Financial Services Bill (Tenth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Stella Creasy]

I completely agree. Many a time have I had conversations with constituents about how they buy things, and they do not see it as a problem. They have no other option, so they use the catalogues and do not look at the interest rates. What they need is not more financial education, but more options. The brutal reality is that it is very expensive to be poor in this country. That is why it matters that the things we do to help them if they get into difficulty work.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that when it comes to debt and interest payments incurred—the price of having that debt—the concept of an unfair contract is far too lax on those who lend the money and far too harsh on those whose circumstances often, as the hon. Lady just mentioned, mean that they have to borrow?

[Stella Creasy]

My hon. Friend knows that I completely agree with her. She also knows that she is tempting me to discuss other amendments that I have tabled about that fair fight, and I do not want to disrespect you, Mr Davies, or the Clerk in trying to keep us to the issue at hand. My point is that when we talk about a respite scheme to help people with problem debt, we have to be clear about what we mean by problem debt and whether people recognise that they have a problem. The point of a breathing space is to be able to address that problem.

The hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) and I tabled the amendments because we recognise that people do not necessarily see things as a problem until it is too late, so when we construct measures to help people in these difficult places, we have to be able to work with them and where they are at, and how people deal with debt. We might look at something and say, “That is an unsustainable financial situation that you have got yourself into,” but our constituents not see it that way.

I said at the start that it was worth thinking about where this country stood at the start of the year. There are conflicting figures, which I am sure the Minister has been looking at. I know he shares my concern about consumer debt and consumer credit. Bank of England data shows that during the coronavirus crisis people have actually been trying to pay down their debts—frankly, they have been stuck at home, so they have money and they think, “Well, I’ll try to pay down my debts.” Since March this year, £15.6 billion of household debt has been repaid, and credit card debt has fallen by 13% in the last year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stella Creasy]

My right hon. Friend is right, and that was one of the points I was going to make. If we are dealing with a new group of people who have never been in financial difficulty before, one of the sources of help and support for them may well be our welfare system. Anybody who has ever dealt with people trying to make new claims in our welfare system knows that 60 days is an incredibly tight timeline for that to happen—to deal with any appeals and paperwork, and to even get a response to the claim that has been made. Yet experience tells us then when people do get into problem debt, sometimes they do not know what support they are entitled to.

The amendments speak both to the reality of people and to the practicality of making a breathing space work. I hope the Minister will see them in that way and recognise that that is why so many debt advice providers support the amendments and say, “Yes, actually, what’s proposed does feel too tight to get things right.” Some people’s situations can be resolved in 60 days; others’ will take longer. It is not right to close off the opportunity of a breathing space by setting a deadline or threshold that means that for some people who are waiting for information it will be too late. The amendments speak to how we can make the process work for everyone, giving debt advice providers the discretion to be able to work with people and to use the breathing space for its intended purpose, which is to give those who recognise they have a problem the chance to get it sorted before we go into some of the more serious options.

The brutal reality is that we know that, with jobs thin on the ground, debt already mounting up and the cost of living not reducing any time soon, not everybody who gets a breathing space is going to be able to breathe again. I know the Minister would be frustrated if, rather than the financial position of the people involved, it was that timing, that threshold, that meant the breathing space did not work in the way in which it is intended.

The Minister will have seen that I have tabled other amendments on we make this breathing space work. I know he cares about getting this right. In these Committees, there is always pressure on Ministers to say no to amendments, but I hope he will acknowledge that this is about making the policy work, recognising the evidence on the ground about what works with people who are in problem debt and how long it takes them to see that they have a problem. If he does not accept the timescales, if he does not accept the intentions of myself and the hon. Member for Edinburgh West in acknowledging the distress people feel when they have to front up and talk to a stranger about the financial position they are in and their fears in an environment where unemployment is widespread. Goodness knows, getting people to take debt advice at the start of this year, when there seemed to be jobs in our economy, was difficult—anybody who tried to refer a constituent to Citizens Advice knows that. Getting people to a point where they have the chance to breathe again means making this process work.

If the Minister does not think the extension is right, I am keen to hear what he thinks we should do to make sure that that threshold is not a cliff edge over which people fall and cannot come back from. We are all going to be seeing a lot of people in financial difficulty in the coming months in our surgeries—people who have nowhere else to turn, people who are very frightened, and people whose families, homes and mental welfare depend on us getting this right.

[Ms Eagle]

I wish to spend a short amount of time congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow on the focus and experience she brings to this very important topic. As she said, debt is one of those taboo subjects. People feel ashamed if they have got into debt and tend not to discuss it—sometimes within their own relationships, let alone with other people—because it is a source of shame.

To some extent, it is a bit like the people who fall for scams or fraud. It is a uniquely difficult thing because if someone has got themselves into that situation, it makes them feel ashamed of their behaviour or that they have fallen for something. They feel isolated and unable to discuss it and go to get assistance. To some extent, even getting to what my hon. Friend is suggesting in her amendment means someone has gone a considerable distance: first, admitting there is a problem, and secondly, seeking help and trying to see what can be done to alleviate the problem.

I also feel that when people get into debt in this manner, they are uniquely judged by those looking on. The taboo is reinforced by the judgmental nature of onlookers who think, “I would never get into debt like that,” or, “How on earth have they done that?” There are caricatures of how people who get into debt behave that are almost designed to blame them for their debts, suggesting that somehow they are incoherent with money, that they cannot manage, that they have inadequacies, or that they have gone on spending sprees all over the place and not thought about the future. I suppose in a minority of cases that might be true, but in the majority of cases, in my experience—certainly in my advice surgery—it is not. People get on a slippery slope.

We live in a consumer-oriented society where those who wish to sell us things, and the financial services companies that wish to provide us with the wherewithal to buy them immediately, are very sophisticated. We are in a culture very different from the one I grew up in. I will now reveal how old I am: when I was growing up, one had to put money away and pay for goods gradually before one could get them. Now there are all sorts of electronic currencies that can be used.

On Black Friday, I was shopping for deals from my room, but—uniquely—had no positive results because everything was out of stock. That demonstrates how easy it is to spend money to acquire things, and to get into debt. It is now instantaneous. With the shift to online, one does not even have to physically be in shops to buy things; one is two clicks away from having this kind of problem.

If ever there were something that made it easier for people to get into trouble, it is the speed and effectiveness with which they can click on things and spend money. We talk about that with regard to gambling, but buying goods can also be addictive. People are propagandised the whole time about how success comes with having goods, and that one has to have the right trainers and the right brands.

[Alison Thewliss]

The hon. Member makes an excellent point. In my constituency some years ago, a survey was carried out on how people felt in local communities about the pressure on them to have things. Does she agree that in many communities there is a huge amount of pressure put on people to fit in and to have those goods? Lots of shame is carried by families who feel they cannot afford things, which then puts pressure on them to go beyond their spending limits.

[Ms Eagle]

Absolutely. It is about success and belonging, and that is the kind of culture that the very sophisticated advertisers that push this kind of thing go for. They also advertise to children, so there is the pester element of it. Kids used to want the latest Cabbage Patch Kid; I do not know what it will be this year, but whatever it is will be extremely expensive and beyond the means of quite a lot of people.

[The Chair]

Can I gently interrupt the hon. Lady? I am happy to give a bit of latitude for people to set out the issue, but I do not want this to become a Second Reading debate on debt. If we could stick a bit more rigidly to the amendment, I would appreciate it.

[Ms Eagle]

Of course I will, Mr Davies. The amendment is about having breathing space when one has got into this situation. I accept your guidance, obviously; I was merely trying to set out how people can get into a situation of requiring breathing space, how judgmental people can be about debt, and how different the culture is now about getting into debt. It is so much easier to do it—just two clicks away.

To introduce breathing space and some of the issues that we will get on to in terms of trying to get people out of debt, we need to shed the taboos so that people can ask for help. We need to think about how we can put more warnings in between the two clicks it takes to spend. We also need, as a society, to stop being quite so judgmental about the situations that people find themselves in. If we can do that and foster more upfront and open discussions about how such situations happen, and if people can stop feeling so ashamed about it and so alone, we may find that there are better, more effective ways of tackling debt and preventing the necessity for the breathing space issue.

Financial Services Bill (Eighth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 26th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr McFadden]

I just have a question about these policy statements. We have been through quite a lot about how the FCA will designate, compel and continue the submission of information and all the rest of it. What role do these policy statements play in all of that? Is the policy statement simply putting into law a requirement on the FCA to say why it has acted as it has, or is it, as part of what I think is behind some of the stuff in these clauses, insulating the FCA against the threat of legal action because of the possible effect on contracts? Is this a nice to have, best practice or is it something that helps to protect the FCA against the threat of litigation, which has been a thread through this discussion?

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Obviously, this is a very technical area, to say the least. I just want to ask a couple of questions so that I can get my head round how the FCA will use the power. We have different regulators who could make different determinations as to what constitutes benchmarks going forward, and yet those benchmarks write contracts worth trillions of pounds and dollars into the future. Any arbitrage opportunity in the way that those contracts work could make some people very rich and ruin others. This will be decided as one goes along. Some of these contracts are being made, but some are already projected into the future.

To ensure that markets are not distorted and the potential for nefarious profit by some with insider information is minimised, we need reassurance about how the FCA will perform the task, particularly in its interactions with the other regulators. I am not sure what the Government’s intention is, apart from saying they are going to liaise with other regulators. Is it the Government’s intention that these benchmarks ought to be similarly designed and defined across different regulatory jurisdictions, since this is almost a currency, or are we seeking divergence here as well in order to perhaps increase our chances of being the place where some of this business is written?

Perhaps the Economic Secretary could reassure me on that, because the FCA’s powers are pretty strong, but what is the intention? That might be in all of the many consultations, which I confess I have not read, so it might be set out there. If the Minister could put a little more on the record, we might at least have some certainty there, not least for Pepper v. Hart purposes.

[John Glen]

I thank the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East and the hon. Member for Wallasey for their observations. The hon. Lady demonstrates her experience and professionalism in being able to jump in on the first clause, having not been here this morning—no disrespect intended.

[Ms Eagle]

None taken.

[John Glen]

The point that the hon. Lady makes is absolutely clear. We need to ensure that the regulations are in line with global practices because the issue is global. The interconnectedness of financial services markets demands, as in the statement I made just now, that we work very closely with regulators in other jurisdictions. It is absolutely right that we learn the lessons that the right hon. Gentleman, in his work on the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards several years ago, drew attention to with respect to the appalling abuses in the market. This measure is designed to give us a framework and to give the FCA the powers to ensure that we have global best practice and no ambiguity.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

The clause introduces amendments to article 28 of the benchmarks regulation, including new paragraphs 1A to 1E. Article 28 of the benchmarks regulation stipulates requirements for benchmark administrators and supervised entities in preparing for changes to, or the cessation of, benchmarks. I will refer to this as the change and cessation procedure.

The clause inserts the word “robust” in paragraph 1 of article 28 to define and strengthen the nature of the change and cessation procedures that benchmark administrators are required to publish. The clause also inserts new paragraphs 1A to 1E, which set out requirements for the written change and cessation procedure that a benchmark administrator must publish.

New paragraph 1A establishes that the administrator must publish a robust written change and cessation procedure alongside the publication of the administrator’s benchmark statement, which, among other things, sets out the market or economic reality that the benchmark intends to measure. The documents must be published within two weeks of the benchmark being registered in the FCA’s register. Wherever a material change occurs, the benchmark administrator is required to update its written procedure. For critical benchmarks, the proposed changes in new paragraphs 1B to 1E set out additional and more stringent requirements.

When publishing its written procedure, the administrator of a critical benchmark is required to provide an assessment to the FCA, on the basis of the information available to it, that considers the nature and extent of the current use of the benchmark, the availability of suitable alternatives, and how prepared users are for changes to, or the cessation of, the benchmark. Before publishing an updated written change and cessation procedure, critical benchmark administrators must also provide that assessment together with their updated written procedure to the FCA for review. The FCA is required to review and consider whether the procedure is sufficiently robust. The administrator must not publish an update of its procedure without receiving written notice from the FCA that its procedure is sufficiently robust.

In order to be designated as a critical benchmark, a benchmark must be used extensively, and its cessation may pose significant and adverse impacts on market integrity, financial stability, consumers, the real economy, or the financing of households and businesses. It is therefore reasonable and proportionate to require administrators of critical benchmarks to demonstrate via an assessment that their cessation plans are robust. We do not expect it to be an overly burdensome assessment for benchmark administrators. The clause will support increased preparedness in the event of changes to, or the cessation of, benchmarks in the future. I therefore recommend that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Ms Eagle]

Again, I have just a few questions so that I can get in my head precisely what the reason is for putting this in primary legislation. LIBOR clearly had its issues but it was used for a very long time. Is the Minister anticipating that benchmarks will change much more rapidly in the future, or does he want some kind of stability with the new benchmarks that are based on actual prices, rather than the guesses of participants in the market, as LIBOR came to be defined prior to its demise?

Is the Minister expecting that this kind of provision for ceasing benchmarks will be used regularly? I anticipate that the answer will be, “Only when it is needed because of what is happening in the market.” If this kind of procedure is theoretical and on the face of a piece of legislation but hardly ever used, does that mean that the mechanisms that the Minister is setting out in clause 19 and other parts of the Bill will rust away? They will be there in theory, but there will be nobody there to work them properly. How does he anticipate that the market, the FCA and the benchmark administrators will maintain the capacity to do this if cessation is a very irregular, rare thing?

Will the Minister spend a bit of time defining what “robust” means in this context? In my time in this place, I have had many arguments with Ministers, and made many arguments as a Minister, about why we must not put particular words on the face of Bills and what their meaning is. Can the Minister enlighten us as to what he, the FCA and the Treasury mean by “robust” and how they are defining that in law, so that I can have a bit more confidence that they have got it right on the face of the Bill?

[John Glen]

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. Although the provisions of this legislation are under the heading of benchmarks, they really refer to the capacity that we need to have to deal with the LIBOR issue. She is right to raise the question of the enduring provision and how tested and exercised that capacity would be, but this is about setting a framework for future use, which is very difficult to anticipate. We want to ensure that it is fit for purpose for the future.

The hon. Lady asks when the framework could be used, which is not a matter that I can reasonably be drawn on, because it would be about market conditions evolving, but it certainly means that we are ready for whatever might evolve, in terms of benchmarks on the path towards becoming critical. However, it will be for the FCA, in conversation with the market and Parliament, to determine how to bring that forward.

[Ms Eagle]

Does the Economic Secretary think that, given the incredible trouble that the wind-down of LIBOR has caused in the markets—not least because of what is on the face of the Bill and the very difficult issues caused by having to exit the LIBOR benchmark—it is best to try to get the next benchmark sorted and future-proofed, so that it does not turn into LIBOR 2 and cause his future successor in the Treasury and me all this kerfuffle in a Public Bill Committee?

[John Glen]

Absolutely. It is absolutely right that we give the power to the FCA but also keep a vigilant eye on evolving market conditions, so that we are well placed to move earlier to deal with any failures in benchmarks.

The hon. Lady asked me to define “robust” in the context of the Bill. I am reluctant to be drawn on that, because it is a matter of legal definition, but I would be very happy to write to her on that and respond at subsequent sittings of the Committee, if she wishes me to do so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Extension of transitional period for benchmarks with non-UK administrators

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

I just want to ask the Economic Secretary a question to ensure that we have properly understood the clause. All through this part of the Bill, we have talked about the different timescales in different clauses, and here we have another, which extends the transition period for benchmarks with third-country administrators until the end of 2025.

For my clarity, and perhaps for that of colleagues, will the Economic Secretary clarify whether the measures are different—I think they are—from the five and 10-year timescales in clauses 9 and 12, relating to the FCA designating what the hon. Member for Glasgow Central called zombie LIBOR? Is this five-year period about something different or does it relate to that?

Having debated this matter for a couple of hours, I am not sure that we have resolved it. My feeling is that we are leaving quite a lot to the FCA. I hope that the clause minimises the risk of harm. We have talked a lot about the risk of litigation, but there is also the risk of harm to those who have entered contracts based on LIBOR in good faith. The Government and regulators are trying to move away from that system for reasons that we understand are to minimise harm to those who signed up in good faith, but I suspect that there is still a fair bit of work for the regulator to do to ensure that that is the case.

[Ms Eagle]

Will the Economic Secretary share with the Committee the intention behind the extension to 2025? He said that it was to create certainty—I can understand that. Is the intention to transition to something different—the new third-country regime—after the extension, or is it to develop and introduce it earlier if it looks like there are advantages to doing so? I know that I am asking him to gaze into the future, but this will be in the Treasury and regulators’ work list and they will presumably schedule it at some stage. Does he expect the creation of a third-country regime to be difficult or quite easy? Are the Government thinking of basing it on the existing regimes or diverging from what we are used to? Will he give us a little more information about how the Treasury intends to proceed with this piece of technical but very important work.

[John Glen]

I am very happy to address those points. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East raised the issue of the different time periods. This is different from the LIBOR transition; it is about the third-party benchmarks exclusively. It is a response to the market reality, as we have seen in the number of applications. I will come to the point of the hon. Member for Wallasey in a second.

The right hon. Gentleman also asked about the risk of harm concept and how important that is. Clearly, the LIBOR transition, as we have established today, is an incredibly complicated matter with a great deal of legal complexity, an imperative to align to global best practice, the need to produce a synthetic alternative and the evolution of policy around that. It is also designed to protect. He is right to say that there is a lot more work to be done; there is no off-the-shelf solution. This measure allows the formal framework for that to evolve.

The hon. Member for Wallasey asked me to comment on the future time period by which the new third-country benchmark regime would be constructed. The extension is a response intended to resolve industry concerns and to ensure that UK markets can retain access to the third-country benchmarks. There is no intention to find some way of deviating from norms on that. It is in our interest to have complete alignment to global best practice. The extension gives UK firms the legal and economic certainty. As soon as it can be done, it should be done. I cannot give her the precise location of where that is in the work plan—the FCA has a lot on at the moment—but she is right that we need to operationalise it appropriately, recognising the different obligations on different sized firms. I will be working with the FCA to keep an eye on that in the coming weeks and months.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 21

Benchmarks: minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[John Glen]

Clause 22 delivers the Government’s commitment to enable Gibraltar-based firms to have continued access to the UK’s financial markets. We move on, finally, from benchmarks and LIBOR; I cannot say that I am too disappointed by that.

[Ms Eagle]

I recognise that I missed a lot of exciting things this morning, but I do not think the Minister is really moving on from that, as he now has to do the work to put it into effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Dr Huq. I just have a few quick questions, mainly coming from the evidence we heard last week. During the fourth sitting, at column 125, the Minister, Albert Isola, said that the Bill is akin to enabling legislation, and that other things would need to be worked through in relation to other aspects of the financial services that are currently dealt with. If the Minister could clarify what would happen about those other areas, that would be useful.

Secondly, perhaps the Minister could give further assurances about access to the Financial Ombudsman Service. It is important that consumers here should have adequate protections in the new arrangements, and that those should be made clear. That is the kind of scenario that would not be found out until a consumer needed to make a complaint. Something would have to go wrong for it to be addressed, and I would not want to be such a consumer, feeling in those circumstances that I did not have recourse to the protection that I would have had if I had chosen an insurance policy not based in Gibraltar. It would be useful to hear about that.

Lastly, it would be helpful to have any further clarity that the Minister can give about what would happen to UK businesses and customers if market access were suddenly withdrawn, and where that would leave consumers in the UK. Would they be left without policies and protection? What would happen as a reaction to that, should market access be withdrawn for a period of time? Would it mean that businesses would dry up, withdraw their UK services and go somewhere else, or does the Minister envisage other scenarios happening in that case? I appreciate that it is a scenario that he would want to avoid at all costs, but it could well arise, and I want to ask what state the Government’s preparations for such a scenario are in.

[Ms Eagle]

I suppose I want the Minister to reassure me about the fact that financial markets are rapid and regulation—if there is an equivalence regime, or mini-single market as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East put it—allows the Gibraltarian authorities to do the regulation and then have immediate access to the UK. That may be done in a way that gives us some benefit; perhaps the Minister will say what the benefits of the regime are, particularly for UK consumers, given that Gibraltar does 90% of its business with the UK anyway. Perhaps he will also say what the risks would be.

My right hon. Friend spent a little time raising some of the risks and I suppose they can be characterised by the view that in a very liquid and rapid global money market, if there are vulnerabilities or back doors into regimes that are interconnected, that causes risks. We saw some of those risks playing out during the global financial crisis. To what extent does the Minister believe that the Gibraltar regime for which the clauses legislate will be—I am going to use that word—robust enough to prevent the opening of back doors to vulnerabilities for all sorts of money that is sloshing round the world? My right hon. Friend mentioned some of that—money used for money laundering, drugs and terrorism. It is important that the defences that we have against coming under that kind of influence should be maintained and strengthened, rather than weakened.

[Stella Creasy]

My hon. Friend is giving the speech that I wanted to give, so I thought I would intervene. One example, to express some of the concerns we might have, is the fact that in the Gibraltar regime there is currently no legal requirement to refuse registration to someone with a criminal record. In practice that does happen. It is something that the FATF report flags, but it is not inevitable. One thing we might want to think about for our regulatory regime—and I take the point made by the shadow Minister about not suggesting that the UK regime is perfect—is looking at whether there are lessons in the report that should be put into the Bill to make sure we do not create such a back door. That seems an eminently practical example of the sorts of things that might happen if people with criminal convictions, who may still be able to access financial regulations as a result of the Gibraltar regime, are now able to operate in the UK.

[Ms Eagle]

My hon. Friend gives an example of exactly the kind of point I was trying to make more generally about ensuring that these regimes are correct. Given that Gibraltar governs itself, the Bill makes it clear that Gibraltarian regulators will continue to do that job in Gibraltar and supervise the companies based there after this arrangement has been legislated for. That is quite proper in many ways, but it does give our regulators in a small number of narrowly-defined circumstances—I think this is the phrase—the duty or the right to leap in and do some regulation or enforcement presumably. Will the Minister say a bit more about that? He did mention it in passing in his introduction to the clause, in which he talked about financial stability. We clearly had some recent examples during the 2008 crash, where some robust enforcement had to take place with offshore island countries or territories that were trying to take money out of our jurisdiction in ways that were unacceptable at the time.

There is therefore a financial stability issue, but there is surely something about consumer protection, fraud and money laundering here as well. Perhaps he could talk in more detail about what those narrow circumstances are. Our regulators will be reluctant to romp and stomp all over Gibraltarian institutions and their regulators. Yet, by definition, Gibraltar is a small territory, and it will have less capacity to deal with some of the sophisticated fraudsters and international terrorist, money-laundering types than we do here. I am not saying that our regime is perfect, if we are honest, and we will get on to that later in the Bill.

My worry is that this might inadvertently create some vulnerabilities. I suppose what I am seeking from the Minister is some reassurance that the regulators have got a handle on this, that they will not allow the wish not to infantilise the Gibraltarian regulators to be a reason for not paying close attention to this, and that there will be some close supervision of what is happening, particularly once the regime is established. Once these things settle down, it is then that things start to happen. If a door is opened inadvertently somewhere, this money swilling around tends to find it, and then things can start changing very rapidly.

What warning flags does this regime put up to ensure that if that dynamic begins to happen, we can close it down rapidly? Does the Bill expect some kind of relationship between the Gibraltarian regulators and the Treasury? How does the Minister expect that relationship to work out? Obviously, I do not want to spend all my time being so negative about these things, so will the Minister also say a little more about what the benefits might be?

Will the Minister also talk about consumer protection in his response? Motor insurance is one of the largest components of the financial services that Gibraltar currently sells into the UK, and clearly there is a big retail consumer protection angle to such financial services.

[Stella Creasy]

While we are considering the variations for companies based in Gibraltar as opposed to the UK, it would be helpful if the Minister answered the question that the insurance bodies could not: about VAT benefits for companies based in Gibraltar and the likelihood, now that we have left the European Union, of companies moving more industry to Gibraltar because of that benefit, which could also affect consumers. Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be helpful if the Minister set out those figures? The industry seemed slightly coy when we spoke to it about those matters.

[Ms Eagle]

Clearly, the potential situation is there now. In evidence, the response—reasonably—was that that has not happened to date, even though there have been close connections between Gibraltar and the UK. However, these things tend to be dynamic and, once the agreement with Gibraltar is established, our tax regimes may diverge even further. If the Chancellor has his way after yesterday’s statement, I suspect they might have to.

Will that create more of a temptation for financial service companies to offshore to Gibraltar outside of the UK? Is the Minister convinced that that will not happen as a result of the Bill? I want reassurance from him about those potential weaknesses or risks and about consumer protections. He might even want to say a bit about benefits, if he feels up to it.

[John Glen]

I counted several questions in those four contributions and I will do my best to address them. First, I will reiterate what we are trying to do: to create the market access regime for Gibraltar-based financial services wishing to operate in the UK, and to make provision for outbound UK-based firms wishing to operate in Gibraltar.

The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East made a number of points, which I will start to address. He asked about the two-year reporting mechanism. The Gibraltar authorisation regime provides a broader and deeper market access into the UK market—including to the retail market—than other market access regimes, so the Treasury needs to be satisfied continuously that all conditions are met. We will therefore work carefully with the Minister we spoke to last week from the Government of Gibraltar to ensure that those conditions can be satisfied on an ongoing basis.

It is important to contextualise the nature of the relationship with Gibraltar. There has been a lot of dialogue, visits—not latterly—and evaluation of each other’s situation with respect to market access. In the lead up to the new regime, the Treasury will assess Gibraltar against the relevant market conditions for the sub-sectors to which it seeks access, and we will work closely with the Government of Gibraltar. The most significant area is the Gibraltarian insurance market, and 90% of that is UK facing.

The right hon. Gentleman compared the two-year review to our refusal to review the prudential regimes. As we have already discussed, the prudential measures include an accountability framework; we had a different view on the suitability of the one we suggested versus the amendment. The regulators have the expertise to set rules in the complex and technical areas of financial regulation and can do so in an agile way.

The right hon. Gentleman also referred to the FATF report. I have not read it in full, but I am aware of its broad indications of the challenges that exist. I am also aware that, while we had a good report, there are some challenges that we need to address in the UK. I will not hold back on admitting that. I will write to him specifically on those measures that pertain to Gibraltar, because I ought to do justice to his proper scrutiny.

There is an issue with the extension of the Gibraltarian regime to other countries. That is a bespoke regime that has been specifically designed for Gibraltar, recognising what the right hon. Gentleman and others will acknowledge is a special historical relationship, and our past common membership of the EU. These circumstances do not apply to any other jurisdictions, so that is not designed as a model or, as he said, a mini-single market to be extended elsewhere.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked about the scope of the FOS jurisdiction over products sold by Gibraltarian firms. Our intention is that all Gibraltar-based firms with a schedule 2A commission will be covered by the FOS’s compulsory jurisdiction. That ensures that individuals and small businesses can seek appropriate redress. However, the extension of the FOS’s jurisdiction to schedule 2A firms does not require express wording in this Bill. The Bill makes schedule 2A firms a type of authorised person, so the FCA be able to make rules about them, bringing them inside the FOS’s remit. The FCA will be reflecting that change in the rules governing the FOS’s jurisdiction. Firms already under the FOS’s voluntary jurisdiction will transfer to the compulsory jurisdiction, with no loss of eligibility for their consumers in respect of actions occurring before they entered the compulsory jurisdiction.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central also asked about the withdrawal of equivalence. If market access were to be withdrawn, schedule 2A puts in place winding down arrangements that enable the Government to pass secondary legislation providing for Gibraltar-based firms to exit the market in an orderly fashion, with appropriate protections for UK consumers. That is what would happen in market failure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Eagle]

Given that some of the areas caught by this part of the regulation were previously quite esoteric, but might not be so esoteric in the not-too-distant future—I am thinking of electronic money, which a few years ago would have been a tiny amount of transactions and is now very much larger—can the Minister reassure the Committee that, if the size and importance of these transactions grow, they are confined in the right area of the law for regulation? Does the Treasury have any views on how to take account of the changing importance and size of this area and to change the regulations around it in future? As we see, the pandemic has meant that many people who used to use cash no longer use it. Payment services and e-money are growing areas and could grow rapidly.. Is he convinced that this is the right regime to have in and around areas of perhaps rapid evolution?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

We will come on to their reaction. It is extraordinary that a sector this important has been relegated so far in the Government’s priorities. It is absolutely extraordinary that in these final days of renegotiation this is not front and centre. We just need to look at the employment, the investment and the tax revenues, and the role that the sector can play in global standards. Yet it has been relegated by the Government to an outcome that they admit is inferior and which, right now, they have not even been able to achieve.

All we can legislate for here is what we do. The fact that it is not front and centre of the negotiations right now speaks volumes about how far we have drifted from talk of achieving all the same benefits and securing a free trade zone from Iceland to the Urals—do hon. Members remember that? All of that has gone.

[Ms Eagle]

Is my right hon. Friend therefore surprised or unsurprised that the Office for Budget Responsibility documents yesterday said that the cost of the end of the transition period will be an economy that is permanently 2% smaller?

[Mr McFadden]

That is the OBR’s estimate of the additional cost of a no-deal scenario, on top of the already long-term hit in the deal scenario. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to set that out.

The fact that this has happened slowly over the past couple of years, and maybe the fact that the industry has become weary of arguing about it—as, perhaps, have all of us—should not disguise the importance of what has happened. It is important to set that out and to put these clauses in perspective. The Government chose to relegate the importance of UK financial services industries in the Brexit negotiations. Having made that decision, they then relegated financial services even further by aiming for an outcome that they openly admitted was inadequate, and they have not even been able to achieve that outcome. That is the context of these clauses.

I have a few questions on the details of the regime being established by the clauses. First, how does this relate to the Chancellor’s statement on financial services on 9 November? The clause and schedule 9 set out a country-by-country approval system for equivalence decisions, but in his statement on 9 November the Chancellor said that he was publishing a set of equivalence decisions for the UK and the EEA member states—those member states who still have access to these passporting rights, even though they are not EU members. Clause 24, as I said, implies a country-by-country process. Does the Chancellor’s statement mean that in policy terms, the equivalent recognition has already been given to all EU and EEA member states? Is that for all the financial products that are produced to which such equivalence might apply—that is, those traded on a cross-border basis?

Spending Review 2020 and OBR Forecast

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

In this covid crisis, the Government have presided over an horrific double whammy of one of the largest per capita death rates in the world and the deepest recession in the G7, and that is before the Brexit disruption due at the end of the year. Is the Chancellor really proud of his record?

[Rishi Sunak]

My priority throughout this crisis has been protecting jobs. I am pleased to see that that is something the OBR, the Bank of England and the IMF all acknowledge has happened as a result of our interventions. We currently have an unemployment rate that is lower than Italy, France, Spain, Canada and the United States. So, yes, I do think what we are doing is making a difference to millions of people up and down the country.

Financial Services Bill (Sixth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 5th sitting & Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons & Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Mr McFadden]

I apologise, Dr Huq; I shall try to speak up.

There are many fine-sounding statements about ESG principles on corporate websites. Some of the toughest money management companies in the world are now telling us that it is no longer just about quarterly or annual returns, but about long-term sustainability. We are told that investors do not want to be making money on the back of poor governance or shoddy or illegal working practices; they want their investments to be in companies and projects that are sustainable for the long term and are run in the right way.

With your indulgence, Dr Huq, I will illustrate that with an example that has been in the news recently. I want to consider what these corporate statements were worth in the case of the clothing firm boohoo. When The Sunday Times exposed the shocking conditions in boohoo’s supply chain back in July, including paying workers in the supply chain well below the minimum wage and serious fire risks in the factories in which the clothes were made, the company commissioned an independent review of the supply chain. That was chaired by Alison Levitt QC; she reported in September. She found that the allegations about the supply chain were

“not merely well-founded but substantially true”.

On the corporate governance side of things, her findings were damning. Her report says:

“No member of the Board I interviewed mentioned that the responsibility for what is happening in the supply chain derived from the duty of the company’s officers to act in the best interests of all the shareholders.”

In other words, the board did not understand that it was not in the interest of their own shareholders to allow a supply chain in which these illegal practices were taking place. Ms Levitt was effectively concluding that the board did not know it was their duty—or that if they did know, they did nothing about it.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the lack of effective enforcement is also an important factor in boards’ thinking that the risk may be worth taking? Lack of effective enforcement has been a feature of the last 10 years, as enforcement authorities have been starved of funding and retreated further and further from the frontline, where these practices are going on.

[Mr McFadden]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The point I am making in moving the amendment is that, although there are arguments to be made about enforcement and minimum wage inspectorates and so on, there is another side to the issue: the considerations for investors in these companies and the role of regulators. That is what the amendment is about.

Following Ms Levitt’s report, my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West (Liz Kendall) wrote to all of boohoo’s main shareholders—the list reads like a “Who’s Who” of blue-chip City firms: it includes Jupiter, Fidelity, Invesco, BlackRock and Standard Life Aberdeen. None of those firms—with one notable exception, which I will come to—has taken meaningful action. They talk about engaging and following the situation closely, but only one has actually followed through. All the firms have on their websites very fine-sounding statements about ESG, corporate governance, social considerations, sustainability and so on—indeed, some have set themselves up as champions of those causes.

Let me come to the exception to the rule on that list: Standard Life Aberdeen. It has sold all its shares in boohoo and is clear about why. In a letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester West, the Standard Life Aberdeen chairman Sir Douglas Flint says that the firm had been concerned about the supply chain for some time and that

“Our patience with the company’s responses on the issue had been diminishing during the last year. That patience evaporated this summer with the company’s response to the media allegations and that is why we took the decision to sell our remaining shareholding.”

Standard Life Aberdeen is run by serious people. It is a very reputable, important financial management firm and it has decided to act in accordance with its ESG principles and wants to uphold them. What the story shows is that too many companies do not and that often it is just words.

Our amendment seeks to put some regulatory force behind the upholding of these principles. Firms say that they want to uphold them, but, as the story shows, too often that is not the case—action is wished away with talk of engagement and monitoring the situation and all the rest of it. The amendment would make the regulator have to have regard to the exploitation of workers and make upholding high social and governance standards a hallmark of the UK financial services industry. In that way, we would not just depend on good people such as Sir Douglas Flint and on companies that are the exception to the rule; we would send a clear signal to the whole investment industry about the kind of response that we want to see. Otherwise, the fear must be that, although there will be plenty more warm words and mission statements, they will be of little comfort to someone working in an overheated factory and earning £3 or £4 an hour—about half the minimum wage—and that, when the story is exposed and the exploitation is no longer hidden, the investors in the company that is ultimately responsible will not do anything about it.

I ask the Minister to imagine the signal that such a regulatory duty could send. Not only would there be a minimum wage law, as there is now, but the UK’s supercharged, empowered regulators would have social and governance considerations at the heart of what they do.

We have had many debates about standards and what would happen in the UK after Brexit on this issue. Time and again, the Prime Minister has said that he does not want a race to the bottom: he wants the UK to uphold high international standards and there is absolutely no reason to think that our departure from the EU should be any threat to rights of work or any considerations like that. This amendment is a chance to prove that and put it at the heart of financial regulation.

The truth is that companies are much more likely to take such considerations seriously if their investors are tapping them on the shoulder and saying, “Why aren’t you doing that?” It is clear that Standard Life Aberdeen tried to do the right thing for a time with boohoo and eventually got so exasperated that it divested itself of its shares in the company. That is what we want to see more of from major investors and shareholders. It is not happening enough at the moment. The fine words on corporate websites are not matched enough by that kind of action.

Adding what is in the amendment to the regulators’ “have regard to” list and the accountability framework in the Bill would send a powerful signal about the character of post-Brexit financial services. That is why we have tabled it today.

Financial Services Bill (Fifth sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Alison Thewliss (Glasgow Central) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Davies. I rise to support the amendment. I think it is perfectly sensible that we make assessments and ensure that the changes the Government are putting in place are worth while and valid and that we keep a close eye on them, because of the very risks that the Labour Front-Bench spokesman set out. We cannot predict the future, but we can assess how things are going and make sure that neither consumers nor businesses are at risk. I support that very much and do not have much to add to his comprehensive speech.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

I repeat that is a pleasure to see you in the Chair today, Mr Davies—there will be a bit more of that as we make our way through the Bill. I support my right hon. Friend’s amendment, and want to tease out some of the Government’s intentions in this very technical Bill. We may not have known before 2008, but certainly know now, that highly technical things can be crashingly important if we do not keep a close eye on them. Given that we are now onshoring all these directives, and that the Government have decided, before the transition period is even over, in anticipation of changes to the capital requirements regimes, to diverge from what was put into UK law as part of the withdrawal agreement, I think the Minister owes us—I am sure he will be prepared to do this—a detailed explanation of what the Government perceive to be the advantages of diverging from rules that we had such a crucial part in writing when we were in the European Union.

It was certainly the case when I was a Minister, and I am sure it still is, that because of the relative size and importance of the financial services industry in the UK, our technocrats, if I can call them that, were always very involved in drawing up and agreeing the financial service directives that were in effect in the whole of the European Union. We used to have quite vigorous arguments with the European Union about the nature of some of that, given the slightly different culture that we have in the Anglo-Saxon world, if I can put it that way—the Minister knows what I mean—compared with some things that more routinely happen in the EU, and also because, frankly, our financial services sector is far larger than most financial services sectors within the EU and differs in its make-up. There were always these cultural issues.

However, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there was widespread recognition and agreement—not only in the Basel III and 3.1 regulatory negotiations and how those agreements were put into EU law, which we are talking about now—about what had gone wrong; about needing to identify systemically important companies and make sure they were regulated appropriately, given the risk that under-capitalisation posed to the economies of countries in which those organisations were based; and about having rigorous and intrusive regulation to avoid some of the mistakes and traps that were fallen into in the run-up to 2008.

I am particularly interested in—I hope the Minister will explain it—how this will work, given that the Bill gives our regulators the power to change what has just been onshored to create a completely different system for investment firms, and then to take that forward in future regulation. We know that we have to be eternally vigilant to the way that companies evolve to respond to regulatory systems. If we end up fighting the previous battle, we will probably miss the next bubble. I would therefore appreciate it if the Minister—in commenting on the amendment, which is probing, in that sense—will explain how he believes that the regime that the Bill introduces will be able to respond to the challenges of the evolution of threats. Once the nature of what had been going on during the financial crisis was laid bare—a lot of it had been going on under the radar—one of the surprises was the connection between investment companies and banks, particularly the investment arms of banks. We discovered their trading of derivatives and the leverage they got out of those derivatives to make more money for themselves, more commission and more remuneration. Actually, a lot of what was in those derivatives was not sighted, and the regulation had essentially involved taking on trust the rating agencies’ assessments of what those derivatives were worth, without looking inside the packages.

--- Later in debate ---

I do not see that this amendment delivers over and above the accountability and scrutiny mechanisms already in the Bill, which already find the right balance in relation to parliamentary scrutiny and regulator accountability. Therefore, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Ms Eagle]

I want to come back on that and press the Minister on a couple of questions that, with all due respect, I do not think he answered in his response. Clearly, our amendment is a hook on which to hang a debate about transparency, so that we know what the regulators are doing, and about accountability, because, as I said earlier, if these organisations begin to respond to particular inducements, such as their own remuneration, they can cause risk to happen in a way that can be severely detrimental to consumers and entire economies, as we have seen in recent history. I think that, in the light of that, we are perhaps owed a little more of an explanation from the Minister—I am putting this gently—about what the approach of the regulators will be. The Minister can stand there and say, “The regulators are going to right-size regulation.” That sounds like a fantastic thing because of the very phrase that the Minister has used—“right-size”—but how are they deciding?

We clearly got the wrong size because of evolutionary behaviour to avoid regulation and increasingly risky behaviour in the global financial system in the run-up to the global financial crisis in 2008, which was caused by or began in the subprime mortgage market in America but which brought most of the—if I can put it this way—western-style banking systems close to ruin in the rest of the very interconnected economy because of what had been happening with derivatives. Therefore I wonder whether the Minister might be able to say a little more about the benefits of having the regime that he called right-sized regulation; why we might wish to move away from the current position so quickly after the transition period is over; and what he sees as the benefits of doing this. Refusing our amendment means that there will be no transparent analysis of the effect on the public domain, so we will not be able to discuss it.

I for one think it is important to get these very technical, dry regulations out into the open and to translate them, with the seriousness they deserve, into the potential implications that they present for all our constituents. Our amendment seeks to do that by at least having a transparent publication of these kinds of analyses. The Minister wants to keep it in the regulators’ ambit, in which there is not so much light, to be honest. It is highly technical, and it is hard for those on the outside to have a look inside to see what the implications are. I have hardly had any correspondence from outsiders on the Bill to help me through the long hours and sittings to come. That rather illustrates my point: that a light needs to be shone on this area, because of the risks if we get it wrong.

The Minister rightly wants to get it right, but surely it is relevant to hear from him and to have a bit of transparency, and to put something on the record now about how he sees the advantages playing out, as opposed to the risks. Will he have another go?

[John Glen]

I am very happy to have another go. The hon. Lady is at risk of suggesting that there is somehow a clumsy, rushed delegation to regulators and a risk that—in that delegation—the industry will influence regulators to right-size in a way that damages consumers. I draw her attention to the fact that the legislation gives the FCA responsibility to have regard to the impact on consumers, on the market and on firms—that is, the impact on themselves—of not having the appropriate capital requirements.

The right-sizing comment refers to the fact that the firms are currently bound by rules that align them to other institutions that are clearly functionally different. Nobody really believes that it would be right for there to be a prescriptive mandate from primary legislation on exactly how those technical rules and those capital requirements on a firm-by-firm basis should exist. The FCA has the right to reclassify firms and monitor that reclassification as firms evolve. The PRA will retain oversight of systemically important firms.

I contend that the Bill contains sufficient mechanisms to ensure public and parliamentary scrutiny of both the FCA and the Treasury through the draft affirmative procedure and the FCA reporting requirements. That combination of the FCA’s existing statutory duties and the “have regards” set out in the Bill cover the areas that amendment 19 seeks to address.

I make one further important point that goes to the heart of the wider regulatory framework. The future regulatory framework consultation that we launched on 19 October sets out over a 12-week period to look holistically at what should be the constitutional relationship between the FCA, the PRA, the Treasury and Parliament to embed an enduring accountability framework on a much broader basis. There will be another consultation subsequent to that. I anticipate that the response to the consultation might be, “Why haven’t you done this before?”. The bottom line is that the measures are required to meet international standards within an internationally determined timeframe of expectations. I declared on Second Reading that this is the first in a series of pieces of legislation, and I have always said so. This first piece of legislation sets the accountability framework for the initial measures.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

I am a softly spoken and moderate man; it has not always done me good, but I am on track here at the moment.

I want to respond to the Minister’s reasons for advising us not to press the amendment. I talked at the beginning about three pots of amendments, and it strikes me that there are really two or three pots of reasons why Ministers say no to amendments. The first is that the amendment is wrong or not competently written in some way. Pot two is that it has completely misunderstood the Bill and therefore is not just incompetently written, but actually wrong in its intent. Pot three is to say that it is covered anyway. Usually, if somebody is not going to say yes to an amendment, it falls into one of those categories. The Minister has gone for pot three today. He has not really argued that the amendment is wrong in its content or that there is anything wrong with the way it is written; he has argued that this kind of thing is covered anyway. There is a problem for us in accepting that.

[Ms Eagle]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a fourth one, which is to say, “This should not be on the face of the Bill; we are going to do it, but we are going to put it in secondary legislation,” which of course is unamendable and usually rammed through this House in a way that makes scrutiny even harder?

[Mr McFadden]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Perhaps there is even a fifth one, which is, “Wait for the consultation on something else.” The problem with going for pot three and saying the amendment is covered anyway is that that concedes that it would be completely harmless and there would be nothing wrong if it were accepted. The Government are, in effect, agreeing with its intent and saying they will do it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alison Thewliss]

My concerns very much lie around the interconnectedness, because the system will be only as strong as the weakest part within it. If the weakest parts start to pull down everything else and make everything else unravel, we have a real problem on our hands.

My questions are about the monitoring of risk within the system that is being established. How can the Minister be certain that the risks are being closely monitored by the regulators, that the regulators understand the business that smaller firms are doing in their part of the market, and that the activities that those smaller firms are engaged in does not pose a risk to everything else? There is definitely cause for them to be monitored in order to have an eye kept on them, and to ensure that their activities do not cause wider risk. If attention is not being given to them, how can we ensure that their activities are above board and are not causing further risks anywhere else within the system?

How will the monitoring be scrutinised more widely by Parliament and others? The Treasury Committee gets the opportunity to question the regulators, but getting down to such a level of detail is not necessarily something that we would do. How does the Minister envisage Parliament having a role in that scrutiny in order to ensure that, should something happen or go wrong, we find out about it timeously rather than when it is too late to have any impact and when the whole thing has tumbled down?

[Ms Eagle]

Like the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, I am on the Treasury Committee. We have a very full programme. The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford also shares the pleasures of being on the Treasury Committee. However, it would be very difficult for us to question the FCA with this level of granularity. Therefore, given the onshoring and the importance of this regime as it evolves, how does the Minister expect the transparency, oversight and accountability to be put in place going forward? Does he expect that to also include consumer authorities and the consumer interest, and will explain what he expects these companies to be able to do under this regime that they cannot do now?

[John Glen]

I am grateful for those questions, and I shall seek to bring some clarity. The right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East asked me two questions about the numbers. I cannot give a specific number here, because it is fluid and would be something for the FCA to determine. I am sure the FCA would be very happy to give him an indication on that.

To the other point around interconnectedness, made by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Central as well, the classification will be based on the evolving nature of the activities, and this is something the FCA makes judgments on all the time. The PRA is responsible for eight systemically important institutions, covering Goldman Sachs and J. P. Morgan, among others, which are of a size and scale such that their interconnectedness means they are of systemic significance.

There are a lot of complex relationships between financial institutions. Therefore, as acknowledged by the hon. Member for Wallasey, as people who are technically capable of evaluating those interconnected elements, it is appropriate and in their interest to make those judgments, and that sort of decision making does go on currently.

The scrutiny process links back—I will not keep repeating it—to the point that the right hon. Gentleman made about the “Future Regulatory Framework Review”, which will look at the appropriateness in a situation where that scrutiny has previously happened at an EU level, through combined conversations, the Council of Ministers, work that is then is auto-uploaded to the regulators. What is the new mechanism to hold regulators accountable in a situation where they are given the task from this place? That would be the purpose of the extended regulatory review and future legislation. It may involve an enhanced role for the Treasury Committee, with additional resources to augment the expertise that already exists, but that is a matter for that consultation.

In answer to the question from the hon. Member for Wallasey about what I expect the companies will be able to do that they currently cannot, this comes back to some of the evidence we heard last week from the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, which says there is a wide family of firms with different activities. The question is: are the regulations as they apply at the moment—as fitted for 28 countries, where obviously some compromises were made—appropriate for the configuration of firms as they exist?

What I would expect to see is consideration given for capital requirements that match the actual profile of activities, notwithstanding the very legitimate points made around the interconnectedness and the risks associated with their broadest activities. I have stressed throughout the passage of this Bill so far, and I reiterate now, that the essential purpose of the Government’s approach is to ensure that we have the highest regulatory standards. Our reputation as a centre for financial services is based not on finding quick fixes that shortcut regulatory standards, but on finding something that fits the nature of our industry, aligned to international standards, that gives us the best opportunity to grow and prosper in a way that is safe and secure for consumers.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1

Exclusion of certain investment firms from the Capital Requirements Regulation: consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the schedule be the First schedule to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr McFadden]

I do not really have substantial questions at this stage, because schedule 2 sets out the detail, and I think we will probably have an extensive debate on it.

[Ms Eagle]

The clause inserts a new part 9C into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which forms the legal basis for the new regime that the Bill introduces for investment companies. We have been talking about the minimum amount of capital required. We have covered some of that, although we will get further into it when we come to the Basel 3.1 bits.

Will the Minister say a bit about remuneration policies? That is another issue that will be regulated. We know from what happened in the financial crash and the build-up to that bubble that remuneration policies formed a key part of the bad incentives that created the behaviour that caused the crash. How will the Government be dealing with the regulators about remuneration? What will the principles be? Getting the right incentives for remuneration is a key driver for behaviour, and behaviour is a key driver for activities in that area, as we know only too well. If we did not know that from 2008, we would know it from the Wall Street crash in 1929. It is part of a set pattern. How will the Government ask the regulators to deal with that issue?

[John Glen]

I am happy to respond to that. The risk that the hon. Lady sets out—that, broadly, this country will go down a route where we deviate significantly from the new established norms of the regulation of remuneration and the rules around rewards and bonuses and so on—is a matter for which the regulator has responsibility. It will be incumbent on the Government to look at evolving best practice and the appropriate way to bring continuity to such regulations in line with those highest standards.

It is not our wish to create deviation for the sake of it. We will continue to look at the market situation. The point has been made already that we have to be alert to evolving new practices. In the same way, I think the hon. Lady would acknowledge that, in the light of the last crisis, there was an evolution in business models with respect to high-cost credit. There is always a risk in the sort of environment that we are in now that there will be new developments. I cannot prescribe precisely how we will look forward, but we will look to adhere to global high standards, because the integrity of our reputation relies on it.

[Ms Eagle]

I thank the Minister for his indulgence. Clause 2 is also partly about enforcing regulations; there are references to fraud and criminal offences, which again we will come to in more detail later. Will he let us know whether fraud enforcement will be beefed up? We can have a great regulatory regime and redefine fraudulent behaviour, but if enforcement is not up to scratch, that will not really deter. This is area where, if enforcement is too weak, the rewards are very high and the risk of being caught and prosecuted or fined is very low. Can he give some reassurance on that point at this stage?

[John Glen]

I am happy to. The hon. Lady makes a fair and reasonable point. We have to maintain the highest standards of regulation. The FCA and the PRA are extremely well respected globally, but that does not lead me as the Minister to be complacent. We must continually be vigilant about whether those standards of compliance and intervention into non-compliance are sufficient and adequate. We will always seek to maintain that.

To return to the principle, these capital requirements for firms are extremely detailed and technical. The regulators have the right expertise to update them. They will have increased responsibility, but they will need to consider the principles set out in the Bill. We are following the advice of the House of Lords Financial Affairs Sub-Committee, which said that these delegations would be appropriate. The broader conversation about the direction of travel around what sort of framework we wish to have in the UK is not fully addressed at this moment, but there will be more to say in the context of the response to the future regulatory framework two-stage review and the legislation we bring forward subsequently.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 2

Prudential regulation of FCA investment firms

Financial Services Bill (Third sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 19th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Julie Marson]

I do, but I will let someone else come in. Thank you.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Q You said something astonishing today. You said that, in your opinion, we have outsourced our enforcement on economic crime to the US.

Dr Hawley: That is not my wording; I think that one of the business press has used that phrase. Do you want me to explain why I think that?

[Ms Eagle]

Q I was just getting you to reaffirm that is what you meant: that essentially that is what we have done, because presumably you think that our enforcement and activity against this kind of economic crime is much inferior to what is going on in the US?

Dr Hawley: I am afraid it is widely held consensus that what we do here is significantly inferior to what happens in the US, and I do not think there can be any doubt about that. I could share some research we did in 2019, which very specifically compared only London and New York banks, so that we did not get an unfair comparison because of the much larger size of the US. The level of fines that the US imposes, both criminally and on a regulatory level—that is, the money laundering space—is 22 times higher.

[Ms Eagle]

Q It would be very useful if you would share that information. What can we do to improve the incentives to prevent this activity? Is that more about enforcement and the almost wiping out of action fraud and much of the criminal work that goes on to prevent fraud, which—let’s face it—has fallen off a cliff in terms of its success rates? You have made some very interesting points about how you think the law should be changed, but is that about the law or is this an enforcement problem? Do you think the FCA is fit for purpose when it comes to the enforcement for which it is responsible?

Dr Hawley: The law is certainly an issue with fraud, money laundering and false accounting.

[Ms Eagle]

By the way, without meaning to be rude, you have three minutes to answer this or the Chair will cut you off.

Dr Hawley: Absolutely, it is an issue of the law and of enforcement—law is only as good as its enforcement. We need a fairly wide consensus among the enforcement community, non-governmental organisations and academics in this space. We need a massive boost to economic crime enforcement in this country.

With the FCA, what we hear is it is much easier for them to bring civil actions, and that is what they do. For corporates, they are not using the corporate criminal liability laws that we think need to be used to ensure real deterrence, and that corporate wrongdoing, when it does occur—by the few bad people—is properly held to account and prosecuted. I know the Competition and Markets Authority wants to get rid of its prosecuting function to the SFO. Some people, such as Jonathan Fisher QC, have argued that we need one big super-enforcer in the criminal sphere, because regulators will always have more interest in taking the easier, quicker and cheaper route, taking the regulatory approach rather than the criminal approach.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Finally, because you answered that so fast, do you think that the way to deal with the larger global companies is vicarious liability, rather than “failure to prevent”? Should we be thinking of introducing a law saying that after a company gets beyond a certain size, we switch to vicarious liability, because this idea of directing mind is simply not present in larger global corporates?

Dr Hawley: It is a really complicated issue, which I am very pleased the Law Commission is looking at. One of the options is vicarious liability. Some people feel a bit uneasy about vicarious liability and say it is too strong, but that is where you need the best legal minds of the Law Commission. However, the immediate gap can be immediately filled by the introduction of the “failure to prevent” offence. Otherwise, large companies are beyond the law; the “failure to prevent” offence brings them within the reach of the law.

[The Chair]

Order. I am afraid that brings us to the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. I thank our witness for her evidence on behalf of the Committee. That brings us to the end of the morning sitting. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in the same room to take further evidence.

Ordered, That further consideration now be adjourned. —(David Rutley.)

Financial Services Bill (First sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[Alison Thewliss]

Okay. I will leave some questions for colleagues.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Q Mr Mills, I wonder whether you could say a little more about the resource implications of the Bill. An awful lot of our financial services regulation—well, all of it—used to go on in the European Union, but now that is ending and all these complex and technical issues are being onshored. That must be the cause of a huge amount of extra technical work for the FCA, and in fact for the PRA. Is the FCA getting any extra resources? Are you trying to import all the people who used to live in Brussels back into the FCA?

Sheldon Mills: As I said, we have a significant amount of expertise in the United Kingdom. The reason we have that expertise is that—I have to be careful how I put this—much of the financial services legislation that has come about in the EU, the UK has fully participated in, often leading on the legislation. If we take the investment firms prudential regime, which is in the Bill, our colleagues at the FCA were leaders in that space, setting the pace and direction in the EU. So I think we have the expertise and the experience.

When I think about resources, there are areas where we will need to consider hiring more people, in particular the area of prudential expertise—that is a specific area within the FCA where we will need to hire. We will need to consider our resourcing carefully, as more parts of the acquis are onshored, but currently, where we stand, we think we are capable of moving around our resources in order to meet the demands.

The impact that it could have is of course the speed at which we are able to turn to the different pieces of legislation. If the ask was to do everything on day one, there would be an impact on resources; if we have a sensible framework and approach, I think we can manage.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Mr Mills, I am glad you think you can manage but, given that this onshoring is happening, we have already seen the beginnings of some quite fierce competition—if I may put it in a non-technical way—to nick some of the financial services that we have in this country and to take them abroad. We have already seen quite a competitive and non-co-operative environment develop, seeing who can get what when we are outside the European Union. That is an entirely new form of activity that somehow you have to take account of, and that has not had to be taken account of in the past.

Are you sure that will not cause your resources to be stretched in a way that you had not anticipated? For example, if we have to approve new ways of doing things, onshore all these things and get new systems up and running, those who might wish to carry on can just shift to the internal market and carry on doing things, without having to wait for all the consultations that you and your colleagues will be doing to try to re-establish a UK-based regulatory system.

Sheldon Mills: The starting point is that the foundations of the system are clear to all financial services markets in the UK, so there will not be a gap that means organisations will not know the type of regulatory system that they expect when they are authorised a licence to operate in the UK. We will ensure that that is maintained and is clear throughout the transition and into the future.

On what I think you are referring to as the competitive regulatory system that we might enter into, I can assure you that we are engaged internationally through all international bodies. We play leadership roles in the ESB, the Financial Stability Board and all sorts of international bodies in financial services. Therefore, we are key actors in regulatory systems and the latest approaches to regulation across the world, and that will also support our being a sensible regulatory environment in which firms wish to operate. We are clearly engaged with negotiations and discussions with the European Securities and Markets Authority in relation to a range of regulatory activity, so I am confident that we will not have any significant gaps or issues that would cause issues for the UK financial services industry or for those who wish to come and play an active role in that industry.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Thank you. It appears that the EU will not be in a position to offer us any equivalence, or to certify any of the things that we are doing as equivalent, until at least the middle of next year. There are noises that we will be diverging in some of the areas that we are re-onshoring. You said that would be the exception rather than the rule. Can you give us a bit more information on how divergence will work? I am concerned that the Bill has its Committee stage this side of the transition, and then its Report stage the other side of the transition, when we might be in a different situation. Are you planning for there to be big importations of new stuff into the Bill at the last minute?

Sheldon Mills: The Bill is a matter for Government to take through Parliament. The important thing for us, as regulators, is that the Bill provides us with sufficient flexibility to meet the needs that we face as we move through the transition and into the future. In a sense, the Bill is silent on whether we are divergent or equivalent. Equivalence is a policy matter for Government, as opposed to a matter for us. All we need is sufficient flexibility to ensure that we have an appropriate regulatory system, depending on how Government policy emerges in relation to equivalence.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Just to make that clear, you are basically saying that you are neutral on the amount of divergence or equivalence, and that you can cope with whatever is thrown at you?

Sheldon Mills: Neutral is too strong a word. My point of view is that we are interested in what I would call outcomes-based regulation. Equivalence can be done in one of two ways within the bounds of equivalence: it can be done line by line and letter by letter, or it can be done on the basis of seeking to meet equivalence objectives within an outcomes-based regulatory system. We are moving towards the position of the latter. Overall, equivalence is a matter for Government.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Finally—I am conscious that I have put questions only to you, but I am sure colleagues will put questions to other witnesses—you were saying at the beginning that part of what the FCA has to do is protect financial services in this country and create a good environment for them, as well as protect consumers and ensure market stability. There is only so much bandwidth, so will all the work relating to onshoring compromise consumer protection?

Sheldon Mills: I do not think so at all. To give an example, it may look like it would take an army of 50 or 60 people to do the work of the investment firms prudential regime, but in reality it takes around 10 people to do that work. These are significant specialists in the technical architecture of designing prudential regulation. We would not ordinarily use those people in our consumer protection work, and they have different skills and are involved in different activities. I do not think that we will be any less vociferous in protecting consumers. During the crisis, those who watched us saw that we were at the forefront of ensuring that we tried to provide relief to consumers during the pandemic. We will continue in that vein. As the FCA’s conduct regulator, I am committed to ensuring that the consumer is at the heart of everything we do.

[Ms Eagle]

Thank you, Chair.

[Abena Oppong-Asare (Erith and Thamesmead) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for taking the time to speak to us. I know that you are in favour of the Bill, as it will give you greater agility and flexibility to deal with things. Going back to some of the comments you made earlier about the consultation process, in which you were clearly fully engaged, one of the things I want to find out relates to the consultation discussions, and obviously you have more responsibilities. Will you shed some light on what came out of those discussions in terms of making sure that there is effective accountability and oversight in relation to the additional powers that you are likely to be given?

Sheldon Mills: I will go first and then pass over to Vicky. It is useful to start with our current accountability, because the Bill and future regulatory frameworks being consulted on by the Government deal with that issue. We wish to be accountable. As an independent regulator, an important part of our process is for us to have public accountability. We serve the public and ultimately are scrutinised by Parliament. Our main form of scrutiny is that of the Treasury Select Committee, but we attend many other Committees. Explaining our activity to Parliament is an important part of our work. Below that, within the Financial Services and Markets Act for the FCA specifically, are our statutory panels. They are there to scrutinise our work in a much closer engagement with the organisation. Then we have the consumer panel, the practitioner panel and the small business practitioner panel, as well as the advisory panel on markets and listings. They are able to make public their views, and—believe me—they do very often make public their views on our activity. In addition to that, we will consult on our policies when we do policy-making work ourselves, as do other public authorities. We will also provide access to non-confidential information and data so that all interested parties can make their views known to us.

We also evaluate our work to ensure that it meets its intended outcomes. We already have an existing accountability framework that would sit well with the additional rule-making powers we may get through the Bill and as we move forward with the proposed reform to the financial services regulatory regime. The future regulatory framework is out for consultation, so I will not say much in relation to it, but we of course acknowledge that there may need to be adjustments to the accountability framework to accord with the additional powers that we are getting. We look forward to seeing the responses to the Government’s consultation in relation to that.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Do any other Members have any questions?

[Ms Eagle]

Q I was wondering, Daniel, whether there are any dangers in the move away from LIBOR. Obviously, we know about the dangers of staying with it, but are there things that keep you awake at night about the transition?

Daniel Cichocki: As the Committee can imagine, from an industry perspective, we are absolutely focused on ensuring that the transition away from LIBOR—which is the right thing to do—is done in a way that treats customers fairly and consistently.

There is an awful lot of work being done at both an international and domestic level to agree standardised approaches to transition, where possible, but also to ensure that there are clear expectations from our regulators—here in the UK, it is the Financial Conduct Authority—about how that transition should be done.

Lots of work has been done and lots of work remains to be done, and, as you can imagine, we are speaking very frequently to the regulators here in the UK, and also working through the national working group to ensure that customers are transitioned on a fair and transparent basis.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Obviously, LIBOR is a benchmark. Any benchmark is a sign of some of the profit that can be made on a transaction. If there are differences of approach or changes, there are areas where customers can be fleeced or left out of pocket without, in some ways, even realising it because of the very technical nature of these kinds of transactions. To what extent do you have a consumer protection voice helping you with these changes? Do you think that the protections for consumers who may be disadvantaged during this transition are strong enough?

Daniel Cichocki: We are one voice from the perspective of the banking and finance industries, but it is important also to recognise that, within the overall national working group in the UK, there are voices that, rightly and properly, represent the end users of LIBOR, be they corporates themselves or the representatives of corporates. Although those voices are important in our national transition working group, it is equally important to address the concern that you articulate, which is absolutely right: the guidance that the FCA has provided to all firms that are transitioning their customers that the process should not be used to move customers on to inferior terms or rates that would be expected to be higher than LIBOR would have been. After speaking to our members in the industry, that message from the UK conduct authority has been heard loudly and clearly. All of us who are focused on moving away from LIBOR are acutely aware of the history of the benchmark and committed to ensuring that we move away from it in the right way and in a manner that treats customers fairly.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Obviously we will be keeping an eye on that as it happens.

Mr Hills, the industry has been lobbying the Government, Parliament and regulators to design regulations that will make UK firms more internationally competitive. Indeed, all of us in the room would share the aim of protecting our financial services industry. Do you think that the Bill achieves that?

Simon Hills: Yes, I think it does. The important thing is that the Bill achieves that by setting expectations of how the Basel 3.1 framework is implemented in an internationally coherent way. The PRA has to think about not only international competitiveness, but financial services equivalence, and the Bill achieves that.

[Ms Eagle]

Q So you are not too worried about divergence because you do not think there will be very much of it.

Simon Hills: I do not think that it is in the interests of the UK financial services industry and banks to introduce a divergent regime. We are talking about the importance of the City, and we want people to bring their money to the City for the right reasons, not the wrong ones. UK Finance members are certain that it is in no one’s interest to diverge from internationally agreed frameworks because that creates the risk that we bring in the wrong sort of people.

[Ms Eagle]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.

Examination of Witness

Paul Richards gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alison Thewliss]

Okay. It sounds like a good time to be a lawyer in this area. Thank you.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Do the provisions of continuity and safe harbour apply in America as it converts away from LIBOR? Are the things that you are asking the Committee to consider putting in the Bill happening in other jurisdictions?

Paul Richards: In the US, the alternative reference rates committee, which is the group equivalent to the sterling risk-free reference rates working group, has proposed legislation that is not identical to the UK’s but has the same effect, and so the concepts of continuity of contract and protection through safe harbours in the UK context will be recognised, we think, internationally as well.

Of course, we are not dealing here just with the proposals under New York law. We are having to look more generally. The EU has a proposal for legislation as well. It is important to recognise that the FCA has an international role, because the FCA is the regulator of the administrator of LIBOR, so what the FCA, through this Committee, decides in the UK will have an international impact.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Okay. You did not answer the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East earlier about whether you had asked the Government for this and they had said, “No, the FCA can do it; we’re not putting it on the face of the Bill,” and so you have come here to make the argument again, or whether it is work that you are in the process of doing and you have got to the stage where you want to make these proposals, as the Bill has arrived. Have the Government considered this and said no, or is it something that you have just proposed?

Paul Richards: No, I hope that the Government will consider this and say yes. I hope that that will happen, but it needs to be looked at in the context of the Bill as a great help to the market. It needs to be looked at in this context: can anything be done to strengthen the wholesale market?

[Ms Eagle]

Q I understand your point about how those things would calm things down in the changeover, but why do you not trust the FCA to do this? Why does it have to be in the Bill?

Paul Richards: The FCA has great powers under the Bill and I am sure that it will exercise them wisely, but we are dealing here with law internationally, and anything that can be done to strengthen that—and the Bill has the capacity to do that—will be helpful. I hope that it will also be helpful to the FCA.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for his evidence. That brings us to the end of our morning sitting. The Committee will meet again at 2 pm in the same room to take further evidence.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)

Financial Services Bill (Second sitting)

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee Debate: 2nd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I saw Angela Eagle indicate she wanted to speak.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Q Catherine, you said that the City of London welcomes the Bill. What more would you have liked to see in it that is not in it?

Catherine McGuinness: The Bill must be viewed as part of a package with what we then heard from the Chancellor’s announcement. It is a first step, but it does not set out an ambitious overarching strategy for financial services for the future. This is a critical part of our economy and we would suggest that we need that strategy as we move forward. The Chancellor’s announcement last week and the emphasis on openness, innovation and green seem to us to be a significant next step, but we need to look at an overall direction for this important part of the economy.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Emma, does TheCityUK have any thoughts on the same question?

Emma Reynolds: We agree entirely with what Catherine has just said. I think the Chancellor has made a start prior to the consideration on Second Reading of the Bill. He obviously set out certain key reforms in certain areas, most notably in green finance. He also launched a number of calls for evidence and taskforces. Working in partnership with Government, industry would like to see the Government come forward with a strategy that pulls all of that together. That is not an easy thing to do, but we are a world-leading financial services sector in the UK, and we want to see that continue. This is a question of partnership with the Government. We are not saying we want it done to us without us being in the room, but we do think there is probably more to do to create a more coherent strategy for going forward.

[Ms Eagle]

Q There is this tension between equivalence, which you fairly unambiguously said you wanted a few minutes ago, and the argument made that we should leave the European Union so that we can have competition and—this argument is made implicitly—make our own regulations, so that we can make ourselves more competitive. Do you think that divergence could make us more competitive, or is it more likely to be destructive to UK financial services’ ability to trade globally?

Emma Reynolds: If you are a global company that trades across borders, not just in the EU but in other jurisdictions, what you really want is the same or a similar set of rules. You certainly want global norms and standards on which those rules are based. There is no clamour for significant divergence from what we have. It is worth saying that although we are technically equivalent right now, and that will not change until 1 January, there will need to be responses from regulators, in terms of new regulation going forward.

We have the rise of FinTech, which brings its own challenges, but is a great asset to the UK. We have green finance, as well as some of the socioeconomic trends that have been accelerated by covid. All of these bring new challenges, and so our regulation cannot afford to sit still. We want to avoid unintended divergence when the EU and the UK are facing some of the same challenges. We may go about making our rules in a very different way, but if we could achieve broadly the same outcomes, that could mean we were equivalent, and that would provide advantages to those of our members who trade here and in the EU.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Thank you. Catherine, we are coming out of the European Union, where we used to wield great heft in the technical discussions around this regulation. I assume that is still the case. I speak from my experience as Treasury Minister. Are you worried that, untethered, the EU will go off in a different direction and regulate in a way that makes it much harder for us to trade into the single market?

Catherine McGuinness: I would say two things here. First, if we are not at the table helping to shape the regulation, there is, of course, the risk of divergence from either side as we exercise our own autonomy. I think that global standards are going to be critical for all of us, because we are talking about markets that operate across borders. It is in all our interests—the EU’s, ours and the institutions in the sector—to have a set of global standards around global issues. So, yes, there is a risk of divergence from either side. Keeping the conversation going as the regulation develops is going to be critical.

Taking the green question, for example, we have the EU, which is fairly advanced with its own taxonomy. We are now going to be looking at our own taxonomy, and I think that is a great thing that we should be doing. I also think that green finance is an area in which we can really lead the way, including in regulation. It will be important that we look at how those systems mesh together, and this is a conversation that the sector is encouraging our regulators to have with other countries, too—not simply the EU. I was nearly late because I came from a panel in the US speaking about the importance of a regulator-to-regulator discussion about some of these issues, and the role the sector might play in helping to develop thinking. It is possible that we may diverge, but it is in the interest of customers and businesses that there should be well regulated financial markets, with consistent rules and regulations over cross-border challenges.

[Ms Eagle]

Q With our leaving the EU, there has already been some competitive behaviour on the part of certain countries in the EU that shall remain nameless, which are trying to grab some of our business. Emma, do you think that that kind of dynamic, competitive, semi-predatory behaviour is going to trigger a kind of race to the bottom? Would whether or not there is a deal in the next few weeks make any difference to how you would contemplate that activity?

Emma Reynolds: I hope you do not mind if I take your last question first, because I think it sets the scene for the rest of your questions. There is very little in the deal for financial services, if there is a deal. However, our industry thinks it is incredibly important that there be a deal, because that would leave the door open for the EU granting equivalence in certain areas of financial services, and for other agreements that are essential to services more generally, such as provisions around data; frankly, if there is not a better agreement on that between the two sides, that could be very difficult, not only for our members, but for other service industries, too. I hope that answers your question on deal versus no deal.

There is nobody in our industry I could name who wants a race to the bottom. That is not the way to make yourself more competitive. We view the UK’s high standards as giving us an competitive edge. We have some of the highest standards in the world. We do not think that there will be a race to the bottom in that way.

On your question about protectionism, I think there is a live debate right now in the EU. One EU interlocuter put it to us very succinctly the other day as the trade-off between location and efficiency. European business has access at the moment to deep and liquid capital markets in the UK, which they find very useful, and which they cannot find in the EU currently. We would like to see that continue—that is in the interests of businesses not only here, but on the continent—but you are right that there is a live debate about what happens next, and whether location is more important to the EU. That debate is going on not only in the EU; covid has accelerated the trend towards protectionism, which is why it is so good to see that the UK Government are taking such an open approach in the Bill. We would encourage that to continue, because we think it is one of our strengths, and it gives us that competitive edge.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Thank you, Emma. Catherine, I know this is a slightly invidious question, but I am going to ask it anyway. Do you think the FCA is properly equipped and resourced to take up the duties that the Bill confers on it?

Catherine McGuinness: Yes, but I think it is welcome that the FCA, under its new leadership, is also carrying out a review. That is appropriate. Clearly, we are asking a new role of it, and it is absolutely appropriate that it should review how it operates as it takes that on. I am very confident in our regulators, but I am also pleased to hear that the FCA is carrying out its review. Secondly, I would go right back to my point around the need for scrutiny and challenge in that space. That should involve not just the Joint Select Committee, but looking at the Treasury’s role.

May I revisit the question about how the UK can retain its voice in setting standards?

[Ms Eagle]

Q Please do.

Catherine McGuinness: I feel I missed a couple of points there. It is true that part of the way we will retain our global leadership in standard setting is by bilateral dialogue and co-operation, regulator to regulator, with other countries. There is also the question of how we work with the multilateral organisations. We need to take a good look at how we engage, on our new footing, with the Basel committee—how we engage with other global standard setters. We have a good story to tell. I think next year gives us a very good opportunity, as we take up the presidency of the G7 and with COP26 coming up. I have already mentioned our potential leadership on green standards. We should really look at next year as part of this new chapter for financial services, and look at how we can make clear our place in standard setting, and in that conversation around global standards.

[Stella Creasy (Walthamstow) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q My colleague, Angela, has asked most of the questions that I wanted to ask. I just want to get a bit of clarity. Clearly, there is the question of whether your members are thinking about how the Bill will affect the future landscape for their operation. Could you give us some sense of how you feel the Bill will affect the many who are thinking about whether to stay in the UK or go overseas? What issues around the regulatory framework would be the tests for them? Are there things that we could do in the Bill to make it even more likely that people will commit to the UK, and are there things that would make it less likely?

Emma Reynolds: There are measures in the Bill that do, as I understand it, reflect some of the measures that the EU has taken around prudential requirements. In the past, there has been a bit of a one-size-fits-all for different sizes of companies. For smaller companies that carry a smaller risk, you need to take a proportionate approach to regulation. That is by no means saying that we want lower standards, or a race to the bottom; it is about considering firms of different sizes and the risks that they bring.

Obviously, there are challenges every time there is a significant change such as this, and 1 January will look and feel very different, but there are some opportunities, too. For example, we will be in a position where the UK is making laws and regulations for one member state. I mentioned the fast-moving challenges coming up, involving socioeconomic changes to do with covid, FinTech and green finance; the UK will have more flexibility and agility, and so can perhaps act more quickly than before, or than the EU can, operating with 27 member states.

Catherine McGuinness: I think that is right. To add to what Emma has said, the Bill is very helpful in demonstrating the planned way forward. People will be looking for an ongoing commitment to high standards—and, yes, agility in how we make our rules, but also a rigor in that. We cannot stress often enough the importance of this country’s openness to welcoming trade and business, and to high standards, against our strong regulatory backdrop.

It is very welcome that the Treasury will be looking at the strong patchwork of the bases on which people can come into the UK and operate here—the overseas persons exemption and so on. The Treasury will look at how that whole framework can be knitted together in a more coherent manner, as I understand it. What people will be looking for is an ongoing commitment to high standards and the ability to do their business.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julie Marson (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)]

Q Constance, when he was the interim chief executive officer of the FCA recently, Chris Wollard made the point that having the highest international standards of regulation and doing the best for the markets are certainly not mutually exclusive. You might even go further and say that they are actually vital for each other. To what extent do you feel that the Bill achieves those two objectives—having the highest standards and the best framework for the markets?

Constance Usherwood: It is very clear that the UK Government’s intention is that the UK should maintain high, consistent and global standards. From my knowledge of interaction with the PRA, it is committed to doing that. That was also made clear last week by Sam Woods in his Mansion House speech—it is not about a race to the bottom. In so far as a jurisdiction maintains a predictable, open and transparent rule-making process—we expect the PRA to do that with consultation processes—and operates a high, globally consistent standard, that is a really good competitive base from which global banks can operate out of.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Adam, I wonder whether there is anything that you would have liked to see in this Bill that is not there, given that it is an initial first step. Is there anything that you think should have been paid attention to and dealt with in this Bill that has not been?

Adam Farkas: Given that it is providing a framework for the future regulatory architecture in financial services, I am not suggesting that these are missing, but I will list what is important for the industry: that the framework is predictable—that is key for the players—that the framework provides transparency, so that when the rule making is happening under the Bill, the process is transparent; that it is possible for the industry to engage, so when different rules or pieces of the rules are consulted on, there is sufficient accountability provided, but that is not for us to decide on; and that sufficient time is provided for implementation—that is always a critical issue for the industry.

I think that what is proposed in the Bill goes very far on all those points. In that sense, it is difficult to give a definite answer of what else would need to be in the Bill. Those are the points that we are looking at with great interest in relation to the final adoption of the Bill.

[Ms Eagle]

Q We heard earlier today about the shift away from the LIBOR benchmark—which is obviously another part of the Bill—by the bond markets, and that they want continuity of contracts to be in the Bill, particularly for tough LIBOR contracts that cannot be phased into something else. They also want a safe harbour provision to minimise the possibility of legal challenges on how LIBOR is interpreted as it exists. Do you agree with that?

Adam Farkas: I agree that this is an issue that will need to be addressed. There is a question as to whether it needs to be addressed in this particular Bill or in the context of the future rule making by the FCA, but the points raised are valid ones and we also agree with them.

[Ms Eagle]

Q The Bill also contains powers for the PRA and the FCA to create a prudential regulation; an entire new system for credit institutions and investment firms. Do you represent such companies?

Constance Usherwood: Yes, we do.

[Ms Eagle]

Q So are you happy with the framework that has been set out in this Bill? Given that it is only a framework and you do not know the details yet, I am assuming that you think the details will be fairly similar to the European directives that the UK had so much input in forming.

Constance Usherwood: Yes, I think we support it. One thing that I would note is that there are a lot of rules to implement; the Basel III framework that is going into this part of the Bill is over 160 pages long, so there is a lot of technical detail that will need to be considered. We hope that the full impact assessment is therefore done on that basis for the UK banking sector, and also that the consultation process allows the industry to have a meaningful input. I notice that there have been a couple of smaller consultations done recently by the PRA that have only required a month or two months for consultation, and certainly that is something we hope will be fully considered when they put the rules before industry.

[Ms Eagle]

Q Is that what you mean when you are talking about accountability—to the companies that are regulated rather than the consumer? Clearly a great deal of detail will have to be decided by the regulatory authorities; we simply cannot do it in primary legislation. Do you think the Bill gets the balance right between setting a framework in primary legislation and allowing the regulatory authorities to do the detailed work?

Constance Usherwood: Yes, I think that is probably the best way forward and I agree with the approach that has been taken. The other alternative is that it would all have to come before you and you would have to look at all these pages. I think that the regulatory authorities are best placed, and the most technically capable of really assessing it, and doing the impact assessment that will ensure that it is tailored to the UK banking sector.

[Ms Eagle]

Q In what period do you expect the impact assessment to arise after the rules have been specified in a consultation period? Is that the kind of process that you would like to see the FCA follow?

Constance Usherwood: Usually we would expect the impact assessment to be done before the rules are formalised, but it is a fluid process and I would not be certain what the PRA has in mind. We imagine it would take place at some stage prior to any finalisation of the rules.

Adam Farkas: Normally when detailed rules are produced there is some sort of obligation on the authority to provide an impact assessment with it, on the basis of the draft rules. Then, typically, there is a consultation, so opinions are sought from different stakeholders, and then the rules are finalised. The impact assessment is clearly a key feature of financial services rule making, at EU level and at national level. It is part of the broader accountability, which is very important.

[Ms Eagle]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank our two witnesses for their evidence.

Examination of Witness

Gurpreet Manku gave evidence.

Economy Update

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Thursday 5th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Rishi Sunak]

Travel agents’ businesses, coming under the retail category, will benefit from business grants in England, and that money has been Barnetted to Scotland, so the Scottish Government can choose to do something similar to support their travel agents. My hon. Friend the Economic Secretary has previously worked with the insurance industry and the Financial Conduct Authority to provide clarified and updated guidance on business interruption insurance.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

Will the Chancellor now admit that his premature wind-down of furlough, which he had scheduled to finish last weekend, in the middle of what many people expected to be a second wave, was actually a mistake? Will he admit that the virus does not conform to Treasury models or his own timetable for it to disappear? Will he continue to show flexibility? Will he confirm, for the avoidance of doubt, that if the current lockdown ends on 2 December, the furlough scheme will still be available to all those across the country, whatever tier of restrictions they are put back into?

Covid-19: Economy Update

Angela Eagle Excerpts

Thursday 22nd October 2020 Commons Chamber

[Rishi Sunak]

My hon. Friend has been right to champion the situation for his local businesses. I know that they will warmly welcome this. I can give him the assurance that we will work as quickly as possible to provide the guidance. As I said, the grant value will be calculated on the number of hospitality, leisure and accommodation business premises, scaled by their rateable value. Added to that will be a 5% discretionary top-up, and then the local authority can use its discretion to allocate the money as it sees fit for its local area.

[Ms Angela Eagle (Wallasey) (Lab)]

It seems the Chancellor’s much-vaunted winter economic plan has not even lasted the autumn. His tinkering with the system demonstrates that he has been behind the curve all along, and it has sowed hardship and confusion. Why is the support he offered in March not being replicated as the virus comes back and we are suffering a second wave in October? Why is he trying to achieve local lockdowns on the cheap?

[Rishi Sunak]

I would not consider that providing £200 billion of total support could ever be accused of doing anything on the cheap. That money has gone to support public services like the NHS, and people’s jobs, livelihoods and businesses. I commit to this House that we will continue to do everything that is required, and continue to adapt and evolve as the circumstances demand.