(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 40 to 45 in place of my friend, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who greatly regrets that she cannot be in her place. She is very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Chakrabarti, for their support, and to Women for Refugee Women for its briefings.
Amendments 40 to 44 relate to Clause 31. They are being brought back at this stage because the Government’s response stopped short of providing the reassurances we hoped for. Some 27 organisations with significant expertise in supporting people seeking asylum support these amendments to Clause 31.
In Committee, the Minister stressed that Clause 31 was necessary to provide clarity and consistency of decision-making, the argument being that proving a status of persecution on the basis of reasonable likelihood is too vague and inconsistently applied. Clause 31 seeks to resolve this apparent lack of clarity by instead inserting the balance of probabilities test and a new fear test. This will raise the standard of proof for gaining refugee status, which will have a disproportionate impact on certain vulnerable groups. For women fleeing gender-based violence and those seeking asylum on the grounds of sexuality, providing this increased proof will be difficult and is likely to be highly traumatising, particularly given what we already know of the Home Office’s culture of disbelief and approach to such victims. For this reason, the UNHCR and, indeed, UK courts have consistently applied the reasonable likelihood test. Clause 31 will put us consciously and deliberately out of step with the way the UNHCR believes that the convention should be interpreted and how our own courts, notably the Supreme Court, have interpreted it.
What is most odd, and the reason for pressing this again, is that the Government believe this change will provide clarity. It is not clear why this should be true. There is already a problem with disbelief in the Home Office, which can be readily shown by the fact that 48% of appeals against the Home Office’s decisions to the First-tier Tribunal are successful, and 32% of judicial reviews are settled or decided in favour of claimants. Clause 31 does not seem to provide any additional clarity. Adding two different limbs to the test with different standards of proof seems a recipe for creating more confusion, making it harder for legitimate victims and so inevitably prompting more appeals. Amendments 40 to 44 therefore look to keep the status quo standard of proof and keep us aligned with the UNHCR and existing UK case law.
I turn briefly to Amendment 45, which relates to Clause 32. This was discussed at length in Committee and I will not go over the old ground, but in short, the interpretation of the convention applied in Clause 32 seems punitive towards women and other victims who use the particular social group reason without any clear or positive purpose. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, argued in Committee, if Clause 32 is necessary to clarify the “particular social group” definition, there is no reason it could not be provided by clarifying once and for all that the two conditions are alternatives, not cumulative, as has been the understanding in UK law since Fornah and was recognised by the Upper Tribunal as recently as 2020. This would provide clarity without disadvantaging women and other vulnerable groups.
More than 40 organisations in the ending violence against women and girls and anti-trafficking sectors have supported this amendment to Clause 32. This week, three UN special rapporteurs released a statement on the impact of the Bill, in particular Clause 32, on women. I urge the Minister to listen to their plea. As of 2019, only 26% of asylum applications have come from women. Why would we want to make it harder for legitimate victims of gender-based violence and other gender-related forms of persecution to seek help? Might the Minister say why gender is not mentioned in Clause 32 in the way that sexual orientation is, since it is mentioned in the EU directive on which the Government seek to rely?
Clause 32 not only reverses UK case law but does so against the UNHCR’s standards, following an interpretation of EU law that was rejected by our own Upper Tribunal in 2020. The Home Office did not appeal that decision; nor was that change included in the New Plan for Immigration. It seems to have come from nowhere with little scrutiny or expert oversight. As with Amendments 40 to 44, Amendment 45 is not radical. It simply asks that the Bill continue to operate with the status quo interpretation of the 1951 convention, which is well understood and used by UK courts. The alternative is an unnecessarily punitive barrier being put in front of vulnerable groups. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am rationing my interventions on Report to facilitate the early and many necessary Divisions. I know that other critics of this Bill are doing the same; I am grateful for that.
Given the events in the last century that led to the creation of the refugee convention, it is particularly distasteful that so much of the Bill seeks to rewrite the convention and its jurisprudence against the interests of the refugee. The Government protest otherwise, of course, but all the world’s leading scholars, practitioners and custodians disagree. I am glad to say that your Lordships’ House gave its own view on that general proposition very clearly earlier this week.
Clause 31 is a case in point. I support the right reverend Prelate’s amendments to it, not least because, among other things, they seek to delete the cross-referencing to Clause 34, which absolutely denies refuge to those who do not currently face a well-founded fear of persecution in part of their country. If one looks at the end of Clause 34, there is no discretion there at all. Although we are grateful for the Minister’s earlier comments about Ukraine, convention protection is based on international law, not exceptional executive largesse. If these clauses are not amended, a Ukrainian refugee might well be denied refuge on the basis that they could return to, for example, a part of their country that is not currently occupied or being bombarded by Russia. There is no discretion in Clause 34 at all, despite Ministers waxing lyrical about discretion and case-by-case analysis being so important. This is discretion that works against the refugee, with convolutions and contortions, when it would be for the courts to protect the refugee.
Another trick that has been used in Ministers’ speeches at various times during the passage of this Bill is talking about Parliament having the right to rewrite and interpret the convention—“Parliament this, Parliament that”. However, they use “Parliament” as a euphemism for “the Home Office”, and it is not. I believe I know what your Lordships’ House of Parliament thinks about that.
My Lords, although I support all these amendments, I will speak only to Amendment 45, to which I have added my name. Once again, I thank Women for Refugee Women for its support with the amendment.
The right reverend Prelate has made the case for returning to Clause 32. I just want to pick up some points made by the Minister in Committee. He argued that it is difficult to attack the definition in Clause 32 as wrong, yet, in effect, that is what the Upper Tribunal did in the 2020 judgment referred to by the right reverend Prelate, when it confirmed that this approach to membership of a particular social group is contrary to the humanitarian objective of the refugee convention. Moreover, in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, dismissed this approach as a grave mistake that would cause grave injustice. Was he wrong?
Having listened to his less than convincing justification of the definition in Clause 32, I ask the Minister this: does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be accepted, as the UNHCR and myriad civil society groups have warned? His answer in Committee—given loyally, if I may say so—was this:
“What it means is that a woman, like anybody else, who has a proper claim under the refugee convention will find refuge in the UK.”—[Official Report, 8/2/22; col. 1452.]
I will repeat the question and ask the Minister to give us a clear “yes” or “no” answer, given that clarity is supposed to be what this clause is all about. Does he accept that Clause 32 means that a woman fleeing gender-based violence with good grounds for being accepted as a refugee is less likely to be accepted—yes or no?
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what regular conversations they have with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and how this relationship informs (1) their policy on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, (2) day to day operational policy for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, and (3) their legislation.
My Lords, the Home Office has regular and routine engagement with UNHCR on a number of matters, including through its quality protection partnership and as a standing member of the asylum strategic engagement group and decision-making subgroup. There are also additional ad hoc meetings to discuss individual policies and issues.
I am grateful to the Minister for that. She will appreciate that due to tragic events in recent days, our defence of the refugee convention is now totally inseparable from our defence of the Ukrainian people. Can the Minister comment on reports over the weekend that relatives of Ukrainians here in the UK have been denied visas? Can she assure us that the widest group with connections to this country will be welcome here and that no one—no one—will be turned back or criminalised on account of their means of escape?
I can absolutely assure the noble Baroness that everything that we do will be aligned with the refugee convention. The Prime Minister and my right honourable friend the Home Secretary have made a number of statements this weekend to that very end: that we will do everything we can to help our friends in Ukraine.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has her name to the opposition to Clause 76 standing part of the Bill. I am happy to pick this up briefly, as she has had to leave.
Clause 76 gives the tribunals a charging power in respect of wasted resources. I do not know whether it is aimed at lefty, liberal lawyers, a group to which I would be proud to belong, although I do not think I quite qualify—lefty maybe, liberal certainly, but I am an ex-lawyer.
I am trying to read my notes, but I cannot understand what I wrote last night.
Perhaps while the noble Baroness looks at her handwriting, as a lefty, liberal lawyer, I say briefly to the Minister that the immigration and asylum system is the most unlevel playing field in our legal system. Tribunals were set up, as the Minister will remember, with the aim of people being able to represent themselves, not as places for expensive lawyers.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Ludford, and myself. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, in her usual manner introduced it fully and spoke movingly, as did the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
As we heard, asylum seekers wait months or even years for a decision on asylum claims, and sometimes decades. This condemns them to poverty, uncertainty and fear. It leaves them in a limbo, experiencing poverty and destitution. If they are allowed to work, this would improve family life, give them better prospects for their lives in the UK, and they would be able to rebuild their lives in the UK and eventually integrate better. It also, of course, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, makes economic sense. As we have already heard, the Migration Advisory Committee, which advises the Government on migration policy, in December 2021 recommended that the Government should look again at this policy. It also recommended giving asylum seekers the right to work after six months and not restricting them to the jobs on the shortage occupation list. Perhaps the Minister can explain why they are not paying heed to the advice of their own advisory committee?
The committee also states that the argument that this right would be a pull factor, as we have heard already, is not supported by evidence. The benefits of allowing asylum seekers to work outweigh the unfounded fears expressed by the Government. Therefore, I urge the Minister to accept this amendment, which has very wide support.
My Lords, it is an absolute pleasure to follow both my noble friend Lady Lister of Burtersett—who is hard working to the point perhaps of being a Stakhanovite—and also the noble Baroness, Lady Prashar. I have added my name to Amendment 64 from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but I support the thrust of both of these amendments. I think this is a total no-brainer—forgive me, I really do. I have always thought this. I have been working around this area all my adult life and I have never understood the logic of Governments of both persuasions, over the years, prohibiting this category of humanity from working, at the same time as trying to get other categories to “jolly well get on and work”, not be dependent on the state and not be dependent on benefits: “Don’t be scroungers—just get out and work”. It seems so illogical to have this strange bifurcation.
I know that the noble Lord is concerned about asylum seekers who turn out not to be recognised. No doubt he is even more concerned about the smaller proportion of them who may be wicked people in some way. Does he acknowledge that wicked people who are convicted of crimes in this country, even those who go to prison, are allowed to work? Does he consider that a pull factor or an incentive to commit serious crime?
I do not see the relevance of that question.
Let me conclude, if I may. As we discussed earlier in this debate, the Government’s asylum workload has tripled from 40,000 cases in 2012 to 120,000 cases in 2021. Furthermore, nearly half of all cases awaiting an initial decision have been waiting for 12 months or more. In the present situation, they would in any case get permission to work. However, it is vital for these delays to be tackled. On that point, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and I are agreed. It makes no sense to me to adjust the immigration system to encourage delay. This Bill contains some useful measures designed to speed up the asylum process, and they should be supported.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI most certainly agree with my noble friend that trust in the police has never been more fragile than it is at the moment. Operation Conifer underwent several rounds of scrutiny, but there is further to go. Today’s report certainly means that the police have a way to go before they regain the public’s trust.
My Lords, whatever our differences, I have no doubt that the Minister feels as disgusted as I do—I want to say that. This was horrific hearing and reading for all of us. However, would she like to have just one more go at my noble friend Lord Rosser’s question? The question was not “can” the Home Secretary put these inquiries on a statutory footing but “will” she. This is important for trust in the independence of the inquiry. It should be independent of both the Home Office and the Government, and the police. Will we, please, now have a fully statutory independent inquiry?
My Lords, the noble Baroness is going to be disappointed because I have said in the past and will repeat that if the Home Secretary feels that the inquiry is not fulfilling its terms of reference, she can put it on a statutory footing. Of course, it is a decision for the Home Secretary.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI think there probably is scope for discussion between Governments as this problem becomes an increasingly serious one for countries, certainly throughout Europe. Yes, I would not be opposed to that but what I am calling for is some realism and not slogans.
May I just suggest to the Committee that we proceed with the Committee? I occasionally have nightmares about these issues and I am probably too sensitive to engage in human rights debates, but the die is cast—what can I say? I can think of nightmares I might have about who would be at the Dispatch Box to answer to my questions. At the moment, the little “question time” I have just heard is exceeding the worst nightmare. Can we perhaps hear from the Minister we have, rather than the potential Minister of my nightmares?
I will take that as an invitation. Thank you very much indeed. I will try not to be a nightmare.
My Lords, I would like to introduce into this debate a subject about which we have heard almost nothing so far: the views of the British people. We are, after all, the upper House of the British Parliament. Their views should be heard.
I have some figures here from the latest YouGov poll on the subject of immigration. The interesting thing is that immigration is now regarded as the third most important subject after health and the economy—even more important than Covid, curiously; I am not sure about that but, none the less, that is what it says. A previous YouGov poll said that 70% of people thought illegal crossings were a serious issue, so the public are well aware of the issue; indeed, they have been seeing it every night on television, particularly during last summer. Some 63% said that illegal immigrants should not be allowed to settle here while 60% said that they should be removed. In a June 2021 YouGov poll, 60% said they thought that illegal immigrants should be banned from claiming asylum, while only 20% thought they should be allowed to claim asylum. Some 64% thought it was fair to remove people who come from safe countries, while only 15% thought it unfair. Those are opinion polls so take them for what they are worth—we all have our views about opinion polls—but they are a snapshot of opinion in the recent past.
My own view is that, on an emotional subject such as immigration, you need to develop a policy with which the British people are comfortable. If you do not have a policy with which the British people are comfortable, it will not be sustainable in the long run. I point that out to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who understandably made a point about our international obligations. If we had had a policy on immigration more widely that the British people had been comfortable with in the last 20 years, we might not have had Brexit. Sadly, whether we like it or not, immigration was a huge issue in the Brexit debate. I put it to the noble Lord that the extent to which people’s views on immigration were ignored was a factor leading to the decision that we took. I am a remainer, so I regret that.
I wonder if I could ask the noble Lord two questions. First, obviously public opinion is always relevant, but does he concede that, by definition, someone who is a genuine “refugee convention” refugee is not and never was an illegal immigrant? Secondly—again, this goes to the comments made about opinion—does he agree that opinion is something that the people with the privilege to be in this place, and certainly those in government, play a role in shaping and leading as well as hearing?
My point is that we should pay regard to opinion but it is rarely mentioned in debates about immigration—almost never, in fact. There is a case for putting forward what the British people think about this, whether you think it is right or wrong. I do not think it is wholly right but, none the less, we have to take it into account. We have eventually to reach a position where the British people are comfortable with the Government’s policies; in my view, that is what the Government are trying to do.
I will not take another intervention, if the noble Baroness does not mind, as I have given way twice and want to finish what I am saying. I do not want to go on too long.
This House has to take into account that the silent majority have very clear views about this which they have held consistently for a long period and which have not been heard, and this has had a major effect on the policy positions of the country. In my view, it has had a deleterious effect, unfortunately; I would rather we had stayed in the European Union, but that is the fact we have to face.
It is generally admitted that we are now dealing with a very difficult, specific problem, one aspect of the whole immigration problem, namely illegal crossings of the channel. It is a small part of the problem that creates a bigger problem. Many people have raised wholesale migration, which I understand is a huge issue which is tackled in many different ways—through international development policies, as well as immigration policies, and so forth. However, there is a specific problem here which any Government of any colour would have to tackle, namely people smuggling people—not brandy, tobacco or commodities, but people—into this country illegally, day after day, against the law. That is something that no self-respecting Government can ignore; they simply cannot.
My Lords, I feel profoundly uncomfortable with Clause 11, and I am very tempted to vote for it to be completely removed. But I wanted to listen to the debate, and I am afraid that the people who have argued for the removal of Clause 11 have given me pause for thought, which was not what I expected to happen when I arrived. The reason is the way that this discussion has taken a particular form politically.
I am somebody who voted to leave the EU from the left—in the Tony Benn tradition—and I have historically been liberal on immigration. I have fought on many anti-deportation campaigns, and I am not somebody who thinks that one should close the borders. I am, more than anything else, a democrat; even in this House, I try to stay a democrat. I appreciated, with some irony, the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Horam, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Clarke—Conservative remainers with whom, to be honest, I have not historically had a great deal in common but who raised some important issues that should inform this debate.
My concerns about Clause 11 were very well expressed by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, who explained in great detail where I was finding difficulties with this. But I have a problem with the solution and the way in which this debate has been conducted. I think it is important to consider the British public’s opinion. It was interesting that a lot of people have asked us to walk in the footsteps of asylum seekers; I think empathy is hugely important and humane. But I also ask noble Lords to walk in the footsteps of the British public, who, if you ask them their opinion, do not all want hanging. Leadership is, broadly speaking, not the same as usurping their perfectly reasonable concerns.
What are their concerns? They are not that they do not meet any asylum seekers and, when they meet them, they change their minds; not that they lack generosity; not that they are xenophobic, mean spirited or narrow minded; and not that they want to close the borders and hate foreigners, as is often implied. Their concerns are that they would like control over the borders, which I think is a perfectly reasonable demand. A visceral illustration of a lack of control over the borders has been given to us by those arriving in boats, and we are all trying to untangle what to do about it as humanely as possible. That includes the British public, millions and millions of whom are incredibly generous of spirit towards all sorts of people and do not need lectures from here about how they have to open their hearts to people. They are full of heart-brimming generosity in all sorts of ways. Why do we have an issue here?
This is the bit that I cannot untangle. There are people who are seeking asylum legitimately, and one wants to welcome them. There are people trying to come to the country who are undoubtedly illegal immigrants, as anyone would understand them, but because there are very few ways to arrive as an economic immigrant, they may choose to describe themselves as asylum seekers. On a different set of amendments I will say that we should have more liberal immigration rules that would allow unskilled people to come as economic immigrants to this country.
We can see, and it is perfectly reasonable, that you cannot just say to people that everybody who arrives on a boat is obviously an asylum seeker, and that everybody who worries about them arriving must be a mean-spirited, horrible person who hates foreigners. That is my concern. I am trying to untangle that, because I genuinely do not know what to do. As I said, I would be liberal about economic migrants coming to the country, as much as I would about asylum seekers coming to the country, but I feel as though everyone is being forced to declare that they are asylum seekers because it is the only route in where you will not get kicked out. So I think that we are in a mess.
The Government need to answer this. What happened in relation to Brexit—for noble Lords who are interested in this—was not that people did not want any foreigners to come into the country but that they were told that freedom of movement was a non-negotiable international agreement that nobody could ever debate. So as democrats, people said, “Well, I live here; I’m a British citizen”—many of them from ethnic minorities, before anyone goes down the racist road—and they said, “Shouldn’t we be able to control who are British citizens who come here?” That is what happened. Other people said, “No, we can’t because we’re in the EU; we’ve got no choice”. So they got annoyed. My concern here is that if we say to the British public, “You either agree with us or you’re a xenophobe”, or, “You have to agree with us because we’ve got a refugee convention”—another international agreement from 1951, however good it is—“and it’s the only thing going; there’s no alternative”, that will also indicate that they have no democratic power.
I cannot understand why the Government keep trying to fit in what they are doing to the 1951 refugee convention, which, although one noble Lord described it as having been written in utmost liberality by British lawyers, was written by British lawyers—not by the British public. I want the laws to be written by the British public and for the British public, not just by lawyers—and in 2022, not necessarily referring back to 1951 all the time. I have no objection to that convention, but if it is not fit for purpose in 2022 to take control of our borders, the debate about immigration and asylum seekers will become toxic, if we just keep telling people that they cannot have this discussion. I believe I can convince my fellow citizens to be more liberal on immigration, but not when they are told that they cannot have the debate or that if they want to have the debate or to express worries about people arriving in boats, they must by their very nature be lacking in generosity and xenophobic. That is not the way to go. I am still likely to vote against Clause 11, by the way.
My Lords, I think we have been having this debate all my adult life and probably all my life, but I am certainly happy to keep having it; there is nothing wrong with that. However, I do think that it is very important in the context of Clause 11 to make a distinction in Committee between immigration and asylum. If I may say so, I do not think that Brexit is terribly helpful to an analysis of Clause 11. It used to be said that for the French, a meal without wine is like a day without sunshine. Clearly, for some people the equivalent is a discussion without Brexit, but I am not one of them.
It is important to make this distinction between immigration and asylum, which are both big and important debates, but they are too often conflated—not just in our discussions in this Committee but to some extent in Clause 11 itself. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, did not have the opportunity to reply to my question—all sorts of people intervened in his speech, to be fair—but if somebody is a convention refugee, they are not and never were an illegal migrant. That is incredibly important.
I congratulate the right reverend Prelate, who I think gave the speech of this Committee, and not just because I agree with him. I do agree with him, and also the noble and learned Lord, Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. What was so important about the right reverend Prelate’s speech was its specificity to the refugees’ journey and the way that that would be affected by this differentiation. I congratulate him on that, because it is a very good way to analyse Clause 11: whether it works and whether it complies with the refugee convention.
Why is compliance with the refugee convention so important? It is not like choosing to vote in or out of something that began as a trading bloc but was always a particular grouping of countries rather than the whole civilised world. The reason why the refugee convention is so important is because, after two world wars, it was literally the world’s apology for the Holocaust. That is the best way that I can sum up why the refugee convention is so important. While Britain did wonderful things, not least standing up to Hitler with lots of Americans and Russians and people from the Commonwealth too, and there are very good things to be said about Britain’s contribution, there were also less noble things that have to be remembered—about the people who did not manage to get out, who did not escape the Holocaust, including people who were not allowed into this country and other countries around the world.
To comply with the ECHR means complying not just with Article 8 but with Article 8 read with Article 14, which means respecting the right to family life but also not discriminating in that context. How can it not be discrimination when the whole purpose of Clause 11 is discrimination between group 1 and group 2? It is blatantly a breach of Articles 8 and 14 read together.
It is differentiation rather than discrimination. The two are quite different.
Amendments 44, 45, 47, 51 and 52 seek to remove the powers to differentiate entitlements. As we have noted elsewhere, these powers are broad and flexible; they do not require the Secretary of State to act in a particular way. Equally, there is ample discretion available in respect of whether a person is granted group 1 or group 2 refugee status. While the detail will be set out in rules and guidance in due course, suffice it to say that the exercise of the powers in question will be sensitive to vulnerabilities and individual circumstances. That enables us to balance the need to take a tough approach with the need to protect the most vulnerable.
We have been clear that our starting point in respect of the length of leave will be a grant of no less than 30 months. Similarly, settlement will be available by virtue of our long-residence rules. We have gone further in our defence of refugee family reunion, noting that we will continue to uphold our international obligations under Article 8, but in any event, there is no requirement to apply such entitlements in each and every case. I repeat that we fully intend to be sensitive to vulnerabilities and individual circumstances in that respect. That is why we have retained a considerable amount of discretion in the drafting.
Turning to Amendment 55, I do not think it would be appropriate or right for us to step outside of the existing power to make immigration rules under the Immigration Act 1971. This is the same power that we use to implement most other aspects of UK immigration policy, including but not limited to asylum policy. Indeed, areas in which we regularly use Immigration Rules to administer the system include the type of leave to remain, the length of leave to remain, the routes and conditions of settlement, and family reunion. It would be inappropriate to do otherwise in this case. The rules are the appropriate vehicle: they have a long-standing and clear procedure, with the appropriate level of scrutiny built in. As I have noted, however, I am absolutely committed to this policy being exercised sensitively with a view to protecting the most vulnerable. There will always be discretion in our policies to make the right decisions in each case, and that extends to the Immigration Rules.
I cannot agree to Amendment 39, which would remove the requirement for a person to claim without delay to be a group 1 refugee. That means that anyone claiming asylum, regardless of whether that was done at the last moment to defer removal, could be a group 1 refugee. That would undercut the entire purpose of the policy and embolden those seeking to abuse our rules. There are already safeguards within the legislation enabling discretion to be exercised, such that a claim should be made as soon as reasonably practicable.
Amendments 43 and 50 would amend the list of ways in which we can differentiate from a non-exhaustive list to an exhaustive one. We must keep all options on the table to prevent dangerous journeys from safe countries, and we can do that only by retaining flexible powers to respond to situations as they arise.
Amendment 48 would prevent the ability to differentiate in respect of family members. This is primarily about coherent policy. We should ensure that, where appropriate, family members of refugees are not treated more or less favourably than the lead applicant, but the flexibility that we wish to retain will also enable us to respond sensitively to particular circumstances as appropriate, including in respect of how we treat family members. For example, let us say we discover that a child has been a victim of abuse by their parents and needs to be taken into care. The flexibility in the powers would enable us to respond to such a tragic situation by granting a more generous entitlement to that child compared to their parents, in order to sympathetically reflect the need in those individual circumstances.
Amendment 53 would remove the ability to differentiate in respect of requirements for settlement for family members. We must keep all options on the table to prevent dangerous journeys from safe countries, and we can do this only through retaining flexible powers to respond to situations as they arise. That said, I anticipate that many if not most families will receive the same length of leave to remain to ensure that all qualify for settlement on the same terms at the same time. However, we want to retain the ability to respond flexibly to challenging situations that might require us to do otherwise in respect of length of leave for a refugee and their family.
I turn to Amendment 41, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I hope I can offer some reassurance that his concerns have already been accounted for in the policy, so there need be no further amendments to the Bill in this respect, as I outlined earlier. We envisage that the provision will apply in cases where a refugee meets the first two limbs of Article 31— that is to say, they came direct and claimed “without delay”—but, at the time of the claim, they had entered or were present in the UK unlawfully, having, for instance, overstayed an economic migrant visa.
To illustrate, let us say a person overstayed their visa and then lodged an asylum claim. Because they had entered the UK directly and ostensibly claimed without delay, they might be eligible for group 1 refugee status but, due to having overstayed, we would also check whether they had
“good cause for their illegal … presence”
at the point of claim. If they had no good reason for having been in the UK illegally, they might be liable for group 2 status. An example of where good cause could be shown might be if a person had overstayed their visa and then lodged an asylum claim—a very similar situation to that described by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. If their reason for overstaying and lodging an asylum claim while in the UK illegally was on the grounds that they feared presenting to the authorities because they were homosexual, in such a case this may well amount to a good cause.
Suffice it to say that the powers in the Bill are broad and flexible and therefore enable us to exercise discretion where appropriate, including with respect to “good cause”, which will be reflected in guidance to caseworkers.
I turn my attention to Clause 11 as it currently stands. These powers are primarily intended to uphold the “first safe country of asylum” principle. Clause 11 provides a power, as noble Lords have pointed out—they are not very happy about it—for the UK to differentiate according to whether people satisfy certain criteria based on those in Article 31.1 of the refugee convention. The Government have set out their interpretation in Clause 36. I will not distract the Committee from the issue at hand by going through the provisions of Clause 36, because they will be debated in full.
If I may just pick up the points made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Chakrabarti, on Article 31, the criteria we use as the basis for differentiation are not based expressly on one’s method of arrival. Instead, they are based on the criteria within Article 31 of the convention: whether someone came directly and claimed without delay, and, where applicable, had
“good cause for their illegal entry or presence”.
The clause acts on our commitment to do everything we can to deter individuals, as I have said, from making dangerous and unnecessary journeys through safe third countries, often putting lives at risk. I hope I have fully explained the Government’s rationale and addressed noble Lords’ questions. If I have missed anything out, I am very happy to follow up in writing but I hope that noble Lords will feel happy to withdraw or not press their amendments.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI will just finish dealing with the point raised by the noble Baroness. We must ourselves try to identify what these pull factors are that cause people to risk their lives in the way that they do. It may well be that both the noble Baroness and I are right to identify certain parts of the pull factors, but of course we have to recognise that there are those pull factors.
Given that the Government’s position is that they are right about the refugee convention; given that they disagree with the UNHCR but have their own interpretation under which they are honouring the refugee convention; and given that the Government’s position is that it is about parliamentary sovereignty and not the sovereignty of people elsewhere, why should we be forming our interpretation of the refugee convention on the basis of French criticism? If we are worried about pull factors, perhaps we should reinstall “Go Home” vans and a hostile environment for people seeking asylum.
My noble friend said that it would be good to identify what some of these pull factors actually are. At Second Reading, I sought to try to outline what I believed the pull factors were, and they are not things that we would want to destroy or diminish at all. My understanding of the pull factors—why people want to come to this country—is that they include our language, our culture, the rule of law, democracy, historic ties through the Commonwealth, family connections and liberty. These are the sorts of reasons why people want to come here. The small, pitiful amount of money that somebody gets to survive on is not something, when they are leaving Eritrea and thinking of the hellish journey that they are going to take, that is going to make them want to come here. It is much more likely that they experience push factors, which are war, famine and devastating impacts on their lives. We really need to understand the lives that are lived by these men and women who risk all to come here. We know that every system has elements that get exploited, but we have to make laws for the majority of people and the majority of cases, and to be the sort of nation that we actually want to be.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I hope that, at the end of my response, they will feel that I have at least given a partly positive response. I am aware that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, did not refer to this at Second Reading, but I am very grateful for the discussion we had—I think only yesterday—about this and other matters. I found it very helpful.
I, too, understand the strength of feeling being expressed. I both sympathise and empathise with the residents of the Chagos Islands about how they were treated back in the 1960s and 1970s. I also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, that return and citizenship are two different matters in relation to the Chagossians.
We recognise that some former residents of what is now the British Indian Ocean Territory missed out on rights to British nationality when legislation was last passed in 2002 to address the nationality of the Chagossians. Section 6 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 granted British Overseas Territories citizenship and British citizenship status by descent to any child born on or after 26 April 1969 and before 1 January 1983, where the mother was a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies by virtue of her birth in the British Indian Ocean Territory. This measure reflected the removal of the Chagossians from the British Indian Ocean Territory and the fact that the mother of a British Overseas Territories citizen could not pass on her citizenship to a child born outside of the UK or a UK territory. The Chagossian community, however, has criticised this provision because it did not provide for circumstances where women left the BIOT before 26 April 1969 in anticipation of being required to leave, nor did the provision allow children to inherit citizenship from an unmarried BOTC father.
Here is the partly positive response to these concerns. I am pleased to say that the Nationality and Borders Bill currently makes provision to extend BOTC and British citizenship rights to any second-generation Chagossians who were not able to acquire citizenship through their mothers or unmarried fathers, due to discrimination in nationality law.
The issues are complex. As one noble Lord pointed out, some family members in the same generation hold British nationality while others do not. I agree with my honourable friend the Minister for Safe and Legal Migration, who stated in the other place that the Government are keen to consider what more we can do to support families seeking to settle here under the current system. Minister Foster has said that he is open to considering how we might use the FCDO £40 million fund package to support the Chagossians settled in the UK.
I must point out the position that successive Governments have expressed on this point. Amendment 11 would undermine the principle in our nationality law that applies to all other descendants of British nationals. Second and subsequent generations, born and settled outside the UK and its territories, do not have a right or entitlement to register as British nationals. I know that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, seeks, as she said, to limit the right to register as a British national to current generations who must apply within a limited timeframe. This does not alleviate the Government’s concern that offering this right is contrary to long-standing government policy. It goes further than the rights available to many other descendants of British nationals settled elsewhere around the world.
The noble Baroness requested that I meet her and others interested in this matter. I always follow up on requests from noble Lords and I am very happy to meet her. We will consider the point raised by my noble friend Lord Horam about what more we can do to address concerns about the Immigration Rules. My noble friend Lady Altmann raised a point about citizenship. Of course, those without citizenship become overstayers. These are complex issues. As I said in reply to my noble friend Lord Horam, we are happy to consider what more we can do through the immigration system.
In the light of the eloquent and compelling speeches made in this debate, does the Minister concede a distinction between people who leave a territory to settle elsewhere and people who are forcibly evicted from that territory?
I do not think that anybody in this Committee would say that what happened to the Chagossians was, by any means, acceptable to them personally. I do not think I was trying to make that case.
My Lords, I sense very well that the Committee would like to move on, so I will be much quicker than I had intended to be, but my noble friend Lord Paddick has asked me to speak to Amendment 29. Before I do so, I cannot resist rising to the challenge about my party’s involvement in the 2014 legislation. Perhaps after this debate I will explain to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, the concessions gained in negotiation at that time in response to the agreement.
Amendment 29 would change the requirement from an assessment of conduciveness, if that is a word, to the public good to necessity in the interests of national security. I thank the Minister for her letter following Second Reading. I could not help thinking that the two examples she gave of where Clause 9 could apply probably were matters of national security. She says so for one example, and the other is where it is assessed to be
“in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country”.
That must be very close to national security, unless the issue is a very long way away from the other country’s security, which would not be a good basis on which to move forward. The amendment would change the requirement of an order to allow for judicial involvement. These two examples actually show why the matter should go to a judge.
I am editing my speech as I go. Reference has been made to particular communities being especially affected by this provision. I say to the passengers on what, in my neck of the woods, is the 337 bus to Clapham that something does not need to be designed to have a particular effect. If it has that effect, it falls into the area we are concerned about.
Our amendment would also add to the exclusions a person holding British citizenship by birth, and where it would
“affect the best interests of a child in the family”.
That is looking at a fairly wide family. Use of the power would require an annual review, which I think is in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.
My Lords, I have listened to this debate with enormous care. I have conflicting feelings about it. I do not know whether I am prouder of the quality, logic and humanity of so many of the speeches, particularly from the Benches opposite, or whether the more compelling emotion I feel is anger that the speeches even had to be made. Unsurprisingly, I will speak against Clause 9 standing part of the Bill and in favour of the various amendments attempting to dilute its pernicious effect—and even more in favour of the proposed new clauses that attempt to go further.
I almost feel as if I and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, have listened to two completely different debates. The absolute tour de force by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and other speeches on these new clauses were not wide of the mark, because they quite rightly acknowledged that Clause 9 deals just with notice. They conceded that point, but talked about the rot that goes further back in terms of two-tier citizenship and the more precarious version of citizenship that some people are coming to experience because of the increasing use of powers of deprivation, and because these will inevitably have to be used more against some groups within the citizenry than others.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the equality of treatment between different groups in respect of the enforcement of lockdown regulations by the police since spring 2020.
My Lords, we are clear that nobody should ever be subject to police enforcement based on their race, gender, ethnicity, age or any other protected characteristic. That is why the NPCC—the National Police Chiefs’ Council—has commissioned an independent analysis of fixed penalty notices issued to different demographic groups during the pandemic. The findings from this analysis will be published in due course.
I am grateful to the Minister for that, particularly after such a long night. Broad police powers, however well-intended, will inevitably lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. She makes the point about racial bias and I look forward to the fuller picture. Have the Government now gathered more complete data on differentials in enforcement of lockdown regulations? How much was directed at, say, small family picnics or peaceful protests, as opposed to unsafe places of work?
As I said to the noble Baroness in my first Answer, there is going to be more analysis of FPNs issued to different demographic groups. The outcome will be very interesting in all sorts of contexts—social and otherwise. Like her, I look forward to the findings from the analysis. In parallel to that, the HAC has published its report, The Macpherson Report: Twenty-two Years On, which raised the same concerns over disproportionality of FPNs.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we on these Benches support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Best, to which I have added my name. In view of the hour, I too will be brief, as the two noble Lords have already said it all. I thank the Minister for the time that she gave us both in meetings and in numerous emails. I genuinely believe that there is real commitment to undoing this blot on our societal conscience. Therefore, given the genuineness of that feeling, it is massively disappointing that it appears that the Government have decided not to seize the only opportunity that we can see in the legislative calendar to actually repeal this piece of legislation.
There is widespread support for repealing this Act. To do so would actually be popular and uncontroversial, unlike much of this Bill. It is unequivocally the right thing to do. The fact that in Scotland it has been repealed for years and that most police forces rarely, if ever, use the powers in the Act is surely evidence enough that, in reality, it is of little use in tackling the current issues of homelessness, where there are, as the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, said, a raft of alternative measures at the disposal of the police and local authorities. It will be a great disappointment for many if this can is to be kicked further down the road. That is why, if it comes to a vote, we will be supporting the noble Lord, Lord Best. To steal a slogan from somewhere else, why do not the Government “Just Do It”?
My Lords, your Lordships’ House can be proud tonight for seeking to prevent injustices well into the future, but in seeking to support the noble Lord, Lord Best, we can try to act on injustices that are nearly 200 years old.
My Lords, we will be supporting the noble Lord, Lord Best, if he chooses to press his amendment to a vote. If I may refer briefly to my experiences as a magistrate, it is indeed true that we do not actually see this charge brought very often—of course, we do see beggars, but it really is not that often. It seems to me that there is widespread cross-party support for repealing the Act. A compromise has been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Best, and I will be interested in hearing the Minister’s response. If the noble Lord does choose to press his amendment, we will support him.