Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 2nd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Finally, I will say a word about the amendment in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Polak. I have added my name, since I do agree with the principle. However, I am concerned about the drafting, which would take a judge several hours to explain to a jury, and then they may still not understand it. I hope that the Government will accept the principle and come back at Third Reading with a simpler, more practical amendment. In the meantime, I look forward to the Minister’s response, particularly to Amendment 262, which is widely supported by the children’s organisations. That change to the Bill should be made.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I have signed my noble friend Lady Walmsley’s Amendments 246A, 248, 248A and 262 in this group. I will not repeat the points that she made in her important contribution, other than to say that it is very disappointing that this Government, and indeed the last Government, refused to implement the mandatory reporting recommendations from IICSA.

It is an unusual step for the board of an inquiry to write to the Home Secretary, as it did last Friday, to urge her to implement specific recommendations, but it did. My noble friend Lady Walmsley explained why this was important and why the Government’s worries are unfounded, given that the amendments from her and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, echo the mandatory reporting rules in other countries, including Australia, where it works. I hope that the Minister will have a change of heart.

I heard some ministerial tutting when my noble friend Lady Walmsley was speaking, but she, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the IICSA board all understand that these amendments cover proposals that are essential pillars to finding and stopping child sexual abuse. Without them, there is a real risk that what the Government are proposing will not work in practice.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for bringing back her amendments, and I thank other noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments in this group. I recall that this topic prompted one of the more robust debates that we had in Committee, and I am grateful for the chance to touch on the key points again.

This group touches on the issue of child sexual exploitation. While the previous groups focused on creating specific offences for crimes against children, these amendments consider the failure to report sexual offences when they occur. As was our position in Committee, we are broadly supportive of the principles behind the noble Baroness’s amendments. I entirely understand her concern that criminal sanctions work as both an impetus for, and as a punishment for not, reporting child sexual abuse, and that the Bill, as currently drafted, does not underpin the duty with an offence.

Similarly, I see the logic in removing Clause 77(6), which removes the duty if the individual in question believes that another person will make a notification, and of Amendment 263, which would remove the “best interests” defence. I accept that this may be used as an excuse to turn a blind eye, which would render the new provision rather meaningless, but I also accept that there needs to be some leeway in reporting duties. Perhaps the Minister can touch on this when he speaks to Amendment 266.

Regrettably, I cannot accept the argument behind Amendments 240 and 242. While I accept that the duty of care lies with the local authority, it is the police forces that are tasked with intervening and arresting those committing child sexual offences. There are undoubtedly cases where it would be necessary to contact police forces first, and I do not think that restricting reporting to simply the local authority is wise.

I am grateful for my noble friend Lord Polak’s amendments, particularly those to Clause 84. Amendment 257 underscores the importance of clear and delineated settings in which these new provisions would be applicable. However, although this is important, I do not think it should be exhaustive. CSA takes place in all walks of life, unfortunately, and confining reporting it to categories risks removing the duty in other places.

My noble friend Lord Polak’s Amendment 264 goes past the current drafting of the Bill, which introduces an offence of preventing or deterring the reporting of child sexual abuse, and would create a new offence of intentionally concealing a child sexual offence. I support the intent behind my noble friend’s amendments and hope the Minister will be sympathetic.

I also support the intention of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley. We should be guided by evidence, which the IICSA report provided, and that is why the last Conservative Government accepted its findings—a policy we still champion.

On the Minister’s Amendment 266, guidance is the correct and obvious next step. There are many nuances involved in this new provision, as we have heard throughout this debate, and accompanying it with thorough guidance would allow for requirements to be more clearly outlined. That being said, I hope the Minister will now confirm that the guidance will address the concerns raised today, particularly around exceptions to reporting requirements—that would benefit from further guidance from the Secretary of State.

Once again, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions and look forward to the Minister’s remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, as I mentioned at Second Reading, I am very proud that with Clause 87 this Government abolished the time limitations in historical Church child sexual abuse cases. Survivors such as my friend Stephen Bernard, whom my noble friend the Minister referenced, were concerned that the clause, as originally drafted, added a new substantial prejudice, especially for historical cases. This created uncertainty, delays and an extra hurdle for survivors.

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for listening to the concerns of survivors such as Stephen, and for tabling Amendment 270. With the removal of lines 31 to 39, the IICSA recommendation has now been adopted in full, thus ensuring better access to justice for the survivors of historical sexual abuse. I am very grateful to my noble friend.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I supported the amendment in Committee, and I echo the thanks given by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, to the Minister for listening. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, who tabled the original amendment. This is a really important clarification, which will help victims and prevent injustices happening in the future.

[Lord Faulks (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I apologise for being a little late into the Chamber; things moved much more rapidly than I think any of us anticipated. I spoke about this issue at some length, I fear, at Second Reading, in setting out what I thought were the difficulties legally in this area. In Committee, I invited the Government to give their response to my various submissions, which were effectively that the law, as it existed, provided sufficient safeguards so that claimants could bring their claims much later than the three-year limitation period that applies to a personal injuries claim, provided that they satisfied the various criteria set out in Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.

I agree with the Minister that the clause as originally drafted ran the risk of generating further litigation—and I declare my interest in having been involved in a great deal of this kind of litigation over the years. I thought that would be a mistake. I am glad the substantial prejudice provision has been removed from the clause, because it gives some welcome clarity and should minimise the risk of there being further unnecessary litigation in which the precise meaning of the provisions is probed inevitably by one side or another.

This is not quite where I would have liked the law to be, because I think the law is satisfactory as it is. However, I think that I, or anybody else concerned in this area, would differ with the general aim, which is to make sure that those who, for very good reasons, have delayed bringing claims are sufficiently protected by the law and can invite the courts to take into account their delay. The risk that I was concerned about, which was adverted to in the well-known case of A v Hoare, was the real risk that it would be impossible for there to a be a fair trial in certain circumstances because of the lapse of time. Perhaps witnesses have disappeared, documents have gone missing, and then there are all the other factors that can make it impossible for a fair trial to take place.

Although this is not quite the result I would have preferred, I think I look forward to the Minister’s reassurance that the Government’s position will preserve those twin aims: to preserve a claimant’s right to bring claims, albeit late, if there is a good reason, but also to protect a defendant if, because of the lapse of time, it is impossible for there to be fair trial. I hope that she can reassure me that she thinks that this definition will preserve the observations made by the House of Lords in A v Hoare that there comes a time when it is simply too late to have a fair trial. A fair trial, of course, will concern a defendant who probably was not in any way responsible for the perpetration of any sexual abuse and, because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, was deemed to be responsible—such as a school or other institution—because I do not think anybody has any sympathy for the actual perpetrators, however late a claim may be brought.

It is my observation that it is not a wholly satisfactory situation, but I am grateful to the Government for at least removing some of the ambiguity that was in the original way that the clause was framed.