European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Quite simply because, as I indicated earlier to the Committee, the rights underpinning the charter exist elsewhere than in the charter and it is not necessary to incorporate the charter into domestic law in order to find those fundamental rights in our domestic law after we leave the EU.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am sorry to interrupt, but the analysis by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to which the noble Baroness referred, which is an analysis of the Government’s analysis, identified a number of rights that are not there other than in the charter. Does the noble and learned Lord reject the JCHR’s analysis?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have considered that analysis, and that is why I indicated that we were still looking at this. As I said, if rights are identified which are not in fact going to be incorporated into our domestic law in the absence of the charter, we will look very carefully at ensuring that those are not lost.

Clause 5(5) makes it clear that, notwithstanding the non-incorporation of the charter, retained EU law will continue to be interpreted by UK courts in a way that is consistent with the underlying rights. I hope that addresses to some extent the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. Interpretive provisions will retain a means by which we can look at these rights in the proper context.

With regard to those who have expressed concerns about this Bill resulting in a loss of substantive rights, I repeat—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has done, at least prior to his recent Pauline conversion—that it is not necessary to retain the charter to retain those fundamental rights. If we see that there is a potential loss of such fundamental rights, we will address that, and that is what we have indicated.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 25th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Equality and Human Rights Commission recommended that the review of the impact of LASPO on children should be expedited. Can the noble and learned Lord say what the Government’s response is to these important recommendations?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

A number of parties have raised the question of review of the impact of LASPO. The government position remains, as I outlined earlier, that we will carry out the appropriate review by April 2018.

Refugees: Unaccompanied Children

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is necessary also to have regard to the capability of local authorities to receive these children. Until there are suitable foster places available for them and until there are suitable schools available for them, it would not be appropriate simply to bring them here.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I accept what the noble and learned Lord is saying, but it was suggested in the Commons yesterday that it could be seven months before any child is accepted here. How many more children will go missing in seven months? How many more children will suffer in seven months? This is not the first time that we have said that we need a degree of urgency on this question.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 10th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not repeat all the arguments but, as a member of the all-party inquiry, I support Amendments A1 and A2. The Commons had only an hour yesterday. Quite understandably, most of it was spent teasing out the practical implications of my noble friend Lord Dubs’ amendment. I do not think we should read too much into the fact that not much was said about these amendments.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I acknowledge the work done in the past by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on detention and on the revising of the immigration and detention rules. I must, however, take issue with the suggestion that access to bail is merely theoretical and that there is an absence of judicial oversight.

The access to bail arises immediately on detention and a tribunal must be persuaded that there are substantial grounds for believing that detention should be maintained. This is not a theoretical right; it is an obligation on the part of the Home Office to persuade a tribunal that detention should be maintained. So far as the period of detention is concerned, I can confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that, after a period extending to four months—which is highly unusual—there will be an automatic bail hearing. In these circumstances, I renew my Motion to the House.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will begin by answering the question just posed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The provision does refer to “exceptional circumstances”. The guidance as it exists talks of only “very exceptional circumstances” applying for the detention of pregnant women, and that will continue to be the policy that is applied in the context of the provision. I reiterate what was said in the other place last night: it is only in very exceptional circumstances that it will be considered appropriate for this provision on detention to be employed.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am sorry to interrupt, but there was a specific question there: if that is the case, why is “very exceptional circumstances” not put in the Bill?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In the context of drafting statutory provision, it was not considered that the addition of such words as “most”, “much” or “very” would add anything to the proper construction of the provision. However, the policy guidance is there. It is absolutely clear, and both in this place and the other place it has been said that the policy will apply in the context of “very exceptional circumstances”.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, “It means what I say—it does not say what I mean” may be her line, but that is one that we shall take into consideration.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I am very grateful to everyone who has spoken, and particularly to my noble friend Lord Winston, who made a very powerful point. It has reinforced the sense that this House is very concerned about this issue and not convinced that the welfare of pregnant women and the foetus inside them is being protected by the concessions that the Government have made.

I am grateful to the Minister for addressing all the questions that were asked. I do not think that it is just a question of elegance; it is a question of comprehensibility. I have to say that I did not understand a word of one of his answers, but that is probably me, and I shall put a towel over my head and finally understand it when I read it in Hansard. It does have resonances of Humpty Dumpty and words saying what I say they mean, and the,

“question is … which is to be master—that’s all”.

Unfortunately, it is the Government who are master and who have the power to decide these issues. The answers that I did understand from the noble and learned Lord were very disappointing. I have still not heard a good or proper reason as to why, if it is good enough for the guidance and it means something in the guidance, it is not good enough to be in the legislation. I am still worried that someone looking at both of them will think, “With regard to the legislation, the Government have actually gone backwards”.

I was not asking for a whole new review: I was asking for a very focused review of the process by which a woman is taken from her home into detention. As I understand it, there has already been a commitment to look at transport; I am just asking for that to be broadened out to the whole process. It is not a big thing, and I have still not heard any explanation as to how this is going to be modelled on the family returns process. The noble and learned Lord said there was not going to be any further guidance on this, so it is just an empty claim unless someone can show us otherwise.

I hope that the noble and learned Lord, the Immigration Minister and the Home Secretary will take this away and read what has been said in this House. My noble friend Lord Rosser pointed out the really strange Commons procedures that do not allow the Minister to respond to perfectly good questions, but we at least have a chance to do that in this House. I hope that the people in the other place will all read what has been said in this House and will think about how, within the constraints of the legislation as it is, we could make this a more humane process. As we have heard, there is a lot at stake here. My noble friend Lord Winston said that it could be responsible for a heritable effect on the child. That is very serious, so I hope that this will be looked at further, even if it cannot be in the context of actual legislation. That said, like the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, I recognise when we are coming to the end of the road. Therefore, like him, with a very heavy heart indeed, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 12th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is certainly a sense of urgency in this matter and that is why I expressed my apology to the House and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I had indicated that by Third Reading I would be in a position to confirm the Government’s position on this. However, it is a matter that requires detailed consideration. It is a matter that has ramifications. It is a matter that has to be considered in conjunction with Home Office guidelines. It is a matter that must be consulted on and finally approved before issue, and it is for that reason that, regrettably, there has been a period of delay in respect of this point.

I underline that it will not involve an absolute prohibition. It will, however, involve a very limited power of detention to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and for a very limited period. That is what is anticipated at present. As I sought to point out on Report, it is simply not practicable to have an absolute bar in respect of pregnant women. There are circumstances in which, for example, a pregnant woman arriving at an airport or a port, clearly with no right at all to enter the United Kingdom, may present either a security risk or a risk of absconding, and without any power of detention it would be quite impossible to arrange her return at that time of arrival. Therefore, in these circumstances, I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. Many have spoken so eloquently, drawing attention in particular to the implications of this for unborn children, and have made the case very strongly.

I realise that the Minister is in a difficult position in that he is not able to make the statement to which he referred. I asked him for reassurance that the new policy will mean that pregnant women are detained genuinely in the most exceptional circumstances because the current policy is that they should be detained only in the most exceptional circumstances. While the hint of a time limit is encouraging, I have heard nothing to reassure us that the new policy will be different from the old policy.

I quite understand that it is not the Minister’s fault—if that is the correct word—that he is not able to make the statement today. But Stephen Shaw delivered his report to the Home Office on 24 September. The Government have had over six months to consider this crucial issue, which they know many people—organisations, individuals who gave evidence to Shaw and individuals who gave evidence to the inquiry—feel very strongly about. They must have known that people would want a clear answer on this by now and I am afraid that clear answer has come there none. I am quite sure that the noble and learned Lord understands why it is not good enough to say, when this is the last chance we have to discuss it in this House, that we should wait for a few days because the Government have not managed to get their act together to enable him to make the statement today.

Given that every noble Lord who has spoken did so very strongly in support of this amendment, I feel that I have no choice other than to test the opinion of this House.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

Once again, my Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling this amendment. With her usual lawyer’s quickness, she picked up the point that I raised on Report. As I said then, it is a point that was raised with me by an organisation local to me in the East Midlands, Baca. It was worried because it could not understand why that wording was there. It is perhaps not surprising if groups are worried and perhaps slightly cynical when they come across measures that they do not understand, given that there is so much in legislation that they do not like. So I am delighted that, at the last minute, the letter from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—not the noble Earl—made it very clear that the definition, as in the amendment, is,

“separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so”.

It is helpful to have that in Hansard because of course your average punter cannot read the letters sent between Ministers and Members of your Lordships’ House. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will repeat that for the record. Also, like the noble Baroness, I would appreciate an explanation of why this clause is necessary, given that this is, as the letter says, the,

“established definition in the Immigration Rules”,

and it is accepted by the UN. I am glad that through this organisation raising this matter with me, we have some clarity on what is meant by it.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister. As they have observed, there is already an established definition of “unaccompanied” in the present context. It is not in guidance alone; it is in the Immigration Rules, and that is important. The definition states that an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child is someone who—perhaps I may, as suggested, read this into the record—is under 18 years of age when the claim is submitted, is claiming asylum in their own right, is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who in law or by custom has responsibility to do so.

Following the commitment given by my noble friend Lord Bates on Report to explain how the definition would operate, I wrote to the noble Baronesses—albeit, as they observed, at the last minute—to confirm that there is no intention of altering the definition of “unaccompanied” as set out in the Immigration Rules for the purposes of the transfer provisions in the Immigration Bill. Furthermore, defining particular categories in primary legislation is not always desirable or even necessary. As your Lordships will appreciate, there are times, particularly in the context of the current migration crisis, when the Government need to respond quickly to changing circumstances.

I should make it clear that at present we have no intention of amending the definition of “unaccompanied”. We would do so only in response to a significant change in circumstances, but it is important that in such circumstances we are able to react swiftly and efficiently. Clearly, regulations subject to parliamentary scrutiny are a more appropriate way to achieve that result than placing something on the face of this Bill.

I reassure the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Lister, that safeguarding and promoting the welfare of vulnerable children is at the forefront of the Home Office’s work with the Local Government Association and the Department for Education to develop a transfer scheme for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I understand the concerns about the definition of “unaccompanied”—it may have unintended consequences and inadvertently place children in the hands of traffickers—but immigration officials working with these vulnerable children are trained to be alert to any signs that a child is at risk of harm or abuse or may have been trafficked. Where an asylum-seeking child is accompanied by an adult who is not a parent or a relative, Home Office officials work with local authority children’s services to verify the identity of the adult and establish the true relationship with the child. If that relationship cannot be verified or there are ongoing welfare or safeguarding concerns, the child will be treated as unaccompanied.

In the light of those points and our recent correspondence confirming that we have no intention of amending the already established definition of “unaccompanied” for the purposes of the transfer provisions, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 9th February 2016 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we are grateful for the consideration of the devolved Administrations and the interest in the other place of Members of Parliament representing Northern Ireland in relation to this part of the Bill. We have listened, and government Amendments 241B to 241E, 242A, 242B, 242D to 242F, 242H, 242K and 245B represent our response. They are many in number but they have a simple purpose: to apply to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on a uniform basis the duty to ensure that all public sector workers who work in customer-facing roles speak fluent English; save that, in Wales, the duty will be fulfilled by fluency in English or Welsh. It will apply only to public authorities that exercise functions in relation to matters which are not devolved. At present, the Bill provides for the duty to apply to public authorities exercising any functions of a public nature in Wales. The respective Governments have since agreed that it will apply to public authorities only to the extent that they carry out functions in relation to matters which are not within the legislative competence of the Welsh Assembly.

Noble Lords will have noticed that the Bill does not yet provide for the duty to apply to Northern Ireland. In the other place, a commitment was made to reconsider that position in this House. Our amendments now provide for the duty to apply only to public authorities that carry out functions in relation to excepted matters in Northern Ireland.

Noble Lords will have noted that the Bill already provides for the duty to apply in Scotland only to public authorities exercising functions in relation to reserved matters, so there are no further amendments affecting this region. In these circumstances, I beg to move.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 242, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who have added their name to it. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that Clause 47 does not lead to discrimination against public sector workers in a consumer-facing role whose first language is British Sign Language by explicitly exempting them from the provision.

In his letter of 19 January to the noble Lord, Lord Bates, the Minister for the Cabinet Office and Paymaster-General stated:

“The most significant additions to the Code”—

the code of practice, that is—

“will come from organisations strengthening the content with guidance and practical examples—notably in areas of interest to Noble Lords during the Second Reading debate; avoiding discrimination and providing clarity in how the duty applies to those who communicate using British Sigh Language. We strongly support the use of British Sign Language”.

It also said that one of the main findings of the consultation was:

“Further guidance, clarity and practical examples could be added to support authorities’ understanding and practical application of the duty to reduce any discriminatory impact. Business Disability Forum and Signature will provide case studies for inclusion in the Code to clearly demonstrate application of the duty and the responsibilities of public authorities towards members of protected groups and to advance equality”.

This is very welcome and suggests that the Government accept the spirit, if not the letter, of the amendment.

Nevertheless, Sense, which alerted me to this issue, believes very strongly that writing an exemption into the Bill would remove the possibility of misinterpretation by any authority, which might still occur if clarification were in only the code of practice. Failing that, I wanted to ensure that the Minister’s assurance in the letter appears in Hansard, because it is crucial that we ensure that the Bill cannot be said to discriminate indirectly against deaf and deafblind people, for whom British Sign Language is their first language in either its standard form or as adapted for deafblind people. I am told that its grammatical structure is different from English, so it is possible, on the face of it, that someone might argue that someone using it is not speaking fluent English.

I would be grateful if the Minister would be willing to look again at the possibility of writing a clear exemption into the Bill so as to remove all doubt and therefore reassure organisations such as Sense. If that really is not possible for some good reason, I would at least welcome a clear statement on the record—based on but perhaps going beyond what is in the letter of 19 January—of what the code of practice is intended to say regarding how Clause 47 should not discriminate against users of British Sign Language.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

In circumstances where there is provision for British Sign Language to be available, there will also be an English language interpreter available. Where a member of the public wishes to use or employ British Sign Language, they will, in circumstances where it is available, be able to do that, and the person communicating with them in a customer-facing role will, of course, be perfectly entitled to employ British Sign Language. The provisions of the Bill are not prescriptive. They are not saying that the only language that can be employed is English or Welsh. In circumstances where there is the ability to communicate in a customer-facing role by means of a different language, be it British Sign Language or otherwise, then it may perfectly properly be employed. Whether it will be available on each and every occasion when somebody arrives and is faced with a customer-facing role is a different matter altogether. Clearly, at present it is not invariably available.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am not a lawyer, so I rise with some trepidation, but the Bill states:

“A public authority must ensure that each person who works for the public authority in a customer-facing role speaks fluent English”.

I am very grateful to the Minister for the very clear statement he has made that this will not apply to British Sign Language. It may be that he is going to explain this, but why can that not be put in the Bill to remove all doubt?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Our position is that that is simply not required. Where you have somebody in a customer-facing role who communicates by way of British Sign Language, they will have a British Sign Language interpreter available. It is the interpreter who will be required by the employer to be fluent in English. That is the situation that will apply.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 3rd February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I quite understand the noble Lord’s point. That is why the Secretary of State retains discretion over certification—this is not an absolute. In circumstances where there is a risk of serious irreversible harm because of conditions in a particular country or part of a country, there will not be certification. In circumstances where that would amount to a breach of an individual’s human rights, there will not be certification. There is that safety net. It may not be as large as some noble Lords would wish but it is there for these very cases. It is not dissimilar from the instance cited by the right reverend Prelate of a child being exposed to the very real risk of sexual violence or mutilation. Again, this is why the provisions of Clause 34 are not absolute and compel the Home Secretary to take a reasoned decision that has regard to a primary issue being the interests of the child.

A further point was raised by the noble Lord about whether and when the Secretary of State for the Home Department could be sure that she had all the information. Of course, there can be no absolutes. However, in a situation involving children, individuals—parents and carers—readily come forward to explain that there are children. Where the existence of children is identified, that matter is explored, as it is bound to be, pursuant to Section 55 of the Act I cited earlier.

My experience of being involved in the Kiarie and Byndloss cases before the Court of Appeal involved my examining the decision letters issued by the Home Office. These are not glib, one-paragraph notices, but very detailed and considered letters that were sent out, giving not only a decision but a reasoned foundation for that decision. I cannot—and would never dare to—assert that they are invariably right in every respect, or that they are exhaustive in every way. On the face of it, however, it is the practice, subject to the guidance given, to send out truly reasoned decision letters in these circumstances, with particular reference to the interests of the child or children who may be affected.

I turn to the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, who also mentioned the Kiarie and Byndloss cases. She suggested that ILPA took a slightly different view of that decision from the one I have expressed. I would cleave, however, to the ratio of the unanimous decision of the Bench of the Court of Appeal: it is quite clear what it was saying with regard to this matter. It is not tied to the fact of criminality; it is tied to the facility for an out-of-country appeal and the ability for that appeal to be discharged in such a way that we can be satisfied that it is fair to the appellant. In other words, it may not be the most advantageous form of appeal but it does meet the essential requirements of effectiveness and fairness. That is not affected in one way or another by the pre-existing criminality, or alleged criminality, of the relevant appellant. To that extent, I am afraid I have to differ from her on that matter.

The noble Baroness mentioned the matter of a family test. However, a family test does not immediately arise in this context. I understand that the family test is designed to ensure that the Government’s policies overall encourage and support family life in the United Kingdom. We are dealing here with someone who is not entitled to be in the United Kingdom, and the policies that concern removing persons from the United Kingdom will therefore not always engage the family test.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

My understanding of the family test is that it is to apply not to the generality but to any policy proposal in law that might impact on families. One of the big concerns raised by many organisations giving evidence and briefing us is that this will have very serious implications for families because of family separation. Therefore, it seems appropriate to apply the family test to this proposal.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is not immediately apparent to me that it is applicable to this proposal, but in this context one has to bear in mind that a primary consideration is the interests of the child or the children. To that extent, what might be regarded as an aspect of the family test is being applied. That is always a primary consideration. There are circumstances where it may be appropriate for the children to accompany a person out of the United Kingdom, and there may be no difficulty about that. There may be circumstances in which it is appropriate for the children to remain with a parent or carer within the United Kingdom. If there are circumstances where they will have no parent or carer within the United Kingdom and it would not be appropriate for them to leave the United Kingdom, again, there is the safety net of the certification, dealt with in Clause 34, as there is under the existing legislation. To that extent, it appears to me that the matter is dealt with.

The noble Baroness went on to mention again the interests of the child and to ask how many children would be affected by this. It is not possible at this stage to say. On the basis of unofficial and informal figures, I understand that no child has been certified for an out-of-country appeal under existing legislation. Of course, the present amended legislation has been in force for only a short time, since 2015, so it is difficult to discern figures from that.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich referred to particular cases. I hope that I have addressed his concerns. If there was such a serious risk to a child as he alluded to, it appears to me that, with respect, the safety net in Clause 34 would apply.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred to difficulties in producing evidence in the context of an out-of-country appeal. I do not accept that it would be materially more difficult to produce evidence in these circumstances. We are talking about an appeal to a specialist tribunal that is well equipped to decide the form of evidence it requires in a particular case. As I mentioned, when dealing with a case that is going to arise largely on the basis of Article 8 of the convention, if there is to be a convention appeal, one is concerned with family links with the United Kingdom, which are going to be spoken to by persons within the United Kingdom. In so far as there is any factual issue to be addressed by an appellant, it can be done in writing, by video link or even by telephone. That may appear less satisfactory than taking oral evidence but, as the noble Baroness may be aware, it is far from exceptional for appellants not to give evidence in such appeals before a tribunal. It is certainly far from exceptional for appellants not to give oral evidence in such proceedings.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I hope it may be for the convenience of the Committee if I observe that, with regard to Amendments 220, 222 and 223, which raise the question of bail conditions and the Secretary of State’s proposed power to address conditions already set by the tribunal, I recognise the important constitutional issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has raised. Given the proposed amendments from all sides of the Committee and the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights with regard to this matter, the Government will think again about this. We anticipate bringing forward before Report a suitable amendment to Schedule 7 with respect to bail conditions. I hope that this assists the Committee.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

Very briefly, I support Amendment 215A because I absolutely agree that this is not a trivial matter. I am not an expert on these issues but a social scientist who knows the importance of language. Some years ago, it was quite common among the media and politicians to talk about bogus asylum seekers. That did immense harm, so I absolutely agree that language which has connotations of criminality when applied to asylum seekers is totally inappropriate and could be very harmful.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Baroness Lister of Burtersett and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 1st February 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I may be pre-empting what the noble and learned Lord is about to say. However, Stephen Shaw is very clear that presumptive exclusion should be replaced with an absolute exclusion. The noble and learned Lord talks about strengthening presumption. That is qualitatively different from absolute exclusion. Do the Government accept the recommendation of absolute exclusion and, if not, why not?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The present published guidance means that we do not, and should not, detain pregnant women except in exceptional circumstances. There are, in fact, very few pregnant women in the estate. The Government are reflecting on how to implement Stephen Shaw’s policy in regard to adults at risk, and will address that in due course. However, as I say, it will be a matter of guidance.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am sorry to press this. I accept that it is a matter of guidance. We put it in an amendment to have a debate on it. However, it seems to me that there is an attempt to slide out of answering the question of whether presumptive exclusion in the guidance will be replaced by absolute exclusion, because that is very clearly what Stephen Shaw recommended. I am not getting a clear answer on that.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The clearest answer I can give is that it is a matter for consideration at present by Ministers. They will consider it because they have already said that. They noted the recommendations in Stephen Shaw’s report. They have not yet determined in a black and white way that they will implement all 64 recommendations and no one would expect them to have done so in this timescale, but they will address them.

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[Baroness Lister of Burtersett]

I am sorry to intervene again, but “indefinite” does not mean that people are there for ever. It means that people do not know how long they will be there, and that is what has had the terrible psychological impact on people. From that perspective it is “indefinite”, because there is no clear time limit that gives people certainty and hope.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is not possible to say to somebody that they will be in detention for X period in this context. For example, if they choose not to co-operate by producing any documents, or they do not tell the truth about their point of origin or their journey—where they arrived in Europe, for example—it may be very difficult to investigate their circumstances, and they may yet during that period pose a risk, whether to the public or otherwise. Therefore, detention is not necessarily, and cannot be, dictated by reference to a fixed period. But of course, it is open to them to go to a tribunal and apply for bail—and that is the whole point. So it is not, in that sense, indefinite: they have the opportunity to canvass before the tribunal the issue of whether or not they should remain in detention.

At Second Reading, we heard a number of noble Lords speak on detention. As has been said, there was a contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He rightly identified that:

“There are two basically different circumstances in which people are detained under the legislation: first, on initial application for asylum and, secondly, when, much further down the line, it is sought to remove people whose rights of whatever sort have expired and it is proposed that they finally be deported”.—[Official Report, 22/12/15; col. 2473.]

The detained fast track generally related to the first category that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, identified. Many noble Lords will be aware that the detained fast track has been suspended since July following my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister’s decision that he could not be certain of the level of risk of unfairness to certain vulnerable applicants who may enter the process. I can confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the detained fast track will remain suspended until my right honourable friend is sure that the right structures are in place to minimise any risk of unfairness and that effective safeguards can be put in place. A Statement will be made when that point is reached.