitled Future of Offshore Wind: Considerations for Development and Leasing to 2030 and Beyond, which looks at, among other things, the prime areas of opportunity for new wind farms. It has also recently published a Marine Delivery Routemap, which sets out its vision for the seabed and coastline.

Amendment 34, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, would require the Government to publish a report on the scope, nature and expected impact of the relationship between the Crown Estate and Great British Energy within six months of the passing of the Act, and thereafter publish an annual report. The Government have no principled objection to such a report, but the timing might be more usefully linked to the passing of the Great British Energy Bill, currently in the other place, rather than the Bill we are discussing today.

UK Economy: Capital Gains Tax

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his expertise on this matter. At the risk of repeating myself, he knows I would not be able to comment on speculation about other specific taxes, but we must rebuild our public finances, including by addressing the £22 billion black hole inherited from the previous Government.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, can the Minister define a “working person”?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

A working person is someone who goes out to work.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, it falls to me to open proceedings again. This is very much a “what it says on the tin” amendment. If it were phrased as the question “Will the deposit guarantee always be honoured?”, I would expect the answer to be yes.

Last week, we discussed that there may be more than one recapitalisation dip. For a moment, let us imagine a worst-case scenario where there is more than one but things are worse than expected due to market circumstances—maybe contagion or other unforeseen circumstances—and the insolvency route has to be taken. Can we be certain that there would be no change to bank depositors’ entitlement—I do not think that is intended in any way, but I would like to hear the Minister say it—and that the system would have the capacity for whatever is thrown at it, if not cash capacity then some form of underwriting in addition to whatever borrowing is available? Does the overall capacity extend beyond the borrowing that is already set up or is it fundamentally underwritten by the Government? As they will get it back, I do not object to that; I am just inquiring as to what the mechanism is, although maybe one does not want to think about that until we get there, if we do.

Are the state of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and the affordability of the levy, if there had already been recent large calls, for example, a factor in the analysis of whether to mount a recapitalisation rather than allowing the insolvency? There could be public interest factors that relate not merely to the bank under consideration per se. Does the public interest consideration also extend to the state of the compensation scheme? I beg to move.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to make a few comments about this, many of which have already been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I am determined to make my comments none the less, so I shall use different words in a different order. The amendment does what it says on the tin—that is absolutely right—and I am confident that the Minister will state that there will be no diminution in the benefit of the deposit guarantee scheme, but is that in and of itself sufficient comfort? The framing of this Bill and the Minister’s exposition of it are shaped by a mindset that there will be a single resolution event; it will be an isolated occurrence; it will clearly be in the public interest, and it will be a single financial institution following specific issues relating only to that bank. That seems to be the vibe that I get when I read the information, particularly that which accompanies the Bill, and I remain concerned that there are insufficient checks and balances in place to enable Treasury input when the measures are used as envisaged, but also where there are multiple failures during a wider systemic event—a reasonable worst-case scenario.

A reasonable worst-case scenario can develop quickly, or it may become apparent only over time. In a slow burn and developing situation, decisions relating to banks facing challenges early on in a prolonged event will be made in a very different context from those whose challenges perhaps developed over a longer period. In essence, decisions will be made, but in very different environments, given what might have happened in the intervening period. It may well be that there is significantly less money left with which to play, so to speak, to ensure financial sustainability.

Whether a reasonable worst-case scenario is a one-off event or a slow burn, FSCS resources are going to come under significant pressure should two or more banks face insolvency or resolution, and choices will surely have to be made. Who makes those choices and based on what guidance? Will the FSCS prioritise DGI entitlements over the resolution of a bank or banks? What would happen in circumstances where the public interest test is at best marginal? There will be many circumstances when it is very clear, black and white, but there will be some when it is not quite so clear. On one hand, one might have a bank which needs to go through the insolvency procedure and therefore one set of obligations fall on the FSCS and, on another, a bank could go through resolution and it is a bit marginal whether the public interest test has been met. How are all those decisions going to be worked through, given the lack of direct oversight from the Treasury?

We have been told that the FSCS will be unfettered when it comes to decisions relating to the allocation of existing resources and borrowing from sources other than the Treasury for DGI or recapitalisation. Therefore, it seems that until the FSCS needs to go cap in hand to the Treasury to get more money over and above what it can already borrow, there is an obligation on the FSCS only to consult the Treasury and others and the decision-making essentially remains beyond the reach of Ministers. I will be interested in the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

Not surprisingly, I too support this amendment. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on her exposition of the genesis of the terms of Section 38 of the 2023 Act. Of course, I am a member of the committee that came as a consequence of that. In her presentation, although not in the amendment—wisely so—she suggested that maybe there would be some hearings and questions, and the possibility that they would be in camera.

I urge the Minister, the Treasury and, indeed, the Bank not to shy away from such suggestions, because it would not be the first time that I have heard mutterings about things being confidential and not wanting to talk about them to parliamentary committees. In Germany, its parliamentary committees can look into the books of the banks and get all kinds of confidential information and—do you know?—it does not leak out. It is quite possible for committees of this House to behave just as well. I put that in as some impetus for how you can get better accountability, oversight and, I suggest, help from the committees, where everybody, ultimately, is pulling in the same direction.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, there is not an awful lot more to say. This is a very elegant amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes, and it was very elegantly explained. I am the sole member of this Committee today who is not a member of the Financial Services Regulation Committee—no, neither is the Minister—and I am sorry about that. All noble Lords involved in getting the committee set up have an enormous amount of experience in the field of financial services regulation and, looking at the inquiries that it is already doing, I think it will be a very valuable part of our regulatory infrastructure. I look on this amendment with warmth and favourability and I should imagine that the Minister will do so, too.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, focuses on the important theme of how the Bank of England is accountable to Parliament. As I have said in response to other amendments, the Government agree that it is right that the Bank of England is held to account for the actions it takes in resolution. That includes being accountable, as appropriate, to Parliament, so I do look warmly, in the words of my noble friend Lord Eatwell, at the intent of this amendment. I also stress that it is right that the Bank of England can act quickly and decisively when exercising its powers. That is particularly important in a crisis situation.

That said, the Government expect that the Bank of England would engage with Parliament after taking resolution action, including when the mechanism under the Bill is used. Specifically, under the existing provisions of the Banking Act, when the Bank of England exercises its resolution powers it must provide a copy of the relevant legal instrument to the Treasury. The Treasury must then lay that instrument in Parliament and the Bank of England must also publish it. This will continue to apply under the new mechanism and ensure that Parliament is notified when resolution action is undertaken. I shall give one specific example. In the case of SVB, the Bank sent to the Treasury the copy of the legal instrument the same morning as it exercised its power. The Treasury then laid the relevant document in Parliament on the very same day.

I also reiterate points I have made elsewhere about the Government’s commitment to require the Bank of England to produce reports in the event that the mechanism is used. The Government strongly expect such reports to be made public and laid in Parliament unless there are clear public interest grounds for not doing so, such as issues of commercial confidentiality. I hope this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and, on that basis, I respectfully ask her to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I was not going to speak on this amendment, but I am also slightly in two minds. One hesitation is that it is very hard to know on the day you do the recapitalisation payment what the cost of an insolvency situation would be. However, I understand where the noble Baroness is heading with this, and there is a lot of sense in the sentiment behind it. This gives more ammunition to the question around reporting—we need the Bank of England to give a very clear explanation as to why it has chosen recapitalisation over insolvency. That might be my preferred way of going about it, but I understand absolutely what the noble Baroness said and support the sentiment behind it.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I also support the sentiment in the amendment from my noble friend Lady Noakes. I think all noble Lords here, including the Minister, would agree that this has the right intention but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, mentioned, there will be edge cases which we cannot foresee at this time. The question is: should such a statement of intent be in the special resolution objectives and, if not, where should it go? I do not know—perhaps in a code of practice, or perhaps not. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, seeks to introduce a new objective into the special resolution regime. The new objective would state that the costs in using the new mechanism should not exceed those that would be incurred in the counterfactual of placing the firm into insolvency. This amendment therefore touches on an important point raised both in consultation and during Second Reading, which is whether there should be a formal test or objective that seeks to prevent the use of the new mechanism, or make its use significantly more challenging, where the cost is higher than insolvency.

I also note that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised similar points on the first day of Committee, which he alluded to today, making the case that the Bank of England should be required to present an assessment of costs in reports to the Treasury and to Parliament.

The Government carefully considered the case for inclusion of various forms of such a safeguard, sometimes referred to as a least-cost test, in response to feedback received during the consultation. In considering this matter, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring that the Bank of England can respond quickly and flexibly to a firm failure and ensuring that costs to industry are properly considered. Having considered this, the Government concluded that the existing public interest test and special resolution regime objectives remained the appropriate framework for deciding whether the mechanism in this Bill could be used.

Adding a specific objective for the Bank of England to ensure that the costs to industry from using the new mechanism do not exceed insolvency could prevent it taking the most appropriate action to advance its broader resolution objectives. Those objectives include protecting financial stability, certain depositors and public funds. It is right that these aims are prioritised at a time of significant risk, which is part of the reason why the Government have not proposed changes to the broader resolution framework.

There is also the potential for such a change to impose important practical challenges. Resolution would likely take place in an uncertain and fast-paced context. Estimating the costs of different approaches during this period will be highly challenging and could change over time. There is therefore a risk that such an objective could create legal uncertainty around any resolution action, which in turn may undermine the usability and effectiveness of the new mechanism in situations where it is justified. This could have significant and undesirable consequences, including crystallising a set of indirect costs for the financial services sector and the wider economy. Further, it should be borne in mind that the alternative if the new mechanism is not available may be to use public funds.

However, I appreciate the intent behind the noble Baroness’s amendment and hope that I can provide some reassurance by reiterating previous points on the subject of the scrutiny and transparency of the Bank of England’s actions. As I have noted, the Bank of England is required under the Banking Act 2009 to report to the Treasury when exercising some of its stabilisation powers and, as was set out in response to the consultation, it is the Government’s clear intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism provided by the Bill. However, I take the point that the noble Baroness made in response to my earlier point.

The Government have committed to updating the code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used. I reaffirm that the Government intend to include confirmation in the code that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England would be required to disclose the estimated costs to industry of the options considered, including the comparison with insolvency. The Government consider that using the code of practice in this way, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill, is the best approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions.

The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this will also ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools.

As I have previously said, the Government will share drafts of the updates to the code of practice as soon as practicable and provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them. The noble Baroness also made the case that insolvency should be a preferred strategy for small banks and I stress that this is the case. I hope that I have provided some helpful explanation to her of the Government’s position on this matter and respectfully ask that she withdraws her amendment.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

I should like to pick up on the request for detail put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I am concerned that the powers that the Bank of England has to act in an emergency, which this would presumably be, should not be constrained to any degree other than that which is absolutely necessary. In other words, we should not load up the code with detail, the reason being that the next crisis will be one that none of us has anticipated. It will be completely different.

If we look at the financial crises that have occurred, the major one in 2007-09 and some minor ones since, they have appeared in completely unexpected directions. The Bank must then have the freedom to adapt its procedures to whatever new challenge arises. I quite understand that we do not want just to say it can do anything it likes, but I feel strongly that we must be very careful about loading the code, and indeed the legislation, with excessive detail.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes about the code of practice because it is important that we have this debate. I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, but it slightly struck fear into my heart because it is about those circumstances where there is not sufficient guidance or a code of practice. Essentially, this is not necessarily just for the Bank of England; it is for all those stakeholders who will be involved in the other side of a resolution. A lot of people will read the code of practice and internalise it. When it is needed, it will therefore already be in their hearts because they will have read it, so I am not as concerned as the noble Lord is about putting in too much detail. The simple fact is that we have not seen anything, so we do not really know what we are dealing with.

It struck me that in the slight rush to bring forward some legislation to keep Parliament occupied, perhaps, the Government are not providing all the information that the House needs to consider this Bill fully. It is complex, and as noble Lords go through it, it is clear that we are all picking up new nuances that we consider might be of concern in the future. The code of practice makes up an important component of the regime and the Committee is slightly flying blind, having not seen a draft of the changes—not only a draft of what would happen as a result of the Bill, but also potentially to fill gaps that we know are not going to be part of the Bill. We know that the code is potentially the only protection between anybody who uses banks—essentially, the taxpayer—and the Bank being able to perform maximum adaptation to a situation. There has to be something in the middle that stops that happening.

I am warming to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s suggestion that the Bill should not come into force until the code of practice is finalised, but I sense that that might be a little churlish. The amendment itself is a little anodyne. I think all noble Lords agree that the Government will, of course, make changes to the code of practice, but I would appreciate hearing more information from the Minister about what changes are anticipated—specifically, what will be left out—and the timing for any code of practice because while it remains outstanding, even in draft form, there is a significant lack of clarity.

At Second Reading, the Minister stated that the update will happen in due course. How many times have I used that phrase? I know exactly what it means. It means “when we are sort of ready”. We need to be a bit more ambitious than that. Can the Minister give any further guidance on timing? If he cannot, would it be helpful if I tabled an amendment on Report that required the code of practice to be updated within, say, three months and subject to approval by both Houses? I am happy to do that if it is helpful.

As my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, pointed out, the Minister has referred to these things being addressed in the code of practice. Many of the elements in the reporting are also supposed to be in that code. My concern is that six weeks have now passed since the Minister said “in due course” and the House rises at the end of the week for Conference Recess. I presume that the Treasury is still working, so that would be a further window during which progress on a draft code of practice could be made. Therefore, I very much hope that the Minister can commit to having a draft document available for review before Report stage is scheduled. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I should state at the outset that the Government have no objections to the principle under discussion. Indeed, the Government have already stated publicly in our response to the consultation on these proposals that we intend to update the code of practice to reflect the measures in the Bill. I have already committed to share a draft of the proposed updates at the earliest opportunity, and I am happy to reaffirm that commitment today. I am aware that this is not the answer that the Committee is looking for, but I am afraid that I cannot commit to providing that before Report. However, I expect it to be available before the Bill comes into force.

As set out in the Government’s consultation response, the updates to the code will do three things: first, they will ensure that the code appropriately reflects the existence of the new mechanism; secondly, they will set out that the Bank is expected to set out estimates of the costs of the options considered and, as noted elsewhere, this is expected to include the case of insolvency; and thirdly, they will set out the expectation that any use of the mechanism is subject to the ex post scrutiny arrangements that I have described elsewhere.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, perfectly fairly asked for a series of clarifications of what the code will include. She asked about two points specifically. The first was whether the code will confirm the mechanisms intended for small banks and the expenses covered? Yes, it is the intention that it will. She also asked whether the code will cover multiple uses of the mechanism. Yes, the code will cover that. I will answer other specific questions in writing.

In preparing these updates, the Government are mindful to ensure that they are done efficiently and carefully to ensure that they achieve the intended effect within the wider resolution framework, for instance, ensuring that the right set of costs is considered on the appropriate basis.

The Government will ensure sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on these proposed updates to the code of practice. In particular, the final wording of any proposed updates would be subject to review by a cross-section of representatives from the authorities and the industry on the statutory Banking Liaison Panel, which advises the Treasury on the resolution regime. As noted, the Government will aim to progress these updates and make the proposed changes available for consultation with industry as soon as practicable.

Finally, I note that the Banking Act 2009 already imposes an implicit requirement on HM Treasury to update the code of practice, even without this amendment. Addressing the operation of the new mechanism would therefore already fall within the scope of this requirement.

I know that this explanation may not be sufficient, but I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, I was rather enjoying being characterised as an old-fashioned central banker, until the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, attributed to me to me the idea that selecting from whichever pot would be entirely at will, so to speak. I add my support to what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, just said: in a recapitalisation, shareholders and MREL must clearly be used first, and FSCS money used simply when those pots have been exhausted.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I simply make the same point. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, was absolutely right to summarise the principle which I think all noble Lords on the Committee feel is the purpose of the Bill. There cannot be any circumstances by which there is MREL or whatever it might be left, yet money is going in from FSCS to ensure the resolution of the bank. I cannot see any circumstance in which that would happen—perhaps Treasury officials would be able to think of one—but I think all noble Lords are agreed on the need for some clarity on what would happen.

I appreciated the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I got about 60% of them, so I was really proud of myself; the other 40% went way over my head. I am going to try to understand her points. We are in quite a difficult situation, but the way that she has been so forensic about it has allowed the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, to state what the principle is. It is about combining those two things—the forensic attitude to “This is what the Bill could say if read in a certain way” versus “Just tell us whether the Bill abides by the very simple principle that basically FSCS money should be a last resort, not there for anybody else, but just to prop up a bank to make sure it gets through to the other side of resolution, for the public interest and no more”.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I reassure her that the Bill does not seek to introduce measures to bail out shareholders. I note that she raised concerns about this point on the first day in Committee, about which I am about to write to her. I hope my response will provide the clarification she is seeking pending that letter and the worked examples that we have discussed.

The amendment relates to a subsection of the Bill that would amend Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009. This sets out the definition of the shortfall amount, which is a figure calculated by the Bank of England when using the bail-in resolution tool. The shortfall amount determines how much of a firm’s resources need to be bailed in to restore its capital ratio to the extent necessary to sustain sufficient market confidence and enable it to continue to meet the conditions for authorisation for at least one year and to continue to carry out its authorised activities. The methodology for determining the shortfall amount is not changed by the Bill, and it remains the case that when using the bail-in tool a firm’s own resources and eligible liabilities—its shareholders and creditors—would bear losses.

The relevant provision is not intended as a means of reducing the amount of MREL that should be used when bailing in a firm. Instead, it is intended to ensure that, in the event the mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool, funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme are taken into account and used rather than the Bank of England having to bail in other creditors further up the creditor hierarchy. As an example, without this provision, if a firm had insufficient MREL to meet its shortfall amount without being able to take into account Financial Services Compensation Scheme funds, it may need to bail in creditors, such as uncovered depositors. Retaining this provision therefore ensures that the Bank of England may exercise some discretion in not bailing in other liabilities beyond a firm’s MREL, such as uncovered deposits, where to do so might risk further destabilising the business of the firm, other participants in the banking sector or other sectors, or reducing wider confidence in the financial system. Therefore, the Government consider it important to maintain flexibility to respond to the relevant circumstances.

In this context, I also note that funds provided by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism can be used to cover the costs of recapitalising the failed firm, the operating costs of a bridge bank, and Bank of England and HM Treasury costs in relation to the resolution.

It is important to note that Sections 6A, 6B and 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 require the Bank of England to ensure that shareholders and creditors bear losses when a banking institution fails. This is an important principle that will continue to apply where the new mechanism is used.

I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that the regime provides an extensive and proportionate set of powers to the Bank of England to impose consequences on the shareholders of a failed firm in resolution. The bail-in tool specifically enables the Bank of England to impose losses on shareholders and to write down certain unsecured creditors. This is an important principle that ensures the firm’s owners and investors must bear losses in the case of failure.

This is of course a highly technical area, and I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns. To that end, I am happy to explore whether there is further material that the Government can make available, such as worked examples, to help illustrate how this approach may work in practice. I hope these points can reassure the noble Baroness and I respectfully ask her to withdraw this amendment.

Budget Responsibility Bill

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

2nd reading & Committee negatived & 3rd reading
Monday 9th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate with thoughtful contributions from all sides of your Lordships’ House.

From these Benches, we believe that information about the public finances should be open and transparent so that the public can hold the Government to account over decisions they make when it comes to spending taxpayers’ money. That is why the Conservative Government created the Office for Budget Responsibility in 2010, to ensure value for taxpayers’ money and that the Government of the day were making responsible decisions with the public finances. We therefore welcome the opportunity to ensure that this remains the case, but sadly that opportunity is not before your Lordships’ House this evening.

The Bill is so narrow in scope and effect that it can be assessed only for what it is; a naked opportunity to play political games and engage in a bit of political theatre, using a rushed and ill-thought-through Bill to fill a bit of parliamentary time. Its publication back in July was accompanied by an astonishingly overtly political statement from the Cabinet Office, as was noted by the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria; this statement had to be swiftly withdrawn. This is clear evidence that the Bill is the Government playing political games, as was also noted by my noble friend Lord Frost. To my mind, the Government are not taking the issues of transparency and accountability seriously when it comes to public finances, and this hastily assembled Bill reflects that.

The furore around the statements made on the publication of the Bill was one of the first missteps from this Government, missteps that have continued and intensified. Later this week, the disastrous decision to cut the winter fuel payment will be debated in your Lordships’ House. The Government have decided to buy off the train drivers—with no strings attached—from the pockets of pensioners. The impact of this cut is clearly significant, not only on pensioners themselves but on the public services that support them. But there is no impact assessment accompanying the cut, and certainly no report from the OBR. The timing of the cut could only be described charitably as ill conceived—out of the blue, with no notice, as we head into the winter period. It is all beginning to look a little ragged, and the Government have been in place for only just over two months.

I return to the Bill: what does it actually do? Not much. To summarise, I say that it sets a rather high and woolly trigger threshold for a tax and spending change above which a third-party body, the OBR, would have to write a report. There is no brake, no lock, no stop. It does not stop anybody from doing anything—much as, I hear from many noble Lords, they would like it to do so.

The Minister in his opening remarks rehashed quite a large quantity of doom-and-gloom, “Oh my goodness, we didn’t know what we were getting into” lines about the nation’s finances, echoed by the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Liddle. I struggle to follow the relevance when it comes to this legislation. Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Moylan, pointed to the 2022 fiscal event as the single and only driver for this legislation.

The measures in the Bill are described by the Minister and the Treasury as a “fiscal lock”, which sounds very decisive. I have been trying to figure out who or what is being locked, fiscally or otherwise. It is not a lock. It is another example of the Government taking a very well-understood English word and simply redefining it to mean something else for political expedience. As my noble friend Lady Lawlor noted, it is merely fiscal advice—a report. The Bill does not create a lock. It does not empower the OBR to stop, to brake, or to prevent the Government taking fiscally significant action of any kind. I do not think that it was a lamentation by the Exchequer Secretary in the House of Commons, as noted by the noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, when he mentioned that it did it not do that; it was simply a statement of fact. This Bill is so riddled with holes and high thresholds that I cannot see it having much effect at all, other than to use up a bit of parliamentary time while other more contentious Bills are being argued about with the unions and other stakeholders behind the scenes.

Yet there was an opportunity to improve this frankly underwhelming Bill. As noted by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, my opposition colleagues in the Commons tabled a helpful amendment which would have improved transparency and accountability. The amendment laid in the Commons would have required the OBR to publish a report not only when there are significant and permanent tax and spending changes but when fiscal rules, including the metrics used, are changed. Fiscal rules are important. They set the boundaries within which the Government have committed to operate tax and spending decisions. Fiscal rules are an important pillar, contributing to economic stability. It must be right that the Government should not be able to change their fiscal rules and the underlying metrics without some analysis and assessment of the impacts to enable scrutiny. As noted by my noble friend Lord Trenchard, changing the metric for the debt rule would allow for billions of pounds of higher borrowing, which would be funded by working people and other taxpayers. If large ad hoc tax and spending changes are to be subject to OBR analysis, surely ad hoc changes to the fiscal rules should also apply. These are, after all, very significant fiscal decisions and, as I said, contribute to economic stability. Sadly, the Government declined to accept the amendment.

This Government are beginning to show signs of fiscal incontinence, and I fear that they will seek to conjure up headroom by tinkering with the fiscal rules. Right on cue, only today the Trades Union Congress voted in favour of reforming the

“unnecessarily restrictive and arbitrary fiscal rules”,

citing a £500 billion public investment deficit. That is a pretty big increase. Is that the sort of quantum that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, has in mind? It is going to need quite a shift in the fiscal rules and quite some jiggery-pokery with tax rates. Rather than playing the hand that the Government have been dealt from the current pack, they may seek to simply swerve the difficult decisions and magic up a bigger pack of cards. Will the Minister confirm that, despite extreme pressure from the TUC, individual unions and the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, the Chancellor will stick to the current fiscal rules and metrics which guided the difficult decisions made by the last Government? Or will she make her difficult decisions substantially easier by changing the debt rule and piling the burden on to working people?

It is worth commenting on how the Bill works in practice, and I will turn to triggering the lock—or, in other words, exceeding the rather high and woolly threshold at which a third-party body must write a report. There are at least two elements to be considered by the OBR when deciding whether to write this report. The first is the size and nature of the tax and spending change. In the text of the draft Charter for Budgetary Responsibility, the Government state that “fiscally significant” is equivalent to 1% of nominal GDP in any single financial year in the forecast period. This is quite a substantial amount: just under £30 billion.

I accept that public sector spending is around £1.2 trillion and, as a percentage of that total, this is actually quite small. But realistically, discretionary spending is far less than that. Therefore, the Bill is setting a threshold which would be a massive change over and above what might be considered basal. It is so high as to be substantially meaningless—which possibly reverts to the rationale for the Bill in the first place being that single event. Furthermore, the impact must be in a single year, not the discounted value of the impact in the years in the forecasted period. Again, a carefully crafted but significant change could fall equally over many years and therefore escape scrutiny.

As importantly, how is the costing of the change decided? Who defines what is and is not a fiscal measure—a measure with a potential impact on the GDP of this country? I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, who also questioned the scope of what might be considered significant. Is the Minister able to give your Lordships’ House additional context about how that figure was arrived at and what will be in and out of scope? Might there be a temptation for a Chancellor to make one, two or more announcements totalling just under £30 billion, or 1% of GDP, over several years, and in doing so still substantially change the fiscal picture of our nation?

The second factor is that the change is excluded if it is temporary—if it will unwind within two years and is in response to an emergency. The world of the Treasury is littered with tax and spend decisions which were “temporary” and “emergency” at the time yet still became a permanent part of the fiscal picture. Many noble Lords mentioned income tax, which of course is one of the most famous, but I am sure there are many others—I think fuel duty was also mentioned.

This stipulation that temporary emergency measures be excluded puts the OBR in a difficult position. The OBR must decide what counts as a spending emergency and what does not—the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. The OBR is not part of decision-making within government, and it is reasonable to assume that the OBR will not have all the information available with which to reach a rather rapid judgment about whether something is an emergency.

If the OBR disagrees with Ministers, the process by which it would do so, and the consequences, are unclear. Would the OBR notify the Treasury of its decision, and would the Treasury then delay the announcement, or not? Would the OBR continue its work and produce a report, and over what timeframe? Would the OBR have full access to all the information relating to a temporary emergency measure? What impact would all this have on the markets?

I hope the Minister agrees that, in the haste to get this Bill into the current legislative gap, there are still significant questions to be answered. Has he considered whether the OBR should be under the same obligations when temporary emergency measures are announced but given the latitude to produce the report after the announcement has been made?

I have some questions around OBR decision-making, assuming that the measure is in scope of the arrangements currently in the Bill. How much notice will the OBR get that a fiscally significant announcement is planned? How much time will the OBR have to prepare and present its assessment, and how detailed will that assessment be? Is it the Minister’s expectation that a fiscally significant announcement will be accompanied by an assessment or a statement from the OBR setting out the reasons why one is not appropriate? There is a big grey area there in which I am sure the markets will show great interest. Will the OBR publish a summary of the information that it used to reach its determination one way or the other?

I note that the information in the draft Charter for Budget Responsibility text published on 18 July was quite limited. I would be grateful if the Minister could let your Lordships’ House know whether there will be any further guidance for the OBR around this, because I see pitfalls everywhere—where it may be charged with being too political when politics should not be part of what it does.

I listened with great interest to the wise words of many noble Lords when it came to the OBR’s governance and operations, particularly those of my noble friend Lady Noakes and, of course, my colleague and noble friend Lord Altrincham. The OBR cannot itself be beyond scrutiny, and I hope that the Minister will consider their words, alongside wider input into how we measure and present our public finances from the noble Lords, Lord Eatwell, Lord Davies of Brixton and Lord Sikka and the noble Baronesses, Lady Wheatcroft and Lady Bennett. There is an opportunity to continue to debate how public finances appear in front of the public, and it is incredibly important.

To conclude, the Bill before your Lordships’ House can be described only as a disappointment. It is with sorrow that I reflect on the political theatre accompanying it in political statements from the Cabinet Office and in contributions in the Commons and, to a lesser extent, your Lordships’ House. When he took office, the new Prime Minister seemed to imply that this Government would occupy the highest pedestal and would be above petty and theatrical politics. It is clear now that this is not the case. This Bill will be the first to receive Royal Assent under the new Labour Government; part of me thinks that is oddly appropriate. This Bill cannot be amended in your Lordships’ House, so to the statute book it will go.

Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [HL]

Baroness Vere of Norbiton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th September 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be back in this Room—sadly, standing on this side. Nevertheless, it is an interesting experience being in opposition and doing my first Committee—a learning experience. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in scrutinising the Bill. I recognise that we are at the beginning of the Session and sometimes it takes a while for things to get into place. There has been quite a lot of work done and I think we have made some very good progress. I, too, did not speak on Second Reading, and I blame that entirely on the Prime Minister, because he extended Parliament and I was already on holiday, so therefore I could not do that. I am very grateful and put on record my thanks to my colleague, my noble friend Lady Penn, who did it in my stead.

The Bill was originally developed by the previous Government and was waiting for parliamentary time, so I think my role today is to test the thinking of the new Government to make sure that they are still on the same page. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for kicking off this debate so eloquently and knowledgeably. I note her concerns about the scope of the Bill. I would love to say that she did not slightly lose me, but she did, so I will come back to that if it seems to be a problem that we need to look at.

I want to go back—to be helpful, possibly to me—to first principles on this. Having listened to the contributions that have gone before me, I think I have got it right that there are three groups of financial institutions. I am going to call them “banks”, because “financial institutions” is long and it takes a while to get my tongue around.

The first group are the MREL—the big eight banks. These are the ones that have been directed by the Bank of England to hold MREL, and they must also submit a resolvability assessment framework, or RAF, to regulators. The RAF is structured so that these firms can think about how their business works and what capabilities they need to achieve the three resolvability outcomes: having adequate financial resources; being able to continue business through resolution restructuring; and effective communication and co-ordination.

I read somewhere that the 2024 assessment of these documents was due to be published in September, and I should like an update as to whether it has been published. Can the Minister comment on the outcomes of this scrutiny: is the system working? I understand that one bank was not quite there yet. Let us see whether we are going to try to exclude the largest banks from the scheme or whether we follow the suggestion of my noble friend Lady Noakes of getting the involvement of the Treasury. We need to test whether those banks which are deemed too big to fail have a coherent and funded plan in place should they get into financial difficulty. If that were the case, there would be some argument for potentially excluding them from the Bill, but there should at least be some safeguards in place.

Then there is the second group. This was raised with me by UK Finance, and this is why my amendment is slightly different to those of other people. There are those banks in the second group that are on the glide path to full MREL status. These institutions will get there, but it would be helpful to get an update from the Minister as to how many institutions make up this second group so that we can consider further whether there is a substantial risk and where that risk might reasonably lie—and so how long they will take to reach their destination.

Finally, there is the third group. These are the important ones. They are the ones that the Bill should be focused on. These are the smaller banks, and they are often innovative, they are often very high growth and sometimes that in itself can lead to challenges. It is these banks that the Bill seeks to target. Indeed, it was my understanding, as it was that of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that they would exclusively benefit from this scheme.

If things start to go awry, due to either a business-specific issue or wider market turmoil, these proposed powers would create this mechanism where the banking sector itself, in its entirety—all three groups—would fund the recapitalisation of the relevant bank or banks, and the taxpayer would be relieved of that burden. So that all makes perfect sense to me.

Then we come to the reasonable worst-case scenario, which I think is what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, was referring to. It is not beyond our imagination that things could get very bad very quickly, with a number of small or even medium-sized banks getting into trouble at the same time. The first group would, I hope, have their MREL in place; they would have their plan, which has been approved by the regulators to make sure that they continue.

I am slightly less clear what would happen to the second group—those on the glide path to MREL—were there to be a market-wide event. These are significant institutions and if they are to be included in this mechanism, we get into issues of how the banking sector then repays that through the levy, which I will come on to. There might well be a situation where one, two or more quite substantial institutions need recapitalisation from the FSCS in the same financial year. Have the Minister’s officials done any sort of assessment of how bad that could possibly get and any thinking about what the plan would be if it were to get that bad? Also, what would the hurdle be for declaring this sort of state of emergency?

While the FSCS might have a looming potential liability from the second group, there is also the third group to be considered. These ones are the potential future lifeblood of our financial sector in the United Kingdom and they would most likely need a relatively small amount of recapitalisation funding to get them through the turmoil. This is why parity is needed around the applicability of the scheme proposed in the Bill, but also the circumstances in which the scheme would reasonably and rationally be used—and, frankly, the circumstances in which it would not be, because it would just not work. In a reasonable worst-case scenario, how is anyone going to decide which ones get saved and which do not? One has to rely upon the amount of funding that could be affordable over several years of a levy applied to the UK banking sector, but that is not going to be enough money. How would that resolve itself and what would that process look like?

As mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which I picked up in one of the briefings as well, the FSCS will have significant powers to apply the levy, not only in the financial year when the event or events take place but in subsequent financial years. If I am in the UK banking sector and things have gone pretty bad, and I suddenly have this massive weight of a levy going over several years to repay the events of one financial year, that to me is concerning.

It is also concerning because, of course, things are done differently in the EU, so you would get a slight mismatch from a competitiveness perspective. I would be worried about that. Has the Minister done an assessment of the impact of this potential multiyear hit, once we have an idea of the reasonable size and then the potential maximum size? Has he assessed the competitiveness of the UK banking sector, should this multiyear levy suddenly be required? How much could the UK’s system cost our banking sector and over what period of time? Are there circumstances, and in which circumstances, when rationally there is a systemic failure and the only person who could step in would be the taxpayer? I do not want the taxpayer to step in, trust me, but that would prevent permanent damage to one of our most important sectors.

The other key consideration is the impact on the FSCS and its ability to meet its obligations under the deposit guarantee insurance scheme, because if that has all gone to recapitalisation funding, there will be nothing left. I believe we will come on to that later in Committee.

This is a range of thoughtful amendments tabled by noble Lords and I am grateful for them. As many noble Lords pointed out, they very much go along the same sorts of lines. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to them. I will not go into a great amount of detail on them, but I note that my Amendment 8 takes into account those on the glide path, which we need to recognise. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for the fine case she made for Amendment 22; I will move quickly on from that.

That brings me to the remaining amendment in the group: Amendment 18, which is in my name. Here, in essence, I am probing whether the Minister is content with the current imbalance between the banks liable to pay the levy versus the ones that, realistically, will make use of the new powers. Does he feel it is fair that the entire banking sector pays to recapitalise what, I feel, the Committee hopes will be smaller banks only? Does he accept and is he comfortable with the largest banks paying twice, in essence—particularly as they will have to have limited or no input in or influence on many of the events that might cause a resolution event or events? These largest banks will pay twice: once for their MREL and associated requirements, and again in the event of a resolution event or events of which they would not be able to take advantage.

Context is important here. We will come back to costs again but banks already pay a plethora of taxes, levies and charges, both to regulators and directly to Treasury funds. There is the bank levy, the bank corporation tax surcharge, the economic crime levy, the FSCS levy and the FCA/PRA fees. That is a lot—and let us recall that these costs are never borne by the banks themselves; they will always be borne by the businesses and consumers who use them.

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for taking part in this debate on the first group of amendments. I note that the scope of the mechanism is a key and central issue, both for noble Lords and for the wider banking sector. I hope to offer some reassurance to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and other noble Lords regarding this concern.

I start by addressing Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which would prevent a recapitalisation payment involving a bank that has issued minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, otherwise known as MREL. I stress that the Government’s strong policy intention is for the mechanism provided by the Bill to be used primarily to support the resolution of small banks. The Government therefore do not generally expect the mechanism set out in this Bill to be used on the type of firms that these amendments would seek to exclude.

The principal issue here is whether that intention should be set out in the Bill. The Government’s considered view is that it is right for the Bill to contain some flexibility for the Bank of England to be able to use the mechanism more broadly in some circumstances. That is because firm failures can be unpredictable and there could be circumstances in which it would be appropriate to use the mechanism on such firms.

For example, this may be relevant in situations where a small bank has grown but is still in the process of reaching its end-state MREL requirements. Firms in this position would have at least some MREL resources to support recapitalisation but the new mechanism could be used to meet any remaining shortfall if judged necessary. Without the proposed mechanism, there would be a potential gap in this scenario, creating risks to public funds and financial stability.

Ultimately, the decision to use the mechanism would rest with the Bank of England, having assessed the resolution conditions. The Bank of England is required by statute to consult the Treasury before any use of resolution tools, providing an effective and legally binding window for the Treasury to raise concerns if it had any.

I also point out that, during the Government’s consultation period, more respondents were in favour of the scope set out in the Bill than opposed. I appreciate noble Lords’ concerns about this issue and am happy to commit to exploring how to provide further reassurance on the Government’s intent via the code of practice.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked whether the Bank of England should reduce MREL requirements in the knowledge that it could instead use FSCS funds. The Bank of England sets MREL requirements independently of government but within a framework set out in legislation. Any changes to firms’ MREL requirements would therefore be a decision for the Bank of England. The Bank of England will consider, in the light of this Bill and wider developments, whether any changes to its approach to MREL would be appropriate.

I turn briefly to Amendment 8, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, which similarly aims to exclude from the new mechanism those firms that are required to hold MREL. I hope that I have already fully responded to her concerns in that regard; the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for small banks, but that it is right to retain flexibility.

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[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

It may be best if I write to noble Lords to clarify this point.

Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, would exclude from the scope of the new mechanism those firms whose MREL requirement exceeds their minimum capital requirement. This would include both firms expected to be transferred to a private sector purchaser and those bailed in when they fail.

I stress to the noble Lord, as I have to others, that the Government’s intention is for the mechanism to be used primarily for small banks. That is ultimately central to the Bill’s purpose, but I emphasise the importance of having flexibility in the legislation for the Bank of England’s ability to respond effectively in a crisis. As I have noted, this may, for example, be relevant if a firm is still in the process of building up its MREL requirements to be able to fully implement a bail-in strategy.

I also note the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which intends to ensure that, if the Bank of England seeks to use the new mechanism on a bank required to hold bail-in liabilities, it must first get the consent of the Treasury.

I am conscious that there are other amendments related to the subject of Treasury approval for the use of the Bank of England’s powers and that we will turn to this matter more substantively later. What I will say now to the noble Baroness is that the Government consider it important for the Bank of England to be able to take decisions in a resolution independently and decisively.

I will mention two important safeguards. First, as required by statute, the Treasury will always be consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions. Secondly, if using the mechanism on larger banks had implications for public funds, such as requiring the use of the National Loans Fund, this would be subject to Treasury consent. But I repeat that the Government’s strong policy intention is ultimately for the mechanism to be used primarily on small banks.

Amendment 18 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Vere. It seeks to clarify the rationale for the scope of financial institutions liable to pay the levy for the new mechanism delivered by the Bill, given the expectation that the new mechanism would apply primarily to small banks. The Government believe there to be benefits to mirroring the existing process for recouping the costs of paying out depositors in insolvency and maintaining a broad-based levy. In particular, as noted in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, the exclusion of larger banks would raise concerns about the affordability of the levy for other banks, which would in turn increase risks to public funds and the overall viability of the new mechanism.

In addition, in cases where the new mechanism may be used, the counterfactual would be for the failed bank to enter insolvency. As a result, the sector would already be liable to contribute to the costs of a small bank failure. As set out in the Government’s cost-benefit analysis, while highly case-specific, the upfront costs of an insolvency are generally expected to be greater than those under the new mechanism delivered by the Bill. The Government therefore feel it is right to mirror the arrangements in place for an insolvency and to maintain a broad-based levy.

The noble Baroness asked about the Bank’s resolvability assessment framework. I am told that the latest update was published in August. She asked how many firms were on the glide path. I will write to her with specific details, and if any of her other questions are not answered in my speech today, I will write to her also on those points.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

One concern was raised in the document that has been published, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s comments on that.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Baroness on that point.

I turn finally to Amendment 22 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which concerns the use of the bail-in resolution tool. Section 12AA of the Banking Act 2009 sets out the principles by which the Bank of England calculates the shortfall amount when the bail-in tool is used and, as a consequence of that calculation, how much of a failed firm’s resources needs to be bailed in. The addition to Section 12AA in Clause 4, which this amendment seeks to prevent, ensures that any available funds from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme via the new mechanism could be taken into account when calculating the shortfall amount and, as a consequence, how much of a firm’s resources would need to be bailed in when the new mechanism is used alongside the bail-in tool.

This change to Section 12AA is important as there are some circumstances where bail-in may be the preferred tool for the Bank of England to use as a precursor to transfer of the firm to a bridge bank or private sector purchaser, even if the bank is small. This is because the bail-in tool permits the writing down of subordinated debt or other liabilities, to which mandatory reduction under the bridge bank or private sector purchaser tools does not apply. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate to write down the subordinated debt or other liabilities of a small bank. The intention is therefore for the bail-in tool to be available alongside use of the new mechanism.

In such circumstances, this amendment would preclude the Bank of England, when calculating the shortfall amount, from being able to take into account any funds that were available from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme under the new mechanism. As a consequence, when determining how much of the firm’s subordinated debt and other liabilities should be bailed in, the Bank of England would be obliged not to factor in those external funds and would have to write down more of the firm’s resources than it needed to. In certain circumstances this would be undesirable and could undermine the wider goals of a resolution process. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, suggested worked examples. We will of course take that idea away for further consideration ahead of Report.

I hope that these explanations have been helpful and that I have provided some reassurance on these points. I will of course write where I have indicated that I will do so. In the circumstances, I hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I briefly add my support to what the noble Baronesses have said. This is drafted extraordinarily widely. The words

“another person has incurred or might incur in connection with the recapitalisation”

could theoretically include the legal costs of the shareholders of the bank that is going bust, for example. We have to find some way of reducing that scope. I had attempted to deal with this in Amendment 12 on reporting, but having heard what the noble Baroness said I do not think that does it. We need to find some way of narrowing it.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this amendment and I added my name to it. I am also grateful for the comments made by my noble friend Lord Moylan. He is not in his place but he raised this issue during Second Reading and set people thinking about it.

I do not have a huge amount to add. I agree with the comments made by my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, but I would also say that this will have to be a double-edged attack. Not only must we potentially do something on this but the reporting of it will have to be clear and go into great detail.

When it comes to expenses, all noble Lords will be aware that the costs of financial lawyers and other professional financial advisers are not de minimis. The total cost of expenses may well exceed the cost of the recapitalisation of the bank, so it is important that we ensure that there are some guard-rails around this, recognising as ever that these costs will end up falling not on the banks but on the people who bank with the banks.

Does the Minister have any view as to roughly how large an expense bill might be? I do not even want to guess, because I hope that he will be able to give me some idea of what we are looking at.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, mentioned the expenses incurred by another person. I think that all noble Lords who have spoken so far agree that that is extraordinarily broad, and we will need to consider what we might do about that. Potentially, one could put something in the code of practice but, again, is that sufficient? We might also protect ourselves by requiring Treasury consent—who knows? Again, we might want to think about that. Going back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, it is tempting to think about these things as a single event, and we might be talking about £10 million-worth of expenses, but if a whole bunch of such events happened at the same time, we could very soon be talking about real money. We need to get to the bottom of this. I look forward to the comments from the Minister.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise only to celebrate the fact that my noble friend Lady Noakes had so much time during recess in which to draft all these marvellous amendments because they certainly get the little grey cells going. I appreciate her eloquent explanation of her amendment and the very practical example of what could happen that was provided by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This goes back to a topic that was raised earlier about there being a certain feeling of a blank cheque in terms of certain elements of the scheme and wanting to ensure that there are appropriate guard-rails.

I will not go much further; I will come on to my observations about the sharing of powers and responsibilities between Ministers and regulators in due course. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I note that this amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, is one of several concerning whether Treasury consent is needed when the Bank of England is exercising its powers—in this case, when the mechanism is used more than once for a particular institution.

Addressing the specific case of the amendment, although I think we can agree that it would usually be desirable to have to use the mechanism only once in respect of a particular institution, this may not always be the case. As an example, if a failed bank is transferred to a bridge bank, there is a risk of further deterioration in its balance sheet over time. It is foreseeable that, if that were the case, the Bank of England may need to use the mechanism again in order to recapitalise the institution; this would allow the Bank of England to maintain confidence in the firm, promoting financial stability.

The Government believe that it is important for the Bank of England to have reasonable flexibility to do so, reflecting that the full implications of a bank failure are hard to anticipate in advance. In addition, if further approvals are required, this may undermine market confidence in the original resolution action given that such approvals cannot be presumed in advance.

However, I note a few important pieces of context to this broader position. First, as required by statute, the Treasury is always consulted as part of the Bank of England’s formal assessment of the resolution conditions assessment. In practice, there is also frequent and ongoing dialogue between the authorities. Therefore, the Government are confident that there are proper and robust channels by which it could raise concerns if it had any.

Secondly, given that the new mechanism is ultimately funded by industry, we would expect the Bank of England to consult the Prudential Regulation Authority on any additional request to use the new mechanism. This is important as the Prudential Regulation Authority determines what is considered affordable to be levied on the sector in any given year.

Finally, if additional use of the mechanism had implications for public funds, such as requiring use of the National Loans Fund, provision of this additional funding would be subject to Treasury consent. Overall, the Government believe that this strikes the right balance in preserving the Bank of England’s freedom of action while ensuring the appropriate level of Treasury input into decision-making.

I hope that this provides some comfort to the noble Baroness and respectfully ask that she withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I rise briefly to build on the comments made by previous speakers. This is an important issue. Again, it is worth recalling that this will not just be the recapitalisation funding; there might also be associated expenses. I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, about the Basel accord and it being a subsidiary et cetera, but it strikes me that this is of a different level of political salience than a purely domestic collapse might be, where one has established structures. It could get incredibly uncomfortable for the Government if we do not have a better and fuller understanding of what safeguards exist already to make sure that banks are appropriately capitalised by their parents abroad and of how we avoid the perception of the Bank of England acting in interests which are not necessarily aligned with those of Daily Mail readers—let us put it that way. It is not that they have to align with Daily Mail readers, but one might imagine that this could be very problematic.

I would like some reassurance about what we would do if it were to be a significant amount rather than the very small amount for Silicon Valley Bank and how we would seek to address the concerns that would inevitably arise from the general public.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I hope I can provide some clarification on how the resolution regime operates currently with respect to subsidiaries of international banks, and therefore how the Government have approached the design of the new mechanism with respect to those banks.

One of the strengths of the UK’s banking sector is that a number of international banks seek to operate within the UK, including by setting up subsidiaries. These are often providers of critical banking services, such as current accounts, business accounts and sources of working capital to businesses. It is therefore important that a robust system of regulation is in place to ensure that such subsidiaries can operate safely within the UK. This includes ensuring that in the event of their failure they can be managed in an orderly way. The resolution regime does not currently make a distinction between domestic UK banks and subsidiaries of international banks in terms of which authority is responsible for taking resolution action in the UK. In all cases, this responsibility falls to the Bank of England, except where there are implications for public funds. The Government continue to believe this is appropriate.

While the failure of banks is rare, the most recent example, and the genesis of this Bill, was Silicon Valley Bank UK, itself a subsidiary of an international bank. The Government consider that there were two key lessons from that event. First, it is critical that the Bank of England has the flexibility to move decisively during a crisis. Secondly, it is important to introduce the new mechanism delivered by the Bill in those cases where there is not a willing buyer. The Government do not therefore believe that there is a strong justification for treating subsidiaries differently from domestic UK banks and requiring a further set of approvals. To do so would create additional obstacles to efficient resolution decisions, which recent experience suggests can be necessary.

The noble Baroness asked whether the Bank would have used the mechanism on SVB. I cannot comment on an individual case or decision that it may have taken, but the case showed the usefulness of the option of having a mechanism provided to the Bank.

The noble Baroness also asked whether this issue will be covered in the code. The code updates will cover a broad range of issues following the Bill’s passage. We will progress and publish that code swiftly.

The noble Baroness further asked whether a parent company should be able to support the failure of a subsidiary. While the parent company may be able to recapitalise its subsidiary outside of resolution, there may be circumstances where that is not possible, as was the case with SVB UK. It is important that the Bank of England has the necessary tools to deal with a failing firm regardless of its home jurisdiction. In practice, the mechanism uses the Bank of England’s transfer and writedown powers, so the parent company would suffer losses on its investment in a subsidiary.

I therefore respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I rise to move Amendment 6. Noble Lords will be pleased to know that I get a bit of a break after this one.

This amendment would require the Bank of England to obtain Treasury consent before it uses the recapitalisation power. When I introduced my last two amendments, which contained a requirement for Treasury consent, I explained that they were a device to probe issues about the use of the recapitalisation payment power. In this amendment, my use of Treasury consent is not a probing device and I am focusing on the role of the Treasury in the broader context of accountability.

The Minister is a newcomer as far as the passage of financial services legislation in your Lordships’ House is concerned; some of us are older hands at it. When the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 went through this House, accountability was one of the key themes which was debated on and off throughout its passage. This amendment and a later amendment return to that theme of accountability.

The Bank of England has been given huge powers by successive Governments, which we debated at length in passing the 2023 Act, but, like many other bodies which have accumulated in the public sector, it has relatively weak accountability. The governor may need to turn up to the Treasury Select Committee for an uncomfortable couple of hours from time to time, but that is just about it. One great outcome from the 2023 Act has been the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House, which is chaired by my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean and on which several noble Lords on this Committee sit. I hope that our new committee will add significantly to parliamentary scrutiny of financial services quangos, but neither House of Parliament has any real powers in relation to these public sector bodies that have been given very significant powers.

This problem is not confined to the Bank of England or to financial services. The Industry and Regulators Committee of your Lordships’ House produced a report earlier this year, Who Watches the Watchdogs?, which will be debated in this House next week. One of its findings was that regulators, as a particular kind of public sector body

“exercise substantial powers on behalf of Parliament and the public, but are not subject to the same forms of accountability as ministers; to quote one witness, ‘the people can replace their elected representatives, but they can’t vote out bad regulators’”.

That applies, mutatis mutandis, to many other forms of public sector body.

The report noted that there was a

“widespread perception … that regulators’ accountability to Parliament is insufficient”.

It went on to recommend that there should be a new independent statutory body to support Parliament in holding regulators to account. All of this will sound familiar to those of us who took part in debates on the 2023 financial services Bill, because my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley tabled amendments trying to set up something similar for the main public sector bodies in financial services—the PRA, the Bank of England, the FCA and so on. I hardly ever support setting up new public sector bodies, so I did not support my noble friend last year, and I would not support the Industry and Regulators Committee’s recommendation either. It does not form an approach that I think is the right one, but I wholeheartedly agree with the analysis that accountability is a real issue for these public sector bodies.

By enjoining the Treasury in any decisions as to the use of the recapitalisation power, Parliament gains the additional ability to question Treasury Ministers about the use of the power and the circumstances that surround the use of it. At the moment, it is easy for the Treasury Minister to say, “Nothing to do with me; it’s all down to that lot up in Threadneedle Street”. We have had many frustrating exchanges with Treasury Ministers along these lines, including when SVB UK was given away to HSBC. Treasury consent would be an important enhancement of the process of parliamentary accountability.

As I said in the earlier group, I do not believe that getting Treasury consent is necessarily an onerous part of the process, but it would be a small price to pay for an increase in accountability, so I regard this as a modest addition to the framework created by the Bill. Obviously, I have drafted this in connection with a specific power in the Bill, but it is a principle which could be applied to many uses of significant powers by the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA.

The use of the power by the Bank of England could be entirely straightforward, in which case it is unlikely to engage the interest of Parliament, but there are likely to be some cases where the use of the power is controversial or where there are questions to be asked about whether bank failure is associated with some form of regulatory failure. Parliament should be very much engaged in cases of this nature, and my amendment would provide the platform for such engagement.

I know that the Minister will be briefed by his officials to resist this amendment, and I am sure that it suits the Treasury to be able to operate behind the scenes with the Bank of England but in a largely deniable way. I appeal to the Minister’s instincts, which I am sure are sound, about the need for effective parliamentary accountability. I beg to move.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am incredibly grateful for all the amendments from my noble friend Lady Noakes, but particularly this one. It gives the Committee the opportunity to consider the overarching balance of power and I think it is right that we start to do so—or continue to do so, as my noble friend pointed out.

I am the poacher turned gamekeeper. I am no longer a Treasury Minister. I have just spent many glorious months at the Treasury and prior to that I spent eight years as a Minister in government. I was in the Department for Transport for a long time and a Lords Whip, which many noble Lords will know puts one in touch with all sorts of government departments and various people giving you briefings and all sorts of things. One learns quite a lot about things and it is all very interesting. I am grateful for the opportunity to touch on the bigger picture, which my noble friend has allowed us to do.

The scrutiny and accountability of regulators is somewhat lacking. It was possibly the biggest surprise that I had as a Minister over the years. Having said that, each regulator is very different, and I have worked with a wide variety of them. Each wears the independence cloak in a different manner: some regulators, despite claiming independence, will actually work very closely with and listen to the Minister; other regulators, when I tried to ask them a question, literally slammed the door. It is really not on. Something needs to change.

It is entirely natural that operational decisions, based on a set of detailed regulations, should sit with regulators. Of course they should; that is unarguable. Ministers do not really have the time or the knowledge. They could do it, because they could have the knowledge as Ministers can be briefed, but they would not have the time to do it and it would gum up the system. That is fine. However, the balance between who takes the operational decisions and the broader operations of regulators is somewhat awry, in my view.

We have handed over a large amount of policy-development, policy-making, regulation-drafting, code of practice-drafting and consultation-issuing activities to regulators, over which Ministers have no insight. I know that officials from the Treasury will recall some issues that happened under the last Government fairly recently, when one of the regulators just took off on a path. I asked, “Why are you going down that path? That’s not a path you should be on. Come back”. They replied, “But we’re independent”.

How are we going to fix this? I have a niggling feeling that the Bill continues a trend to which I see no end. Fairly broad-brush powers are being given to a regulator or regulators that are then subject to interpretation and implementation. Often that interpretation and implementation cause the problems. There is mission creep. The regulators add another team of officials; the Minister never sees these officials and does not know what they do. They interpret the policy slightly differently, because they were not involved in its original development and so on. All this happens with little or no oversight.

I used to sit on the other side and would happily stand up to say—my goodness—the best thing that a Minister can say: “I’m sorry; I cannot comment on that. Regulators are independent”. It is really easy. The second thing I would say, if that did not wash, is that, “Ministers are accountable to Select Committees in Parliament”. Are they really? No, they are not really. I have appeared before Select Committees and it can be a bit uncomfortable for a while. They might ask you a couple of difficult questions, but it is not going to cause you to lose more than a couple of nights’ sleep.

Quite often, by the time you get to a Select Committee appearance by AN Other head of a regulator, it is too little, too late. The policies have already been devised, developed and put in place. The damage has already been done.

Furthermore, there seems to be no mechanism by which recommendations from these accountability sessions in Parliament are mandated for action by the relevant regulator. Many regulators can be told or asked by the Select Committee, “Please can you do X, Y and Z”, but they can basically take no insight from that at all.

I feel this quite personally, having recently lived through it, because throughout my time as a Minister I had the fear that if things go horribly wrong—sadly, sometimes they do—it is not the regulator that feels the heat. It is the Minister. One cannot go to the media and say, “The regulator is independent. I had nothing to do with it”. That does not wash with the public. Now that we have broken the connection between Ministers and regulators, we are in a very difficult situation. The Minister has no power—and that is why the fear exists—to make sure that things cannot go horribly wrong, even if they spot things that need to be improved.

This is but one amendment in a whole series. Yes, it was a useful device for getting amendments down for other elements for debate, but this is serious. My noble friend Lady Noakes is trying to take back control from the regulators and rebalance the system to enable Ministers to input at an appropriate point. She has a point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked why I allowed my amendment to be grouped in this way. I was simply trying to expedite matters for us and I thought we did not need another whole group, which would get the Minister up and down again. I agree with the other amendments and everything that has been said on this group. They deal with issues around conflicts and so on, and transparency is one of the best weapons we have that presumably will be allowed or in scope.

My amendment is one of those that do not read as I originally wrote it, because again we came into scope issues. I could not get the exact amendment that I wanted, so this was the best that I could do. Obviously, it is a companion to the amendments in the first group, which were saying that the majority of us want to limit to a threshold equal to MREL. If you therefore want to resolve banks that are a little bigger, you would have to shift MREL. I am not going to cry over that; I will cheer.

That may be an improper tactic but we do not have any other tactics to try to focus the PRA on the damage being done to the growth of smaller banks by putting MREL where it was not intended to be. We are out of line internationally and we do not really have any good justification for that. If there is a division between those banks that can be resolved and those that cannot, I still think that it goes there and the Bank will therefore have to give its view as to why. Perhaps it wants an extension in some way, so that it can get at bigger banks. What do we get back from that? That is the thought process that lies behind my amendment.

I support all these amendments. If they are knocked into a format that is suitable for Report, they would be very good additions to the Bill.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

My Lords, I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lady Noakes for thinking carefully about reporting and tabling amendments accordingly. I had to support one of these amendments and I am afraid that I picked the noble Lord’s on this occasion. This is not favouritism; I was purely trying to spread the love a little. But as we approach Report, we might want to go back and check that whatever we end up putting into the Bill is future-proofed.

Sometimes one can put in too much detail, then people can slide round the edges by saying, “Oh, you didn’t tell us to do that”. Alternatively, there is being too broad, when people slide round another edge by not putting in the detail that you want to see. There is a balance, but this is certainly worth taking forward and looking at. Obviously, the accountability element is key here.

Another thought I had around this was on timing. Again, sometimes one can go too far and have a report too far in the distance, so by the time it comes out no one remembers what the problem was in the first place. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, says “three months”; I was thinking “as soon as practical” or, in any event, within six months. I do not know, but in very complicated and complex circumstances there might still be issues and context to resolve to produce a report that is relevant in timing terms, but also incorporates everything that stakeholders wish to see.

When I was a Minister, my heart would sink when an amendment was put down about producing a report. I would think, “Another report—are we really going to read it?” To me, the question is: we might produce a timely report in a good fashion and with the right amount of detail, et cetera, but how do we then ensure the scrutiny of that report? It goes back to the issue of expenses which, as we agreed, could be quite significant. But who is going to look at those expenses and suck their teeth? Will they look at the legal fees of firm XYZ and say, “Do you know what? That’s too much”. Who is going to do that? Is there any body at all—not anybody—which would be able to look at it and do that? It has been suggested to me that the National Audit Office might occasionally pay attention to this sort of thing. This is about trying to get us beyond “Just produce a report”. Well, just produce a report and then somebody can look at it. I am sure that these are going to be great reports, but even so it is a concern.

I am looking forward to the response of the Minister. I believe that this should be our last group today, fingers crossed, but I am not sure that many of us want to go outside, given the weather.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I fully understand the substantial focus on the reporting requirements that will apply when the new mechanism is used. I shall start by addressing Amendment 12 on this point, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

The Government agree that, should the new mechanism be used, it is right for there to be a reporting mechanism to hold the Bank of England to account for its decisions, and that this should encompass estimates of the costs of different options. However, the Government intend to achieve the principles of scrutiny and transparency in a different way; namely, through the existing requirements placed on the Bank of England under the Banking Act 2009. As set out in their response to the consultation, it is the Government’s intention to use these existing reporting mechanisms to ensure that the Bank of England is subject to appropriate scrutiny when using the mechanism. The Government have committed to updating their code of practice to provide further details on how these reporting requirements will apply when the mechanism is used; I can re-confirm that the Government intend to include in the code confirmation that, after the new mechanism has been used, the Bank of England will be required to disclose the estimated costs that were considered as part of these reports.

The Government consider that using the code of practice is an appropriate approach to hold the Bank of England to account for its actions, rather than putting these requirements in the Bill. The Bank of England is legally required to have regard to the code and the Government are required to consult the Banking Liaison Panel, made up of regulatory and industry stakeholders, when updating it. Using the code will therefore ensure that a full and thorough consultation is taken on the approach. Given the complex and potentially fast-moving nature of bank failures, this is important to ensure that any approach is sufficiently nuanced to account for the range of possible outcomes under insolvency or through the use of other resolution tools. The Government believe that amendments to the code of practice are more likely to be successful in achieving this outcome. As I committed at Second Reading, the Government will share drafts of these updates to the code of practice as soon as is practicable and will provide sufficient opportunity for industry stakeholders to be consulted on them.

I acknowledge the further amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—Amendment 24—which would make such reports available to Parliament when the new mechanism was used to facilitate a transfer to another buyer. It is the Government’s clear intention that any such reports required under the Banking Act, following the use of the mechanism, will be made public and laid before Parliament. The Government would not make reports public only if there were clear public interest grounds not to do so, such as commercial confidentiality reasons. This may particularly be the case when exercising the power to sell a failing bank to a commercial buyer. While such cases would hopefully be limited, it is important that they are allowed for.

I appreciate the intent of Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which would require the Bank of England to report to the Treasury more swiftly than under the current requirements. The use of resolution powers is complex; in some cases, the Bank of England may be executing a resolution over a long period, particularly when placing a firm into a bridge bank. It is therefore sensible for the Bank of England to report a reasonable period of time after exercising its powers, ensuring that its report provides a full and meaningful assessment. On reporting more broadly, I repeat the points made in response to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

Finally, Amendment 25 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the Chancellor to assess in the light of the Bill the appropriateness of the thresholds used by the Bank of England to determine which firms are required to hold additional loss-absorbing resources, known as MREL. As before, I should start by noting that the Government recognise the important role played by smaller and specialist banks in supporting the UK economy. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Baroness at Second Reading.

The Government have carefully considered the perspective of such banks in developing the mechanism in the Bill, which is intended to be a proportionate solution. On MREL, the Bank of England is responsible for determining MREL requirements for individual firms within a framework set out in legislation; that is an important principle, as the resolution authority, the Bank of England, is ultimately best placed to judge what resources banks should hold so that they can fail safely. I point out to the noble Baroness that, as set out in the Government’s consultation response, the Bank of England has committed to consider the potential case for changes to its indicative thresholds. Specifically, it has noted that it will consider whether any changes are appropriate in light of this Bill and other wider developments.

I hope that these points provide reassurance to noble Lords. On that basis, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.