Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Clark of Kilwinning Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

The simple answer is yes. That is an extremely successful outcome, and we are delighted with it. A lot of effort has been expended by the four partner nations. I was at the Bangalore air show myself in February pursuing the cause, and I am delighted by the outcome. We must now pursue the campaign to a successful conclusion.

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

What discussions has the Secretary of State had about the future servicing and storage of complex weapons systems? In particular, what assurances can he give about the future of Defence Munitions Beith, in Scotland, which stores such systems?

[Dr Fox]

I cannot give the hon. Lady a precise answer about what discussions have taken place lately on that subject. If she will forgive me, I will write to her with the details.

Trident

Baroness Clark of Kilwinning Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Westminster Hall

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair today, Mr Benton, and to secure the debate. Its focus is on the cost issues associated with Trident, and on issues of parliamentary scrutiny. Many other issues are associated with Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons, but I hope that in the short time we have today we shall focus on the aspects I have mentioned.

The background to the matter is of course that in March 2007 the House voted to support the decision taken by the then Government as set out in the White Paper “The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” to take the steps necessary to maintain Britain’s nuclear weapons capacity after the Vanguard class submarines leave service in the mid-2020s. The motion that was passed also said that we should take steps towards meeting the UK’s disarmament responsibilities under the non-proliferation treaty. I voted against replacing Trident, but I believe the concerns I am raising today are shared by many hon. Members, and probably by Members on both sides of that debate.

After the vote in March 2007, the Ministry of Defence began the first stage of the process known as the concept stage, which was due to end with the initial gate decision point. That was one of the points of scrutiny of the project. The initial gate report was expected in September 2009, but it has still to be published. The decision whether to authorise the construction of the submarines is to be taken at the later main gate scrutiny stage, which was originally scheduled for 2012-14, but following the conclusion of the strategic defence and security review, that has been delayed until 2016, beyond the next general election.

The White Paper published at the end of 2006, which was voted on in 2007, estimated that the cost of the replacement of the system would be between £15 billion and £20 billion at 2006 prices. No updated estimate in current figures has been provided, and today I shall ask the Minister to ensure that one is provided to the House, particularly given that we know from the information that is in the public domain that spending so far is over-budget. Specifically, I understand that the current submarine programme for the Astute class is running 57 months late and £1.35 billion or 53% over budget. Expenditure on the concept phase has also significantly exceeded its budget—£309 million was originally set aside, but spending up to June 2010 exceeded that, with a figure of £570 million. That is an overspend of 84%. The House is right to be concerned, given that the information provided to this place and to the general public seems to show that spending to date has been far greater than originally projected.

The year 2010-11 has £330 million allocated for the Trident replacement programme. An estimated 15% of the submarine cost is due to be spent during the assessment phase prior to the main gate, based on the 2006 figures. That would amount to about £2 billion, using the MOD’s 2006 figure of a requirement of £11 billion to £14 billion for the submarine replacement plans. It is apparent from the concept phase that the cost of the programme is already increasing. The MOD has refused to provide annual budget figures for the assessment phase period up to 2016 until after the publication of the initial gate.

There also seems to be no intention to provide Parliament with regular reports of the progress of the programme until after the initial gate. Recent statements by the Secretary of State for Defence have confirmed that orders for major items required in the construction of submarines will be placed prior to main gate, and indeed a response to a recent freedom of information request revealed a plan to place more than £1 billion before the main gate approval in 2016, in relation to the various orders for submarines and matters associated with that work. That information was confirmed in answers to questions tabled by hon. Members. The answers to freedom of information requests, and recent answers to parliamentary questions, seem to show that a large proportion of the first boat will be ordered ahead of main gate, as well as the reactors for the second and third boat.

The 2010-11 budget for Trident replacement exceeds that of the planned budget for the whole of the concept phase from years 2006-08 to 2009-10, although we have yet to reach initial gate. I therefore think that the House is right to be concerned about the costs incurred to date, which seem to be well in excess of the projections and information provided to the House in 2007, when the decision was taken, but also about the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of the programme.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Lab/Co-op)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing the debate. Does she agree that in any decisions that are taken we do not want to add further to the cost of the programme, and that it would therefore be helpful for the Ministry of Defence to set out the change in the cost profile that has already been conferred by the delay in the main gate decision, and the totality of increased costs that could flow from that?

[Katy Clark]

I agree, and my contention is that it would be helpful if as much information as possible could be put before the House, so that this place takes the right decisions, and so that whatever decisions are taken in years to come will be based on the fullest information, made available not just to Members of the House but to the general public.

[Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. Is it not about time that the Government published the value-for-money review that was undertaken in 2010? Throughout the defence budget we have cuts that seem to be completely driven by putting the cost down as low as possible; yet here we have a massive overspend. People want to know what value for money we are getting from this atrocious weapons of mass destruction programme.

[Katy Clark]

I agree with my hon. Friend’s points, and will ask the Minister to publish the value-for-money review that was undertaken in 2010. My hon. Friend has made powerful points: when we see other decisions made by the Ministry of Defence, including cancelled contracts and cuts, it seems that a different approach is taken to the project in question.

[Dr Julian Huppert (Cambridge) (LD)]

I congratulate the hon. Lady on securing this excellent debate, which is generating a lot of interest. Does she agree that a key issue is that the main gate decision in 2016 should be a proper decision? There is real concern that if too much money is spent before then, the next Parliament may not have a proper decision to make. It may be trapped, as the present Parliament has been over aircraft carriers.

[Katy Clark]

The hon. Gentleman is correct, and I am delighted that he is here today, and, indeed, about the cross-party support that has been raised. An early-day motion has been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), which highlights some of the issues and the concern that contracts are being made, perhaps, in a way that goes against the spirit of undertakings made in the 2007 debate. That may mean that the decision that Parliament will take later will be tied by the amount of money already spent on the project. That is one reason for some requests that I will make of the Minister today. The first is that we should, as has been mentioned, publish the value-for-money review undertaken in 2010. Equally importantly, we need to ensure that the House has a full debate on the initial gate report and that decisions are taken with its consent.

I urge the Minister to explain some of the figures that I have cited today, particularly why the 2010-11 budget for the Trident replacement has exceeded the planned budget for the whole of the concept phase, which ran from 2006 to 2010. I urge the Government to publish an up-to-date budget for work done during the assessment phase before the main gate decision, and to say how much they plan to spend on orders for construction before the scrutiny of main gate, in view of recent statements and information provided by the Ministry of Defence. Given the clear increase in costs, it is only fair that the Government should publish the estimated full project costs in current prices, as it is clear that the information provided to the House in 2007 will no longer be accurate. Finally, I ask for a full strategic review of the UK’s possession of nuclear weapons before the main gate decision is made and orders for construction begin, and to give MPs the opportunity to debate and vote on the continuation of the programme, based on up-to-date information.

I have consented to the vice-chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), making a short contribution to the debate, and I understand that the Minister, too, has consented. I hope, Mr Benton, that you have no objection to my hon. Friend making a short contribution.

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Baroness Clark of Kilwinning Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

I commend the Backbench Business Committee on choosing the motion. If the Committee had existed in 2001, perhaps there would have been an opportunity for a proper vote in the House before troops were deployed. I only hope that we are never again faced with having to consider whether to enter another armed conflict. However, I would also hope that if the Government were not willing to provide us with the opportunity to vote in such a situation, the Backbench Business Committee would have the courage to create the space for a debate and a vote on such issues.

There was a vote in 2001 on a technicality, and as has been said, 13 Labour MPs voted to make a protest, with a number of Tellers involved too. I was not an MP at that time, but I was involved outside this place in campaigns to try to stop the war, and I marched against it. They were small campaigns; there were not many hundreds of thousands of people on the streets at that time. It is probably fair to say that most of the British public were supportive of the intervention in 2001. That stands in stark contrast to the position in 2003, when, along with a far greater number of Members voting against the war in Iraq—139 Labour MPs broke the Whip and voted against the intervention—there were also massive protests and demonstrations. In terms of public support, therefore, the situation that we are debating today is very different from the situation in relation to Iraq.

However, it is also fair to say that most people in 2001 would not have believed that we would still be in Afghanistan nine years later. Most of the British public accepted the version of events that was put to them. At the time, the war was said to be about capturing the terrorists—al-Qaeda and, in particular, bin Laden. The tabloid press focused very much on that, but within a few weeks bin Laden’s name was no longer being bandied around as what the war was all about. One reason why I was extremely concerned at the time about the proposed intervention was the lack of clarity about war aims. That lack of clarity has only intensified over the years, and a number of Members talked about the different war aims that have been claimed at different times over the past nine years.

In 2001, the human rights of women were given in Labour party circles as a reason why women in the party should support the intervention. That was done to pull at the heartstrings of people who were perhaps not sure whether we should pursue the intervention. There are many of us who very much feel for the women and girls in Afghanistan. We had severe concerns about human rights prior to 2001, and we have had them since then, not just for women and girls, but for all in the community. We thought that that was something maybe worth fighting for, if it were possible to achieve something meaningful in Afghanistan for the long term.

Although I am in no way trying to underplay any achievements that have been made or the fact that girls have had access to education as a result of the west’s intervention, these are not achievements that it will be possible to sustain; indeed, they are not being universally applied throughout the country. We need only read the press in this country to learn about some of the human rights abuses and the terrible situations that women in Afghanistan face—my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgend (Mrs Moon) touched on those—or about how women who are accused of infidelity or who refuse to co-operate with the men in their families are treated. Many of those abuses are happening legally in Afghanistan because, for cultural reasons, values that we would regard as acceptable are not necessarily those which that society signs up to.

My concern is that those values are not going to change, irrespective of what happens to the motion today and of whether western forces stay in Afghanistan for many years, or withdraw immediately or over a short period. It is not in our power to change the value system in that country, and a forced, military intervention is perhaps the least best way of winning hearts and minds.

I did not support the intervention in Afghanistan at the time, not only because the war claims were unclear but because of the history of the region. Even my poor knowledge of the history of Afghanistan told me that occupying country after occupying country had had difficulty in achieving their war aims there over the decades and even the centuries. The cynic in me therefore found it difficult to believe that we could achieve a different outcome. My major reason for not supporting the intervention, however, was that I suspected that it would simply become a recruiting sergeant for the fundamentalists and the terrorists, and I fear that that is what has happened. British Muslims who have become involved in terrorist activity or hold fundamentalist beliefs say that those involved in terrorist activity in Iraq and other parts of the world cite what the west is doing in Afghanistan as a reason for adhering to those values and beliefs.

The position now is very different from the one in 2001, in that the British public are now war weary, as many hon. Members have pointed out. Opinion polls suggest that most of the British public want us to leave Afghanistan sooner rather than later. The most recent poll shows that 30% want immediate withdrawal, and that 42% want withdrawal soon. I suspect that everyone wants withdrawal as soon as possible. After nine years, I do not believe that any military strategy that might be pursued over the coming months and years is going to help us to achieve our aim of addressing problems such as the drugs trade and terrorism and the issue of human rights.

I want to put on record that it is a shame that the amendment in the name of—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Order.

Defence

Baroness Clark of Kilwinning Excerpts

Monday 19th July 2010 Ministerial Corrections

Trident

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

Given that Trident is costing us perhaps £1 billion or£2 billion every year, and an estimated £96 billion over its entire lifetime, does the Minister agree that we should listen to the military figures who are increasingly saying that it is not necessary and counting it as something to be considered in the comprehensive spending review?

[Dr Fox]

Ultimately, it is up to the Government to decide what the policy should be. There is a wide range of advice, military and otherwise. The House came to the conclusion that it did in 2007 on the basis that we believed that that was a cost-effective way for this country to go forward with a nuclear deterrent. We know that abroad there are a number of countries trying to develop nuclear weapons. We do not know what will happen between now and 2015—the time scale for the Trident replacement programme—and we cannot play fast and loose with Britain’s defences.

[Official Report, 5 July 2010, Vol. 513, c. 3.]

Letter of correction from Dr Liam Fox:

An error has been identified in the oral answer given to the hon. Member for North Ayrshire and Arran (Katy Clark) on 5 July 2010.

The correct answer should have been:

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Clark of Kilwinning Excerpts

Monday 5th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

It might help the House if I tell my hon. Friend that the programme will cover the timetable itself, submarine numbers, the number of missiles, missile tubes and warheads, infrastructure and other support costs, and the industrial supply chain.

[Katy Clark (North Ayrshire and Arran) (Lab)]

Given that Trident is costing us perhaps £1 billion or £2 billion every year, and an estimated £96 billion over its entire lifetime, does the Minister agree that we should listen to the military figures who are increasingly saying that it is not necessary and counting it as something to be considered in the comprehensive spending review?[Official Report, 19 July 2010, Vol. 514, c. 1-2MC.]

[Dr Fox]

Ultimately, it is up to the Government to decide what the policy should be. There is a wide range of advice, military and otherwise. The House came to the conclusion that it did in 2007 on the basis that we believed that that was a cost-effective way for this country to go forward with a nuclear deterrent. We know that abroad there are a number of countries trying to develop nuclear weapons. We do not know what will happen between now and 2015—the time scale for the Trident replacement programme—and we cannot play fast and loose with Britain’s defences.