Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Tuesday 28th April 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso. I pay tribute to him. He will be much missed by this House. His work on this Bill and in many other areas has been most welcome and helpful and his demeanour and the manner in which he has co-operated with us and with Ministers has been appreciated by everybody. I declare my interests as far as pensions are concerned. I am an adviser to a master trust and a non-executive director of a pensions administration company.

I will not delay the House too long, but I want to welcome the changes that have been made. I thank the Minister for her patience, her engagement and for listening and working with this House. We have now achieved much safer and better outcomes for members of pension schemes. These will allow trustees and managers to look after the best interests of members so that they do not feel forced to invest in ways that they might not otherwise have chosen to or which are against their best judgment.

There will not be an exclusion of listed investment companies. Again, I thank the Minister and the Government for listening to the serious concerns that were expressed by this House. I also welcome the changes that we have made along the way to the Bill. It is a much better Bill. I thank all colleagues across the House who have co-operated so well.

I must pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for all the work that she has put in, and the Front Bench on this side as well, who have worked so hard to make this Bill a better Bill. I wish this Bill well. Hopefully, a lot of pension scheme members will enjoy better retirements in the future—I certainly hope so—as a result of what we are doing now.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased to have reached this stage, where we are now all back on the same side. We have had some exchanges when we have said, once upon a time, that we were all pointing in the same direction, and then we had a little bit of slippage away from that, but now we are back together. I am still no fan of mandation, but we have now got it suitably under control, if I can put it that way. There are reasonable guardrails to make sure that it does not go wrong, that we, I hope, never use it and that we get the additional investments that we all agree in principle are needed.

I thank all noble Lords who have worked on the Bill, because the work, the meetings and so forth have been harmonious. A lot of late-night working, and some early this morning, has resulted in the solutions that we now have. Like others, I thank everyone and hope we can see the rewards that come from the passage of this Bill.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments brought forward by the Government today, in lieu of those proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, go some way towards addressing our more fundamental concerns about the mandation power. In particular, the shift in the test—from requiring schemes to show that compliance

“would be likely to cause material financial detriment”

to demonstrating that it is

“likely not to be in the best interests of members”—

represents a significant and welcome change from the Government’s original position. By placing members’ best interests at the heart of the policy, this reform helps to mitigate the risk that mandation could cut across trustees’ fiduciary duties. It was never acceptable that schemes should have to show a risk of material detriment before securing an exemption, as the Government had proposed in earlier stages. The Government’s recognition of that point is therefore very welcome, albeit somewhat overdue.

I welcome the Government’s commitment to require the regulators to undertake an independent assessment of the purported collective action problem and the extent to which it is inhibiting investment in UK assets. The Government have consistently argued that mandation is necessary to address a collective action problem. They will now need to substantiate that claim with robust independent evidence, with the Secretary of State having regard to this assessment before they make regulations. That too is a welcome step forward, as is the Government’s commitment to remove discrimination in the clause between investment vehicles. Their decision to bring forward the sunset period from 2035 to 2032 is also sensible.

These changes are a direct result of sustained and determined pressure from across this House to address the question of mandation in the Bill. Noble Lords on all sides recognised early on the fundamental flaws in the Government’s original approach—concerns that were not only shared here but held strongly across industry. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, who has led that effort with clarity and persistence. She has kept the House focused on what is, without question, the central issue in our consideration of this Bill. I am glad that this has borne fruit in what is a substantial move from the Government’s original position, which was untenable.

I shall not detain the House any further but will just say that we on these Benches are content to accept the amendments that the Government have introduced. I thank the Minister for her earlier remarks. The situation is far from perfect and we remain of the view that the mandation power is wrong in principle, but this settlement, which we might now call mandation-lite, is far better than that in the Bill as originally drafted. That is a direct result of the work done in your Lordships’ House to stand up for businesses and savers in our country.

Finally, as this is my very last contribution from the Front Bench, and in this House, I wish the whole House and all noble Lords the very best of luck for the future. It has been a genuine, huge privilege to serve on the Front Bench almost continuously for 15 years. Of course, I will miss it dreadfully, but I do know that there is a life outside this great House of Lords.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 27th April 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88, do insist on its disagreement to Commons Amendments 88A, 88C and 88E to 88P and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments 88R to 88W to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, including for our meeting on Friday. For the record, we suggested a “have regard” framework, requiring trustees to consider private market investment in alignment with the Mansion House Accord and to report to the regulator. That approach would meet the Government’s stated policy aims without overriding fiduciary duty or distorting the market. It was rejected, apparently because it lacked a sufficiently heavy sanction threat. So we continue and, unfortunately, mandation remains.

At the second round of ping-pong, I dealt with the technical and market concerns, and all those concerns remain. Today, I turn to the constitutional issues. First, fiduciary duty is a foundational principle in our common law. Trustees must act solely in the beneficiary’s interests, yet this clause directs them towards particular asset classes without any statutory defence or immunity. Trustees are left in a double bind: comply and risk personal liability or refuse and face deauthorisation.

Secondly, the process has been procedurally defective. There was no consultation on mandation, discrimination between investment vehicles or the sanction. The Commons amendments this time merely add procedural language around the savers’ interest test, due regard and reasons, which public law already requires. Further, there is the coercive effect of the so-called reserve power, which is already being deployed to pressure schemes and trustees into compliance without the consultation, assessment or regulatory discipline that regulations would require. That is constitutionally improper. Policy is being pursued by threat, not by law.

Thirdly, the savers’ interest test itself is unchanged in substance. The insertion of “likely to” is trivial. The test still reverses the logic of fiduciary duty, savers have not consented to the additional risks, and the penalty of deauthorisation remains draconian and disproportionate.

Fourthly, pension savings are members’ property. A coercive statutory scheme backed by deauthorisation is an interference with property rights that requires clear justification and careful design. Neither is present.

For these constitutional, procedural, proportionality and rights-based reasons, the clause remains defective and the Government’s amendments do not cure it. This is legislation that relies on threat rather than clarity and coercion rather than properly framed substance. I therefore will ask the House to insist on our deletion and to disagree with the Government’s amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

I support the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. I point out to the Minister that the Mansion House Accord had two parts. The second part had government obligations, on the basis of which the industry voluntarily agreed to invest in the private assets that the Government favour. None of the Government’s obligations is enshrined in the Bill; they are hoped for. The Minister assumes that private assets will definitely outperform and that if savers do not invest in them they will be losing out somehow. There is no underpin for the losses and even if the investment experts decide that they disagree and would not normally want to buy them, they will still be forced to. This is not the way to get pension funds to invest successfully or to trust the Government in the future. I hope that the Government will think again.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, my speech says, “I would like to thank all noble Lords who have spoken in today’s debate”—but that will not take long.

I will not hold us here for a long time, tempting though it is to go over the arguments in considerable detail, but I will say a couple of things. We need to remember that the whole purpose of the Pension Schemes Bill is to improve outcomes for savers. Where are savers in all of this? It is their interests that are there. The reason the Government are doing this is that the evidence is clear internationally that pension funds which have a small holding in private assets as part of a diversified portfolio bring better returns.

If there were a situation where that would not be in the interests of a particular scheme, that is the point of the savers’ interest test. This does not cut across fiduciary duty because, in fact, nothing in the Bill overrides that core principle of fiduciary duty. If trustees believe it not to be in their interests, not only can they make an application for an exemption under the savers’ interest test but we would expect their fiduciary duty to guide them to make that application. That really is the beginning and end of it.

I will simply say this. The whole point of the Bill is to make pensions better. This whole Bill will transform our pensions landscape. Pensions are the promise we make to millions of people that years of hard work will be rewarded with security and dignity in retirement. Bigger, better pension schemes will drive better returns, as well as tackling inefficiencies. We need to find a way to get the Bill agreed. Industry wants to get on with implementing the reforms and our pensioners want to start benefiting. The other place has expressed its view clearly, repeatedly and by substantial margins. I hope that noble Lords will reflect on whether it is right to ask the elected House to vote for a fourth time on a question to which it has given the same answer on every occasion. I ask noble Lords not to insist on their amendments and to agree the amendments proposed in lieu in the other place.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the arguments have been well rehearsed. I am not convinced that this coercion is as innocent as has been made out and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Wednesday 22nd April 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88, do insist on its disagreement to Commons Amendments 88A and 88C, and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments 88E to 88P to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her explanation and for our meeting with her and the Pensions Minister yesterday. Small movements are better than none, but she will know from that conversation that, as regards the so-called reserve power, there is still a long way to go, and the House should be clear about the issues that remain. There are four in particular.

First is the principle of mandation, even if it is a reserve power to bring in mandation. The primacy of trustee fiduciary duty must be made clear. A structure that subordinates that duty is not acceptable, which means no mandation. Secondly, it is wholly unacceptable that the bar for trustees to decline to invest in the assets that the Government prefer is set higher than the fiduciary duty threshold, requiring trustees to prove material harm—which is a very high standard and probably impossible to do. What reward would the pension saver receive for taking that additional risk? The potential for higher returns alone is not sufficient, but that goes if mandation goes.

Thirdly, the Mansion House Accord has fiduciary duty and consumer duty embedded within it. If this clause is truly a back-up to that accord, it cannot set those duties aside and replace them with something else.

Fourthly, this whole part of the Bill, as the Minister has explained, is predicated upon an allegation of market failure. Were that not the case, I would maintain that competition law would come into play for policy co-ordination.

So what to do? The only logical conclusion is that mandation must go. That does not stop a nudge and monitoring approach—but no threatening reserve power or regulations, because that is coercive, like the debt collector who says they will break your arm, even if not right now. Supporting the Mansion House Accord should surely reference the enablers and caveats that are the fiduciary duty and consumer duty, as well as the government assistance with assets where appropriate.

As this whole project is, in effect, a competition law dispensation to permit co-ordinated policy action, it should be appropriately time limited—for example, to the end of the current Parliament, because that would also safeguard from what future Governments might do, which has been raised more than once. After that, the entire structure should fall away. If it needs replacing, that would be up to the subsequent Government.

Of course, as I have expressed all the way through, there must be no discrimination between investment vehicles, which we know is a Treasury plant, not an industry request, and an example embedded in the heart of the Bill of how highly inappropriate things can be imposed. It will come as no surprise that I will ask noble Lords once again to insist on our deletion and to disagree with the government amendment. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Motion C because that deals with Amendment 35B, which I moved in the last round of ping-pong. I am delighted with the amendments that the Government have brought forward. I felt, during the process of Committee and Report, that I was banging my head against a brick wall every time I spoke—which was often—about innovation and competition. I did not think I was getting anything other than a headache. I am absolutely delighted, and I completely accept that the broader wording that the Government have put forward in their Amendments 35C and 35D is an improvement on what I had been arguing for, so I thank them.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I thank them for being very constructive in their engagements—possibly more so offstage than onstage, but I am always grateful for and will take whatever I can find. I thank in particular the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes. I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, knows now that I really was listening all the way through Committee and Report, even if there may have been times when—I am sorry—it looked like I was not; I shall work better on my nodding in future. I am really glad that she and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, are happy with where we have got to.

I will try to pick up on a few points. We have gone over them many times in debate, so I will not hold the House back in order to redo them all over again, tempting though that is. I turn first to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. I think the problem is that we have started in the middle of the argument. The diversification of portfolios is critical to reducing risk. There is clear international evidence that a small investment in productive finance, in the context of a diversified portfolio, brings better returns. That is demonstrable. We have to admit that most mass-market DC schemes have little or no private markets in their default funds, and that is very much in contrast to the position in many other countries. So the starting point is that it is reasonable to assume, as the evidence would suggest, that it is better for savers for that to happen.

However, we do want safeguards around this, and what the noble Lord described is one of the safeguards. If this power were ever to be used—it is a reserve power, so the Government do not expect it to be used—a report would have to be commissioned to look at the impact of doing so on savers as well as the broader economy, to establish what would happen. Then, despite all that, if trustees believed, knowing their savers and membership, that it would not be in their interests because of some reason—for example, even if it might broadly be in their interests but it would not be in their savers’ interests—not only can they make an application for an exemption under the savers’ interest test but we would expect the fiduciary duty to drive them to do so. The test is designed to be capable of being passed, not just failed. I understand the noble Lord’s position, but that is the Government’s position.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, asked about the timing: why should it not stop in this Parliament? We have talked about the power stopping in 2032, but the Mansion House Accord has until 2030 to happen, and this Parliament, I am sorry to say, is due to finish before that. Would that it could continue—no, I will not go in that direction; it will get badly reported. We think, that if the power were ever used, there would have to be enough time to see its impact before bringing it to an end. The sunset date of 2032 seems a reasonable starting point and that, I hope, is something that she can appreciate.

A question was asked about collective action, which we have been around several times. The Government have set out the arguments that the view on collective action failure in the market is not just ours; the industry has made this really clear. When the Mansion House compact—the predecessor to the Mansion House Accord—published its collective assessment of progress two years into its assessment, it identified this dynamic of competitive pressure focusing the market on minimising cost as the single biggest barrier to delivering on its own commitments. We have been here before; it has been tried on a voluntary measure and failed, and industry identified this as the single biggest barrier. That is why we are addressing this and that is the reason for doing it.

I can reassure my noble friend Lord Davies that the OBR will continue to produce long-term forecasts of the economy, which will provide a context for the figures that are being made. I am grateful to him for asking about it.

Finally, to describe the changes the Government have made as small is unreasonable. I remind the House what this now is: this provision, the reserve power, is now capped at the same rate as the accord. It cannot be used to compel investment in a single, hand-picked asset class. The headline percentage can be set only once. The power lapses in 2032 if not used and, if it were ever used, the entire regime is repealed at the end of 2035—every element is taken off the statute book. Those are significant movements. The Government have listened. The Commons has twice sent this back; it wants this in the Bill, so we should give it to the Commons. I urge the House to agree.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have contributed. As the Minister said, we have been around the arguments many times, so I will be brief. This was sold as a backstop to the accord, so it is not a case for celebration when something that bit off a lot more than the accord is brought a bit more closely into alignment with it. The fact is that the reserve power is coercive—that is what it is there for and what it is meant to do. It is not without effect, yet it was not consulted on. It was sprung on us suddenly and snuck into the Bill, and we have had to deal with it.

I was interested in the tax advantage point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but these are the least well-off pensioners who are going to be asked to put more into risky assets. Should they not get an extra slice of tax relief, then? All the people who are in safe, defined benefit schemes and those kinds of things where they are not at risk get a tax advantage too. It is not a runner.

I come back to the basic point, which relates to fiduciary duty and the best interests of pensioners in what is their money. Bear in mind that the point has been raised—I am not sure whether it has ever been answered—about the human rights aspect of diverting some of the pensions. We could go on a lot longer— I hope we do not—but I regret that I must test the opinion of the House.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments and / or reasons
Monday 20th April 2026 Lords Chamber

Motion E1 (as an amendment to Motion E)

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

Moved by

As an amendment to Motion E, leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88, and do disagree with the Commons in their Amendments 88A to 88C to the words restored to the Bill by the Commons disagreement to Lords Amendments 15 to 24, 27, 30 to 34, 36, 38 to 42, 83 and 88.”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, the Commons has asked us to accept a clause that reintroduces strict mandation of pension scheme asset allocation, traducing trustee fiduciary duty. There are two problems with the clause: the mandation itself and the discriminatory definition of investment vehicles that excludes listed investment companies—one of the two vehicles explicitly endorsed by the productive finance working group, composed of regulators, HMT and the wider investment industry.

Both defects are fundamental. Until this clause appeared, there was broad political and industry alignment on the direction of travel, supporting trustees to consider a wider range of assets and ensuring that the Government play their part through the enablers set out in the Mansion House Accord. Nothing in that shared approach required coercion.

Further, the Government’s own consultation evidence contradicts the justification for mandation. Ministers say that employers choose schemes based on cost and that private asset investment is too expensive. But the DWP’s own data, quoted in the consultation document, shows that investment charges are not in the “top three factors” for employer decisions. The top factors are convenience, professional advice and employer fees.

Most schemes are already priced well below the charge cap and only 5% of employees ever switch schemes at all. The consultation stated that investment charges are not likely to feature heavily in employers’ decision-making. If that is so, the rationale for strict mandation simply does not stand, although I can see how the allegation helps to escape competition policy concerns about strategy co-ordination. But do not forget that value for money is meant to solve the focus on cost.

There can be perfectly good reasons why a scheme has not invested in a particular asset or asset class—reasons recognised explicitly in the Mansion House Accord itself. Ministers say that this clause is just a back-up to the accord, but it does not reflect the accord’s own terms: its dependence on government actions and the critical enablers. Instead, the clause is a doubling down, not a codification. The Government admit that it is intended to be and will be coercive merely as a reserve power.

Ministers have also spoken often about crowding in investment and using pension capital to give confidence to the wider market, but coercion does the opposite. If investment has to be compelled, the signal to the wider market is not confidence but doubt—crowding out, not in. Wider market effects have consistently been overlooked in the drafting of this clause, but it is not something that this House should ignore.

The overriding principle is that government must not undermine fiduciary duty, whether by mandation or coercion. Therefore, we should continue to insist on our amendment and disagree with the Commons. I intend to test the opinion of the House at the appropriate time. I beg to move.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, it is beyond doubt that mandation is, rightly, the most serious and contentious issue in the Bill. We have made our views on this very clear, as have many other noble Lords. The state should not be directing the investment of assets held by private funds. The power that the Government are setting out in the Bill directly undermines the principle of fiduciary duty on which the entire pensions system relies. It must by now be plainly obvious to the Government and the Minister that any investment that has to be forced by the Government is not in the interest of savers.

We are absolutely opposed to this power, in principle and in practice. We have met with many representatives from industry, including signatories to the Mansion House Accord, to which the Minister claims this power is designed to be a backstop. They have been crystal clear that this power crosses a line and must not proceed. We will support the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, if she seeks the opinion of the House on this Motion.

On Motion F1, the argument for scale exemptions is now well rehearsed and I will not repeat it today. Our amendment would preserve the policy intent and provide two clear and targeted routes through which a scheme may qualify—both tightly drawn and firmly anchored in member outcomes—that introduces a rigorous evidential threshold and places the responsibility firmly with the regulator, who must be satisfied not only that the conditions are met but that any claimed benefits are material and demonstrably in the interest of members. The Government committed through the Mansion House Accord to taking a pragmatic approach to scale. This amendment gives effect to that commitment. I put on notice that I will seek to test the opinion of the House on this Motion when it is called.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their comments. Having spoken at some length at the start, I will not respond at length. I shall just pick up a few points.

On the question on fiduciary duty, nothing in the Bill disapplies trustees’ existing duties of loyalty, prudence and acting in members’ best interests. Those continue to apply in full. Were this power ever to be used—I repeat, the Government do not expect to use it—and the asset allocation requirements were in place, the savers’ interest test allows a scheme to seek an exemption if it can show that compliance would cause material financial detriment to members. Not only would they be enabled to do that but we would expect the fiduciary duty to require the trustees to make such an application to the regulator. Trustees are not directed to invest in any specific asset or project, and if they believe that the requirements are not in the members’ best interests, again, they should apply for an exemption.

The neutrality amendments provide a meaningful constraint. The Government must prescribe qualifying asset descriptions across each of the private market categories in the Bill, so they could not load an entire requirement into a single asset class, let alone a pet project or specific investment. Any future Government who attempted to define qualifying assets in a way designed to serve their own policies or a pet project, rather than savers’ interests, would clearly be vulnerable to legal challenge on rationality grounds.

I am not going to debate this at length since the noble Lords have made clear their intention to test the opinion of the House irrespective of whatever I say. I have just two other comments, on scale. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, that the Government should be pragmatic. I completely agree. My problem with her amendment is that it is not practical, so I cannot be pragmatic in trying to apply an amendment that is really clear in the matter of scale but would simply be too difficult to apply, because it is not clear what the nature of the test would be and it would end up getting bogged down in the courts for years, giving the regulator an impossible job. That simply does not work.

I have made the point about competition in our previous, long debate, and I do not doubt we will return to it again should the Bill not all disappear tonight. In the light of that, I hope that noble Lords feel able not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, we have heard continued disagreement with mandation and coercion from across the House. As the Minister has said, we do not need to re-rehearse all the things that we have already said, but something that stuck in my mind from a previous stage was when the Minister said that if we did not have mandation, it would rest on good faith alone. That is the whole point: I think there is good faith in the City to deliver on this, and not to trust it, exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Remnant, has said, damages relationships and any good faith and trust in government. This is therefore doubly, trebly and quadruply a bad thing for the Government to have suggested, and I hope they will have a change of mind. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 26th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

1: Clause 42, page 41, line 39, leave out “or [subsection removed]”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a cross-reference to section 26(7B) of the Pensions Act 2008, left out by a report stage amendment in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I did not expect to be back moving amendments quite so quickly, but despite the 20 consequential amendments that I moved on Report, four more have come to light. They are printed on the Marshalled List. They are entirely consequential on Amendment 52, which deleted mandation. All I seek to do with Amendments 1 to 3 and 8 is to move them formally when the time comes. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hayman (CB)]

My Lords, I will say a word or two at this stage about government Amendment 4, because I understand it relates to Amendment 156, which the Minister moved on Monday. That Amendment 156 had wide Cross-Bench support, coming as it did after an amendment in the other place that was supported across parties and particularly by the Liberal Democrats. It gave the Government the responsibility and ability to issue statutory guidance on the fiduciary duty of trustees in relation to systemic issues, including climate change and many more.

In response to that, the Minister in the Commons said that the Government would bring forward plans to ensure that the guidance reflected the views of all within the sector and that it could be useful to trustees. All I have ever been interested in is bringing forward something that would help those involved with investment decisions for pensioners to be able to take into account with confidence the long-term systemic issues that they found. I am sure the Whip would not want me to repeat their arguments, which I am in danger of doing.

Following the vote on Amendment 156 on Monday, which I still do not understand, I am concerned about what the Government will now do. They are committed to this course of action and have taken a great deal of effort in setting up the technical working group and getting views from across the sector. It would be a real shame if that work were somehow to be halted by the procedural issues of how we get the legislative base to do this.

I should pay tribute here to the Minister and her officials, who moved at great pace and put a lot of effort into coming up with a solution that unfortunately was not accepted by the House on Monday. I would very much appreciate some understanding from the Minister, when she winds up, of how this issue will go forward. Because it was a government amendment, we do not have the opportunity of asking the Commons to think again; it is dead in this House. I would very much value an understanding that the need for this guidance has not gone away. As I understand it, the Government’s commitment to the guidance has not gone away, so it would be very interesting to know how we take the next steps.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

2: Clause 42, page 53, line 20, leave out subsections (16) and (17)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is connected to another amendment in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted to the commencement clause.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

3: Clause 137, page 156, line 11, leave out subsection (6)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a cross-reference to section 26(7B) of the Pensions Act 2008, left out by a report stage amendment in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

8: The Schedule, page 158, line 30, leave out “[section removed]” and insert “28F”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a cross-reference to section 28G of the Pensions Act 2008, left out by a report stage amendment in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 23rd March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

176: Clause 122, page 154, leave out lines 32 and 33

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Report stage
Thursday 19th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

52: Clause 40, page 38, line 12, leave out “and Condition 2”

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, we debated Clause 40 and the new FSMA Section 28C issues thoroughly in Committee. I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed and to those who have spoken to me since. The amendments in this group would remove the reserve power that would allow the Government to mandate asset allocations for workplace pension savers. We will vote on Amendment 52, which is a consequential amendment, but it carries with it the business amendments—the thing that it is really about. These are Amendment 78, which would delete Section 28C, and Amendment 96, which would delete the now redundant savers’ interest test and all associated references.

My objection here is one of principle. Why should government override trustees? We all know that UK pension funds have invested too little in UK assets and private markets, but we also know why: regulatory interventions, the charge cap and pressure into low-cost indices and gilts have made it difficult to invest in anything that requires governance or research. The track record of intervention is not good, yet this clause proposes more intervention. It is described as a back-up to the Mansion House Accord, to be used if industry does not deliver. But if industry does not deliver it will not be out of obstinacy; it will be because the opportunities are not there at the right price or at the right risk. Mandation does not solve that; it simply overrides fiduciary and professional judgment. Even the threat of mandation is intended to do the same.

If regulated for, this clause would reverse the burden of proof and raise the evidential bar for trustees. Trustees, who already must act in members’ best interests, would additionally have to show the regulator that the mandated allocation would cause material detriment to be exempted from allocation. That is a very high bar, flying under the guise of a savers’ interest test. We would be placing trustees under a new adjudicator of fiduciary duty that has no fiduciary responsibility itself, and a Government with an inherent conflict of interest—and, if I may say, no technical or regulatory qualification. Spending workers’ pensions instead of raising taxes is not fiscal discipline; it is concealment.

The power itself is extraordinarily broad. There is no time limit, no percentage, no end date, and a rather dodgy exemplary asset list—available to any future fancy. Nothing prevents a Government from choosing their preferred assets, including those that no one else will touch, and compelling 22 million savers to invest in them. That is not the route to pension security.

For all these reasons, the only responsible course is to remove this power, and I intend to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I fully support everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said. I am very sad to be in the position of needing to do so, because I support the Government’s aim of helping pension schemes to put more money into UK investments and growth. However, the way in which it is being done is the issue here, with unlimited powers and not incentives but diktats. If you threaten a pension scheme that, unless it does what you want, it cannot auto-enrol workers in this country then clearly that is not any kind of carrot; it is just a big stick. Incentivisation is normally what we do to encourage pension investments, and it is what we should be doing. One of my amendments would achieve that, but if the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, is successful with Amendment 52, we will not need to go into those details.

I hope that the Government, even at this late hour, will rethink their approach to have a two-step approach: to have a voluntary agreement and commit to do certain things, but then the second step would be, if the voluntary agreement was not stuck to or if schemes did not do any of the things that they said that they were going to do, that they would force schemes to do what they wanted anyway. That is not the way to make the best of people’s pensions, and I hope that the Government will think again.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

This all comes as a package. A lot of attention is focused on this particular reserve power, but in fact it is the combination of all the elements of the Bill that we discussed in some detail in Committee over recent weeks: the question of the investment in scale, the need for the value-for-money framework, the need for the option to consolidate small pots. All these things come together to create the conditions in which this will work. This reserve power is to address a particular question, the risk of collective failure. I fully accept that the noble Lord does not agree with it, but I want at least to have the opportunity to make the argument as to why the Government are proposing to do it in this way.

The Mansion House Accord represents a voluntary commitment by 17 of the UK’s largest DC pension providers to invest 10% of their default funds in private markets, at least half of that in the UK, by 2030. We continue to be encouraged by progress, but the risk of a collective action failure in this market has long been recognised. As I said, individual providers face strong commercial incentives to keep costs low and to defer action until others move first. The reserve power exists as a backstop to ensure that if voluntary progress stalls, the Government have the means to act. Its presence in the Bill sends a clear signal that the commitment to change is underpinned by more than good intentions, and it helps to give each provider confidence that the rest of the market will move too.

At earlier stages we discussed a range of issues around safeguards and other things, which I thought would come up in later groups but that will obviously depend on what happens next. First, the power is time limited. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, thinks this power will outlive us all. I hope it does not, because if it has not been used by the end of 2035 it falls away, so I very much hope that it will not outlive the noble Baroness and me, although obviously we are in the Lord’s hands: should we be called home, what can we do? If it has not been used by 2035, it falls away. If it has been used, any percentage requirements in place cannot be increased beyond that date.

Secondly, the Bill establishes a savers’ interest test. Pension providers will be able to apply for an exemption from the targets where they can show that meeting them would cause material financial detriment to their members. Thirdly, the Government must consult and publish a report on the expected impacts, both on savers and on growth, before exercising the power for the first time, and a post-implementation review must follow within five years. Finally, the regulations implementing any requirements will be subject to the affirmative procedure, so Parliament would have its say.

I will respond to some specific questions. There was a question about how to define UK assets. This would be done in regulations were the power ever to be used. Consideration would have to be given to the characteristics of different asset classes. The Mansion House Accord is accompanied by some high-level guidance on how a UK investment should be identified within each of the different asset classes. That asset class by asset class approach to establishing the location is also the one that the FCA has taken as it consults on the upcoming value-for-money disclosure requirements, which will require firms to provide UK overseas asset allocation split. If the Government ever came to exercise these powers, we would expect similarly to take an asset class by asset class approach.

Questions were raised about a future Government and how this might be used. The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, prayed in aid the European Convention on Human Rights, and I commend her on that. First, on the question on property rights, this applies to default schemes and people can choose to opt out, but she raises a relevant point. Obviously I hope there will never be one, but if there ever were a Government of a different persuasion, were they to seek to use it in a way beyond what is here, I think they would run into problems. This Government have made it quite clear, in Committee in this House and in the other House, that the purpose of the power is to assure good outcomes for savers and the economy, recognising diversification benefits and the potential for higher returns. It is not an instrument for channelling investment into pet projects or specific companies.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, quoted me on this point. It was marvellous—“What he said” is what I would say. That is the Government’s view, and I have spoken about the various safeguards, but even if a future Government wanted to use these powers to do something either much broader or much more specific, of course they would have to abide by established principles of public law, including the requirement for Ministers to act rationally, ensuring procedural fairness and compatibility with ECHR rights when making secondary legislation.

The Government are under no illusions about the significance of this power. It is a substantial intervention and, if we ever found the need to use it, we would have to proceed with great care. I understand the strength of feeling on this. These powers, alongside the scale provisions, the value-for-money framework and the consolidation measures, are a package. Together, they are designed to deliver a step change in outcomes for millions of pension savers. If we remove the reserve power, we remove the mechanism that gives the rest of this framework its teeth when it comes to investment diversification.

For a long time, successive Governments have recognised the need to channel pension capital into productive assets. Auto-enrolment has brought millions more people into saving. We now have a responsibility to ensure that those savings are put to work properly to deliver better long-term returns. But the question before us is whether the Bill should contain the backstop at all. In the Government’s view, the answer is yes. Without it, the voluntary commitments made by the industry would rest on good faith alone. The experience of previous attempts to shift investment patterns in this market suggest that that, on its own, may not be enough. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken. The overwhelming view is still that this power goes too far. Many of the issues on which the Minister comments are around cost but, as I said, the whole focus on cost has been brought about by regulation. Changing to value for money will, I hope, adjust that, although I have concerns that it will still be too bound up. But the more I listen to the Minister, the more I hear that there is a deliberate intent for market manipulation and control. That really worries me, because it does not seem to be at all market sensitive or prepared to use what is supposed to be one of the strengths of this country—its asset management.

I think this is dangerous and market distorting, even without any legal effect. As has been eloquently said, it is the wrong direction of travel—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for that reminder. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

53: Clause 40, page 38, leave out lines 24 to 28
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

57: Clause 40, page 38, line 38, leave out “or Condition 2”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

61: Clause 40, page 40, line 19, leave out “or the conditions for approval under section 28C”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

78: Clause 40, page 45, line 32, leave out from beginning to end of line 19 on page 48
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

96: Clause 40, page 50, line 28, leave out from beginning to end of line 16 on page 51
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

99: Clause 40, page 51, line 24, leave out “or 28C”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

102: Clause 40, page 53, line 19, leave out subsection (13)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

106: Clause 40, page 54, line 17, leave out “(7B),”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

108: Clause 40, page 54, line 18, leave out “28C (other than subsection (10)(f))”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

110: Clause 41, page 55, line 3, leave out “or the asset allocation requirement in section 28C”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, connected to others in the name of Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted, seeks to remove provision on the asset allocation condition from Chapter 3, while preserving provision related to the scale condition.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 16th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 4 in this group. This concerns mandation, which we will debate more extensively later this week in connection with defined contribution schemes. Amendment 4 seeks to ensure that mandation cannot apply to the LGPS. This amendment should be easy for the Government to accept. This mandation amendment, unlike the ones we shall debate on Thursday, reflects what the Government have said is their policy.

Clause 1 gives the Government very extensive powers to tell local government pension funds what they may or may not do in relation to asset pool companies and scheme managers. Clause 2 says that any Clause 1 regulations must—not may—

“make provision about the management of the funds and other assets”.

As is usual with regulation-making powers, they are unconstrained. While Clause 2 lists some of the things that could be included in the regulations, it contains no restrictions on the use of the power.

I have tabled Amendment 4 seeking to ensure that the power cannot be used to tell local government schemes to invest in particular assets, asset classes or locations of investment. I firmly believe that fiduciary duties are paramount and should never be interfered with by the Government, whether in relation to public sector schemes such as the LGPS or private sector ones, which we will debate on Thursday. The noble Lord, Lord Katz, said in Grand Committee on 12 January:

“To be absolutely clear … we are not mandating asset pools to invest in certain ways in the LGPS. The power to direct pools is a backstop power. It does not allow government to mandate investment in specific assets or asset classes”.—[Official Report, 12/1/26; col. GC 244.]


The issue is not whether the power is a backstop power or whether the Government intend to use it but whether the Bill could be used—by this Government or some future Government—to mandate investments in the LGPS.

Clause 2 is clear that regulations under Clause 1

“must make provision about the management of the funds and other assets for which the scheme managers are responsible”.

Subsection (2) goes on to require an investment strategy, and subsections (3) and (4) allow the Secretary of State to specify what is in that strategy, including strategic asset allocation. On any ordinary interpretation, this adds up to very considerable power over LGPS investments.

In the other place, the Government removed from the original Bill a more explicit power of direction that would have allowed the Secretary of State to direct LGPS investment activities. It was pretty shocking, and the Government sensibly removed it before the Bill arrived in your Lordships’ House. That removal, however, does not mean that the Bill we now have before us could not be used to mandate investments using the powers that remain in Clauses 1 and 2. I hope the Government will agree that certainty is required in this area. My amendment would put matters beyond doubt. If the Government do not accept Amendment 4, I am currently minded to test the opinion of House when it is reached.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 2 and 5, which address the same underlying issue—whether pooling and expertise in the Local Government Pension Scheme is intended to support good investment decisions or to constrain them. I will speak in support of Amendment 4, to which I have added my name.

No one disputes that there can be value in scale, but scale does not require exclusivity. Nothing in the case for pooling requires funds to confine to a single pool, unable to access specialist expertise developed elsewhere. The LGPS is a federation of, I think, 89 funds with different demographics, liabilities and investment strategies. It is entirely foreseeable—indeed, it is already happening—that one pool will develop a particular strength in, say, infrastructure, and another in renewables or local investment opportunities, or, as has already been outlined, it may be that the investment opportunity is large and accessible only by more than one joining together. Why should a fund be prevented from accessing that expertise or that scale simply because it sits in a different pool? Looking at it from the non-scale end, I have personally spoken to fund managers who wanted to invest local to support infrastructure at local scale but who do not want all that exposure in their own area, for reasons of diversification. They have had their fingers burned with shopping centres. The current drafting would make that unnecessarily difficult.

In Committee, the Government were clear that they want to avoid forced or value-destructive transfers of assets between pools. Allowing funds to participate in more than one pool and allowing cross-pool investment is one of the simplest ways to avoid exactly that. If a fund can access a specialist vehicle without having to replicate it internally or move assets unnecessarily then that is a win for the scheme members. The purpose of pooling was to broaden access to expertise, not to narrow it; to create economies of scale, not to create silos; and to support better long-term investment decisions, not to restrict the routes through which those decisions could be implemented.

The noble Lord, Lord Fuller, has reminded us of many of these issues, as he did in Committee. The LGPS is a British success story, delivering strong returns, low costs and high efficiency for 6.7 million members. His warning was and is that the Bill risks fettering the independence of schemes to make the best long-term decisions for their members. These amendments go directly to that point, and it would be beneficial if the Government could recognise this—I really cannot see what they would take away.

I therefore suggest that the Government seriously consider adopting these amendments. They are modest but important. They would not weaken pooling but strengthen it, they would not undermine scale but enhance it, and they would not challenge the Government’s policy direction. They would simply ensure that the LGPS could operate as a coherent system, rather than a set of sealed compartments. I hope that the Minister will see them as constructive corrections to support fiduciary duty, improve efficiency and help deliver the very outcomes that the Government say they want.

I turn to Amendment 4. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has already explained in detail why it is a good amendment, and we on these Benches support it. It would be a safeguard to make sure that the same kind of mandation that the Bill contains for default pension funds did not creep across through regulations into the LGPS. That may not be the intention now, but, as elsewhere in the Bill, there are no safeguards against the future intentions of we-do-not-know-who in a change of circumstances. It is a bad thing in legislation to continually have these open abilities to make regulations, billed as doing one thing but completely open sometimes to do almost the opposite. The precedent has been set elsewhere in the Bill by the drafting and, no matter how it ends up, we need to be certain that it cannot creep into local government. I therefore support Amendment 4, and we will support the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, if she is minded to divide the House.

Pension Schemes: Ministerial Powers

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I have said this many times in Committee, as the noble Lord knows, but I am delighted to explain again for the benefit of the whole House. I have just explained what the Government believe the challenge is. By international standards, we are really very low in aiming for 10%. Canadian schemes invest 11% in infrastructure alone. The evidence is clear that investing a small proportion of funds in the context of a diversified portfolio brings better returns for savers over the long run. The aim is to get better returns for savers. There is too much short-termism in our markets at the moment, and the view of the Government—as well as the evidence that seems to be out there—is that this is because we are seen as competing on cost, rather than on return or value. It is much easier to pitch to an employer on that basis. If we make it clear that the whole industry is going in this direction, then we believe that that will be the case. The choices will still be there, the safeguards are still in place, and we believe that this will be in the interests of savers across the long term.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, what timeline are the Government following, given that the Mansion House Accord target is 2030? When will the Government commence consultation, as there has not been any yet, and what analysis has been done about the difficulties now reported daily of private credit funds, and others, not being able to make redemptions or exits? Would the effect be that the Government would be forcing workers’ pensions to be buyers of last resort, and is that fair when private sector workers do not have any guaranteed benefits?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government have not set out a timeline for using the power precisely because we have made it clear that we do not wish to use it, and do not expect to use it. The timeline for Mansion House is clear: the power expires if it is not used, and if any requirements are in place, they are capped at that level and cannot be raised thereafter. This will happen only if it becomes clear that the Mansion House Accord is not able to be delivered on. At that point the Government would consult, they would produce draft regulations, and the process would then happen. As I have made clear, since the only aim is to backstop the Mansion House Accord, the evidence should come from what companies are doing in that accord.

Pension Schemes Bill

Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 23rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

My Lords, I was not going to take part in this short debate, but I am drawn into it by some of the comments that the noble Lord made. In respect of future funding, it is an absolutely valid point that we should have regard to the liability we are accruing, and we should work out how we want to fund it. That is open for debate, and I do not take issue with it in any way, shape or form. But the central point is that we employ public service workers on a contract which is in part what we pay them now and in part what they will get in the future. There is an obvious trade-off between the fact that they will be earning less during their working lifetime but probably for a better pension.

Indeed, I look to my sons, if I may. One is a police constable in Scotland. Before he became a police constable, he ran a hotel and got a degree in hotel management. He is now being paid about two-thirds of what he would have earned as a hotel manager, where he would have been funding his own pension on auto-enrolment. He is doing what he loves doing and has chosen it because he looks at what he will get in retirement as part of the package for the service he gives now. My other son is a primary school teacher in south London, who also has a degree in hospitality and ran a hotel. As somebody in the hospitality industry, I am doing my best to talk the industry down, but I do not mean to do that. The point I mean to make is that they both decided they had vocations and both have given up a considerable amount of current earnings to do something in public service that they like.

So, although I agree entirely that we should look at funding, I disagree that defined benefit schemes are inherently wrong. I am a trustee of the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund. MPs put in roughly 11%; the Treasury puts in 10%; it is fully funded and all the liabilities are covered. The noble Lord said—I wrote it down—that 20% of the privileged have awarded themselves a pension. I take issue with that. Tell it to the police constable being spat at in the aftermath of Covid on the streets of Aberdeen. Tell it to the primary school teacher who is there for 12 or 14 hours looking after a disabled child and getting them to where they ought to be. Tell it to a nurse who is working a second shift on A&E. If we want public service workers, we either pay them today and tomorrow with a good pension or we up the cost of the public sector by 30% today. It is one or the other.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I will say only a couple of things. The first is that this is asking for a review and transparency. It is necessary for us to know the liabilities that are stacked up; there is no getting away from that. My experience in this came in the financial crisis, when I was in Europe and chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. We were doing battle with the IMF and the troika and all the cuts that were happening to pensions—for instance in Greece, where they halved all the defined benefit pensions. Over time, the courts have reinserted a lot of them, so they have come back again. That reflects the point about bargains and promises being made—although we have heard today about promises being made and then not happening for some of the erstwhile public sector that unfortunately went through a privatisation.

I see nothing wrong with a review and nothing wrong with the cost of these things being more public knowledge, and I am also for a considered look at whether they have to phase out in the future, whether we have to pay more for these jobs and whether we have to have something that is more together. Although different people might be on different sides of the argument, the fact is that if the crunch time comes—if we have to have the IMF in—I know where the finger will be pointing first, because “been there, done that”. So, let us have a review.

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Moved by

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted]

219A: After Clause 119, insert the following new Clause—
“Alignment of regulations with Technical Actuarial StandardsThe Secretary of State has a duty to ensure that regulations under this Act align with Technical Actuarial Standards issued by Financial Reporting Council, requiring trustees to compare bulk annuity, superfunds and run-on strategies for defined benefit pension schemes before making irreversible decisions about scheme assets.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure a joint approach between Government departments and their related regulators including the PRA, FCA and TPR, to help align their respective responsibilities for solvency, consumer interest, member protection and promoting growth.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I am introducing Amendment 219A on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. She regrets that she is unable to be here, but I think she is somewhere on a plane at the moment, and I know she considers this a matter of great importance.

The amendment seeks to enhance the framework for defined benefit pension schemes by ensuring that regulations under the Bill align with the Financial Reporting Council’s technical actuarial standards. The current version of those is TAS 300, version 2.1. However, the amendment does not identify a specific technical standard but explains what the required standard covers in order to ensure that future versions of the standard which produce the prescribed calculations would also be covered by the wording of the amendment.

The wording of the particular technical actuarial standard, particularly paragraph 5, requires trustees to compare key strategies, such as bulk annuities, superfunds and run-on approaches, before making irreversible decisions about scheme assets and members’ pensions. Annuity buyouts are no longer necessarily risk-free, as official warnings regarding the lack of Treasury underpin for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and the rise in offshore takeovers of annuity companies have highlighted. My remarks today reflect upon the thoughtful contributions from noble Lords in earlier debates on similar amendments. I will first address the points raised previously.

I appreciate the concerns expressed about avoiding unnecessary legislative intrusion into actuarial professional standards. Indeed, far from diminishing the role of actuaries, this amendment recognises their crucial expertise in guiding trustees. TAS 300 sets out robust principles for actuarial work, including requirements for clear advice on bulk transfers, risk assessments and the impact on member benefits. It covers essential areas such as whether a scheme can afford discretionary increases, how much surplus might be distributed and whether members might be better off with a run-on strategy rather than buying annuities. By embedding alignment with these standards in regulations, we would simply ensure that this high-quality actuarial insight is carefully considered by trustees to make better-informed choices without mandating outcomes.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, rightly highlighted the FRC’s independent role in enforcing standards through disciplinary measures. The amendment does not seek to duplicate or override that. It would better align the actuarial advice with trustee decision-making. Currently, the FRC’s oversight seems weak and generally unenforced. The FRC plays a vital role in setting and enforcing standards, but its resources are too stretched across a broad remit. Only a small fraction of its annual budget, estimated at £200,000, is allocated to actuarial professional supervision, with no dedicated budget for investigations. This is at a time when we are expecting the profession to advise trustees on matters affecting the proper stewardship of £1.1 trillion of the national wealth in pension assets.

Existing trustee discretion does not seem to provide sufficient safeguards. Actuarial reports under TAS 300 are apparently not always presented to trustees unless specifically requested. Even when they are, they can sometimes become routine exercises rather than the rigorous analyses intended. This is not a criticism so much as a recognition of practical realities in a busy field. By making consideration of these reports a regulatory requirement before irreversible commitments, such as surplus payouts or buyouts, happen, trustees would gain a valuable tool to weigh options thoroughly, aligning with the Bill’s goals of better governance and better member outcomes.

The real power of this amendment lies in the potential value it could unlock for stakeholders, particularly scheme members, unions and workers. Defined benefit scheme surpluses exceed £240 billion on prudent measures. Independent financial modelling indicates that, for every £1 billion transferred to insurers via buyouts, expected excess cash flows of £150 million to £250 million accrue over 10 to 15 years—value that would bypass members and sponsors entirely. A run-on approach rather than a buyout could instead share these gains between employers and members.

The Stagecoach pension scheme offers another example. Its trustees developed and used TAS 300 reports to evaluate options for the scheme. This resulted in them seeking to run on and ultimately replacing the original sponsor, Stagecoach, with a stronger sponsor in Aberdeen Group plc. The analysis supported and enabled the use of a run-on strategy, which enhanced member benefits with an immediate 1.5% pension uplift and stronger inflation protection worth over £50 million for members, all within supported risk and investment guardrails. In addition, Aberdeen Group plc agreed that two-thirds of future surpluses will go towards further improving pensions, directly benefiting bus drivers and other workers.

This ground-breaking transaction has attracted widespread attention and support across the pension industry. It has also ignited greater expectations among many schemes that endgame considerations must properly include serious focus on improving member outcomes, shifting the narrative towards more equitable and productive use of surpluses.

This amendment would improve the Bill by embedding a proven standard into its framework, ensuring that actuarial expertise illuminates decisions that safeguard retirements and support growth. It respects the profession while empowering trustees, members and unions. The stakes, potentially billions in additional pensions for hardworking people, demand that we act. I urge the Government to support it, and I beg to move.

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[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

I thank the Minister and other noble Lords who have spoken. I will not delay your Lordships very long because, as I said, these thoughts are from the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. However, her key point, as I understand it, is to ensure that adequate attention to those alternatives is given. Largely due to funding circumstances, the checks to make sure that that happens are not necessarily there. I have raised and highlighted this, and I hope that more attention is given to it as a consequence.

I will withdraw the amendment, for now, but I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, will wish to proceed with it again on Report, so I cannot guarantee that it will not come round again. I think this is important and my personal feeling is that not enough attention has been given to continuations instead of buyouts. The dash for a buyout has been very fashionable, but maybe the tide will begin to turn and attention to this kind of thing might help to do that. If it gives us better outcomes, that is good for everything.

Amendment 219A withdrawn.