Brexit: Attorney-General’s Advice

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Thursday 29th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, it is not for me to implore Members of this House not to worry in either the short or the long term, and it would be equally inappropriate for me to anticipate a Statement that has yet to be made by my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, can the Minister tell us whether the legal advice will take account of the interesting additional sentence in Monday’s Statement that opened up the prospect of there being a trade relationship but, if that were later altered by a future Parliament, the Irish backstop not coming back? What would be the legal implications of that for the European Union’s understanding that we will respect the Good Friday agreement and not bring back a hard border in Ireland—that is, we could chop and change whatever happens initially in the permanent relationship?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to anticipate a Statement that has not yet been made. With regard to the interpretation and application of the withdrawal agreement, this is not the time or the place to indulge in a detailed analysis of its effect. However, the withdrawal agreement is in the public domain, and it is open to anyone and all to take appropriate legal advice if they consider that that is required with regard to the interpretation of that agreement.

Brexit: Negotiations

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the package the Prime Minister has come back with is a bad deal: it would make Britain poorer, weaker and less secure. That does not mean that no deal is better—far from it. Only remaining in the EU is a good deal and that is what the people must now have the opportunity to choose. It was inevitable that leaving the EU would put the UK at a disadvantage compared with staying in. As for saying in a cavalier fashion, as so many Brexiters do, that leaving to trade on WTO terms would be a superior arrangement, that is like saying that Interpol is better than Europol. However, the extent of the damage has been made worse, without any shadow of a doubt, by the conduct of this Government. The following are my seven deadly Brexit sins, though speakers in this debate will no doubt add more.

First, incompetence has permeated the handling of Brexit. The most egregious example was the early imposition of red lines about no membership of the single market or customs union and the demonisation of the Court of Justice. These placed extreme and unnecessary constraints on negotiations. Then there was the triggering of Article 50 without a strategy, which meant that everything since has been done backwards, with successive retreats from the bombast of the Prime Minister’s October 2016 Tory conference speech and the hubris of her Lancaster House speech. This has led to contradictory assertions too numerous to mention. Out of many examples, I would just mention the almost total neglect of services—cited by Jo Johnson as a major reason for his resignation—which account for 80% of our economy.

Secondly, the Brexit proposition has been riddled with deceit. This started with the lies and alleged fraud by the leave campaigns, in which a variety of Cabinet Ministers are implicated. But it has fully permeated the subsequent conduct of the Brexit path as the Prime Minister grappled with turning fantasy into some semblance of reality, while trying to pretend to her party that she was not doing so. This habit of deception and dishonesty has endured through to the package deal. The Government’s note on the state of play of negotiations says that the:

“Outline of the Political Declaration … records the progress … in reaching an overall understanding on the framework for the future relationship”.


It does nothing of the kind. It is barely more than a shopping list of matters to be covered.

As for the mantra—repeated ad nauseam—of taking back control, the Prime Minister proposes in fact that we hand it over completely, as we will have to follow all EU rules and regulations for at least four years and effectively on a permanent basis, if we are to get anything like decent access to the EU single market, safeguard the interests of our manufacturers and of course keep the Irish border open. In the language of the European Commission, during the transition period,

“the EU will treat the UK as if it were a Member State, with the exception of participation in the EU institutions and governance structures”.

That is rather a large exception. This is the very opposite of taking back control. The British people were lied to big time about this. I see Nadine Dorries MP recently bemoaned the fact that the UK would have no commissioner or MEPs during the transition period—you could not make this up.

That reminds me of another piece of dishonesty. As the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, has often reminded us, the withdrawal agreement is a bridge to nowhere. Not only is there is no implementation period, as there is nothing yet to implement, but that is also true of transition since we still have no idea what type of long-term relationship we might be transitioning to.

I see that Boris Johnson accused others of peddling lies, attempting deception and having tragic illusions in his latest Telegraph column. That is as gross an example of pot and kettle as one could imagine. As his brother Jo indeed wrote on Saturday:

“For May to maintain that we’re delivering Brexit when we're actually giving away control will gravely erode trust in politics and imperil the future of the Conservative Party”.'


Just rewards, some of us would feel.

Thirdly, ignorance has been on permanent display. Of course, Mr Raab’s recent statement that he had no idea that the port of Dover was so important to Britain’s trade took the biscuit, but there have been many other examples of Brexiters showing that they have no idea how our economy works or of the importance of rules of origin and smooth customs procedures to our businesses. Many Ministers embarked on the negotiations betraying absolutely no visible knowledge of the EU’s legal and constitutional structure, competences or policies. They seem to think it is just a diplomatic club where everything is up for bargaining and cherry-picking. The “they need us more than we need them” boast is born of such ignorance. Ignorance is of course a fertile ground for its siblings, delusion, fantasy and petulance. Boris Johnson maintains that all that is needed is,

“confidence and enthusiasm and belief in this great project”.

Fourthly, complacency—a close cousin of ignorance—has been hard to overlook. The House will, of course, recall Liam Fox saying that the free trade agreement that we will have to do with the European Union will be one of the “easiest in human history”, and David Davis, on the prospect of new trade deals with non-EU countries ready to sign on Brexit day, saying:

“We can’t actually sign until the day we leave. But I've got a very strong suspicion there will be a lot of things to sign that very next day.’


I expect the Minister can confirm that that is not the case.

Fifthly, hypocrisy has been much in evidence. Brexiters hate EU freedom of movement, except when they want residence in another EU country and find they can get—or buy—a passport from another member state in order to retain free movement rights for themselves, at the same time as working hard to deny those very same rights to millions of their fellow countrymen or the businesses that want and need to recruit EU workers. We have the spectacle of Jacob Rees-Mogg securing a licence in Dublin for his investment fund to trade across the EU, while snatching the advantages of passporting from other financial firms wanting to trade from their base in London. We have seen Brexit donor hedge fund bosses boast about the fortunes they made speculating against the pound as it had a rough time on the foreign exchanges, caused by the Brexit they back. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens taking a well-earned break abroad have taken a hit they can ill afford on the value of their holiday money. We also saw the rallying cry of Westminster parliamentary sovereignty exposed as the Government fought tooth and nail for six months through the courts to stop Parliament having any say in decisions about Brexit.

Sixthly, xenophobia has been woven though the Brexit motivation. Brexiters are fond of protesting “we might hate the EU but we love Europe”, but what we have heard from Prime Minister May in recent times is a veritable torrent of hostile environment xenophobia. In her Tory conference speech two years ago, there was the notorious condemnation of her countrymen who believe in liberalism, openness and internationalism as “citizens of nowhere”. Then there was the otherwise inexplicable failure to give a unilateral guarantee to EU citizens here—with a reciprocal assurance from the EU 27 to Brits in their countries practically guaranteed—of their future rights as acquired to date. Yesterday, she accused EU free movers of being “queue jumpers”. Is she seriously saying that they prevented her opening the doors to Indian IT workers or Bangladeshi curry chefs? In fact, it was her intransigence on work visas for Indians that scuppered the EU-India trade agreement.

Lastly, Brexit has been a project not of construction but of destruction. One sometimes hears the term “destructive technology” used of new business ideas. Personally, I have never understood how the bright young things who use this term expect to get support from the wider community for projects which are intended to destroy their livelihoods, but the Brexit project does not even have the figleaf of “creative” to justify its destructiveness. Its negativity is just a game to many of its sponsors. It will kill off jobs. It threatens peace in Northern Ireland. It rips us away from our best friends and allies. It imperils the stability and coherence of Europe. It puts Gibraltar at risk of encroachment by Spain, and the Falklands at renewed risk of Argentinian scheming as we seek that country’s agreement to a rewriting of the WTO schedules. Many EU trade partners are getting the chance of more bites at the cherry as we ask them to roll over those agreements. And despite the Prime Minister’s declaration of devotion to “our precious Union”, Brexit imperils the unity of the United Kingdom. The disdain and contempt shown by some Brexiters for the Good Friday agreement will not be easily forgotten in Ireland, south or north.

Nothing can make up for the way these sins have infected the past two and a half years, but the Government and the Prime Minister have a last chance to redeem themselves in a display of unaccustomed honesty, courage and decency by putting the country first instead of Tory party unity, which did not work out very well. The Prime Minister had a flash of such honesty when she said last week that there are three possibilities: her deal, no deal or no Brexit. So she should tell the public that they cannot have the “exact same benefits” of the EU while being outside it, and that the only fair and honourable course of action is to give them the final say, so they can choose to remain in the EU. The Government should immediately and transparently begin contingency planning for a people’s vote in parallel to contingency planning for a no-deal Brexit. Let us have an end to deceit and hypocrisy and give the voters the final say.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not a question of difficulty; it is a question of how we have decided to approach dealing with this in a legislative manner. The intention is that the present Bill will legislate for legal certainty whether there is or is not a withdrawal agreement. In the event of a withdrawal agreement, we will legislate to ensure that in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill the terms of the present Bill will be brought into line with the terms of the withdrawal agreement in order that we can discharge our international legal obligations. We have consistently pointed out that that is the approach being taken to legislation in this context. It is really quite inconceivable to suppose that the Government are going to enter into a withdrawal agreement and then not implement that international legal obligation in our domestic law. That is the intention. It is simply a question of the order in which these things are being done, and it has always been maintained, and will be maintained, that it is not for this Bill to deal with the eventuality or the prospect of the implementation period.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Does the Minister not appreciate the absurdity some of us feel? As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed out, we are being marched to the top of a hill that the Government have already abandoned. We are being asked to legislate in terms that are contrary to government policy and strategy in the Brexit negotiations, which leaves one feeling in a somewhat surreal position.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I sympathise with the idea of being left in a somewhat surreal position. As I said at the outset of my remarks, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so while we have the anticipation and desire to secure an implementation period, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

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[Baroness Altman (Con)]

My Lords, the 2011 Act was introduced by the elected Chamber for the express purpose of safeguarding major constitutional changes in respect of our relationship with the EU and I support the amendment, to which I have added my name.

The Act, among other matters, provides for a referendum throughout the United Kingdom on any proposed EU treaty or treaty change which would transfer powers from the UK to the EU. Parliament voted for this power in order to protect the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and it is this aspect of our constitutional framework that it is important for the Committee to be mindful of as we negotiate our future relationship with the EU. Surely the proper time for the 2011 Act to be repealed is when we conclude our relationship with the EU. However, the Bill as it stands allows a Minister to repeal it at any time after Royal Assent.

The Conservative Party manifesto in 2010 led to this Act. It is worded not in terms of transfers of power but in terms of the extension of the competence or objectives of the European Union and decrease in the voting power of the United Kingdom. If we go into a transition period, there will be a new form of treaty relationship with the EU, one in which the UK has surrendered powers to the EU. The transition or implementation phase is a subordination of power to the EU 27 and binds us to them with fetters in a new international treaty. I contend that even if one believes wholeheartedly in leaving the EU there are strong grounds not to repeal this Act before we have actually and finally departed. Parliament does not yet have the terms of any deal for Brexit, nor will it have before Royal Assent. I therefore believe that it is vital that the 2011 Act is not repealed in this Bill as that would remove a safeguard which currently exists to protect the United Kingdom and our constitutional position. Parliament enacted that legislation for a specific purpose and Ministers should not be allowed to repeal it at will without proper debate and discussion unless we have already concluded our exit terms.

The other place did not have an opportunity to debate this amendment and it seems to have been missed, or perhaps honourable Members might have assumed that the repeal of the Act would apply only on the date of exit, but it turns out that it could be before that date by ministerial diktat. Given the uncertainty that still surrounds this Bill and the entire Brexit process, as well as the lack of clarity on our future relationship, I urge my noble friend the Minister to agree to this amendment. It safeguards the constitutional position enacted by Parliament in 2011 and maintains the sovereignty of Parliament over the Executive to protect the UK from deleterious treaty change that has not received prior approval from Parliament or the people.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, I am delighted to take part in this the last debate of the Committee stage, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for providing the opportunity for it. The noble Lord, Lord Dykes, took us down memory lane. I am sorry to say that I was deprived of the delights of participation in the debates on the 2011 Bill, as I was exiled to the European Parliament at the time. Obviously, I was denied a most enjoyable opportunity.

There is an arguable case that the 2011 EU Act referendum requirement could apply on the grounds that the standstill transition and/or the future relationship removes powers from the UK relative to the EU. There is much legal argument, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, noted, about whether it could apply, and indeed litigation is taking place on that very question. It would therefore be premature to abolish the Act either while the litigation is progressing or before it is clear whether the relationship between the UK and the EU during the standstill transition and beyond that into the future entails a loss of sovereignty such as to trigger the need for a referendum under the Act. The standstill transition most certainly does entail a loss of sovereignty, as we discussed earlier today. We will be mere rule takers who are obliged to obey with no say; that is already clear. It is a clear transfer of power to the EU.

The Government’s emerging Brexit policy, as articulated in the Prime Minister’s Mansion House speech, suggests that their plan is for us to take our instructions on the facts from Brussels for many years to come and indeed into the long-term future, so the Act ought to be retained in the tool-box and abolished by Parliament only as and when it is genuinely no longer needed. Certainly it should not be repealed before exit day or subject only to ministerial regulations.

Members on these Benches make no bones about the fact that a further vote for British citizens on the Brexit deal is justified in its own right. That is our major argument for a further opportunity for the citizens of this country to have their say on Brexit. It would be a wholly different exercise from the 2016 referendum because citizens would be able actually to evaluate what kind of Brexit we are going to get. Is it the kind of Brexit that some have advocated, or is it Brexit in name only? There have been no lesser advocates than Jacob Rees-Mogg for having a two-stage process. In 2011, he said in the context of one or other of the plans to renegotiate our membership:

“Indeed, we could have two referendums. As it happens, it might make more sense to have the second referendum after the renegotiation is completed”.—[Official Report¸ Commons, 24/10/11; col. 108.]


For that, one can substitute the Brexit negotiations.

I recall my noble friend Lord Newby quoting recently that a majority of Conservative voters want to have a referendum on the final Brexit deal. In London, that figure reaches 61% to 25% opposed, and the support for people to have the chance of a vote on the deal is growing all the time. So the major case for that to happen rests, as I say, on substantive rather than procedural grounds.

Until things are clear, it seems to Members on these Benches that there is validity in retaining the possible use of the EU Act, which is about the loss of sovereignty and the transfer of powers to the EU. That is precisely what we are going to be faced with.

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[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, we might not leave the European Union next year. We have not enacted the legislation to do so. At the moment there is no treaty. The 2011 Act would be repealed under the terms of the Bill. The two are clearly not consequential.

[Baroness Ludford]

Does the noble Lord agree that there is no relationship between exit day and the repeal of the European Communities Act? Clause 19 says that the repeal, inter alia, of the 2011 Act, is a provision of the Bill that will,

“come into force on such day as a Minister of the Crown may by regulations appoint”.

It has absolutely nothing to do with exit day or the ECA.

[Lord Adonis]

That is the precise point. The big question that the Minister would not answer—I do not think he wanted to give me the answer—is why the repeal of the 2011 Act is being accelerated ahead of Brexit day and the repeal of the European Communities Act 1972. The Minister has not given an answer, nor has he given the Committee any indication of when that repeal would take place. My understanding is that the Government would seek to repeal the 2011 Act as soon as they can after the enactment of the Bill, which will mean that its terms would not apply for the period between that repeal and Brexit day, but it is of course perfectly possible. Who knows what will happen in the next 52 weeks? As Harold Wilson famously said, a week is a long time in politics, so goodness knows what will happen in the next 52. The Act would not apply. It may well be that my noble and learned friend is right that there is not a substantial legal argument here, but that is precisely the issue the courts are there to determine. They will not have the opportunity to do so because the Act will have been repealed.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord for his assistance, which is always welcome. I do not agree with the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, regarding the breadth of the provision. This is a standard type of power contained in many Acts of Parliament to deal with consequential issues, such as those alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. A very similar power can be found in the Scotland Act 1998, in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, in the Government of Wales Act 1998, and in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012—LASPO. All these statutory provisions have a similar consequential power for the same purpose, so this is not unique, exceptional or unusual.

However, I understand concerns being expressed about the scope of the power and the way it will be used. I notice the reference by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, to the use of the term “appropriate”, which some, of course, often consider to be inappropriate in a statutory context. I hear what is said about making clear that this is a consequential power that will be needed to repeal provisions.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for examples. If we look at the various statutory provisions for accession of other countries to the EU—the Croatian accession is the most recent—which amend the ECA, it is necessary to address that sort of primary legislation. If we look at the provisions of the European Union (Approvals) Act 2017—

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. He cited some other examples. I admit that I am not familiar with devolution statutes and the consequential powers in them, but we have to take account of the context in which this legislation is being made and the considerable worries about the potential use to which they could be put, which is surely more than the Croatian accession. The Government cannot ignore the worries that these powers—in the context of the Brexit negotiations, future relationships, trade deals and whatever—could be used in a way which could significantly affect existing rights and remedies.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it appears to me that some of the fears being expressed are not about the use of these powers, but about their misuse. As the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, observed, we have to see this provision in context. It is to be applied to the consequences of the Bill becoming law.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, asked for further examples. There are many examples in primary legislation of where consequential amendment will be required. I will not elaborate on them at this stage. For example, there are provisions in all the accession Acts that would have to be regarded as necessary to clear up in the context of the statute book. There are provisions in such things as the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which would again have to be addressed in this context as a consequence of our removal when the Bill becomes law.

What will be required is a meaningful indication of the type of change that is needed to keep the statute book in reasonable order after our departure from the EU. In my respectful submission, where there may be concern about the misuse of this consequential power we are of course alive to concerns that are expressed. It may be that it turns largely not on the way Clause 17(1) is presently framed, but on the use of a term such as “appropriate”. We will give further consideration to the use of that language and whether that is the way this consequential—I stress “consequential”—power should be employed in this context.

I hope that gives noble Lords some degree of reassurance about the intention here. I suggest that the removal entirely of the consequential power contained in Clause 17 would have a materially adverse effect on the way the Bill can be properly implemented to bring the statute book into proper order following our exit from the EU. I hope at this stage that the noble Lord will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 8th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 19th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Warner (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment and echo very much the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I say that as a former Minister who was responsible for regulating pharmaceuticals and medical devices. In those days, we were a rule-maker; now, we become a rule-taker—and in an area where we have already lost the European Medicines Agency, which is disappearing out of the country. So our position on the regulation of medicines has been worsened, as has the investment in this country as a result.

We are now going down the same path with medical devices, which are one of the unglamorous bits of our healthcare system but they are very important. We are rather good at inventing medical devices in this country. We produce quite a lot of inventions and have been the rule-maker through the BSI. Most of Europe has been happy to take that rule-making from the BSI, which has moved abroad, because it has a reputation as an effective regulator in this area. We are ending up with medicines and medical devices coming ever closer together but we have lost the regulatory system for them both. That is no mean achievement for the Government.

If we do not secure some kind of reciprocal agreement, as this amendment suggests, we will be in an even worse state than the noble Lord, Lord Deben, thinks we might. I am with him all the way. This is another industry which we are neglecting. In many cases, the companies making these devices are quite small and we are putting them into a very difficult position. They cannot hang around when they make their business decisions in the hope that David Davis will come up with a deal that resolves some of the uncertainties in their business. They will have to take decisions quite quickly if they want to survive.

The Government’s approach to negotiation is to be untransparent and incoherent, while trying to reassure everybody that it will all be all right on the night. But that is not a position that businessmen and businesswomen can accept in running their businesses and keeping them solvent. This is another example of a sector where we are going to diminish our capacity to innovate and to open up new markets within Europe for our inventions. Much more to the point, we will lose the kind of control over regulation that we had in the past.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Can I just remind the noble Lord of the debate we had last week on the clinical trials regulation and the uncertainty there? We have had contradictory statements from two Ministers about whether the clinical trials regulation will be retained EU law, in domestic law, on exit day. As I think the noble Lord is aware, I have written to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to try and clarify exactly what the Government’s position is.

[Lord Warner]

I did not want to remind the Government Front Bench of the slaughter of the innocents over clinical trials last week, but I have no doubt the Minister will read that debate in Hansard and form his own judgment. I am pleased the noble Baroness has written to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, about this. It opens up the possibility of securing more protection in the Bill for some British industries, and we should not be afraid to take that opportunity in this House.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Clancarty]

I am not sure that is the case at all. It is very likely that visas will be introduced.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

It may well be that we benefit from a visa waiver but it is also likely that we will have to apply for what is often called a “visa lite”, which similar to the United States’ ESTA. The EU is bringing in something called ETIAS and for most people it will not amount to a big difference: you have to go online, pay a fee and answer lots of questions about health, criminal background and so on. We may not require a visa but we will need a “visa lite”, so it will not be hassle-free.

[The Earl of Clancarty]

Absolutely. Whatever happens, we will be at a disadvantage to everyone else in Europe and that is really significant.

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[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 202, which is in the name of my noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham, who is unfortunately unable to attend because of illness. It is also in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Roberts of Llandudno and the noble Lord, Lord Judd. Before going on, I fully agree with what has been said in this debate about the need to retain EU citizenship for us all, and about the hypocrisy of some of those who supported and continue to support leave, but who have somehow managed to acquire a passport of an EU member state, such as Malta. That enables them to continue enjoying the benefits which they are quite happy to deprive the rest of us of.

Amendment 202 calls on the Government,

“to maintain, preserve and protect the rights of”,

EU citizens in the UK. I therefore very much agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, about the fact that that has not been done. We are seeking a guarantee that existing rights will remain unchanged. The Government have had the opportunity in the last 21 months to give a unilateral guarantee that existing rights would be retained. They were invited to do so by the EU Select Committee, in a report produced under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—I had the pleasure to serve on that sub-committee—but have not done so. They also had the opportunity to try to ring-fence the discussion about citizens’ rights from all the other matters being discussed within the withdrawal agreements but, unfortunately, they have not done that.

EU citizens resident in this country and British citizens resident in the EU 27 have indeed been used as bargaining chips. That has led to great distress for many of the 5 million affected citizens, who live in a state of anxiety and limbo that was not helped by the words of the Prime Minister in her speech to the Conservative Party in October 2016 about “citizens of nowhere”. She has now resiled from that kind of terminology, but unfortunately the damage has been done in that the tone is somehow one of, “You do not belong here if you have multiple allegiances. It is not good enough to be a contributing and responsible person in this country”. The Government still have a chance to offer unilateral guarantees and I invite the Minister to tell us today that he is going to ignore the mire into which all of this has become embroiled and just give a straightforward guarantee.

Many ambiguities and gaps still exist in the current state of play over the discussions about settled status. Some of the issues are being taken up in correspondence with Home Office Ministers on the part of the EU Select Committee. The problem is that settled status is not the retention of the same rights and protections that EU law currently confers on people; it is based on UK immigration law and has all the features of that law, including the hostile environment that is currently being created. People will have to apply for settled status. It will not just be a question of carryover or cut and paste—they will have to apply. Apparently, the Home Office expects the vast majority of cases to be granted, although that begs the question of which ones will not be granted to people who are currently resident here.

[Lord Green of Deddington]

Will the noble Baroness explain how we could possibly deal with several million people unless we invite them to apply?

[Baroness Ludford]

There could be a simple declaratory process. If any parliamentarians in this Chamber have ever had to deal with the Home Office on behalf of one of their constituents, as I did when I was an MEP, they will know what a happy—or otherwise—process that is. Something simple and declaratory such as going to the local town hall could be worked out. It should be light touch: a declaration of existing residence. That is quite different from having to apply to the Home Office.

The fear has been expressed on behalf of the group, the 3 million, that perhaps around 10% of people might fall through the cracks because their application is rejected or because they do not apply. Some people are not very aware of what is going on in the law or they do not have access to computers and so on. There is no legal presumption in favour of granting settled status to all residents who are legally living here before exit day, which begs another question. Perhaps the Minister could explain to us what exactly is going to happen to those people who arrive during the transition period. That, of course, is something the Prime Minister has conceded, in that they will have a status, but it is slightly unclear how it is going to work.

There has also been no clarification of the continuation of all the individual economic rights and recognition of qualifications that EU citizens currently enjoy and, as I have said, no guarantee that the registration will be simple and light touch. There is supposed to be a digital application system. Can the Minister tell us exactly where we are in the construction of that system? We all know that IT projects, in particular Home Office IT projects, have a habit of becoming problematic. Moreover, the backstop to all this is that the European Parliament will have to approve the withdrawal agreement, including the conditions for EU citizens. I note that Mr Verhofstadt tweeted yesterday,

“the European Parliament expects a cost free and burden free registration process”.

It wants to ensure that there is no discrimination between EU citizens and British citizens, which of course raises the question: are the Government planning to introduce ID cards by the back door in order to say that we are all being treated the same?

There are many holes and gaps that the Home Office is still unable to answer questions on. I do not have time to cover them all but I would like to ask about comprehensive sickness insurance—the requirement that people have private medical insurance—because very mixed messages are being given about it. The position of the European Commission has always been that if people are allowed to use the NHS, that amounts to comprehensive sickness insurance under the directive. It started legal action but that has apparently not progressed.

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[Lord Green of Deddington]

I am very puzzled as to how any of this is relevant to the Bill we are discussing. Does the noble Baroness not understand that this kind of stuff, which is being repeated time and again, is actually doing more harm than good? It is raising issues for people who do not face them. It is quite clear that the maximum is being done to help people qualify for residence in the UK. We could not do more than we have done. Frankly, this is just making trouble.

[Baroness Ludford]

It is highly relevant to whether people are being guaranteed their existing rights to legally reside in this country. I am quite surprised that the noble Lord thinks it is not relevant to an amendment that is about maintaining and guaranteeing the existing rights of EU citizens. The confusion is caused by the Home Office’s lack of clarity, not by me.

I end on that note. I would like some answers from the Minister to these detailed questions and many others.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I want to make two short points. The first is that the precedent of giving rights in other countries when there is a separation is set up very well by the arrangements between ourselves and the Republic of Ireland in relation to Irish citizens and their rights in our country, which are guaranteed by statute in a number of cases.

Secondly, on the idea that we have to refer all these matters to the European court, anyone who reads the judgments of our courts from day to day will realise that the fairness they exhibit towards foreign citizens is of the highest possible standard. I know of no country in the world and no court in the world that succeeds in getting a higher standard; there are others that have an equally high standard, but I know of none that has a higher one. It would be a most retrograde step for this House to do anything that suggested to people in Europe that they could not get justice from the courts of this country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My noble and learned friend is talking in the context of this being an international treaty that has to be transposed into UK law, but surely the amendment addresses the issue of the supremacy of European Union law, which citizens of the EU currently rely on when they live in this country. I thought that the purpose of the amendment was to make sure that those rights continued to exist and would be clarified. That is all that we asking in the Committee today.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With great respect to the noble Baroness, I think that I must respond to my noble friend Lady McIntosh.

Again, that argument rather misses the point, because what we have at the moment is a belief on the basis of the joint report that rights of EU citizens in the UK may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union after Brexit, but that is not finalised; it is not yet contained in an international treaty agreement.

[Baroness Ludford]

We have always understood that we cannot unilaterally guarantee in the context of what is now happening an agreement of two parties. What was said from the very beginning, immediately after the referendum, was, “Give a unilateral guarantee and then we can with almost 100% certainty expect full reciprocity”. That was always what was suggested.

[A noble Lord]

Ha!

[Baroness Ludford]

Yes, I would say to the sedentary noble Lord.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness—who I think invited me to drop all the mire; I am not sure what I am supposed to do about that—the expectation of reciprocity is something that we hope to achieve during the negotiation, and that is ongoing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for making that point. I would add only that I spoke as a Minister of this Government in expressing that view, because I spoke from the Dispatch Box when I made it clear. I can refer the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, to Hansard in regard to that point. Of course, the origins of the remark may not have had quite the impact that it could otherwise have had if coming from another source—I do not seek to elaborate on that point.

Sometimes it comes ill to counsel to listen rather than to speak, but this is an occasion when it is entirely appropriate for me and for the Government to listen to what has been said. I am extremely grateful for the contributions of all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords with regard to the formulation of Clause 6(2). I refer to the formulation of the clause because I believe we have a common desire to ensure that we give appropriate, effective and clear guidance, in so far as it is required, to the judiciary regarding what is a relatively complex issue. Of course the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out that in the normal way one might delete Clause 6(2) and allow the courts to deal with this as they deal with other matters of comparative law, but he went on to point out—quite correctly, I submit—that here we are dealing with a very particular situation where guidance may be needed. I am conscious of the way in which the various amendments have evolved.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, also referred to Clause 6(4) and the issue of whether and when the Supreme Court might decide whether to adhere to precedents in this context. I bow to the far greater experience of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Neuberger and Lord Hope, who sat in the UK Supreme Court. My limited experience is that, where I attempted to persuade them to adhere or not to adhere to a particular precedent, they had no difficulty in making their own minds up.

Be that as it may, I recognise the force of the points that have been made. They have come from beyond this House as well because, as noble Lords will be aware, the Constitution Committee also made some recommendations about this. Indeed, its early recommendation in March 2017 was,

“the Government may wish to consider whether the Bill should provide that, as a general rule, UK courts ‘may have regard to’ the case law of the Court of Justice (and we stress that it should be optional)”.

Indeed, we were having regard to that as we looked at Clause 6(2).

A point was made about the distinction between “may” and “must” in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It occurs to me that, where he uses “must”, he goes on in his amendment at (2C) to qualify the context in which that word is used, and there may not be a vast gulf between “may” and “must” in the context of the two amendments that have been tabled. Of course, that which was recommended by the Law Society of Scotland has the merit of some simplicity and embraces the same point.

At this stage I would add only that the Bingham Centre looked at the current recommendations of the Constitution Committee that lie behind the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and raised concerns about a number of aspects of the formulation put forward by the committee. However, I make it clear that we greatly appreciate the contributions that have been made to this part of the Committee’s debate. We will go away and consider the various formulations, and I believe it would be sensible for the Government to engage with various interested parties once we have come to a view about how we can properly express what we all understand is necessary policy guidance in the context of this exceptional step. Against that background, I invite noble Lords to consider not pressing their amendments at this stage.

[Baroness Ludford]

I know I will not be popular by holding things up, but the Minister was specifically asked if he could explain the reference to,

“another EU entity or the EU”,

in Clause 6(2). I do not know whether he feels he could do that. Does it have any reference to the European Commission? The Prime Minister said we would have a binding commitment to follow EU state aid and competition law, and I wondered if it had any relevance in that context.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not going to elaborate at this stage because, as I say, the Government are going to go away and consider the proposals for an amendment to Clause 6(2).

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I have my name to Amendments 37 and 70, and declare my interest as a trustee of the charity, Coram. I remind the Minister that it is the hereditary oik from the Cross Benches here again for the second time—good evening.

There appears to be broad agreement that it would be disappointing and unfortunate if we inadvertently managed to let children’s rights slip as a result of our anything-but-straightforward and frictionless departure from the EU. The United Kingdom has often played a prominent role in developing global human rights frameworks, and I sincerely hope that the Government intend that we should continue to do so in the hereafter.

Many of us have taken on board the distaste which many on the pro-leave side feel for the charter. Indeed, I have watched online a video of the Minister lamenting the United Kingdom being told to make prisoners have the vote and to allow some individuals involved in terrorism to be given greater human rights than he thought was entirely appropriate. The European Scrutiny Committee of another place in 2014 described the charter as creating a state of confusion.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I think I heard the noble Lord refer to prisoners’ votes. That was the judgment of the Strasbourg court about the European Convention on Human Rights; it was nothing to do with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In any case, the way in which it has been demonised is wrong, because it said only, “Please have a scheme”, and not, “All prisoners must vote”.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool]

I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. All I would say is that the discussion I heard was framed in the context of the European charter of human rights, probably incorrectly.

[Baroness Ludford]

Very incorrectly.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool]

That committee was chaired by Sir William Cash and included a certain Member for the 18th century, Mr Rees-Mogg, so I think that we can conclude that it was clearly completely impartial. We have got the message.

The question that we are posing to the Government, in response to a wide range of representations which many of us have had, is whether they will honour their commitment to defend the rights of children as we come through this process.

I mentioned at Second Reading that scrutinising and discussing this Bill in a non-partisan and apolitical way might be helpful, so I have a specific question for the Minister: does he have a twin brother or a doppelganger? Can he be same person who on 30 January was responsible for writing two articles? One of them appeared on the ConservativeHome website and said:

“From the beginning we have been clear that we need—and indeed want—to adopt a collaborative approach and listen to the views of Parliamentarians from all sides of the House. The necessity and sheer scope of this legislation means that thorough debate and examination is more important than ever. We took this approach in the House of Commons and we will continue to do so in the Lords … The House of Lords has a well-deserved reputation for its detailed and thorough scrutiny. This Bill should be no exception—it will benefit from the forensic examination the Lords can bring and we look forward to that razor-sharp review”.


On the same day, in the Sun newspaper, he wrote:

“We are seeing a co-ordinated push by the defeated elites; the Europhiles will use their majority in the Lords—a majority that rests heavily on quangocrats and busybodies, some of them in receipt of fat Brussels pensions”—


which possibly includes Members of the European Parliament—and:

“For the Lords to overturn a result supported by more British voters than anything else in history would be outrageous”.


He described some of your Lordships as scheming Peers who want an anti-democratic coup. So I have two more questions for the Minister; could he share with us what he had for breakfast the day he wrote those two reports, because I shall try to avoid eating the same? Secondly, did he ever consider a career in the Foreign Office?

Let us please forget the unending politics and focus on the children, whose voice and interests have hardly been top of mind as a rather unseemly procession of opinionated individuals compete for media airtime and attention. I recall noble Lords to the fact that I am speaking to Amendments 37 and 70. Amendment 37 aims to bring into domestic law the parts of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law that are necessary to protect children’s rights. I appreciate that we are not going to bring the charter overall into our law; however, it has some very important provisions: the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration in all actions, children’s views may be expressed and shall be taken into consideration, and children have a right to maintain a personal relationship with both their parents unless that is contrary to their interests. It contains other articles, as other noble Lords have mentioned, including on education and the prohibition of slave labour—the Minister will be aware that our Prime Minister has a particular interest in anything to do with child slavery.

Amendment 70 goes about achieving the same end in a different way. The UNCRC is viewed by most of us as the gold standard. The Government have stated that the source of the rights of the child set out in Article 24 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights stem from the UNCRC, but as others have mentioned, it is not incorporated into domestic law. We share the concerns outlined by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its recent report, Legislative Scrutiny: The EU (Withdrawal) Bill: A Right by Right Analysis. There are several examples of where the UNCRC and the charter have fundamentally helped where there are gaps in our own law. Among these are cross-border family breakdown; the right to be forgotten and data protection; and where 17 year-olds, who are still children under the law, are arrested and treated as if they are adults, which is against the law.

I believe that we must protect the hard-won protections of children and ensure that they are not inadvertently lost. I also support Amendments 68, 69 and 97, all of which are simply trying to probe the Government, to understand how they see the way forward. What all of us are saying is that, however we go forward, we must ensure that in no way, shape or form are the rights and protections of children in any way impaired.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

I hope I can put the noble Lord’s mind at rest.

It is important that we recognise how these functional rights are developed and ongoing. The day after Brexit, our rulebook will be safe. The rights which we have will be incorporated and we will build on them as a foundation. They are not a ceiling. It is right and proper that both this Chamber and the other place are instrumental in taking forward the enhancement of these rights. We have to recognise that over the past 30 years our understanding of what is a necessary family right has entirely evolved. As the vice-chair of the LGBTI group in the European Parliament, I recognised how far we could push things within the European Parliament, but I was very clear about how far we could not push them within the European Parliament because of the inability of certain member states to move forward with us. In that regard, in terms of equalities, on not one occasion have we ranked lower than third in the whole of the EU—indeed, in the whole of the continent of Europe. We have pushed forward those rights far faster, deeper and more surely than many of the other member states, so we should not lightly shake them off. We will remain what we have been, I hope, all the way through: a deliverer of these rights, not just on paper, because that is not a functional right, but in functioning and working in the workplace and elsewhere. It is absolutely right that we do so.

In response to a number of the questions raised, I am conscious that there is unease and a certain regard that the Government today will take the first opportunity to cast these rights aside, to scrape the barnacles off the boat to allow the ship to move faster. I assure the Committee that they are integral parts of the engine of the ship and we shall not be discarding them. That is how important they shall remain.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

If that is the case, and we are all very impressed by this unexpected and thorough assurance from the Minister on behalf of the Government, why can he not accept some amendments in this area and some others to put that in the Bill?

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point as to why people have not been able to hear these points, but I am iterating what the Prime Minister, and a number of other Ministers in the Government, have said as regards this, and am pleased if I have been able to cut through some of the hubbub that has surrounded it. We are and remain a Government committed to ensuring that on day one after Brexit there is no diminution whatever in the rights which are and have been enjoyed through our membership of the EU. It is important to stress that. I hope I have been able to give noble Lords some reassurances this evening and some confidence that they will be able to set aside these amendments on this occasion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

Leaving aside Article 191—we can argue about that and there is a decision that appears to demonstrate the point: the case of Artegodan, where the court appeared to be willing to extrapolate from the precautionary principle a general principle of EU law—does the Minister accept that, so far as the other general principles of EU law are concerned, to exclude them from the ability to found a cause of action and not just be an interpretative tool would be a diminution of the rights that people currently have and would include a diminution of many of the rights that the Government are saying are already protected under English law?

[Baroness Ludford]

So that the Minister does not have to bob up and down, may I also ask him a question? He talked about our approach in this Bill. That leads me to reflect on how far the approach in this Bill fits, for instance, the Prime Minister’s speech on Friday, in which she envisaged not only strong commitments in the area of trading goods but binding commitments in competition law. The noble and learned Lord talked earlier about how there would be EU law and then retained EU law in this country, the interpretation of which could diverge. How will the Prime Minister’s commitment to binding commitments in some areas to stay fully aligned with EU law be reflected in this construction of the Bill? If we diverge, would we then have to have domestic legislation to bring us back on track with the EU?

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Farmer (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise that this is the first time I have spoken during the passage of the Bill: I was unavoidably out of the country when it received its Second Reading. My contribution, if I had been able to make one then, would have touched on the vital area of the implications of Brexit for family law.

I understand that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, has said, these are probing amendments, but I find myself in disagreement with the noble Baronesses who have tabled Amendments 29, 53 and 336. This is generally not the case: indeed, I and other noble Lords are aware of their very strong track record in championing families in general and family justice in particular. However, under their amendments the UK would either remain entirely subject to EU law in the family law context or enter into some bespoke arrangement—such an arrangement does not exist presently between the EU and any other non-EU member state—which would lead to the same outcome.

Reciprocal arrangements are possible only by being subject to EU laws. The UK government position in the withdrawal legislation is that EU laws on the day we leave the EU will become part of UK national law, but not that we will be bound to those laws on an ongoing reciprocal basis, whether in the short term or for eight years or more. As far as I am aware, this is not being proposed in any other area of UK law. I understand and share the concern for children and families that drives many of those tabling these amendments. However, if accepted, they would lead to a situation in which, in effect, the UK had not left the EU. I will look in turn at Amendments 29, 53 and 336.

Amendment 29 would bind the Government to publish a report on the maintenance of rights in family law within six months of the Act being passed. If that event takes place in June 2018, two years after the referendum, this proposed new clause would take us to late 2018 and a matter of months before we leave the EU. Obviously, the Government need not take the full time, but it is worth saying that there have already been many meetings and consultations: I am aware of an early round with international lawyers and the Ministry of Justice as early as October 2016, with responses requested by the MoJ by November 2016 so it could report to DExEU.

A major family law conference was held by Cambridge University in March 2017 with academics, practitioners and policy advisers from across the UK and some EU nations, again with civil servants in attendance to report back. A couple of other conferences were held last spring. Then over the autumn, I know there were direct meetings between practitioners and civil servants about these issues, including the proposal that we should remain part of EU family law after we leave the EU. These meetings continued throughout the latter part of 2017 and, no doubt, are still ongoing.

Noble Lords will be aware that just before Christmas there was a debate here on the European Union Justice Sub-Committee’s report on civil law matters. Allowing another six months would unnecessarily extend what has already been a long consultation process. Nothing has been said by any government department to hint that the UK Government will contemplate such a dramatic change to the withdrawal legislation that we will continue to be a direct party to EU legislation in one distinctive area of law.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way; I was anxious to ask him this before he sat down. I respect his professed commitment to the rights of families and children, but he appears to be saying that a rather ideological commitment to escape the jurisdiction of the European court and the other enforcement mechanisms should prevail above the needs of divorcing people and especially children who need maintenance obligation enforced and who may have been the subject of abduction. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said—as a judge, she has vast experience in this area—it was much easier once EU law provisions came into force than under the international conventions. Can the noble Lord honestly tell me that he could look children in the eye and say it is better to be outside the reciprocal EU arrangements?

[Lord Farmer]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I believe it will be better in the long run. We have mentioned the Hague convention. There are many experts; Professor Paul Beaumont, for instance, is a leading expert, who has said at international conferences that in his opinion the Hague alternatives will be perfectly adequate and satisfactory on our leaving the EU.

Moreover, the amendment anticipates a report on steps taken to negotiate continued reciprocal arrangements—that is, effectively, continued membership of EU family law. This position has not been adopted in any other area of law, as far as I am aware, and is not supported by organisations such as the Law Society.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I cannot say that agreements are being reached at this time because we are only setting out on the process of negotiation with regard to the future partnership; I cannot take that any further at this stage. However, our position is that family law co-operation is critically important, and it is no different from our general position with regard to civil co-operation.

I would acknowledge that the development of Brussels IIa is an improvement on the Hague conventions, and indeed I believe that some would acknowledge that it is an improvement on the terms of the Lugano convention in this regard as well. The terms have been refined and developed, and it may be that there will be a further negotiation and conclusion over Brussels IIa—what might be termed as Brussels IIb, I suppose—which may well occur after Brexit. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that we have reasonable alignment and therefore the basis for reciprocity, we will want to take into consideration such developments in the law.

Let us be clear: generally speaking, these developments take place for all the best reasons. They are developments that reflect improvements, so why would we turn our face away from improvements in the law on the reciprocal enforcement of family law matters related to maintenance, divorce and child abduction? We have no cause or reason to do so and of course we are going to embrace these matters.

I appreciate that the amendments in this group are probing in nature, but I shall try to address some of the specific details. The report called for in the first amendment tabled by the noble Baroness would require the Government to publish details of how rights in EU family law operate in domestic law as well as key details of the negotiations within six months of this Bill receiving Royal Assent. With great respect, that is an arbitrary deadline which makes no reference to the position of the negotiations at that stage or the other documents that the Government will be publishing on the subject. These documents include not only any final agreement reached in the negotiations regarding continuing judicial co-operation on family law, but also the explanatory material that Ministers will publish when they exercise their key Bill powers to amend retained EU law. That will include retained EU family law. So, as I am sure the noble Baroness is aware, any agreement between the UK and the EU will be detailed clearly within the withdrawal agreement and domestically legislated for in the upcoming withdrawal agreement and implementation period Bill, which Parliament will have a full opportunity to scrutinise. However, I have to say that it does not arise in the context of this Bill.

The next amendment concerns the jurisdiction of the CJEU. We will discuss that in more detail when we come to debate Clause 6, so I will not take up a great deal of time although I want to make a couple of points. First, it is not necessary for the UK to be subject, unilaterally, to CJEU jurisdiction to secure a reciprocal agreement in this field any more than it is a requirement of the signatories to the Lugano convention to secure agreement with Brussels regarding family law matters. There are a number of existing precedents: not just Lugano, but the Hague convention as well. As I have indicated, the jurisdiction of the CJEU is sometimes either exaggerated or misunderstood in this context. In the EU, it is of course the final arbiter of the construction and application of EU instruments, but that does not mean that we have to embrace the CJEU’s jurisdiction to have a suitable partnership agreement with the 27 members of the EU.

[Baroness Ludford]

In his lengthy reply, the Minister appears to perpetuate some of the misunderstanding that underlay the Prime Minister’s speech on Friday, which is that somehow if you mirror the laws of the EU 27 and start from the same position, you do not need the rest of what Commission jargon calls the ecosystem—in other words, the common rules and the enforcement of institutional and supervisory mechanisms. Surely that is the difference between the EU context and the Hague and Lugano conventions, and accounts for the difference between having regard to and mutually recognising and enforcing judgments. It is part of a complex of arrangements. There is a qualitative difference between the international arrangements and the EU arrangements, which does not seem to come through in the Minister’s response.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, neither I nor the Prime Minister misunderstood any of that. With great respect, I want to correct the noble Baroness on one point: that ecosystem is simply not required for mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments by two separate jurisdictions. That happens between the countries of the Lugano convention and countries in the EU in any event. I am talking about starting from the same point, with common rules regarding judicial recognition and enforcement, and moving from there to the negotiation of a new partnership. We do not foresee the sort of difficulty that the noble Baroness alludes to in that context.

At this stage, I want to come back to the point I was seeking to make. First, it is not necessary for the UK to subject itself unilaterally to the CJEU’s jurisdiction to secure a reciprocal agreement. Many other countries do that. Secondly, in any event, the Government have been clear throughout debate on the Bill that it is in no way designed to legislate for any future agreement between the UK and the EU. That is not the purpose of the Bill. We cannot unilaterally legislate for our future relationship with the EU simply by including in our domestic legislation certain provisions about recognition of family law, maintenance and other agreements—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, readily acknowledged at the outset of her opening remarks some considerable time ago.

I understand that the intention behind Amendment 120 is to make sure that there can be continued application of international agreements, such as the Hague 2007 maintenance convention, which the UK currently operates by virtue of its membership of the EU. Of course, we are intent on doing that; as I noted earlier, we understand that there is a potential three-month gap there, which we need to address. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness that we are clearly intent on securing an agreement, albeit not as an EU member and not subject to the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU, which ensures that we can maintain the highest standards of family law and mutual recognition, whether it be jurisdiction, choice of law or enforcement. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton]

I accept that, but the Minister is assuming that legislation is always very neatly compartmentalised in a way which would allow that. My fear is that there will be enabling parts of legislation that could be caught up because some subsection could be EU related.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

Could I just follow on from that by expressing a related concern? We know what the Government’s attitude is to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and we know that the Bill provides that there is no right of action on the basis of general principles of EU law. I am thinking aloud here, but the concern might be that even with only a strict and narrow interpretation of which bits of, say, the Equality Act are EU derived and therefore subject to all the consequences, including Clause 6, we might miss some of the context in which those narrow provisions should be interpreted if we were to remain in the EU and fully under the jurisdiction of the court.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not sure I agree with that proposition. But of course, at the end of the day, pursuant to Clause 7, it will be necessary to bring forward regulations which address amendments that are required in regards to retained EU law. At that point of course, those regulations will be the subject of scrutiny to ensure that they are limited to those aspects which are EU-derived law and therefore EU retained law. I do not believe that that is necessarily a problem, but I hear what the noble Baroness has said. We will of course take into consideration any difficulties that could arise in that context.

I wish to add one further point that I meant to make at the outset in response to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. He referred to me as the Advocate-General. I am not appearing here as a law officer, and nothing I say should be construed as law officer advice. I am appearing here as a Minister in respect of the Bill. I would not want there to be any misunderstanding in the light of his reference.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben]

Does my noble and learned friend agree that my noble friend Lady McIntosh has raised an issue that probably should not be answered in this way, but provides a difficulty for the Government that would be overcome if they said, when they had agreed and supported a particular decision, that they would then carry it out in whatever way they thought was the most sensible? That means that we can go on discussing and not be left in some sort of oblivion.

[Baroness Ludford]

Before the noble and learned Lord answers that point, I add a further complication. Whether we agree to a directive or not, if it was adopted by qualified majority voting it would still be adopted with an obligation for the UK to implement it. That does not quite solve the issue. What is raised is surely a very valid issue. It may not strictly come within the definitions in the Bill, but there is still a legal obligation if a directive has been adopted at EU level, whether we agree to it or not.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

The legal obligation would cease on Brexit day. That is the situation. Unless something has been implemented by that time it is not strictly part of our law. On deciding what is to happen in the future, as far as I am concerned, there is enough to decide at the moment, but nothing will harm the Government if they give some indication of what they would do with instruments that have been adopted but not yet implemented, although, at the date of Brexit, we were obliged to adopt them on some future date.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to all sides of the Committee for their contributions to this part of the debate, which began with an amendment concerning directives. I was not initially taken with the use of the word “fuzzy” by my noble friend Lord Deben but the term has begun to gain traction as the debate has continued. Let us try to be clear about one or two issues. The Bill seeks, for very clear reasons, to take a snapshot of EU law as it applies immediately before exit day. That is the cut-off point. Regulations emerging from the EU have direct effect on the domestic law of member states, so regulations that have taken direct effect by the exit date will be part of retained EU law. There is really no difficulty about that whatever.

[Baroness Ludford]

Nobody, I think, has questioned that. We are talking about directives.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is what we began talking about but the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for example, has referred to regulations. I will come on to address the point she made, but regulations have direct effect and if a regulation has direct effect by exit day it will form part of retained EU law. Directives have no direct effect in the domestic law of a member state. Directives have to be the subject of implementation and in that regard a transition period is given to member states for the implementation of a directive. There may be directives that have been adopted prior to the exit date which have a transitional period that will expire by the exit date specified in the Bill. In that event, the Government have indicated that they will seek to implement those directives that require implementation by a transitional date before the exit date. Therefore, they will become part of retained EU law because they will have been implemented in our domestic law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No, that would not be covered, because in those circumstances there would have been no crystallisation of the direct right prior to the exit date. That is our position with regard to that point—but I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for his acknowledgment that we are answering questions as they are posed. I was rather hoping that my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern might actually come forward to the Front Bench and allow me to retire to the second tier in order that this matter could be dealt with even more cogently than I am able to do.

I return for just a moment to the actual amendment. I have sought to emphasise—clearly, I hope—why the amendment is not appropriate in the present context. It would simply take away from one of the principal purposes of the Bill, which is to determine that there is an exit date—a cut-off point—when we will determine the scope of our own domestic law. I can quite understand the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, about emerging provisions in the EU that have been worked on for many years and that would bring about appropriate and attractive standards for various aspects of our life in the United Kingdom—but, of course, it would be perfectly open to this Parliament to decide, in light of what has already been agreed in Europe, that it would be appropriate to have these standards in our domestic law, and we will have the means to do that. It is just that they will not form part of retained EU law for the purposes of this Bill.

On the noble Baroness’s amendment, I respectfully suggest that the mechanism that she has put forward—that you somehow retain the ECA for some purpose after it has been repealed—simply would not work. I appreciate that this is Committee, and we are actually looking at the underlying purpose of the proposed amendment and therefore have to consider whether we find that attractive and then look for a way to make it work. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to notice that the actual mechanism proposed in the amendment would not work.

I hope that I have addressed most of the points raised by noble Lords, but I agree with the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with regard to what this Bill is attempting to achieve. It is attempting to achieve certainty as to the scope of our domestic law at exit date. That is its purpose, and we must keep that in mind.

[Baroness Ludford]

Will the Minister take another look at Clause 4(2)(b), which is a double negative? It talks about rights that are,

“not of a kind recognised”,

by the European Court or any UK court. When he was talking earlier about a directive that had direct effect, I think I recall him saying that it would have had to be recognised by a court decision as having direct effect—but the wording of Clause 4(2)(b) suggests a direct effect if it is “of a kind” that has been recognised by the European Court or a UK court. He might not be able to reply immediately but perhaps, when we come to Clause 4, he could look back at what he said today on directives with direct effect and be sure that there is a logical fitting together with Clause 4(2)(b).

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In my submission, it fits entirely with what is said in Clause 4(2)(b) and is consistent with that. It points to the necessity of there having been a recognition by the European Court or a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom for those purposes. It may be that the noble Baroness will want to take issue in due course with the use of the word “kind”, and no doubt we will come to that when we consider amendments to Clause 4.

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[Baroness Ludford]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, I invite her to agree with me that the fears that she raises are not fanciful. Indeed, the reason the Brexit Secretary had to make his speech was that we have on record numerous statements by Conservative politicians who are now Ministers expressing a desire to deregulate. I quoted one from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, the other day. In 2012, Liam Fox said:

“To restore Britain’s competitiveness we must begin by deregulating the labour market. Political objections must be overridden. It is too difficult to hire and fire and too expensive to take on new employees. It is intellectually unsustainable to believe that workplace rights should remain untouchable”.


That is on the record, and I have lots of other quotes in a similar vein.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, three pretty clear themes are emerging around the House. First, you should be able to use the subordinate legislation to change EU retained law only where it is necessary to make EU retained law work. Secondly, it should affect only technical matters; and thirdly, it should not take away any individual’s rights. So there are three requirements: it must be necessary to make it work, affect only technical matters and not take away anybody’s rights. The argument for being allowed to go further has not been made anywhere, and I would be very interested to hear the Minister say why those three principles should not apply to every piece of subordinate legislation under the Act. If the Government want to go further, primary legislation should be used. Unless there is a case for going further, this Act should be appropriately limited.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Ludford]

13: Clause 1, page 1, line 3, at end insert—
“( ) Regulations bringing into force subsection (1) may not be made until the Secretary of State has laid before both Houses of Parliament procedures agreed with the EU for continued UK participation in measures to promote internal security, police cooperation and counter-terrorism and these procedures have been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich 10 days ago, which was cited in the previous debate, was encouraging as far as it went. The Prime Minister spoke of wanting to participate in Europol, the Schengen Information System, the European arrest warrant and the European investigation order, which is a sort of European arrest warrant for evidence. But aspiration is not enough. Cross-border co-operation on law enforcement is premised on an assumption that all member states share similar standards of fundamental rights protection. Mutual recognition is rooted in mutual trust. I am afraid that successive British Governments have not really understood this sufficiently and have been more or less reluctant to sign up to the protective measures alongside the measures on police powers.

It is really strange that the UK has had such an ambivalent relationship with EU justice and home affairs over the past 20 years because it is possible to say, without being arrogant, that our record on the rule of law and the quality of our lawyers, judges and police stand comparison with any other in Europe and should have put us at the centre of EU developments in civil as well as criminal justice. But successive Governments have insisted on opt-outs and optional rather than full-hearted participation. That has not stopped the merits and value of our weight and experience and our personnel in justice and home affairs being recognised. We have the director of Europol—I think he has been there for the best part of 10 years—Rob Wainwright, who is on the brink of retiring. Of course, the European Commissioner for Security, Sir Julian King, is British. Two former presidents of Eurojust are British. That is the body of prosecutors which ensures that cross-border investigations and prosecutions are carried out smoothly. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, was president of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary—the network of judges—which supports and encourages an independent and qualified judiciary.

You cannot do cross-border co-operation unilaterally. It has to be a reciprocal arrangement based on legal agreements which are enforceable in respecting individual rights as well as the rights of national authorities. There are two foundations of mutual trust within the EU: first, the possibility of recourse to the European Court of Justice to ensure a level playing field in the application of EU law; and, secondly, the rights and principles in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the right to protection of personal data being of particular relevance in this context.

On the resolution of legal disagreements, in her Munich speech the Prime Minister proposed two principles: first, respect for the sovereignty of the UK’s legal order; and, secondly, respect for the remit of the European Court of Justice, at least when participating in EU agencies. I think there is a lot of head-scratching about how those two principles are going to be reconciled. I am hopeful that the Minister will be able to explain to me precisely how that is going to work. Can he also flesh out what a security treaty would look like in incorporating what the Prime Minister called a mechanism for,

“independent dispute resolution … in which both sides can have the necessary confidence”?

How will the full exchange of data be secured under the auspices of such a treaty? About three years ago Denmark voted to leave Europol. Since then, it has negotiated very limited access to data in Europol—and it is a full member of the EU, the Schengen area, the European Court of Justice and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. What makes the Government think we will get better access to Europol than Denmark? We might well get observer status but we will have no vote on the work programme or the direction of Europol’s work.

We will discuss the Charter of Fundamental Rights fully later but it is highly relevant to the exchange of data so I must mention it now. The relevance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights is why the trade body of the British tech industry, techUK, has urged the retention of the charter in domestic law. It is interested mainly in the commercial exchange of data for the digital economy but the same applies to the exchange of personal data for the purposes of law enforcement. The tech sector is very well aware of the long-running problems over transatlantic data transfers after the Snowden revelations in 2013, leading to years of political wrangling and litigation, including the ECJ blocking the so-called safe harbour agreement before the privacy shield was agreed—and there had to be changes in US data protection law to achieve that.

Whether or not the UK seeks a formal adequacy decision in the context of our future trade and security relationship, we can be sure that there will be a wide and deep assessment of data protection in this country, not least by the European Parliament, and the possible invalidation by the ECJ of any agreement which fails fully to adhere to EU standards. It seems ill judged for the Government to prejudice that trade and security relationship with the EU by jettisoning the charter. The fact that they insisted on weakening the privacy protection for immigration data in the Data Protection Bill may also turn out to be unwise.

The Prime Minister wanted continued participation in the European arrest warrant and the European investigation order. The extradition agreement with Norway and Iceland took 13 years to negotiate, is still not in force three years after agreement, and does not include surrender of own nationals. How do the Government propose to do better than Norway and Iceland? The 1957 Council of Europe convention would be a step backwards in extradition practice and in any case would require not only the UK but individual European countries to change their legislation. What prospect is there of them doing that?

On the European arrest warrant, the Government will of course be aware that the Irish courts have refused the extradition of a person to the UK and have referred the case to the Luxembourg court because they are afraid that if they return someone to the UK and they are in detention beyond March next year, they will not get the protection of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. So it is already affecting extradition co-operation. The European investigation order—the other measure the Prime Minister mentioned—has been implemented in UK law, as I have had cause to raise with the Government, by substituting reference to the charter with a reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, which of course is not an EU measure. That seems a rather petty thing to do and, again, does not seem very sensible if it is a flagship measure mentioned by the Prime Minister but it has not been properly implemented in UK law.

To conclude, can the Government tell us, given their limited acceptance of ECJ jurisdiction and their rejection of the charter, exactly what terms—and under what structures, as was just mentioned—they expect to get in a security treaty, and will they submit a draft for our enlightenment before too long? I beg to move.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, I added my name to the noble Baroness’s amendment for two reasons. The second was that I was encouraged by what the Prime Minister said in Munich and I very much hope that we are going to have the closest possible co-operation for all our security. But the first reason that I put my name on the amendment was that I had the honour, until the unfortunate general election of last year, of serving on the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee of this House. After the general election I was summarily dismissed because I had not voted with the Government during our debates on the triggering Bill last spring. But there we are: it did not shut me up and certainly will not shut me up tonight because we took evidence from Rob Wainwright, the head of Interpol.

On that committee, I used to sit next to Lord Condon. I am very sorry that he has retired from your Lordships’ House because he made an extremely important contribution, based on vast knowledge. I was impressed by his pride in what Rob Wainwright had achieved as a Brit leading that extremely important organisation. I was impressed, too, by the searching questions that Lord Condon asked of not only Rob Wainwright but a number of other expert witnesses who came before us. The conclusion that one had to come to after those various evidence sessions was that the measure of success of our negotiations would be determined by how close we had come to replicating what already existed.

There is no point in rehearsing all my misgivings about where we are, because we are where we are. But I hope that my noble friend on the Front Bench can reassure the Committee that the Prime Minister, following her Munich speech, really is committed to coming to close arrangements with our European friends and neighbours to ensure that the measure of security which we enjoy—and which the people of this country enjoy—will not be damaged by an imperfect relationship with Interpol. I would like to see a proper membership of Interpol and, frankly, I am not persuaded that it could not happen. I hope it will because what matters more than anything else to the people of our country, almost a year away from the terrorist outrage which hit us here in Westminster last March, is that they feel secure. That feeling of security is encouraged if they know that there is the closest possible co-operation and exchange of information with our European friends and neighbours. One other thing that came out during our evidence sessions was the very real importance of the European arrest warrant. I hope that in building upon what the Prime Minister said in Munich, we can ensure that there is again a similar arrangement after we leave the European Union.

Those were the reasons why put I my name to the amendment and I am glad to support it. I do not want to sound offensive in any way because I have a high regard for my noble friend, who has a very difficult job to do, but I hope we will have a reply to this debate of real substance, in view of what the Prime Minister said in Munich a couple of weeks ago.

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[Baroness Ludford]

I should briefly like to thank all speakers in this extremely valuable debate, especially the co-signatories to my amendment, the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Judd, and my noble friend Lady Smith of Newnham. It was evident that, almost without exception, there was very strong support for staying in these crucial law enforcement measures. I am not so sure we got what the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, asked for, which was a reply of real substance. We certainly did not get the clarity that my noble friend Lord Paddick asked for on the ECJ. Quite honestly, that was an extraordinary response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, there is no safety net in this area. The WTO is not much of one but it exists.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

Is the noble Baroness talking of the European Court of Justice as though there would be no change in its constitution as a result of our leaving the European Union?

[Baroness Ludford]

There obviously will be a change, in that there will not be a British judge or British Advocate-General. What we want to know is how we will plug into what the Prime Minister asked for in Munich: to have respect for the sovereignty of the UK’s legal order—the Minister really emphasised only that—but also respect for the remit of the ECJ, at least when participating in agencies. That raises the question: will we also respect the remit of the ECJ when it rules on the individual rights of people who challenge, for instance, a European arrest warrant? We have no answer to that question but the people who are nationals of those countries will want to know exactly what the jurisdictional regime is. I am afraid we are no closer to knowing that. As my noble friend Lord Paddick said, however, we do have clear negotiating objectives in this area—this is perhaps unique in Brexit—as the Prime Minister has set them out and the Minister has just confirmed them. What we are utterly in the dark about is how the Government propose to secure the arrangements, structures and mechanisms for continuing effective and efficient cross-border law enforcement co-operation.

The Minister said that we will have a meaningful vote on the withdrawal agreement, which is supposed to give us an opportunity to scrutinise at the end of the process, and hence that this amendment is not needed. But that is not enough; we want a purchase and input into those negotiating objectives. The Prime Minister makes a speech in Munich and tells us, “These are the objectives”, but the Government do not deign to tell us how on earth those objectives are to be secured. Like me, the Minister is a veteran of the European Parliament. We found there that the European Commission, the member states and the Council learned the hard way that unless you bring the European Parliament, in that case, into your confidence about your negotiating objectives and how you are going to secure them, the danger is that at the end of the process the deal will be rejected because it has not been kept informed along the way. The lesson in Brussels was to front-load the process by keeping the people who might be in a position to block the deal informed of how it was to be secured.

I am afraid the Minister did not convince me, at least, that we are any further forward than we were with the future partnership paper, because that paper did not set out how we are to achieve these objectives. It said what the Government wanted to achieve. That has been repeated by the Prime Minister and the Minister, but we are none the wiser about how these measures will be replicated when we no longer have the structures and mechanisms of the EU. I fear that we will have to come back to this in all seriousness at future stages but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

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[Noble Lords]

Minister!

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

This side!

[Baroness Ludford]

There are several more speakers, I am afraid, including me.

[Baroness Whitaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in briefly supporting those amendments that seek to retain the charter, I owe your Lordships an apology. I ought to have declared that I am a member of the advisory board of the British Institute of Human Rights at Second Reading, but I forgot.

I am not a lawyer, but I respectfully submit that law is not primarily for lawyers, any more than water is for water engineers—it is for people to implement the central values of our democracy on their behalf, and the deprivation of rights and access to justice causes harm, unfair poverty, unfair unhappiness and, in some cases, unjustly shorter lives. That is the sort of thing we should be thinking of when we look at these amendments.

I shall just give three quick examples, much humbler than those of Mr David Davis. The general principles and the charter ensured that Mr John Walker could challenge and end pension inequality for same-sex couples. The charter and the general principles supported the recent case in the Supreme Court, which found employment tribunal fees implemented by the Government were unlawful. And the charter enabled the recognition of the importance of health as a fundamental right—not in our law—when tobacco companies challenged regulations to introduce plain packaging of cigarettes.

It seems extremely clear that dropping the charter will do away with protective rights and drop safeguards that have ensured justice in individual cases of injustice. It is individuals who we ought to be thinking about, and rights that would not otherwise exist that we ought to safeguard in the charter.

[Baroness Ludford]

My Lords, the Benches opposite have been well filled to harry the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, about fundamental rights. Sadly, they were not here for the previous debate to speak up for achieving a fundamental right to safety and security.

I fear that parts of this debate have displayed a fundamental misunderstanding about the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. There has been evidence of some quite muddled thinking. The charter is not a tool that extends the remit of EU law or promotes further integration; it protects citizens and businesses from abuse of the powers that EU laws confer on EU institutions and—I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—on national Governments when they are implementing EU laws. So it is not just about all the EU institutions that we might leave; it is about achieving legal certainty and continuity. Deleting the charter means discontinuity by making substantive changes to the EU law that is retained in domestic law.