Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I agree and disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in equal measure, which may surprise him. On the protest point, he reaffirmed what I tried to say the other day, which is that the ECHR does not give the term “facilitation of protest”, but the police have given that term and put that sobriquet over the articles. The danger is—and I am afraid it is what materialised—that it has been interpreted as almost arranging some of the protests rather than the simplistic expression of “facilitation”. I do not think that we are a mile apart on it, but I come at it from a slightly different angle.

I think that facial recognition is an incredibly good thing. People during the debate have agreed that it has a value. It has two purposes: one is to try retrospectively to match a crime scene suspect with the database that the police hold of convicted people; and the other one, which has caused more concern and on which there may be common ground, is about the live use of it.

One thing that I think needs to be amplified—the Minister may mention it when he responds—is that the Court of Appeal has decided that the police use of facial recognition is legal. However, it did raise concerns—this is where I certainly agree with the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Doocey, who already made this point—that it needs to treat all people equally. It is not okay to have a high failure rate against one group by race and a different success rate against another race. That is not acceptable. I was surprised, as I know the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, was, when this had not been made public and was discovered in whatever way it was discovered. That needs to be got right. There is no justification for that error rate, and it must be resolved.

Secondly, this may surprise the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but I agree that there should be more regulation of its use, and that it should be regulation by Parliament, not by the police. Where I disagree is on whether this Act, and this proposed amendment, is the right way to do it. We are going to have to learn, first, how the technology works, how it is applied by the police, where its benefits are and where its risks are. I also agree that there ought to be independent oversight of it and that anybody who is offended by its use should have the opportunity to get someone to check into it to see whether it has been misused. They should also be provided with a remedy. A remedy may be financial compensation, but I would argue that it is probably better that something happens to the database to make it less likely to be ineffective in the future. There needs to be some reassurance that somebody is improving this system rather than not. I am for facial recognition, but there should be regulation and I do not think that this Act is the right time. As has already been said, the consultation that started just before Christmas and concludes, I think, in February will give us a good way forward, but it will need a bit more thought than this Bill, when it becomes an Act, might offer us.

Finally, there are an awful lot of regulators out there, and we all pay for them. There are surveillance commissioners, intrusive surveillance commissioners and biometric commissioners. They are all examining the same area—if they ever get together and decide to have one commissioner to look at the lot, we would probably save quite a lot of money. This is an area in which the existing commissioners probably could do two things. One is to regulate and the other, potentially, is to approve, either in retrospect or prospectively depending on the emergency or the urgency with which it should be used. There is therefore some need for help but, for me, I do not think that this Bill is the right opportunity.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have signed this amendment because I think it is very sensible and covers some ground that really needs tackling. It would ensure that the police could not use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under Sections 12 or 14 unless a new specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been formally approved by both Houses of Parliament—that sounds quite democratic, does it not? It is intended to safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this surveillance technology is deployed in such contexts.

It is always interesting to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, former Met Commissioner, on the tiny little areas where we do overlap in agreement; I think it is very healthy. However, I disagree deeply when he says this is not the legislation and it should be something else. We keep hearing that. I cannot tell noble Lords how many times I, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, have raised this issue here in Parliament and in other places. The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, asked a quite interesting question: why should we care? Quite honestly, I care because I believe in justice and in fairness, and I want those in society. As I pointed out yesterday, I am a highly privileged white female; I have been arrested, but I was de-arrested almost immediately by the Met Police when all the surrounding people started saying, “Do you know who she is?” and they immediately took the handcuffs off.

At some point we have to accept that this needs regulation. We cannot accept that the police constantly mark their own homework. We were reassured that all the flaws in the algorithm and so on had been fixed, but clearly we cannot be sure of that because we do not have any way of knowing exactly what the flaws were and who has fixed them. Live facial recognition represents a huge departure from long-established principles of British policing. In this country, people are not required to identify themselves to the police unless they are suspected of wrongdoing. Live facial recognition turns that principle on its head by subjecting everyone in range of a camera to an automated identity check. It treats innocent members of the public as potential suspects and undermines the presumption of innocence.

I disagree deeply with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, when he says that it is not a blanket surveillance tool—of course it is. It is a blanket surveillance tool and is highly dangerous from that point of view. It is a mass biometric surveillance tool. It scans faces in real time, retains images of those flagged by the system and does so without individuals’ knowledge or consent.

If the police randomly stopped people in the street to check their fingerprints against a database, for example, we would rightly be alarmed. Live facial recognition performs the same function, only invisibly and at scale. Its use in the context of protest is a dangerous crossing of a constitutional line. We already have evidence that facial recognition has been deployed at demos and major public events, with a chilling effect on lawful protest. People will not go to these protests because they feel vulnerable. They are deterred from exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly because they fear being identified, tracked or wrongly stopped. While this amendment proposes a safeguard through parliamentary approval of a statutory code, we should not allow that to imply acceptance of live facial recognition at protests in principle. In my view, this technology has absolutely no place in the policing of democratic dissent.

We should reflect on the broader direction of travel. Live facial recognition is most enthusiastically embraced by authoritarian regimes, while a number of democratic countries have moved to restrict or even prohibit its use. That alone should surely give this Government pause to reflect on whether this is the right legislation to bring in. Independent observers have witnessed cases in which live facial recognition has misidentified children in school uniform, leading to lengthy and very distressing police stops. In some instances, those wrongly flagged were young black children, subjected to aggressive questioning and fingerprinting despite having done nothing wrong. What safeguards are in place to prevent misidentification, particularly of children and people from UK minority-ethnic communities? That is a basic question that we should be asking before we pass this legislation. I support the amendment as an essential check, but I hope that this debate sends a wider message that Parliament will not allow the routine use of intrusive biometric surveillance to become the price of exercising fundamental democratic rights.

I want to pick up something that the Minister said on Tuesday. He directed the Committee to the front page of the Bill and said that, in his view, the Bill was compliant with the ECHR. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, pointed out, that is his belief and his view. It is absolutely not a certificate of accuracy. I am not suggesting for one moment that there is any intent to deceive; I am merely saying that it is not a certificate of truth. With claims about seemingly authoritarian laws being compliant with human rights, that assessment can be challenged and should be challenged as much as possible. It remains subjective and is challenged by the organisation Justice, for example. We are clearly going to disagree about a lot in this Bill, but we are trying our best over here to make the law fair and representative of a justice that we think should exist here in Britain.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

My Lords, I was hesitant as to whether to speak here, but some years ago I had very close acquaintance with facial recognition software, so I thought it might be useful to say a couple of things.

First, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that this is an extremely good technology. I will get to the concerns expressed about it in a minute. This software has been used to apprehend murderers. For example, I think the Australian outback murderer was apprehended because of it and a far-right group of extremists in Sweden was identified by some very clever use of this facial recognition technology. It can be used successfully in preventing crime. Now, that is not all live use of the technology, and these amendments are about live use of the technology.

I very much respect the work of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. I am a great supporter of Big Brother Watch, and he and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, make good points. Much is made of the disparity in accuracy between white and black faces. The software I was involved with had that problem. The reason for that is that it was trained on white faces—they were afraid of being thought of as racist if they focused on black faces. Therefore, the accuracy for black faces was much worse, they discovered, and so they quickly started training the software on black faces and the disparity closed right up. As far as I know, the disparity, if it still exists, is quite small, but others may know better than me. This was several years ago, but that definitely happened with this set of facial recognition software.

There is the issue of perfectly innocent people being stopped and searched. That happened to me several times when I was in my teens and twenties. I had rather long hair and looked a bit—

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Shifty.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

Shifty is a great description—the noble Baroness could have said far worse than that.

I was given a hard time and then let go. We have to accept that there will be errors, but we have to understand where this is going. We can less and less afford to have police on the streets—we have seen that problem—and technology has to take over. Look at the super-spotters, a very successful crime-fighting group in New York. They would go to an area where there was a lot of crime—noble Lords will know that there was a process in New York where they directed people to crime hotspots—where they looked at the gait of individuals to see whether they were carrying guns or knives. Soon, people in those areas discovered that they had better not carry guns because they would be stopped by these super-spotters and arrested. If you are not carrying a gun, which they had all stopped doing, you cannot kill somebody because you do not have a gun to kill them with. It was a tremendously successful operation in lowering crime.

State-of-the-art facial recognition, at least before I stopped looking at it a couple of years ago, was more in gait than in face. We have to understand that you can start training technology to be much more effective than even these super-spotters at spotting people who are carrying, using their gait to recognise an individual rather than their face. There are all sorts of ways in which this software will be used to recognise people. It will get better and better, and fewer mistakes will be made; mistakes will always be made none the less, but that is the way of policing. They were mistaken when they stopped me—I was this tremendously law-abiding good chap, but they stopped me, and so will the facial recognition.

I loved the description from the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, of the 20 police hanging around, which I am sure resonated with noble Lords around the entire Chamber as the sort of thing that happens, but over time we will have to depend on technology such as this. We will have to be extremely careful about civil liberties, but we cannot blanket get rid of this technology, because it will be very important to policing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not think that it does. We will leave it at that. There is a proper and full consultation document, a copy of which is, I am sure, available in the House for Members to look at.

I revert to my starting point. For the reasons that have been laid out by a number of Members in the Committee today, across the political divide and none, it is a valuable tool. Do the noble Lord and the noble Baroness who raised this have an objection to automatic number plate recognition? Under current regulations, every vehicle that goes past a camera at the side of the road is an “innocent” vehicle but some of those number plates will lead to crime being solved or individuals being caught. The principle is there. If they object to the principle then we will not find common ground on this. We need regulation—I have accepted that. We are bringing forward the consultation, but, ultimately it is a valuable tool to stop and prevent crime and to catch criminals.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

The Minister cannot compare cars with people—that is a completely false comparison. I do not know whether the Minister has been in a van with a camera looking at number plates. There is no mistaking number plates; there is a lot of mistaking human faces.

The Minister earlier used the word “proportionately”. There is a significant distinction between proportionately and expediently. The test for lawful interference with ECHR rights is proportionality rather than expediency. We have covered this before, but it has come up again now. Having expediency in the Bill gives police the powers beyond what is reasonable for human rights. We are not sitting here for hours into the night doing this for fun—we can all agree that this is not fun. We are doing this because we believe that the Bill is wrong.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am doing it because I believe that we need to catch criminals and reduce crime. That is a fair disagreement between us. That is why I am doing this Bill and that is what this Bill is about. We may disagree, but facial recognition technology is an important mechanism to prevent crime and to reduce crime. I can tell the noble Baroness that we have agreed to bring forward regulations and are consulting on what those will include. I hope she will submit some views. I remain convinced that the type of technology that we have is valid and useful.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 118 should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

How nice it is to be back here again. I oppose Clauses 118, 119 and 120 standing part of the Bill. These clauses introduce a pre-emptive targeting of people based on location rather than behaviour. That should concern anyone who cares about the right to peaceful protest. Under these clauses, a senior police officer may designate an area in anticipation of a protest, based on a belief that an offence is likely to occur. Once that designation is in place, simply wearing an item said to conceal identity becomes a criminal offence. This applies to everyone in a designated area. Criminal liability comes not from conduct but from being in a certain place and from what a person is wearing. That is a profound shift in approach and one that I cannot support.

It is also a massively broad discretion. An inspector can designate a locality for up to 24 hours, extendable, on the basis of a prediction or guess, rather than evidence, of immediate serious violence. The result is a huge power to ban everyday protective coverings across a place at a time based only on an estimate of what might happen. That is exactly the kind of power that leads to overenforcement and a chilling effect on protest, particularly for those who already face risks from being identified.

The Government may say that defences to these provisions exist for health, religion or work, but those protections operate after arrest and charge, not at the point where the person decides whether it is safe for them to attend a protest at all. That is the key issue here. Liberty’s supporters have been clear about the real-world impact. One disabled person wrote:

“I am clinically vulnerable … Forcing disabled people like me to unmask is surely disability discrimination”.


Another said:

“As a single woman, I do not want to be identified”.


Women who have experienced domestic abuse may cover their faces for the same reason.

For others, including diaspora activists and those with credible fears of transnational repression, anonymity is not a political statement but a basic safeguard. We have already seen reporting on how mask restrictions at solidarity protests in the UK, including those linked to Hong Kong, have deterred participation because surveillance and reprisals are real concerns. This then becomes about who feels safe enough to exercise their democratic rights.

I must also ask: are these clauses really necessary? The police already have a targeted power, under Section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, to require the removal of certain items where this is justified. That power has been used in recent protest policing, including at protests outside a migrant hotel in Epping. Can the Minister say what evidence the Government have of a gap in existing targeted powers that they cannot meet, rather than simply a desire for broader, pre-emptive control? The Government have not demonstrated an operational gap so far. What we appear to have instead is a preference for wider, pre-emptive control rather than targeted, evidence-based policing.

That matters because Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights are absolutely clear: any restriction on protest must be necessary and proportionate, and the Strasbourg court has repeatedly warned against measures that deter peaceful participation through fear of sanction. A clause that criminalises ordinary behaviour across a designated area, without reference to a person’s actual behaviour, is precisely the kind of measure that risks crossing that line.

Will the Government consider narrowing the trigger to “imminent and serious violence or disorder” and introducing a clear front-end reasonable excuse protection, rather than relying on defences only after arrest? If the Government’s concern is intimidation or disorder, then the answer is the better use of existing targeted powers, not a blanket approach that sweeps up disabled people, women concerned about safety and minority communities, along with everybody else. For all those reasons, I support removing Clauses 118, 119 and 120 from the Bill.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I stand to oppose the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and to suggest that it is vital that these clauses stand part of the Bill, because protest is strongest when it is open, accountable and proud. A movement that hides its face borrows the language of secrecy; a movement that stands unmasked invites public judgment and moral authority.

History teaches us that the most effective and morally persuasive movements were led openly. Emmeline Pankhurst marched into the public square and faced arrest and imprisonment without concealment, because the suffragette cause depended on moral clarity and public witness. Arthur Scargill led the miners in mass action, visible and unhidden, because solidarity is built on faces and names, not anonymity. Martin Luther King Jr stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and in the streets of Birmingham with nothing to hide, because non-violence and moral authority require openness. Mahatma Gandhi led millions in acts of civil resistance with a visible, symbolic presence that made the movement impossible to ignore.

The Government’s own summary of the Bill is clear about the purpose of these measures. It refers to:

“A new criminal offence which prohibits the wearing or otherwise using of an item that conceals identity when in an area designated by police under the new provisions”.


That designation is constrained by a statutory trigger:

“A designation can only be made … when the police reasonably believe that a protest may or is taking place in that area, the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences”.


These are targeted powers, aimed at preventing criminality while protecting lawful assembly. It is not about silencing dissent; it is about responsibility and transparency. The fact sheet also notes a practical enforcement tool:

“The bill also creates a new power for the police to require someone to remove a face covering during a protest”.


That power underlines the expectation that those who lead and speak for causes should be prepared to be seen and held to account.

I mentioned older historical protest leaders, but I can bring the Committee more up to date. Contemporary political figures continue to lead visibly. We all have tremendous respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who has led a few protests in the past. I have looked at about 50 absolutely magnificent photos of the noble Baroness protesting in Westminster and other areas. She has been at the forefront of various Green Party protests. She said that she had been protesting all her life, but I could not find any of her as a schoolgirl at the anti-Vietnam War or Aldermaston protests.

She has a varied repertoire: stop the police Bill; stop pension financing; outside the Royal Court of Justice with a banner saying “Neither Confirm Nor Deny”; stop fracking in Lancashire; stop dumping sewage, South West Water; renters’ rights; and many more—all with her trusty loudhailer. She also said that part of protest was to cause inconvenience and disruption. I suggest that the three of them on the green holding up a banner against Guantanamo Bay did not cause much inconvenience.

The serious point, as I tease the noble Baroness, is this: in every single photo, after her last 50 years of protest, she and her colleagues had their faces uncovered, demonstrating modern political leadership in public demonstrations. To all other organisations I say that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I admire as a conviction politician, can protest so frequently with her face uncovered, so can and should everyone else. So I say, “Go on, organisers: encourage openness, train you marshals and make sure your aims are clear”. To the police I say, “Use these powers proportionately and protect lawful assembly”. To the public I say, “Support the right to protest and expect those who lead to do so with courage and transparency”.

I conclude by saying that, when protest is unmasked, it persuades rather than intimidates; it invites debate rather than hiding behind anonymity. That is how movements achieve lasting change.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, time is pressing for the response, but that is largely due to interventions. I say to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that the main objective of the police in this process will be to ensure that there is a peaceful demonstration, with no trouble for the community at large. If the police overpolice an issue, that is potentially an area where trouble can commence. So I give the judgment to the police to do this in a proper and effective way.

A number of comments have been made, and we will always reflect on those comments, but I stick, particularly because of time, to the contention that the clauses should stand part of the Bill.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I cannot tell you how much energy and self-control it has taken to stay seated, with all these interventions and comments. First, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for his very kind comments and the photographs, which have obviously brought back a lot of very nice, happy memories. I thank him for that. The other aspect to my having to exercise loads of self- control in staying sitting down is that I get very agitated —very irritated, in fact—and I scribble all over the papers I have in front of me, which sometimes makes it difficult to reply fully. I am going to do my best, and I beg the patience of the House in allowing me to go through all my scribbles.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Fox, and the noble Lords, Lord Strasburger and Lord Marks, for their support. I am very grateful. Obviously, this is a day that will go in my diary: the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, actually agreed with something I said. That is quite rare.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I did not necessarily agree that the Baroness, Lady Jones, should be mentioned in the same sentence as Martin Luther King and Emmeline Pankhurst—I just wanted to make that clear.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the noble Lord. I would like to say, by the way, that I did go to Aldermaston, but my first real protest was in 1968 when I was 18. I went on a CND rally, and it was peaceful—at least, I think it was; I cannot remember.

It is not difficult to counter the arguments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He talked about my being brave enough—perhaps he did not use the word “brave”—to go to protests without a mask, but, of course, I am a highly privileged white female and he is a highly privileged white male. It is not for us to say who might be vulnerable and who might not, and who might fear reprisals and who might not. Let us remember that there are people who live in fear of other people, and those people could easily be deterred from going to protests.

On the points from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and the Minister, the fact is that the police have enough powers already. If they really are requesting this, surely the Government should have a little bit more pragmatism about what they are passing. The fact that the Minister is so happy that two Tories are supporting him is something I honestly find quite shocking. If they are the only people he can rouse to support him in your Lordships’ House, that really says something—and I do not mean for any of you to stand up and support him: it is not necessary.

On the issue of the police getting confused, because the legislation at the moment is very confused—there is so much of it—

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Too much.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Thank you. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, is absolutely right. For example, Steve Bray, the man who does all the loud Brexit protests in Parliament Square—

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

Lock him up.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I will thank Members on this side not to comment on my speech if possible.

Apparently last week the police tried to close Mr Bray down in spite of the court ruling that said that what he was doing was legal. They made, I am told, the absurd and fatuous claim that the judgment had been repealed. That is completely wrong; it is complete nonsense. That is what the police said. They are confused. I do not blame the police for that; I think that the law on protest has now reached such proportions that they really cannot be expected to stay up with what is happening. The Minister said that the police are going to make these decisions and that we have to trust the police and have lots of confidence in them, but if you make bad law, you are responsible and not the police. You are responsible for passing laws that are, first, unnecessary and, secondly, plain wrong. The police have to try to put that into practice, and that is not fair.

I think I might have said everything actually.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I think this is terrible; these clauses should be thrown out or should at least be rewritten, because they are not useful. They are not useful to people who are in genuine fear of their lives but who want to protest about something, and they are not useful for the police, who already have the powers. I asked in my opening speech whether the Minister could point me to the gap in legislation. If the police have really asked for these clauses, then they do not even know the legislation properly.

Very unwillingly—and I am glad the Minister suggested I bring this back on Report—I will withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 118 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Polak (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I should just begin by agreeing with the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, about the farmers, but I note that they did not call to globalise the intifada.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Walney, and thank him for the work that he has done and continues to do on counterterrorism. It is deeply appreciated by many, and, from the point of view of the Jewish community, he is a leading non-Jew—a righteous gentile, if I may add—in everything he does.

I have added my name to Amendment 370A and to two or three other amendments in this group. Supporting this amendment would ensure that those creating a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions and the rights of others are curtailed. This can include all sorts of groups, and we know some of them. These groups can pose a clear and tangible threat to public order and public safety, even where their activities may not, in every instance, meet the statutory threshold for terrorism.

The Committee will recall, for example, the incident in November 2023, when Just Stop Oil protesters obstructed an emergency ambulance with its blue lights flashing on Waterloo Bridge—an action that plainly placed lives at risk. An amendment of the nature of Amendment 370A would ensure that such groups, which demonstrably endanger the public and interfere with essential services, could be addressed at an early stage. It would enable more timely and effective intervention where there is a sustained pattern of reckless, disruptive conduct, before serious harm occurs.

On Amendment 370AA, “intifada” is not a neutral expression but one rooted in campaigns of organised violence and terrorism, yet the Government seem to fail to understand, or choose to ignore, what intifada really was and what it truly means, with tragic consequences. I look over at the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and think of Heaton Park synagogue at Yom Kippur. Melvin Cravitz and Adrian Daulby are no longer with us. Sydney might be the other end of the world, but what went on there—15 innocent people murdered—was a massacre that shows the results that antisemitism can lead to. These people are the victims of the so-called global intifada. When this Government and Governments around the world do not heed the warnings about the severe and dangerous impact that these words have, this is what happens. This amendment would help stop Manchester or Bondi Beach happening again and would provide clarity for CPS enforcement, in ensuring that Parliament draws a clear line before more lives are lost rather than afterwards. Waiting until loss of life to act is, quite simply, deeply shameful.

I have added my name to Amendment 380. It cannot be right in a free society that any community feels unable to go about its daily life because of repeated demonstrations, however lawful they may each be. This was starkly illustrated by the protest that took place the day after the Manchester synagogue attack, when a traumatised community was given no space to grieve. In such circumstances, managing or conditioning a protest is not always enough. The police must have clear legal authority to prevent such protest going ahead where the cumulative effect tips into serious disruption and intimidation. This amendment would provide that clarity and ensure that the law properly protects public order and the right of communities to live without fear. I would be very interested in the views of the Minister on that.

Finally, Amendment 486B would address a serious problem in our framework for public funding. This problem was exposed most clearly, I guess, by the debacle surrounding the band Kneecap, which was permitted to retain a grant of £14,250 from the British taxpayer, despite a catalogue of deeply troubling activity. This includes behaviour glorifying terrorism, when one of the band members held up a Hezbollah flag on stage, shouting, “Up Hamas! Up Hezbollah!” Artistic expression must be protected but it must never be allowed to cross the line into incitement—and when it does, public money should certainly not be supporting it. This incident demonstrates how ill equipped our current law is to prevent funds flowing to individuals or organisations whose conduct runs directly counter to our values and our security.

However, the problem is not just Kneecap. An organisation funded by the UK taxpayer, the Collections Trust, issued guidance referring to Hamas, a proscribed terrorist organisation, as “anti-colonial freedom fighters”. That language is not accidental or trivial. It legitimises and sanitises terrorism, and it was disseminated with public funds.

This amendment would make it clear that no organisation should be permitted to receive or retain taxpayer support if it promotes or excuses criminal conduct or narratives that undermine our democratic values. Again, I ask the Minister whether he agrees that public money must never be used, directly or indirectly, to legitimise extremism, and that we here in Parliament have a duty to draw that line clearly and unequivocally.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I have given notice of my opposition to Clause 124 standing part of the Bill. I have done this for two reasons. First, I think it is unnecessary and, secondly, it could be even more repressive than the law that this Labour Government have already passed.

Let me be clear: I support the right to worship and to access places of worship freely and safely. I would go along to anywhere where people are protesting and making life difficult for anybody who wants to worship, as that is unacceptable. However, this clause is not a targeted protection against genuinely threatening behaviour. It is a broad, low-threshold power that risks sweeping up lawful, peaceful protest on the basis of guesswork rather than evidence, exactly the same as was discussed in the previous group.

Clause 124 allows conditions to be imposed where a protest

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”

in “the vicinity” of a place of worship. The word “may” is doing a lot of work here, as is “vicinity”; neither is defined and together they create a power that is open to misuse. This is not about stopping harassment or threats—we already have strong laws for that. If someone is genuinely intimidating worshippers, the police already have plenty of powers to intervene. What does this clause actually add?

The real problem is that the clause allows restrictions to be imposed even where the protest is peaceful, so long as someone claims they might feel intimidated. That is not a hypothetical risk. Almost any protest that touches on controversial issues could be said to intimidate somebody. Pride marches, trade union demos, climate protests and peaceful protests against war or injustice could all be caught by this wording if they happen to be near a place of worship. In many places in our cities, including London—particularly central Westminster, where so many protests happen—it is very difficult not to be near a place of worship. That creates a very real danger of rolling exclusion zones where protest is progressively pushed out of public space altogether, not because of evidence of harm but because of location and perception.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I support the proposed new clause establishing an express statutory right to protest and will speak to my amendments which, I believe, would make that right workable, balanced and fair to all members of the public. I begin by saying that the right to protest is a cornerstone of any free society. It is a mark of confidence, not weakness, when a nation allows its citizens to gather, speak, dissent and challenge those in authority.

I support that principle wholeheartedly, but rights do not exist in isolation. They exist in a framework of mutual respect, where the rights of one group cannot simply extinguish the rights of another. That is why I have tabled these amendments: to ensure that alongside the duty to respect, protect and facilitate protest, public authorities must also ensure that those who are not protesting are not hindered in going about their daily business.

My amendment proposes a new subsection (2)(d), which makes that duty explicit. I have proposed two further subsections in Amendment 369ZB, (3)(d) and (3)(e), to make it clear that preventing inconvenience to any member of the public and permitting people to go about their daily lives are legitimate grounds for proportionate restrictions on protest.

This is not an attempt to water down the right to protest; it is an attempt to anchor it in the real world. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, in the words of the convention, it is to protect the rights and freedoms of others as well. In the real world, “the public” is not an abstract; the public are individuals: it is a nurse trying to reach her shift on time; it is a carer who must get to an elderly relative; it is a parent taking their child to school; it is a worker who risks losing wages, even a job, because the road has been blocked; it is a small business owner whose customers cannot reach them; it is the disabled Peer in this wheelchair who could not get across Westminster Bridge three years ago because Just Stop Oil were blocking me getting across—I should have borrowed one of their banners and then the police would have helped me across.

All these people matter every bit as much as those who are protesting. Their rights are not secondary. Their needs are not trivial, and their lives should not be treated as collateral damage in someone else’s political campaign.

Some argue—I think the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said so—that inconvenience is a part of protest, but inconvenience is not a theoretical concept. Inconvenience has consequences—missed medical appointments, missed exams, missed care visits, missed wages, missed opportunities. For many people, what is dismissed as mere inconvenience is in fact material harm.

I want to be absolutely clear that a legitimate public interest does not need to be a crowd of thousands. It does not need to be a major national event. It does not need to be a threat to infrastructure. Sometimes a legitimate public interest is one person, one individual, who simply needs to get to work or go to school or go to hospital. A democracy protects minorities, and sometimes the minority is a minority of one.

My amendments recognise that reality. They would ensure that the right to protest was balanced with the right of everyone else to live their lives. They would give public authorities clarity rather than ambiguity, because at present the police are often placed in an impossible position. If they intervene, they are accused of supporting protests. If they do not intervene, they are accused of failing to protect the public. My amendments would give them a clear statutory duty: protect protests, yes, but protect the public and ensure that daily life can continue.

This is not about silencing anyone; it is about ensuring that protest remains peaceful, proportionate and legitimate. If protests routinely prevent ordinary people going about their lives, public support for them will erode. When public support erodes, the right itself becomes more fragile. I think we all saw on television recently motorists getting out of their cars and dragging people off the road. That should not happen. They had to become vigilantes to clear the road. That was because they felt the authorities were not doing their duty in keeping the roads clear.

My amendments would strengthen the right to protest by ensuring that it was exercised responsibly, in a way that commands public respect rather than public resentment. The proposed new clause before them is well intentioned, but without my amendments it risks creating a one-sided right that elevates the interests of protesters above the interests of everyone else. That is not balance, that is not fairness, and it is not how rights should operate in a democratic society. My amendments would restore that balance. They recognise that the right to protest is vital but not absolute. They recognise that the rights of protesters must coexist with the rights of those who are not protesting. They recognise that sometimes the legitimate public interest is not a grand principle but a simple human need—the need to get to work, to keep an appointment, to reach a hospital or simply to go about one’s daily business without obstruction. I commend my amendments to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, it was quite difficult to sit here and listen to that, but I will come to that. I very strongly support Amendment 369, and I do so with a real sense of fury that we are in this position, that we actually have to do this, and that it is not obvious to any Government that in a democracy we need the right to protest to be protected. To engage in peaceful protest means irritating other people. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, but, unfortunately, what he said just now was complete and utter nonsense.

Over recent years, we have seen a real erosion of protest rights through one Bill after another. I sat here and watched it all and protested at every single move. Each was justified on a narrow, technical or operational point but, taken together, they amounted to a clear political direction—making protests harder, riskier and much easier to shut down.

Amendment 369 does not invent new rights. It states in clear and accessible language that peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right and that public authorities have a duty to respect, protect and facilitate that right.

Amendments 369ZA and 369ZB seek to qualify that right by reference to whether members of the public are “hindered”, experience “inconvenience” or are able to go about “their daily business”. These amendments fundamentally misunderstand the nature of protest. Almost all meaningful protest causes some degree of hindrance or inconvenience. If it does not, it is very easy to ignore. From the suffragettes to trade unionists to civil rights campaigners, protest has always disrupted business as usual, precisely because that is how attention is drawn to injustice. For example, proscribing Palestine Action was such a stupid move by the Government and has caused more problems for them and the police than if they had just left it alone and arrested its members for criminal damage and similar.

I come back to these embarrassing amendments. It is not just the problem of their intent, which I disagree very strongly with, but their vagueness. Terms such as “hindered” and “inconvenience” are entirely undefined. Being delayed by five minutes could be an inconvenience. Noise could be an inconvenience. Simply being reminded of a cause that one disagrees with could, for some, be considered an inconvenience. If those concepts become legal thresholds for restricting protest, the right itself becomes meaningless.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, used the phrase “in the real world”. I live in the real world, and I understand what protest does and why it is needed. Under these amendments, any protest that is visible, noisy or effective could be banned on the basis that someone somewhere was inconvenienced. Democracy is by its nature sometimes noisy, disruptive and inconvenient. It is very inconvenient being here at night debating these issues, quite honestly, in a moderately cold Chamber.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

Moderately?

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

All right, in a cold Chamber.

If we prioritise convenience over conscience, we should not be surprised when people feel shut out of political decision-making altogether. For those reasons, I support Amendments 369 and 371. In essence, protest law is a terrible mess, and we have got here by a long series of government decisions and government weirdnesses. The whole thing is confusing for the police, as we have been told by senior police officers. It means that police officers make mistakes based on their own judgment. That is a terrible thing to happen in a democracy. Let us get this into the Bill to make clear exactly what a democracy looks like.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The terms of the noble Lord’s review have been published and they are available to the Committee now. The review will examine whether current public order legislation is fit for purpose in the light of contemporary protest tactics, community impacts and the need to safeguard democracy. It will examine how effectively police are using the powers available to them. It will consider whether further measures are needed to reassure the communities who are most affected by current tensions, while respecting the right to protest. Those are all important issues. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, expects to submit the review to the Home Secretary by spring 2026 and, in doing so, will give an overview of all the legislation that is in place.

The noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, commented on Palestine Action and the right to protest of Palestine Action. I want to reaffirm that both the House of Commons and this House had an opportunity to vote in favour or against that legislation. Both the House of Commons and this House voted in favour of the legislation, which is why, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, police officers are implementing the legislation that was passed by both Houses. As I recall, although I cannot remember the exact figures, a number of Members of this House voted against that order, including Members from my own side. It was a difficult debate in July. It was a free vote; many Members voted against it in the Commons and this House, but both measures were passed in both Houses.

It is not illegal for anybody to go outside now and campaign against the Israeli Government or any actions by the Israeli Government, or to campaign in favour of the Palestine organisations that are seeking to change the status quo in that part of the Middle East. What is illegal is to show support for an organisation that I, Ministers and the Government, on advice from the security services and others, determined was engaged in activities that crossed the threshold of the Terrorism Act. The noble Lord, Lord Walney, is well aware of the complexities of that, as a former adviser, but that was the advice we got.

If an organisation is breaching the threshold for terrorism, it is the duty of this Government to act, and that is what we did in those circumstances. So I want to place on record again, for clarity, that the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, can go outside tonight and campaign for a Palestine state and against the Israeli Government, and no police will arrest him or, as he mentioned, any grandparent, teacher or professional. But if he goes out and supports Palestine Action, which has been determined to have crossed the threshold of the Terrorism Act, he will face the full force of the law. If he does not like the law, he can try to change it, but that is the law passed by both Houses and therefore the police have a duty to uphold it. It does not stop peaceful protest.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I would love to reopen the Palestine Action debate, because I was the person who pushed for the vote and, as we exited the Chamber, several Peers said to me, “This is going to cause trouble”. So people knew.

However, on the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, can the Minister say whether the noble Lord set the time limit or whether the Government did, because it seems a lot of work for such a short time?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I always try to be helpful to the House. I was not directly party to the issue with the Home Secretary and the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, about the time limit, so I cannot say with any certainty whether the Home Secretary said to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, to do it by April, or the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, said that he will deliver it by April. If the noble Baroness wants me to write to her to make that point, I will do so.

The key thing at the heart of Amendment 371 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is that it provides for the review to be undertaken within 12 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that the review we are doing currently will have been completed by April 2026.

Shamima Begum

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Wednesday 7th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The position that the noble Baroness refers to is currently subject to consultation. I will take that as a representation, because I will need to look at the details of what she has said with a forensic eye after this Question Time is over. The key point is that proposals that the Home Secretary has brought forward are to ensure that we put some discipline and management into the migration system. The good character test is one that is currently open to interpretation through consultation.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, there are 60 British individuals in north-east Syria at the moment in camps of some sort. I have worked in north-east Syria, in Raqqa, and I suspect that they will not get a fair trial there—and they have not been convicted here. I have huge respect for the Minister, but I find his Answer that they have to go and get some sort of help from the embassy or wherever quite flaccid. Surely, the British Government are worried about those 60 British nationals.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government will examine and support individuals on an individual basis. It is important that those individuals who have the potential to ask for consular access do so. That is what they should be doing in this case.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

My proposed amendment, if enacted, would send a clear signal to police and prosecutors that speech that offends, shocks or disturbs is indeed lawful. At the same time, it would do nothing to remove real protection from victims who have suffered. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

Is the noble Lord saying that, when I was on the Bench here and he hissed at me that I should shut up because I was rude, that was okay because it did not alarm me? Does he remember doing that? We almost came to blows outside.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I recollect that we have always had a robust exchange of views. I did not in any sense seek to alarm the noble Baroness, but, from memory, she arrived late for a group of amendments, pontificated for a few minutes on issues that she had not heard and then—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I rise, mercifully briefly, to come at this from a slightly different direction. Four years ago, when I was a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, we had a debate in the assembly specifically about honour-based abuse in the part-session in September 2021. The point I want to raise is that this is not a UK-only phenomenon but an international phenomenon, and I am putting forward the idea that there is something to be gained from looking at the experience and examples of attempts to deal with honour-based abuse in different jurisdictions. The report that the debate was about looked at the incidence of honour-based abuse and how it is being dealt with in countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands. That was four years ago, so I suspect things have moved on since then. All I ask is that the Government are conscious of that when they are looking at the current state of international knowledge and the degree to which we can benefit from that.

Honour-based abuse comes underneath the Istanbul convention, which we have finally signed up to. Within that, there is an organisation called the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which has the acronym GREVIO. It has been in existence for about 15 years. I have just checked, and I am ashamed to say that, at the moment, while there is a lot of international representation on this body, there is not a single UK representative, nor has there ever been. I suggest that looking at what this committee does—because it focuses very much on this area—and seeing whether we could not potentially nominate somebody who could go and participate in that and learn from it would be a very good idea.

The only other thing I would say is in the context of the research that the rapporteur for this, who was a representative from Monaco, did. She spoke quite extensively to Nazir Afzal—somebody who I suspect the Minister knows—a prosecutor from the north of England who has been particularly heavily involved in this. One of the things he said really struck me. The report says:

“The crimes were strongly linked to cultural factors”,


particularly factors

“which strengthened … male power and aimed to prevent women from making choices”.

What really struck me was this:

“A 21-year-old man born and raised in England had told him that a man was like a piece of gold which you could clean if you dropped it in the mud, whereas a woman was like a piece of silk, which would be stained forever”.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 356, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. First, I would like to apologise for my intervention earlier. I am afraid I am getting very grumpy, and the Christmas Recess has arrived just in time.

All the amendments in this group have validity, and it might be worth trying to combine them on Report, because this is such an important issue. When serious crimes are committed in the name of so-called honour, the law should recognise that for what it is: a particularly severe and controlling form of abuse. This amendment is to ensure that our justice system understands the dynamics at play in so-called honour-based abuse—abuse that is often collective, prolonged and enforced through fear and the threat of extreme violence.

The case of Banaz Mahmod illustrates this with devastating clarity. Despite reporting rape, violence and repeated threats to her life, and naming those responsible, she was not protected. After her murder, a police watchdog investigation found serious institutional failings, including a failure to grasp the specific risks posed by so-called honour-based abuse.

This amendment reflects the Women and Equalities Committee’s recommendation to explicitly recognise so-called honour in sentencing guidelines to ensure an understanding of such abuse. Recognising so-called honour as an aggravating factor in sentencing would send a clear and necessary signal that crimes motivated by perceived shame or dishonour are deliberate acts of gender-based violence.

This amendment is also supported by victims, survivors, specialist organisations, including Southall Black Sisters, and Banaz’s sister, who has campaigned tirelessly and at huge personal risk. However, there is one thing about all these amendments that I feel is totally wrong and we need to rethink, and that is the fact that I have been saying “so-called honour”. This has nothing to do with honour. This is dishonour, and that is what we should call it.

Facial Recognition Technology: Safeguards

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the safeguards necessary for the use of facial recognition technology by the police.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

The Government commenced a consultation on 4 December on the use of facial recognition technology. There is an established legal basis for the use of facial recognition technology by the police, but the Government intend to bring forward a new bespoke legal framework to provide clearer, more specific rules. Through the consultation, we want to hear views on when and how facial recognition should be used and what safeguards and oversight are needed.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the Minister for his Answer, but does he now accept that the police’s facial recognition algorithm has been flawed? It has been racially biased and biased against women. Actually, it should be stopped until it can be improved.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The Government recognise that the algorithm needs to be examined, and that is why we have asked His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to present an urgent report to the Government on the mechanisms of the algorithm. In the meantime, facial recognition technology is a useful tool. If missing people walk past a facial recognition van, they can be identified. If people are on a wanted list, they can be identified. If people appear on a Ring doorbell, they can be put against a facial recognition database to see whether they have committed an offence and be further questioned. There are good things about that, but the consultation is about how we can better regulate it. HMCIC will look at how we can deal with the issues with the algorithm over the next few months.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Wednesday 19th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 232 is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I admit that I am using an old amendment list, so some other people might also have added their names, and I apologise if I have missed them.

My proposed new clause amends Section 3 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 to explicitly include child criminal exploitation within the definition of “exploitation”, aligning it with new provisions in the Crime and Policing Bill. Clause 40 of the Bill creates a new offence of child criminal exploitation. The offence rightly focuses on the prosecution of perpetrators. It is vital that we do not lose sight of the child victims of criminal exploitation. We must ensure that there is a consistent definition that can be used to identify children formally, so that every child gets the support they need to escape this abuse.

This amendment is also essential to close a serious legal gap that leaves criminally exploited children at risk of prosecution rather than protection. Without corresponding changes to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, legal protections remain inconsistent and inadequate. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which provides a statutory defence for victims of exploitation, does not currently cover criminal exploitation explicitly. This leads to inconsistent application across the criminal justice system. Evidence from the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and ECPAT UK shows that police and prosecutors frequently struggle to apply the existing statutory defence to children exploited into criminal activity.

Children often continue to be treated as perpetrators rather than victims, despite clear indicators of exploitation for criminality. In 2024 alone, over 2,891 children were referred to the national referral mechanism as potential child victims of criminal exploitation. Yet many of these children still end up in courtrooms, not safeguarding systems. Young people exploited for criminality are particularly vulnerable to being prosecuted for offences committed as a result of their exploitation. This undermines the UK’s obligations under international law, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, which requires states to facilitate the non-prosecution of trafficked children for offences committed as a result of the exploitation.

Including child criminal exploitation within the definition of exploitation in the Modern Slavery Act is essential to ensure that children are formally recognised as victims under the UK’s framework for identification, allowing them to access the full range of protections and entitlements under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, including specialist support.

We have the opportunity to fix this now by ensuring that legal definitions and protections are harmonised. Without this amendment, we risk embedding a two-tier system which recognises exploitation in theory but fails to protect child victims in practice. Clear, consistent legislation will empower professionals to intervene earlier, prevent inappropriate prosecutions and ensure that exploited children receive the safeguarding support they need. This is a targeted, evidence-led amendment that strengthens the Bill and ensures that our legal framework reflects both the reality of child exploitation and our responsibility to protect those at most at risk. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, Amendments 232A and 262A are in my name. I have also signed Amendment 232, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and Amendment 263, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Randall of Uxbridge. The noble Lord, Lord Hampton, has given an excellent explanation of his amendment, so I will just say that I agree with him.

Both my amendments provide a defence for victims of child criminal exploitation and cuckooing who are coerced into committing offences. Both amendments have a simple purpose: to ensure that victims of exploitation are not treated as criminals for acts they were compelled to commit. The amendments are supported by academics and charities such as the Children’s Society.

The Bill, as it comes before the House, creates two new offences in Clause 56: child criminal exploitation and cuckooing. These are important steps. They recognise forms of exploitation that front-line workers, police officers and charities have been grappling with for years. However, the Bill currently does only half the job. It recognises the exploitation, but not the victim. Unlike the long-established offences of modern slavery and human trafficking, these new offences do not come with a bespoke defence for victims who commit unlawful acts as a direct result of their exploitation. Unless a victim can prove duress—a notoriously high bar—their only option is to argue that what happened to them also amounted to slavery, servitude, forced labour or trafficking under the Modern Slavery Act. That is a legal contortion, and it is simply impossible for many victims.

It leads to outcomes that I do not believe this House would wish to endorse. For example, a child forced by older criminals to store drugs or weapons, a young person threatened into carrying out low-level offending under fear of violence, or someone whose home has been taken over by a gang who is then compelled to assist in their criminal activities would all be vulnerable to finding themselves before a court, even though their exploiters are the ones truly at fault.

We have been here before. When Parliament passed the Modern Slavery Act in 2015, we accepted, rightly, that victims sometimes commit offences because they see no realistic alternative. Section 45 of that Act created a defence for those victims, carefully limited, and subject to important exclusions. It has not opened any floodgates. It has provided protection only where the courts are satisfied that the offence was the direct consequence of the exploitation, and that a reasonable person in the same situation and with the same relevant characteristics would have acted in the same way.

These amendments have the aim of applying the same principle to the new offences that we are creating today. The amendment on child criminal exploitation mirrors the structure of Section 45. It would not excuse all behaviour and would not allow serious offences listed in Schedule 4. It would apply only where the prosecution cannot disprove that the child acted because they were compelled to do so, that the compulsion arose directly from their exploitation and that a reasonable child of the same age, sex and vulnerabilities would have seen no realistic alternative. In other words, this is a defence grounded in both common sense and compassion.

The same is true of the amendment concerning victims of cuckooing. Anyone familiar with this phenomenon —and many police forces now are—knows that victims have often been threatened, groomed, manipulated or assaulted. They may be obliged to let their home be used for criminal activity, and they may then be forced to play a role within that activity. The amendment would make clear that, where the compulsion arises directly from the cuckooing, those victims should not be criminalised for acts they were compelled to perform.

These defences would not apply in most cases. They would apply only when the court is satisfied that the offending was the direct result of the exploiter’s conduct, not incidental. They offer a fair and proportionate safeguard. They would also prevent the injustice, indeed the absurdity, of Parliament recognising exploitation on the one hand, while punishing its victims on the other. When vulnerable children or exploited adults are used as tools by criminal networks, the criminal justice system should not compound their suffering by treating them as willing participants. These amendments would complete the logic of the Bill and would ensure that the law protects those who need protection most. I hope that the Minister will look at these amendments and see the validity of what I have explained.

[Lord Randall of Uxbridge (Con)]

My Lords, I should start by declaring my interest in the register as the chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation, which probably these days should have changed its name to the Modern Slavery Foundation, because that is in fact what we are really dealing with. It was the late, great Lord Field of Birkenhead who first came up with the expression “modern slavery” and I think it is something we should have as a tribute to the late noble Lord, who was a fantastic Member of this and the other House.

I welcome the Government’s intention to address criminal exploitation through the child criminal exploitation offence and cuckooing offence and commend them for doing so; it is very important. However, the offences will not apply to the exploitation of vulnerable young adults over the age of 18 or with issues of cognitive impairment, as far as I can see. I am not a lawyer, as I explained in the last group; I have more skills on marking things down in a sale—and thank goodness we did not have Black Friday in my day.

This is a probing amendment. I believe—I have the figure here—that, in 2024, 774 young adults aged 18 to 24 were referred to the national referral mechanism for criminal exploitation, including alongside other forms of modern slavery, and that 65% of all victims referred were in that age group. As far as I can see, they are not covered and perhaps they should be. What I do not understand—I am very willing to be lectured and taught on this—is what happens if this criminal child exploitation has started for somebody at, say, the age of 15 and a half but does not come to light until they are 18 or 19, which could easily happen. Will they be treated in a different way? As I mentioned very briefly, there are obviously young adults who have cognitive impairment and who in effect—I am sure that this is not the correct expression—have the mental age of a child.

I fully support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones; I think the noble Baroness, Lady Jones also put her name to my amendment. I fully support them and I think that this should go into the Modern Slavery Act, for all the reasons that have been given. I would, however, like some clarification on what can be done about those young adults and where the law we are creating is going to put them.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 11th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

75: After Clause 48, insert the following new Clause—
“Duty to have due regard to family unity(1) A relevant authority must, in the exercise of relevant functions, have due regard to the need to promote the unity of the family.(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a relevant authority must, in the discharge of its duty under that subsection, have due regard to—(a) the public interest in children being properly brought up,(b) the right of children to be cared for by their parents unless this would be contrary to the child’s welfare,(c) the right of children to have direct contact, in person, with members of their families, unless this would be contrary to the child’s welfare, and(d) the principle that maintaining contact with family members by electronic means of communication is not an adequate substitute for direct contact in person.(3) This section is subject to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (duty regarding the welfare of children); and nothing in this section requires or authorises a relevant authority to do anything which is contrary to the welfare of any child (whether that child is in the United Kingdom or not).(4) Nothing in this section—(a) requires or authorises the Secretary of State or an immigration officer to refuse to grant a person leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom where they would, apart from this section, have granted such leave, or(b) requires or authorises the First-tier or Upper Tribunal to find that a ground of appeal under section 84(1)(c) or (2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 is not made out when it would not, apart from this section, have so found.(5) In this section—“child” means a person under the age of 18, and “children” shall be construed accordingly;“relevant authority” means—(a) the Secretary of State,(b) the First-tier Tribunal, and(c) the Upper Tribunal;“relevant functions” means—(a) any function of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration or asylum;(b) any function conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer in relation to immigration or asylum;(c) any function of the First-tier or Upper Tribunal in connection with the determination of any ground of appeal under section 84(1)(c) or (2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Amendment 75 would insert a new clause after Clause 48 to place a duty to have due regard to family unity on the Secretary of State, immigration officers, and the immigration and asylum tribunals. This is supported by the organisation Bail for Immigration Detainees. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that, in the exercise of immigration and asylum functions, those charged with making decisions have due regard to the need to promote the unity of the family. It is a modest but vital safe- guard to ensure that decisions affecting people’s lives are made with a clear understanding of the human consequences.

Subsection 1 of the proposed new clause sets out the core duty that every relevant authority, in carrying out its functions, must have due regard to the need to promote family unity. Subsection 2 then provides helpful clarification of what that means in practice. These principles are rooted in common sense and compassion. They simply reflect what every parent, teacher and social worker knows: that children who have the love, stability and presence of their families can thrive.

This proposed new clause would complement the existing duty under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, which already requires regard to be had to the welfare of children. Subsection 3 makes that explicit. The new duty would sit alongside Section 55 and be subject to it, ensuring that the welfare of the child remains paramount.

Equally importantly, proposed new subsection 4 provides clear limits. It ensures that nothing in this clause would require or authorise the Secretary of State or a tribunal to refuse leave to enter or remain, or to allow or dismiss an appeal contrary to what they would otherwise have done. In other words, this clause does not create new rights to remain in the UK. It simply creates a duty of consideration and a framework for fairer, more humane decision-making.

This amendment would not diminish the Government’s ability to control immigration. It would simply require that, when exercising discretion or assessing proportionality, decision-makers take proper account of family unity and children’s rights to grow up in the care of their families. By including the First-tier and Upper Tribunals within the scope of this duty, we would ensure that the principle applies consistently across the whole system, from the Home Office desk to the final appeal. It would give tribunals a clear statutory steer that family relationships are not peripheral to human-rights decisions but are central to them.

The UK has long recognised through international commitments and domestic law that the family is the fundamental unit of society. This amendment would give practical effect to that principle in the immigration and asylum context. It reflects our obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, both of which emphasise the importance of maintaining family life. It does so in a proportionate way, respecting the primacy of the child’s welfare and the proper limits of executive power.

I hope the Minister will see that this amendment would strengthen rather than weaken the integrity of our immigration system by ensuring it operates with fairness, consistency and humanity. I beg to move.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the importance of family life and family unity is a principle that no one in this House would dispute. The principle already has a firm statutory protection. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 imposes a clear duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom. It is a duty embedded in every decision taken by immigration officers and by tribunals that consider appeals.

With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, the amendment before us would, in effect, duplicate these existing safeguards and reduce them in a way that risks generating uncertainty and inconsistency. It would open the door to litigation and invite the courts to revisit and reinterpret established principles of immigration law. For those reasons, I respectfully urge the House to resist the amendment.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her Amendment 75. As she outlined, it would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to have due regard to the unity of family in exercising immigration functions. She has raised an important point, but the amendment is unnecessary. I will try to explain for her the reasons why.

The important protections it seeks are already firmly embedded in legislative frameworks and policies, such as Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, the Human Rights Act 1998, and the public sector equality duty derived from the Equality Act 2010. As announced in the immigration White Paper in May, we are exploring further reforms to the family route. As she mentioned, there is already a statutory duty to promote and safeguard the welfare of children in Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. That places a duty on the Secretary of State to make arrangements to ensure that immigration, asylum, nationality and general customs functions are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK. That every child matters is set out in our statutory guidance.

The Immigration Rules balance the right to family and private life under Article 8 and the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Under Part 5 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, Parliament set out the view of what the public interest requires in immigration cases, engaging the qualified right to respect for private and family life under Article 8. It requires the courts to give due weight to this public interest when deciding such cases.

Where an applicant under the family rules does not meet all the core eligibility requirements, the decision-maker will consider whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal a breach of Article 8. This involves considering whether refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or, indeed, their family. Under Section 149 of the Equality Act, which I mentioned earlier, the Secretary of State must have due regard to eliminating discrimination, advancing equality of opportunity and fostering good relations. Due regard for family unity must not limit the ability of the Secretary of State for the Home Office to remove serious criminals who would do us harm. Article 8 claims, as we will discuss, will succeed only if a deportation’s impact on a qualifying child is unduly harsh. The immigration White Paper confirmed plans to legislate for easier removal of such offenders under Article 8, but not in other circumstances. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I hear so often in this Chamber that the amendments the Opposition have brought are completely unnecessary, it is already in law, and we do not have to worry our pretty little heads about it as it will all be fine. The fact is, it is not. This issue, in particular, will continue to make an awful lot of money for lawyers, who will fight what the Government are doing. However, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 75 withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in this group, so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Russell.

Amendment 27 asks for a statute of requirement for police officers to undertake an anti-social behaviour impact assessment when a victim reports three incidents of anti-social behaviour in a six-month period. This would enable agencies to understand the level of harm that is being caused, so that victims are given access to the appropriate support.

Victims have cited several barriers to utilising the anti-social behaviour case review. A key barrier was a lack of knowledge and awareness about the case review among staff at key agencies with a responsibility to resolve anti-social behaviour. For many victims, this lack of knowledge prevented them being signposted promptly, if at all, to the case review mechanism. This posed additional barriers to them being able to successfully activate the case review process and get the anti-social behaviour resolved. This ultimately prolonged victims’ suffering—and none of us wants that. I ask the Minister to seriously consider this.

Amendments 28 and 31 ask for a statutory threshold for triggering an anti-social behaviour case review that removes any discretion for authorities to insert additional caveats which serve as a barrier to victims getting their cases reviewed. To ensure consistent access to anti-social behaviour case reviews, we are recommending the Home Office consults on the need to legislate to standardise the threshold for anti-social behaviour case reviews by placing it in statute as opposed to just guidance. This would prevent local authorities unilaterally adding caveats which make it more difficult for the victim to make a successful application. This consultation, we recommend, should look at mandating access to case review applications via a range of options, including but not limited to paper, online and telephone applications.

Amendment 29, which has already been outlined, would give victims a voice and enable them to explain the impact that the behaviour is having on them and their families, which is critical. To strengthen victim participation and ensure their voices are central to the process, we recommend the Home Office consults on the need to introduce legislation which guarantees victims the right to choose their level of participation in a way that best suits their needs. It might include attending a case review meeting in person, participating virtually or submitting a written impact statement detailing the anti-social behaviour effects, or being represented at the case review by a chosen individual to ensure their perspective is effectively communicated. We want them to have the right to choose the method in which this happens. There should be a statutory requirement that anti-social behaviour case reviews are chaired by an independent person—this is not an unreasonable request. Very often, when there is somebody independent who can see things that other people have not seen and bring it to people’s attention, fairness and confidence in a system is absolutely strengthened.

Amendment 30 seeks that local bodies should be compelled to publish data on the reasons an anti-social behaviour case review was denied to enable better overall scrutiny and an understanding of how effective and consistent the process is across England and Wales. As the noble Lord, Lord Russell, stated, data is king, and we do not think this is an unreasonable request at all.

I hope the Minister will give serious consideration to these amendments and, if they cannot be accepted, he will explain in detail why.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, these are powerful amendments and it is hard to see how they can be argued against. We have all heard of cases where victims have had a very tough time demonstrating the persecution that they have experienced, and they often get challenged in court, unreasonably, I think. These amendments are excellent and we should encourage the noble Lord to push them to a vote later.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, this group, so well introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Stedman-Scott and Lady Jones, focuses on putting the victim first, a principle that we wholeheartedly support.

Clause 6 aims to strengthen the anti-social behaviour case review, and we support the package of amendments to the clause tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Hampton. We support the objective of establishing a statutory threshold for convening a review that explicitly considers the victim’s vulnerability. This is crucial, as it would remove the discretion for authorities to apply additional caveats and ensure that the severity of the impact on the individual is prioritised over mere persistence of the behaviour.

We back the proposal in Amendment 29 to ensure that the review is chaired by an independent person who has not previously been involved in the case. Independence is essential to restore trust and ensure objectivity when agencies review their own failures. We also strongly agree with the demand in Amendment 30 that authorities must publish the reasons for determining that the threshold for a review has not been met. This is a simple but powerful measure to increase accountability and transparency in the decision-making process. Amendment 27, which would require police officers to undertake an ASB impact assessment when the threshold is met, is a common-sense measure to ensure that victims experiencing high levels of harm receive appropriate support.

These amendments demonstrate how we can collectively strengthen the system to deliver genuine justice for victims of persistent anti-social behaviour, ensuring that their trauma and vulnerability are fully recognised. I very much hope that the Government will take them on board.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35 standing in my name says:

“Regulations may not require a relevant authority to provide information on social media posts which they may consider to be anti-social or have anti-social behaviour messages”.


I do not need to regurgitate much of what I said earlier on non-crime hate incidents, which could compose a large part of this, because I am looking forward to the Minister’s announcement in due course that he will have solved the problem of so-called non-crime hate incidents.

I was tempted to propose that Clause 7 should not stand part of the Bill, because I wanted to discuss the huge number of requirements in it, but I thought I would do it under the scope of this amendment. Basically, I want to ask the Minister: what will the Government do with all the information demanded by Clause 7? When I was a Home Office Minister—and I am certain the noble Lord has had this experience as well—we got lots of written requests from Members of Parliament, PQs, asking for information on all sorts of law and order issues concerning what the police were up to in England and Wales. We could not provide it, because the police forces were not under an obligation to send it to the Home Office.

Sometimes I would think, “Oh, I’d like to know that as well”, but whenever I asked the police forces if they could provide it, they would quite legitimately say, “What resources do you want us to divert from fighting crime to collating this information to send to the Home Office, and what practical use will you put it to?” Well, I think they had a fair point, but the demands for more and more statistics from the police have continued to increase. I will not suggest that it is in proportion to the rise in crime, but more information has not helped reduce it.

I come back to the point: will the Minister tell the House exactly what use the Home Office will make of all this information, since what is demanded is fairly extensive? If this information was free, it would be okay, but we all know what will happen. All councils will employ at least one, probably more than one, special information-gathering co-ordinator to collect the information required and transmit it to the Home Office. New computer systems will be needed to provide it in “the form and manner”, as per new subsection (4)(b).

This, I suggest, is not a low-grade clerking job, since the information demanded in subsection (2) is not just a collection of numbers or reports, but provision of the reports, plus the authorities’ responses, plus the details of ASB case reviews. Then subsection (3)(d) calls for the information collected to be analysed by the local authorities. As I say, analysis of the plethora of different anti-social behaviour orders and responses to them in sufficient quality to be sent to the Home Office will be regarded as a fairly high-level job, not one for a low-paid junior clerk in the council.

I think we are probably looking at a salary of about £50,000 for the lead person and £30,000 for the assistant, and with national insurance and pensions we are looking at about £100,000 per authority. Multiply that by 317 local authorities and we will have local government costs of £32 million. No doubt many local authorities will love it; there will be more office-bound jobs as they cut dustbin collections and social services work and leave potholes unfilled. Okay, that is a sinister, cynical comment, but that will happen in some local authorities.

I simply ask the Minister to tell the Committee, if that £32 million I calculate will be the cost of every authority supplying all the information requested in Clause 7, will that be money well spent? My little amendment would do my bit to limit some of the costs, since I do not want local authorities wasting time and resources by collecting and analysing so-called anti-social social media posts which have happened in their area, either to the poster or to the complainant. They will be chasing their own tails if they attempt to go down this route. It would be a self-defeating waste of time. That is the purpose of my amendment: to ask the Government to justify what they will do with all the information collected under Clause 7 and to ask whether my calculation of £32 million is roughly right. I beg to move.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 55A, which is supported by StopWatch, a campaign organisation that is concerned with the use of stop and search. I disagree wholeheartedly with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra.

Amendment 55A would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data on the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders and related injunctions. Specifically, it would ensure that these reports include the number of occasions when stop and search has been used by the police prior to the issuing of such orders, and the protected characteristics of those who have been issued with them. These powers can have serious and lasting consequences for those subject to them, particularly young people and those from marginalised communities. Yet at present, the public and Parliament have very limited visibility of how these tools are being applied. This would ensure transparency and accountability about how anti-social behaviour powers are being used across England and Wales.

We know from existing evidence that stop and search disproportionately affects people from black and non-white ethnic backgrounds. The Government’s own figures last year reported that there were nearly 25 stop and searches for every 1,000 black people and yet only around six for every 1,000 white people. There is a real risk that these disparities could be echoed or even compounded in the issuing of anti-social behaviour orders or injunctions. Without clear data, broken down with protected characteristics, we cannot know whether these concerns are justified, nor can we properly evaluate the fairness and effectiveness of the system. By requiring the Home Office to publish quarterly data, this amendment would bring much-needed transparency. It would allow Parliament, bodies with oversight and the public to monitor trends, identify disparities and ensure that anti-social behaviour powers are being used proportionately and appropriately.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, is clearly very exercised about the use of resources. He actually said that more information does not reduce crime. I think that is probably completely wrong, because the more information you have, the better you can understand what is happening. So this is about good governance and evidence-based policy. If these powers are being used fairly, the data will confirm that. If not, then we will have the information necessary to take corrective action. Either way, the transparency will strengthen public trust in policing and the rule of law.

This amendment is about shining a light where it is most needed. It would do nothing to restrict police powers. It would simply ensure that their use can be properly scrutinised. I hope the Minister will agree that accountability and transparency are not optional extras in a just society; they are actually the foundations of it.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, we support Amendment 55A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. She has already highlighted the importance of improved data collection around the use of anti-social behaviour legislation. This is essential because it is impossible to gauge the fairness or effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers without adequate data and transparency.

We also support Clause 7. It is important to have more transparency around how these powers are used by local authorities and housing providers. The evidence is that they already have this information but are failing to share it. As a result, little is known about how these powers are being used in practice.

The charity Crisis wants the Government to go further by making this information publicly available. This would provide full transparency around patterns of anti-social behaviour and the powers used to tackle it. Is this something the Government might consider? Perhaps the Minister could let us know.

The police, too, must improve their recording practices around anti-social behaviour. A report last year by HMICFRS found that some forces’ recording is very poor, while others do not always record the use of statutory powers. We believe that transparency is key to ensuring that future orders are applied reasonably and proportionately, and to prevent discrimination.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 3rd November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

28: Clause 38, page 32, line 20, leave out “11” and insert “12”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would add section 12 (period for which persons may be detained) to the list of sections of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to be repealed.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, these are meant to be helpful amendments and, if they are read with a favourable eye, they might be seen as such. To start, I remind your Lordships that freedom from executive detention is the most fundamental right of all. It is not only an international human right but a national one, reaching back 800 years to the Magna Carta. In the absence of any statutory time limit on the length of detention, other than for children and pregnant women, the right to liberty has been safeguarded in our common law.

Amendments to strip back Section 12 and uphold the common law during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill in July 2023 were supported from all corners of this House by a quite motley crew of very noble Lords. Amendment 28 and the consequential changes made by Amendment 30 seek to simply restore the common law to the position it was in before Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 was brought into force and sought to chip away at it. With so many other provisions of the Illegal Migration Act to be repealed by Clauses 38 and 39, Section 12 should be added to their number.

There are two reasons. First, the reasonableness of a period of immigration detention should not simply be in the hands of the Minister and down to her opinion; it should be entrusted to the responsibility of our courts in our world-renowned common-law system. This is not to say that courts will ignore the Home Secretary’s views. On the contrary, in 2007 our Court of Appeal specifically acknowledged that it will no doubt take account of the Home Secretary’s views as may seem proper.

Secondly, by returning to the common-law position, we would also uphold the right to liberty under international human rights law. In 2016 the European Court of Human Rights agreed that it is this consideration by domestic courts of the reasonableness of each individual period of detention that ensures the absence of a general fixed time limit in the UK system, because it does not, in principle, give rise to increased risk of arbitrariness.

Repealing Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act is consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. At paragraph 103 of its report on this Bill, it clearly stated:

“We agree with our predecessor Committee and recommend the repeal of section 12 to restore certainty and ensure compliance with Article 5”.


Turning to Amendment 32 in my name, I take forward the task of continuing to recommend that the Government leave out the retrospective element of the detention power in Clause 41—that is, the power to detain people when considering whether to make a deportation order on the basis of their presence. This amendment is modest when compared with the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was to leave Clause 41 out of the Bill altogether. This amendment is simply about removing retrospectivity in subsection 17, which treats the new detention power as always having had effect.

The Government’s position appears to be that Clause 41 is necessary to clarify matters but that it is not retrospective. Both cannot be true. It is either necessary because it is retrospective and protects the Government from false imprisonment challenges, or it is unnecessary because it is already the position in law. The Government’s own impact assessment, when read carefully, shows that it has been unlawful since 20 October 2014 to detain people in the way that they have. Changing the law now and treating it as if it had always had effect will provide neither legal certainty nor foreseeability to people detained in these past 11 years. It only insulates the Government from challenge and inhibits people from having a domestic remedy and compensation for their unlawful detention.

This precedent of making the unlawful deprivation of liberty lawful places us on a very slippery slope. I ask the Government to reconsider their position on both these amendments, to repeal a section of the law that prior Governments passed in the Illegal Migration Act to erode our common law, and to leave out retrospectivity from their new detention order—all to uphold the right to liberty and to be free from executive detention, that most fundamental right of all. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked when and how we can review this matter. We will keep all matters under review. There are further potential issues around immigration and asylum trailed with the immigration White Paper. We have got to keep these matters under review at all times. I would argue to both him and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the extension of the Secretary of State’s powers is still subject to all the legal oversight that she would wish it to have and is ultimately still subject to parliamentary scrutiny on how those powers are exercised. I will answer to this House if there are any abuses of that power that Members wish to draw to the attention of either House—to the Home Secretary or to me, as the Minister accountable in this House. I therefore urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I thank the Minister for his reply. I deeply regret that I did not come to him with these amendments before to discuss them a little bit more. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, even the noble Lord, Lord Harper, who started to raise deep, dark political waters that I definitely do not agree with him about. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 28 withdrawn.