Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Monday 15th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness’s speech ranged very broadly indeed. We are in fact debating a complex penal issue where we have a policy that addresses the matter very sensibly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, explained.

I will add just one point to this debate. It is not difficult to see the danger to people who were registered as male at birth but who are now registered under the Act as female if they were required to be placed in a male prison, as this amendment would require, irrespective of the particular circumstances of their case, as long as they are a sexual or violent offender. It should not need to be emphasised, but I will emphasise it because it is the fact, that many of these people have had hormone treatment, and some of them have had reconstructive surgery that has given them primary and sometimes secondary sexual characteristics of a physical nature. What do the proposers of the amendment think will happen to such people if the Home Office is obliged to place them in a male prison?

Of course we would all agree that, if there is an offender in custody for a suspected violent or sexual offence who is in possession of a gender recognition certificate and poses a risk to others in custody, then specific steps should be taken to isolate and deal with them. But that does not justify or require ignoring a gender recognition certificate in the way the amendment proposes.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it has to be said that when I talk to members of the general public and tell them that it is MoJ policy to allow prisoners of a male sex to be housed according to their self-declared gender identity in a women’s prison, irrespective of whether they have taken any legal or medical steps to acquire their gender, that they do not need to have gone through any physical transformation and still retain male genitalia, which we have heard lots about already in this debate, and that they do not even need to have obtained a gender recognition certificate—they need just to declare that they are women and demand that they are moved to the women’s estate, and it is seriously considered—they are aghast. It falls under the category of, “Has the world gone mad?”

That common-sense response might not feel appropriate when discussing legislation, but in this instance it may help us to look at this issue in practical, real-life terms, not just in abstractions. That is why I welcome the amendment very strongly. Although it does not resolve all my concerns, I welcome its modest, narrow aim of removing the most egregious aspect of this situation: allowing male prisoners who identify as trans but have convictions of violence or sexual offences against women to live with women prisoners. There really is no point in the Government issuing strategies and grand words about violence against girls and women if the same Government have no qualms about letting rapists share the same confined living quarters as vulnerable women in prison who, let us be frank, cannot leave or escape because they are locked up by the state. This amendment’s focus is on convicted sex offenders and it is urgent that the Government take notice.

It is important to note that when gender-critical commentators and academics raise qualms about the general policy of housing transgender prisoners in the women’s estate, they are often dubbed transphobic and accused of holding a prejudiced view of all trans women as sexual predators, but this is a malign caricature. At this point I give a shout-out of solidarity to Professor Jo Phoenix, an esteemed and conscientious criminologist who has been harassed and traduced for raising such legitimate concerns.

Wherever one stands on the general issue, this amendment is specific and cannot be accused of implying that all natal men, however they identify, are a sexual threat to women, because that would not be true. We are talking only about convicted sex offenders and those guilty of violence. I still hope this probing amendment might encourage the Government to look more closely at a range of issues in this area. I particularly want the Government to consider whether the Ministry of Justice’s involvement over a period of time with the controversial lobbying group Stonewall, which has already been referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, as with so many public bodies, may—just may—have led to the skewing of policies in a particular direction.

For example, I know how keen this Government are on data and statistics, but as Kate Coleman, the founder of Keep Prisons Single Sex, has noted—this just seems incredible to me—the MoJ admits that it does not know how many prisoners identify as trans because, with a gender recognition certificate, they are counted by their new legal gender. I am not sure how the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, can be so sure of the statistics she quotes, because the tools designed to assess any threat posed by male prisoners who identify as trans women cannot be picked up accurately. If someone with a GRC attacks a female prisoner, it will be recorded as an assault by a woman on another woman.

I also want to query who is listened to in this discussion on what is obviously a clash of rights. In the course of the recent High Court ruling we have heard about, Lord Justice Holroyde outlined the need to balance

“the subjective concerns of women prisoners”

with

“the rights of transgender women in the prison system.”

This made it sound as though the women, the biological women, were all being overly subjective, and the transgender women had rights. Describing one side as subjective and the other with rights misses a crucial point, because that transgender woman has an identity that is not an objective fact but a subjective desire and then a declaration. Why are women prisoners’ subjective but rational concerns afforded less weight here?

When the High Court acknowledged that women prisoners may well be worried and “scared” about sharing prison accommodation with male-bodied prisoners, the court said that that fear was not enough to outweigh the desire of some male prisoners to be housed with women. I wonder: when did the prison estate, or indeed the law, allow its policies to be dictated by prisoners’ desires? I have worked with prisoners over a number of years, particularly with Debating Matters Beyond Bars. Many of the prisoners I have worked with have declared that they desire decent prison education. They desire retraining and better conditions. The prison authorities certainly did not accommodate their desires, so why are these desires accommodated when it comes to the trans issue?

Finally, I am keen that the Government look carefully, and use this probing amendment to do so, at how staff in prisons understand the issue of sex and gender in the context of training. The MoJ policy entitled The Care and Management of Individuals who are Transgender advises staff to complete an “eLearning module” on transgender identity. One of the training courses is named intersecting identities. I have looked at these, and it all rather terrifies me. It is one-sided, jargon-ridden and ideological. I hope this amendment might point the Government to raise and review the whole issue. For now, at least, a very modest amendment should be taken seriously if they really mean they care about protecting women from violent men.

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

My Lords, I just want to intervene briefly. I support this amendment. To me, it is morally wrong for a physical man to be in a woman’s prison. It is as simple as that. If he has identified himself as a woman, and deserves to be in prison, there should be special facilities that do not bring people of that sort into close proximity with women or—if they are in danger—with men.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I want to respond to that because I think another point that follows from what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said is that the other argument that comes up all the time is that if you raise these issues you want a culture war, which I think the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was implying.

On terminology, if we are all going to get offended, I do not particularly find descriptions of people as “cis” very helpful either, so when it comes to language issues, the point is that there are tensions that exist outside this place. We know that and it is disingenuous to pretend that there are not.

The noble Baroness rightly pointed out that this is a question of administrative duties of care. This amendment has been very carefully worded in a very narrow way about a very specific issue. What is the objection to that? This is precisely a responsible administrative duty of care, regardless of any hyperbole that people do not like other people using even when they use it.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. If I offended her in any way by my remarks—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Not me.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

—I apologise. Clearly one of the reasons this is so sensitive is that, beyond this Committee and this Chamber, there is not yet even a settled courtesy about some of these matters. If I have offended any Member of the Committee, I apologise.

I was born a woman, and I still identify as a woman, but I have always tried to disagree well with people, including those on the Benches opposite, who I disagree with across the piece. I have never seen all men as a threat, and I have certainly never seen people of other races, sexualities or sex as a threat, and I am not calling anybody names in this debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Can I just clarify one thing? Many trans people do not agree with some of the orthodoxies that have become associated with trans activism. The inference was that some people possibly have a particular view because they have not met any trans people. That is not true. Whole swathes of trans people do not go along with a particular political opinion, for example in relation to prisons, as in this instance. I am concerned that it is not seen that those people who argue a gender-critical view are doing it because they are ignorant and have not got out enough.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

I hear and understand what the noble Baroness says. However, on this amendment, I am clear. We oppose Amendment 214 from the Front Bench. We do not support the noble Lord’s amendment, but we understand completely the concerns that he and other noble Lords have. However, we feel that the risks that the noble Lord seeks to minimise are already minimal, and that other risks that need to be managed are not covered by this amendment.

The amendment seeks to amend the Gender Recognition Act to reduce the risk that transgender prisoners present to others. This is neither necessary nor desirable for the following reasons. First, there are very few transgender prisoners. In a data collection exercise between March and May 2018, only 44 of 124 public and private prisons said that they had any transgender prisoners at all. The fact that there are so few transgender people in prison is also an indication of the level of offending by transgender people, the seriousness of that offending and the extent of the threat that they pose.

Secondly, the risk of mental health problems, self-harm and suicide is far greater among the transgender community than it is among those who are not transgender. Clearly, in a prison setting, the risk of mental health problems, self-harm and suicide is likely to be higher for all inmates; for transgender prisoners, it is likely to be very high indeed. In November 2015, an inmate who said that she would kill herself if she was sent to a male jail was found dead. Vicky Thompson, aged 21, died a week ago at the all-male HMP Leeds. Friends said that Thompson, who was born male but had identified as a woman since she was a teenager, had asked to be sent to a female jail in Wakefield. This is the sort of impact that having an unbalanced amendment, such as the one proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, can have on transgender people.

Thirdly, if the Prison Service thinks that the risk presented by a transgender prisoner is such that they should be housed in a prison contrary to their legal gender, it can allocate them to a part of the estate that does not match their legally recognised gender. The decision must be taken after consultation with experts and at a high level, but it is possible.

A number of noble Lords have referred to the High Court judgment in July 2021, where lawyers for a female inmate in the female prison estate brought a judicial review against the MoJ. The MoJ argued that the policy pursues a legitimate aim, including

“facilitating the rights of transgender people to live in and as their acquired gender (and) protecting transgender people’s mental and physical health.”

It is interesting that I am actually quoting from the same case as other noble Lords have quoted from. Lord Justice Holroyde said:

“It is not possible to argue that the defendant should have excluded from women’s prisons all transgender women”—


as this amendment proposes. He continued:

“To do so would be to ignore, impermissibly, the rights of transgender women to live in their chosen gender.”


The case was not actually about excluding all transgender women; it was about challenging how policies applied to those who had been convicted of serious or violent offences against women—as the noble Lord’s amendment does.

The Lord Justice went on to say that trans women’s offending history was a factor that the existing policies were required to consider. He said:

“the need to assess and manage all risks is repeatedly emphasised”

throughout existing MoJ policies. He continued:

“In an exceptional case, a high risk transgender woman, even with a GRC, can be transferred to the male estate because of the higher level of security which is there available.”


Therefore, there is a mechanism to do exactly what the amendment is seeking to do, but on a risk-assessed basis.

The court also heard that expert panels are also involved in the process when allocating transgender prisoners and are “expressly required” to consider the trans woman’s offending history, her anatomy and her sexual behaviours and relationships. The Lord Justice said:

“They can in my view be expected to be astute to detect any case of a male prisoner who, for sinister reasons, is merely pretending to wish to live in the female gender.”


He concluded:

“the policies require a careful, case-by-case assessment of the risks and of the ways in which the risks should be managed. Properly applied, that assessment has the result that non-transgender prisoners only have contact with transgender prisoners when it is safe for them to do so.”

This is the same case that noble Lords have been quoting from.

Yes, the Lord Justice said:

“I readily accept that a substantial proportion of women prisoners have been the victims of sexual assaults and/or domestic violence.”


He added that some women prisoners,

“may suffer fear and acute anxiety if required to share prison accommodation and facilities with a transgender woman who has male genitalia, and that their fear and anxiety may be increased if that transgender woman has been convicted of sexual or violent offences against women.”

This amendment says nothing about whether the person has had sex-reassignment surgery, and there are trans women with gender recognition certificates who have not undergone gender reassignment surgery. The amendment, therefore, is not fit for purpose.

There are two sorts of risk that need to be managed here. There are the risks to the transgender prisoner, either from themselves, in terms of mental health, self-harm and suicide, or the risk from other prisoners, such as the risk of a transphobic attack or an attack based on their acquired gender if they present as a woman in a prison housing men, for example. There may be risks that the transgender person poses, perhaps because of a previous history of violence or sexual offences, but those falling into this category are few and far between and can be dealt with under the law as it stands. Any attempt to stereotype all transgender women as a threat to women flies in the face of the facts and needs to be robustly challenged.

The implication that transgender women are a threat to children reminds me of the sort of abuse that was directed towards me as a gay man a few decades ago.

--- Later in debate ---

I want hate crime legislation to be extended to misogyny. I very much hope the Equality and Human Rights Commission continues its pursuit of clarity and consistency, and I was interested to hear the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner. I cannot see that conflating sex and gender, as in this amendment, goes in the right direction. We should wait to hear what the Law Commission advises.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am of a mind to be opposed to the introduction of a misogyny hate crime, but your Lordships will be delighted to know that I will not be sharing my broader thoughts with the Committee at this late hour. However, there are problems that we need to be clear about before we can even have this conversation. What is our definition of misogyny here? We just assume that we are talking about it as a hatred of women, but it is not straightforward to legislate against hatred of women in 2021, when there is such a toxic debate about what our definition of a woman is. What is a woman, and who is and is not a woman? We heard a very lively discussion earlier; we in this place do not necessarily agree.

We know that somebody can simply declare themselves a woman, regardless of biological reality. We know that the debate about whether only women have cervixes has scuppered leading politicians, who seem unsure about biology in that regard. I do not say this to be glib, in case the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, thinks I am trying to stir up trouble again. I do so because it seems a genuine issue that the conflation of sex and gender—I know that the amendment does not do that; it separates them out—means that “misogyny”, as hatred of women, is not straightforward at the moment.

I also want to know which or what misogyny this amendment is trying to address. If you erase, for example, sex-based rights, which is what some feminists think is going on at the moment, is that a misogynistic outlook? Some feminists certainly argue that it is. There is certainly a huge amount of visceral and vile hatred thrown at gender-critical women, meted out by some of the gender and trans extremists—not by trans people in general, I hasten to add, but the kinds of people who drove Professor Kathleen Stock out of her job at Sussex University. They sounded misogynistic to me, but are they the target of this amendment? I am drawing attention to the fact that wanting a misogynistic hate crime does not clarify to me what the amendment is trying to do.

I understand that what I have said is contentious and that not everybody here will agree with some of the points I have made even so far. In this context, is it appropriate to get the law, let alone the police on the ground, to try to untangle what is a very toxic discussion in society and implement this? I do not know how putting that on to the police will help women.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

Would the noble Baroness perhaps accept that if she was to speak to some of the senior police officers, men and women, who have to deal with the victims of hostility and aggravated crimes, largely motivated by misogyny, and ask them what they think misogyny is, she would get a very clear response? They interact on a day-to-day basis with people who are direct victims of it.

While it is very interesting to have a “Moral Maze”-like discussion at a theoretical level, to be clear, what those of us proposing this amendment, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, want, is to do something now for the victims experiencing hostility based on misogyny. We should not be talking in airy circles about this; we need to do something.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I will try to avoid airy circles. Not long ago, I was invited to speak to a gathering of police officers of various ranks on the issue of hate crimes and I can safely say that it was a 50/50 split. As an aside, quite a number of the female officers there were supportive of me and my position, so this is not an airy-fairy, “Moral Maze” position, although it does try to have some principle.

I was about to go on to talk about policing. I understand that one of the reasons there is a sense of urgency about making misogyny a hate crime is in response to horrendous and high-profile murders and rapes of women. We are all mentioning Sarah Everard, but there are many more. I wonder whether, in fact, framing violence against women through hate will solve the problem that it says it will tackle. As far as I can see, we have laws against indecent exposure, stalking, voyeurism, sexual assault, domestic abuse and rape. They are criminal offences, largely serious, and I do not understand why an additional law would act as a further deterrent or reassure women—I do not get that. If, as some argue—I agree with them—women are having problems gaining justice for those very acts in the courts at present, why would hate crime as an aggravated offence make any difference if the crimes in question are not being policed, investigated or prosecuted satisfactorily in the first place?

When I read the literature on misogyny and hate crimes—this was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove—the theory goes that minor incidents of gross sexist behaviour are misogynistic and indisputably part of a continuum that will lead to more serious crimes. I worry, however, that there is a danger there of relativising the horrors of rape and murder and tangling up the police in events that are not as serious, meaning that they take their eye off the ball in what I think they need to be doing: policing the streets, protecting people, prosecuting and so on. I am worried that this will cause a distraction for the police from doing the very job they need to be doing.

To use one example—I have been involved in talking to people in the area—the organised networks of male grooming and the systematic abuse and rape of vulnerable young women in Rochdale and Rotherham were largely ignored by the authorities, downplayed and continually not discussed. That is what we should be discussing here. Labelling the abuse as misogynistic does not seem to me to help; I just want the authorities to do the job of investigating when women are abused. That is far more important.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly—the noble Lord, Lord Russell, will be pleased to know—to offer the Green group’s support for Amendment 219 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. I shall simply make two points, one of which draws on the recent intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Russell.

First, the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, referred to the origins of this amendment. Nottinghamshire Police Force has been a pioneer in this area. In my contribution on this subject on the Domestic Abuse Bill, I looked back beyond that. If you look at the history of how Nottingham police came to be doing it, it began with a group called Nottingham Citizens and a survey it conducted among the people of Nottingham. That led to a conference held at the Nottingham Women’s Centre, which informed the police and police action. This is something that very much grew from the grass roots up. In response to many of the contributions from people advocating Amendment 219A instead: this has been proven to work. It is there demonstrably on the ground. The fact is there.

For my second point, I refer to the author Caroline Criado Perez and quote her:

“There is enough data to know that men who kill women do not suddenly kill women, they work up to killing women … If only we were to listen to women and pay attention to the misogyny and aggression and violence that they deal with on a daily basis.”


That is what Amendment 219 seeks to do. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggests that we have to wait and wait and wait. I would suggest we have been waiting lifetimes—centuries—for this action. We have a proven model that has been shown to work. Let us put it into effect.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support the proposed new clause and I will give it all the support I can. The arguments put forward by my noble friends are, frankly, unarguable against.

There are three propositions that I think are affronted by this notification of non-crime hate incidents. The first is the chilling effect on free speech. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, illustrated that very clearly. One has to be assured of the right to express one’s views without the risk of having this notification made against one.

Secondly, one has to recognise that these are very long-standing notifications, which can have a seriously prejudicial impact on individuals. That is thoroughly undesirable, especially as the individual has no right of appeal or an effective way of challenging. Judicial review, for most people, is not an effective way of challenging.

Thirdly, there is the point made by all noble Lords who have spoken so far. There is no statutory guidance; it is local police policy which influences the way these notifications are made. That is inherently unjust, having regard to the impact that this could have.

Finally, I welcome very much that the regulations are to be made by the affirmative procedure. However, as I have said in this House and elsewhere on many occasions, while that is a good thing in the sense that the comments made by your Lordships and those in the other place can be heeded, we do not have the power to amend the statutory instrument. I have long argued that this House and Parliament in general should have the power to amend the contents of statutory instruments. This is a good example of where that would be beneficial.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I enthusiastically endorse these amendments and thank the noble Lords, Lord Moylan, Lord Pannick, Lord Macdonald and Lord Sandhurst, for raising this crucial issue. The issue of non-crime incidents has been of concern to a number of us for some years and it is good that it is getting some parliamentary attention at last. I particularly credit those organisations and publications that have persistently raised it in the public realm and whose research informed my remarks, especially the Free Speech Union, of which I am on the advisory council, the anti-racist campaign Don’t Divide Us, and Spiked online.

Too many avoid the issue because it is rather tricky and contentious. One of the reasons it is difficult to raise is because nobody wants to look as though they are being soft on hate incidents. However, I am concerned that this in itself has led to a degree of chilling self-censorship and allowed some confusion to arise about what is and is not a crime when the police are involved.

When the public hear the phrases “hate”, “hate crime” or “hate incident”, they instinctively think of, for example, someone being beaten up because of their skin colour or being harassed in the street because they are gay, and they are appalled and shocked. We assume the worst kind of bigotry and our instinct is that something must be done. However, it is not so clear cut. According to the hate crime operational guidance issued by the College of Policing, hate crime is often an entirely subjective category, based on the perception of the alleged victim; I will come back to this.

What is extraordinary about the guidance on hate crime is what the police consider to be successfully tackling hate crime. The guidance says:

“Targets that see success as reducing hate crime are not appropriate”.


That completely befuddled me. The guidance says instead that the measure of success for the police is

“to increase the opportunities for victims to report”.

I fear that, in this act of enthusiasm to get more people to report hate, the police have muddied any clear distinction between what is criminal and what is not.

The focus on reporting initiatives led earlier this year to rainbow-coloured hate crime police cars patrolling local areas, with the aim of giving communities the confidence to come forward and report hate crime. However well-meaning, such awareness-raising initiatives often encourage people to come forward and report things that are not crimes at all. In fact, earlier this year, a police digital ad van trawled around the Wirral, warning that

“being offensive is an offence”.

Actually, being offensive is not a criminal offence. After a backlash, local police clarified that this was an error. Why did the police get it so wrong in terms of what is a crime?

This is not an isolated incident. A few years ago, Greater Glasgow Police tweeted an ominous warning:

“Think before you post or you may receive a visit from us this weekend.”


This was posted alongside a graphic that warned social media users to consider whether their treats were true, hurtful, unkind, necessary and then, right at the end, illegal. Then there was the South Yorkshire Police Hate Hurts campaign, which asked people to report any “offensive or insulting” social media posts to police officers. None of these is a crime and, in relation to a Bill named the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, it is a concern if the police do not know what is or is not a hate crime, so much so that Cheshire Constabulary recently admitted to conflating crime and non-crime in its hate crime statistics.

This amendment can potentially start unpicking this muddle, because the source of the confusion about what is or is not a crime lies in the creation of the category of non-crime hate incident. As we have heard, this category was established by the College of Policing and its guidance encourages police officers to overreach and police non-crimes. It is worth telling noble Lords how this is posed in the guidance. The NCHI guidance states:

“Where it is established that a criminal offence has not taken place, but the victim or any other person perceives that the incident was motivated wholly or partially by hostility, it should be recorded and flagged as a non-crime hate incident.”


Note the use of the word “victim” to describe the reporter or accuser, when no evidence exists that any crime has been perpetrated against him or her. The victim has to claim only that some action or speech was

“motivated wholly or partially by hostility”.

“Hostility” itself is a vague and subjective term. The guidance continues:

“The victim does not have to justify or provide evidence of their belief, and police officers or staff should not directly challenge this perception.”


Furthermore, any other person’s perception can be the basis for this, which is even further removed from any real incident, let alone crime.

Finally, the guidance notes:

“Police officers may also identify a non-crime hate incident, even where the victim or others do not.”


Why? It is because:

“Victims … may not be aware that they are a victim of a non-crime hate incident, even though this is clear to others.”


I find this a kind of dystopian, Orwellian, nightmare world. Imagine untangling your way through that; your name, unknown to you, can appear on a database intended for recording details of criminal offences and be subject to checks by vetting officers when you apply for jobs, as we have heard from noble Lords.

I hope noble Lords can see the dangers here. The subjective nature of the NCHI guidelines creates a real possibility of abuse of the system by people acting in bad faith. The NCHI guidance means that unfounded, spurious and malicious reports can be filed and never tested, let alone the fact that this data gathering distracts the police from pursuing real criminals. I was contacted by one person ahead of this debate, who said, “I had a visit from the police because a member of staff offended another member of staff, who works for me. No crime was reported. The police spoke to me for 40 minutes. In the meantime, the 200 pallets that I reported stolen the week before did not generate a phone call or visit.” Then there is the chilling effect of NCHIs on free speech, as other noble Lords have vividly spelled out. NCHIs can act as a threat, a kind of surveillance of free speech, by people who say it will eventually lead to crime. Anyone who is following the fate of gender-critical feminists, who are constantly accused of hate by a particular brand of trans activist, will understand just how damaging that is to free speech.

This Government tell us all the time that they are keen to oppose cancel culture. I fear that these NCHIs inadvertently contribute to that censorious climate of denunciation and the toxic climate of hate, which we are all keen to combat. I therefore urge the Government to consider these amendments carefully and remove this contradictory anomaly, which, I fear, brings the police and criminal law into disrepute.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I was not going to speak on this, because there are much bigger issues coming up later, but I had seen this in a reverse way. It is not completely clear, if you do not have a QC’s training or legal training of any sort, whether this amendment is trying to help or hinder the collection and retention of data.

To me, this seems like a good opportunity to talk about misogyny and other abusive behaviour that falls short of a criminal offence but none the less should be recorded on a person’s police record. The biggest benefit of retaining that data is that it might help in the future investigation of criminal offences. For example, if someone is a notorious misogynist but it has never reached the threshold of criminality, this will help the police’s line of inquiry if said person is later a suspect in a violent attack against a woman. As we all know, the justice system is biased very strongly against women committing crimes.

What I did agree with from all those offering support for the amendment is that proper oversight is absolutely necessary. There should be some regulation about this, because some of the anecdotes mentioned seem ridiculous. I still have not decided whether I support this; it would depend on how it dealt with proper oversight.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the supporters of the Motion emphasise the technical and modest parameters of the proposed laws. However, since I have been in this House, I have endlessly been told that legislative changes send important messages, and it is the possible messages of this Bill which lead me to oppose it.

Taking a step back: what is our message if we encounter someone who implores us to help as they are suffering unbearably, who tells us they are in intense pain and their life is not worth living, who is disgusted by their own body and who begs for help to take control over how and where they die? We are urged here to be compassionate and concede to these understandable suicidal thoughts. However, perhaps noble Lords might pause more if they knew that these pleas are taken from a self-harming site, from teenagers on message boards on online suicide sites, and they include an anorexic young woman who loathes her body and a bullied, despairing young man about to jump off a bridge. Note that in their minds they are suffering just as much pain as the terminally ill citizens the Bill addresses.

In my view, when anyone of any age says they want to die, there is only one message: we cry out loud, “Don’t do it!” We must remain loyal to the value of their life and not accede to their subjective wishes, however heartfelt. Our message should be, “If you’re in unbearable pain, let society hold your hand, mop your brow, surround you with a genuine protective ring of social solidarity”—with palliative care, of course. We must also say, “However malfunctioning your body, or demented or disturbed your mind, you are still you and every moment you are alive is precious to us all—and you are not a burden.”

A note to my fellow libertarians: your agency, autonomy and desire for control will not be honoured by handing over your death to doctors, the law courts and the state.

What message we send matters because of two powerful contemporary trends. First, younger generations are being inculcated with and have internalised a new form of cultural pessimism. Too many are consumed by dystopian, angst-ridden fears of the future, and anxiety and mental health problems are spiralling. Our task surely must be to reassure: to make a positive, life-affirming case for the value and worth of human life, whatever the challenges, circumstances or discomfort —the very opposite of the message of the Bill.

Secondly, for those same young people, psychological and physical pain are often interchangeable. That erosion of the distinction of types of harms is causing major free speech disputes, when words and ideas are treated on a par with violence. Regardless of my qualms about that approach, it is now a social norm. So to those who say, “Don’t worry, this law will never lead to those suffering mental anguish being allowed access to state-endorsed assisted death”, I say that I am just not convinced—and that is just one of the many reasons why I am firmly against the Bill.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard part one
Wednesday 20th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely accept that this is a real problem, but real problems require real solutions that have some chance of being effective. I cannot imagine anyone who commits an assault on a police officer or emergency worker actually knowing what the maximum sentence is for that offence—still less that the Government are currently increasing it. That information might just get through to the newspapers for a week or two, but there is no measurable deterrent effect from something that people do not know much about anyway. Most people must realise that if they get caught assaulting an emergency worker they will get into some kind of trouble, but whatever impels these dreadful assaults is clearly not likely to be affected by what is happening here.

What happens when you increase the maximum sentence? If you achieve generally longer sentences, you have made a commitment of resources. The question has reasonably to be asked: is this the best way of spending money to try to stop emergency workers being attacked? We must therefore look at any other measures that you can reasonably take that would have that effect, if, as I contend, there is no evidence that increasing the maximum sentence will lead to any reduction in attacks on emergency workers or police officers.

This is just one of many examples, and there are others that we will perhaps debate more fully later in the Bill, where the Government rush to have something to say—lengthening the maximum sentence certainly looks like having something to say—but it does not have the effect in the real world that we all desire.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am a bit too squeamish to discuss Amendment 9 but I wanted to reflect on Amendments 10 and 11 and to follow on from some of the comments just made about the deterrence factor and expanding how long people are threatened with jail for.

I thought the Bar Council raised some very useful challenges for us to consider in relation to the section of the Bill dealing with assaults on emergency workers. The Bar Council asks us to consider if increasing the maximum penalty for such assaults is necessary or commensurate or whether it will work. It notes the limited evidence. I thought when I was listening to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who I was very compellingly convinced by, that it can feel a bit like virtue signalling rather than tackling the problem.

I was particularly interested in a slightly different point from the one that has been made and was struck by what the Bar Council said in relation to, I think, these amendments: there is a danger of creating a disparity between the penalties for attacks on emergency workers and those on other workers, and indeed a disparity between attacks on emergency workers and those on members of the public. There is an offence of common assault that should be considered a serious offence whoever is on the receiving end of it. Whoever is attacked, I would want the law to deal with it.

We heard from the right reverend Prelate how, if you start saying that an attack on this particular group of workers has to have a particular length of sentence, that might make other groups of workers—in this instance, in prisons—feel as though they are being neglected or somehow are not as important. We therefore have to be nervous about differentiating between categories of workers because that might end up being divisive, implying that front-line workers in some jobs are more important than others.

As a former teacher who has worked in the education sector—I worked with some challenging young people and was on the receiving end of some common assault, let us put it that way—I have been following closely the case of Professor Kathleen Stock, a feminist philosophy academic at Sussex University, whom the police have advised should not return to her place of work on campus because of the danger of violence from some self-styled anti-TERF activists. There have been all sorts of threats and harassment. They even have a special phone number for her to ring. There are other teachers who face this.

I raise that because when it comes to this kind of threat, that kind of potential violence and those kinds of assaults, it does not matter if you are a front-line worker. I do not know why the “emergency” bit should give you an extra penalty. I am not advocating for a special penalty for attacks on education workers. I just do not want people on the front line to feel that some are more important than others.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Tuesday 18th May 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I confess that I felt a frisson of excitement at seeing the long-awaited Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill in the gracious Speech. At last, free speech is on the agenda. The Bill is a valiant attempt by the Government to counter the chilling effect of censorship on campus and to strengthen the legal duty to uphold open debate—hurrah for that. I have some reservations. Will it lead to an overly litigious framework that interferes in institutional autonomy? Can you really use fines and threats to guard academic freedom? I am always nervous of outsourcing political battles to lawyers, especially when the problem is less procedural and more cultural.

To those who insist that free speech on campus is hyped-up reactionary scaremongering, tell that the Lisa Keogh, a law student at Abertay University, facing a career-threatening disciplinary action for discrimination for merely arguing biological facts about men and testosterone and women and vaginas in a seminar on feminism. Or say it is exaggerated to the teacher training student at Manchester Metropolitan University who has been threatened with a formal fitness-to-practise panel after raising the disgraceful lack of educational solidarity shown to the Batley Grammar School teacher suspended and forced into hiding, and branded Islamophobic, for showing a cartoon of the prophet Muhammad in a lesson on religious tolerance.

Campus cancel culture is a real and present danger, but I have chosen to speak today because if the Government posit themselves as a champion of free speech on campus, I am worried that aspects of two of the Bills listed here seriously threaten free expression off campus. The Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill gives the police enormous new powers over public space and threatens, I would say, the very purpose of protest. It is most likely playing on the popular irritation with the undoubtedly anti-social, nihilistic and misanthropic tactics of groups such as Extinction Rebellion. It focuses on the noisy and disruptive process that may cause distress and may inconvenience public services. In other words, the police could stop any protest if assessed as a risk of being too noisy or disruptive. The police already have an armoury of draconian powers that frankly, it seems to me, they fail to enforce consistently. Is it because of a seemingly more politicised or partisan police force, or is it confusion about when or how to intervene? The police do not need more laws, but better leadership. What the public need is the freedom to demonstrate dissent—from Black Lives Matter supporters to anti-lockdown demonstrators—however unpopular their cause to some.

Parts of the online safety Bill have united civil libertarians across left and right, described as

“a frightening and historic attack on freedom of speech.”

The Bill imposes a duty of care on big tech providers to remove content that is lawful for adults but said to be harmful—harmful not in the JS Mill sense, or meaning physical harm, but using concepts stolen straight from the campus safe space canceller’s playbook. Harmful is anything assessed as risking

“a significant adverse … psychological impact on an adult of ordinary sensibilities”


—whatever that is. This vague and subjective diktat will inevitably mean Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram being empowered to double down on removing controversial or offensive views even quicker, and invites platforms to snoop on users more routinely. All of this is to be enforced by Ofcom, the state regulator that this year enlarged the number of protected characteristics, in its hate speech guidance for broadcasters, from four to 48—a catch-all so large that many speeches in this place would fall foul of it—creating ever more people who say they are a victim. That same Ofcom has shamefully elided gender critical feminism with transphobic hate speech too often. The Bill also gives Ofcom the power to police disinformation or misinformation. That should at least give us some pause, if not chill us. In a democratic society, citizens should be free to make up their own mind whether they trust what they read, sources and so on.

The Government boast that the online safety Bill will make the UK the safest place to go online. The danger instead is that it makes the UK a world leader in monitoring and sanitising dangerous views online. I have heard many eloquent and passionate speeches from my noble friends here, opposing laws used to criminalise protest and free speech, but usually they are talking about other countries, such as Hong Kong and Zimbabwe. I hope to hear equally compelling opposition closer to home, and that the Government will resolve their split personality approach. Are they free speech champions or world-beating censors?

Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I should declare that I chair the Commission on Alcohol Harm. I added my name to Amendment 31 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Goudie and Lady Hollins. It is very welcome that the Bill will, for the first time, give local authorities a formal role in the provision of domestic abuse support. The voluntary sector has done a heroic job in protecting survivors, victims and their families, but this vital task should not be left to the voluntary sector alone.

The words of the Minister were welcome, reflecting her deep and sincere commitment to tackling domestic abuse. The government amendments recognise the need to ensure that regulation will meet need and are certainly to be supported. If I heard correctly, some of the additional finance will apply only to England. How will parallel community services be financially supported in Wales? Without that additional funding also coming to Wales, there will be a serious risk that women fleeing abuse will also have to flee Wales to get the support they need.

We must not ignore those outside refuges, some of whom are turned away due to their alcohol and substance-use needs, which makes them ineligible for support from their local authority. However, they still need support. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, is needed in addition to the Government’s amendments. It would ensure that the necessary support is available and would support the whole scoping exercise without any discrimination. I really urge the Government to support it.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, the new statutory duty on local authorities to provide safe accommodation-based services for victims of domestic abuse and their children is widely welcomed, but I am still sympathetic to the ongoing fears that this might mean local authorities simply redistributing funding away from community services in order to meet that statutory need. I welcome these thoughtful amendments and the discussion that focuses on protecting specialist community service provision. While I am still not sure whether this issue should be dealt with through legislation, it is very important that it has come up. I am minded to consider seriously Amendments 30 and 31 in particular.

However, there is one category of specialist services that I am worried the Bill has inadvertently not focused on: women’s domestic abuse services, whether community or accommodation-based, which are under threat. Ironically, council funding does not help. The Bill’s increase in funding and the new legal duty on councils will not resolve this issue. There seems to be some muddled thinking about how councils should deliver specialist services more broadly. I would appreciate it if the Minister would take that into account in this set of amendments or in guidance notes.

I declare a minor interest, in that I am a long-standing columnist for the MJ – for the uninitiated, the Municipal Journal. It has been eye-opening watching councils in recent years trying to negotiate equalities legislation in the context of new political trends such as gender-neutral policies. The Equality Act 2010 clearly protects single-sex exemptions that allow women to have legitimate access to women-only services and spaces: gyms, hospitals, changing rooms and, of course, crucial services such as Rape Crisis, women’s refuges and women’s advice services. The newly launched organisation Sex Matters notes that rules and explanations are now confused and controversies around gender identity mean that organisations can be reluctant to communicate their women-only services clearly, and, when they do, councils can use this against them. This needs to be clarified as we go forward; otherwise, all the good will will be undermined.

One example of the unintended consequence of fudging championing women’s refuges is how councils are interpreting equalities impact assessments. In the drive for more inclusive, non-gendered service provision that caters for the needs of all protected characteristics, women’s refuges are in danger of losing funding for not being inclusive enough.

--- Later in debate ---

That was reassuring, but it is better to have it on record in the Official Report. Therefore, I beg to move.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for such clarity in raising some of my concerns. My enthusiasm for the Domestic Abuse Bill is somewhat muted by the worrying trend from the Government more broadly to use civil protection notices and orders to expand the coercive powers of the state, criminalising a greater range of behaviours without the bother of reaching the burden of proof of criminal law.

To be honest, I was surprised that those who usually speak up on civil liberties in this place seemed rather quiet on this, which is why I was glad to see this amendment. I know that the issue of domestic abuse is emotive and sensitive, and that we all want to do what we can to oppose it, but due process is important too, so I warmly welcome this amendment and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising it.

It is a crucial amendment, because it aims to ensure that a criminal standard of proof is applied to a breach of a domestic abuse order. That is just not clear as the legislation is written. It seems an important protection for justice and the rule of law. The danger of any hybridisation of civil and criminal instruments is that criminal penalties can be given out without satisfying the criminal burden of proof, which means that someone can effectively be found guilty of a crime and labelled as a proven abuser without a legal test or representation. That feels far too subjective in the Bill, as it stands.

Of course, I understand that breaches of orders must have consequences. They are not just a piece of paper; they are not just there for show. The amendment seeks to clarify how the judgment of a “reasonable excuse” for a breach in the legislation, or that it was “beyond reasonable doubt”, is arrived at. It must be the role of the courts, but it is just not clear.

Dispensing with the criminal burden of proof can have some unintended consequences that are not in the interests of the victim either. Some campaigners fear that the police may choose to use breaches of an order as an easier alternative to proving charges for more serious criminal offences, such as assault or criminal damage. A lower threshold may imply that something has been done by the authorities—as it were, ticking a box—but perhaps more should be done. If the police go about choosing an easier tick-box solution, without the nuisance of gathering evidence that can be tested, that is a bad outcome, so we must ensure that order breaches are not used as an alternative to pursing criminal charges where appropriate.

It is also nerve-racking that some breaches of an order may be relatively minor and very far from criminally threatening to anyone, least of all the person the order is protecting. Some fear that alleged victims may be deterred from reporting breaches if that automatically criminalises their partner or their ex-partner, who might perhaps be the parent of their children.

The worry is that those who the Bill seeks to protect are being sidelined in the process and potentially disempowered. Their agency is potentially undermined by decisions taken by the police or third parties who can use breaches of an order to criminalise alleged perpetrators, regardless of what the victim wants or of however minor the breach. If that were to happen, the main loser would ultimately be due process. I therefore support this amendment wholeheartedly and look forward to the Minister clarifying this or reassuring us that this is not a way of avoiding a criminal burden of proof.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I want to go one step back and start with domestic abuse prevention notices. These can be given by a relatively junior police officer, despite what the legislation describes as a “senior police officer”—I was a police inspector at the age of 23—on the basis that he has reasonable grounds to believe that P has been abusive towards another person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and reasonably believes that the notice is necessary to protect the person from abuse by P. If P breaches the notice, P can be arrested and must be held in custody before they can be brought before the court. That is a lot of power invested in a relatively junior and potentially inexperienced police officer, with serious consequences for P. A practical alternative might be to seek the authority of a magistrate, in a similar way that the police might seek a search warrant, which can be done at short notice, on a 24/7 basis. Did the Government consider such an alternative?

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, domestic abuse prevention orders can be made by a court on application, and must be applied for if P is already subject to a domestic abuse protection notice. The orders are made on the basis that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the civil standard of proof, that P has been abusive towards a person aged 16 or over to whom P is personally connected and the order is necessary and proportionate to protect that person from domestic abuse, or the risk of domestic abuse, carried out by P.

The order can be made in the absence of P, and it can impose a range of prohibitions and requirements. If P fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with the order, he commits a criminal offence and can be imprisoned for up to five years. Normally an accused person is convicted of a criminal offence only if the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt, and while I accept that a breach of the order might be so proved, the basis upon which the order is given is on the balance of probabilities.

When this House debated knife crime prevention orders, we discussed whether the breach of what is effectively a civil order, granted on the balance of probabilities, should result in a criminal offence, rather than a fine or a term of imprisonment for contempt of court without a criminal conviction being recorded against the perpetrator. In that case, the Government claimed that it was the police who said that a criminal sanction was necessary, rather than a civil penalty, in order for perpetrators to take them seriously. What is the Government’s reason this time?

As we discussed then, Parliament changed a similar regime introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003, whereby breach of the civil order resulted in the criminalisation of many young people with no previous convictions for breach of an anti-social behaviour order or ASBO. Parliament replaced ASBOs with anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices—a purely civil process—by means of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

On the basis of hearsay, potentially a malicious allegation, someone could be given a domestic abuse protection order, breach of which may result in a criminal conviction and a term of imprisonment. Can the Minister please explain why it is necessary for a criminal record to be created when there is a breach of the civil domestic abuse prevention order when it is not necessary in relation to anti-social behaviour injunctions and community protection notices?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I had to bring this amendment back on Report, because I did not think that the Minister accepted the issues in Committee. They are important: domestic abusers are being granted unsupervised contact with children as a result of an ingrained pro-contact culture. The Ministry of Justice’s own harm review concluded that “the dominance of contact” is seen

“as excluding other welfare considerations, including the child’s need for protection from abuse, or the child’s wishes and feelings.”

Rather than seeing contact as a means to an end and weighing it up against all the harm and damage that an abusive parent has caused, it is seen as the end in itself, almost no matter what the cost. That is deeply harmful.

The debate on parental alienation on Monday showed just how embedded some of these ideas have become. Wanting to exclude an abusive parent can itself be labelled as abusive. Abusive men, in particular, falsely claim that abuse is mutual and reciprocal, and try to label the victim as a fellow perpetrator. As the Minister said on a previous group, an abuser will pursue their victim through the family courts to try to force contact with their child, not because they care, but because it is an extension of their coercive and controlling behaviour and their fury that their victim has managed to escape them. So, the abuse continues through the courts and then into unsupervised contact. More than a dozen children have been murdered by their fathers during unsupervised contact. Can the Minister please tell me what the Government are going to do to stop it?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

In my short time in this House, I have been hugely impressed by the fairness, clarity and reasonableness of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—that might be bad for her reputation—even when we have not agreed. However, in this instance, I am sad to say that I cannot find anything reasonable in this amendment, but it raises some broader issues about the Bill that worry me, so I will make those points.

This amendment effectively argues for denying the right to be a parent to anyone accused of the offence of abuse. In listing those who will be denied unsupervised access to their own children, we have those “awaiting trial”, “on bail” or

“involved in ongoing criminal proceedings”,

all of which—as anyone who knows anything about the criminal justice system knows—can involve months or years of one’s life. That would mean that innocent people, accused, are already treated as guilty.

Of course, we all want to protect children from any risk and, as the noble Baroness has illustrated, those horrifying stories of children being hurt or even killed, sometimes as revenge, are at the forefront of our minds, but I have two points. The amendment refers to ensuring the

“physical safety and emotional wellbeing of a child”.

Those are two distinct threats. The latter, at least, is difficult to pin down. I argue that being deprived of time with one’s parent, free from a court-approved third party, could also be the cause of considerable emotional distress for any child. It could be a recipe for the parental alienation that she mentioned.

Secondly, even the prospect or fear of a threat to physical safety cannot distort our sense of justice or lead to disproportionate or punitive measures in a risk-averse “what if?” scenario. It could too easily lead to the state unjustly alienating children from a parent who is accused but not found guilty. Surely, evidence and facts are key to establishing the level of threat. I note that the amendment would deny unsupervised contact

“pending a fact finding hearing”,

which makes a mockery of establishing facts and tears up any commitment to factual evidence as an important part of judging whether an accused parent can be trusted to care for or parent their children without third-party supervision.

I am even worried that this amendment argues that unsupervised contact would not be allowed for anyone with a “criminal conviction” for abuse. Granted, in this instance the evidence has been weighed and facts established, but consider the implications of this. This amendment would mean that someone found guilty of abuse perhaps when as young as 18 could find themselves, at the age of 38—by now, we hope, a reformed character in a different set of circumstances, maybe no longer drinking, on drugs or mentally ill, as we have heard today, or just shame-faced about their younger self’s abusive behaviour—still denied unsupervised access to their children. To be honest, that seems ungenerous, even barbaric and vengeful. It suggests that we are branding people found guilty as perpetrators with the letter “A” for abuser, for ever.

We also heard earlier that one can gain a criminal conviction for abuse by breaching a domestic abuse order. That breach might be for a relatively minor offence. I worry that aspects of this amendment encourage a lack of perspective and a disavowal from making judgments of different threats. The Government continue to stress that they do not want a hierarchy of abuse or harm—we have just heard the Minister discuss that—but this can lead to a muddle when it comes to parental contact. I want to discourage a lazy, one-size-fits-all approach. When considering risks to children, there is a distinction between, for example, the perpetrator of regular, systematic violence or coercive control and the particular emotional or psychological abuse that one partner might inflict on another in a toxic relationship. The latter may be worse than horrible if you are at the receiving end of it, but it may never be aimed at or even witnessed by children.

To conclude, I urge the Government to maintain the presumption of parental contact. It should be curtailed or removed only with great care. That does not mean putting children at risk, but it means holding justice dear.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I recognise the good intentions of the amendment, but I am concerned that it is too rigid. As I know from my judicial experience, not all situations are black and white. As I said at some length on a previous occasion on Report, judges and magistrates will get specific training on the Domestic Abuse Act, but the effect of this amendment would deny them important judicial discretion.

I am particularly concerned about that because proposed subsection (2D) in the amendment says:

“Evidence of domestic abuse may be provided in one or more of the forms accepted as evidence for legal aid, as per guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice.”


As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, that means that a decision is taken that generally a father, but sometimes a mother, would be forbidden unsupervised contact based on the information provided by one party and before the fact-finding decision had been made by the judge. Although I understand why the amendment has been put forward, I am not prepared to support it.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I was rather surprised to discover that the Government have accepted this amendment. The disclosure of sexual photographs and films is egregious and abusive, but I am not convinced that primary legislation is the place to criminalise threats to disclose in this way. I seek clarification and reassurance from the Minister.

I am concerned about the elision between speech and action. Angry words exchanged in the height of relationship break-ups, for example, might now be taken as literal and on a par with action. Domestic abuse is not the same as domestic arguments. These arguments can be verbally vicious and intemperate on both sides. When intimate interpersonal relationships turn sour, there can be a huge amount of bitterness. Things are said and threats made in the heat of the moment. I do not understand why primary legislation should be used to criminalise these things.

Of course I understand that a threat, or a continued threat, to expose intimate images of the most personal nature can be abusive—it may not be, but it can be. However, if it is abusive, I do not understand why it is not covered by the ever-broadening definition of abuse in this Bill. If the threat was used as part of coercive control—for example, “I will publish these photos unless you do whatever”—would that not be captured by the coercive control provisions of the Bill?

The amendment notes that, for a person to be,

“charged with an offence...of threatening to disclose a private sexual photograph or film, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove … that the photograph or film referred to in the threat exists, or … if it does exist, that it is in fact a private sexual photograph or film.”

This feels like a dystopian, post-modern removal of actual abuse into the absurd world of virtual threats, relating to non-existent artefacts and images. I do not understand why this specific form of threat needs to be in the legislation.

I will give a couple of examples of similar threats, even though they are not of images, which were definitely intended to cause distress. One person I know years ago threatened her partner that she would reveal details of some of his more dodgy tax goings-on about which she, as his wife, knew. If she had done as she had promised, and posted them on Facebook, it would have been very embarrassing. It would undoubtedly have been an incredibly distressing breach of privacy. It was being used as leverage in an alimony and custody battle, but it was just a threat.

In another instance, a husband threatened that he would show his estranged wife’s mother and her friends private letters to her then lover, and expose her secret affair. Those threats were horrible, but should they be illegal? I am just worried that such grim threats can sadly be used but then never acted on and, as such, should surely have no place in the law courts. In both examples, the threats were never acted on. One couple separated amicably in the end. The other couple reconciled and are happy to this day.

I understand the modern world, online tech issues and the images we have been discussing. But I am worried about the threats point. Should threats be elided with action in this way, or will we potentially criminalise speech? This is a dangerous, slippery slope.

Finally, I am concerned that this could give a green light to more and more offences being considered in need of official intervention, investigation and prosecution. The police could potentially become overly preoccupied and drowned out with complaints of threats, rather than focusing on pursuing the properly egregious examples of abusive actions, such as publishing the said images.

[Baroness Hodgson of Abinger (Con) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 48 is in my name and those of my noble friends Lady Morgan and Lord Wolfson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. I will also speak to the other amendments in this group. I congratulate my noble friend Lady Morgan on moving Amendment 48 so ably.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, during the Committee discussions last week, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, commented on how helpful the debate on presumed parental consent was, and I agree. I felt that I was back on “Moral Maze”; I was moving around the issue and considering it from all sides. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, made concrete for us that day, lots of issues thrown up by this proposed legislation are complex and nuanced moral dilemmas. It shows what a difficult task we have here in applying public law in what is usually the terrain of private and intimate relationships.

In some ways, though, that discussion on presumed parental consent focused our minds on the domestic core at the heart of this legislation. My concern is that this amendment shifts our focus away from that domestic core—although the previous noble Baroness tried to suggest that we should now broaden our understanding of “domestic”. It shifts our focus, broadens it too widely and potentially dilutes it. Do not get me wrong; when, at the end of the last Committee day, the noble Lord, Lords Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, spoke passionately and movingly—and we have heard similar testimony since—on the devastating impact of those reaping the bitter winds of recovered memory syndrome, which has been a dogma, sadly, I was cheering them on. I have been following the bitter memory wars since the 1990s, and consequences such as the satanic ritual abuse panics and various other panics. When that was a fashionable theory among trauma therapists, sections of social work professionals and some feminist academics, I argued against it. Now that form of therapy has largely been discredited by modern memory science, and is widely ridiculed, as it has been in this discussion, as pseudoscientific quackery.

I share noble Lords’ frustrations that the practice continues unlicensed and unregulated. I have no doubt that unethically encouraging vulnerable people to interpret their present woes through the prism of abuse, and then unethically planting false memories, is coercive. But my worry is that this amendment stretches the definition of coercive control, in the context of domestic abuse, too far. There is a danger, to quote a noble Baroness from an earlier Committee day, that this legislation will be seen as a Christmas tree on which everyone can hang a different preoccupation or grievance. That makes the definition so elastic that it can be a catch-all, and unintentionally relativises our gaze from the specific and discrete brutality of domestic abuse. I am already worried that this Bill has defined abuse far too promiscuously, and that it might well backfire and not help those it is intended to.

It is not just our focus—our gaze as legislators—that it will shift. How will it affect the police and criminal justice system if we label too many incidents as domestic abuse? Part of the popular frustration with the status quo is that serious incidents, threats or credible risks are not taken seriously, sometimes with tragic consequences. People go to the police and they are sent away. Surely what we do not want is for the authorities and the police to be swamped with endless numbers of complainants citing this Bill and a loose basis of the definition of coercive control, starting to make complaints.

I am all for dealing with, and exposing, the charlatans who call themselves counsellors, who play on the therapeutic culture and wo are only too willing to use the issue of abuse to push their own agendas with the consequence of destroying families. Let them be dealt with. I hope the Minister will look at how to deal with psychotherapists exploiting those who turn to them for help, but this is not the legislation to pursue that. So I will not be supporting the amendment, even though I cheer on those who wish to expose the charlatans.

[Baroness Mallalieu (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, on Wednesday, both the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, put the detailed legal arguments for this amendment, and I have added my name to it as well. I shall not try to repeat what they said, but instead will say something that has, perhaps, been said by all bar the last speaker in this debate, which is that I strongly support this amendment.

As a nation we have been very slow to recognise the way in which the human mind can be coerced and controlled by unscrupulous people without the use of violence. I am not sure that until “The Archers” featured Rob Titchener in its storyline about marital coercive control, and gripped the nation with it, many of us would have been able to describe or recognise it on our own doorsteps. We have been even slower as a nation to recognise and enact legislation to protect those who are its victims in another category, namely those whose vulnerability, whether it is emotional or psychological, renders them a target for the bogus counsellors, the amateur psychotherapists and the self-styled life coaches, usually bent on profit, who may appear to be well intentioned but still often inflict real harm and damage on their so-called patients and their families.

This is not a new phenomenon. Unhappy people often search for explanations and cures, and the unscrupulous offer false promises of help and future happiness. They frequently obtain substantial amounts of money from them and very often, using transference, seek to replace contact with parents and families, sometimes by implanting false memories, which in turn often sever domestic relationships for life. As a pupil barrister in 1970s, I remember cases involving the Scientologists. I know the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, remembers cases involving the Moonies. Domestic alienation was a common feature then, 50 years ago, as it is today with some of the quasi-healers operating in this country right now with impunity.

I personally am aware of one family whose adult daughter fell into the hands of just such people in London. They were paid substantial sums of money by her. Their methods involved repeated “counselling” sessions lasting six or seven hours at a stretch during which, exhausted, she was persuaded to sever all contact with her parents and her family. It took some years for them even to find her, and eventually get her back. She was one of the lucky ones. These people are untrained, unqualified, unregulated and damaging to the vulnerable on whom they prey. Yet our present law currently provides no adequate protection from their activities.

Our understanding and recognition of mental illness is, thankfully, advancing rapidly today. Yet we are only beginning to understand more about how the power of words, whether they are spoken directly or via the internet, can convince an otherwise intelligent adult to become a jihadi or embrace a coronavirus conspiracy theory and, in so doing, often damage and even destroy their closest domestic relationships. On this form of abuse, we have looked the other way for far too long. We have given protection, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, to other vulnerable categories by law—whether they are children, the mentally ill or the elderly—and it is now surely time to add those who are at the mercy of these bogus healers.

The Government argument is often, “Yes, but it’s not right in this Bill”—but I do not see a better Bill on the horizon to deal with this particular lacuna in the law. I totally understand that members of a Bill team that has produced an excellent Bill, as this team has, will always be reluctant to look at a new amendment that may, they fear, perhaps alter the architecture of the Bill on which they have worked so painstakingly. However, I do not see any other way, in the near future, of tackling something that I believe has not only been overlooked for far too long but I suspect is likely to grow, particularly in these times when so many young people are searching for an explanation of why their lives have changed so drastically from their expectations.

I hope that the Minister will agree to take this amendment away, have a look at it with his Bill team and, hopefully, come back with a solution. If he did so, I believe that he would have support across the whole House.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)]

I have received requests to speak after the Minister from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and Lord Kennedy of Southwark. I will call them in that order.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, one salutary and useful aspect of this amendment is that it has focused our minds on false memories and false allegations. It is therefore a reminder that we must challenge what we believe to be the victim mindset that can lead to grave injustices. The amendment should remind the Government that abuse is so emotive that it becomes quite hard to challenge if it has been alleged. The reason why false memories have been so damaging over the years is that once the victims say that they have been abused while under the care, guidance, manipulation or coercive control of said “quack” counsellor, no one can challenge that because it is an accusation of abuse. This legislation bends the stick in the direction of victims far too much, in my opinion, and I urge the Minister to take great care and perhaps investigate some of the harrowing stories of false memory syndrome in order to learn lessons and not make the same mistakes here.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

The noble Baroness is right to say that this area needs continued and careful thought, a point also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, who referred to the complexity of the issues and the matters which have to be considered. We will indeed do that.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 3rd February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP) [V]]

Let me try an alternative technology—apologies, my Lords.

It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for the second time, on this group of amendments, on which it is clear that he has done a great deal of work, and for which he deserves great thanks. I am simply here again as a support act for the reasons that I set out in the first group of amendments we addressed today. I think the arguments of justice and compassion are the same in this group of amendments as they were in that first group.

Sitting in many courtrooms over the years as a journalist, looking at the witnesses, you think about what the experience of being a witness is like. Earlier, I used the theoretical but eminently likely example of civil proceedings arising out of the collapse of a farm business that is also associated with domestic abuse. Later on, we will be talking about attempts to insert into the Bill an offence of non-fatal strangulation or suffocation. If we think about the actual experience of a witness who suffered that kind of assault and is then expected to stand in a courtroom and look in the eye the person responsible for that assault, and who is expected to look strong, stand tall and not seem what anyone might determine as shifty or uncertain, we can imagine the pressure that puts on such a witness.

In his answer to the first group of amendments, the Minister said, “Well, there is always judge’s discretion.” We know from many other debates in your Lordships’ House on the Bill that much domestic abuse is not fully reported. Indeed, we know that non-fatal strangulation and suffocation are sometimes recorded simply as common assault. Full information about what witnesses may have been subjected to may not be available and full reporting may not have happened, so it may not be open to a judge to be in the right place to rule on this. There should be an automatic protection available to witnesses who need it.

I will be brief because we have a great deal to do, but I believe that this is an important set of amendments, and I really hope that the Government will reconsider.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will start by making a general point about an issue that has been concerning me regarding the amendments on cross-examination on special measures. I apologise that I am not a lawyer, and if I have not quite have grasped what Committee stage is. I could have been jumping up to speak to all these amendments, so I have bundled my comments into one. I hope that will work. If I have got it wrong, I will not do it again.

I have found the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, hugely helpful and insightful throughout these Committee discussions, but something he said on Monday troubled me. He said:

“My Lords, for reasons of brevity and clarity, I will refer to the person to whom a domestic abuse protection notice is given as the ‘perpetrator’, rather than the ‘alleged perpetrator’ or ‘defendant’, and the person the notice seeks to protect as the ‘victim’, rather than the ‘complainant’, the ‘alleged victim’ or ‘plaintiff’.”


He went on to say:

“Clearly it will be for the court to decide, ultimately, whether they are in fact perpetrator and victim.”—[Official Report, 1/2/21; col. 1925.]

I understand entirely the noble Lord’s shorthand point, but I get anxious that sometimes, that sort of shorthand becomes the presumed fact or reality. That has been the case throughout Committee stage—nowhere more obviously than in the discussion about cross-examination —and I worry that that might prejudice justice and fairness in proceedings. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, rightly stated, it is up to the court ultimately to decide on guilt or innocence. It seems to me that cross-examination is a key part of making such weighty decisions. Testing the evidence thoroughly is very important, and demands for special measures for cross-examination should not compromise that.

We have already heard the way in which this can happen. We have heard the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, say, in calling for special measures in an earlier set of amendments, that if a witness claims that they are frightened, this can be seen as sufficient reason to treat the alleged perpetrator as a perpetrator, and the alleged victim is secure in special measures. I just worry about a slippery slope. Because of the importance I place on cross-examination, in relation to the distinction between family courts and civil courts, I would actually prefer that a legal representative be appointed by both courts in order to facilitate the most objective and thorough cross-examination and to make sure that the evidence is objectively tested.

Public Health (Coronavirus) (Protection from Eviction) (England) Regulations 2021

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have previously queried whole swathes of illiberal legislation that have been put on the statute books, such as that which makes it illegal to leave your own house without an explanation or to mingle with friends in your own back garden. When I pressed for a date about when lockdown will end and asked if we can know exactly when these things will happen, my queries were met with great irritation and government Ministers saying, “We are following the evidence, don’t you know there’s a pandemic on?” This is one statutory instrument where I would actually like to see that kind of approach. Instead, here we have very specific dates, which are always time-limited, on-the-dot and short-term. I do not understand, especially given that homes are so important in this pandemic, why the Government are being so mean-spirited on this question.

That dreaded lockdown phrase, “Stay home”, resonates differently across society. For some, “Stay home” means saving money on the commute, or thinking about where to place the home-school workspace for the children or what bookcases are on display during business Zoom calls. But for many people, “Stay home” means how to rota the kids’ laptops on the dining room table in the cramped, gardenless flat. With this SI, it is about the fear and dread of whether or not being able to stay in the same home will be feasible once lockdown ends. This is one of the greatest causes of anxiety, with parents lying in bed at night worrying about debt and eviction. Many private renters are worrying about how to stave off homelessness for themselves and their families.

I of course welcome this temporary ban on eviction—I welcome it again, as it was only a few weeks ago that we renewed it for a further few weeks—but it feels too short-term and shallow to deal with the challenges of the continual closure of society. Surely the Government realise that this is storing up huge problems for the future. Tenants’ debts are mounting up, and, as other noble Lords have mentioned vividly, this is not their fault. Many of them would never have got into debt before. They are using their rent money to pay fuel bills because they are not allowed to leave the house with their families. As the months drag on, furlough, which was at first welcomed, now means a one-fifth cut in wages. This is unemployment delayed. In the past, those who managed to juggle their finances often had a number of part-time jobs to make do, but you can no longer have an evening bar job or a shift in Debenhams to make up the money because we have locked down.

As tenants’ debts mount up, they do not stand a chance of paying them off. It is now clear that when lockdown measures end there will not be a land of milk and honey but a serious economic depression with mass unemployment. If furlough is just redundancy deferred, then the inadequacy of this SI means that it is, I am afraid, eviction deferred. There is just no need; I genuinely do not understand why the Government— for whom money seems to be no object during this pandemic—cannot see that targeted loans and grants will get them out of this and help tenants and landlords alike. Why do they not write off the debt and have a debt amnesty? Remember that so many landlords, who are also suffering, are not property tycoons—almost half of them own only one property. They have spent their life savings or redundancy money on prudently investing in a buy-to-let for their income and pensions, and they too are now desperate.

I finish by saying that the Government have proved, through the magnificent vaccine rollout, that they can be impressive and swift, think in the long-term and solve problems. But, unfortunately, they also have the problem of making a mess of less challenging issues, from the cladding scandal and the throwing of leaseholders under the bus, to the home-school meals saga. I welcome the noble Lord to the Chamber, but I appeal to him to not follow in the same suit of making a mess of this, because it is easy to solve. Just solve it, and do not keep coming back with SIs for another few months.

Anti-Semitism: University Campus Incidents

Baroness Fox of Buckley Excerpts

Thursday 21st January 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, one of the most egregious aspects of the indisputable rise of anti-Semitism on campus has been the way that elements of the left have exploited the well-meaning, progressive and radical instincts of so many students to deploy anti-Semitic myths. Whether it is the crass critique of capitalist injustice, with its gross, caricatured cabals of big bankers or, more pertinently, in the name of protecting oppressed groups, censorship is used to de-platform and disrupt Israeli speakers, to argue for academic boycotts or even, through the prism of identity politics, to treat all Jewish students as an undifferentiated blob representing privileged oppressors to be silenced.

Can the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who I of course welcome, assure us that when tackling this urgent matter, there will be no attempt at mirroring this censorious cancel-culture approach by, for example, no-platforming external speakers or clamping down on student societies, however unpalatably anti-Semitic their views? As Deborah Lipstadt reminds us in her brilliant book, Anti-Semitism: Here and Now, we need to strike a balance between warning and overreacting. It can backfire if we ourselves become intolerant. Free speech is an ally in fighting campus anti-Semitism, and shining a light on prejudice and bigotry, even in this House, is far more effective than bans.