Identity Documents Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 17th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shipley]

My Lords, I would like to raise a further issue which relates to the wording of the amendment. It requires the surrender of the ID card for there to be a reimbursement of £30. There may well be a category of person who would like the £30 back and feel entitled in law to get the £30 back but who actually wants to keep their ID card. Of course, there is a further issue here, which may have struck a number of us. With only 12,000 or so cards in circulation, the residual value of the identity card in future might well be a great deal higher than £30. So the question may arise of how many people with an eye to the future would be keen to get that £30 back now but to retain their identity card. Some further examination of these and other issues might be helpful.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I recognise the strength of sentiment expressed on all sides of the House. If the House will permit, I shall explain why I cannot accept the amendment.

The Government set out at an early stage that they would not continue with this legislation and that they would repeal the Bill. That has been the long-standing position of the Government, well known in advance. It is fair to say that the Government made their position known on the fact that the ID cards would no longer have any validity.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Excuse me, but that was the opinion of the Opposition at the time, not of the Government.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Earl is quite right. It has always been the intention, whether in opposition or in government, to scrap the ID cards scheme at the least possible extra cost to the taxpayer. Our primary purpose has been to prevent further expense being incurred when we can avoid it. We have no option but to pay compensation to some contractors because we are tied in by the contracts negotiated by our predecessors. That is a contractual agreement, and we are negotiating at the moment what that final sum should be. We do not agree that there is a contract between the Government and cardholders who received a service, nor do we believe that there is any expropriation of property or rights under it. The cardholders are not card-owners; the noble Lords who said that the card was government property were quite right to say so.

[Lord Maxton]

I hear what the noble Baroness has just said about the card being government property. Is she saying, therefore, that it would be illegal for a person who had that card to use it in any way for identity purposes? In other words, if a young person was asked for ID in a pub who still had their ID card, if they produced their ID card would they be committing an offence by using a government document?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I think not, any more than if one uses a passport for that purpose, which is also a government document. The basis is the same.

[Lord Maxton]

But the passport is being retained. It is still going to be a legal document, whereas presumably the ID card, once it is abolished, ceases to be one.

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[Baroness Neville-Jones]

If it is a valid document, it can be used validly for identity. If it is an invalid or cancelled document, obviously it no longer has any legal status.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Under Clause 6 about the possession of false identity documents, does the ID card once it has been revoked become a false identity document? That was the point that the noble Lord was making. It is government property and it is no longer an identity document, so in using it you are probably using a false identity document.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

You are certainly no longer using a valid identity document. It is not any longer valid in law.

The Identity and Passport Service has estimated that the cost of cancelling the ID cards scheme and the national identity register will be up to £5 million. This includes an estimated figure for compensation to the contractors, which I have just mentioned, destruction costs, staffing and other administrative matters. They are all necessary costs that we cannot avoid in abolishing the scheme. A refund scheme would add 10 per cent to that cost, which we do not consider to be a trivial addition.

Noble Lords have talked about principle. One can look at that in several ways. One of the principles that seems to be on offer this afternoon is that one set of taxpayers should refund another set of taxpayers. This does not seem to be a sensible arrangement. Some say that the sum is only about £400,000—one of the noble Lords mentioned that sum—the inference being that in the grand scheme of things this is entirely insignificant. Certainly, compared with the cost of the ID card scheme that has already been paid out—over £290 million—another half a million pounds might not seem significant. That is not, I am afraid, the attitude that the coalition Government take to public spending. We have demonstrated that we have a commitment to ensuring that unnecessary and unjustifiable expenditure is stopped and that we focus on delivering more for less. We are not therefore in a position to offer this refund.

[Lord Soley]

I am listening with some puzzlement. I am not a lawyer, but the Minister has signed off this Bill as being compatible with the convention on human rights. Yet this identity document is the possession of the Government—it is a government-owned thing—and she is confiscating it without compensation. Would it not be wise to take legal advice as to whether she would face a legal challenge if she went ahead with this?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

As I have just said, we do not believe that we are expropriating anybody of their rights. If this is challenged in the courts we will obviously defend that position.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

May I follow that point? The Minister has made the proposition that there is no right in contract by the cardholders and no expropriation. On the assumption that no advice has been obtained from the law officers on these matters, would it be prudent before the next stage of the Bill to obtain such advice?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I will confirm the advice that I have received.

[Lord Morris of Aberavon]

Is the advice from the law officers?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am not sure that I can confirm that. I will seek to do so before Third Reading.

We should not exaggerate the significance of all this. Much has been made of the elderly and the very young. We have no reliable demographic information at all on who the purchasers were. We know that 3,000 of the 15,000 were given free to airside workers for a particular purpose.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

The noble Baroness is getting into the complexities and numbers of this. Is this not a matter of simple principle, irrespective of numbers? If the noble Baroness buys a good or a service and the merchant or other supplier who sells that to her fails to deliver it, she would feel cheated. If that merchant got away with it, she would feel that that undermined the good faith on which the economy and society depend. Is it not a fact that people have in good faith bought a service for 10 years, and after a matter of months, that service is being unilaterally withdrawn? Are people who have done that not entitled to feel thoroughly cheated? Is this not a disgraceful example for a Government of this country to give?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The point I was answering before noble Lords intervened was the inference somehow that we are inflicting great hardship on cardholders. We do not believe this to be the case.

We do not believe that the statutory basis of the issue of ID cards creates a contract or anything akin to a contract in relations between the Secretary of State and the cardholder. Remedies that would be available in the courts if the contract were governed by the law of contract or consumer legislation—which I think is the point raised by the noble Lord—is not available for identity cards.

One or two noble Lords have raised the issue of compromise and of whether it would be a good idea to have one. Could we not, for instance, set the cost of this against the cost of the next passport or, indeed, use the lifetime for which the present card was available? There are associated problems. I do not want to detain the House extensively on this, but the fact of the matter is that the two databases—that is to say, the identity register and the passport database—are not the same. They contain different information, issued for different purposes; their legislative frameworks for what you pay are also different. We cannot therefore simply transfer the one across from the other.

That construction of two differently governed databases with different information on them was the construction of the legislation put through by our predecessors. Unfortunately, in addition to that we are going to destroy the database. We would otherwise have the continuing cost of maintaining it. That is why it cannot be regarded as a valid document for its lifetime; there is nothing behind it against which anybody needing to check your identity would validly be able so to do. There is a problem in that it simply is not a useful document any longer.

[Lord Deben]

I understand that there may be technical reasons why my proposal does not work, but surely they do not apply to the question of a passport. If you sent your form in, it would be quite clear from all the other documents that that little card was for the same person who sent in the form. You do not have to look it up on the two databases; you just know that that is one of the cases in which they could have £30 off. I do not see that that costs anything at all.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am sorry; I thought that the noble Lord was suggesting that this card should be available for use during its previously indicated lifetime. It is of course a separate issue as to whether you could ask for a refund. There are many problems about the refund issue, one of which is that we would have to verify whether the person presenting a card was actually entitled to that refund, which would mean referring to the database. We would have to notify everybody. The costs involved—

[Lord Filkin]

I will be brief. There are times when we have to look at Civil Service advice, good and honest though it is, and apply a political judgment to it. Sometimes it is clear that, in terms of both the justice of the case and the political risk and pain of humiliation, we have to override Civil Service advice. To avoid further pain and agony to the House and to the Minister, I urge her to withdraw and say that she will look at this again.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

This is the position of the Government, my Lords.

[Lord Higgins]

In answer to an earlier intervention regarding the position of the law officers, my noble friend said that she would look at that and return to it on Third Reading. Since it would be helpful to have the law officers’ advice, which at the moment we do not have, would there not be a strong case for deferring this matter until Third Reading, at which point it would be clear?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I said that I will indeed confirm the advice that we have received on the legal aspects.

I want to make one final point before concluding: I am not sure whether the concern which has been expressed in this House is entirely shared by the public. Much has been made of public attitudes but, against the background of 15,000 cards having been taken out, we in the Government have received a grand total of 297 letters on the subject, of which 122 included complaints about refunds. That is 122 against 15,000. We should bear in mind that that is against the background of sending letters to all individuals who had taken out a card when we came into office, so one cannot say that they were uninformed about what was going to happen—that they would not be receiving a refund, because that is what we told them. That letter is also in the Library. So—

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I regret interrupting the Minister again but it really is crucial, if I may say so, for her to draw a distinction between information given to people before they purchased their cards and information given to people after they purchased their cards. Therefore, I hope that she will not lay any stress at all on what she has just said.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I understand that difference. I am saying that all 15,000 cardholders were informed specifically and in terms that these cards would be withdrawn, that they would not be valid thereafter and that there would be no refund. We have had 122 letters of complaint, not necessarily all of them from actual cardholders. I do not think that that indicates a very high level of concern about £30. One has to take into account—

[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

The House is listening with some incredulity to the defence the Minister is making of a mere £400,000 recompense. Today, the Chancellor has assured the Irish Government that he will give them £7 billion of support and here we are in the House of Lords talking about recompensing British people £400,000. It is complete and utter nonsense, if I may say so to the noble Baroness. For her own sake and for the sake of the Government, will she not at least say to the movers of this amendment and to the House, “I have listened to what you say, I will take the matter away and reconsider it and we can come back to it at Third Reading”?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, support for the Irish Government, the national interest, the economic prosperity of this country and the welfare of Ireland are quite different matters. I do not think that we can ignore the very low level of public interest in and reaction to the Government’s decision. The House should take note of that. I have tried to deal with compromises. They do not work; otherwise one might be able to do something in that respect.

I ought to deal with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Brett. I apologise to him that he did not receive an answer earlier. We have not consulted the Government of Gibraltar, who issue their cards in a rather different way. The Identity and Passport Service is not able to answer that question directly. The UKBA is the agency which sees the documents of EU cardholders. We will have to get further information on that point, which I will endeavour to do for the noble Lord.

In light of the views that have been expressed in the House this afternoon, I propose to take this amendment away and consider it.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, will she guarantee to come back with an amendment along the lines of recompensing people? On two occasions the Government have promised to take a proposal of mine away—this Bill has only one more stage—but at Third Reading have weaselled out of it at the last minute. Under the rules governing Third Reading, we are not able to put down anything at that stage to ensure that the Government come back with something, so we need a binding commitment from the Government to come back with an amendment along the lines of this one. If the Government will not give such a commitment, we should not permit the amendment to be withdrawn.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I say to the government Front Bench that we are out of order. It is the job of the Front Bench on the government side to make sure that we keep to order.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Perhaps I may just say that I have undertaken to take the point away. I have done so in good faith and noble Lords may rely on my good faith.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I say to the Minister that her good faith is not at issue at all. The issue is whether it is possible under the rules of the House to bring back at Third Reading an amendment that has been moved on Report. I would like advice from the Clerk because, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, I do not think that that is within the rubric of the House.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, the amendment is fairly straightforward, and I hope that it will be seen as a much-needed addition to the Bill. Conservative shadow Ministers when in opposition made varying claims about the current cost of the ID card scheme which ranged widely from nearly £1 billion to up to £20 billion. Meanwhile, the National Identity Service cost report of October 2009—the official document laid before Parliament under the terms of the Identity Cards Act 2006—stated that the projected forward cost of providing ID cards for the next 10 years until 2019 was £835 million. Crucially, that figure does not equate to the savings to be made from scrapping the scheme. We know that because we read the impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, which states at the bottom of page 4:

“The October 2009 cost report indicated that cancellation of ID cards would avoid future costs of £835 million up to October 2019. However, these costs are planned to be recovered through future fees to ID card purchases. Therefore, there are no benefits to the taxpayer from Year 3 onwards”.

The tables included in the impact assessment reveal that total savings from scrapping the scheme are £118 million. The total cost of cancelling the ID cards and the NIR are given as £22 million, although the Bill’s Explanatory Notes state the cost to be £55 million. There appears to be a muddle and the Government have been rather misleading to claim the scale of the savings that they have done. A definitive, preferably independently audited cost and saving report would be desirable and it would be appropriate for it to be part of the Bill. I hope that the noble Baroness will consider this matter as sympathetically as she can.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The Government certainly agree that it is important that we are open and transparent about costs and savings. Ministers have set out the level of costs, both in the debate here and in the other place. Clearly, the Opposition do not entirely agree with our figures, but we have set out the costs and savings as we see them and as they are expected to be over the spending period. We also agree that it is important that these are set out in an accountable and auditable form and that is why we are including the costs and savings associated with scrapping the ID card scheme in the annual report and accounts—we have already undertaken to do this—which will be submitted to the House of Commons by the chief executive of the Identity and Passport Service.

Noble Lords will be aware that the annual report and accounts are presented to the House of Commons in accordance with Section 7 of the 2000 Act and they are published by the House of Commons. The accounts are aimed at being published in advance of the Summer Recess. If one looks at the noble Lord’s amendment, one can see that the timings are such that we would be invited to publish the same information twice over a very short time. I do not think that that makes a great deal of sense.

I can confirm to your Lordships that there will be a full and transparent breakdown of the costs and savings related to ID cards in the IPS annual report and accounts for the next year and that these will cover the points raised in the amendment so that there will be complete clarity on the points that noble Lords have raised. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am grateful to the Minister. She has said that the details that I require will be published and I am very happy to accept that assurance. I beg leave to withdraw.

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[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I fully understand the sentiment behind this, but I am not sure this is the best way to go. I do not think it is really the Home Office’s forte to produce such a report. I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee; there are a lot of lessons to be learnt and a lot of people studying this sort of thing. As for the figures used by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser—and taking the point just made about the banks—that is the whole point. People confuse theft of credit card details with identity theft. Identity theft is when someone’s identity is taken over and used to do many other things, such as entering into contracts, travelling across borders and perpetrating crimes. Nicking a credit card and its details is something completely different. Those provide the huge figures, and the people who can stop that are the banks and the credit card companies by increasing their security. They are always looking at this, and they are trading off between the losses they make on transactions where cards are not present, and the cost of additional security. We are seeing new security measures coming through, but it is not a government job. There is no point at which you would take a national identity card that is not designed for online transactions, and a credit card that at the moment is not designed for them, and hope that one is going to help with the other. Actually, the entire problem about security for the credit card is contained there, and the people know what to do about it. They are getting on with it rather slowly to my mind, but when the fraud figures get big enough they will do something about it. I agree there are lessons to be learnt, but I do not think it is an identity card lesson. There are some other lessons to be learnt, but I think that there are other bodies better qualified to do the job than the Home Office writing expensive reports.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, raises two issues. He spoke to the first issue as regards combating identity fraud and the effect of the repeal. He did not really mention the second, which would require us to write reports on the operation of the identity card scheme. I will deal with both those matters because, if the amendment were accepted, they would be obligations on the Government.

I very much support the notion that what we do in government should be evidence-based, but I do not think that trying to draw lessons from a scheme of such narrow scope and numbers, as well as short duration, will help us a great deal in what are, without doubt, serious issues. One can draw a number of lessons about the operation of the scheme itself, but I do not know that they would cast much light of a general kind on how to operate identity schemes in the future. Frankly, the Government’s view is that this is not a worthwhile thing for us to try to do.

We entirely agree that combating fraud is a major issue. There is no argument between us on that. That is precisely why the Home Office is taking it very seriously in conjunction with other departments. The National Fraud Authority and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau have, as I mentioned in Committee, produced a strategic threat assessment of the harm and the impact of identity fraud. I entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, that identity is an issue and we certainly will have to do work on identity authentication. That would have been the case even with the NIR.

These assessments are now being taken as the base for an action plan, which I also mentioned in Committee. I hope that the House will accept that it would not be sensible for us to publish the details of the action plan, which is designed to try to get at the root of those who are engaged in criminal and fraudulent activity. But I can assure the House that we are taking this issue seriously.

[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

I have listened carefully to what the noble Baroness has said. It worries me that the Home Office seems to be considering another form of identity card. I sincerely hope that we will not have another proposal for a national identity card and register by the back door.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am not quite sure how the noble Lord gained that impression. All I said, I think, was that identity authentication, which is not anything like the identity card, is an issue. If you have a transaction with the bank, it does not know who you are, and you want to know who they are.

[Lord Maxton]

Does the noble Baroness not agree, however, that an identity card would be the easiest way of authenticating identity?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I think that this is a debate perhaps of a more expert kind, but I do not agree that that is the case. I should like to make one other point on combating fraud. We also said in Committee that we would review whether there was overlap or duplication of the offences which are being re-enacted as a result of this Bill with those in the existing Fraud Act 2006. We are looking also at the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 in an exercise to make sure that the legislation is tidy and, if we can, to simplify it. Both on the legislative front and on the question of actual action in government to combat fraud, vigorous action is being taken. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I look forward to further debates on those matters. The noble Lord is quite right. I hope that your Lordships' House will have further opportunities to discuss the implications of that, because it is a matter of great concern. There are some international companies that seem to feel that they can do what they like, and there is a need for this to be looked at very carefully. I understand the concerns about Governments amassing data. Equally, I refer the noble Lord to Mr Hodder, who wrote to me before Grand Committee, as an example of a business person who has used his card 30 times in going to the European zone and found it very convenient. For that reason, I do not think that we have heard the last word about the use of such cards.

I hope that the Minister considers taking this matter away. Whatever view noble Lords take of what the last Government did and of the nature of the cards and the information, it is rightly important that the public have confidence that the process used is done properly and well, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said. The BBC carried a very interesting story about some of the techniques that will be used to ensure that the information is appropriately destroyed. I welcome that, but it would be helpful—and it is an important matter of public confidence—to have a proper independent scrutiny of this matter, which is why I very much support the noble Lord in his amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Two separate issues seem to have been debated under this amendment. The first was whether one needs the extraordinary amount of information that would have been contained on the national identity register as a means of establishing ID cards, and whether that is the kind of thing that we want to see reintroduced, which I certainly do not believe to be the case. The second issue, which is the proper intention of the amendment, is about ensuring that information retained by the Government is properly governed and accountable. On that second point, I share absolutely the preoccupations of those who have proposed the amendment, but I have reservations about the method that they have chosen to achieve the end. In effect, the amendment establishes a new individual—some sort of passport commissioner—who would have the job of overseeing how the data were used and retained by the IPS. That would also be the case in connection with information received by third parties for the validation of passport applications.

In our view, the Information Commissioner has significant powers, and we would regard them as sufficient to examine and consider or scrutinise any of the data processed within the IPS. I think that the noble Lord has had a conversation with the Information Commissioner to that effect. My impression of the Information Commissioner is that he takes a considerable interest in the operation of the Act and has powers to serve the IPS with a notice to allow him, or his staff, to find out whether the IPS is complying with the Data Protection Act, which is the governing Act here. He is able to oblige the IPS to allow him or his staff to enter any premises and to show any of the specified documents or to see any of the information of the specified descriptions that he wishes to inspect.

Those are very considerable powers. I share the preoccupation of the House in ensuring that Government retain information only for the purposes for which it is genuinely needed and they are governed in ways which ensure that that is the case—that it is not used for purposes for which it was not specified and for which the Government are not entitled to use it. It is important for us to ensure that this is the case, and to talk to the Information Commissioner to ensure that he is able and willing to exercise his powers in this way, which I believe to be the case. I ask the noble Lord if on that basis, and with an assurance from the Government that we will take the intent of this amendment seriously, he is willing to withdraw his amendment?

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful for what my noble friend the Minister has said. I am happy to withdraw the amendment, but would she keep us informed about the conversations she intends to have with the Information Commissioner? Could she assure us of that?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am happy to give such an assurance to the House.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

On that basis I am happy to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (No. 2) Regulations 2010

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 17th November 2010 Lords Chamber

Moved By

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

That the draft regulations laid before the House on 11 October be approved.

Relevant document: 3rd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, the UK Border Agency currently spends over £2 billion to manage its borders and control migration. Over a third of its total running costs is recovered through fees on visas, nationality and immigration applications. The remaining costs are met by the UK taxpayer. Clearly there is a balance between these two things to which I shall return.

Earlier this year the Chancellor set out in his emergency Budget the position of the nation’s finances, which revealed the very difficult choices that had to be made by government departments. Of course the decision to increase the fees is relevant to the background and the economic situation which we were left by our predecessors. The decision has been taken to take the UK Border Agency into the new spending review period in a position where more is done to balance the costs of supporting the immigration system between those who use and benefit directly from it and the UK taxpayer, who is otherwise obliged to subsidise it.

The Home Office is making savings of £367 million this year. The proposals we are debating today form the other part of the equation—that is to say, seeking to increase fees paid by migrants and sponsors.

The regulations are made under Section 51 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 and are in accordance with the powers granted in Section 42 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, as amended by Section 20 of the UK Borders Act 2007. Under Section 42, the Secretary of State can set a fee for an application at a level that exceeds the administrative cost of determining the application. The way in which the legal powers are defined means that the Government must also specify fees for applications, processes and services that are provided at or below the administrative cost of determining the application, in separate regulations under the powers in Section 51 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. These regulations were laid before Parliament on 9 September 2010, are subject to the negative process and are not being debated. I recognise that having fees in two sets of regulations makes things a little complicated and I am happy to take the points that may be raised today on any of the fees proposals.

For these mid-year increases, the UK Border Agency has undertaken very careful consideration of the issues. These increases are made in line with the principle that the overall contribution of fee increases should be spread across all routes and be in line with our broader policy to align better our fees structure overseas with the one operating in the United Kingdom. Where there are greater increases to the fees on some routes than others, we have done so on the basis of the benefit to the migrant of a successful application. Examples of benefit vary from route to route but may include, for instance, access to the UK labour market, the right to stay here permanently or the right to vote.

These increases mean that the Government can hold other fees at existing levels, or increase them only by a comparatively small amount to help maintain our international competitiveness and in recognition of the importance of these routes to the UK economy. For example, the Government recognise the importance of keeping direct costs to sponsors under the points-based system as low as possible, particularly in the current economic climate. The fees for acting as a sponsor and the certificate of sponsorship fee have been held at the same level as previously, while maintaining existing concessions for small businesses, charities, education providers and the arts and entertainment sectors.

In the same spirit, we have managed to limit the tier 4 visa increase to just £21, which is for a visa being offered below cost. It is a very small proportion of the overall costs incurred by a tier 4 student coming to the UK to study, who will pay an average tuition fee of close to £10,000 a year in higher education. The visitor visa has been increased by only £2. Tourism is obviously important to the UK economy, but it is right that the migrants contribute towards the costs of the services they use and benefit from. However, we have still kept it down and the fee recovers only about half of the total administrative cost of the visa.

The House will, I hope, be pleased to hear that these proposals also introduce a fee exemption where a person makes an application for a nationality registration relying on Section 4C of the British Nationality Act 1981. This will align better the position of those applicants born to British mothers with that of applicants born to British fathers. This is a long-standing grievance, which I have shared, and was a matter of great interest to this House. I hope that fulfilment of that commitment made by the previous Government gives satisfaction today.

This Government are committed to sending a message overseas that we welcome legal migrants and that the UK is open for business. I believe, as the Government believe, that migration brings great benefits to the UK. However, I also believe that UK citizens and newcomers to this country wish to see an immigration system in place that is sustainable and stronger in the future, and is less subsidised by the average taxpayer. The immigration system costs money and, through these proposals, the Government are seeking today a greater contribution, as I say, from those who benefit most—a little more in line with the benefits on offer—so that the traveller and migrant meet a greater proportion of the costs of the system. As your Lordships can see, we have tried to keep down the cost for those who receive comparatively little—the tourist and, indeed, the student—and put the increases primarily in those areas where there is long-term benefit for individuals who come to work or to settle here. I beg to move.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I rise to speak on the Motion as the regulations have a direct impact on a tiny company—on whose advisory board I sit—called Pingar UK, which is developing contextual search engine technology for a number of years. We are a subsidiary or offshoot of a New Zealand company that is funding the research and wanted to have a research establishment over here. This information is highly relevant as it will explain why this government policy is a disaster that will drive small companies such as Pingar offshore.

Tomorrow night, I will take part in a conference call with the New Zealand company in which we will almost certainly decide to move out of this country because of the immigration policy and the visa policy. A company employee took a degree at a Welsh university. He is a Hong Kong citizen. He obtained an 18-month postgraduate visa to do further development work, but that has expired. In the summer, we applied to get the visa extended, but we got caught up in the mish-mash of everything when the new immigration cap of 24,100 visas was suddenly introduced. We needed a certificate of sponsorship.

We got the certificate of sponsorship just in time, which was amazing since we employ hardly anyone over here and the chap in question will really be the first serious employee. That was the right thing to do. However, we were given a zero visa allocation. All the time that we put into the matter was completely wasted because we cannot sponsor him. We have now been told that, for £1,000, we might get a visa after all. The decision has been taken that, as a small business, we cannot afford to pay out £1,000 on a gamble. As another director of the company said, “It is a lottery”, so there is absolutely no point in doing it.

I am intrigued that the Explanatory Memorandum’s paragraph 11, “Regulating small business”, states:

“The legislation does not apply to small business”.

The very reason that we will have to relocate offshore is because, indirectly, the legislation does apply to small business. We will probably try to relocate the research arm in either Singapore or Hong Kong. Pingar is not the only company that I know of in this situation. Many people are considering relocation. I am afraid that the Government’s immigration policy is about the most stupid thing that they could have done for small business.

I have heard, and read in the papers, about the new entrepreneurship visas that are about to be issued. I would love to know how to get one for the chap, if we can. We do not have long to make up our mind. He is currently abroad as, under the law, he is required to be. In the next week or two, we have to decide where he should move to. I should be delighted to hear from the Minister how these new entrepreneurship visas will work. Why should we pay £1,000 to enter a lottery to see whether we can exist in this country?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I followed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, very closely and will try not to repeat what he said, but I, too, have a number of questions.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked how our fees compared with those of a number of other countries. I would be particularly interested in those of EU countries, because that is the context in which we should look at ourselves.

Wider policy objectives are referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum. Paragraph 8.2 gives the example of attracting specific groups of migrants who are beneficial to the UK. Like both the previous noble Lords, I find it difficult to separate that from the wider issues of immigration policy. Perhaps the Minister could amplify on that, without taking us into a bigger debate, which we will no doubt have very soon.

Can the Minister tell the House how the monitoring of the impact of the fees, which the Explanatory Memorandum promises will be monitored closely, will be done? Will it be a matter of looking at trends? Important as the examples that we have heard are, those examples would probably not feature very much, if at all, in the statistics. However, sometimes anecdotes are useful.

Like the noble Lord, I am happy to support the approach that has been taken in the regulations.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, a number of points have been raised in the debate, which I will try to answer.

One of the first points was on the question of a sensitivity analysis of the elasticity of demand for visas and whether price affects take-up. Partly because the impact of the fee in relation to the benefits gained is relatively marginal, there is little or no convincing evidence that the increase will have such an effect. Indeed, we have had cases—this may be regarded as perverse—in which an increase in the fee actually led to an increase in demand. The reverse is also true, as a reduction in the fee has coincided with—I do not know whether it led to—a reduction in demand. We do not have convincing evidence of a direct elasticity relationship. However, it is clearly important that we monitor what goes on, and we intend to do that. It is fair to say that there is a continuous monitoring process. In the wake of price increases, it is right and sensible that we should be particularly careful about the monitoring of their effect, and we will certainly do that.

On the competitiveness of the UK visas system with other regimes, comparisons are fairly difficult because, as Members on the Benches opposite will know, no two national systems are exactly the same. However, I will try to give some comparisons. Two comparisons that are perhaps relevant include comparator countries in the European Union, which the noble Baroness will be interested in, and some of our Anglophone competitors. France and Germany operate simplified immigration systems. In Germany, applications include a Schengen visa—comparable to a UK short-term visa—for which the fee is €60, which this month is roughly £51. France offers a Schengen visa for the same fee or a long-term visa to remain for more than 90 days, for which the fee is €99 or roughly £85. The comparable figure in the UK is £70. Overall, therefore, we mostly reside in the middle range, although we are possibly nearer the upper end for the charges for some long-term visas. I am happy to give the noble Baroness more detail in a table if she would like. To give another example, Australia charges a total fee of £1,074 for a tier 2 visa, which is a longer term visa, whereas the equivalent figure for the UK is £1,750. Ireland is much more expensive. From looking at these figures, you would not immediately say, even with the increases, that the UK is out of line with comparator migrant countries.

On the question of fees inside and outside the country, this is where one enters the Hampton Court maze of the fees structure, as the permissions for raising fees inside and outside the country are different. However, I can say to the noble Lord that equalisation is not the objective. We are raising the fees in those contexts in which we are allowed to do so and where we are able to do so without regard to whether we are going over the limits of the cost. We do not intend, or indeed have as an objective, that the fee increases or the fee structure should contribute to, or be part of, immigration policy. The issues are separate. Therefore, if noble Lords have any thought that the fee increases might somehow be a covert immigration control, I can assure them that that is not the case.

I am quite certain that we will not be charging MPs or Members of your Lordships’ House for inquiries.

Finally, on the question of the migrant impacts fund, it is indeed the case that a contribution from the visa fee previously went to feed that fund, which has now been abolished. The money will now contribute to the cost of the visa and will mitigate increases that we would otherwise have had to make.

I am grateful to noble Lords for their support for—if I understand the mood of the House correctly—the price structure that is being put in place.

Motion agreed.

Public Disorder at NUS Rally

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Thursday 11th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, I beg leave to repeat a Statement made earlier in the other place by my right honourable friend the Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice. The Statement is as follows:

“With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on yesterday’s public disorder at the National Union of Students rally.

The House will be aware that yesterday, following a peaceful demonstration organised by the National Union of Students, a violent faction directed a series of criminal acts against the office complex on Millbank, which houses a number of organisations and businesses.

This Government have been clear that we are committed to supporting peaceful protest. Indeed, we included the restoration of the right to peaceful protest in our coalition agreement. However, as the Prime Minister said this morning, we are equally clear that when people are bent on violence and on destruction of property, that is completely unacceptable.

The operational response to the violence is quite rightly a matter for the Metropolitan Police, but I want to give the House an early indication of what happened yesterday, the action taken by the police and the follow-up action that will now be necessary. This information was provided at 9 this morning by the Metropolitan Police Service.

The NUS had predicted that yesterday’s protest would attract around 5,000 demonstrators. This estimate was then revised upwards to 15,000. The police had planned to deploy around 225 officers to the protest. As the situation developed during the day, an additional 225 officers were deployed.

In the initial stages, the march passed the Palace of Westminster in an orderly manner. However, this meant that vehicle access to the Palace was not possible for around two and a half hours.

At about 1.10 pm, the front of the march reached the rally point at Millbank. At the same time, a group of protestors ran towards the Millbank office complex, which houses the Conservative campaign headquarters. Protesters from the main march then seemed to be encouraged by a number of individuals to storm the building and throw missiles. Windows were broken and significant damage to the property was caused. Some protestors also managed to gain entry to the building and some got on to the roof.

At its height, it is estimated that about 2,000 people were around Millbank, though many appeared not to be directly involved in violence. It is now clear that a small hard core within this group were intent on violence. Additional officers were then deployed in public order protective equipment. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills was also attacked by a small number of protesters.

At about 3 pm, the police were informed that members of staff within the Millbank complex were concerned for their safety. They advised them to stay in the building. Officers were deployed to make contact with the staff and secure their safety. This took some time to achieve. By 4 pm, police officers had located the staff members and, over time, arrangements were put in place to escort them from the building.

The police then undertook a search of the office complex and made 47 arrests for criminal damage and aggravated trespass. The British Transport Police also made three arrests. Around 250 individuals were also searched, photographed and then released pending further investigation. Forty-one police officers received injuries. A small number were taken to hospital for treatment and were subsequently released.

The police are committed to bringing the criminals who carried out this violence in front of a court. The whole House will join me in condemning the minority who carried out these violent and criminal acts. There is no place for such behaviour in Britain’s democracy. I would also like to thank the police officers who were deployed to the scene and who helped to protect innocent bystanders. They acted with great courage, particularly those who were holding the line until reinforcements arrived.

Yesterday, during the violence, the Home Secretary was in contact with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Paul Stephenson. The Home Secretary also spoke to the Mayor of London and I spoke to Kit Malthouse, the chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority, which has responsibility for the governance of policing in London. I would like to praise Sir Paul for his swift and candid response to yesterday’s events.

I spoke to Sir Paul this morning. He confirmed to me that the Metropolitan Police will also be undertaking an immediate and thorough review of their operational response to the incident. This will include an examination of why numbers and violence on this scale were not anticipated.

The police have to strike a balance between dealing promptly and robustly with violent and unlawful activity on the one hand and allowing the right to protest on the other. Clearly, in this case the balance was wrong, but these are difficult decisions and they are not taken lightly.

Let me finish by saying this. Yesterday did not go according to plan and the police will learn the lessons, but the blame and responsibility for yesterday’s appalling scenes of violence lie squarely and solely with those who carried them out. I commend this Statement to the House”.

That concludes the Statement. In the course of questions afterwards, my right honourable friend the Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice corrected himself. The Home Secretary did not in fact speak to the head of the Metropolitan Police yesterday. However, my right honourable friend did.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord for his endorsement. I think that it is the shared sentiment of the House that we do not accept violence as an accompaniment to the right to demonstrate. He was correct to commend the officers who were involved in dealing with the violence in Millbank Tower. Of course it is right that the police will want to learn lessons; the head of the Metropolitan Police has made that clear and has himself said that there was an operational failure. I have no doubt that it betokens a serious and detailed investigation that he will want to take place and I am confident that we can expect that. Of course, he will be reporting to the Metropolitan Police Authority.

As for the questions that the noble Lord put to me, in the first instance it is clearly for the police to decide how it was that a failure of intelligence arose. They were clearly not aware of the faction that appears to have come to the scene. It will be for them to assess why that was the case. There is no reason to suppose that it was in any way a result of a failure of resources. If the head of the Metropolitan Police decides to come to talk to the Home Secretary about some of his findings, I have no doubt that my right honourable friend will wish to listen to him and see where, if anywhere, the Home Office can offer help. However, in the first instance, it is clearly for the Metropolitan Police to make these judgments.

On the noble Lord’s other points, I do not know whether there was advance discussion about Millbank Tower. It is clear from the dispositions of the police that they were aware of some of the sensitive buildings along the route. The Police Minister was certainly in touch with the Metropolitan Police during the demonstration, although I cannot give the noble Lord a precise time. As for the resources available, this is not a resource question; it is very clear that that was not the issue yesterday. I am confident that the measures that the Government have taken in relation to policing will not in any way impede an adequate response to all the various points that he mentioned in his list of issues, which undoubtedly we will need to take care of in future years.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, there will be criticism no doubt that the policing was too light on this occasion and there was criticism that the policing of the G20 demonstrations was too heavy. Does the Minister agree that it is important that the pendulum does not keep swinging and that we seek the right level of policing for such demonstrations?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My noble friend puts the point, which I am sure we all appreciate, that these decisions are difficult. Getting the balance right between protecting the legitimate right to peaceful protest and safeguarding the public against illegitimate activity—and certainly violence—is precisely the issue that the police face. She is also right to say that in the past the police have been criticised for being too heavy-handed, whereas this time there was clearly not quite enough resource immediately available. However, once the police had learnt the nature of the situation, they were pretty fast in bringing the right sort of people in protective gear to the scene. I am sure that this is the aspect that the head of the Metropolitan Police will be looking at with great care.

[Lord Bilimoria]

My Lords, yesterday I was rushing to get to the House for our weekly Cross-Bench Peers meeting at 2 pm, but I was stuck on the Embankment for an hour. I eventually made it to just below Big Ben, where a policeman kindly let me through after I showed my pass and I drove, very slowly and carefully, through the mass of protesters. In front of the House of Commons, I was then surrounded by demonstrators with placards, who started to get violent and then lay down in front of my car and refused to let me move. The police standing around immediately came to my rescue. Four of them removed the demonstrators and I was able to proceed. When I made it here into the House the doorkeeper, when he heard my story, said, “My Lord, either you are the bravest Peer in this House or out of your mind to drive through that”.

Only afterwards did I learn of the violence that had taken place, but when I was in that car I did not feel scared. I just thought to myself, “You’re not doing any favours to your cause. There is no place for violence”. There is every place for peaceful demonstration and I have every sympathy for the students who were demonstrating peacefully. I want to place on record my thanks—I request the Minister to convey them—to the police who saved me yesterday.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I am sure that the police will be extremely grateful for what the noble Lord has just quite rightly said. I am sure that one of the points that the head of the Metropolitan Police will be looking at is the question of access to the House, which was not available to vehicles for rather more than two hours. I am sure that he will want to look at the whole question of how you combine the right to peaceful protest with continuing to enable Members of the House and, indeed, members of the public to gain access to the Palace of Westminster during protests. Perhaps I might say that the president of the NUS, to do him credit, has written to the head of the Metropolitan Police saying in formal terms that he is willing to co-operate with the police in their investigation, which shows a good sign of responsibility on the part of the NUS and its president.

[Lord Dubs]

My Lords, I join in praising the police for their efforts yesterday and in condemning those demonstrators who resorted to violence, thereby weakening their case. I am pleased that the Government have committed themselves to the right of peaceful protest, as we all do. However, I have one difficulty with what the Minister said: that it was not a matter of resources. If the police are using what intelligence they have to assess the likely amount of trouble that may be associated with a demo, the pressure on the police will be to have police officers in reserve and sitting in their vans in case trouble should develop. The difficulty for the police is that keeping those officers there is pretty expensive in overtime. I should like an assurance that the pressures on police finances, through the Government’s decisions, will not be allowed to affect the right and the ability of the police to have officers in reserve, should they seek to do so.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I should perhaps have been more specific when I commented that it was not a matter of resources. It was not a matter of the availability of resources. This was not a case where the police were constrained from having the necessary resources available. I think that it was an operational decision that they were not necessary but, as regards the future, that is obviously going to be very important. I am sure that the police will wish to make sure that in the resources available to them are the resources necessary for policing this kind of demonstration.

[Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville]

My Lords, I first declare an interest as somebody who, perhaps surprisingly, was once elected deputy president of the National Union of Students. The Official Opposition spokesman raised the fact that the estimates of those who were going to attend rose steadily in the 48 hours before the protest. Do the police have a figure for those whom they believe to have been involved at the end of the day?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I think I am right in saying that the figure is 40,000 involved. Certainly, there was a relatively late surge and the figures rose. I am sure that is precisely the point which the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, when he is investigating how they did their planning, will want to look at—including whether they had enough regard to possible, last-minute additional numbers joining the demonstration. Until we have had the results of that investigation, it is quite hard to go any further in examining the whys and wherefores or the lessons that we need to draw.

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

The Minister was quite right to underline the fact that most students conducted themselves in a seemly manner and that it was a minority who misbehaved, but will she also direct her attention to the way that the press—some of the press, not all of them—have depicted the view that a large section of the protesters encouraged riotous behaviour? It was unseemly of that section of the press to so behave.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Well, my Lords, we have a free press, do we not, and we may not always agree with either what they say or do. This is not quite so germane to the noble Lord’s question, but it turns out that the correction I made was erroneous. The Home Secretary did not speak to the mayor; I had said it was the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, so I apologise to the House. However, as is clear from the Statement, there was contact between the Government and the police. There has also, obviously, been extensive contact today as a basis for giving accurate information to the House.

[Lord Brett]

My Lords, yesterday when watching television I had a sense of déjà vu watching the disgraceful events in Millbank Tower. The déjà vu was: 1996 in Seattle with the World Trade Organisation, where I was one of the people inadvertently suffering from pepper gas and tear gas, because the police were seeking to protect the delegates but had the Seattle sound with a 30 mile an hour wind to put up with. The thing that was in common was watching people dressed entirely in black and wearing hard hats, smashing into Millbank Tower then encouraging young people to go in and themselves, noticeably, not necessarily going in but walking away. That is exactly what I saw when a Starbucks coffee house was burnt out in Seattle. The gentleman who threw the brazier in—he had lit a whole pile of rubbish—then walked away, taking off his black shirt and putting it underneath his other T-shirt.

It is therefore not necessarily just a question of students, because I suspect that some of the people have nothing to do with being students. I trust that the investigation will therefore look at that. More particularly, there was intelligence about Millbank Tower, where I used to work. It is a large building with lots of staff who must have been very terrified when that happened. If there was such intelligence, was the management of the building informed of the likelihood of such dangers?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord makes some good observations about what went on. The Statement was rather careful in just referring to a “faction”, because at this stage we simply do not know exactly who was involved. He is quite right, and anyone who viewed television saw what he saw, that there was obviously preparation; you do not come along with a mask without the intention of doing something, or indeed with, I believe, a hammer. Clearly there was premeditation.

The noble Lord is also right to say that this must have been pretty frightening for those who were in the building. I would say that one of the first cares of the police when they arrived in that building was to secure the safety of those in it and, thereafter, to begin to eject the intruders.

I cannot answer the question about the information to the management. I would hope that because of the route, and given that the police were there, the management of the building had some forewarning.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, I am sure we all agree that peaceful protest is a crucial element of democracy and that the right place to protest against Parliament is Parliament Square. Unfortunately, Parliament Square is barely available now to protesters. Because of the misuse of the whole green area over a long period, it has all had to be closed off, and now the pavement in front of that area is occupied by a permanent camp. Will my noble friend recognise that Parliament Square should be kept as an open space, available for protest, and that the way of achieving that is to say that there should be no permanent camps in the square? I suggest that at some stage in future—I do not know whether it needs legislation—all impedimenta is removed between midnight and 6 am. People can come and protest any time they like but, between midnight and 6 am, anything that has been left behind is removed by appropriate vehicles. That at least will mean that Parliament Square is then available for protest, which is such an important aspect of our liberty.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord is right to say that we need to have Parliament Square available for protest. The House had a big discussion of this issue a few days ago and I repeat what I said then: we entirely agree that that is the case. At the moment the grass is being reseeded, which is why the square is not available. The Government intend to bring forward a first Session Bill not so much directed at in any way limiting or trying to curtail the right to organise a protest but to deal with those things that get in the way of and frustrate the right to peaceful protest, which will include encampments.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, I commend to the Minister the wisdom of the late James Callaghan, whom I had the honour of serving in the Home Office some 40 years ago when there were some very robust protests, as she will remember. He used to say, “It is far better to have a surplus of officers on the scene rather than the other way round. The more officers you have, the less likely will be the need to resort to violence”.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I have no doubt that the head of the Metropolitan Police will heed those words. It is obviously not just the number of policemen that is important; it is how they manage the protest as well. It is clear, though, that one has less chance of being able to police it satisfactorily if the numbers are not adequate.

[Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe]

My Lords, the demonstrations yesterday were about tuition fees. Today we have the announcement about welfare reform. Next year we will start to see the consequences of the housing benefit changes being introduced and there will be a growing mood, as I am sure most people will agree, of dissatisfaction in many quarters. Do the Government have appropriate resources available, following on from my noble friend Lord Hunt’s question, for the appropriate intelligence research to be undertaken?

As a side issue, I draw attention to what happened in Newcastle when there was the debacle with Mr Moat. We saw that a substantial website was quickly established, with thousands of people signing up to it and supporting him, quite contrary to the view expressed on behalf of the public by the Prime Minister. We then saw a funeral that literally hundreds of people attended, contrary to what most people would have thought would happen. There is a distinct possibility, with the technology that is now available to us—we see this when surprise parties are called by teenagers and thousands of people descend on their home for a party—that in 2011 we will see a different mood entirely, with a different technology available that could lead to demonstrations of a nature that we have not previously experienced. Are we geared up for this when we face substantial cuts in the Home Office?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, as I said previously, I am confident that this is not a question of whether the numbers and resources are available for the acquisition of intelligence. The noble Lord makes a good point when he says that modern technology—mobile telephony, combined with the use of the internet—can produce situations that can change rapidly, as in the immediate run-up to a demonstration of this kind. That is clearly something that the police will need to take into account in how they use their intelligence resources with the help of other agencies, and how they plan for demonstrations. I am confident that the police have both the resources and the capability to do this.

[Baroness Sharp of Guildford]

My Lords, were any police resources outside those of the Metropolitan Police used to help to police this demonstration?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am afraid I do not know the answer to that question. I will have to write to the noble Baroness. Clearly, students came from some distance so it would be logical for there to have been contact, but I do not specifically know.

Drugs: Classification

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 9th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taverne]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether, in the light of the recent report from the Independent Scientific Committee on Drugs on the harmful effects of different classified and non-classified drugs, they will reconsider the present system of classification.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, the Government do not intend to review the drug classification system established by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The criminal justice system expects—and the Government must provide—a stable and enduring system. The current system continues to serve that purpose.

[Lord Taverne]

My Lords, this recent report is perhaps the most thorough analysis of the impact of different drugs not only on users but on others in society at large. If the Government believe in evidence-based policy, is it not obvious that, in light of this report and of many other reports that have reached similar conclusions, the present classification—with ecstasy in class A and cannabis in class B—is in no way based on evidence of either the physical or social impact of drugs?

Will the Government further accept that they would be utterly irresponsible and failing in their duty to society if they did not provide much stronger disincentives to the indulgence of the abuse of alcohol, which comes top—by miles—of all other drugs in its impact on society as a whole?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, on the whole question of drugs classification, there is clearly no consensus about what constitutes evidence. The Government simply do not agree that a system of a sliding scale of harms, such as is suggested in the Nutt report, constitutes a good basis for government policy. We do not believe that structuring drug-harm classifications in the way that the recent report does would be better than the current basis for government policy.

[Baroness Meacher]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that Mr Fedotov, who is the new executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, is urging Governments to put away their policies that criminalise drug users and to replace those policies with health policies? In the light of that advice from the United Nations, what plans does the Minister have to review the Misuse of Drugs Act?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the Government certainly take seriously the need to engage the community in reducing the level of drugs misuse. Later this year, the Government will produce a drugs strategy to reinforce that side of their policy, but they do not agree that it is right and proper to decriminalise all use of drugs.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we tax alcohol, we regulate tobacco use and we criminalise drug use. The Minister may not want to use words such as “hypocritical” and “cynical”, but is there a consistency in this approach?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, we believe that all drugs that are classified on the list are extremely harmful to society; we do not believe that alcohol taken in moderation is harmful to society. Clearly, there is alcohol abuse, but the Government already have a strategy—and we will add to it—on reducing the possibilities of that abuse. This Government are taking measures that are rather more stringent than those of the previous Administration.

[Lord Deben]

Will my noble friend take very great care before she takes seriously the recent report of this independent committee on drugs? Its judgment is based on a methodology that to most of us, when looked at carefully, is shown to be entirely flawed.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the Government have confidence in the independent advice given by their own statutory commission and we trust that advice. I am inclined to agree with the comments just made by my noble friend.

[Lord Willis of Knaresborough]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the proposal that Professor Nutt and Professor Blakemore put forward in the Lancet and in the recent report is based not only on their own evidence but on peer-reviewed evidence? What evidence does the Minister have to say that the misuse of alcohol and tobacco, which appear in the top quartile of the list in that report, is less harmful and creates fewer deaths than the rest of the drugs in the classifications A, B and C?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I suggest that there is a real difference between alcohol and tobacco, which taken in moderation are not harmful to society, and the drugs on the classified list. I am afraid that there is no consensus between the conclusions reached by Professor Nutt and the evidence that he took.

[Lord Faulkner of Worcester]

My Lords, would the noble Baroness care to reconsider that last answer and separate alcohol from tobacco? There is no safe use of tobacco; all government advice that has ever been offered on the subject is that, when tobacco is used in accordance with manufacturers’ instructions, it is a killer. Therefore, it is treated differently from alcohol.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I accept the trend of that comment from the noble Lord. It is indeed the case that tobacco is harmful, as he has just said. I think the House would agree that alcohol taken in moderation is not so harmful.

[The Earl of Listowel]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and her colleagues for examining policy in this area, but will they consider very carefully the pricing of alcohol, particularly in consideration of the young people who binge drink and the association of criminality with the heavy intake of alcohol? Pricing might discourage that.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

As the noble Earl may know, the Government are introducing policies that will prevent the sale of alcohol below cost, and will toughen the penalties for those who engage and persist in selling alcohol to underage consumers.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

What discussions is the Minister having with her counterparts in Scotland on all these matters to ensure some degree of compatibility, if not consistency?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am afraid that I am not informed about discussions with the Government in Scotland, but I shall inform myself and I shall write to the noble Lord.

Parliament Square

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 8th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Trumpington]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether any agency is responsible for the removal of those occupying the pavement in Parliament Square.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, Westminster City Council is responsible for the pavements under its control and the Metropolitan Police are responsible for policing crime and managing protests in the designated area around Parliament. The Government share the public’s concern about the current state of Parliament Square and are working with all the relevant agencies to protect this place of national importance. The Government intend to introduce legislation shortly.

[Baroness Trumpington]

My Lords, I am terribly sorry, but I hardly heard one single word that the Minister said. This is therefore guesswork, and I apologise. Does she not agree that it is not a demonstration but a squat? Furthermore, does she not agree that this beautiful square is now a mess? Why cannot this Government get together with whatever authority is liable and, after all this time, do better than the previous Government to put this matter right?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The Government share my noble friend’s sentiments and those of the House. Let me say what the Government have been trying to do. My honourable friend in the other House, the Minister for crime prevention, has been working with the GLA, Westminster Council and the police—there are, of course, several authorities involved in Parliament Square—to bring about the situation we have now. As we know, the squatters have been evicted, the grass has been reseeded and the pavements have been repaired, so we are dealing with the mess. The problem is that the continuing demonstration is based on the existing law, which allows one person to attach 20 others to the application for a demonstration. That law, which was passed in 2005, has been abused in a way that Parliament most certainly did not intend. That is why we believe that it is necessary to bring forward legislative proposals, which we intend to do in a first Session Bill, to clarify this situation and to restore the balance between the right to protest and public enjoyment of an amenity such as Parliament Square.

[Lord Dubs]

My Lords, the Minister referred to working with several authorities. Will she explain who owns the middle of Parliament Square?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, as many noble Lords may know, the problem is that no single authority owns Parliament Square. Westminster Council has responsibility for the pavements on the southern and western sides of the square and the GLA has responsibility for the pavements on the northern and eastern sides and for the grass. This means that we have to have partnership between these various agencies, and the Government have been involved in fostering that in order to bring about improvement in the square.

[Lord Boston of Faversham]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the most effective agency to remove these people in Parliament Square would be the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington?

[Baroness Trumpington]

Noblesse oblige!

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I think my noble friend Lady Trumpington has been very helpful in asking this Question.

[Lord Waddington]

My Lords, it is surely not necessary to spread litter around the place in order to exercise the right to protest. It would surely be perfectly lawful for any citizen to go along and remove all the unsightly litter and the tents without offending against any law whatever. I simply cannot understand why some of us are not enlisted to do precisely that.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, there are many public services that we could all perform in this area. My noble friend and this House are right to be concerned about the encampment, which is at the root of our problems. In the legislation that will be coming forward, it will be very important for Parliament clearly to express its will as regards what it sees as being the rightful use of Parliament Square. We are trying, while safeguarding the legitimate right to protest, to make it clear that encampment and other abuses of an amenity are not permissible.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

Will the Minister consider in the future legislation reducing the number of local authorities which run Parliament Square?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble and learned Baroness puts her finger on a real issue. In the short term, that will not be very easy to do. But, certainly, over the longer term it is something that might be looked at.

[Lord Peston]

My Lords, I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Security, which has been looking at this for years and has got nowhere. At our last meeting, we were told something quite extraordinary; namely, that although what surrounds the square may look like a pavement and, if you fell on it, would feel like a pavement, the High Court has announced that, as it does not go anywhere, is not a pavement—which shows the idiocy of judges. That is one of the things that prevents anyone, including the Met, from doing anything about these squatters.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

This is getting into territory on which I tread with some trepidation. I think that the noble Lord is referring to the judgment which stated that, given the circumstances of the pavement in front of Carriage Gates which, I think it was judged, “did not lead anywhere”, it was permissible for the two protestors and those who were attached to them to continue their protest there.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, will the noble Baroness accept that, while there are many—and I share this view—who see the value of Parliament Square as an open space which supports a site of world heritage importance, it is entirely natural and proper to allow protests in the vicinity of Parliament?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The Government accept my noble friend’s contention that it is right and proper for people to be able to protest peacefully within Parliament Square or its environs. The legislation will seek to restore the right also of the general public to enjoy the amenity of the square.

Identity Documents Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd November 2010 Grand Committee

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, the other two amendments in this group, Amendments 14 and 16, are in my name. I reiterate what my noble friend said about the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, who has put his name to both my amendments.

The purpose of Amendment 14 is to get on record—this may help those who have to interpret the statute—an explanation of the difference between Clause 6(1)(a), which my amendment would delete, and Clause 4(1)(a). If the Minister could explain the intended difference between the offences laid out in those two paragraphs, that would be extremely helpful, as they are close in wording, albeit with different conditions. Amendment 14 is truly a probing amendment.

Amendment 16 relates to Clause 8, which is headed, “Meaning of ‘personal information’”. The phrase “personal information” is used in Clauses 4 and 5. My amendment seeks to clarify paragraph (l) of Clause 8(1). I ask the Committee to humour my error in framing the amendment. Its first word, “or”, is redundant and my amendment should therefore read,

“in relation to any identity documents”.

The paragraph, as it stands, refers only to “documents”, not “identity documents”, which my amendment does. The term “identity document” is defined in Clause 7, but I am concerned that the paragraph could refer to, for example, a rating return, a television licence or any one of many other documents which identify the person to whom they relate and which contain numbers allocated to person A. I should be grateful if the Minister could say whether I am right or wrong in seeking to confine the personal information defined in paragraph (l) to that which relates only to identity documents, as defined in Clause 7.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, I am not sure as to whether I am lost. Let me try to explain the differences. One of the difficulties that noble Lords are having relates to whether there is a difference between Clauses 4 and 6, to which my noble friend Lord Phillips referred. Clause 4(1)(a) requires proof of improper intention and so requires proof that a person has used a document or has allowed it to be used by another person. On the other hand, Clause 6(1)(a) requires only proof of possession of such a document. There is a difference between having something in your hand and having it in your hand when someone else has knowingly permitted you to use it wrongly. These clauses are different in their purpose.

More generally, I confess that I am concerned about the amendments, which are intended to bring greater clarity to the offences that are being re-enacted. I remind noble Lords that these clauses are re-enacted from the Identity Cards Act 2006. We do not believe that the proposed amendments offer anything of substance and we are concerned that they may cause confusion at the level of investigation and enforcement. As I mentioned on Monday, the definitions of offences work well on a daily basis—there are more than 3,000 convictions a year for false applications and attempts to get false documents. That is clearly an important element in trying to prevent identity fraud. Therefore, we are anxious to keep the effectiveness of these provisions in the Act.

As we know, the Identity Cards Act is four years old and, as I mentioned previously, we want in the near future to review the existing offences under this Act, the Fraud Act 2006 and the 2001 legislation on fraud and counterfeiting. We want to ensure consistency between these pieces of legislation. The review will consider not only areas of overlap but what potential improvements can be made as part of the rationalisation work. As I mentioned in our discussion on Monday, we would welcome the views of noble Lords on that when the review work is completed. As things stand, we would like to transpose—the transposition would be direct and unaltered—the existing clauses in the previous Act. We do not want to start altering them now, because we will be carrying out a more extensive and substantive review in a short while.

The noble Lord also asked about the definition of “personal information”, which is relevant to the offences set out in Clauses 4 and 5. As drafted, included within the definition of personal information is information about numbers allocated to a person for identification purposes and information about documents to which the numbers relate. For example, this could include the number of a departmental pass or the fact that the number related to a pass issued by a particular department. If you suspect that someone is trying to assume another person’s identity, that kind of information would be helpful to them and they would be all the more likely to use a guise of that kind given their knowledge of the document to which it relates.

The link between the number and the document would be lost by the wording of the amendment because the amendment would bring within the definition of personal information,

“information in relation to any identity documents”.

We are not clear about what is intended or to what extent the amendment adds to the matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (k) in Clause 8(1).

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

The Minister mentioned that a departmental pass would be a document under this paragraph. What about a television licence or a rating demand, both of which have specific numbers and relate to a particular individual? Would they be documents within this paragraph? It may be unfair to ask the noble Baroness that on the hoof—in fact, it is unfair—and I would be content to hear the answer later. But, no, here comes an answer. This is Roy Rogers at his best.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The advice that I am getting is that that would not be the case because a TV licence or similar document does not identify the individual but relates to them. That is right. You get back a receipt for the money that you have paid but it does not verify in any way the identity of the person who has paid the bill.

[Lord Maxton]

Perhaps I may briefly clarify that. A TV licence does not relate to an individual; it relates to the property to which it applies.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

Before the noble Baroness agonises over whether to withdraw the amendment, perhaps I may ask the Minister about the review. Will it be a departmental review or will it be a more public review? Can she say something about its timing?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

If you are going to do a review as extensive as the one proposed, it will have to have external input. It would not be particularly valid unless we were able to take advice on the kind of things on which I am offering to have consultation. I am told that the findings will be made public. We ought to make it known that we are conducting this review and we should be open to inputs from those who have interests in the matter.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not sure that I have worked out which part of the Minister’s answer related to my amendments. It all seemed to be addressed to my noble friend. I am not sure that the Minister dealt with Amendments 13 and 15. I could of course bring them back.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I apologise. The noble Baroness is absolutely right: I failed to deal with the issue. I am concerned that the effect of Amendment 13 is to shift the burden of proof. The prosecution in these circumstances would have to prove a couple of elements. It would have to prove, first, that the defendant knew that they were in possession and, secondly, that they had no reasonable excuse so to be. In Clause 4, which covers the possession of false identity documents with improper intention, the burden of proof is on the prosecution. It must prove improper intention. I hope that that clarifies the difference between what is there at the moment and what I understand to be the effect of the change that would be made by the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

In other words, one can commit an offence under Clause 6 without knowing that one is doing so. I do not mean not knowing about the law; it is not an excuse not to know what the law provides. In this case, do you not need to know, for instance, that an identity document in your possession is false or has been improperly obtained?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

It hangs on the improper intention.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think that I am grateful for that. I do not know whether there has been an answer on my Amendment 15. I had given notice that these were probing amendments and of what was behind them. My point was simply that it was interesting that offences had to be created in this way. I would have thought that there must be offences attached to the holding of driving licences quite separately from this.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

It is not established that that is the case but I think that it is. We do not believe that the Act to which the noble Baroness refers covers driving licences. We would have to check this and provide a written answer. I suggest that we provide the noble Baroness with a more detailed answer on this between now and Report. To speed through this legislation, and in light of the fact that we will be conducting this review, I hope that noble Lords will agree not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 13.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendment 17 is grouped with Amendment 18. Again, these are probing amendments and I hope that my questions will not cause too many anxieties. I know that there is an answer to the first one, which is to ask the Minister to explain the desirability of including a qualifying reference agency as one of the bodies in Clause 10(3). I have heard the reason informally but I think that it should be on the record.

Amendment 18 deals with the provision which allows the Secretary of State to retain information—in other words, not to have to comply with subsections (8) and (9) where he thinks that it is desirable to prevent or detect crime, or apprehend or prosecute offenders. Again, I should be grateful to hear a little more about, and to get on the record, the Government’s thinking on this.

It is clear from the debates in the House, particularly before the last election, that there is growing concern about provisions which allow the Secretary of State to take this sort of executive action, which one might think would require either an order or some judicial input. In debates in which I have taken part with regard to RIPA and parallel matters, noble Lords have suggested that magistrates should play a role because they can always grant applications when there is an urgency or a particular necessity, and that would provide some control over the Executive in a way that certainly colleagues across all sides of the House have thought would be proper in those situations. It seems that there should be justification for Clause 10. I beg to move.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, during the passage of the Bill in another place, the Government introduced an amended Clause 10, adding significant safeguards, and I think that it is entirely right to demand such safeguards. We specified in the Bill that data collected have to be destroyed within 28 days following the issuing of a passport unless—and this is obviously the whole point—they are retained to prevent, detect or investigate crime or prosecute offenders. My understanding is that the amendment would remove that provision, but I should like to put to the noble Baroness that it has to be recognised that an agency which is responsible for passports and civil registration should be in a position to retain information that is relevant to assisting in the pursuit of suspected or actual criminals.

I probed this issue myself to establish what the criterion for retention would be, to which I got the answer that it would indeed be “reasonable suspicion” for as long as was necessary in determining whether the suspicion would lead to a prosecution. Therefore, such retention is for a strictly limited time and for a strictly limited purpose. This has been put into the Bill so that the matter is quite obvious, and I hope that it removes all doubt about the extremely limited circumstances in which the Identity and Passport Service would be allowed to retain information. I suggest that this is really a safeguard and not a power.

The other point raised by the noble Baroness is the resort to credit reference agencies. In the process of issuing a passport, it is very important to be absolutely certain about the claims being made by the applicant. The IPS makes use of a credit reference agency because it provides the most up-to-date information on addresses and is able to provide a relevant historical perspective which is particularly useful during interviews. In the course of one’s application, one gives one’s assent to this being done. It is a part of ensuring that a British passport is a reliable document that meets the highest standards. It is a very important part of the verification process. The information is strictly limited and must be relevant to the application. It would be a bad idea to remove the ability of the IPS to maintain a high level of verification by excluding a resort to a verification process conducted by an agency which itself maintains high standards and which has become important to verification. External credit reference agencies can add to the range of agencies able to provide a high degree of security and verification in considering applications for passports. I hope that, on this basis, the noble Baroness will be willing to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful for that answer. I recognise that Clause 10 is a recent addition to the Bill. I think that it was added without any debate in the Commons and so has not been looked at in detail previously. I guess that it indicates how old-fashioned I am that I feel slightly uncomfortable in thinking that a credit reference agency is more up to date and more accurate than a number of government departments.

Where is the accountability in subsection (10)? How can the public know how and when the power is being exercised? The provision seems to be entirely private in the way that it is drawn.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Baroness asks a perfectly reasonable question to which I shall try to get her an answer. I share her feeling that one must have accountability and that one must be certain that, at the end of the process of determining whether there is prosecutable evidence, information is destroyed. Both these things need verification.

There are two government changes to Clause 10. The first inserts a time limit of 28 days and the second defines that the information used must be strictly relevant. It is all subject to the terms of data protection legislation. While we could not be expected to inform a suspect that information about them was being held, one can rely on the fact that use of the data and all the provisions governing their retention will be subject to the terms of the data protection legislation. So they are not exempt; you cannot just do your own thing under this legislation.

[Lord Brett]

I am fascinated by the idea that information from a private sector credit reference agency, whose staff are not vetted by anybody, is considered to be reliable and secure enough for us to see it as a key part of the provision of passports. Concern was rightly expressed during the passage of the 2006 Act about government security and the destruction of the information being held. The Bill states that the information will be destroyed within 28 days. Can the Minister go into more detail about what “destroyed” means? Does it simply mean wiping out the tape that holds the information? Does it mean a wider destruction of information? For example, every piece of information that is put on the record goes on the computer, which has a hard drive that retains it. The word “destruction” carries with it a fairly comprehensive meaning, but the reality is that 28 days is a short period of time. Can we have more of a flavour of what physically has to be destroyed?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I wondered whether to table an amendment probing paragraph (i), but since the provision would require an order, I thought that that was the inbuilt protection which subsection (10) seems not to have.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, several questions have been raised. It is indeed the case that the contract with Experian was inserted in this Bill. We are transposing it, as it was negotiated by the previous Government. I do not think that it is contrary at all to the public interest, as it is a very reputable agency and, without doubt, it provides up-to-date and accurate information in a way that financial credit reference agencies are liable to have that information, which may be less up to date in departments of government or other organisations.

Other points were raised about the power of the Secretary of State or,

“any other person specified for the purposes of this section by an order made by the Secretary of State”.

That should be related to the question of how such orders can be made, under Clause 11, of which subsection (3) states that it has to be by affirmative order. So there would indeed be opportunity for debate. I do not think that this power could conceivably be exercised on an arbitrary or unaccountable basis.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

There is a difference in how the power is granted, and the Minister is quite right in saying that the affirmative order is protection enough. But there is the practical issue of how the order is implemented. That is where one needs to come back to this matter of some sort of independent review.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I take what the noble Lord says. We come back in all of this to the relationship between the Information Commissioner, the operation of these Acts and the assiduity with which the data protection provisions are applied. The Secretary of State is in discussion with the Information Commissioner about precisely these kinds of issues to ensure that there is proper internal accountability and that he is satisfied.

I was asked how we could be certain that these powers of retaining information could be properly held and used and about the power to exercise spot checks. The noble Lord, Lord Brett, also asked a question in relation to that. The other day, we debated the different powers that would be used for different parts of the operation of this Act. If I remember rightly, a procedure is laid out that applies particularly to the destruction of information that is not part of the register but connected to the applications that go to it. They are covered by a destruction process and that process would apply in this instance because it would be in connection with the application process.

The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, asked whether there could be judicial input. I understand that a requirement to attend a magistrates’ court on every occasion that a person is working for the IPS has suspicion—I am sorry, I cannot read this. What we appear to need to do is to ensure that there is operational capability to deal with suspected offenders. I am afraid that that is not an adequate answer and I will try to clarify it in a moment. I wonder whether any Members have any other comments that they want to make.

[The Countess of Mar]

I was going to apologise for holding up the Committee, but my intervention seems to be opportune. I am puzzled because Clause 10 is about verifying information provided with passport applications and we are provided with a whole list of people who can verify applications. Why then do we need paragraph (i)? If there has to be an order made by the Secretary of State, and if that has to be debated in both Houses of Parliament, it will take time to verify information. Surely not every one of the others listed has to verify information. Surely only one or two of those people would do so. Why go to the length of having an order debated in Parliament in order to verify information on a passport? Will it apply to the passport of one individual, or will it be a block verification order?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I do not have the impression that paragraph (i)—

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

It is Clause 10(3)(i) at the top of page 6.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I am not quite sure what we are now trying to do.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I think that the point of this is that, before the Secretary of State can start demanding verification information from people, there must be statutory authority and that Clause 10(3)(i) is a longstop provision in case some other category of potential informants is thought by the Secretary of State to be necessary for the verification process. It seems logical, I must confess.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

Will it be thought necessary or helpful if we find that a new organisation is holding information about citizens? I hope that we do not extend that category by much, if by anything at all.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I will endeavour to answer those two points. As regards the question posed by the noble Countess, Lady Mar, the distinction depends on the individual application and on the ability of the Identity and Passport Service to determine which source of information is best suited to the application. This is therefore permissive, rather than demanding that every single source should be applied to and used.

As regards the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, on judicial input, I think that what we are saying here is that a requirement to attend a magistrates’ court on every occasion when a person working for the IPS has a suspicion that there is a problem is impractical. We need to be able to ensure that there is an operational capability to deal with suspected offenders. The provision as it stands replicates the power and ability that exist in the Data Protection Act, which also provides safeguards.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think that it was my question, so I obviously I should go away and read the Data Protection Act. I have lost my bet because I thought that the debate would be over in about three minutes, but it has taken more than 30 minutes. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration: Deportation

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neuberger]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what restraint methods are now used in deportations; and whether there has been any change of practice recently.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, the vast majority of people who are being removed from this country depart voluntarily. There is a small category of people who resist. It is known policy that escorts may be used to control and restrain such individuals and that these techniques are accredited by the National Offender Management Service.

Following the death of Mr Mubenga, the UK Border Agency temporarily suspended the use of control and restraint on scheduled flights for a 10-day period between 15 and 25 October. That was for the purpose of carrying out an immediate review to see whether the techniques used on the aircraft were appropriate.

The use has been reinstated. The National Offender Management Service, which conducted this review, has said that there is no substantiation to the claims that have been made that the restraints being used were inherently dangerous. We are now going on to conduct more investigation of the appropriateness and utility of restraint. We do not believe that we have anything like achieved the last word. So I can assure the House that this issue, which I know is a matter of anxiety to us all, will be taken forward and that we are examining what needs to be done very thoroughly.

[Baroness Neuberger]

I thank my noble friend the Minister for her reply. It is very reassuring to hear what she said. Given the news that we are now to have a new contractor, Reliance, conducting these deportations, perhaps I may ask whether its contract will spell out in greater detail than hitherto what control can be used, and, indeed, whether the individual staff members will have to sign up to a code of practice. I think that that would give the House considerable reassurance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Baroness raises some of the absolutely pertinent issues which our further review needs to take into account. I cannot comment precisely on the contract of the company that will be employed in addition to G4S but I think it fair to say that the Government feel they need to look at all aspects of the services provided. They need to start with the contract and go right through to what happens on the aircraft.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, what checks will the Government be making to ensure that the new private security firm involved in deportations carries them out in accordance with the laid-down practices and procedures, including, in particular, the use of force?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, as the House may know, there are several control and monitoring systems in place. Contrary, perhaps, to some of the prevalent views, they are in fact very active. The Chief Inspector of Prisons has oversight of all the detention facilities, which includes the escorts, and he conducts inspection visits on an unannounced basis. The independent monitoring board is based at Heathrow. After the last Question that I was asked on this subject I inquired how active that independent monitoring board was, and I was told that it is very active. It has produced critical comment on some of the practices it has observed, although not in this area, and it has said specifically that it does not think that there is a systemic problem, which I know is one of the anxieties in the House. Furthermore, detainees themselves have the right to make complaints. Those go to the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman and he reviews them. There are many controls trying to ensure that there is both a good system and proper practice.

[Lord Anderson of Swansea]

My Lords, voluntary departures are clearly much more humane and give much better value to the taxpayer. Are the Government convinced that there are enough incentives available for people who depart voluntarily?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

We are trying to increase the number of people who are willing to depart voluntarily. Nevertheless, we also encourage people, when we have to oblige them to go, to do so in a compliant fashion. We are making very great efforts to ensure two things: first, that the maximum number of people who are not entitled to stay do depart this country; and, secondly, that when they have to be escorted, it is done in a proper, humane fashion.

[Baroness O'Loan]

My Lord, can the Minister tell us what alternative methods to the distraction techniques that are used by detention officers exist? Can she tell us, possibly at a later date, what distraction techniques are used in other parts of these islands by the various detention services? Does she agree that the use of pain-induced compliance requires much more stringent management and that such management will inevitably incur further cost?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I hope the noble Baroness will forgive me, but I did not hear all her question, although I heard the last part. One of our objectives is not to be put in a position where any pain-induced compliance technique has to be used. As a result of this latest incident, not only have we gone through with all escorting officers their duties and the methods of restraint they use, but we have taken them all the way through in detail with particular emphasis on the health and safety aspects of the job, including positional asphyxia, which is a particular source of attention at the moment. We clearly need to have extremely well informed and educated guards on duty.

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

May I express to the Minister our appreciation for the energetic way in which she has followed up the concerns of the House? Will she consider allowing the guidance offered by the UK Border Agency to private companies, which is currently not in the public domain, to be made available in the Library to Members of both Houses? That would help us in sustaining the very high standards that she wants to see.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I think that is a perfectly reasonable request and I shall see that it is done.

Intellectual Assets: Crime

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Goschen]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the threat posed to United Kingdom corporate interests by illicit attempts to acquire proprietary technology and other intellectual capital.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, this Government recognise the risk to the prosperity of the United Kingdom from the loss of intellectual assets, and work is afoot to obtain accurate information as to the size and nature of that loss. The Government provide advice to private sector companies on defending their systems against cyberthreats. The transformative cybersecurity strategy, which the Government are now developing, will strengthen our collective ability to tackle cyberespionage and cyberattacks that target UK intellectual capital.

[Viscount Goschen]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reassuring and informative Answer. Does she accept that the protection of proprietary, valuable technology is absolutely critical to companies’ ability, and indeed willingness, to invest in long-term research and development, and indeed to our ability as a country to attract inward investment?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I think that the whole House will endorse the view that an economy such as ours depends crucially for its advance and future prosperity on its capacity to innovate and the intellectual capital on which that depends. Therefore, a central part of the Government’s strategy is very much concern not just with national security but with developing, with the private sector, a secure cyberplatform on which investment in this country from both domestic companies and companies abroad can be based.

[Lord Rosser]

Bearing in mind the increasing threat posed by the type of crime raised in this Question and the importance of developing still further links and levels of co-operation with other countries on this issue, can the Minister give a categorical assurance that the Government’s intention to merge the Serious Organised Crime Agency with the new national crime agency will not result in any diminution of personnel and resources directed at fighting crime of this kind? Furthermore, will the Government’s recently announced review of intellectual property and its value to the UK economy also address the threat posed by intellectual property crime?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, of course many sorts of crime are involved. The original Question was clearly about espionage but there is also theft, to which the noble Lord referred—that is, crime of a more straightforward kind—and both those aspects of our intellectual underpinning in this country need to be addressed. I can give the assurance that there will be no change in the status of SOCA, which will remain central—and I mean central—to crime-fighting in this country, so there will be no diminution in our efforts on that front. As those on the Benches opposite may know, we will produce a strategy for cybercrime by the end of the year. Therefore, I can give that assurance, and we agree with those on the Benches opposite that this is a matter of high national importance.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, will the Minister tell the House of any work that is being undertaken internationally since it seems that work with other countries should be central to management of the ware?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Yes, I can give several instances but two in particular. First, the UK is developing a vision for our handling of cyber issues in the future which we will share with close allies. Secondly, noble Lords may have observed that it was announced today that we and the Government of France are seeking to co-operate on cyber matters. I believe, as the noble Baroness says, that we will not succeed in producing a secure cyberrealm in the absence of international co-operation.

[Lord Reid of Cardowan]

My Lords, the Minister and the Government were correct in identifying cyber as a major new priority in the strategic security review, but does she accept that if we are to counter the use of malware, industrial espionage, or, God forbid, cyberattacks from terrorists, possibly in our emergency systems or in the financial sector, we will require above all a new cadre of well-developed, trained and selected young people who are at the very frontiers of thinking in this direction? Can she tell the House what measures have been taken to encourage and identify such a cadre?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord puts his finger on a very important issue, and one that will be a concrete and identified part of the strategy that the Government are developing. Clearly we need to have proper competences in government and co-operation with the private sector, and to build skills in this country, which means enhancing the necessary studies at our universities. We must also encourage best practice and good behaviour among all cyberusers—individuals as well as companies.

[Lord West of Spithead]

My Lords, I know that the noble Baroness shares my view about the importance of cyber, and I welcome the extended work on that. However, her initial Answer did not quite give the right impression that we are still looking at the problem. Am I not right in saying that whole areas—for example, whole engines and their entire design specification, and whole aircraft and their design specification have been taken from companies in this country and America? We know that that has happened. That information is already there and it is important that it is acknowledged by the Government—it was certainly acknowledged by the previous one.

This might be more difficult, but I would be interested to know the answer. Mr Jonathan Evans, head of the Security Service, mentioned China as a specific country. Would the noble Baroness be willing to agree with that, or is it too sensitive to talk about?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I think that I will refrain from rising to that one. The noble Lord is quite right that this is one of the reasons why we have fixed our eyes on this threat. It is real. There is evidence that theft has taken place and it must be stopped, so there is no dispute between us. In my original Answer I was saying that we are trying to put a value on the losses. In other words, we are doing some historical work but also looking at the trend lines to be able to know more than we do at the moment about both the volume and the nature of the threat we face.

[Lord Clark of Windermere]

My Lords, the Government very sensibly in the spending review announced an increase of expenditure on cybertechnology and cybercrime. Is the Minister confident that there is sufficient co-ordination within Whitehall to ensure that that money is spent correctly, and will she advise the House which is the lead department in Whitehall on this issue?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the lead department is the Cabinet Office and I am the Minister responsible in that department. The answer to the noble Lord’s question is that we are extraordinarily aware, as I am sure the previous Administration were, of the need for co-ordination. We are building on what the preceding Administration did to strengthen the co-ordination, but we want rather more than that. We want a single strategy that all the departments follow, and do not want simply to co-ordinate existing efforts but to have everybody involved in an overall strategy in which they each pursue their delegated part.

Identity Documents Bill

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 1st November 2010 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just raised a series of issues that are not covered by the amendments in this group, which I will cover when we come to the appropriate amendment. It is important to start our debate in Committee with this group of amendments because they go to the heart of the issues we have to deal with, and we need a debate on the underlying implications of what the opposition Benches are proposing. I owe it to the Committee to explain why, far from being simple, these amendments present a real difficulty.

Amendment 1 would remove the current status of the identity card as an identity document and instead it would become a simple plastic version of a passport. I have to say that if that had been the original intention of the identity card, matters might have been a great deal simpler. Instead, the previous Government indicated that ID cards were essential for security, necessary to prevent terrorism and crucial in detecting fraud. At Second Reading during the passage of the Bill in the other place, we were told that cancelling the ID card scheme would cause the end of civilisation as we know it. The current shadow Chancellor and then Home Secretary said at Second Reading of the Bill in the other place:

“All that we want to do is make it easier for banks, GPs and employers to verify someone's identity and thereby make it much more difficult for people to create multiple identities and commit identity fraud. That crime costs our economy £1.2 billion every year and has increased by 20% in the first quarter of this year alone. Combating identity fraud protects the security not just of individuals but of all of us collectively. Drug dealers, people traffickers and terrorists depend on access to false documents”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/6/10; col. 358.]

We agree with a lot of the sentiments there; the issue is whether ID cards have performed any of those functions.

The amendment clearly recognises that the ID card was not that panacea. It is unfortunate that, after spending millions of pounds on a scheme which the public did not want, we now have, in effect, a credit-card-sized version of the passport for travel in Europe. That would be the effect.

I want to come back to that in a minute, but I want first to comment on the amendments to transfer the records of ID cardholders from the national identity register to the passport database. There are some problems. Those amendments depend on Amendment 1 being accepted, but the practical issues are these. The passport application and issuing process is governed by a fee structure which provides that the income generated from the fee can be spent only on passports. There is no provision which would allow the passport structure to expend resources, no matter how small, on other areas than passports. The Identity and Passport Service does not hold any other database, so unless the amendments are intended to suggest that a new one be established, it is not clear to me how the transfer of information could occur.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Is the passport defined as a paper document containing X number of pages, or could the general word passport include a bit of plastic?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

It is defined as a travel document. The issue is what the passport database contains. It is able to hold early biographical information and a facial biometric. The NIR, the other database, is going to be destroyed. I can only assume that noble Lords are suggesting that a new database be set up, because the passport database cannot take this stuff. That would require a separate provision—statutory enactment—and resources.

Furthermore, the information held on ID cardholders includes fingerprints. Fingerprints are not held for passports, and the IPS does not have the capacity to store fingerprints, nor any intention to start taking fingerprints for passports, as we have indicated. The amendment fails to consider how the fingerprints would be stored. Perhaps it is not envisaged that fingerprints would be retained, but in that event, it is not clear whether that is an omission or whether it represents a change of policy on the part of noble Lords opposite concerning the need to take fingerprints.

[The Earl of Erroll]

I am sorry to interrupt yet again, but paragraph (a) in Amendment 4 states,

“which is relevant to an application by a person (“P”) for a passport”.

In other words, it would not include fingerprints or anything which is extraneous to a passport application. I have to admit that I did not draft the amendment, but, on reading it carefully, the reason that I backed it but not Amendment 2 was that Amendment 2 seemed to be a blanket provision for transfer, but Amendment 4 seems to provide for only those things, which would be very few things. It would be a minimal data transfer merely to facilitate the issuing of a passport.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Yes, but the fingerprint process is an integral part of the ID card process. The noble Earl is saying that we should now somehow start tweaking the data as we go through.

[The Earl of Erroll]

I envisaged that the amendment meant that the fingerprints go, everything on the NIR is scrapped and one or two things—which might be literally just the facial biometric—are transferred to the passport to save time. That is all.

[Lord Brett]

I seem to have caused part of this confusion with my amendment. As I understood during that brief period when I was the Minister responsible for identity cards, you have the information that is on the passport database and additional points that are on the national identity register. We are scrapping the national identity register, but we are told that virtually everyone who has an ID card is on the national passport database. So, on the national passport database we need to have an indication that some individuals have an ID card as well, as a travel document. To me, that seems to be the only information that needs to be transferred from the national identity register to the database for passports. That does not sound very resource-intensive or difficult in terms of legal base. I cannot see why any other information is required to be transferred if we are getting away from a register and back to just having a passport, albeit a plastic one.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, the amendment does not contain all that accompanying detail. It is not easy, therefore, to interpret what the noble Lord actually thinks should be transferred. If he wants to make that clearer, perhaps that might help, but, as things stand, these amendments have not been thought through. That is a pity because there is the germ of a good idea here. The idea of a passport card is not new, and Members of this House may be aware that—

[Lord Rosser]

I have a question in the light of what the Minister has said. If it were possible to produce something with which she agreed that achieved the objective to, as Amendment 1 said,

“remain valid as a travel document in Europe until their expiry date”,

by the moving of data on to the passport database, is that something that she would agree to?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I cannot give advance assent to a proposition that I have not seen in writing, so I cannot concede that point to the noble Lord.

Might I continue? It is the case that transport cards are issued by a number of countries for use with other countries where there is a bilateral or multilateral agreement, and there is a set of standards issued by ICAO that were adopted under a non-binding conclusion by the EU in 2005. It may be that the previous Administration chose not to invest in passport cards; they could have done so then. That might have been because of the work and the level of investment on ID cards themselves.

Another possibility at that stage would have been consideration of the use of vignettes. The ability to store the equivalent of a vignette in the passport card is under development, and we will wait to see how that progresses. At this stage, though, given that none of that base was laid by the previous Administration, we do not think it is possible or cost-effective to invest in passport cards as a priority.

My final point is again on costs. I appreciate that the amendments aim in effect to pass the data currently on the NIR to the passport database. As I have indicated, there is no existing provision, nor is it appropriate, for the IPS to establish a new database. The amendment also fails to recognise that it will be necessary to deal with lost or stolen cards that would have to be replaced. Once this thing is working, you cannot just say, “Well, if you lose your card, that’s too bad”; it has to be a living system.

Issuing replacement cards would require an infrastructure to be in place. Given what was said at Second Reading, I asked the IPS to estimate how much that would cost each year. The results are as follows: to maintain the infrastructure and pay service charges to the contractors would cost about £4 million; to replace lost or stolen cards would cost an estimated £500,000; and to maintain basic customer support facilities and appropriate levels of staffing would be another £500,000. Those are all per annum figures. About £5 million over one year—which, in the lifetime of these cards, means 10 years—gives a total of £50 million. I have tried to cover the issues raised by the Opposition. There are others—such as transgendered people having only one card, as they currently do with the passport, and the question, which we will come to, of refunds and consumer protection—which I shall go into in due course. However, even with the amendment, there is a catalogue of problems. Instead, I recommend that the amendment be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, I did not add my name to the amendment because there was not room, but I spoke about this on Second Reading. It is absolute lunacy not to offer a refund. It could be optional, in which case, as I said, a lot of people might well then decide to keep the cards as a collector’s item and an investment for the future. The concept that we would have to spend £22 million refunding the money is, to my mind, dotty. The Government have clearly fallen into the hands of the large systems integrators again, who are siphoning off our taxpayers’ money to America. I would suggest that they deal with some British SMEs for a change, but unfortunately government procurement rules do not let us do that at the moment. That is just a quick side swipe.

Thinking about the statements of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, about consumer protection, I thought that there was also provision under the ECHR whereby Governments could not expropriate private property without compensation. I suppose that the ID card is not people’s property, but presumably there is an issue because they paid for it and were expecting something in return. If it is expropriated without compensation, I should have thought that that might be an interesting case to go further up the line—there is nothing like stirring things up a bit.

I find amusing the concept that the general public are better than the weather forecasters, all the pundits and all the experts, and can predict the outcome of the next general election several months ahead. That is wonderful. I would love to know who those members of the public are. Then there is the idea that they could also predict the coalition, the way round that it ended up, which was not expected by many people at all. For a while it was largely thought that Labour and the Liberals would end up together. Then there is each of the parties having the arrogance to say that they will have sufficient control over the next Parliament to get what they want through. This is still a democracy. Opposition parties are still supposed to have some say. I know that after a few unfortunate years under first Margaret Thatcher and then Tony Blair, when majorities were excessive, Governments behaved in that way. Perhaps it is good that we return to the situation where Governments do not have control over Parliament and these things have to be agreed among other people, including Cross-Benchers—who are sometimes very cross.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I appreciate the importance that the noble Lords who have spoken place on the matter of refunds, but it is not at all clear that their anxiety on this matter is widely shared elsewhere. Following Second Reading, I asked the Identity and Passport Service to inquire into exactly how much correspondence it had had about refunds. I would expect that to be the place where letters were sent on that subject. From May to September, it received a total of 297 letters about ID cards, of which 122 included complaints about refunds. We do not know whether all of those 122 letter writers were cardholders, among the 12,000 who have paid for the card, but I do not think that that is a significant indicator of widespread indignation on the part of the public.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Does the Minister agree that in September it was not clear that there would be no refund—no one had told them? Does she further agree that if the service were to write round now to tell everyone that there will be no refunds, the response to that would be likely to be very different?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I have just said that this survey of correspondence went on after the statement was made in the summer. These figures apply right up to the end of September. If there had been widespread anxiety about whether people would get their money back, we would have heard more from the holders.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but will she answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips? Is she saying that all holders were written to and told that no refunds would be given, or are they expected to read the statements that appear in the media?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

People have been written to. I will come to that in a moment.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

With respect, I checked this; they have not yet been written to to say that they will not get refunds.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

They have, however, been written to to say that the scheme will be cancelled. The key issue is not that of a refund to the individual but how much the taxpayer is expected to pay to end this wanton scheme. We have already seen that the previous Labour Government spent £292 million on the ID scheme and the associated biometric work. That is a staggering amount for a scheme that was predicted to be self-financing through the fees, and given that only 15,000 cards are in circulation in the first year of issue, 3,000 of which were given away free anyway. The amendment’s effect is that the 12,000 cards should be given away free of charge. We cannot go on spending taxpayers’ money in this fashion, particularly when the public have shown overwhelmingly—there is no ambiguity about this—that they do not want ID cards. At the previous election, they showed their unwillingness—

[Lord Brett]

Will the noble Baroness provide the evidence to back up her conviction that the public do not want ID cards, as all the opinion polls taken by this and the previous Government do not indicate that that is the case? However, more importantly, is she saying that some people are rich enough to write off the £30 without worrying and complaining, while the people who are being punished are the poor people for whom £30 is more than they can afford, even if they can afford Sky Television? That is the logic of it.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, we do not have a socio-economic profile of those who bought cards. We have other profiles but not that one as we did not inquire about people’s incomes. However, I do not think that the public are very interested in the Government spending a further £400,000 on refunds. Unfortunately, the sum is not £360,000 as an administrative overhead is incurred in refunding the £30 fees, which themselves amount to £360,000. You might say that £400,000 is not a significant sum in the previous Government’s overall scheme of spending on ID cards. Indeed, I hear noble Lords present saying that. However, I am afraid that the Government maintain the contrary view. It is a significant amount and, frankly, noble Lords opposite have not provided a good reason why a refund should be given. Instead they accuse the coalition of being mean-spirited. If mean-spirited means extricating ourselves from an expensive failure at the least possible cost to the taxpayer, I think that we are doing the right thing. We do not accept that yet more money has to be spent on ID cards.

I am happy to ensure that the details of how we extricate ourselves from the ID card mess are placed in the public domain. As the Immigration Minister made clear on Report in the other place—I again confirm this—a Written Ministerial Statement will be made to the House on completion of the destruction process. I will place a copy of the planned destruction process referred to in the amendment in the Library.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Maxton]

Will the noble Baroness tell us exactly when this information was made public vis-à-vis those who had bought their cards? Was it before or after they had bought their cards? If it was during the election campaign, many people had already bought their cards before the election campaign had started.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The question of the cards and whether they would be valid after the election, and everything associated with it, was a continuous process. Certainly, a large number of people bought their cards fully aware of the fact that there was controversy about them. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, indicated at Second Reading, the House has always taken account of the content of manifestos, which is true today of the Opposition Benches.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about the impact assessment.

[Lord Bach]

The noble Baroness quotes me correctly. Obviously, the House does take notice of manifestos, but there is nothing in the manifesto that says that those who had bought cards when they are abolished will not be paid anything. If the manifesto had said that, this might be a different argument. When I said that the House, of course, took note of what is in the manifesto, that is only stating the obvious. But it does not do anything to answer the point so well made by noble Lords in this Committee.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I quite appreciate what the noble Lord has just said. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about the impact assessment, which simply set out the possibilities in a straight catalogue of options, which ranged from doing nothing through to the option chosen. Today, we are debating the option chosen by the Government.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I am sorry to disagree with the noble Baroness, but, with the greatest respect, first, clearly, this impact assessment was produced in a hurry, because it is such a mess. Clearly, on page 2 of the impact assessment, it is shown as option 1. Yet, on the front page, option 1 is the “do nothing” option, whereas option 1 on page 2 is the option to cancel ID cards without refunds and no requirement to return cards. But when I look at the first section of policy option 1 on page 2, under the cost figures of £22 million, the costs include the cost of the refund process. I rest my case.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I do not think that this Chamber or the House is under any illusion as to which of these options we are debating today. If there has been confusion over—

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

With the greatest of respect to the noble Baroness, the preferred option says that it includes the cost of the refund process.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Option 2 was the preferred option, as I have made clear. That is the option that we are discussing. I am afraid that there is an error simply on page 2. The figure of £22 million was also queried. That is the cost of decommissioning in the first year.

The Government take the view that it is not a sensible use of public money to throw further costs behind this scheme, and that the right thing to do with taxpayers’ money is to cancel this scheme but not to pay refunds. Accordingly, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[The Countess of Mar]

My Lords, I might have got this wrong, but the Minister said every cardholder had been written to and told that the scheme will be withdrawn. Were they told “will be” or “may be”?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Every cardholder has been written to and told that the scheme will be cancelled, yes.

[The Countess of Mar]

In that case, is that not contempt of Parliament? Parliament has not yet decided that the scheme will be cancelled.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, it is certainly the Government’s intention to cancel it, assuming that Parliament gives its assent.

[Lord Brett]

My Lords, would it be helpful if a copy of that letter were placed in the Library of the House so that we could all examine it before Report?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, we will so do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, those arguing for this amendment have made a case based on the value of these cards to airport security. I will say straightaway that there is nothing between the Government, the Opposition and other Members of the House on the importance of airport security. That should not stand between us. Would these cards really be valuable? The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, made a point that I would otherwise have made. A card will give you an indication of a person's identity. It does not tell you whether they are a fit and proper person to conduct security operations at an airport. That must be done separately. It involves checking. You have to check somebody's record. You have to do this not only when you employ them, but on a continuing basis. A good deal of the burden—the burdensome part of the burden—is not relieved by the existence of a card supplied by government.

Secondly, there is a philosophical difference between this side of the House and the other on the question of databases. We believe that it is wise and democratic to distribute information, and that information should be given by individuals for the purpose for which it should be used. One way of doing that is to specify the purpose. We have no embarrassment in saying that the issuing of identity cards, and the drawing up of an identity procedure, to enable somebody, under supervision, to have access to sensitive parts of the airport, should be done on the basis of relevant information given to those who will then operate the security system. It is neither necessary nor desirable for the Government to have more than 50 pieces of information on a central database that itself is a honey pot in order to perform these functions.

We are not impressed by the argument that this will relieve airports of some of the task of putting together a valid ID card. ID cards for airports already exist. We know that they have to exist, that they will continue to exist and that airports will issue them. We shall ensure that they are used according to stringent procedures. The card does not itself guarantee security at an airport. It must be associated with procedures that tie down access as well as ensuring that the individual who has access is a fit person.

We come to the question of what the value would be of evaluating the scheme, which has not been in existence for even a year and which is now ending. I asked for a calculation to be made. We reckoned that it would cost more than £100,000. We do not think that that is a sensible use of money. I entirely agree that we should look to see whether the existing scheme gave advantage, and draw the lessons from that, but we do not believe that it is necessary or desirable to have the formal evaluation which had been provided for in the legislation at the cost that would be incurred. I therefore propose that the amendment be withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, although there are different views about the ID scheme—as we identified in our earlier debates—clearly there is a general understanding among all noble Lords that, given that the ID card scheme will be scrapped if the legislation is passed, the destruction of the data needs to occur properly and efficiently. I agree with the spirit of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. The question is, what is the best way to achieve the desirable policy outcome? Clearly, destruction must be thorough, transparent and successful in order to provide sufficient public confidence in the process. Those whose data are held on the national identity register deserve reassurance that their personal information has been destroyed to an acceptable standard.

I was grateful to the Minister for saying at Second Reading that the Government were committed to producing a Written Statement to Parliament on the event of the destruction of the data contained in the national identity register. It is absolutely right, and I welcome the fact, that the Government will report on the process and delivery of the destruction of the data. However, given the report of the Joint Committee and the comments of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, and given that it is such a sensitive area, it would be helpful if that were to be made a statutory requirement. In reporting to Parliament, the Government should specify what data have been destroyed, the process involved and the standard by which destruction occurred. I recognise that the Minister is having a tough day with the Statement as well as this Committee, but it would be helpful if she were able to give a little more information in respect of that.

I would also like to follow the noble Lord’s amendment and its implication. Will the Minister confirm that the destruction will occur in line with the standards of the Data Protection Act 1998 to ensure that the process is recognised as being fully comprehensive? On Report in the other place, the Minister, Mr Damian Green, revealed that the Government were in contact with the Information Commissioner’s Office about the destruction process. As part of the Government’s stated wish to ensure transparency and openness about the physical destruction process, will the Minister consider making available communications with the Information Commissioner as soon as possible and, at the very least, include this information in the report that the amendment calls for?

Finally, Clause 3 requires destruction of data within two months of Royal Assent. I would be grateful to have confirmation from the noble Baroness that the Government are confident that that deadline can be met.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, for the time that he has taken to discuss this aspect of the Bill with the Bill team. His experienced views on these matters were very much appreciated. The best thing that I can do to reassure the Committee is to describe what we are going to do. I ask noble Lords to forgive me if that takes a moment or two. The national identity register is a generic term applied to the process of collecting and storing personal biographical and biometric data on ID card applications. At the moment, the core database is maintained in secure conditions on behalf of the Identity and Passport Service by its main contractors. Data held for dealing with applications, for subject access requests or for marketing purposes are similarly held in secure conditions by IPS staff and by contractors, such as Teleperformance.

IPS and any other party which has or had access to information gathered in connection with the NIR is required to comply with data protection legislation. We certainly will ensure that that is the case throughout. IPS has adopted an active approach and has identified all sources where information recorded as part of the NIR is held. As a result of that exercise, three categories have been identified. The first is the core data where the central records for the NIR are held. Core data containing biographical and biometric data are held by contractors on secure production systems. The storage media such as hard disks and back up tapes containing the data will be physically destroyed by shredding. That shredding process will comply with requirements for destroying secret data set out in Her Majesty's Government Information Assurance Standard No 5—the Secure Sanitisation of Protectively Marked or Sensitive Information. This category represents by far the largest element in the destruction process.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Countess of Mar]

My Lords, may I return to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights? It says, in relation to Clauses 4, 5 and 6:

“The practical use of these offences could engage the right to private life and we call on the Government to provide Parliament with a more detailed justification of why these offences are necessary and an explanation of what conduct is criminalised by these offences that is not already caught by existing legislation”.

I hope that the Minister will respond to that point as well.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, speaking as a non-lawyer, I hope that I may be able to give the noble Lord some comfort on this amendment. We certainly recognise that the intention of these amendments is to bring clarity to what might otherwise seem complex provisions of the Bill. As your Lordships will be aware, the provisions in Clause 4 re-enact the Identity Cards Act 2006. As the purpose of the Bill is to scrap the ID card scheme and destroy the NIR, that gives rise to questions about how we describe these offences and where we put them. However, law enforcement remains important. Last year, there were 3,000 convictions for offences under the 2006 Act. That is a significant number of successful prosecutions and the powers that are being re-enacted are being used on a daily basis by the police and other enforcement agencies and provide important operational tools to tackle fraud-related offences, so we are anxious to ensure that the law remains effective in this respect.

We do not see great benefit in considering amendments that are aimed at improving the clarity of the legislation which is successfully applied in the investigative and judicial enforcement stages of the criminal justice system. ACPO fully supports the retention of the existing powers. However—this is where I come to the next set of issues—we do not believe that everything should stand still. While re-enacting the provisions to maintain the effectiveness of tackling fraud, the coalition Government have undertaken to review the number of offences on the statute book and to consider the scope for repeal. Therefore, we are on the same track as noble Lords in wanting to ensure the appropriateness of the offences and the powers to ensure their enforcement.

Over this autumn, we will look at whether these offences should stand alone, or whether they can be accommodated within existing offences under fraud and counterfeiting legislation. I am aware that the offences in the Act derive in some part from the paper issued in 2004 by the previous Administration, entitled Fraud Law Reform: Consultation on Proposals for Legislation. We will examine the common ground, or overlap, that exists between the Identity Cards Act and other legislation to see if there is scope for simplification and rationalisation of the offences. I hope that this answers the noble Lord’s point. We will undertake that work this autumn alongside colleagues in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. It may be that in the end we decide that the offences should remain in place; but possibly they could be combined with others. Clearly there is an operational need for them, so the issue is how they are best described and where they are best placed.

While Amendments 9 and 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, do not change the meaning of that provision, Amendment 10 does, because the effect is to widen the scope of the offence so that it is no longer limited—here, perhaps, there is a substantive disagreement—to the use of cards to establish aspects of the person’s identity. The common factor in relation to all documents listed in Clause 7(1) is that they may be used as identity documents. It is the improper use of these documents as identity documents that the offence is targeting—nothing beyond that. Other dishonest uses to which the documents may be put are likely to be covered by other legislation. We are not neglecting the issue, but we do not see it as relevant to the Bill.

Obviously, this legislation is to get rid of the ID card system. In view of our intention to look at the law enforcement aspects and related offences, and bearing in mind in the mean time the need for these powers, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I have no doubt that, in consideration of how we deal with these offences in future, his help and views will be greatly appreciated.

[The Earl of Erroll]

Would it be possible later to have a written explanation of what Clause 4(3) means? I am sure that I read it wrongly and it would be interesting to find out. Also, I do not know what “establishing” means in this context, and it would be nice to know that when I am asked by other people.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, Clause 4(3) excludes the scenario where a person uses another’s card to establish personal information about the other person. It would allow a carer, for example, to assist an elderly relative by using that person’s document to collect a parcel or avail themselves of a service on behalf of that person. In other words, that is a perfectly proper intention—what is intended to be excluded is improper intention. The term “establishing” could have two meanings, as suggested. It could mean proving certain facts, or finding out certain facts.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, the Minister has—I nearly said “dealt manfully”, but that would not be right—dealt with her usual sophisticated aplomb with this impossible matter. One wonders whether, for a provision in a Bill such as this, our methods are adequate. I suspect that if one could have a conversation, one might get further. In moving the amendment, I thought that I made it clear that Amendments 9 and 11 do not alter to the meaning of that provision, but just make clearer—

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Indeed—I may not have spoken clearly. I did indeed say—at least I thought that I said—that we are in entire agreement that these two amendments do not change the sense of the provision.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am grateful for that, but I shall still come back to the point. The noble Baroness said that Clause 4 is a re-enactment of the provision in the Identity Cards Act 2006. This part of the clause diverges from the 2006 Act in a seriously unhelpful way. The changes mean that there has been a shift into subsection (3) of the language that is there. The noble Baroness did her best to explain it, but all I can do is to go back to the 2006 Act, which is better and clearer on the point. In withdrawing the amendment, I would ask the noble Baroness if she would think a little more about it before we come to the next stage.

I want to make one other point. The noble Baroness made the important point that my attempt to create in Amendment 10 through proposed new paragraph (c) a catch-all provision in terms of the definition of improper intention was unnecessary. However, she was less than categorical. I would be comforted if she and her advisers would put their thinking caps on and make sure that that is the case. I ask that because I am still worried that paragraphs (a) and (b), which provide the exhaustive definition of improper intention, would not catch circumstances where the Government would wish there to be an offence in terms of the possession of false identity documents. However, as I say, we are all reassured by the review that is to be undertaken in what is a very difficult field.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, Amendment 19 is in my name and that of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. The provision is covered by Clauses 22 and 23 of the Identity Cards Act. The only difference is that that constitutes 60 lines of legislation, with 14 subsections, whereas my amendment is infinitely more modest. I would like to think that its modesty and open-textured nature is a plus and not a minus. I well appreciate that the dismantling of the identity card scheme is not the same as its creation. Some may think that this is superfluous and that it is enough to rely on the statements that the Minister has made about what the Government may do. I take a cautious view about that. With issues of citizens’ basic rights, it is incumbent on us as legislators to be cautious. I also have in mind the fact that the noble Baroness is here today but may be gone tomorrow.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I hope not.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

Of course, to higher and greater things. It is notorious in our system that Ministers remain in post for less than two years, and that one Minister does not feel bound by the statements of another. If anyone doubts that, I can give them half a dozen chapters and verses now. Therefore, the soft soap, even from the mouth of as distinguished a Minister as the noble Baroness, is not enough where one is dealing with issues of citizens’ basic rights. For this side of the House, and no less for Members opposite, the destruction of the national identity register is a crucial matter. If ever there was a situation where somebody beyond the Minister is needed to give reassurance that what has to be done has been properly done, this is it.

Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause requires the independent person appointed to review the arrangements to make an annual report of his or her findings not just to the Secretary of State but also contemporaneously to Parliament. That ensures that the absence of specifics in the proposed new clause is adequate, because any independent reviewer, because they know that they have to report to Parliament as well as to the Secretary of State, will be on their mettle.

I finish by saying that this deals in the Bill with a number of anxieties expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights when it reported in October. For example, it stated that,

“the Government should report to Parliament on the progress towards the destruction of this information and the decommissioning of the NIR”.

It says that “the Government” should report. However, as I have attempted to justify, it should go a step further. The committee made other recommendations, particularly with regard to Clause 10, which entitles the Secretary of State to require verification information from not only a long list of government bodies, but from others; and, in subsection (10), gives discretion to the Secretary of State to disapply subsections (8) and (9). Subsection (8) requires that information in relation to passports should be destroyed no later than 28 days after the passport is issued. Subsection (9) contains another provision related to that. The clause gives discretion to the Secretary of State to disapply those subsections where he or she thinks it is “desirable” for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime and so on. That is fair enough, provided there is an independent reviewer who can look at that and make sure that no slackness has entered the system, and that any use of the discretions in the clause has been sensible and justifiable.

Finally, the Joint Committee expressed concern about the proportionality of some of the rights given to the Secretary of State by the Bill. For those reasons, I commend Amendment 19, and the inclusion of an independent review in the Bill. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Countess of Mar]

My Lords, I am not normally in favour of reports being put before Parliament. We have far too many reports and most of them lie unread on dusty shelves. The argument put forward about identity fraud is a question of proportionality. I understand that a very high proportion of identity fraud—up to 90 per cent—is internet fraud, although I am not exactly sure of the figure. Identity cards would do nothing to prevent that. However, I support the call for a report to be made to Parliament in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, because of the human rights implications. I do not wish to detain the Committee for long, but those are my concerns.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, we are discussing two akin but not entirely identical amendments. I shall deal with them separately. The substantive point that is being made concerns the importance of combating fraud and identity fraud. I say straight away to noble Lords that the Government take fraud and identity fraud extremely seriously. The noble Lord opposite quoted something that I said relatively recently in the House. That reflects the Government’s preoccupation with organised crime generally, and particularly with fraud and identity fraud. I assure the Committee that this is being pursued with purposive intent and as speedily as possible. We need to get a good strategy together but we are hoping to publish a cybercrime strategy that goes to the heart of these issues by the end of the year. Therefore, there is no lack of purpose and attention being given to what we entirely agree is a very important issue that poses a growing threat to the prosperity of this country if it is not tackled effectively. Of course, it also has national security implications. I think that the issue which divides us is the question of whether the Bill is the right way to tackle that. I cannot see that what is proposed would greatly add to our knowledge but it would certainly add to complexity and cost.

The purpose of Amendment 12 is to hold the Government to account for something that will no longer exist. It would require resources to be committed to determining, in effect, why ID cards were not successful. However, the offences relating to identity fraud are being re-enacted; we are not letting them drop. The impact of identity fraud will continue to be monitored through the crime statistics. We are pursuing the evil of identity fraud in government policy. We therefore consider that we are on the case, but we are against the setting up of yet a further quango to monitor it. There is nothing between us on the importance of the issue but we do not think that this is the right vehicle with which to pursue it; it would add complexity but not value.

On the other amendment, we are similarly concerned about the implications because again this proposal would add to the bureaucracy on how the Government report on offences within the existing passport process. The proposals would involve the creation of a new post to oversee arrangements for the use and retention of data in connection with passport applications. I have to say that we already have the Office of the Information Commissioner. The IPS, like any other organisation, is required to comply with data protection. It is also required to comply with the provisions of the Bill when it is enacted and is subject to the rigours of government audit procedures. This Government have undertaken to report in detail to Parliament on all the processes.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s flow. She has just made an important statement, which is that the Information Commissioner has a duty. The question is whether the duty of the Information Commissioner extends to the Government dismantling the national identity register. If it does, most of my concerns will go away. Can the Minister assure me of that?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The Information Commissioner needs to be satisfied that the destruction process has been proper, thorough and complete. That is why we are in touch with the Information Commissioner. We really do not see the need for yet another layer of oversight that could get in the way of the exercise of his functions. In fact, it would duplicate what he is already charged to do—effectively, I would hope.

I would also say that the Government are committed to transparency in this process. We have nothing to hide and we are absolutely committed to the citizen’s rights in the matter. While I realise that I might not last for ever—the thought of being translated to a higher place is rather worrying—nevertheless, I will say with absolute confidence that this Government, whether I am in your Lordships’ House or not, are committed to ensuring that this process is carried out properly and that there is no doubt about its integrity and thoroughness. I hope that, in the light of my comments, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Brett]

My Lords, personally I am sure that the reference by the noble Baroness to a higher place was simply to a more senior position in the Government, if only because I am not sure that anyone who is a politician can hope to go to heaven.

I am disappointed with the Minister’s reply. I do not think that we are looking for bureaucracy in the amendment I have tabled. I believe that the Government are just as concerned as the previous Government were about issues of identity fraud and we know that things would have come from the identity card scheme that would have helped. However, it is not to be persevered with and we have been told that a plan is to be put together by the end of this year. The Bill requires a report to be made only within one year. I would have thought that, without too much bureaucracy, it would be possible to look at the extent to which the Bill will provide for those things that were provided for by the various parts of the Identity Cards Act, particularly in relation to individual identity fraud. We have seen that, online, someone’s identity might be used again and again.

So, I am disappointed, but I hope that between now and Report, the Minister will look at this again with her advisers. Transparency requires other people to be able to see something. In some ways, the only people who can report back with all the facts at their command, which we can then scrutinise, are the Government. Even at this stage, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to reconsider the matter. In the mean time, I shall withdraw the amendment.

Terrorism: Aviation Security

Baroness Neville-Jones Excerpts

Monday 1st November 2010 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall repeat a Statement made earlier in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Home department. The Statement is as follows.

“With permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a Statement on the recent airline bomb plot. The House will know that in the early hours of Friday morning, following information from intelligence sources, the police identified a suspect package on board a UPS courier aircraft which had landed at East Midlands Airport en route from Cologne to Chicago. Later during the morning, police explosives experts identified that the device contained explosive material. A similar device was located and identified in Dubai; it was being transported by FedEx to Chicago.

Since then, an intensive investigation has been taking place in this country and overseas. COBRA met on Friday to assess progress. I chaired a COBRA meeting on Saturday. The Prime Minister chaired a further COBRA meeting this morning. The House will appreciate that much of this investigation is sensitive and that the information I can give is necessarily limited. Disclosure of some details could prejudice the investigation, the prospects of bringing the perpetrators to justice, our national security and the security of our allies. But I want to give the House as full a picture as possible.

We know that both explosive devices originated in Yemen. We believe that they were made and dispatched by the organisation known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This group, which is based in Yemen, was responsible for the attempted downing of an aircraft bound for Detroit on 25 December last year.

The devices were probably intended to detonate mid-air and to destroy the cargo aircraft on which they were being transported. Our own analysis of the device here—analysis which has to proceed with great care to preserve the evidential value of the recovered material—established by Saturday morning that it was viable; this means not only that it contained explosive material but that it could have detonated. Had the device detonated, we assess that it could have succeeded in bringing down the aircraft. Our forensic examination of the device continues. We are receiving valuable assistance from a wide range of partners. The analysis has some way to go.

At this stage, we have no information to suggest that another attack of a similar type by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is imminent, but this organisation is very active. During this year, it has repeatedly attacked targets in Yemen. On 26 April and 6 October, it attacked and attempted to kill British diplomats based in San’a’. It continues to plan other attacks in the region, notably against Saudi Arabia.

We therefore work on the assumption that this organisation will wish to continue to find ways of also attacking targets further afield. We will continue to work with international partners to deal with this threat. We have for some years provided assistance to the Yemeni Government and will continue to do so. The Prime Minister has spoken to President Saleh to make clear our desire for a closer security relationship.

Following the Detroit incident, Ministers in the last Government took the decision to stop all direct passenger and cargo aircraft flying from Yemen to and through the UK. Over the weekend, we took the further step of stopping all unaccompanied air freight to this country from Yemen. This will include air freight from Yemen carried on both courier flights and hold-loaded in passenger aircraft. The small number of items in transit prior to this direction have been subject to rigorous investigation on arrival in the UK, and no further suspicious items have been discovered.

We are now taking further steps to maintain our security. I can confirm to the House that we will review all aspects of air freight security and work with international partners to make sure that our defences are as robust as possible. We will update the guidance given to airport security personnel, based on what we have learnt, to enable them to identify similar packages in future. From midnight tonight, we will extend the suspension of unaccompanied air freight to this country, not just from Yemen but also from Somalia. This decision has been made as a precautionary measure and it will be reviewed in the coming weeks. It is based on possible contact between al-Qaeda in Yemen and terrorist groups in Somalia, as well as concern about airport security in Mogadishu. From midnight tonight, we will suspend the carriage of toner cartridges larger than 500g in passengers’ hand baggage on flights departing from UK airports. Also from midnight tonight, we will prohibit the carriage of these items by air cargo into, via or from the UK unless they originate from a known consignor: a regular shipper with security arrangements approved by the Department for Transport.

We intend that these final two measures will be in place initially for one month. During that time, we will work closely with the aviation industry, screening equipment manufacturers and others, to devise a sustainable, proportionate, long-term security regime to address the threat. Department for Transport officials are already in technical discussions with the industry and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport will chair a high-level industry meeting later this week to discuss next steps.

These initiatives are in addition to those which we have set out in the Strategic Defence and Security Review. We are already committed to widening checks on visa applicants to this country. Following the Detroit incident, we are also committed to making changes to pre-departure checks to identify better the people who pose a terrorist threat and to prevent them flying to the UK. We are also committed to enhancing our e-borders programme which provides data on who is travelling to this country and is, therefore, an essential foundation for our counterterrorist and wider security work.

We have an increasingly active and important border co-operation programme with counterparts in the United States. The Detroit incident led to the introduction of further passenger scanning devices at key airports in the UK. COBRA will continue to meet throughout this week. The National Security Council will also consider this issue. We will continue to work closely with our partners overseas.

Finally, the House will wish to join me in expressing gratitude to the police and the security and intelligence agencies in this country for the work they are doing to understand the threat that we face and to deal with it so effectively”

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made by her right honourable friend the Home Secretary in the other place and for the detailed information contained in it. The whole country has been shocked by the events of the past four days and by the discovery of two concealed and hard-to-detect explosive devices, one at East Midlands Airport and the other in Dubai, and by the very serious and challenging threat that such terrorist activity constitutes to public safety and our country’s security. There can be no complacency when it comes to preventing and dealing with terrorism.

The noble Baroness has said that the devices were probably intended to detonate in mid-air and that had they done so, they could have succeeded in bringing the aircraft down. Today, my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary, Mr Ed Balls, has commended the Home Secretary for the calm way in which she has led the response to these threats. I join him and the Minister in commending our police, intelligence and security services for the vital work that they have undertaken in the past few days, in close co-operation with our allies around the world, to save lives.

It is the job of the Opposition to ask questions, to probe statements and to hold the Government to account. We will do that but we shall also be mindful, at all times, of our wider responsibility to support necessary actions, to keep our citizens safe and to protect our national interests. In that spirit, I pose a number of questions to the Minister in three areas: first, the detailed events of the past few days; secondly, the implication of the events for airline security; and, thirdly, the implications for wider security policy.

On the first point, we all appreciate that where intelligence and international co-operation are involved, events move fast and things are always clearer in hindsight. At what point were the police, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister first told about the potential threat? Were there delays in getting precise information to our security and police officers on the ground? Can the noble Baroness say why the device was not discovered by police officers during the first search? Would early information have made a material difference? What operational lessons will be learnt from dealing with such events in the future?

The second area concerns the fact that these two live explosive devices were intercepted only by an intelligence tip-off after they had already been carried on a number of different planes, including passenger planes, giving rise to serious questions about the security of our airspace. Some security experts have referred to cargo security as a potential blind spot. The noble Baroness will be aware of comments made by BALPA to that effect over the weekend. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, drew attention to the potential risks of cargo transit in his annual reports in 2007 and 2008. As a result, significant actions were taken to improve intelligence and international security co-operation, and a tougher search method—explosives trace detection—was introduced for passenger flights following the Detroit attempted attack.

I appreciate that this is a complex problem to solve, that a review has already been established and that the Home Secretary has already acted to ban unaccompanied cargo packages from Yemen. The Minister has also set out, in the Statement, a series of measures that the Government have already taken. What conclusions does the Minister draw about the reliability of current checks from the fact that the device was not spotted on first check by police experts at East Midlands Airport? Will the review consider extending explosives trace detection to cargo flights? Will the scope of the review cover cargo being carried in passenger aircraft? Are there other immediate actions that we should take now to improve the security of cargo coming into, out of or transiting through the UK while the review is being undertaken?

The events of the past few days raise wider issues for our national security and counterterrorism strategy. It is clear that terrorists operating from Yemen constitute an increasing threat. Can the Minister assure the House that the Government are in urgent discussions with the Yemeni Government and our allies around the world with a view to interrupting terrorist activities at source? Given the wider evidence of a mounting threat, the judgments that underpin the Government’s current review of counterterrorism powers will be especially important. While we will reserve judgment until we see the outcome of the review, we have said that we will support the Home Secretary where we can and that consensus should be our shared goal.

I raise the issue of resources. Given that these explosive devices were intercepted through vital intelligence work, is the Minister confident that a 6 per cent real-terms cut in the single intelligence account over the next four years can be managed without compromising this vital work? Given that the device was discovered by specially trained police working closely with our security and border services, is she confident that a 10 per cent real-terms cut in counterterrorism police over the next four years, and a 50 per cent cut in capital available to the UK Border Agency, will not undermine our operational capability?

The Olympics, when the eyes of the world will be on this country, are now just two years away. With a planned 20 per cent real-terms cut, front-end loaded, in police budgets—a 6 per cent cut in the year before the Olympics and an 8 per cent cut in the year of the Olympics—can the Minister assure the House that, given the extra strain that police resources will face, this does not pose an unacceptable risk to fighting crime and to our national security? Finally, does the Minister agree that, in the light of the events of the past few days, the issue of resources should now be looked at again alongside the counterterrorism review?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord opposite for his willingness to support the Government in the next measures that will have to be taken in what the House will agree is a challenging task concerning the transport of freight around the world. I am sure the police and the security services are grateful for his joint commendation of them.

The noble Lord asked a number of detailed questions, and I will do my best to answer them. First, he asked when people were informed. I can say that the device was removed from the plane at 3.30 in the morning and work continued through the night. In the early morning, the information was fed to London, and Ministers began to be informed shortly after 8 o’clock. The Home Secretary was personally informed nearer lunchtime. The Prime Minister was also informed then, and at that stage they were given a significant analysis of the investigations that had taken place and the information and assessment that was then available.

The noble Lord asked about the police investigation at the airport. There are two aspects to this: the intelligence tip-off and the process of investigation of the device. He rightly remarked that these packages were looked at following an intelligence tip-off. I might say that any implication—I am not suggesting that the noble Lord was implying this—that this was somehow accidental and that we were very fortunate, as we undoubtedly were, is slightly beside the point. I think the House will agree that we pursue a multilayered approach in this, and that it is the combination of the physical measures that we take, the protective procedures that we put in place and the intelligence context that we maintain around the world that enables us to give the people of this country the security that they are entitled to receive. It is very fortunate that our security relationships worked on this occasion and that the tip-off proved extremely accurate.

The police investigation proceeded in stages. Of course, the police are extremely careful about the way in which they dismantle a device not only because it may be dangerous but because they need to retain the evidential information. It is fair to say that they did not discover the device immediately, but they were still proceeding with their investigation when information came from Dubai that it had found evidence of a device. Subsequent work done at East Midlands Airport unravelled the precise nature of the device, which was then explored in detail.

The noble Lord also asked about the precautions that may be taken for cargo security while the wider review, which I mentioned, is under way. Those regulations are pretty stringent; they require any cargo that does not come from a trusted, listed consigner known to the airport authorities and approved by the Department for Transport to undergo stringent security tests. Therefore, only those items whose origin is known have a relatively easy passage, but I can assure the House that these regulations will be enforced with the utmost stringency in the foreseeable period. Very clearly, we will need to look in great detail not only at the procedures that we ourselves enforce in this country, but at what happens to cargo coming towards the United Kingdom—obviously something on which we will need to consult widely. There obviously has to be international co-operation and, in co-operation with other countries, we might wish to lay down new standards.

The noble Lord also asked about the relationship between what this episode tells us and our wider counterterrorism policy. Clearly, this episode tells us that we face a threat not just to passengers but to cargo and freight, unaccompanied and accompanied. It is perfectly possible, after all, for these people to do what they were doing on the basis of accompanied freight. Therefore, the Government are not relaxed and will not confine their investigation or the measures that they take to unaccompanied freight. We will look at a number of measures that may be necessary, and the Transport Secretary’s consultation and investigation will be quite wide-ranging, because we clearly need a higher level of assurance about cargo transit and transport.

On the relationship between our wider counterterrorism policies and on the Security Service, which the noble Lord asked about, I can assure the House that, based on an assessment by the head of the Security Service, we will be able to maintain, on proposed funding, the same assurance about our coverage and knowledge of terrorist activity in this country and elsewhere that we have had previously. That also applies to the role of our police in counterterrorism where we are protecting the Olympics budget and where we have confirmation from the head of counterterrorism command that he is able to carry out his duties on the basis of the funding that he will get. There is no reason to suppose that the measures that the Government are taking will in any way detract from, inhibit or prevent this country taking care of the security of the population of the United Kingdom.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the Home Office appointee on the Metropolitan Police Authority, with responsibility for overseeing counterterrorism and security. I, too, am grateful to the Minister for the full account that she has given. With what degree of certainty does she feel that these devices would have been detected had they been in checked-in passenger baggage on a flight embarking in the United Kingdom? Given the variations in standards of airline security in different parts of the world, what degree of certainty does she have regarding incoming flights that such baggage would have been detected at airports elsewhere in the world? What will her answers mean in terms of current levels of aircraft security for passenger airlines in this country?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord asks some pertinent and, I have to say, extremely difficult questions. My honest answer to his first question must be that we do not know the answer. This explosive is extremely difficult to detect. Technologies are known for detecting PETN and one consideration that we will have to take advice on is whether we should extend PETN testing to cargo going on board aircraft—most particularly passenger aircraft, but also other aircraft. We have to do this in a way that is consistent with assuring the public that they can travel safely, while not crippling the country’s economy and international commerce. Therefore, an international effort will be needed and we shall talk not only to other operators but to those who may be able to help us technologically. Part of the Transport Secretary’s review will consist of talking to the companies. Many of them are well advanced in increasing—and we will be increasing—the screening processes, including capabilities that are not necessarily at the moment distributed as a matter of course.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in the wider context to which both Front Benches referred, can the Minister confirm that control orders are simply not relevant to this situation and that, had they been in place, they would not have prevented it? Would she also like to comment on the remarks made by Michael O’Leary of Ryanair, who talked today about “ludicrous” airport security? He said that,

“we have another … lurch by the securicrats into making travel even more uncomfortable and an even more tedious ordeal for the public”.

I say this not as a cheap shot—although one might say that, if anyone knows about that, he would—but because I think that these are serious points, which should be responded to.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I do not think that we are discussing the control orders today. As for what Mr O’Leary of Ryanair said, he does perhaps have extraordinary timing. The view that the Government take is that airport security is extraordinarily important and we cannot let our guard down. That does not mean, of course, that there is never any room for improvement, for review or for looking at those things that could constitute an assurance of greater security. My right honourable friend the Transport Secretary said the other day that he intended to look at whether procedures could be improved and, in particular, whether we could proceed to some extent by way of audit rather than by laying the emphasis on the input side and insisting on lots of layers of security. However, we will wish to proceed extremely cautiously, in the light of events, in lowering or in any way interfering with the current security precautions, which I think give the travelling public a measure of assurance about the seriousness with which these issues are taken by the Government.

[Lord Clinton-Davis]

My Lords, I speak as the president of BALPA. The Minister spoke about widespread consultations. Has BALPA been included in this? If not, why not? Should not BALPA be included in the review? Is it not absurd that pilots, with all their expertise, should be subjected to stringent inspection before they board the aircraft? Finally, will pilots be consulted further on the relevant rules concerning cargo?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I am absolutely certain that the Transport Secretary will consult everyone who has a contribution to make and BALPA would certainly not be excluded from that. The noble Lord mentions the degree of stringent control over the pilots when they board the aircraft. The House will agree that it is important that those controls are exerted. What we clearly need, however, is to raise controls in other areas.

[Lord Elystan-Morgan]

My Lords, the Minister will recollect that the Statement said that the device seized at East Midlands airport “could have detonated”. Am I placing too slavishly literal an interpretation on that to assume that that refers to a timing device of some nature or, indeed, that the device could have been detonated by remote control? If it could have been detonated by remote control, within what range could that have been achieved?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, we are not entirely at the stage when we can answer all those very detailed questions—and we may never be. The “could” rather than the “would” relates to a number of factors, including the precise power of the explosive material and the power of the detonator. Also relevant would be where these devices were located in the aircraft—had they been in the middle of the fuselage, they would have been less likely to cause an accident than if, say, they were near the outer skin of the aircraft. There are a number of imponderables. It is fair to say that those who put the devices on board—these were cargo routes, which can vary at the last minute—could not have known in practice where, if they were able to cause a detonation, it would have taken place. It would be hard for them to know exactly how accurate their ability to detonate was.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, given that terrorists travel both in and out of countries, does my noble friend share my deep concern that at present only people travelling into the United Kingdom have their passports properly examined electronically? Is she aware—I assume that she must be, because any of us who travels must be—that immigration officers make very little attempt to look at the passports of those who are leaving the United Kingdom? Indeed, in April I travelled out of terminal 3 at Heathrow where there was no one at all at the immigration desk to look at one’s passport. When I asked why, I was told that there was nobody available. When is the electronics border system—the e-Borders system—which is meant to record both the departure and the arrival of passengers, going to be in full effect? As a result of what is now happening, will the Minister ensure that scrutiny of people departing from the United Kingdom is properly and electronically achieved?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, it certainly is the intention that in due course we will be able to record not only incoming travel but outgoing travel as well. The noble Lord is right to say that that is not happening at the moment. It is certainly not happening electronically. I cannot give him, I am afraid, a precise date, but I can say that we are doing our very best to speed up the introduction of e-Borders to enable us to have this information. That would not have necessarily borne directly on this episode, but of course everything helps in giving us greater information about those who are travelling. As I said at the beginning, it is relevant to know not only about cargo but about those who are potentially travelling in the same aircraft.

[Lord Malloch-Brown]

My Lords, is there not a tremendous disproportionality between the attention with which an individual passenger’s luggage is microscopically examined and what she described as the trusted consigner, whose large packages cannot be examined in anything like the same detail? A second contradiction relates to the long-term interest that we share in the foreign policy of this. We have had many tragic examples now and many budgerigars in the mineshaft, so to speak, of Yemen’s role—growing role, sadly—in international terrorist incidents and of the links between Yemen and Somalia, which she mentioned. I ask her to take to her colleagues the concern of all of us that we look at this not just as a border security issue but as a development issue, an intelligence-gathering issue and a diplomatic issue, which we must not shy away from just because of its difficulty.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, on the noble Lord’s first point, the House would agree that we clearly have to increase the capacity to understand and guarantee that cargo travelling around the world is not a danger to the aircraft that it is in or, indeed, to any people who happen to be on that aircraft. As regards what he said about Yemen, the Government are in full agreement. As your Lordships know, the UK is a leading member of the Friends of Yemen, a group that seeks to underpin and help the Government of Yemen to increase the welfare and economic situation of the people of Yemen. A number of countries are contributing to that and a programme is being formulated that should help to put the Yemeni Government on a much more coherent policy of economic development. Other things are happening, including bilateral actions by the UK. Obviously, one policy object is to increase the local Government’s capacity to combat terrorism and engage in effective counterterrorism. As I said, the Prime Minister assured the President of Yemen of our continued support. However, underpinning that is quite a lot of technical assistance to that Government to enable them to, in a sense, take charge of their own affairs, because ultimately the Yemenis have to create conditions in which terrorists do not flourish on their soil.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, it has been suggested that it is likely that these bombs would have been exploded in the air. However, earlier it was suggested that they were intended for the recipient of the parcels in Chicago. Can the noble Baroness say any more about why there has been this change of view?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

Given the destinations of the packages—one was destined for a synagogue in Chicago and the other for a shared Christian/Jewish centre—there was certainly speculation that these presents were intended for the recipients. I cannot give a precise answer and I would not want to suggest that there is total certainty about what we now assess to be the case—that these devices were intended to explode in mid-air—but the technical analysis tends to suggest that that was more likely to be the intention of the perpetrators.

[Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville]

My Lords, I have a question on a related issue but it is one that comes into the category of “It’s an ill wind”. Can my noble friend say what proportion of the companies engaged in making the security equipment, to which reference has been made, falls into the SME category? These companies have a significantly greater reputation for building employment in growing markets than do much larger companies.

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

I thank my noble friend for that question. I cannot give him a precise percentage figure, although the implication of his question is that it is considerable, and in that he is absolutely right. In this country we have some big companies that tend to be both defence and security contractors. Underneath and alongside them are myriad small companies, or SMEs, that are indeed the source of much of the innovation and inventive technology and some of the science. In this respect, I should also mention our universities, which, as I think is widely acknowledged, are going to contribute to and underpin the strength of this country in the defence and security technologies. This Government’s policy is greatly to encourage them to grow and to be real contributors to future security, as well as earning a good living for themselves and this country.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, are we not deeply indebted to foreign national intelligence officials who risk their lives in gathering intelligence to send to us in the democracies? Is a message going out from the British Parliament to thank the people and officials involved in those countries?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

The noble Lord has put it extremely well and I endorse what he has just said. Certainly our intelligence effort cannot be just one-sided—it cannot just be a case of what our own people do, although that should also be the object of our commendation. However, the intelligence that we received on this occasion was undoubtedly extraordinarily valuable and was illustrative of the extraordinary importance of developing these relationships and keeping them in good repair. I entirely endorse what the noble Lord said.

[Lord Stoddart of Swindon]

My Lords, it was reported on the “World at One” that the Saudi authorities had not informed the Yemeni authorities that there was a suspect package that originated in the Yemen. Was that perhaps a mistake that should be remedied in the future?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, I am afraid that I do not have any knowledge of that and cannot confirm it. However, it is clear that international co-operation between the parties is extremely important and we are very grateful to those who have helped us on this occasion.