Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise, but it is the return of the double act.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for tabling this amendment and for his excellent explanation of it. If the previous group was tricky then, yikes, getting rid of hate crime has me asking what I am doing here. I am going to carry on regardless and try to unpack why I think this is so important.

One thing that I am very aware of is that the accusation of hate crime or hate speech in any way can make you stutter and stammer and look the other way. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, told of the abuse that she received and how everybody stayed quiet until the incident was over and then rushed up to her. That reminded me of what it feels like at the moment to have unpopular views. Very often, you are attacked, and then people will come up to you afterwards, squeeze your arm and whisper, “I agree with what you said”, but they do not say it out loud. There are an awful lot of people who look away because they are frightened that they will be accused of supporting hate.

The best example, and one that this House has discussed endlessly, is the consequences for the thousands of young women in towns throughout the land who were abused, raped and sexually assaulted because people in official positions—social workers, teachers and people who knew that young women were being abused in that way—were frightened that, if they complained, they would be accused of Islamophobic racist hate. And so they were quiet. The report by the noble Baroness, Lady Casey, makes that clear, as does all the other discussion on that question. In other words, this one is difficult, but we have got to keep going.

What is a hate crime? For the purposes of legislators, Lord Sumption, who has already been quoted, explains it this way:

“The Crown Prosecution Service and the police have agreed to define a hate crime as anything which is perceived by the victim or anyone else to be motivated by hostility or prejudice. In other words, the definition which they use is subjective. If the complainant thinks it is a hate crime, then it is a hate crime”.


That is extraordinarily dangerous, as it inevitably makes it impossible to deny the charge, to say, “I am not a hate criminal, and what I have just said is not a crime”. You have no defence, but it empowers a complainant as a victim who cannot be challenged. It has been proven that this is incredibly divisive in society. It incites people to adopt a victim label. In a period of identity politics and protected characteristics, it undermines equality before the law.

In reference to something else that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, said, in the 1980s, I was active in anti-racist politics. We sought equality before the law rather than discrimination, and made an argument focusing not so much on words but on making sure that people were treated equally, not spoken to nicely in different terms—although that was a bit of an argument, it was never something that was demanded by those of us involved in those fights.

Ironically, the aim of hate speech laws for many people is to create a kinder and nicer society, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who is not in her place, reminded us at Second Reading, and I am paraphrasing here, certain legislation in the early 1990s raised public expectations that Governments could legislate their way to a harmonious society and eradicate an emotion like hate. Indeed, that is a theme that the Economist feature that I mentioned earlier picks up. It says:

“The aim of hate-speech laws is to promote social harmony. Yet there is scant evidence that they work. Suppressing speech with the threat of prosecution appears to foster division … When the law forbids giving offence, it also creates an incentive for people to claim to be offended, thereby using the police to silence a critic or settle a score with a neighbour. When some groups are protected by hate-speech laws … others … demand protection, too. Thus, the effort to stamp out hurtful words can create a ‘taboo ratchet’, with more and more areas deemed off-limits. Before long, this hampers public debate. It is hard to have an open, frank exchange about”


controversial issues such as

“immigration, say, if one side fears that expressing its views will invite a visit from the police”.

That is really what the amendment is getting at. Removing hate crime from the statute books would not mean living in a hateful society. Hate crime on the statute books actually encourages people to be divisively, toxically antagonistic to each other.

On aggravated offences—the idea that you get a longer sentence if it is alleged that you are motivated by hate and the concept of stirring up hate—removing specific acts that are crimes from thoughts or the speech behind them dangerously conflates speech and action. When hate crime laws require that the authorities infer a perpetrator’s belief and assign greater punishment based on ideological motive, that can lead to some perverse criminal justice outcomes, which matter to legislators. In the CPS report on recent hate crime prosecutions there was a telling, shocking example. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for

“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.

Actually, 20 weeks seems a bit low to me, as it goes. Then the detail was revealed: the CPS explains that, for assaulting his father, his sister and a police officer, the person who was found guilty received a community order. They received the 20 weeks in prison for the racist slur. So for the assault you can retain your freedom, but for the racist words you get 20 weeks in jail. Is that not confusing?

There are endless examples that I could cite. It is no wonder that young people in particular, rather than being super-sensitive, as was described earlier, are actually super-sensitive to words they find difficult. They think that speech is violence and cannot distinguish between physical threats, physical harm and what they imagine to be harmful speech, which in turn justifies using physical violence against hate speech that they hear. That was brutally illustrated by the assassination of Charlie Kirk—someone whose politics I did not agree with but who was basically seen to be a hate criminal and, if all speech is violence, you can use violence back. I think these are regressive cultural fruits of vaguely drafted laws that give a vast and subjective discretion, and that is adding to the atmosphere of toxicity and cancel culture.

I know that all roads lead back to the review by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, but I ask the Minister whether he can explain the point of the review if, when he is looking at provisions such as public order offences and some of these issues—I know he is very concerned about free speech—we are going to just say that the status quo works. Hate crime legislation is getting us in a mess. The Minister says that he absolutely disagrees, but the Government have asked for a review of these very ideas.

Surely the Minister might be open-minded to that review, if not to the proposals from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and me, or other people who have spoken. Might there be some flexibility from the Minister in thinking that, just possibly, legislators before this Government brought in some bad laws and that, at the very least, we should look at them again? It just may be that hate crime legislation is making society more hateful, is making young people more anxious and frightened and is bad for democracy.

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly in opposition to this amendment, but I will resist the temptation to give a Second Reading speech. My understanding is that it would abolish the entire statutory framework relating to hate crime and hatred-based offending.

I have been a blatant homosexual for many decades, and part of that look means that you evoke some hatred as you walk around the streets—the streets of Cardiff in 1993, certainly, when no hate crime legislation existed in relation to sexual orientation. The message I got at that age was that the state agreed with the offences that I was experiencing, because I did not know that the state supported me.

Within the last year, when I was in Shoreditch, a group of men surrounded me and my partner. They got up in our faces and used unequivocally homophobic language. We did not report it as a hate crime, but we were frightened and discombobulated. My response was, “But it’s Shoreditch”, which was my middle-class shorthand for, “There are so many lesbians in this area. What exactly are you going to do if you think that this hate is going to be acceptable here?” I did, however, feel utterly supported by the state a year ago, because I knew that legislation existed that made that kind of offence unacceptable.

As has been outlined, there is no single offence of hate crime. What exists is a framework across several Acts. There are aggravated forms of certain basic offences, and I look forward to the Government’s amendment on Report, as in their manifesto, relating to disability, sexual orientation and gender identity. There is enhanced sentencing, where hostility is proved on grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or gender identity. There are offences such as stirring up racial or religious hatred. It is my understanding that this amendment would dismantle that network in its entirety.

Those who have concerns about the recording of non-crime hate incidents, which I have sympathy with, or about proportionality in relation to hate crime, which I also have sympathy with, can and should address those matters directly. But those issues are distinct: wholesale repeal of criminal protections is not a measured response, in my view, to broader free speech concerns.

I find it impossible to ignore the context. Official Home Office figures record 137,550 hate crimes in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025. As a resident of Bethnal Green, I am acutely aware of hate crime in relation to antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiment. It exists across all the streets; the graffiti is going up and up in relation to both those things. On antisemitism specifically, the same Home Office bulletin records 2,873 religious hate crimes targeted at Jewish people in the year ending March 2025, and notes that the previous year saw a very sharp rise and spike following the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict. In addition, the Community Security Trust recorded 3,528 antisemitic incidents across the UK in the calendar year 2024. I share that data because what we measure, we manage. Understanding these spikes and seeing these patterns matter. What the hate crime legislation gives us is a mechanism for measuring and managing those spikes and incidents.

Where reporting shows acute risk, His Majesty’s Government have acted. In October 2023, the Conservative Government increased the Jewish community protective security grant to £18 million for 2023-24, and that figure was maintained in 2024-25. That is right and proper as a reasonable and justified response to that spike in hate crime, which was measured because this legislation exists.

One can believe deeply in freedom of expression; I sympathise and actually agree more than people might think with the previous amendment, and with some of the comments we have had so far. But the law must recognise and respond to crimes intended to intimidate whole communities. In my view, this amendment would remove the very tools that allow the police and the courts to identify, mark and properly sentence hostility-motivated offending. For those reasons, I would request that this amendment be withdrawn.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

That was a very useful and nuanced contribution from the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to notice the rise, for example, of antisemitic hate against Jews. The amount of hate crimes being recorded, however, has gone up hugely, despite the proliferation of hate crime legislation. Does that not rather imply that hate crime legislation is not stopping hate crime?

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is a really important question, and I will try to remember to keep speaking in the third person, because I do want to just talk.

Has the proliferation of legislation helped prevent hate crime? During the past two decades we often saw increases, and we would question whether those increases were a product of increased hate crime, or an increased awareness of the legislation that led people to report. I am aware that, being of my generation, I am reluctant to report. There is a part of me that thinks, “You had it coming, and you should probably have taken your tie off for that walk down that street. You brought it on yourself”, added to which I do not want to waste police time. There is a conditioning that goes on with minority communities, and it takes some changing in how we think about these things to give communities permission to say that they did not have it coming, they do not deserve it, and that they have the right to talk to the police about those incidents.

I welcome the increase in reporting. Nevertheless, there has been an overreliance on using some of this legislation for incidents that should not constitute a hate crime. What happens when those cases are brought and those complaints are made, and how they are investigated, absolutely requires examination and thought. However, that does not justify the wholesale removal of hate crime legislation, which is a disproportionate response to the problem that has been identified.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment of my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I also declare my interest as a director of the Free Speech Union. I will make three arguments against the statutory hate crime regime, and against embedding the concept of hate crime in British law. As we have heard, and as we are all aware, the concept of hate crime is inextricably bound up with protected characteristics. A hate crime is either the stirring up of hatred against the bearers of certain protected characteristics, or it is a crime that becomes a hate crime because the perpetrator is motivated by hostility towards one or more of the protected characteristics of the victim.

The number of protected characteristics in this statutory framework, however, varies from law to law. Hate crime law, on the face of it, is for that reason slightly confusing and incoherent. There are three protected characteristics in the stirring-up offences in the Public Order Act, five are referenced in the aggravated offences regime, seven in the Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act, and nine in the Equality Act. How can we rationalise this anomaly? The solution of successive Governments has been constantly to add new protected characteristics to the statute book. I dare say it is possible that, in due course, amendments will be made to the Crime and Policing Bill to add yet more protected characteristics to the criminal law.

The direction of travel is clear: the number of protected characteristics is constantly expanding, and various lobby groups are constantly petitioning parliamentarians to add ever more protected characteristics to the statute book. The end point of this process will be that every characteristic is protected; but if every characteristic is protected, then no particular characteristic will enjoy special protection and we will, in effect, be back to where we started pre-1965, before the concept of hate crime raised its head in British law.

My first argument is that, in the interests of saving us all a great deal of time and effort, can we not just short-circuit the process of getting to the point where every characteristic is protected by stripping out the concept of hate crime and protected characteristics from British law and returning to the pre-1965 status quo?

My second argument has been touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, which is that the concept of hate crime is at odds with the sacrosanct principle of equality before the law. Why should bearers of protected characteristics enjoy more robust legal protections than non-bearers? Why is a criminal offence motivated by hostility towards a victim’s transgender identity punished more severely than exactly the same crime motivated by the victim’s sex? Sex is not a protected characteristic, apart from in the Equality Act. This two-tier justice—this sense that some people, because they happen to belong to protected groups, enjoy additional legal protections—fosters grievance, breeds resentment and undermines public trust in the law and in the police in particular. In 1981, around 87% of Britons reported having confidence in the police. By 2022, that had fallen to about 67%, a substantial long-term decline. I would suggest that one of the reasons for declining public trust in the police is this sense that some groups are better protected than others because of the hate crime, protected characteristic regime.

My third argument, which is probably the strongest argument, is that the aggravated offences regime introduces the concept of thought crime into British law. We need to distinguish between mens rea and the particular thought someone is having towards the victim while committing a particular crime. I do not think, when assessing the seriousness of an offence, you could exclude motive. It would be absurd not to take motive into account, but that is different from punishing a crime more severely if a person is experiencing a particular emotion—hostility, hatred—towards a particular group that the victim of the crime belongs to. Mens rea is universal and does not discriminate, but hate crime does. It says that if you are having particular thoughts about the victim when you commit the crime—importantly, not hatred in general, but hatred based on their possession of one or more protected characteristics—you should be punished more severely.

Not only is this criminalisation of certain thoughts a hallmark of a totalitarian society, but, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, it is very hard to prove. It is very hard for a court to determine whether the person accused of the crime had the verboten thoughts while committing the crime. To paraphrase Queen Elizabeth I, we cannot open a window and see into men’s souls.

I am perfectly aware that an amendment stripping the concept of hate crime from British law has little chance of winning a Division in this House, so let me close with some more modest proposals. Do not add any more protected characteristics to the list of aggravators. Extend Section 29J of the Public Order Act, which protects various forms of criticism of religion and makes it more difficult for people to be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred. You can criticise a religion, even quite robustly, thanks to Section 29J and not be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred.

One useful improvement to the hate crime statutory regime would be to extend Section 29J to the other stirring-up offences. For example, the Free Speech Union paid for the legal defence of a former Royal Marine called Jamie Michael. He robustly criticised illegal immigrants in a Facebook video and, as a consequence, he was prosecuted for intending to stir up racial hatred. It took a jury in Merthyr Tydfil all of 17 minutes to unanimously acquit him of that offence. He should never have been prosecuted. We need a protection in the Public Order Act whereby, if you make robust criticisms, even of legal migration, you should not be vulnerable to a charge of stirring up racial hatred.

Finally, an anomaly in the stirring-up offences is that you can be prosecuted for stirring up racial hatred if the effect of your words or behaviour is likely to stir up racial hatred, even if that is not your intention—whereas you can be prosecuted for stirring up religious hatred or hatred on the basis of sexual orientation only if you intended to do that. That is an anomaly, and my recommendation would be that a two-limb test has to be satisfied before one of the stirring-up offences can be made out. To successfully prosecute someone, it should be incumbent on the Crown to show not only that what they said or did was likely to stir up hatred against the protected group in question but that they intended to as well. That would bring British law to a certain extent into line with the Brandenburg test in the US first amendment, whereby you can be prosecuted only if your words or actions are not only likely to but were intended to cause imminent lawless action.

So, accepting that this controversial proposal that my two colleagues have bravely made is unlikely to ever win enough support in this House as presently constituted to win a Division, I urge the Committee to consider those more modest reforms.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

My Lords, I begin by congratulating the Minister on an exceptionally comprehensive introduction to what is, by any measure, a wide-ranging and ambitious Bill. In the time available, I will confine my remarks to three aspects of the Bill: the Government’s manifesto commitment to extend aggravated offences to all strands of hate crime; the continuing discussions around the recording of non-crime hate incidents; and, in common with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, as a London cyclist, I am very interested in the new provisions around cycling.

First, I welcome the Minister’s commitment, made on Report in the other place, to introduce a government amendment at Committee in this House to make all existing strands of hate crime aggravated offences. The framework for race and religion has made a real difference: it has given prosecutors the tools to reflect the gravity of hate-motivated crime, ensured higher sentences where hostility is proven and given victims confidence that the law recognises when they have experienced such an offence. These offences send a clear message about who we are as a society and what we are prepared to confront. For disabled people, the same clarity has never existed; hostility is too often treated as an afterthought, with incidents instead recorded as ordinary assault or public order without recognition of the prejudice behind them. Extending aggravated offences to disability would bring long overdue parity and show that hate in any form will be met with equal seriousness. For LGBT people, too, the gap in protection remains; while cases can be charged as hate-motivated, they still fall outside the aggravated framework. I hope that the Government’s amendment will close that gap once and for all. I look forward to working with Ministers on this.

I note the comments by the noble Lord, Lord Herbert, on the recommendations to stop non-crime hate incidents. I believe that seeing a spike in incidents can help police forces and, crucially, communities take action. For example, an increase in antisemitic incidents in an area can signal growing tensions. I accept the recommendations of the National College of Policing, but I am interested in how police forces and communities can still consider signals and measures of community cohesion and take proportionate and measurable action to prevent escalation.

Finally—perhaps the most controversial thing I will ever talk about in this Chamber—I welcome the provisions on cycling now included in the Bill. I cycle in London and I do something that sometimes feels rare: I stop at red lights, I indicate when turning and I wear a helmet. Anything that deters dangerous or careless cycling is to be welcomed, and it is time our laws reflected how we travel in our cities today. I must confess, however, that I enjoy an e-bike. Although I have no financial interest in Lime, it certainly has a financial interest in me. Reducing the maximum speed of hired e-bikes would be a simple way to make them safer. They simply go too fast, and they evoke an adolescent abandonment of safety and conscience in a way that I am totally ashamed of. Riders must behave responsibly, but providers also have a part—an easy part—to play in protecting everyone.

This Bill covers a great deal of ground, and the issues I have touched on all point to the same principle: the law must be fair, proportionate and responsive to the world as it really is, not how we wish it was. I look forward to working with the Minister and noble Lords across the House as the Bill progresses.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 17th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jenkin of Kennington (Con)]

My Lords, I too shall make a very brief intervention, in agreement with my noble friend Lady Stowell. I have some concerns that this is not the way to solve the problem of violence against women. I absolutely accept that misogyny does exist, I think women have good cause to be aggrieved about the increasing challenges we all face and the idea of misogyny as a hate crime certainly sounds attractive, but at a time when I have never known women angrier and more afraid, I think we have to ask whether this is really the right legislation to deal with our grievances. From my experience, women want better conviction rates for rape, better protection against domestic abuse and violence, and to be able to go for runs outside without fear of attack or even murder. With an average of two women murdered every week, that is what they want the police to focus on.

The Law Commission report says

“while we consider that there is a serious problem of crime that is connected to misogyny”—

I accept that too—

“we have concluded that the particular model of hate crime laws is unlikely to prove an effective response to misogynistic offending, and may prove more harmful than helpful, both to victims of violence against women and girls, and also to efforts to tackle hate crime more broadly. We suggest that reforms in other areas are more likely to result in tangible positive results.”

I agree, and I think there is a danger: we need to be careful what we wish for. There is every possibility that this kind of crime will get bogged down by bureaucracy and endless debate, none of which will improve the lives of women at all. The law of intended consequences may well be part of this. I just say to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that surely the example he gave is not correct, because transgender identity is already a protected characteristic. I was confused by that.

[Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)]

My Lords, I will not take up too much of the House’s time. I am a Covid baby—I have learned the culture of this House via screens—so I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I get the protocol incorrect, but I consider you all my noble friends. I am really struck by the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and support it wholeheartedly because I have seen the benefit of hate crime legislation and the benefit of aggravated offences on the grounds of sexuality, disability and race. It is illogical to me that that is not extended to women when it exists for every other protected characteristic.

On a personal note, this issue of sex and gender is something that I have been researching for a very long time. I am the former CEO of Stonewall—since 2019 I have been free—but I have been thinking about these issues since 1998, when, as a student at St Hilda’s College, Oxford, we were debating whether transwomen should be allowed in that women-only college. So, I am slightly a 1980s baby, but have thought about these issues for a very long time.

I am often thought to be trans. I am not, but I am often thought to be. I do not have my tie on this evening because it is going to be a long night—and if, unlike the gentlemen, I have the option to drop it, I will—but when a woman has been told for most of her adult life to accessorise, she does get attracted to the tie racks in Liberty as an option for those accessories. I experience discrimination on the grounds of my gender, sometimes on the basis of my sex—because I am a woman and perceived to be a woman—but often on the grounds of my gender, my gender identity and my gender presentation. These things are complicated; they do not lend themselves to pithy statements.

I have huge sympathy with those who have very different views from mine on trans issues and I think there is probably more that we can talk about together than what divides us. We have become caricatures of ourselves by the medium of social media and I have a huge amount of respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jenkin, and the work she has done around women in politics, but I know we disagree on this. I hope we can find ways to come together, but I think this amendment referring to sex and gender is wholly beneficial to women. I hope to support it, hope to see it taken back to the other place, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Russell, for his support.

[Noble Lords]

Front Bench!