(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Blackwood of North Oxford, on the clarity with which she introduced this legislation. On the basis of her speech, I look forward to many spirited debates with her in your Lordships’ House. I have a fair degree of sympathy with her as she has to bring forward this Bill under the constraints of her maiden speech. I thought she did that extremely well.
Before we get lost in a Bill which is bereft of detail, it is important to reflect on the purpose of the law, which is to enable citizens to understand and exercise their rights and to enable them to fulfil their obligations as citizens. It is not to provide a blank cheque or a blanket set of excuses to the Executive. This Bill is deficient in that respect. I do not believe that any citizen of this country reading the Bill would understand their rights and responsibilities under it as of April. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, who went first, reported the thunder of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Some noble Lords have heard me use the description of that committee given by Mark D’Arcy, which is that they are a group of people among whom the raising of an eyebrow can be considered severe criticism. A report such as its report on the Bill is the equivalent of throwing a chair through a window because it is pretty strong:
“Clause 2 has a breath-taking scope. Indeed, the scope of the regulations could hardly be wider … There is no limit to the amount of the payments … There is no limit to who can be funded world-wide … There is no limit to the types of healthcare being funded … The regulations can confer functions (that is, powers and duties, including discretions) on anyone anywhere”.
I and many Members of your Lordships’ House have many a time sat through debates in this House about the detail of primary legislation that enables citizens of this country to go abroad for healthcare and the circumstances in which that would be approved by the National Health Service. There is nothing in this Bill about that. I wonder whether the Government are not setting themselves up for a slew of court cases at some point in the future in which people who have been unable to receive treatment in this country see that it is possible to have such treatment in another part of the world, as the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, said, and try to do so. In particular, I am thinking of things such as fertility treatment. I do not imagine that that is the intention behind the Bill, but it is certainly possible.
We seem to be moving from a situation in which over time we have worked with our European partners, who have broadly comparable health systems and systems of publicly funded health provision which exercise similar clinical standards, and are seeking to extrapolate from that agreements with countries across the world where that does not apply and where the public provision may be extremely limited or expensive, as in the case of the United States. I think we are in some difficulty. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, was correct when he put it to the House that the Government are putting in place temporary, almost emergency, continuity arrangements for public healthcare but have given us this Bill, which is so bereft of detail that it can be much more widely interpreted. That is a problem, not just for individuals but for business.
I shall tell your Lordships about a young man I talked to about 18 months ago on this very subject. He was desperately worried about his future. He is a young man who would expect to go abroad during his career and to be a high earner and highly successful. The problem is that he is HIV positive, which means that it would simply not be possible for him to pursue his career in many places. He would be unable to do so in the Commonwealth because he would have to divulge his status and either he would not be admitted or he would not be allowed to live in a country legally. He cannot go to the Middle East, and he cannot go to America due to the healthcare costs. Therefore, he can see his world and his job prospects shrinking. Coming forward at such a late date with a Bill that is so lacking in detail makes life difficult for people like him.
I noticed during the discussions in another place that questions were put to the insurance industry, which was very honest. It is as much in the dark as anybody else. It was very forthright in saying that there are only two conditions that it can deal with under the changes in our arrangements with Europe: either having the EHIC or not having the EHIC. Frankly, if we do not have it, the cost of travel insurance will go up. Not only that but it will not be as easy for people with pre-existing conditions or disabilities to get insurance to travel for business or pleasure as it is for the rest of us.
I want to concentrate on one area which I do not think has been mentioned so far—the reciprocal provision between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. From what has been said, I understand that citizens of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom benefit from the common travel area arrangements. We also have arrangements that are currently underpinned by the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. I understand that it is not the Government’s intention to cease the common travel arrangement. It is very beneficial to people on both sides of the border: people can access specialist treatment in the Republic of Ireland; equally, citizens of the Republic can travel for treatment in the north.
Ministerial Statements are extremely important, so, when the noble Baroness responds, I would like her to explain whether under the terms of this legislation the arrangements between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland will be those in place as of 29 March and, if not, whether they are to be updated. For example, if treatments that are not currently available were to become available in the future in either the United Kingdom or the Republic of Ireland, would citizens of either country be able to take advantage of them? That is a very important point.
I think that we are in some difficulty with this Bill, and there is a particular danger for women. They might well get pregnant within whatever the timescale is, depending on what arrangements are agreed, and they might need treatment under maternity and gynaecology services. I would like to think that at the very least we might be able to give them some reassurance that they will, if only on an emergency basis, be able to seek treatment. I have absolutely no doubt that medical people the world over will abide by the oath of their profession; they will not seek to deny treatment to anyone in urgent need. However, that is not the point; the point is that we need to try to secure arrangements around which individuals and businesses can build their lives and construct their future prosperity.
I agree with my noble friend that this is not taking back control; it is a constitutional land grab. As a matter of principle, we should not let legislation as deficient as this pass through without an intense amount of scrutiny, and I hope that the Government are willing to come back with the degree of detail that should have been in the original Bill.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, forgive me for a brief intervention. I do not have any problems at all with the basic notion of what is in front of us. It is possible that I was the first person to do a surrogacy agreement using IVF, so I have a certain amount of background in this rather murky subject.
One thing that slightly concerns me is the issue of paternity or maternity genetically, because we now have a situation where children can normally trace their genetic parent. That is on the birth certificate. Here we have a slightly odd situation. For example, particularly with a gay or lesbian couple, or where someone has not only had their uterus but their ovaries removed, someone may end up receiving a donor egg which is then implanted into the surrogate mother after fertilisation. So an embryo could be put into a surrogate mother who is happy with that, but it is not genetically her embryo.
I am just trying to raise the issue of clarity. Given that Parliament in its wisdom decided that people should be able to trace their genetic mothers, someone who had given an egg in that situation could suddenly be presented with a child they did not know they had, even though their own treatment had failed 20 years or earlier. When the Minister wraps this up, can he provide some clarity on what would happen, because there is human rights issue both ways here?
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing this debate in the way that he did and giving the background to the instruments before us today. I should declare that I am a member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Surrogacy. I have a long-standing interest, fuelled by many a night sitting listening to the noble Lord, Lord Winston, as we went through various bits of legislation but principally by the work done by Surrogacy UK in 2016 when it produced a report. There was a debate in December of that year. Baroness Warnock was no longer a Member of your Lordships’ House, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was. Those of us who had been involved in legislation on this matter from the beginning in the 1980s accepted that the overall legislative framework we now have is not really fit for purpose, not least because of the many scientific advances that have happened in the intervening years. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, observed in that debate in 2016, there are now many more ways in which families, as well as children, are created.
The Minister was right that the original stimulus for the legislation was the case of a man who in 2015 had a child by surrogacy abroad, brought the child back and found that the child’s status was incompatible with our law at the time, which stated that parental orders could be made only in respect of a couple. That was two and a half years ago. In the meantime, others have found themselves in similar limbo. The courts have had to make what are essentially temporary orders. Those orders are above all for the welfare of a child: a child is being cared for by somebody who is not their legal parent and has no legal responsibility for them. We should not lose sight of that.
This measure is a welcome step forward which offers a degree of certainty not only to individual parents or intended parents who find themselves in this position but to the children. I am pleased that the Law Commission is now undertaking an extensive review of the legislation. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Surrogacy is conducting its own hearings on the matter. For just a small all-party group, the hearings have been extremely interesting. We have had a huge number of people give evidence, some with very conflicting views. I think that we will end up with an interesting report that feeds into that work. My guess is that the Law Commission will take about two years to produce a report.
My reason for mentioning all that is that time ticks by for individuals as we debate these matters. I do not suggest for a moment that we should do anything in a rush, but, at the same time, it is incumbent on us to deal with some matters urgently, because to do so is in the interest of individuals.
There are some ways in which a single person applying for a parental order will be still be left outside these remedial orders. I understand that a case is before the courts at the moment of a woman whose relationship with the biological father of a child has broken down. She is now in the position of being a single person who has no biological relationship with the child but nevertheless wishes to have parental responsibility. Another tragic case is before the courts in which one member of a couple has died subsequent to the fertilisation process having taken place.
However long the Law Commission takes to do its work, which it should do extensively and thoroughly, I think that we will continue over the years to have a small number of cases that are intensely important both for intended parents and for children. It is therefore likely that we will find ourselves back in this House making more revisions of regulations of this kind before we get the comprehensive review of surrogacy law that we need so that practitioners, medics, intended parents and children all have a better understanding of where we should be legally in this day and age.
My Lords, I will say a few words, partly reflecting what the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said. I spoke on this subject in her debate some time ago.
We should be extremely grateful to the Law Commission for taking on this, in my opinion, very difficult and rather controversial work. Only an organisation like that is going to bring this to some sort of conclusion, but as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, it will take considerable time, and understandably so—we do not want to hurry it. However, one or two problems are going to slip through the net before it reaches its conclusion. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, mentioned particular problems and some of them might be resolved, as she said, by further orders but some will still be in difficulties because some women simply do not have the time to spare in their reproductive cycles to wait for these problems to be solved.
There is another example, similar to what the noble Lord, Lord Winston, was saying. In rather rare cases of cancer, the treatment disallows women from being able to be genetically connected to the child who is being born. That is another example where we might be in difficulties over the long time period we have. I very much welcome these regulations, and I hope the department will keep an eye on difficult cases that come up. We will be looking after them as well.
Yes, because the court retains a copy of the original birth certificate. I am going to need to clarify this because it is tricky and there is a danger if I try to describe it now. I do not want to do that. I think the noble Lord is asking for clarification, but I am going to need to write to him, if he will accept that, to clarify the situation.
I hope I am going to be helpful. If I am right, I think that at the point at which a parental order is given, a new birth certificate is issued. That rather mirrors the procedure under adoption, which is the same. The point is that a child always has the right to find out their genetic history but they may not know the means of their birth. From all the things that I have listened to in this House, that makes them probably like a good 40% of people who were not adopted or the result of fertilisation but who have a different father from the one they thought they had; I do listen.
I do not want to delay things, but surrogacy is a special situation because the child is developed in another uterus, so there are epigenetic factors which may act on that child’s development. We are now beginning to understand—for example, from the study that I am involved with in Singapore—that things which happen when the baby is in utero can affect cognitive development and other sorts of development later in life. It is therefore slightly different from a normal donated gamete in a usual IVF setting or simple artificial insemination. That is why I wondered whether there will be clarity about the exact nature of the bearing mother as opposed to the genetic mother, because that seems to be important. Is that recorded on the certificate?
I am glad that over the years I have had to do my homework because I am now going to be in debates with the noble Lord, Lord Winston. I think that the issue is covered by the licensing of the clinics which are under an obligation to maintain a record if they are HFEA-licensed in this country. I believe that in certain jurisdictions abroad to which people go for surrogacy, notably California and Canada, clinics are similarly required to meet certain standards of record-keeping.
That is absolutely right. It is fantastic to be able to bow to the wisdom of noble Lords. In effect, although this is a rather inadequate way of describing it, there is a paper trail of whether it is the surrogate parent—the original genetic donor, if there is one, that is different from the parent who subsequently gets the parental order—when that is done through licensed clinics. The child has a pre-existing right to pursue that information and they are able to do so, if they want to, when they become aware of the circumstances of their birth. I think I have got that right. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is nodding, which means I can be confident.
I congratulate the noble Baroness on her tenacity in pursuing this issue and I congratulate other noble Lords as well. It has taken longer than it should have done to make this remedial order; I can only reflect on how much has happened in the last two and half years, which may be some of the reason behind that. The department is very aware of the need to watch this space. There are court cases going on. Clearly it would be inappropriate for me to comment specifically on them but, as the noble Viscount, Lord Craigavon, pointed out, thorny and difficult cases will continue to emerge and we need to deal with them as they arise if they have policy implications. We also need to ensure that we keep up the impetus through the Law Commission review, which I understand will be two years of inquiry and then a year of drafting legislation. That is why it will take three years; these things have a natural pace to them. The critical point is that at the end of the process, the Government—as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, whoever is in government at that point—should then be in a position to take that legislation forward. One would hope that if the Law Commission has done its work, that is something on which there is a pre-existing consensus and we can all move forward.
I am incredibly grateful to noble Lords for their wisdom and sagacity. This has been a very high-quality debate. I will provide the specific clarification to the noble Lord, Lord Winston, and circulate it to other noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. I thank them once again for their contributions.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I concur with what other noble Lords have said and ask the Government to take one more look at the remaining conflict of interest relating to independent hospitals. It appears they will be able to employ their own AMCPs and, as the responsible body, authorise the deprivation of liberty of people in the hospital. This could pose a huge conflict of interest. The team has taken a great deal of trouble to remove this in the care home setting, and it seems it would be relatively straightforward to do so for independent hospitals. I fully support the amendments outlined today.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for bringing forward this amendment and for having taken the time and effort to discuss the thinking of the department with many of us. I pay tribute to him and to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott. They were rookies—this was their first ever Bill—and they have done a tremendous job, not least because it is a fairly open secret that many of us think this is one of the worst pieces of legislation ever brought before this House. I seriously mean that; we have said it several times. Together, they have enabled all of us in this House to play a very responsible role in turning some very bad legislation into legislation that is still in many regards highly deficient, but not as bad as it was.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, inevitably we failed to see the wood for the trees. We were so busy dealing with big defects in what was presented to us that we did not really get the chance to stand back and look at what would be an efficient overall system. It is for people in the House of Commons to look at what remains to be done to improve the Bill as it comes to them.
Part of it is that we spent so much time looking at the role of care home managers, we did not get around to thinking about how AMCPs, IMCAs and appointed persons could work together more efficiently to ensure that the most vulnerable get the most attention. It is unfortunate that Sir Simon Wessely’s review came to us only last week, with, at its very heart, the important issue of objection, the implications of which we should have been able to discuss in this Bill. I am sure we will need to return to that.
On this amendment, I thank the Minister for widening the triggers to include the involvement of an AMCP. But I want to flag up to those who will look at this in future the change in the role of care home managers and the role they will continue to play in renewing deprivations of liberty for up to three years, which is a big concern.
I also want to return to an issue that has been raised before: why, in this Bill, do we continue to deploy the best interest argument when it comes to ensuring that somebody has an IMCA? Several times we have asked to see the evidence base for creating that hurdle to access an IMCA, and the Government have yet again not given us any. A lot of people, particularly older women with dementia, will not get an IMCA because they will not be deemed to be objecting.
Perhaps the Bill’s biggest deficiency, and one we have not discussed much, is that practically nothing is in regulation; large swathes of it will be left to a code of practice. If one goes back to the Mental Capacity Act, however, one finds regulations that relate primarily to those who will be enacting this legislation. Regulatory conditions are applied to those who can be an AMCP, and to what their training has to be, and to those who can act as an IMCA, and to their ongoing duties to maintain contact when people move and to step in when the appropriate person, for some reason or another, ceases to fulfil the obligations it was initially assumed they would.
I say to those who will look at this in the House of Commons: the Government must be required, apart from anything else, to come forward with a great deal more detail than we have been able to elicit from them. With that, I welcome what is before us today.
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming this amendment, which we will of course support. It is a little disappointing that we have not made all the progress that we wished around the AMCP. We are half way there with the pre-assessment regime in this amendment and have a commitment that the other part will be undertaken in the Commons. As the Minister and other noble Lords will be aware, the Bill has to end its passage here anyway, so we will be able to see whether those commitments have been fulfilled to ensure that the safeguards are in place.
As we discussed on Report, and in the helpful meeting with the Bill team, the amendments we were seeking—to ensure that the care home manager is not responsible for decisions about independent consultation —have been responded to. However, I am not sure we are quite there yet.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, pointed out, a question remains about independent hospitals employing their own AMCPs and whether that is a conflict of interest that needs to be dealt with by the Bill. As other noble Lords have said, we need to ensure that if the person who expresses concern is a member of staff, they will be protected under the whistleblowing regime. I accept that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, that would not necessarily be included in the Bill, but it simply has to be there, otherwise this will not work.
The noble Baroness said that we are going to congratulate each other, but I shall do that next.
My Lords, I will use the opportunity of my closing speech to offer my sincere thanks to all those in the House who have contributed to the passage of this Bill. I hope that I will not miss out any names from this list, but I want to thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly, Lady Tyler, Lady Barker, Lady Wheeler, Lady Finlay, Lady Hollins, Lady Murphy, Lady Watkins and Lady Meacher, as well as the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Touhig, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for their contributions. I also thank my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott for her steadfast support. In her first time at the Dispatch Box she was stupendous and set a high bar for future performances. Lastly, I thank my noble friend Lady Barran, who gave us an excellent maiden speech during the passage of the Bill, and congratulate her on her promotion to the Whips’ Office.
I believe that, by working together constructively over the past six months, we have much improved the Bill. In doing so, we have provided a system that will protect much better the 2 million people in our society who have impaired capacity. As noble Lords have brought to life during the passage of the Bill, that is something of which many of us have personal experience. I think that there is broad agreement that the current system does not work and needs to be changed, to put the cared-for person at the centre of it. I also believe that during the passage of the Bill through this House, and in response to suggestions and ideas from noble Lords, we have made some significant improvements. Once again I beg to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. We have not made just superficial changes: rather, some really important changes have been made.
The Bill will now apply to 16 and 17 year-olds as well as those aged over 18. We have carefully designed a role for care homes while eliminating conflicts of interest and being clearer about their role in the system. We have been explicit that the person completing assessments must have appropriate skills and knowledge, and a statement to the responsible body must be written. The Bill no longer contains the outmoded and unwanted references to “unsound mind” and we have also strengthened the provisions around appointing IMCAs, including a presumption that they now will be appointed. I hope that in practice that deals with the concern just expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. We have also made sure that the cared-for person must be consulted so that their voice is heard in every case, and today we have amended the Bill to enable families and staff whistleblowers to raise concerns much sooner and for those concerns to be acted on.
I should also say that the House has made its own opinion known in defeating the Government on the issue of specifying that arrangements should be necessary and proportionate in order to prevent harm to self, and I can confirm that the Government will not seek to change this position in the Commons. The Government will also carefully consider the amendment passed by noble Lords on rights of information being provided to the person.
The Bill will now move forward to the Commons and I can give some reassurance about several of the issues that noble Lords raised in the last debate. As I say, we have committed to make sure that the amendment passed today will be reflected in the sense of being able to raise concerns at the review stage. We will also provide clarification about referrals to AMCPs, including independent hospitals. That was a commitment I gave on Report and I am very happy to repeat it. It will look not only at independent hospitals but at whether there are other circumstances, and what they ought to be, when a referral to an AMCP ought to be direct.
I should also say a word in response to the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Hollins, about the definition of deprivation of liberty. Again, I can confirm that this is something we intend to deal with in the Commons. I hope the noble Baronesses will be reassured on that. We have achieved a lot, and even if there is more that we wanted to achieve, the contributions of noble Lords have directly influenced the changes that we intend to make in the Commons. So, although it is for those in the other place to pass the amendments, noble Lords should be congratulated on their role in designing them. I hope that they will get support when we move them in the other place.
A further question was asked about the flexibility of reviews by, I think, the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Barker. We will need to consider that. It is worth pointing out that it is a flexibility, not a timeframe, and that it is meant to allow for continuity in situations where the circumstances of the person are not changing. Clearly, safeguards in the system will allow for much quicker reviews if there is a reason for them. Indeed, the amendment we passed today is another way in which such a review could be triggered. So I will certainly take on board the noble Baronesses’ points about flexibility, but I think that there are enough safeguards in the system.
I hope that I have answered all noble Lords’ questions. I am sure that the conversation will continue. There is much work still to do. I thank the hard-working policy team for their engagement in this process, as well as all the stakeholders who have contributed, given us their thoughts, challenged us at times and as a consequence made this legislation better.
I want to end with some reflection. We know that these are difficult and divisive times in our country and in Parliament, but we have shown through the passage of the Bill that we can work together to improve legislation, reform public services and protect vulnerable people. We should all bear that in mind as we move through the days and weeks ahead. With that, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and I beg to move.
My Lords, I do not want to detain the House but I have one or two important things to say. First, the House owes a debt of gratitude to the ministerial team for their work in getting us to this point. The noble Lord, Lord O’Shaughnessy, should take a great deal of the credit for enabling all the things he listed as achievements of the House, going forward. Obviously, the Bill leaves us in a much better state than when it arrived.
There was one contribution by a Member of your Lordships’ House that we have not acknowledged but should: that of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. She has not been able to take part in many of our debates but she made an important contribution when she stood up and said that the Bournewood gap still exists. For all our work, it does, and it will continue to exist until such time as we sit down and really consider mental health and mental capacity legislation, including who makes the decisions about who comes under what piece of law. Until we sort out that gap, people will still be deprived of their liberty. We can call it by a different name, but they will be.
I will ask the Minister to reflect on one thing. Nobody came to this legislation believing that DoLS had to be preserved. Everybody knew that it was wrong. Everybody understands that we need to make greater and better use of the limited professional resources for overseeing the lives of people detained for one reason or another. We should listen to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and reflect on what else Parliament may have to do over the next five, six or seven years to make sure that the gap is addressed once and for all so that people are not wrongfully detained.
My Lords, I will very briefly add my thanks to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and the Bill team, for listening. I also thank everyone from outside who brought their own experience, either individually or as part of a professional group, a voluntary sector group or the care home sector. I thank personally those in the Welsh Government who arranged meetings for me and also brought expertise, coming from a different health service framework. That was important because this legislation must apply across England and Wales. So I add my thanks to others.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes an excellent point: we have cause for optimism not least because of the work that he, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, and so many others have done. I mentioned the decline in diagnoses year on year. The UK has met the UN’s 90-90-90 ambition in every part of the country, including London. Having done that, which is a huge achievement, of course we should set our sights higher. I should be very happy to discuss with noble Lords exactly what our target should be. Clearly, a zero infection rate must be where we want to get to in the end.
My Lords, given the Minister’s Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, about the general population, does he agree that the over- representation of people from black and minority ethnic communities, with high incidences of HIV and late diagnosis, is a continuing problem that Public Health England has yet to address?
I agree with the noble Baroness that that is a continuing problem. Infection with certain diseases is disproportionately distributed. Testing and screening are not taking place uniformly among different groups. Public Health England published an action plan about a year ago on how to improve sexual health services and is trying to address that specific issue.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my name is attached to some of the amendments in this group, most notably Amendment 88. I endorse everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, said in her introduction. It is paramount that those detained under this legislation, and their friends and family who care for them, must know in exact detail that they are being detained under a law that stipulates that their detention should be the least restrictive option for their care and what their rights are.
In speaking to my amendment, I wish to return to a theme I have spoken to throughout our discussions: the role of a code of practice. As I said in our previous discussions on the right to information—as set out in cols. 335-38 of Hansard on 15 October—there is a fair amount of unease and disquiet among stakeholders about the Government’s understanding of the duty to provide information and its place in legislation. It is important to state again that statutory codes do not exist without a statute, and the majority of laws do not have a code of practice. Codes are there only for when non-legal people are using a law directly. No one expects non-legal people to read or necessarily understand a statute and so a code is provided. Such a code follows what is in statute and sets it out in lay terms and at length. But it would not exist if the obligation in law was not clearly set out.
We have had some case law about the Mental Capacity Act code of practice. In 2018, in the case of An NHS Trust and others (Respondents) v Y, the Supreme Court said:
“Whatever the weight given to the Code by section 42 of the MCA 2005, it does not create an obligation as a matter of law to apply to court in every case”.
In the Mental Health Act code, which has been in force for a very long time, and to which the original drafters of the Mental Capacity Act looked when drawing up the legislation back in 2005, there is an explicit duty on hospital managers to provide information to a person who is detained and to the relevant interested persons responsible for their welfare.
No doubt the department will stick to its line that a code of practice is adequate. However, for the reasons I have outlined, which I think are compelling, we do not. I therefore simply wish to indicate that if the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is minded to push her amendment to a vote, she will have support from this side of the House.
My Lords, I first thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, for introducing this group of amendments, both for her own speech and for representing the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, as she does. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments clearly relate to providing information to the cared-for person, which is a critical issue that we have debated throughout this Bill.
Amendments 49 and 85, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, require that the authorisation record must be provided to the cared-for person, or their representative, their donee of lasting power of attorney, or a court-appointed deputy, and also to the team providing care in the person’s place of residence. Amendment 83, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, specifies that the authorisation record must also include details of how the deprivation of liberty, or its effect on the person, will be reduced. I will deal with Amendment 29, the first amendment in this group, shortly.
I introduce these amendments in order to talk about less restrictive care. Less restrictive care is a central aspect of the new liberty protection safeguards, as a result of the necessary and proportionate assessment. This was emphasised by the Law Commission in its final report, which concluded that,
“integral to the question of whether the deprivation of liberty is proportionate (as well as necessary) is consideration of whether there is a less intrusive alternative”.
Less restrictive care is also a vital principle of the Mental Capacity Act—as set out in Section 1(5)—and therefore should be considered at all stages of the process. It is already considered as part of the current DoLS system.
Given the abiding role of “best interests”, as discussed in the last day of Committee, as a principle of the Mental Capacity Act, it does not need to be restated in the Bill. Indeed, our belief is that the liberty protection safeguards scheme will drive less restrictive care, as it will require the responsible body to specify a programme of regular reviews. This review should be triggered if there is a significant change in the cared-for person’s circumstances. Critically, this means that if there are practicable, less restrictive alternatives available, the authorisation will cease to have effect as the arrangements will no longer be necessary and proportionate.
Amendment 86, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins, would require the responsible body to ensure that the cared-for person, appropriate person and IMCA, or independent mental capacity advocate, are given a copy of the care plan as soon as possible and those consulted with should be provided with a copy unless there is good reason not to do so. As has been mentioned, this was discussed at every stage of the Bill, in the Chamber and outside it. I agree that it is vital that relevant people are given full information about the authorisation and the rights of a cared-for person, including rights to review and to challenge authorisation.
The key point, and the reason why we do not support these amendments, is that this is already the case in law, which clearly provides that people must be given appropriate information. This is required by Article 5 of the ECHR, as enacted into UK law by the Human Rights Act. Article 5(2) sets out that everyone deprived of their liberty must be informed promptly and in a language that he or she understands. This should set out the reasons for the deprivation of liberty. Where a person has been informed of the reasons, he or she may apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of their detention in accordance with Article 5(4). It is plain from the wording of Article 5(2) that the duty on the state is to proactively provide specific information to the individual or their representative. Whether the information provided is sufficient must be assessed depending on circumstances, but, as a minimum, people must be given information in simple, non-technical language that they can understand.
It is also worth noting that the Law Commission’s draft Bill did not explicitly outline what information should be provided. The Government took forward the Law Commission’s approach, as we have been encouraged to throughout by noble Lords, because we are satisfied that Article 5 makes it clear that a person has the right to information. So while I have carefully considered whether the Bill should be amended to explicitly state what information should be provided, I believe that it would be better to set out specific details in the code of practice.
On the specific point from the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about statutory codes of practice having to sit within a framework of law, the Human Rights Act, which enacts the ECHR into British law, provides the route into law. Therefore, I believe that the code of practice is the appropriate place and has that anchor in statute. Furthermore, it is appropriate to set this out in the code of practice because it will allow us to fully and accurately capture the detail of all the people who should be provided with information, exactly what information should be provided and how, and to be able to amend it without having to amend primary legislation over time.
One of the problems with the original DoLS legislation is that it is overly prescriptive. Indeed, this House found in its post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act that the provisions for DoLS were “overly complex”. These amendments set out, for example, who should be provided with the authorisation records, but they exclude others who might need the care plan, such as members of the care team providing support in the community, not in the person’s place of residence. We believe it is precisely that level of detail that is better set out in the code of practice.
Amendment 29, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Thornton, Lady Jolly and Lady Watkins, specifically seeks to address this point. This amendment outlines that a person must be fully informed of their rights and ensure that appropriate persons and IMCAs understand their rights and duties. Further to this, Amendment 88, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, would require the cared-for person and their representative to be informed, in addition to any person likely to be carrying out the arrangements, if their authorisation ceases to have effect.
I absolutely agree that it is vital that people are informed of their rights. Let me be clear that this Bill does not take away or amend any rights. Article 5 is already clear that people have a right to information. However, we want to use the code of practice, rather than the Bill, to outline how this applies. As I said, this is so that we can provide a level of detail there that would simply not be appropriate in the Bill. We would also use the code to detail, for example, the role of the IMCA and/or the appropriate person’s role in the provision of information and ensuring that people are supported in understanding their rights.
In closing, I want to address Amendment 87 which supports, as it were, this set of amendments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, Amendment 87 would require an approved mental capacity professional to complete an investigation where the relevant parties disagree over any aspect of an authorisation. If agreement is still not reached, it would require independent mediation. I agree with her that it is vital that the new system of liberty protection safeguards ensures that the voice of the person is heard and that there is an appropriate level of scrutiny in all authorisations. That is why we have been explicit that the person must be consulted with, as we will discuss later, and why, as a result of government amendments brought forward after listening to noble Lords, if there is no appropriate person acting as a representative, there is now in effect a presumption that an IMCA should be appointed. Again we will discuss that later. It is also why we have tabled amendments to remove conflict of interest and to make clear who should and who should not carry out pre-authorisation reviews.
So while the Government recognise the important role that mediation plays within the NHS, we do not believe that it is necessary to make it a compulsory feature of the system. There are fantastic systems of mediation already available, through private, public and charitable sectors; indeed, the noble Baroness gave us an example of a further initiative in this area. It is worth noting, on this point, that the Mental Capacity Act code of practice already provides guidance about mediation. In answer to her specific question, while we do not think it is necessary to have it in the Bill, I can confirm that guidance on the use of mediation will be in the code of practice and we will make sure that that is as up to date as possible and comprehensive in taking account of new schemes.
I will finish by saying that while I applaud and recognise the importance of the right to information, not just for the cared-for person but for everybody representing them, the Government’s view is that this is already adequately accounted for in law, so we do not need to set it out in the Bill. Indeed, it may be counterproductive to do so, by not being able to be comprehensive of every category of person. For that reason, I fear that we are not able to support these amendments.
Can the Minister confirm that, if the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, is passed, it does not preclude the Government from setting out anything they like in the code of practice, at considerable length, to explain the detail of what information should be conveyed to whom and how? Does he agree that it might be helpful to have her amendment in the Bill, if only to bridge the rather large chasm between Article 5 rights and the code of practice? Would her amendment not be rather helpful?
On the noble Baroness’s first point, of course there is nothing to stop us setting out anything in the code of practice. The concern would be whether there would be a clash between what was set out in the Bill and what was set out in the code of practice or in Article 5. That is one of our concerns and it is for that and other reasons that unfortunately we are not able to support that amendment.
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I do not intend to pay much attention to many of the amendments in this group because the Government made significant moves last week in relation to the role of the care home manager.
In relation to Amendment 121, I take this opportunity to raise again an issue I mentioned during our deliberations last week. There has been a great deal of talk about the Bill and the code of practice, but there has been very little said about regulations under the Bill. In particular, very little has been said about the functions of IMCAs in representing and supporting people under the schedule which are a bit different from the role of the IMCA in other circumstances under the rest of the Mental Capacity Act. Unlike DoLS, the Bill does not make detailed provisions for this or any regulations.
Can the Minister confirm whether amendments will be forthcoming in this area in relation to the functions of IMCAs? Specifically, will the Government look at amendments in relation to Section 35 of the Mental Capacity Act to place a clear duty on the responsible authority to make arrangements to enable IMCAs to be available and to represent and support cared-for persons under paragraph 36 of Schedule 1 to this Bill and in addition to support the appropriate person to fulfil their functions under paragraph 37? Can the Minister also confirm that the existing regulation power under Section 36 of the Mental Capacity Act will be extended to reflect the IMCAs’ function under the schedule?
A particular concern that has been raised with us by stakeholders is that there is no current reference in paragraph 36 to maintaining contact with the cared-for person and supporting their rights under the schedule. Given that the intention is that under the Bill authorisations will be made for much longer periods than was intended under the original Bill—longer than 12 months—it is rather important that someone who is acting in the role of an IMCA continues to have an ongoing involvement with that person. I understand why on this occasion it may not be entirely appropriate to put that in the Bill, but it is an issue of such significance that it might well come under the aegis of regulations.
I thank the noble Baronesses for speaking to the amendments in this group. Before I deal with their questions, I say to the House that I take note of the significant margin in the vote on the previous group of amendments. That is something that the Government will reflect on.
I am grateful for the recognition by the noble Baronesses of the progress that we made on the last day of Report in defining the care home manager much better. I am grateful to everyone who has contributed to that process; we have made progress.
I turn to the specific questions posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. She asked about determining that arrangements are necessary and proportionate and inspecting proposals, conditions and indeed the care plan. The preauthorisation reviewer—as we are about to discuss, we are tightening up who can carry out that role—will thoroughly scrutinise arrangements and need to satisfy themselves that they are necessary and proportionate. It is also worth saying that in making the determination they have the power, if they so wish, to meet the person to determine that, which clearly is important. There is another critical matter, although we will come to this when we talk about conditions so I do not want to pre-empt that discussion too much: in making an authorisation, the responsible body can also then set a timetable of regular reviews to take place so that there is a process of ongoing review to ensure that the “necessary and proportionate assessment” test is always being passed.
We also said—this deals slightly with one of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was making—that if the responsible body is not satisfied that the care home manager is capable of fulfilling this function, they can take on the role of organising assessments themselves. That is, to use the phrase that we coined last time, a backstop that provides some reassurance that any variable quality in provision should not affect the process by which assessments are made and organised and the preauthorisation reviews carried out.
It is absolutely the case that responsible bodies will be able to demand to see care plans and care and support plans as part of their deliberations. That is something that they can ask for, and we would expect that they will be provided because the whole point of the process that we are trying to move to is that decisions on and circumstances around deprivations of liberty are actually integrated into care planning and therefore ought not to be divisible in that sense. I hope that that provides reassurance, but if I can provide more by follow-up, I shall be happy to do so.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked some specific questions, which I shall need to consider, on the regulation-making power. I do not want to get that answer wrong without considering it, but we can meet in the coming days to ensure that she is reassured on that. A group of government amendments about IMCAs that we will discuss later provides greater reassurance on their role, in that, if they are agreed to, there will be a presumption in favour of an IMCA, removing the gatekeeper role that we have discussed. Also, the preauthorisation review will be carried out only by a responsible body, which must apply that presumption of access to an IMCA, so there will be much greater rights to advocacy on an ongoing basis.
The noble Baroness makes an excellent point about maintaining contact. As we move to a system of regular reviews, it is important to make sure that someone is alongside the cared-for person who can flag up any problems—for example, that a less restrictive care option is available, or that there is an objection. As we discussed, passive objections can materialise many weeks or months later. That ongoing role is clearly very important, whether it is for the IMCA or the appropriate person, the family member, or whoever. I give her the commitment that we will determine that in the code of practice.
I hope that I have answered the questions from both noble Baronesses and that on that basis, the noble Baroness will feel comfortable withdrawing her amendment.
My Lords, I think the Minister deserves our congratulations on having met all the conditions that we around the House said we believed were important. I am sure that the Government always intended to have some of these matters as part of the legislation, but making them explicit in the context of the Bill is helpful. Not least, it will be helpful to care home managers themselves, who will welcome the protections from unjust accusations of undue influence in future. On behalf of these Benches—and, I should imagine, others—we welcome that.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and welcome these amendments. As the Minister said, they are very important and deal with the issues of conflicts of interest and the preauthorisation review. I congratulate the Minister on navigating us to this point, and certainly we will be supporting the amendments.
My Lords, Amendment 35 is a failsafe mechanism that will save a great deal of court time in the future and make it clear where the process has halted if things go awry. The failsafe is that an approved mental capacity professional—AMCP—can veto authorisation if the AMCP has grounds to object. However, it is important that the AMCP cannot authorise arrangements. In other words, the default position is to preserve liberty and not to impose restrictions on a person without a very sound reason. It is important that we are explicit about the extent of the AMCP’s powers, whether on the face of the Bill or in subsequent regulation, as we will need to be more prescriptive about these powers in the statutory code of practice than we have been to date, for the sound reason of flexibility and the independence of the AMCP.
The reason I tabled the amendment and feel it should be in the Bill is that there is a risk that local authorities facing financial stringencies might be inclined to authorise arrangements that are less costly, thereby revealing an inherent conflict of interest where a local authority is funding a person’s care. We have had many debates about conflicts of interest in relation to care homes but we must remember that in a whole-health and social care system which is under financial pressure, all kinds of little conflicts and pressures can creep in.
The other amendments in this group specify the different criteria whereby an approved mental capacity professional must conduct the review. I am not going to go through each line of these amendments—they are quite self-explanatory—but they show the importance of that degree of independence before taking the major step of imposing restrictions on somebody’s liberty and conditions under the new liberty protection safeguards process. I beg to move.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 77 in my name, which was drawn up because of the experience of many relatives. I make particular reference to the case of Stephen Neary, where relatives had to deal with local authorities which were telling them wrongfully what their position was in law. A great deal of responsibility was put on to the relatives to oversee the right interpretation of the law. This amendment seeks to ensure that, where they are acting in the best interests of someone who is cared for, relatives would be able to meet an AMCP and trigger their involvement. In our earlier discussions, there was an underlying sense on the Government Benches that the involvement of professionals can often be an unwelcome intrusion into families. In fact, many of them do not find that at all. Many find that the first occasion when they come into contact with a professional is the point at which all sorts of information and understanding becomes available to them in support of their loved ones.
Although I am not seeking to press this amendment today, I hope that the Minister might think about it and, if he is disposed to do so, make some supportive statements.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 46, which is in my name and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. It provides that the care home manager, or any person interested in the cared-for person’s welfare, is responsible for being satisfied that an AMCP should carry out a pre-authorisation review. The Committee has already discussed this and the important safeguards which we will be seeking come under Amendment 76A. Some of the important matters raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, have been addressed by the Minister in the Government’s amendments. I look forward to his reply.
My Lords, at Second Reading I said that there was much to be concerned about in this Bill and that I really hoped the Government would be in listening mode. For the most part, the Government have listened and have made improvements, thanks to the willingness of the Minister and Bill team to listen and to the hard work and commitment of noble Lords on all sides of the House, who have pursued improvements with all the energy they could command.
Government Amendments 41 and 96, requiring a care home manager to provide a written statement to the responsible body to authorise and renew arrangements, seem pretty obvious. Most of us would think that it is common sense to provide a statement in writing, but my late mother would often lament that I would find that, in life, sense is not that common. We certainly welcome these amendments.
The same applies to Amendments 47 and 59, which will ensure that the determination that arrangements are necessary and proportionate is to be made in an assessment, and that a record of this assessment must accompany the statement from the care home manager to the responsible body before an order to authorise arrangements is made. This is also most welcome. On this side, we certainly welcome these amendments.
My Lords, I also welcome these amendments and want to make a brief observation. Since the summer, like many other noble Lords, I have spent a great deal of time talking to practitioners and stakeholders. If one were to try to thoroughly amend and improve the DoLS and LPS systems, you would start not with the role of the care home manager but with the paperwork and the bureaucracy. Before the code of practice is written, the Government would do well to spend some considerable time talking to local authorities and practitioners about paperwork and communication, because that is perhaps the biggest cause of the backlog of people who have yet to have a proper assessment.
I hope that the Minister will take on board what noble Lords have said on this matter. It is not a commitment to the current way of doing things; rather, although noble Lords are committed to ensuring that people are sufficiently informed, we are not averse to changing and modernising the systems to make them work more efficiently.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for their support for these amendments.
I want to reflect on the last point made, which is very important. The reference is to a written statement, which tends to bring to mind a piece of paper, but of course what we are really talking about are digital records. A great deal of thought has to be put into whether a paper system—or digital records—passing back and forth is the best way to go about this, or whether we can make a technological intervention. That is particularly true if we want these authorisations to be much more dynamic, so that their consistency and application can be assessed over time. There might be technological interventions we can make to make that process easier. I take that advice on board. We will absolutely talk to local authorities, cared-for people, their representatives, charities and others in making sure that we do it right. Noble Lords will be aware that the Secretary of State is a true technophile, and I imagine he would relish the opportunity to inject a bit of innovation into this area to make everyone’s life easier. I will take that point forward.
My Lords, Amendments 61 and 67 return to two issues that I and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised at earlier stages in our debates.
Amendment 61 pertains to what happens when the circumstances or condition of a person deprived of their liberty change. As we have said on previous occasions, that may be someone with dementia whose condition deteriorates or, as in the cases cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, it could be someone with a brain injury whose condition improves and who regains some of their capacity. It is the intention under the Bill that deprivations of liberty will last considerably longer than under current circumstances.
I seek an assurance that there is an ongoing duty on care home managers and those responsible for arranging and carrying out assessments to revisit people whose conditions are likely to change to ensure that their detention is still the least restrictive option.
In Amendment 67, I use the word “conditions” in a completely different sense. As has been said, under DoLS people carrying out assessments and authorisations have the right to say that it would be in order to detain someone and deprive them of their liberty provided that certain conditions are met. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has given us memorable examples of what those conditions might be. However, in truth, the most common condition concerns medication and reviews of medication.
The Government have consistently said that the Bill does not alter that—and that, as ever, the matter will be dealt with in the code of practice—but I am simply asking for a statement from the Minister setting out the legal force by which it will be possible in future for those who are responsible for depriving people of their liberty to do so on the basis of conditions which must be met. The importance of those conditions— particularly when we talk about DoLS in the community —is that they can make something a least restrictive option and therefore admissible.
It is for that reason that I have returned to these two amendments today, and I beg to move.
I have added my name to Amendment 61 because it is important that we recognise that no one has a crystal ball—we cannot predict what is going to happen. Even people we think might be seriously impaired, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, can sometimes improve and it can be quite unexpected.
It is inconceivable that the course of a person’s illness will match the timetable of annual reviews—that is not the way bodies behave when they have an impairment; if someone does not improve within an expected time frame, they must be reassessed. Otherwise, there is a real possibility that they will languish with inappropriate restrictions on their liberty when such restrictions are no longer necessary or proportionate. In fact, in the case of medication reviews, they may have become inappropriate because they may be on medication that is unnecessarily a sedative.
Of course, those who deteriorate will also need phased authorisations and reviews. Without the Government laying out explicitly this degree of uncertainty in the timeframe and the fact that wherever there is expected to be uncertainty, it should be specified, I fear that there will be pressure to define the amendment’s principle by going to court. We will then end up with a court precedent that is not necessarily applicable to a lot of people, but which they will get caught up in anyway. We will end up with a risk-averse response. I hope the Government will be able to accept, if not the actual wording of the amendment, the principle that the timeliness and the timeframe need to be specified wherever possible to avoid that confusion.
I thank the noble Baronesses for introducing their amendments and giving us the opportunity to discuss this important issue. I will set out why the Government have taken a different approach and attempt to explain it.
It is not that we do not think conditions are important. The use of conditions should be baked into the care plan and the arrangements put forward for authorisation, rather than being added only at the point of authorisation. This is not to say that the conditions—let us call them the elements of the arrangements—pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and other noble Baronesses are not critical. Obviously, they are critical to making sure that the elements are the least restrictive. This is about when they are put in place in the care planning and authorisation process. I shall explain our approach, which I hope will satisfy noble Lords, but we can see whether further discussions are required.
I will deal with the amendments in order. Amendment 61 states that it should be determined by the responsible body,
“that the arrangements will continue to be necessary and proportionate for the period of time for which the arrangements are sought”.
We absolutely agree that this should form part of our model and I confirm that this will be considered by the responsible body.
Furthermore, under the Bill, the responsible body is required to specify a programme of regular reviews at the point of authorisation. In a sense, it gets to specify at the point of authorisation how frequently reviews should take place, to seek whether changes in arrangements or other changes have taken place. This means that the care home manager—or the responsible body, if it is carrying it out directly—will be continually required to consider whether arrangements are necessary and proportionate. That is baked into the system we are introducing.
Amendment 67 specifies that conditions can be put on authorisations and, of course, conditions exist under the current DoLS system. However, with the backlog, by the time they come into force, it is often too late, because the person has been subject to the arrangements for some time before the conditions can be applied. In developing the liberty protection safeguards system, we have taken a different approach; for that reason, conditions have not been included in the Bill. Again, it is worth pointing out that this is consistent with the approach adopted by the Law Commission, which concluded that conditions, as currently provided for under the DoLS system, were not necessary under its new scheme. The Law Commission’s final report states on page 112 that, instead of DoLS conditions, the scheme,
“focuses on particular arrangements and what will be authorised are very specific arrangements. Further, it is only arrangements which result in the minimum amount of deprivation of liberty possible that will be authorised, otherwise the necessary and proportionate condition will not be met. So the arrangements will need to be described in a way which builds in any conditions”.
In other words, arrangements under the Bill can be detailed in such a way as to have the same effect as conditions. For example, the authorised arrangements could include enabling the person to be taken out on trips with one-to-one support, or their care plan could specify that additional staff should be provided to enable the person to be taken out more frequently.
It is our view that doing this provides greater protections for the person. This approach means that conditions—or, if noble Lords prefer, specific arrangements—are considered as part of care planning, before an authorisation is sought, rather than being bolted on afterwards. Rather than being something that happens after the person is deprived of liberty, they would be an integral part of care planning, with the proposed arrangements submitted to the responsible body for review.
Notwithstanding this approach, I know the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is keen to have a statement from me about current practice, under which a DoLS lead, or best-interests assessor, can insist that deprivation of liberty is authorised only if stated conditions are made. We are not proposing to change the ability of the responsible body, whether the responsible body itself or an AMCP, to make conditions as part of an authorisation. It will still be possible for that to happen. We are trying to ensure that the decision on appropriate conditions is made earlier in the care-planning process, so that they are incorporated into the arrangements that are then put to the responsible body for review, rather than being added when the review takes place. Failure to comply with these conditions, specifically because they have been within the authorisation, would mean that the authorisation would cease to have effect, and must be reviewed. There we come to the ongoing important role that appropriate persons, IMCAs and others will have, in making sure the person is supported, so that if there are any changes in their condition, or their circumstances, a review is triggered.
I recognise this is a fiendishly complicated thing to describe, and I have probably done a fairly inadequate job of it. However, I strongly believe that, in making this change, we are not trying to remove conditions, but move the concept of applying conditions to earlier in the care-planning process. That is the right thing to do. The responsible body will continue to be able to add subsequent conditions if it feels it is necessary for an authorisation. I genuinely believe that is a better system. Clearly, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. On how this will happen in practice, there will need to be clear guidance and training to make sure that people are trained to do this, both at the care home, and in other NHS bodies, and to make sure that reviewers are capable of assessing such arrangements and making their own subsequent conditions, if they feel it is necessary. That guidance and training is something we aim to provide, of course.
I hope I have explained why we take the point the noble Baronesses made in tabling these amendments very seriously, and shown that the system allows for it. It puts this consideration earlier in the planning process, we hope with better effect. We have been guided by the Law Commission’s approach in this way. I hope this has been persuasive, but if further discussion and elaboration is needed, I would be more than happy to give it following today’s debate.
I thank the Minister very much for his response. We are arguing not about two opposites but about a gap that I am trying to close, the answer to which lies in why conditions happen. They happen not necessarily because of any failure of care planning, which I think the Minister is talking about, or to improve care planning, but because in real life people end up being cared for in a particular place. Things to which they object or limitations in their care become apparent at the point at which someone goes to do the authorisation.
I am all in favour of improving personalised care planning and so on, but the one thing that DoLS and best-interests assessors have been absolutely united in saying is that this makes a practical difference when they go to see people. I am very happy that the Minister said that it would still be the responsibility of a responsible body to make sure that conditions are being met, and that, if they were not or if it became apparent that further conditions needed to be put in place, they would still be able to do so. With that reassurance, I am content that we have probably closed the gap that I was trying to close. On that basis, I am willing not to press the amendments.
My Lords, right from the beginning of this Bill—at Second Reading and in Committee—concerns have been expressed across the House about how the interests of the cared-for person can be ensured through the process of using the AMCP when that person is at their most vulnerable and may not be articulate at all. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, articulated exactly what we are saying. Amendment 76A, in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Oxford, is an essential fail-safe that we believe needs to be in the Bill.
Like the Minister, we have sought across the House to prioritise the issues that we thought were most important for the cared-for person. I think we have come through rather well in improving this Bill together, and mostly without having to resort to Divisions. I hope that the Minister will accept Amendment 76A, because it is certainly in line with the aspirations that he has expressed to the House about safeguarding the cared-for person. If he is not prepared to do that, certainly on these Benches we hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, will seek the opinion and support of the House, because it is certainly there.
My Lords, it has been a concern of all noble Lords who have taken part in discussions on the Bill that a person could be deprived of their liberty without seeing an appropriate professional at any time. We have argued back and forth about the extent to which access to an appropriate professional should be universal, automatic or whatever.
With this amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and those of us who have attached our names to it are trying to ensure that where the people who are most closely associated with a person have a genuine and deep concern—I imagine it would be a shared concern—but not necessarily a formal role, they can alert a professional to come in and make an assessment. We are trying to close a loophole that we think is still there.
If we can do that, we will be well on the way to doing what the Minister has indicated the Government are trying to do: to make the most effective and efficient use of professional resources amid a level of demand which we know cannot currently be met. We have moved some way from what we would ideally like to see and this amendment represents something of a compromise. I hope we can reach agreement on this last part of the link.
I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for tabling these amendments and giving us the opportunity to debate this very important issue. I will come to Amendment 76A last, because clearly that is the one about which there has been the most debate and, in a sense, has the most import. First, I will deal briefly with the other amendments in the group.
Amendment 81 would require the person who conducts the pre-authorisation review to be a,
“registered health or social care professional”,
with appropriate skills, knowledge and experience. I think and hope that we dealt with that adequately on our previous day on Report. Those qualifications will be set out in the code of practice. Indeed, we might want to go more broadly than we have done historically on this.
Amendment 76 would require that where there is a dispute between the responsible body and the professional who completed the pre-authorisation review, it would automatically go up to an AMCP. I agree that in some cases that would be the right and prudent thing to do. In other cases, it may be able to be resolved between the two parties. Again, we dealt with that before and it is something I want to consider in our deliberations about the kinds of cases that an AMCP would look at.
The debate on Amendment 76A has been helpful in bringing out the core concern here: the role of whistleblowers. We have talked about the cared-for person, their family members, the appropriate person, IMCAs and others, but this is about the people who are doing the caring or who are employed by the organisation or organisations that are doing the caring. It is absolutely right—indeed, the Bill requires—that an AMCP must conduct a pre-authorisation review if there is a reasonable belief. Clearly, a note of concern being raised by a staff member would qualify because they would have understanding and knowledge of the care of that person.
Last week we had a Statement on the Gosport inquiry, in which the health system not listening to whistleblowers was critical in these issues not being dealt with for years and people losing their lives as a consequence. As the Government said in response to that, we are working with BEIS—the department with responsibility for such legislation—to see if there is anything we can do to strengthen the rules around whistleblowers. I take very seriously the concerns that have been raised by noble Lords. As I said, with Gosport and indeed many other instances, whether they involve one person or, sadly, dozens of people, this kind of issue crops up again and again. I understand its importance.
The concern I have at this point actually relates to the drafting. Because it would provide an automatic trigger, rather than one that gave some consideration to the seriousness of the case, there is a risk that it could be abused or that frivolous cases could be raised and put to an AMCP when it was not really justified. That is, in a sense, an issue with the drafting
I want to deal with this if we can. My suggestion, if noble Lords are willing, is to meet between now and Third Reading to discuss this topic—as well as any others we want to discuss, of course—to work out the right approach. This would enable us to get to the bottom of it, work out what is right and think about that in the context of other whistleblowing issues, of which we are all aware. It would ensure that if we all agree on the need to legislate, we can agree on what that ought to look like. Again, I emphasise the importance with which I regard this issue. I hope and believe that we can do something in the coming days to deal with it in a way on which we all agree, while having the effect that we want. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness is prepared to withdraw her amendment.
Before I address this amendment, I again thank noble Lords for their willingness to talk further on Amendment 76A so that we can reach the right conclusion.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, quite rightly talked about the role of Amendment 82 being to make sure that the cared-for person has rights and that they are at the centre of the authorisation process. Of course, that is absolutely right. The reason why we have not taken the approach that the reviewer should meet all people in the system is because we want to provide a more proportionate system that nevertheless contains significant safeguards so that if there are any concerns about the nature of a review then not only would the reviewer, whether a responsible body or an IMCA, meet the person but there are opportunities for escalation beyond that.
Let me be absolutely clear that in cases where the person objects to the arrangements, the Bill already requires AMCPs to meet the person, where practicable and appropriate, when they complete the preauthorisation review. This amendment would require a face-to-face visit in all preauthorisation reviews, not only those completed by an AMCP, regardless of whether it is appropriate or practicable to do so.
I of course appreciate there will be circumstances where it is right and proper for the person conducting the preauthorisation review to meet the person, even in cases where the review is not completed by an AMCP. That is not precluded by the Bill. Indeed, it would be our expectation in some cases that that would happen. For example, if the person completing the preauthorisation review is concerned that adequate consultation has not taken place or if there is a question over the validity of any of the assessments provided, we think it right and proper for the person conducting the preauthorisation review to meet the cared-for person. Details about that, including scenarios, will be set out in the code of practice.
However, we also want to make sure that the system is proportionate. One of the problems we have at the moment is that it is not proportionate, and that is why we have a backlog. There are straightforward cases. For example, when someone who consented to living in the care home subsequently loses capacity and there is no reason to suspect that they would object to continuing to live in the care home, a meeting with the cared-for person would be very unlikely to change the outcome. In such cases, the person may have already undergone an assessment process and the person will also have access to representation—we are about to come on to IMCAs. Unless there are concerns about the validity of the assessments, it would not normally be necessary or proportionate to meet the person who, after all, had agreed to live in the care home.
A further potential effect of this amendment would be to require the person completing the preauthorisation review to meet the cared-for person, even if the person refuses. This is a topic we have discussed before. We do not think it goes with the ethos of the Mental Capacity Act, particularly in cases where someone has expressed a desire not to do so. It is important to stress that that is not just our conclusion but is also the conclusion of the Law Commission after its work. We believe that a targeted approach will be much more effective in making sure that those safeguards are in place.
While I understand the noble Baroness’s desire for reassurance that the cared-for person will be met, I do not think it would be appropriate in all cases. We have been clear during the passage of the Bill in the amendments that we have laid, and as we will specify in the code of practice, that there will be many circumstances when it is appropriate to do so but equally there will be circumstances when it is not appropriate. Therefore, we do not think it would be right to have a blanket application of this approach of the preauthorisation reviewer meeting the cared-for person. I hope that on that basis the noble Baroness will feel reassured and will withdraw her amendment.
During our deliberations the Minister has several times talked about people being forced to meet an IMCA or an AMCP when they do not want to. We have asked him to supply evidence of that. He has not yet done so, even though we are at this stage in our deliberations. Clearly this is a matter that may well return at a further stage in the Commons. I ask him again please to write to noble Lords with that evidence.
This amendment follows on in some way from the previous discussion. It relates to a practical issue. We keep returning to the fact that authorisations are going to be made, potentially for a longer time—they can be renewed for up to three years —yet there is not much in the way of safeguards for those people for whom the initial authorisation and the process of review is no longer the least restrictive option. This again uses the importance of putting something in the Bill rather than sticking it in the back of a code of practice to ensure that in the process of reviewing an authorisation and bringing it to an earlier conclusion there is information about less restrictive options for that person that would meet the authorising conditions.
This is mostly the case for people who are discharged from hospital into a care home and whose care is then very often not reviewed. At that stage their care may be taken into consideration along with the sale of their own property. That is why it is important that we consider this issue as the Bill goes through, so that by enabling there to be longer authorisations for most people we are not putting a subgroup of people in jeopardy by not having this requirement to continue to look at less restrictive options. I beg to move.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment and the other noble Baronesses who have spoken to it. The example given was very illuminating, and I rather like the idea of that happening automatically if you leave a vacuum cleaner in someone’s room. I might try that with my children and see what happens.
The key point here is that we want the least restrictive arrangements necessary to provide for the person’s ongoing care. That is the animating idea behind the liberty protection safeguards system. We believe that the effect of the amendment is catered for through the “necessary and proportionate” test. Let me explain that. When the Law Commission published its final report on this, it concluded that,
“integral to the question of whether the deprivation of liberty is proportionate (as well as necessary) is consideration of whether there is a less intrusive alternative”.
So consideration of whether an ongoing restriction continues to be necessary and proportionate is already baked in.
As I said, the nature of the authorisations to be given by the responsible body under the new system will instigate a system of regular reviews. To give an example, it might stipulate a review for someone with fluctuating capacity, where there is reason to believe that a review might be required after a period. The system being set up enables regular reviews in a way that provides greater specificity than is the case now.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, was concerned that, as the length of an authorisation was extended, although that might be all right for some people, it might not for others. That is a fantastically important point, but in the process of authorisation the responsible body will be able to stipulate more frequent reviews. Our hope would be that that would come from the care home manager or other person organising the arrangements in the process of their care planning, because they will have worked out, by looking after that person, that there is reason for regular review, but it could equally be something that the responsible body attaches as a condition to the arrangements.
The effect is that when less restrictive alternatives are practically available, the authorisation ceases to have effect. It is no longer applicable. As I said, that could be determined by continuous review, regular review or be flagged by anyone—a staff member, a family member or others—with an interest in the cared-for person’s welfare, which would trigger an updated review of the situation to see what less restrictive care was available.
Although I absolutely agree with the intent behind the amendment, the “necessary and proportionate” test is already in the Bill. It provides precisely the effect that the noble Baronesses seek. Indeed, because of the way we are dealing with specific arrangements in the authorisation process, it is something for which the responsible body can stipulate a system of regular reviews. I hope that, on that basis, they will be reassured that we are conscious of the importance of this issue but believe that it is dealt with in the Bill as amended, and that the noble Baroness will feel comfortable withdrawing the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord very much for those statements. He will understand that, given the state in which this Bill arrived in your Lordships’ House, there was a great deal of genuine concern among stakeholders that the people making the decisions—largely, care home managers—might not be in a position to know what would be a less restrictive option for somebody: to be either in their own home, or supported in the community. In this Report stage, it has been useful to go back over that ground and to put more clarification around the frequency and timing of reviews. That will be a tremendous test for this new system, given the way in which it has been set up for there to be a period of two-year renewals. Nevertheless, at this stage, I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, like all other noble Lords, I welcome the Government’s change of heart on this matter and am glad that they have understood the very real concerns about conflict of interest in relation to care home managers. However, I would like to take this opportunity to raise one other potential conflict of interest to which we have not really had time to pay much attention, and that is within the responsible body. The responsible body may well be the local authority which is funding somebody’s care home place. During meetings, stakeholders have been very concerned that the person within the responsible body who makes these decisions should not be within the commissioning part of that body, as there is the potential there for another conflict of interest.
Some further work will have to be done—I suspect either in regulations or in a code of practice—to make sure that we do not enable another conflict of interest to take place which is probably more important than a conflict of interest relating to a care home manager. It is just a case of being sure that all the decisions—although principally these decisions—are taken by a person within the responsible body but not within the financial decision-making parts of it.
I have an amendment in this group which covers the same ground that we have been talking about for the last 20 or so minutes. It is probably not essential to pursue this amendment because the government amendments on this matter seem very comprehensive.
I just want to be clear: am I right that the code of practice would not be amendable when any debate came? Would it come before this House simply for information purposes?
That would be correct at the point at which it came before the House, but it would be published for consultation before then. There will be an opportunity for everybody—noble Lords, Members of the other place and stakeholders—to consider a draft and to recommend changes. The final product would be laid before Parliament.
We discussed the Mental Health Act review a little bit last week. We await its conclusions. Many of us have had conversations with Sir Simon Wessely about what it is likely to conclude, and about the interaction between the Mental Health Act and the mental capacity Bill when enacted. Since we are expecting its recommendations in the middle of next month—I think the scheduled date is the 12th—we will have an opportunity to consider the review’s recommendations before we move to the new system. Indeed, given that those recommendations will be out at about the time the Bill moves to the Commons, they will clearly be the subject of debate there. The Government will need to respond to those findings as we go through the Commons stages.
Amendments 143A and 147A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, would require the Government, before the new system could come into force, to conduct public consultation on the Act with vulnerable people and other stakeholders and publish a report on its findings, as well as to publish their response to the Mental Health Act review and an equality impact assessment. I hope that I have dealt with the issue of public consultation, as well as consultation on the code and, equally, on the Mental Health Act review. The noble Baroness is quite right to bring the equality impact assessment to the House’s attention. It was prepared prior to introduction and required amendment following input from the Welsh Government. It will now need to be amended further to reflect the changes made in the Bill. I can commit to publishing the equality impact assessment before the Bill makes it to the Commons so that there will be ample time for consideration before it is debated there.
If the House will allow me, I will finish by thanking all noble Lords for their perseverance and patience during a sometimes difficult and challenging debate. We know that we all want to achieve the same end to our journey; there has been disagreement at times on the right way to get there. I am deeply grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. The Bill has been immeasurably improved already in its passage through this House. That is a very good thing in itself and will have a very positive impact—notwithstanding the slightly gloomy prospect given by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—when it goes to the other place and on to implementation.
Once again, I extend my sincere gratitude to all noble Lords. I hope that I provided reassurances on the amendments in this group and that they will feel able not to press their amendments.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI will come to that. I am using that technical point to illustrate that there are concerns with the amendments as laid. We recognise the importance of this issue and the strength of feeling on it in the House. As I have said, I see merit in the argument for having this defined in statute, and I am sympathetic to that point of view. I can therefore give noble Lords some assurance, and confirm today not only that we are working on this matter, but that we intend to bring forward an amendment in the Commons to give effect to a definition. We want to work with all noble Lords and other stakeholders, and of course the JCHR, to ensure that we can table an effective amendment that achieves our shared aims and gains the level of consensus that we all want to achieve, and that we shall be able to lay it and have it agreed during the Commons stages of the Bill. I hope that in providing that commitment, I have been able to reassure noble Lords of the strength of our intentions. We absolutely want to do this, and we want to get it right. I still think it will take a bit more time, but I know that, working together, we can achieve that.
I thank the Minister very much for his response to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lady Tyler and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. I acknowledge that he has listened to the arguments made in this House over the past few weeks. I understand why he cannot make a commitment to come back within the timescale of the Bill in this House. This is an important matter, and many different people have a great deal of expertise, practical knowledge, legal knowledge and so on, to put into the process of coming up with a definition, which will be extremely difficult.
Would the Minister therefore be so good as to write to noble Lords as soon as he can, setting out the timetable of the work the department intends to undertake and the people they intend to involve in discussions, which I hope will include practitioners, stakeholders and academics, medical experts and so on, as well as Members of your Lordships’ House who have reviewed the operation of the current law and found it deficient? Could he do that as soon as possible so that, when we come to consideration of Commons amendments when the Bill comes back to this place, we will be able to give this subject the attention it merits rather than the rather perfunctory consideration that we usually have to give to arguments that come back to us within a very technical parliamentary framework?
My Lords, I realise that in the last group I mentioned general medical practitioners. I ought to inform the House of my forthcoming appointment to the General Medical Council.
We have had a lot to read in the last few days, and are clearly going to have to take a lot of this on trust, but the thrust of the amendments is welcome, and I am grateful to the Minister for tabling them. As he said, they strengthen the role of local authorities and give them a clear remit to intervene where they feel that, for one reason or another, the care home manager cannot discharge the responsibilities given in relation to the authorisation application appropriately.
In the letter that the Minister sent to a number of noble Lords, he set out factors that might be considered by the local authority as a responsible body. These would be:
“Whether the person has a care plan with the responsible body … local intelligence about a local provider of care homes”,
which would suggest that the responsible body takes over the process;
“insight from local commissioners or concerns about performance … sustained absence of a registered manager”—
or presumably when the turnover of managers is high, as it can be; and—
“an increase in concerns raised by residents, their carers or families … a new service or category of care provision, and/or … provision of poor or incomplete statements”.
To me that sounds very comprehensive and welcome.
What arises from this is that the responsible body will have to make a considerable judgment and, to make it, will need a very clear understanding of the care homes in its area. Could the Minister say a little about how he thinks that local authorities might be supported in that role? Clearly, they now have a major role which they have found it hard to discharge, for reasons that have been discussed. It is important they are able to do this in a consistent way.
The Minister mentioned the code of practice. It is a statutory code of practice, which I think means that it must be followed unless the local body has very good reason not to do so. It would be interesting to know what plans the department has for checking with the local authorities—not in a heavy-handed way—how well it is going after time and implementation, and seeing whether there is consistency across the country as a whole.
My Lords, I too welcome the Government’s change of mind. They started with a very different understanding from ours of the current roles of care home managers, local authorities, best-interests assessors and DoLS assessors. I think we still have a difference of opinion about how life works in practice, but these amendments show a considerable movement, if not complete agreement on that part, and therefore we welcome them. I feel it is right to remind the Minister that when the Select Committee of your Lordships’ House did the post-legislative scrutiny on the Mental Capacity Act and its workings five years after its implementation, there was an overwhelming lack of information and data both in local authorities and throughout the health service. I rather think that we have been perhaps unnecessarily preoccupied in this Bill with who carries out a particular function rather than looking at the way those functions could possibly be streamlined and better audited.
I do not think that the work of a local authority best-interests assessor or a DoLS lead, however they may be termed under the new scheme, is actually going to change that much, but I welcome the attempt here to meet us half way, and I thank the Minister for that. Well, perhaps it is more than half way in terms of our assessment that what was being asked of care home managers was beyond their capacity to deliver. Big questions still need to be asked about their role in the overall scheme. If we had not spent quite so much time on this, we might have been able to look more closely at greater efficiencies in terms of reporting and so on. For the moment, however, I welcome these amendments.
My Lords, following our previous discussion, we turn to an area that has not received sufficient attention because we were so focused on care homes and care home managers. My Amendment 16 addresses the position of independent hospitals. I think independent hospitals in Wales might in part be addressed in Amendment 16A, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and grouped with my amendment.
In the process of talking to stakeholders over the past few weeks, it became clear that many of the concerns that we have expressed over conflicts of interest for care homes also apply to independent hospitals, and therefore it seemed to us important to state in the Bill that where a person is deprived of their liberty and is in an independent hospital, the CCG or the local health board is the responsible body as, as we have discussed in great depth and tortuous detail over the past few weeks, is the parallel case for care homes and local authorities.
It is unfortunate that we missed this and have not discussed it as much as we should have. People deprived of their liberty in independent hospitals perhaps have the worst of both worlds. They do not have the protection of the Mental Health Act and they are perhaps less likely to come to the attention of an external body, such as a local authority, because their care is unlikely to have been through the care planning process. Therefore, they could be at a greater point of vulnerability. They may also be more likely to be deprived of their liberty because the deprivation may be something to do with medication. That is why I tabled this amendment, so that we could perhaps return to this at Third Reading. It is important that the Government make clear their intention that there should be clarity about the position of people held in these establishments, and that they do so swiftly and in sufficient detail. I beg to move.
Absolutely—I would be more than happy to do so. I have tried to demonstrate our intention to deal with the issue, but we remain open-minded about the best way to do it. We have concerns with the amendments as laid—we were trying, if anything, to turbo-boost the approach. I recognise that the noble Baroness is concerned about an overfamiliarity between individuals, which she is trying to make sure that we avoid. There may be other concerns with the model that we are considering. I am more than happy to take that offline, and that would be a very fruitful discussion.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will need to think about long and hard. One thing that noble Lords will have to take into consideration is whether an AMCP would have the power to refer a case to the Court of Protection if they felt it necessary. That would be a big factor. I listened very carefully to the Minister, who used the term “hospital manager”. He will know that it has a particular meaning in the Mental Health Act. I have no crystal ball, and neither do other noble Lords, but were the role of the hospital manager in the Mental Health Act to be something on which the forthcoming review sought to make a decision, then would this not be another case for our looking in detail at the synchronisation between this legislation and the Mental Health Act? I welcome the Minister’s response. There is a bit more work to do, and considerable constructive welcome for continued work. With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, I have good news for the Minister. After all these weeks, I have finally accepted his argument that the best-interests principle in the Mental Capacity Act remains and applies to all decisions made under the Bill. I now agree with him that it is therefore not helpful to reiterate the term “best interests”, as we suggested in previous amendments at a previous stage. The even happier news is that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, agrees with me on that.
However, I am afraid that peace and harmony may not have broken out completely. Noble Lords will recall from previous debates that we have argued that the requirement that an arrangement be “necessary and proportionate” seems to be a weakening of the protections for an individual, sitting as it does with no direct connection back to those earlier best interests. We all agree that deprivation of liberty is a very important matter, and the law needs to be in compliance with Article 5. That is why we think the Bill contains a deficiency, because lawful detention is not considered directly in relation to best interests. Therefore, through these amendments, which relate both to the authorisation and the determination, we have attempted to reiterate the current wording of the DoLS legislation regarding a determination being necessary and proportionate in relation to harm to the person. In other sets of amendments and at previous times, we have had discussions about whether decisions are taken on the basis of harm to the person whose liberty is being deprived, or of harm to others. We have tabled this amendment to make it clear that it is harm to the person, and that the proportionality relates to the potential harm to that person if they are not deprived of their liberty.
Much of today’s discussion about deprivations of liberty in domestic settings originates in the failure of many professionals, in making judgments, to remember the part of the safeguards which states that deprivations of liberty must be the “least restrictive option”. It is not wrong to deprive somebody of their liberty, but it must be the least restrictive option to avoid harm to that person. We have therefore concluded—again, in discussion with stakeholders—that this amendment to the Bill would lead to greater clarity.
I can hear the words “code of practice” coming to the fore. One point on which we have never had an agreement is reliance on the code of practice. Very few pieces of legislation have a code of practice, and in health there are only two: this Act and the Mental Health Act. Anything which resides in a code of practice rests upon statute in order to be lawful. When there are arguments about whether a deprivation of liberty is lawful, those arguing the case, particularly judges, do not go to the code of practice but to the statute. What is contained in the statute may be minimal, as this is; we are simply talking about a sentence which says that that action must be “necessary and proportionate” with regard to the harm to that person. A code of practice can go on for pages and pages and include numerous examples, as it should, so that practitioners know where they are. But it does not and never will carry the legal force which comes from the wording in the Act.
As the noble Baroness knows, I am all for harmony and agreement.
I thank the noble Baronesses for laying these amendments, and I accept the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about her gracious acceptance of the role of the best-interests test. I recognise that she has some serious concerns about this legislation, which I take seriously. I have been determined to work closely with her, and I am grateful for her reciprocation in that process as we have moved ahead.
These amendments seek to specify that the necessary and proportionate assessment must be undertaken by reference to whether an authorisation is needed explicitly to prevent harm to the person. We know that an assessment of whether the arrangements are necessary and proportionate is key to ensuring that liberty protection safeguards will afford people their protections and human rights, and is a requirement of the European Convention on Human Rights. There are many factors which would need to be considered in the necessary and proportionate assessment, including the wishes and feelings of the person, whether any less restrictive measures can be put in place and the risk of harm. That is the issue that is the subject of these amendments.
Importantly, these amendments raise the issue of considering risk of harm to the cared-for person during the assessment by including that expressly and explicitly in the Bill. However, my concern is that that may be at the cost of other factors that ought to be properly considered during the assessment process. If these amendments are passed, one of the factors which may not be properly considered in the assessment process is the risk of harm to others, which the Law Commission said should be explicitly considered within a necessary and proportionate assessment, as well as risk to self. There are cases currently under the DoLS system where the risk of harm to others is an important factor in the justification for deprivation of liberty, such as a person with Lewy body dementia who may need restrictions in order to prevent harm to people in the community.
Furthermore, ensuring that no harm could come to a person is in some cases intertwined with ensuring that no harm comes to others. For example, there could be a retaliatory attack as a result of harm caused by a person to someone else. These amendments would mean that by focusing solely on harm to self in the Bill, it could be more difficult for assessors to make those balanced decisions. I therefore have some concerns about the amendments tabled by noble Baroness, as they could perpetuate the current confusion surrounding cases that involve some degree of harm to others. They could also lead to an increased use of the Mental Health Act, since the liberty protection safeguards might be interpreted as being ruled out in all harm-to-others cases. We would not want to see the Act used in this way.
Therefore, in the spirit of consensus and moving forward, I have carefully considered whether the Bill should be amended—or whether the Government could support such amendments—to explicitly set out inclusion of the risk of harm to the person. I am afraid I am going to disappoint noble Lords by saying that it would be better set out in the code of practice. I emphasise that we have considered the issue in detail, and we believe that the code of practice has sufficient force. On that basis—although I know that she will not do so—I encourage the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his reply. The problem that I have is that it leaves the guidelines for decisions to deprive people of their liberty because of harm to others in a code of practice, not the legislation. I do not believe that that is the right place in which to make that law. I absolutely accept that it is sometimes necessary to make a decision about a deprivation of liberty, and that part of that decision-making might be about the risk the person poses to others. However, that should not be determined in legislation fashioned on a set of principles and practices that are about harm to self, which is what the Mental Capacity Act is all about. A substantial judgment that will impact on people’s lives is buried away in a place where it is very unlikely ever to rise sufficiently up the scale of legal concerns or ever to be tested in court. That is my problem; that is what I think is wrong. It is therefore important that we in this House make a statement now to the Government about the importance of this issue, so I would like to test the opinion of the House.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am glad to be the first speaker on our third day in Committee. We are under some time pressure this evening because of earlier business. But, having spent yet another weekend going through the Bill, trying to understand its full intent, I have to say that it really is a shockingly bad Bill. Therefore, whatever pressure may be brought to bear, we should spend adequate time going through all the amendments before us. I will not speak at great length and I know that other noble Lords will be very disciplined, but there are some very serious issues and the potential for harming some of the most vulnerable people in our society if we get this wrong is great. Therefore, I make no apology for initiating what I hope will be a series of quite searching debates.
Amendments 55, 56 and 58 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Tyler. They deal with one of the most serious issues at the heart of this legislation—although you would not really know that just from reading it—which is the interaction with the Mental Health Act. I do not need to repeat what was said at earlier stages about the interaction of the Mental Capacity Act and the Mental Health Act because there are many people here who understand that and have discussed it as many times as I have. But I will say one thing as a result of contributions made by some noble Lords last week about Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Mental Health Act. People reading the Hansard of our debate last week might well have come away with the understanding that, if a person has mental health issues, they are dealt with by the Mental Health Act, and if a person lacks capacity, they are automatically dealt with by the Mental Capacity Act. But that is not true, in two particular ways.
One is that a person may have a mental health condition but may also have a physical condition, and the question is: what happens about their capacity to make that decision? It is not a decision covered by the Mental Health Act, even though they may be residing in a secure unit. Secondly, there are some people who are wrongly detained under the Mental Health Act: increasing numbers of older people with Alzheimer’s are wrongly diagnosed and detained. Therefore, as was recognised when the mental capacity legislation was initially developed, it is very important that we get these two pieces of legislation and their interaction right. That will explain to the Minister why, when we had the initial briefing on this from civil servants, some of us were rather astonished that there was no mention of the Mental Health Act at all until we brought it up.
My Lords, I feel that I should contribute to this debate although I have no speech prepared because, in the discussion with Sir Simon Wessely that I referred to last week, I challenged him about this issue. I asked what we were doing by debating this Bill before his review came out. He was clear and while I cannot say what he is proposing, maybe I can indicate the sort of areas he is looking at. These may help to illuminate the clear differences in certain ways between the two sets of debates and legislation.
For example, he is looking at the role of the Ministry of Justice in relation to people under restriction orders. There are specific mental illness issues in that area. He is looking at how community treatment orders operate—there might be less use of such orders—and how detentions in hospital for people with psychotic illnesses operate, and so on. Those areas are, in general, probably quite distinctive to the Mental Health Act. The bit where I feel there really is a potential overlap is in the area of mental health tribunals, which I will raise when we come on to deprivation of liberty concerns in the context of specific domestic situations. I will have a proposal to make then. I will not go into it here, as it would not be appropriate.
Sir Simon Wessely’s position is clear: he feels that the Mental Health Act needs reform and I think he will have very interesting proposals to make about that. We also all agree that the DoLS system needs reform and we are discussing how that should be done. What he is doing and what noble Lords are trying to do here are both quite complex sets of reforms. Sir Simon Wessely’s view—I hope that he would agree with me—is that these two sets of reforms need to be in place for quite a period. He talked about a decade, actually. There is also the Northern Ireland situation; there are proposals for some bringing together of these things there. There is of course no Government in Northern Ireland but Sir Simon Wessely wants that Northern Ireland Government to be formed and for them to be the pilot of all this and see how that works over a period of years. We would then come forward with some proposals, as and if appropriate, for bringing these two pieces of legislation together.
I hope that I have represented Sir Simon Wessely properly. It is important for us all to be aware that we do not have the support of the person in charge of the review of the Mental Health Act when we say, “Come on, what are we doing by having this first? Surely it should all be done at once”.
I want to make it clear to the noble Baroness that I am not talking about bringing these two pieces of legislation together. I know some people have suggested that that should be done, but I am not asking for that. I am simply suggesting that this legislation, which makes a substantial change to what has been the basis of decision-making about best interests on the basis of harm to self, is now going to include harm to others. We were told back in the summer, when the Minister sent us a letter, that the Government were waiting for the outcome of the Mental Health Act review to see what the impact would be. We are now being told, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, confirmed, that that basis of decision-making is changed by this legislation. It is linked to the necessary and proportionate assessment that people will have to make. I think that is a major change that will perhaps result in the detention of quite a number of people. I do not think it is unreasonable for the Government to wait until Sir Simon Wessely has published his report to ensure that the two pieces of legislation are not drifting further apart.
I have to disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. Mark Neary had to resort to the law, not to a code of practice, to get his son out of a place where he should never have been detained. We need to have further discussions about what needs to be in the Bill and the role of regulation and the code of practice. I think she has a fundamentally wrong take on this. This is about legal protection for very vulnerable people. That sometimes has to be in a brief outline in law. It has to be stated in the Bill that a person has to be spoken to face to face. We can then go on to put a load of stuff in the code of practice about how we do that.
To pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I think this is a terrible Bill containing huge holes and some real problems. If the Government take the tack they took last time, we may be able to improve it substantially, but we are in danger of putting one bureaucracy in place of another bureaucracy, and the only difference between the two is that there are far fewer protections for the most vulnerable people. We would be somewhat negligent to go ahead on that basis. I cannot approach the Bill in that way.
I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Tyler, for tabling this amendment. I agree with the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about the state of the Bill. I am rather—“disappointed” may not be quite the right word—surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, who has brought discipline to the House to focus on good legislation and how it should work, is suggesting that we have to have something, so this is it. I really hope that that is not the case and that this Committee will have revealed to the Minister, and particularly to the Bill team, that many elements in the Bill need clarification, need to be changed and can be improved. That is our job, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is highlighting but one of those elements. In fact, the amendment that I am due to talk about next refers to the difficulties that the Bill has brought and the differences between the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act.
The last month or so has been very revealing. The Bill was sold to us as something really quite simple that was going to streamline things, get rid of the backlog, save some money and so on, and it really needed only one day in Committee. That is certainly how it was sold to me on these Benches and, I am sure, to other people in the House. In fact, what has happened over the last couple of months is that all the stakeholders and people who are writing to us are saying, “No, this will not do. This Bill does not work. It is dangerous and difficult”. It needs clarification, and these amendments highlight the areas that need it. We are going to move on to other areas that need clarification and which will certainly need amendment. This is an important and legitimate question to ask about the Bill.
I thank all noble Lords for taking part in that debate, which was a useful exchange of views and information. The Minister is in some difficulty, because the two organisations that he cited are on record as saying that they do not support the Bill in its current form. I remain of the view that we run the risk of attempting to deal with an underfunded, under-resourced system by putting in place another underfunded, under-resourced system which dilutes the protection of vulnerable people.
Ahead of debates on other groupings, I simply ask how many times the Mental Capacity Act and DoLS codes of practice were changed. How many times were they amended? I do not disagree that a code of practice is a good place in which to put examples; I do not think it is a substitute for having well-drafted legislation and regulations—regulations can often be changed.
I will read Hansard with great care, but I reserve the right and hope, with the assistance of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who is not in her place but is equally concerned about these matters, to return to the matter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, for tabling these amendments and precipitating this discussion. I will move straight on to the substance of the amendments. Amendment 61 provides that local authorities must make arrangements for a named person to be in charge of training and revalidation of approved mental capacity professionals and that local authorities must make arrangements for contracts with neighbouring local authorities and health bodies as required.
On the issue of approvals and training, the Bill is clear that local authorities must approve individuals to become AMCPs, and regulations under paragraph 33 will make provision around training, qualifications and other eligibility criteria. The question of what kind of training there should be and who pays is something that we discussed at some length on the last Committee day. That was more in relation to care home managers, which was primarily the focus of the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The same read-across applies to AMCPs as well. On that occasion, I committed to bringing forward more details of what the training would look like. I also confirmed that, in England, Health Education England and ADASS would be responsible for working with Skills for Care, and Social Work England. Those are the bodies that would be responsible for overseeing and designing the training. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, asked about the rights of individuals. Of course, that would be the centrepiece of any training programme to make sure that those rights are properly respected.
On the specific question about local authorities naming an individual, I say that the Bill does not prevent them doing so. It is something that they are able to do and, in our view, it does not need to be set out in primary legislation. There is no such requirement for best-interests assessors or approved mental health professionals, I understand, and that has not caused any difficulties in practice. To that extent, we can mimic the arrangements in place there.
Making arrangements with other local authorities is again not precluded by the Bill. Clearly, that is something that local authorities will want to do, depending on the arrangements they have commissioned in care across different authorities. I can confirm that we will provide guidance on this in the code of practice.
Amendment 61A adds to the criteria that must be met for a person to become an AMCP. They must be,
“a registered professional, with a minimum of three years clinical experience”.
A list sets out whom that could include; that list has been added to by one tonight, which in some senses exemplifies the nature of the problem. I completely agree with the noble Baroness: we need to set out not only the kind of professionals but the kind of qualifications and experience. There has to be a balance and a mix between all of those. That will be set out in regulations. The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked about the proper place to set out the rigidity or robustness, and we believe that the appropriate place would be in regulations, which provide a degree of flexibility that would not apply if we enshrined this in primary legislation. That is why we are proposing the approach of defining the groups that should be acting as AMCPs.
How many cases have been taken to the Court of Appeal on the basis of regulations not being observed, as opposed to something in an Act? I do not expect an answer now, but I would like to know.
I am afraid that I do not know, but I will write to the noble Baroness and circulate the letter to all noble Lords.
To conclude, I hope that I have provided the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, with the reassurances that she was looking for and that she will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, in this group of amendments we begin to get into the issue of IMCAs and how that whole system will operate. In Amendment 63 I use the words,
“there is reason to believe”,
because I feel strongly that anyone who is concerned about the cared-for person—whether they are family, a friend who knows them well, a care assistant in the care home, if they are in a care home, or somebody who is coming into wherever they are being cared for, such as supported living—must be able to raise them independently, if necessary anonymously, and to request that an IMCA is appointed to go and see what is happening.
In Amendment 64 I removed the word “only” because I was attempting to remove the veto from a care home manager. The potential veto of a care home manager has caused so much concern in debate, and a great deal of anxiety in the briefings that have come through to us. I stress that advocacy—we will come on to that overall—needs careful monitoring, too, and people who act as advocates need support and supervision. Not just anybody can be an advocate, and we have to be careful that we do not exclude family and those who know a person well by having an advocate come in when in fact a family member who has known them for years may be in a much better position.
Also, we have to have a way of screening out advocates who, for whatever reason, may not be the right people to do this at the time. Unfortunately, it is inevitable and part of human nature that people will want to work in a field if they have had some experience of being on the receiving end. But certainly, when you look at bereavement counsellors and so on, they need to have a clear period before they are selected, and they need to be carefully selected and screened, and supervised. We are talking about extremely vulnerable people here, and the last thing we want to do is somehow to open the door to them being vulnerable at somebody else’s hands through our best intentions. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is again a rather fundamental indicator of some of the things that are badly wrong with the Bill. The words “best interests” appear in it three times, and twice they are used in relation to a care home manager being able to restrict access to advocacy. As the Bill stands, referral to advocacy is controlled by a relevant person, either the responsible body or the care home manager, and an advocate must be appointed if a person has capacity and requests an advocate—that is quite rare, and I have to say that under the Bill it would be something of a miracle, because they do not have the right to information about not only their current circumstances but about other less restrictive options. The Minister’s statements on information last week, when he referred to GDPR, were so strange that it has taken me a considerable time to work out that he had completely misunderstood that under the current system people have a right to information. They have the right not to request information but to be provided with information, which this amending Bill severely restricts.
However, the second condition is by far the most worrying. Somebody can request an advocate if the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is,
“satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the … person’s best interests”.
I invite noble Lords to think what would have happened if those words had been in law during Winterbourne View. That is why I am quite happy to use the word “shocking” about the Bill, as this is unacceptable. My amendments would try to get rid of the abuse of the term “best interests” to limit vulnerable people’s access to support. The Minister knows that under the DoLS system, by and large, if somebody requests an advocate, it is up to the relevant body to try to do their best to find one, or that they find an appropriate person. I refer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that under case law at the moment, local authorities have the right to override if an appropriate person is not doing their job properly on behalf of the person. That too will be undermined by the Bill.
The Minister will also know that if somebody has no relatives and nobody else in the world—they are “undefended”, to use that rather archaic but useful and clear term—they have an automatic right to advocacy. I know that much will be made of advocacy being expensive, advocates being a resource that is not readily available, and that people who do not need advocacy will be unnecessarily interviewed. I am quite happy to talk at length to the Government about ways in which advocates or advocacy resources could be better used and better targeted—but absolutely not by drawing it like this, putting this sort of hurdle not even in a code of practice but in a Bill.
My Lords, we on these Benches very much agree with the purport of these amendments, which again bring to light some of the ambiguities in the Bill and some of the rights that are not properly respected by it. Over the next period the Minister will not only need to give us a theoretical answer but have to answer things such as the question about Winterbourne View, and look at the hard examples of real experience which some of us have been receiving in our postbags over the last month. We will need to return to this over the next few weeks, and possibly even at the next stage.
I thank the Minister for that explanation. Given that the Bill as drafted is essentially a “get out of jail free” card for bad care home owners, the Government must have a really good evidence base to have come forward with a proposal as sweeping as that. I wonder whether the Minister can share with us the evidence that has led to the Government putting this in the Bill. It really should be quite convincing, given that it has got to this stage. It would be helpful if he would let noble Lords see that evidence.
I am happy to discuss the issue with all noble Lords, as I have said in the past. I return to where I started: the intention of this approach is to make sure that independent advocacy is not imposed on someone who genuinely does not want it. It is not to provide a “get out of jail free” card for poor care home managers. If that is a concern, I take it very seriously, but it is not the intention of the Bill. However, if it is the case, something needs to be remedied. Let me assure noble Lords that I will make best efforts to do so as we move forward from Committee.
This has been a very useful discussion. In some sense it has provided a degree of continuity from our discussion last week, while moving on to the issue of advocacy, which we will clearly explore further. I hope that, with the reassurances I have given at this stage, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, this debate has been extremely interesting and, in many ways, gets to the nub of some of our concerns. In looking at the Bill, one thing I have tried to do is to benchmark its procedures to see how they would work. I was involved in prosecuting appalling care in EMI homes. I am trying to see how we could have discovered sooner that there were problems there.
I share the concern about the care home manager having too much power. Having said that, I have found the Minister’s answers today reassuring, as they were on the second day in Committee. I suggest, however, that the number of objectors will be very few, because many of these people have such impaired capacity and are not in a position to object—it may be other people who speak up on their behalf.
I wonder whether the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, agrees that, when you watch well-trained advocates at work, you see that they absolutely understand if their presence is upsetting somebody. They are not routinely attempting to force themselves on to people who definitely do not need their help. The question of whether somebody wants their help or not is a more nuanced professional judgment.
I agree with the noble Baroness that when they work well, they can work extremely well. As I said earlier, I would also caution against the family and other people being potentially pushed aside, and people being not adequately supervised or monitored.
We have a great deal to consider outside the Chamber tonight. I am grateful to the Minister for being in listening mode so far. This group of amendments and the next are the ones that we will need to have a big discussion about. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 78, but I should like to say a word in support for the amendments spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to which I have added my name. These amendments concern the arrangements for the appointment of independent mental capacity advocates and they sensibly seek to ensure that an IMCA must be appointed if the appropriate person would have substantial difficulty helping the cared-for person to understand their rights, involving them in decisions and assisting them to exercise rights of challenge if they wish to do so without the support of an IMCA. I want to make it clear that relevant rights include the right to make an application to the court and the right to request a review of the arrangements. The responsible body must ensure that cases are referred to the court when a cared-for person’s right to a court review is engaged.
The concern is that at the moment, referral to advocacy is controlled by the relevant person, who is the responsible body or the care home manager. An advocate must be appointed if the person has capacity and requests an advocate, which is likely to be very rare, or the person lacks capacity and the relevant person is satisfied that being represented and supported by an IMCA would be in the person’s best interests. The problem, which we have now debated a number of times, is that the right to advocacy seems to be more limited than under DoLS, and it is at the discretion of the relevant person not to refer if it is not considered to be in the best interests. As has been commented on, there are only three references to best interests in the entire Bill, and two are used at the discretion of the care home manager or the responsible body to actually limit the right to an IMCA. We have to build in some more safeguards, including referral to the Court of Protection. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, which looked at the original Law Commission work, said that the responsible body should be under a clear statutory duty to refer cases where others fail to do so.
I was interested to receive over the weekend an email from the carers for HL in HL v UK ECHR 2004, otherwise known as the Bournewood case. They have always been critical when they observe bad practice and the failure to uphold a person’s rights. They say that reading the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill and following its passage through the parliamentary process so far has been depressing and leaves them feeling extremely frustrated and angry that the work they started in 1997 and the protections for the person that came about from that work are now being thrown away by this Bill. The lack of any of the protections they argued for individually and collectively, which at least had a fair hearing when they gave oral evidence to the JCHR and, they believe, were mostly reflected in its recent paper, appear to have been completely ignored, as has most of what the JCHR had to say. They say that anything less than the JCHR recommendations, along with nearly all of the proposals from the Law Commission, would be a reduction in the value of a person’s individual rights and against the concept of the MCA and even of the existing DoLS.
Interestingly, their acid test is this: if HL against Bournewood happened today under these proposals, would he be any better protected than in 1997 or under DoLS? They say that given the attitude of the professional employed by the hospital managing authority at the time, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Bill places more control in the hands of those very professionals and shows less consideration of HL and those who were trying to get him out. In its current form, it is a monumental failure. I know that the Minister thinks that this is an exaggeration, but coming from the carers of HL, it suggests that there are real and genuine concerns about where the Government are going. My fear, as I said last week, is that essentially we are seeing a streamlining of the bureaucratic process and many of the safeguards are being reduced. That is why access to the Court of Protection is so important.
My Lords, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 75. I do not wish to rehearse the arguments we had on the previous group but I want to put one question to the Minister. Why in paragraphs 36 and 37 do we suddenly see the term “relevant person” being introduced? It is quite confusing and I shall need to go back and look at Hansard. I do not want to make a wrong accusation, but I think there is confusion about the terms “relevant person” and “appropriate person”, when in fact they are two completely different things. My understanding is that a “relevant person” is either the responsible body or a care home manager, so why do we not talk about that? If that is what is meant, let us be up-front about it.
Amendment 75 asks why the appropriate person as we know them under the Mental Capacity Act has to have capacity to consent to being supported by an IMCA if the purpose is not just to put another hurdle in the way to make sure that these people—let us bear in mind that they do not have a right to be given information under this Bill—have to make a request of the care manager or the care home manager. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is right to say that the Minister has talked about care home managers and care managers; they are different, but all of them have a potential vested interest in making sure that someone does not have access to an IMCA. That, I think, would be a gross dereliction.
My Lords, these amendments go some way to ensuring that a cared-for person is not left without an independent mental capacity advocate or the support of an appropriate person. Much of the Bill as it stands represents what I think is a real assault on human rights. For heaven’s sake, we should be listening to the contributions of the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Barker and Lady Finlay, and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt. He has shared with me the email from the carers of HL and it is very powerful. My father was a miner and he would have said, “This is the experience from the coalface”. We can take this as an important contribution to understanding the difficulties that families face when they have to deal with the issues we are discussing.
Amendment 66 would give a local authority discretion to appoint an appropriate person or an independent mental capacity advocate without notification from a care home. Mencap and others have argued most powerfully that this amendment would minimise the risk of conflict of interest. That is important, as we have seen in other debates. It would mean that a care home arrangement could be more easily challenged and subject to scrutiny. Is not challenging and scrutinising what we do every day in this House? We challenge and scrutinise legislation brought forward by the Government; that is our role. Why would we deny that opportunity to the vulnerable people we are talking about in this Bill?
As it stands, the process for deciding whether to appoint an appropriate person or advocate requires a series of capacity assessments and best interest decisions made by the responsible body or the care home manager, even though both convention and domestic law have made it clear that there is no place for best interests in Article 5 appeal rights. Unless we effect change, this Bill will pass into law and we will see a cared-for person without the appropriate support of either an independent mental capacity advocate or an appropriate person—and that at a most crucial time in their life. That cannot be right. Amendments 76 and 77 are important if we are to ensure that the appropriate person gets the support they need for the role they have undertaken. We have had several long and important debates during the passage of the Bill. These amendments are reasonable and surely the Government must now start to listen.
My Lords, this is a fascinating discussion which will be familiar to the noble Lords who took part in previous legislation on mental capacity and on mental health. The thing I am most heartened by is the prediction made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, of what Sir Simon Wessely might do in his review of the Mental Health Act. Way back when the law was reviewed in 2005—I think it was then but I am hopeless with dates—I was one of a number of Peers who argued the case that people with fluctuating mental health conditions should be able to say, at a point when they had capacity, “At some future point, if I have an episode, it is likely that I may refuse treatment but, right at the moment, now that I am well, I wish to say that I want you to ignore that”. That was resolutely turned down by the small bunch of forensic psychiatrists who were behind that change to legislation. So I am glad that the world of mental health is moving to catch up with other parts of medicine, where greater involvement of patients and exercise of patient choice is something to be encouraged and not dismissed.
Many of the arguments that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, put forward were arguments which were put up against the original proposals of the Mental Capacity Act. I believe that, were this to be in legislation, we should be able to put a lot of safeguards around it. At this stage, I encourage the Minister to take these proposals and put them into the future discussions that will take place on the Bill.
I do not want to prolong this too much but I will ask the noble Baroness: has she in any way lost confidence in the proposal that she put forward when the Mental Capacity Act was a Bill before us? It was for an advance statement of wishes, which has, when properly used, been a very powerful tool to make sure that somebody is listened to. My concern has been that our discussion to date has been about the wishes and feelings of the person as previously expressed. From the way she was talking, I am concerned that it sounds as if she might have lost confidence in the ability of that—because, as I have said, I have a real concern that tying somebody legally to enforcing something which was said in advance could potentially be really dangerous.
No, I have not lost confidence in that; I simply wish to undertake further discussion, given that—I say it again—it looks entirely likely that mental health legislation may be changing. I think, in light of that, that it is a wise discussion to have.
May I just add that I think it is important to read all the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton? She provides for any opportunity, any chance, that the individual may indicate that they have changed their mind, at which point those things come to an end, essentially. They have to be quite specific that if there is any doubt in somebody’s mind that this is no longer something that can be continued, that there is anxiety about them being implemented, then it comes to an end. So I think those things can be taken care of.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for tabling this amendment, which I support. I will keep my remarks very brief and make just two points.
The first point is about the spirit of the amendment. Clearly it aims to avoid broadening the scope of the legislation to apply to people who lack capacity and are living at home but who may need their liberty to be restrained. My comments relate to the 450,000 people mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy: those for whom there may be no formal care plan in place. I want to consider how issues relating to safeguarding and deprivation of liberty would be identified; namely, how do we uphold the rights of vulnerable people in those situations?
If we think in practical terms, there are potentially two routes to safeguard those cared-for people: one is the Mental Capacity Act and the other is the Care Act. I strongly agree that the Care Act 2014 is the route that we should go down. In almost every family, there will be multiple health professionals involved, either by going into the home or through appointments. They are equipped to identify both the safeguarding and the deprivation of liberty issues. It is through the Care Act that we can have the most human and proportionate response for those families.
Secondly, I want to deal with the point behind what the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, alluded to: cases where somebody is being cared for at home but then perhaps their carer has a fall and has to go into hospital, and the cared-for person then briefly goes into a care home and is therefore subject to liberty protection safeguards. What is the status of those safeguards when that person returns home? It would be very helpful if the Minister could clarify that.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, said, these arrangements might be idiosyncratic, but almost all of us have had experience of them and we value them greatly.
My Lords, I want to make a couple of quick points. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, is of course right that the whole issue of DoLS and the community is known to be a problem. However, the examples she gave seem to me to be examples of people not understanding the DoLS legislation and applying it wrongly, rather than the legislation necessarily being wrong. It is always important to make the case for the rights of families to reject undue intrusion, but I want to share with her the case of a young man with whom a learning disability organisation was working. The organisation achieved great results and he did really well. Prior to his involvement with the organisation, he would sit all day in a part of the living room that had been bricked off by his parents, with his own chair, his own television and being fed through a hatch. That was in a domestic setting. I need not tell the noble Baroness that we need to be quite careful when drawing up legislation.
It is a great shame that we have been presented yet again with a piece of legislation that came out of nowhere when we could have had a proper consultation. The people who are out working in the field at the moment having to administer DoLS understand many of the problems. They know that issues that arose partially from the application of the Cheshire West ruling and the High Court judgment have caused a problem. But amending a really bad Bill is not the way to deal with this problem.
I want to make a couple of points, but I first draw the attention of noble Lords to my interests in the register relating to learning disability. It is interesting how to read this amendment. I looked at it and thought about individuals in domestic settings, and the charity that I chair does just that. We put four or five individuals into a domestic setting. A proportion of them will have a DoLS. If noble Lords go into the house, it looks just like an ordinary home. Each resident pays rent and would consider it very much their home. Carers offer 24-hour support and locks are well and truly in evidence. Over the weekend, I asked our director of operations what proportion of the people we support were subject to DoLS, and she said thousands. It is just the norm.
I understand that the noble Baroness’s intention was to take this into a family setting where there is mum, dad and a child who may well be an adult—certainly, we see parents in their 80s caring for their children with a learning disability who may be in their late 50s or late 60s, and the parents are at their wits’ end. All that fits with this amendment so, whatever its merits, the wording needs to change but it is certainly worth pursuing.
This is the last amendment, and I will be very brief. It is quite appropriate that the last amendment we consider is about Article 5 of the ECHR, which is about the core of the Bill: people’s liberty and the deprivation of it. I have four things to say. The reason this amendment is so important is because it addresses the things that we have found lacking in the Bill which we feel need to be addressed. They are: the availability of information; advocacy and the fact that people need to have access to champions; representation; and the conflict of interest that arises when a detainer is required to assess a detainee. Particularly where a financial interest is in play, it is obvious that it has to be addressed if the proposals in the Bill are to be Article 5 compliant, which they need to be. That is the test that we need to apply to the Bill all the way through. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness has given us this opportunity to discuss a really important matter, albeit that it is late at night. I noted what the Minister said at various times throughout the debate about reliance on the code of practice. He will know that, as we have been trying to make clear all the way through the debate on the Bill, if some rights are not statutory rights in the Bill, then compliance is inn question. I rather suspect that the Bill that was presented to us was not compliant. I do not see how a Bill which, on the face of it, would enable somebody to be detained without being met and assessed by a professional person could be compliant.
There are a number of key matters which the Government are, at the moment, talking about putting into the code of practice—perhaps, possibly on a good day, into regulations—but which need to go back into the Bill. If they do not, the responsible body will not have the statutory responsibility to see that they are carried out. They are: the basis for the detention and the necessary and proportionate test and when that test applies; the role of IMCAs and access to appropriate persons; professional qualifications and training for people undertaking those pre-authorisation reviews; where an AMCP referral should be made; and the obligation to provide information to the person and their family about authorisation. All those things are important.
I say from these Benches that if we do not have considerable movement towards putting those things into the Bill, however briefly, the Bill will still be in trouble when we come to Report.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberI absolutely agree with my noble friend that more research is required. Clearly, long-term research is also required here to track people throughout their lifetime and to understand the physical and psychological outcomes. The NHS England service was developed on the basis of peer-reviewed research—the best research available. However, it is still in its infancy, and we need more research to make sure that the correct services are being given to children and young people who, in many cases, are in quite significant distress.
My Lords, will the Minister confirm that surgery for gender dysphoria is never carried out before the age of 18, and that young people receive hormone treatment only after extensive periods of assessment, not just by psychologists and psychiatrists but also by endocrinologists, all of whom have to work to clinical guidelines?
Yes, I am happy to confirm to the noble Baroness that no surgery should be offered to under-18 year-olds; no cross-sex hormones, which change biological gender, should be available to under-16 year-olds and even the use of hormone blockers is highly unusual for those under the age of 15. That is set out in the guidance and adhered to by the Tavistock and Portman trust, which delivers the service for children.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is our job to look at how things will and will not work and what the alternatives are. The noble Baroness takes a perfectly legitimate position that says, “If this won’t work, what will?” In a way, that underlines a lot of the discussions we have been having in this House: we need some time to discuss this Bill and we have not been able to have that.
My name is to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt. We are questioning the ability of the care home manager to be able to do this at all. The words that have been used to us by the stakeholders—we have now talked to dozens of stakeholders in the last month or so—are “capability” and “capacity” of care home managers. Professionals question the capability and local government and other institutions question the capacity. Those words are being used constantly while we discuss this issue.
It is also worth mentioning the voice of the care home managers themselves, which is starting to emerge. We recently had a briefing from a large group of care home managers who feel that they are not qualified to take on this role or to carry out assessments and that the administrative burden they could carry could mean that they will not have the capacity to take on the extra work to carry out liberty protection safeguard assessments.
There is some confusion here with what the Minister said during the first day in Committee and in the letter he wrote to us all following Second Reading. I admit that I am confused as to whether we are talking about initiating and carrying out assessments and what the powers of the care home managers are. It seems that the Bill team and the Minister have given us several different descriptions of what those roles might be. That has not helped our consideration of our concerns.
Mencap has stated that it believes that the views of the cared-for person have to be at the heart of this part of the Bill and that it should be refocused accordingly. The comments made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, suggest that that has not yet been achieved, and that the role of the care home manager makes it less rather than more likely. That has been said to us not just by Mencap but by many stakeholders. They are concerned that the cared-for person is not at the heart of the Bill. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the Government have got this aspect of the Bill right and whether they need to find a different way of delivering it.
My Lords, I wanted to respond in part to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. The original legislation was brought in on the basis of agreement across all parties in the House; so, too, was the report which reviewed the workings of the Mental Capacity Act. There was a unanimous view that DoLS need to be revised; they are not working.
It is interesting that many of the criticisms that have come to light in recent months have been from people who do not defend the current system but who have grave concerns not just about capacity but about some basic assumptions being made—not just about the role of care managers but about how the arrangements will work in practice. There is a quite legitimate view that the legislation will not solve the problem nor necessarily deal with a backlog; it will just shove it somewhere else. We need to think our way carefully through that because, as I will go on to say in debates on later amendments, there is no doubt that there is a watering down in the legal protections proposed by the Government. The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, are therefore right that we should examine in some detail exactly what the Government are proposing, because up until this point it has been quite difficult to understand it.
I thank the Minister for sending his letter of 4 October —he did so in the characteristically open and respectful way in which he treats this House. However, I want to ask a question which is germane to what the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is trying to achieve in her amendment. The letter states:
“Care home managers will be responsible for arranging the assessments that are needed for the authorisation. In most cases, they will use assessments that have been completed by a social worker or a medical professional or others as part of the care planning process. This means we will reduce the duplication that exists in the current DoLS system and ensure that people access the safeguards they need”.
Exactly what assessments is the Minister talking about? DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. It would be very helpful if he could say that, because it is one of the fundamental assumptions that we are all working to and which may turn out to be incorrect.
My Lords, I want first to thank noble Lords for their amendments and for their contributions to the debate. Reflecting on our first day in Committee and on Second Reading, it seems to me that an enormous number of the questions with which we are dealing are about the creation or definition of a new role for the care home manager—a number of the amendments that we will consider today deal specifically with it. I shall deal with those and the many questions that noble Lords have asked.
Given that it has been more than a month since we had the first day in Committee, I would like to reflect on some of the other issues that were discussed on that first day to demonstrate that there has been some progress. I will also explain why, although we are undoubtedly dealing with some difficult and complex issues that we know we have to get right, I am confident that if we work together, we can do that. I am quickly going to pick three issues in respect of which there has been some progress.
The first issue that was raised is extending the scope of the Bill to include 16 and 17 year-olds. I said in Committee that we would look at that and I can tell noble Lords that we will bring forward proposals to include that group in the scheme. I will also reflect on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Finlay and Lady Barker, about the role of the cared-for person being front and centre. In fact, that was the one obligation to consult that was not translated from the Law Commission report into the Bill. Clearly, if we want to get the improvements that we want to see, it is essential that that person’s wishes and feelings about proposed arrangements be at the heart of the model, so we will ensure that the Bill reflects this.
As the noble Baroness says, there are conflicts of interest of various kinds; the important point is that there are protections against any conflict of interest. Typically, those will be through the regulatory authorities, whether the professional bodies or the CQC, which of course inspects all care homes and has found that 80% of them provide good or outstanding care. I believe that there are systems within the current regulatory framework that will provide for that oversight and prevent conflicts of interest. There is also the fact that the responsible body will carry out the reviews and that there is an opportunity to refer to an AMCP.
My Lords, the Minister has made several points, each of which needs to be gone over with great care—but I want to take him back to one of them. In his letter of 4 October, he said that the Bill is explicit that a necessary and proportionate assessment must be completed by someone who is suitably qualified and that case law establishes who is qualified to conduct other assessments. However, that is not actually so. What the Bill says in paragraph 16 of Schedule 1 is:
“The determination required by this paragraph is a determination that the arrangements are necessary and proportionate … The determination must be made by a person who appears—(a) to the care home manager, if the arrangements are care home arrangements, or (b) to the responsible body … to have appropriate experience and knowledge”.
So that wording does not say that it has to be a medically qualified person, and I am not sure whether case law establishes that a capacity assessment must be carried out by a nurse or a social worker. Under the Mental Capacity Act, you get best interest assessors who are not medically qualified; that relates to an amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I suggest to the Minister—and I will suggest this quite a lot—that it should be in regulations rather than in the code that the minimum standards for completing assessments should be made.
On the first day in Committee the Minister said:
"Care home managers are already required to make applications and to consider capacity and restriction. Effectively, the new model recognises what they are doing but also allows for a further escalation”.—[Official Report, 5/8/18; col. 1829.]
At the moment care home managers do not make many of the assessments. They do not do capacity assessments. They do not make decisions about whether somebody is objective. It is not up to them whether an advocate comes in to see somebody. It is taking the truth to its outer limits to liken what happens now to what is intended under LPS.
When the Minister uses the word “escalate”, what is clearly understood not just by noble Lords but by stakeholders is that many of the protections, such as access to an advocate or to an AMCP, have deliberately been weakened in the Bill from what they are under DoLS. So I do think the Minister is somewhat overstating the case. That is what has given rise to many of the fears that have been expressed by a remarkably wide range of stakeholders. I therefore take some issue with what he said.
We believe that case law does establish that suitably qualified people need to be appointed. Clearly that is something we need to continue to discuss to persuade the noble Baroness that that is the case, but that is our understanding. As she pointed out, “suitably qualified” can include medical and other qualifications.
On care home managers’ capacity, they are of course carrying out some assessments. The intention is they will carry out more assessments. I agree with the noble Baroness on that point. The point that the noble Baronesses, Lady Barker and Lady Thornton, raised was about the capability and capacity of this group of people to carry out these roles. On our previous day in Committee I committed to explain how we would ensure that that group of people had the requisite training and skills to carry out these kinds of assessments.
The noble Baroness made a point about weakened access. I want to update the House on our thinking about making sure that the person is consulted. We are trying to create a more proportionate system such that, where all those concerned with the care of a person are content that the arrangements have been properly put in place, it does not need to be escalated and reviewed by an AMCP or similar person. The problem we have at the moment is that the system takes every decision to the highest possible level. This is not about weakening access but about trying to have a proportionate system and also about making sure—we will debate this further tonight—that at every stage there are the right opportunities to seek advocacy support and to refer concerns so that an AMCP or responsible body can intervene and review a case if necessary.
Unless we find a way to deliver a more proportionate system we will simply be re-enacting the system we have now, which is not working. This is why I am so keen to work with noble Lords to make sure that we can determine the proper role and responsibilities of, and checks and balances on, care home managers so that we can get the system right and deliver a reform that saves money, enables more people to have their cases reviewed and enables us to make sure that people are protected, which is what we want to do.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for moving the amendment. It gives me the opportunity to return to the question I asked previously, to which I do not think we have yet got the right answer. It is about the nature of the assessment. The noble Baroness talked about the sort of assessments made under the Care Act—assessments to support somebody. They are not DoLS assessments, which assess whether someone is being deprived of their liberty. In what the Minister has said so far, in reference to care home managers, there is a failure to make that distinction. A DoLS assessment is a very serious assessment of whether someone has been deprived of their liberty. It can also be viewed in court. It is some stretch for a care home manager or someone in a community setting—making genuine operational assessments about supporting somebody—to make a decision that deprives that person of their liberty. We will come on to records of authorisation, but I have to say nothing the Minister has said so far has reassured me we are talking about an assessment system that would come anywhere near DoLS or be accepted by a court.
My Lords, if I may come back very briefly on that, the noble Baroness makes an important point. I worry that some of the DoLS assessments are very long and complex, yet make little difference to the lived experience of the person on the receiving end of care, so I hope they will become better tailored. A badly drawn-up care plan could also be presented in court if there was a dispute, not only the assessment forms. Some of the forms I have seen will have taken a great deal of time to complete; I wonder whether the detail replicates that obtainable elsewhere, and whether there is a problem of proportionality. Also, I worry that we should be looking at the minimum amount of restriction on liberty, rather than deprivation of liberty. If someone is imprisoned, the whole system has failed. They must be encouraged and empowered to live as well as they can while being kept safe from dangers that, without due care and attention, would probably end for some of them in their deaths—wandering on to a motorway or whatever.
I take the point made by the noble Baroness; she is absolutely right. There are some pretty awful assessments. I am not sure the Bill will stop that—I think she is rather wishful in her thinking if she thinks otherwise. She will have talked to practitioners, as I have. Sometimes DoLS work really well, particularly when trained assessors use the conditions. These can be something quite simple, such as the right to see a priest once a week or go out on a pass. I find myself in a slightly different position from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. As I sit in these debates I find myself becoming ever more defensive of DoLS because some of the case made against them is exaggerated. A lot of the reason for the backlog is not that the system is complicated but that there are not enough assessors out doing the work. I take the point made by the noble Baroness, but I still go back to the need for assessors who are trained, understand their purpose and carry it out in a proportionate and timely way.
I am grateful to Members of the Committee for their sympathy and for giving me breathing space. I was flustered by flipping forward and almost missing out this group of amendments.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, the issue of concern is the distinction between the person who is responsible for somebody’s care and the person who manages a care home—they are of course different. What we are trying to get right here—I understand that this is what the amendments are exploring—are the relevant responsibilities of those people, bearing in mind that we want to integrate liberty protection safeguards into the process of care planning.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, knows huge amounts about this topic and I very much respect her opinion. She pointed out that DoLS assessments are different from assessments under the Care Act. There are some overlaps. As she will know, there are similar questions or parts in both assessments concerning consent, for example, but she is right that they are different types of assessments. I want to explore whether her or indeed the Committee’s concern is that those assessments should not be carried out by care home managers or whether—a more positive view—they should be carried out by certain types of professional. Those are subtly different points. Perhaps I may give her the opportunity to respond in a moment, as I am really keen to explore this matter.
Clearly, we are trying to make sure that those who have the professional expertise to carry out certain types of assessments do so. Equally, we are trying to make sure that a co-ordinating body has responsibility for ensuring that these assessments are carried out in a proportionate way and are included with care assessments in an overall care plan, with people being answerable to the relevant regulatory bodies. If the noble Baroness would not mind, I would be grateful if she, along with other noble Lords, gave her perspective on that. I want to make sure that we determine the appropriate role of the care home manager.
I thank the Minister very much for that because it enables me to point out something that I am sure he and all noble Lords know—that, when it comes to deprivation of liberty, the body which is ultimately responsible for that in court is not the care home but the state body, which would be the NHS body or the local authority. The Minister said that responsible bodies currently receive from care homes the referral forms and then do a desk-top assessment of those. Yes, they do that; however, they do it in the knowledge that the person will be seen by a qualified person. The problem with the Bill as it stands is that that is not an automatic assumption that a responsible body can make because of the gatekeeping role of the care home manager.
I thank the Minister; I am very grateful to him. If I have understood it correctly, the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, supports my Amendment 30A, which requires that a registered professional—who, if they really get it wrong, would lose their registration—who has responsibility for the care plan and appropriate experience and knowledge, should make the determination. In other words, it is not good enough just to be a professional. I go back to the example of people with a head injury, who need a highly specialised assessment and overview so that a lead can be taken on the care planning process.
I will just finish, if I may. I completely share the concern about self-funders. They must have a care plan, because they are in receipt of care once they are in the system. It is appalling if there are people who are paying to be cared for in some kind of chaotic way without a proper, co-ordinated plan that they and their family can know about, so that everyone coming and going, be it out of hours or whatever, can understand what is happening.
I am beginning to think that there is not that much difference between us, and I agree that the current forms are inadequate. I apologise if, in the previous debates we have had, my comments about notification from the care home manager to the local authority were not well worded—on re-reading, I can see that, and I accept that I was wrong in the way that I worded it.
I do not want to get up the hopes of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, too strongly. She is a medic and therefore her go-to place is medical qualifications. There are some excellent best interests assessors who are not engaged in the care of the person. I wish to make that point. I shall keep coming back to the valid point of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, about the need to wind up with an affordable and manageable system. Noble Lords who have been involved in discussions with stakeholders will not be surprised to know that some of us think there is a way in which that could be done but it would involve reliance on advocates and assessors. Having said that, I agree with the noble Baroness.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I move Amendment 17 and will speak also to Amendments 19, 54 and 57, which are in my name. Like other noble Lords, I thank the Minister for statements he made earlier about having listened to concerns over the duty to consult with the person and over the inclusion of 16 and 17 year-olds. He will appreciate that a number of amendments tabled by noble Lords stemmed from that deep concern about the lack of a statement on the Bill that the person being cared for should be seen by the person arranging for their assessment.
On a matter of form and detail, I do not like the term “cared-for person”. I prefer the scheme used under the Mental Capacity Act, where the person is referred to as P. They are considered as a person in their own right; they are subject to the legislation as a whole person. It is a stylistic matter. We got there with “unsound mind”; perhaps if we keep going, we might be on a roll—you never know—so I throw that in.
These amendments dig at some of the same concerns as those at which the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was getting on a previous set of amendments. As noble Lords will know, under the DoLS legislation there is a duty to ensure that not only does the cared-for person know what their rights are and have access to justice, but the people who care for them also know that what is proposed is the least restrictive option. There is a real question under the liberty protection scheme, as laid out, as to how somebody who lacks capacity or the people who look after them would know that. Furthermore, there have been concerns—assuming the care home manager was responsible for much of the assessment—over how they too would know that what was proposed was a least restrictive option. These amendments are about seeking to establish a duty to ensure that people are fully informed.
That takes us to another basic criticism of the Bill, which is about what I would say was an overreliance on the code of practice. Noble Lords have many years’ happy experience—some of it on the other side of the Dispatch Box—arguing about the importance of codes of practice as opposed to law. There has to be a statement in the Bill for anything in a code of practice to have force. As the Minister will know, practitioners need only have regard to the code of practice; effectively, they may not have regard to it. It matters more towards the back-end of the Bill, where much of the Mental Capacity Act is amended.
Put simply, nowhere in the Bill does there seem to be a duty to provide this information to the cared-for person or to the people who care for them. In the coming set of amendments the Minister will no doubt make much of the new requirements to consult, but that is something slightly different. We felt it was important to restate this and back up what is already the intention under the best interests of the Mental Capacity Act, but that we felt had been ignored in this Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 17 because I think it is important that things be written down clearly, particularly for the cared-for person—which is the term we are using—if they have fluctuating capacity or need to absorb things very slowly but want to understand. Also, their families and those concerned about them will not necessarily be there when someone comes in to assess them or formulate a care plan, but they will certainly have concerns and they may have a very good idea about wishes and feelings that could have been overlooked—not maliciously, but because people did not know about them. A written record will provide evidence for everybody about what is happening.
The way the consultation is conducted should therefore, I agree, demonstrate that restrictions have been proportionate and necessary, and that alternatives have been considered—and the reason they have been discounted should be given. I would like us to give people much more access to all their clinical records; the caring family, in particular, should have access to the records. Often, information held by family members and others close to the person is effectively like gold dust when it comes to planning their care, and would benefit from being shared.
Where someone’s condition deteriorates, if this has all been written down clearly you have a baseline against which you can measure changes. If they improve, the baseline shows the reason that things were put in place as restrictions, which could then be lifted. Again, that gives a benchmark against which to measure, which would make care more personalised. I hope this concept will be well received. I am unsure as to whether it should go in the Bill or in the code—it is easy to put lots into the Bill—but the principle is important.
Well, I shall see whether I can lift the gloom from the noble Lord. I think that there was a slight mischaracterisation, in that the Government are listening. Indeed, we have responded and made changes. I hope that in responding to these amendments I will be able to show further that we are taking a positive and constructive view on improving the Bill, making sure not that it removes rights but quite the opposite—that it provides access to liberty-protection safeguards for people who do not currently enjoy them.
I begin by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for leading the debate and I also thank other noble Lords. I shall go directly to her Amendment 17. Of course she is right, as are other noble Lords, about the arrangements for the cared-for person—person P—being written. I am very happy to confirm to all noble Lords that that is our intention and that we will make sure that the Bill reflects it.
With regard to other amendments, the entire thrust of policy across government, whether in health and care or anything to do with data, is about providing more people with the information that the state holds about them. I can give the absolute commitment to noble Lords that that is what we intend to do in the Bill and in changes that we make to the Bill going forward. It is essential that cared-for persons, their families, appropriate persons, IMCAs and so on are given full information about their authorisation and their relevant rights, including their rights to review and appeal. I can tell noble Lords that that will be set out fully in the code of practice.
On the code of practice—I can see the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, grimace—I will say two things. First, it is a statutory code of practice involving a consultation arrangement and a laying before Parliament—noble Lords know how these things work. The noble Baroness asked about the force of the code of practice and it is true that the Bill says “have regard to”. But case law confirms—I am happy to write to noble Lords with this opinion—that the code of practice must be followed unless there are cogent reasons not to do so. That means that there will be some occasions when the code is not practised, but those not following it will have to justify, potentially in court, why they did so in the interests of a person’s care. So the code of practice is statutory and it has very great force. It is worth pointing that out, not least because on this group and future groups we will be talking about information or an instruction that will be within the code of practice. I will take the opportunity to make that clear at this point.
I thank the Minister for that. This is a very important part of our discussion. I have two questions which I am absolutely certain he will not be in a position to answer, but I hope that he will write to me. First, how many cases of a failure to follow the code of practice rather than a failure to follow the law have gone to the Court of Protection? Secondly, can the Minister confirm that the original Mental Capacity Act code of practice was never reviewed and that it is not possible to make individual amendments to a code of practice: it has to be changed in its entirety? I shall not put the Minister on the spot now but we need to return to those matters in a further discussion because they are really important.
The noble Baroness is quite right: I do not have the answers to those questions, but they are very good questions and I will make sure that we answer them for noble Lords in a communication following this debate.
On the point about access to information, I think that two other aspects are worth considering. One is that under the general data protection regulation, which came in on 25 May this year, the cared-for person or their family, IMCA or somebody holding a lasting power of attorney—that is, somebody acting on their behalf—will, and indeed does, have access to their authorisation record. I believe, although I will clarify, that that has to be done free of charge. I know that that is certainly the case with medical records and GPs. In terms of access to information, that is an important advance.
Again, I want to get further clarification on exactly what is involved, but the NHS and the LGA have created a programme of local health and care record exemplars. It happens in a few parts of the country and it is about creating a single health and care record that contains all the information about a person’s health and care. Obviously it spans both health and care settings. That will be available not only to inform the care carried out by a clinician or someone in a caring role but information to that person and those with responsibility for them.
That obviously has huge implications for improving joined-up care. It is an important programme by which we set a lot of store. What I will take away from this discussion is the need to ensure that what we are describing here, around access to information by the cared-for person or by those caring for them, ensures that they will have access to the local health and care record, which would contain the kind of information we are talking about. If it does, we have a vehicle; if it does not, we need to think about what the right vehicle is.
The amendments in this group also support the IMCA to help the cared-for person understand their rights under liberty protection safeguards. I can confirm that this will be a key role for the IMCA. It will be defined in their job description and, again, contained in the code of practice.
Once again, we have already made changes, and are committing to changes in the Bill, that will deal with the questions raised about access to information. I absolutely concur with the sentiment behind the questions. There is good reason to believe that expanding programmes and mechanisms in the system will give us the opportunity to do that, and in a much more thorough way than is done now. I want to continue to work with noble Lords to make sure that we get that right as we move towards Report, so that it is properly reflected in the Bill. I hope that, on the basis of my comments and reassurances, the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, will feel a little less despairing and the noble Baroness will be prepared to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his comments. I hear what he says about GDPR, but if he could send Members a small briefing note, that would be extraordinarily helpful. Clearly, there has been a significant change. I and other noble Lords will remember times in the past when individuals were not able to access historic care records because they contained information about a third party. A whole series of cases had to go through the European courts to establish exactly what the rights of access to care records were.
I will study what the Minister said. However, we need to be absolutely certain that the spirit of these amendments is reflected. Perhaps we may come back to this at a later stage with a simple amendment introducing a requirement in the Bill to provide information. How that is done can be set out at considerable length in a code of practice, but the requirement to do it needs to be in the Bill. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on again introducing this discussion on a difficult topic. I do not share her pessimism that it is impossible to find a definition. It would be quite simple to have a definition in the Bill which would enable us to distinguish between those who are and are not being deprived of their liberty.
The fact that people are deprived of their liberty, in reality, by their condition is an irrelevance. We have to stick with what is happening to people; what we, the state or the carer are doing to the individual. We would not find it too difficult to decide what is or is not a restriction. You can compare the living accommodation of a person in a care situation to that of someone who is living in the same place without those restrictions. Care home managers would not have too much difficulty in saying who was and who was not restricted.
We should not give up trying to have some kind of definition that lists those conditions. People might be receiving sedative medication so that they cannot move around and others might be restricted physically—there are still people being restricted physically—in dreadful chairs and so on who cannot move about. We could define fairly well what the conditions are. I hope we will come back on Report with some clarification of what they are so that we can put something in the Bill. I worry that if they are in the code of practice it will be so flexible that it will result in a postcode lottery, with one area’s policy different from another’s. That would be a disaster.
We should be able to get something in the Bill. I hope that we will not give up at this stage.
Following on from the observation made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, one of the most common restrictions of liberty is medication and medication reviews. We often think of it as being physical but it is not. New medicines often come online and create change. I take her point and hope we will be able to work towards a definition.
I will not add much more because the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has done us all a favour by putting forward great questions exploring the Cheshire West ruling. The Joint Committee on Human Rights agrees that a definition needs to be found, otherwise—the noble Baroness is right—we will be back in a situation where things have not gone right and we end up in court again. We all need to put our minds to this. We should be able to find a definition and I look forward to the Minister leading that particular discursive discussion across the Committee.
My Lords, again I preface my remarks by saying that these amendments were drafted when the role of the care home manager was less clear than perhaps it is now. Nevertheless, they take us to the important point about determinations on mental capacity and the requirement to make sure that they are evidence based. In the Bill as it stands, a huge amount of discretion is given to care home managers and people involved in care to determine whether someone has capacity. We do not believe that that is right. Determining whether someone has capacity is difficult to do and something for which a great deal of training and experience is required. We keep coming back to what would be acceptable levels of training and qualifications to exercise that determination.
Amendment 21 seeks to provide that there should be an evidence base and that those making the capacity assessment should go through it and be ready to justify their decisions accordingly. I will go back to a point and reiterate it, although it must be rather boring: a DoLS assessment is different from a care assessment, and whoever makes and records such assessments should know that they are challengeable in court, which is a big responsibility.
Amendment 22 again endeavours to make sure that the person carrying out the assessment of capacity should be properly qualified, a point I have made before. I do not think that the Bill as it stands is sufficiently robust about the level of professional training needed and therefore this is a matter to which we should return.
Amendment 25 in a way follows on from our previous discussion. With this Bill we will move into a new position where the assessment of capacity is not as clearly specific to the situation as it is under the Mental Capacity Act. We are also moving towards a position in which assessments can be rolled over for longer periods. I am not saying that that should not happen and I take absolutely the point that a number of the assessments being required under DoLS are unnecessary. When someone has had a diagnosis of dementia, for example, their capacity to make decisions may not fluctuate or change, but we need to be altogether a lot more precise in the terminology being used in the Bill. It is not just a change in someone’s condition but may also be a change in their circumstances which has led to the deprivation of liberty. We are bringing in a new test to show that things are necessary and proportionate. I do not think that it is that clear or that it will clarify the decisions which are going to have to be made. This is an attempt on our part to move away from what we believe to be a position where the subjective judgment of care providers would have been given too much weight in the determination of capacity. The amendments on that issue are probing in nature and I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to lend my support to Amendment 21 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Barker and to speak to Amendment 22, which is tabled in my name. Amendment 22 is essentially about who should be able to determine whether an individual is, as it currently states in the Bill, “of unsound mind”. That is the terminology being used, but I would prefer to see terms like a “disorder” or a “disability” of the mind. That is one of the three key authorisation conditions. Perhaps I may say again how very pleased I am that the Minister has indicated his willingness to look at some new language so that we do not use the term “unsound mind”, which in my view is stigmatising and has no place in today’s society.
I return to Amendment 22. Currently, the authorisation arrangements in this part of the Bill state that a medical assessment has to be made but do not state who has to make it. It is likely that most people would assume—indeed, it may well be that the Government are assuming it and no doubt the Minister can reassure us on the point in his response—that a medical assessment needs to be carried out by a registered medical practitioner. However, it would be helpful and reassuring to have that made clear in the Bill. The report published earlier this year by the Joint Committee on Human Rights is clear that, in order to comply with human rights law, any deprivation of liberty under Article 5 requires,
“objective medical evidence of a true mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement, which persists throughout the period of detention”.
Given the requirement for “objective medical evidence”, my contention is that there needs to be a guarantee in the Bill that only a registered medical practitioner with appropriate training has the power to determine whether someone has an unsound mind or mental disorder, depending on which language is going to be used.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. It has clarified some matters to a certain extent. I very much welcome the Minister’s suggestion that we should meet further. There is agreement on the part of everybody that we want to cut down the number of unnecessary repetitions of assessment, but to do that we need to be quite clear that the assessments are done correctly and by the correct person.
The Minister talked about qualifications changing and wishing to move towards a competency-based arrangement, but the parallel with Mental Health Act and approved mental health practitioners is a good one. All sorts of people from different disciplines and backgrounds are approved mental health practitioners. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, illuminated, a whole number of people from different professional backgrounds could be AMCPs. The important thing is that they have demonstrable expertise in this legislation. I yet again make the point to him that he talks about using different assessments, but assessments under this legislation are not the same as care assessments. They are particular ones. We have not had the discussion about the implications for the changes to Care Act assessments if this Bill goes through, but we need to because we need consistency between the two.
Nevertheless, I am heartened by the Minister’s response. We are not quite there yet on this. We need to do a number of different things to make sure there is consistency and clarity across the range of professionals engaged in doing these assessments, and that the people who are being cared for and their families, and care home managers, can have a reasonable expectation that these crucial assessments—it is assessment of someone’s capacity; it is a really important one—are done consistently under the Act. It is when assessments are done badly that these things start to unravel. I very much thank the Minister for his response and at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I have two amendments in this group, Amendments 60 and 62, to which I shall speak briefly. To reiterate, the responsibility for this law lies and remains with the responsible bodies, and not with the care providers. If things go wrong, it is they who will end up in court. Consequently, and rather like the bodies under the Mental Health Act, they retain responsibility for ensuring enough sufficiently trained people are available to ensure that the law is applied properly.
Part of the reason for all noble Lords having such an interest in this issue is that we know from the review of the Mental Capacity Act that availability of trained staff is one of the biggest reasons why the Act failed to be properly implemented. Furthermore, we have statistics on the patchy nature of implementation by local authorities and some in the health service. Some authorities absolutely get this and implement it properly, but a lot just do not. It is an almost random distribution, which has a knock-on effect.
The other reason for noble Lords wanting to talk about these issues is the impact assessment. We have not really talked about the impact assessment for this Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, used some particularly strong words, but she let them off very lightly, because I do not see how that impact assessment stacks up. Perhaps I may ask the Minister about one of the many assumptions made in the impact assessment. My understanding is that it assumes that training under this Bill will be needed for 10% of doctors and 10% of social workers. Can the Minister explain—if not now, then perhaps at a different juncture—that assumption and how it has come to be? I would be really surprised if the figure for social workers was 10%. Ten per cent for doctors is possible, but a figure of 10% for social workers needing to be trained under this Bill seems very low. My amendments were designed to enable us to have this sort of probing debate.
I support the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on some of the training issues. Like many people here, I suspect, I have spent a great number of years training junior doctors in how to use mental health legislation, as well as social workers and occupational therapists. One of the most difficult things is to convey the culture of what we are trying to achieve in legislation of this kind. We all refer to the European court and the agreements, but what we are trying to achieve for individuals and why is difficult for many people to grasp when they have grown up in a very didactic, academic environment, where these things are not necessarily considered.
A key aspect of that cultural shift which is so required is the problems that arise between relatives, carers and professionals over what should happen to an individual. All the way through this Bill, I have been scratching my head and thinking, “Will this solve the Bournewood problem?” All the cases from Bournewood onwards have arisen because of a cavalier approach or attitude by professionals to discussing with relatives and carers what the individual wanted, needed or was used to. If we do not get those things right, we will not solve the problem and there will be another case because it will all be up again for grabs where the professional training has not been accurate.
I note that there are some very specific proposals about care home managers. There are some very specific difficulties about what training care home managers currently have, and it is absolutely basic and rudimentary. It is largely about keeping the accounts right. We need to find a way to get the culture of what we are trying to achieve for individuals and families into this Bill. Exploring those training options is crucial if we are to avoid another Bournewood.