Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 18th January 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brazier]

The Prime Minister was quite right that our relationship with our European partners plays a very important role in defence.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend remind the hon. Member for Cambridge (Daniel Zeichner) how many times, in the 10 years since its inception, that the EU battle groups have actually been deployed?

[Mr Brazier]

The EU battle groups have not yet been deployed. The EU does have five significant common security and defence policy missions at the moment, complementing areas where NATO has chosen not to become involved.

Armed Forces Covenant Annual Report

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 7th January 2016 Westminster Hall

[Danny Kinahan]

We are aware of the DUP wish to go down the section 75 route. We are not sure we agree with that system. We are not keen to have the armed forces seen as a minority or dealt with in that way. There is much more that we need to work our way through, although I certainly praise Brenda Hale. She has been magnificent in coming into the Assembly, having lost her husband, and working through on armed forces issues. She has been extremely good.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Can the hon. Gentleman also bring himself to acknowledge the change—a subtle change, but a change nevertheless—of attitude within the nationalist tradition within Northern Ireland? That change certainly struck me when I was a Northern Ireland Minister. It is difficult for many, but it is definitely there in terms of attitude towards the armed forces and, interestingly, in connection with the centenary to which he has referred, whereby for the first time there are members of the nationalist community who are prepared to talk about relatives who served during the great war.

[Danny Kinahan]

I thank the hon. Gentleman very much; I am very glad he has raised that matter. There have been huge changes in my time at home and we have seen many people from the nationalist side come on board—that is why I said “some” earlier, but sadly that “some” on the other side are the ones who drive everything against us. I remember going down to Dublin and being told to take my poppy off. That was a long time ago, but we have seen the visits of the Queen and the Duke. So much is changing in Ireland—Northern Ireland is getting there. There are some quite fantastic people leading in what they are doing, and from the nationalist community as well.

If I can talk about prisons, I know that in Northern Ireland we also have a high percentage of veterans in our prisons. I met Care after Combat a few months ago. It is not involved in Northern Ireland, but I look forward to seeing it work there, because we need a great deal of help. We also need to help all the other veterans’ groups. Sometimes I think we have too many veterans’ groups, but that is not their fault; it is because so many people are seeing that things not working for them. We need to find a better way of pulling all the veterans’ groups together and making sure that they are actually helped.

Hon. Members will have had enough from me today, but what I really want to see is Westminster and this side of the water helping to ensure things are put in place. If I can go back to my comment earlier, we must stop pussyfooting around, use common sense and make things work for our veterans.

Oral Answers to Questions

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 23rd November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

One of the finest parliamentary answers in the course of the hon. Gentleman’s 28-year career to date.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Maritime patrol aircraft featured large in last year’s referendum, but does my hon. Friend agree that they are pretty pointless, either manned or unmanned, unless there is the data-gathering and analysis technology to go with it, and the wherewithal to respond to any threats that emerge—something that the SNP failed to offer last year?

[Mr Brazier]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend.

Armed Forces Bill

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 15th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

No, because the commanding officer will be kept informed about the investigation and the stage it has got to. They are not being removed from the process; we are merely simplifying the procedure and shortening it so that the matter does not have to be referred automatically to the commanding officer and then back to the director of service prosecutions.

Clause 3 also deals with linked cases such as separate offences that occur during the same incident. Some cases may need to be sent to a commanding officer, even though they are connected to a case that has been sent to the director of service prosecutions, and that can result in separate decisions on whether to prosecute, and separate trials. Clause 3 allows the service police to refer a case to the director of service prosecutions if, after consultation, they consider it appropriate to do so because of a connection with another case that has also been referred to that director.

Clause 4 clarifies the procedure for the referral of those linked cases from the commanding officer to the director of service prosecutions, and clause 5 allows the director to bring charges. Currently, when the director of service prosecutions decides that a charge must be brought, they must direct the suspect’s commanding officer to bring that charge. Clause 5 allows the director to bring that charge, just as the Crown Prosecution Service brings charges in the civilian criminal justice system.

Clause 6 increases the range of sentencing options available to the court martial. Civilian courts are currently able to suspend sentences of imprisonment for up to 24 months, but service courts can suspend them for only 12 months. We would like courts martial to be given greater flexibility to vary the deterrent effect of service detention. In some cases it is right for suspended sentences to allow continued service alongside rehabilitation activities. The clause simply corrects the anomaly by giving courts martial the ability to suspend sentences of service detention for up to 24 months.

Clauses 7 and 8 give the director of service prosecutions power to give offenders immunity from prosecution, or an undertaking that the information they provide will not be used against them, in return for assistance that the offender may give to an investigator or prosecutor.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend say what service offences he has in mind for immunity from prosecution? Will he reassure the House that that does not involve any form of plea bargaining, and say whether there are civilian equivalents of the kind of offences that he has in mind?

[Michael Fallon]

Only the most serious cases would involve that kind of immunity—perhaps the Minister will provide my hon. Friend with more examples of what such cases might be when he winds up the debate. These are cases where the evidence from a witness or defendant could be crucial, but where fears about self-incrimination stop someone coming forward and providing essential information.

In the civilian criminal justice system prosecutors such as the Director of Public Prosecutions have statutory powers to offer immunity and restrictions on the use of evidence, but the director of service prosecutions in the service justice system does not. That damages their ability to prosecute the most serious cases, because it may be necessary to rely on evidence from individuals who may not be willing to come forward and give evidence without conditional immunity, or an undertaking that that information will not be used against them. These clauses closely follow those in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 that apply to the civilian criminal justice system.

I assure my hon. Friend that as in the civilian criminal justice system, the intention is for immunity and undertakings not to use information to be offered only in the most serious circumstances for those who are found, after proper investigation, to have fallen short of the high standards that we set.

Clause 13 brings the Armed Forces Act 2006 back into force in the Isle of Man and British overseas territories except for Gibraltar. Under United Kingdom law, the 2006 Act has always applied to members of the armed forces, wherever in the world they are operating, and that will remain the case. That means that a member of the armed forces commits an offence under UK law if they do something in another jurisdiction which, had they done it in England or Wales, would have been a criminal offence.

In addition, the 2006 Act originally formed part of the law of the Isle of Man and the British overseas territories. However, the Act expired in those jurisdictions in 2011. Clause 13 and the schedule to the Bill revive the Act in those jurisdictions so that, as it currently has effect in the UK, it will also be in force there. That ensures that things that members of the armed forces might do under the 2006 Act in those jurisdictions, such as the exercise of service police powers of arrest or search, would be lawful there not only as a matter of UK law but as a matter of the local law. It also ensures that the civilian authorities within those jurisdictions can do things under the 2006 Act which they might not otherwise have powers to do under the local law, such as the arrest of a person suspected of a service offence under a warrant issued by a judge advocate.

An exception is being made for Gibraltar. This is because we are currently consulting the Government of Gibraltar on how best to extend the provisions of the 2006 Act—and, therefore, of the Bill—to that territory.

Clauses 14 and 15 relate to Ministry of Defence firefighters. The Defence Fire Risk Management Organisation has more than 2,000 personnel operating over 70 fire stations. Yet those firefighters currently have no specific emergency powers to act to prevent or deal with fires to protect life or preserve property. That could lead to a situation where firefighters entering a property to put out the flames might have to defend themselves against charges of breaking and entering, or where restraining family members from returning to a burning building might leave them open to a charge of assault.

Fire and rescue services at some MOD sites are currently provided by a contractor. They, too, should be able to deal with an emergency in the same way as MOD firefighters. Clauses 14 and 15 address this issue by giving defence firefighters the same powers to act in emergencies as employees of a civilian fire and rescue authority.

In conclusion, the Bill is an important act in continuing the authority of the armed forces. It makes modest but relevant upgrades to the existing system for the armed forces of command, discipline and justice. The world-class reputation that our armed forces enjoy is underpinned by many factors, one of which is that system of command, discipline and justice. We need to make sure that that system continues to be fit for the modern age. I commend the Bill to the House.

Drones in Conflict

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Tuesday 13th October 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

After this debate there will be a small ceremony to mark the three crests in memory of three Members of this House who died during the great war and who, until this point, have not been recognised.

In the immediate aftermath of that war, the strategist J.F.C. Fuller predicted the demilitarisation of warfare as machines replaced men on the battlefield. General Fuller was well ahead of his time, but the recent use of unmanned machines to eliminate people in a country where we are not actively engaged in war fighting was described by the Prime Minister on 7 September as a “new departure”. Perhaps in time, drones will rank alongside the longbow in the hundred years war, and submarines a century ago. Both in their time were castigated as disreputable and even cowardly, on the grounds that they appeared—initially at least—to be capable of killing with little risk to the operator.

This debate takes place as we contemplate a further vote on military action in Syria, and in the meantime drones have been used to kill two British citizens in Raqqa on 21 August under article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Last week the Prime Minister announced that the number of RAF drones would be doubled, and yesterday the Defence Secretary issued a written ministerial statement about the Protector replacement for Reaper.

I support the development of unmanned air systems as part of the UK’s defence and security. Their endurance, the removal of personal risk from our troops, and the potential for reducing civilian casualties, together with the cost implications of simulator-based training, are all impressive. However, like any “new departure” they must be appraised critically.

Ministers have said that drones operate under existing generic rules of engagement and that nothing more is required. I would like to unpack that a bit, particularly since that assertion appears to conflict with the Ministry of Defence development, concepts and doctrine organisation’s joint doctrine note of March 2011. That JDN notes what we now know to be a “new departure”, and calls explicitly for an unmanned aerial vehicle governance road map. Will the Minister say what progress has been made in advancing the JDN’s recommendations? Will the road map be published? If so, when?

The availability of low-risk, low-cost means of delivering military effect risks lowering the bar for military intervention. It could be that the killings in Raqqa, which I volubly supported in September, illustrate the point. Would the Government have ordered this new departure without the risk-free means of delivery made possible by drones? Indeed, the absence of any obvious criminal or disruptive proceedings against collaborators of the individuals killed in Raqqa suggests that the unmanned aerial vehicle action was not as pressing as we initially understood it to be. Were it otherwise, one would have expected a highly sophisticated delivery and support system in the UK where the offence or offences were to be committed. As yet, we have seen no evidence of that.

In its response to the Defence Committee’s report, the Government denied that the availability of drones lowers the bar for military intervention. I expect the Minister to reiterate that today. However, unless Ministers are prepared to say that risk to our own troops is immaterial in determining whether to embark on military action, which I do not think she will, that line will have to be finessed in due course.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and for securing this important debate. He has clearly outlined the issue for military use, but there is an opportunity to use drones for surveillance. In Northern Ireland, we have very active dissident republicans and the threat level is severe. Does he feel that drones could be used, for example by the Police Service of Northern Ireland, to enable better surveillance and to catch terrorists involved in illegal activity?

[Dr Murrison]

The hon. Gentleman makes his point in his normal fashion. He will understand that Northern Ireland falls outwith the scope of today’s debate, but those responsible for security in Northern Ireland will no doubt examine all the options open to them to safeguard the people living in Northern Ireland.

I hope the newly repopulated Intelligence and Security Committee will be assisted by Ministers in applying its forensic skills to investigate the Raqqa killings. I am confident that the action was only taken, as the Prime Minister said on 7 September, as there was “no alternative”, so it should be able to reassure the public fairly easily. However, it or others must substantiate or refute the hypothesis that, in the Raqqa case, the availability of drones lowered the bar for intervention under article 51 on 21 August. If the former is the case, UAVs will indeed be a new departure in the tradition of J.F.C. Fuller, and the argument for tailored doctrine and rules of engagement will be overwhelming.

This is especially important as what may seem like surgical, low-risk interventions have an unnerving history of altogether bigger consequences that are difficult to predict and control. What is more, the use of particular systems by the UK legitimises their use by other states. The quality of our doctrine and our rules of engagement have a direct bearing on those of others. If we are seen to be relaxed about this new departure, we cannot be surprised if others take a similar line.

The use of drones by the US to eliminate operatives in Pakistan and Yemen is highly controversial. I am one of the greatest admirers of the United States, but its post-war history of what has become known as blowback —provoking sometimes game-changing retaliation through the generation of civilian collateral—is alarming. America’s allies are at risk of being seen as colluding to the point that the Defence Committee has called for a clear demarcation in the operation of drones where, of course, interchangeability of US and UK personnel and airframes is very advanced. The Birmingham Policy Commission was assured that UK personnel releasing a weapon from a United States air force vehicle remain subject to UK rules of engagement. Will the Minister confirm that that is the case, since manned air operations in Syria—despite the express will of this House two years ago, however right or wrong—suggest otherwise?

We cannot directly influence our allies’ ROEs, but we can ensure that joint operations are conducted appropriately, that NATO doctrine is acceptable and that UK personnel are not compromised. Will the Minister say how many UK servicemen are involved in the operational use of drones with US or other forces and what arrangements she has made to ensure that the ROEs they are required to use do not fall short of the standards applicable in the UK? What will be done to ensure that data acquired using drones are not then used by allies to act against targets in a way that the UK public might find objectionable? The Defence Committee has suggested that the Intelligence and Security Committee look at this. Without wishing to overburden the ISC, would she agree that that suggestion is sound and do what she can to facilitate it?

Drones are all controlled by human beings, but concern remains over the development of autonomous airframes and so-called killer robots. Some level of independence already applies to a few of our existing weapon systems, such as Phalanx, but it would be useful if the Minister delineated the bounds of acceptability. Can she confirm that the UK is bound by the missile technology control regime, the Wassenaar arrangement and not least the consolidated criteria? What is her view of the future for unmanned technology exploitation in the UK aerospace and defence sector? Will she confirm that the UK Government would be unlikely to license the export of autonomous weapon systems?

Can I tempt the Minister to indicate how UAVs will feature in the upcoming strategic defence and security review? It sometimes seems that the only defence policy the Scottish National party has is the restoration of maritime patrol aircraft. Manned airframes for that purpose seem increasingly last century, so will she say whether UAVs—perhaps the US systems Poseidon or Triton, or NATO’s high altitude long endurance proposition —are being actively considered to restore capability taken at risk on withdrawal of Nimrod? Will the MOD now undertake to publish the study we understand is being conducted by the MOD into that matter?

Will the Minister say where we are with the future combat air system? A joint BAE Systems and Dassault post-Typhoon and Rafael unmanned combat air system concept trailed in the Lancaster House treaties and launched in 2012 appears to have stalled. Will she say what has happened to it and the extent to which the challenges of evolving technology designed for permissive airspace and data feeds to deal with hostile environments and semi-autonomy are delaying progress?

Will the Minister confirm that the UK has no interest in the European Defence Agency’s medium altitude long endurance remotely piloted aircraft systems project? I remember being distinctly lukewarm about that, as I am with “more Europe” in defence generally, at the Foreign Affairs Council when I was at the MOD. When will the Navy’s maritime UAV strategy paper be finished and published? If drones are relatively cheap, easy to control, low risk and readily deployable, they may well become a weapon of choice for non-state actors. What assessment has been made of this and, while spending on UAVs is bucking the defence spending trend in this country, what investment is being made in countermeasures?

I would like to consider the implications of emerging technology on military software—on uniformed men and women who serve this country. With the SDSR pending, it is important for Ministers to understand where technological advances are taking not only defence hardware but its software—the human beings who populate the military today and will do so over the next two decades. Air marshals gamely tried to convince us that a drone pilot playing with his joystick in the Nevada desert or Lincolnshire is the lineal descendent of “the few” and of airmen in conflicts since—that is, people who engage directly with or are engaged by the enemy in the air.

Although the mental challenge to a person who logs off and goes home after a shift in Lincolnshire should not be equated with an infanteer in Basra or Helmand, the psychological implications of killing the enemy at a distance rather than at close quarters merit close examination, particularly since operators lack the unit cohesion and support systems of those physically on the frontline.

If Fuller is right, military practitioners will increasingly be technicians, not tough men at the end of a bayonet. “Professional spirit” will replace “fighting spirit”: it will be as if the Royal Army Dental Corps has taken over from the Black Watch. If so, in the sanitised operations of the future, “fighting spirit” may become a positive disadvantage. The military covenant exists because of the extraordinary risks run by fighting forces. If there are few risks beyond the expectation of routine civilian employment, there is no need for a covenant.

General Fuller’s prediction of the end of the infantry was premature, but it may yet have its day as we shift from hand-to-hand to hands-off combat in an environment where societal tolerance for taking and inflicting casualties is low. If so, there are profound implications for how we structure our armed forces, the sort of people we recruit to them and the implicit deal struck between servicemen and the nation, reflected in the military covenant.

Counter-ISIL Coalition Strategy

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

As I have said, about 11,000 Iraqi forces personnel have been trained in the past few months. The British Army has made a formidable contribution to that training and is now extending the training it offers to the training bases outside the Kurdish areas. We need to continue to do that. The Iraqi army has to be reconstituted. It has been weakly led and has been slowed up, particularly by improvised explosive devices in vehicles and by booby traps left behind in abandoned villages. The British Army can make a real contribution with the training we offer and the operational expertise we developed in Afghanistan, but it will be slow work.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend rightly spoke of the importance of aerial surveillance in gathering a picture of what is happening on the ground, but he will be aware of informed speculation on both sides of the Atlantic that we were to an extent blindsided by lack of HUMINT—human intelligence—on the fall of Mosul and, a year later, Ramadi. What confidence can we have that the necessary assets are in place to build up an optimal picture of 21st-century jihadism?

[Michael Fallon]

I do not think that my hon. Friend or the House would expect me to go into too much detail about how we gather intelligence in either Iraq or Syria, except to say that 30% of the intelligence-gathering effort is done by British aircraft. We need to build up a more accurate picture of ISIL’s strengths up the Tigris and west along the Euphrates before we can assist the Iraqi and Kurdish forces to retake the ground that has been lost. That advice, and train and equip, is all part of the mission to help bolster Iraqi forces.

Britain and International Security

Andrew Murrison Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I welcome my hon. Friend and parliamentary neighbour to his place in this House. He brings a wealth of experience from the armed forces and, indeed, the Ministry of Defence to debates such as this one. His question allows me to emphasise the importance of the work of other Departments. These cannot just be military solutions.

The work of the Department for International Development is extremely important and I have always seen development and defence as two sides of the same coin. The money we can spend up-front on capacity building helps to avoid a bigger financial outlay downstream. That money and the work by DFID and the Foreign Office can help prevent crises and conflicts. By strengthening countries in Africa, we can do more to discourage people from leaving them, and because today’s aid budget is much better focused, with fewer countries receiving it, it has greater impact.

We are spending some £60 million on supporting millions of people who have been displaced by ISIL/Daesh, and we have pledged £900 million to answer the specific humanitarian crisis in Syria—the biggest ever UK response to any crisis anywhere.

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

The OECD is this month considering whether to re-categorise official development assistance so that it includes elements of the military, particularly peacekeeping. Would my right hon. Friend welcome that?

[Michael Fallon]

There are a number of measurements, including the OECD one and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute one. The return that I have filed on behalf of the United Kingdom is to NATO, and it complies with NATO guidelines. The House will want to know that, on the basis of that guidance, we spent 2.2% last year and expect to spend more than 2% again this year.

As well as the 4,000 service personnel committed to the operations I have described, more than 10,000 people working in defence are stationed overseas—from Brunei to the Falklands, and from Cyprus to Kenya. They delivered courses in some 15 countries last year, and we have helped to train representatives from 90 countries in our military academies. More than 1,200 naval personnel are deployed in the middle east, helping to keep our energy supplies flowing and to counter terror.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jack Lopresti (Filton and Bradley Stoke) (Con)]

What a privilege it is to follow the hon. Member for Dundee West (Chris Law) and his excellent maiden speech. I congratulate him and wish him well in his future career and his service in this place. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ribble Valley (Mr Evans), I do not think back much to my maiden speech—it was not a happy moment and it is something I like to forget. Making speeches is something that we do, and people tell me it gets easier—ask me in about five minutes and I will say whether it does or not.

This important debate is on a vast and complex subject, so I shall endeavour to make just a few points, mainly on NATO, foreign aid and defence spending. I agree with the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) who said we must decide what sort of country we are in our attitude to defence and security—that conversation came up at a defence event last night, and there was some consensus.

Are we just another northern European power with armed forces that are broadly defensive and engage in a limited fashion in UN peacekeeping missions or—dare I say it?—on EU missions? Or are we, as I and perhaps the majority of British people think, a global force for good with the sovereign capability to defend ourselves robustly and to project power globally in the national interest, keeping our people and streets safe wherever the next threat may come from? Even if we are the former, we must accept that such things come at a financial cost. History demonstrates time and again that our wars choose us; we do not choose them.

A myth promulgated by certain sections of the liberal media is that somehow our engagements and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were merely wars of choice. I would disagree strongly with that and say that they were undertaken with the highest, most decent and honourable motivations to protect our national security, keep our people safe, and improve world security. In my view, in order to maintain our contribution to international security, keep our people safe and maintain our place in the world, we must be prepared to invest more in our defence capability. As Denis Healey—not someone I quote often or agree with much—said in 1969:

“Once we cut defence expenditure to the extent where our security is imperilled, we have no houses, we have no hospitals, we have no schools. We have a heap of cinders.”—[Official Report, 5 March 1969; Vol. 779, c. 551.]

He was absolutely right.

The cornerstone of our defence and security policy, and our place in the world, is our membership of NATO. Let me refer to the most up-to-date figures that NATO published last week on estimated defence spending by member states in 2015. Happily, this year we will comply with our treaty obligations and spend 2.1% of GDP on defence. Astonishingly, however, the only other countries in Europe that it is estimated will spend the agreed 2% of GDP on defence to be members of NATO are Estonia, Greece and Poland.

Poland has made a big improvement on last year, stepping up to the plate having been spending only 1.8%. France spends 1.8% and Germany 1.2% of GDP, which is the same as last year. Turkey is getting close with 1.7% of GDP, but Luxembourg is expected to spend only 0.5% of GDP on defence, the lowest in NATO. The other NATO members that will spend less than 1% of GDP alongside Luxembourg are Belgium, Hungary and Spain.

We have led by example. I agree with points the Prime Minister made last September at the NATO summit in Newport when he called on NATO members that are not making their 2% of GDP contribution to spend more. The UK and the US account for almost four fifths of the total NATO defence spend. The US will pay practically 73% of NATO’s total estimated budget for 2015. The European nations cannot keep relying on the Americans to write the cheques to provide them with the personnel, kit and manpower to protect them. We are next on the list, paying 6.6%, followed by France with 4.7% and Germany with 4.2%. It is estimated that Germany is planning to spend nearly £14 billion less than us on defence. France will spend £10 billion less than us. The US is spending around £300 billion more than the UK, Germany and France put together.

The home country of the President of the European Commission, Mr Juncker, is Luxembourg. As well as spending the smallest percentage of GDP, as I have mentioned, Luxembourg provides 0.3% of the NATO budget in real terms, less than any other NATO member apart from Albania. No wonder he is constantly calling for a European army, so that other people can write the cheques and provide the manpower to protect his country.

[Dr Murrison]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that if countries want the cover, they have to be prepared to pay the premium, but does he agree that, rather than insist on 0.7% or 2% imposed by supranational organisations, we should instead focus on outputs? In other words, we should focus on effectiveness—be that international development or defence. In those respects, this country does pretty well.

[Jack Lopresti]

They are not mutually exclusive. We need a benchmark figure to show we are serious and that we are maintaining a commitment. That does not diminish the other things we do, looking for value for money and finding other avenues for defence and security, which I will come to. It is an important commitment for a nation state to say, “I belong to NATO. I get the benefits of the protection. I am prepared to make the right contribution.”

The relatively rich countries of Europe cannot expect the United States and the UK to continue to look at their defence needs. On kit, NATO already has an over- reliance on the US for the provision of essential capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling, ballistic missile defence, airborne electronic warfare and carrier strike. That is completely unsustainable.

Obviously, the use of soft power, including the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development and the BBC World Service, is key to our national security, but they must be backed up by hard power. I was shocked and surprised when I looked at the Library figures for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, MOD and DFID. According to Treasury figures on expenditure for 2015-16, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office spend is £1.3 billion; DFID spend is £11.2 billion; and MOD spend is £42.5 billion. It seems to me that, if we are looking at soft power, influence, defence, security and our place in the world, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is woefully underfunded. Obviously, the MOD spend needs to be increased. DFID does excellent work, but we ought to consider returning to the previous model, when a large degree of that excellent work was carried out under the FCO and MOD. That would help to focus what we are doing, save the taxpayer money, avoid potential duplication and waste, and be more concentrated. We should perhaps look at getting rid of DFID as a Department and going back to having ministerial representation in the FCO and MOD.

We are still a great nation and one of the biggest defence spenders. We are one of the largest economies in the world. Owing to our history, our contribution and our unique relationship with the United States, we are a global power. We are also a nation with moral authority, recognised around the world for our rule of law, parliamentary democracy, basic freedoms and common decency. However, to remain a global force in the world, we must accept that we cannot continue to do it on the cheap. Freedom is not free, and the Government’s refusal to commit to 2% of GDP for the duration of this Parliament is troubling to say the least. Two per cent. should be not an aspiration or the maximum but the absolute line that we will not fall behind. If we did so, it would send a terrible message to our allies and our enemies.

Finally, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Defence Secretary: “Weakness is provocative. Time and again weakness has invited adventures which strength might well have deterred.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I am pleased to follow the excellent speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen), and more particularly to follow three extraordinary maiden speeches. I congratulate their authors enormously—my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Chris Green), and the hon. Members for Dundee West (Chris Law) and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Stuart Donaldson). I agree with the hon. Member for Dundee West in his thesis that we risk, particularly in defence and foreign policy, becoming distant and disconnected—I think those were his words—from the views of those whom we represent.

In 2003 I voted against the Iraq war, though I went on to serve in that conflict. I was conscious at the time that the Government of the day were distancing themselves, as were the official Opposition, from the views being expressed to me by my constituents. It is important, particularly in this arena, that we try to reconnect with the views of the public—the people we represent. The hon. Gentleman was quite right to underscore the dangers we face in the event that we fail to do that.

Twelve years on, we should rule nothing out in dealing with Daesh. It is indeed illogical to conduct strike missions in Iraq, yet not to contemplate doing the same in Syria against an organisation that respects no national boundaries. I suspect that we can lead public opinion on that. Where I think we may have problems is in committing boots on the ground, other than special forces. We will face grave difficulty if such strike missions succumb to mission creep. Right hon. and hon. Members will, I know, be very mindful of their duty to reflect public opinion more fully in this endeavour than perhaps we did in 2003, when this House gave the green light to an unpopular war which badly stretched the patience of the public. We must not do so again. We must reflect on the lessons of the past.

Trust and confidence were very much part of the Anderson report that we debated in this place last Thursday, and were reflected in the title of that report, “A Question of Trust”. Next Tuesday will mark the 10th anniversary of the 7/7 bombings. We can see when terrorists win, but generally not when they are foiled, yet the public do not necessarily understand—Anderson touches on this—when it is necessary to do things in their name which they do not fully understand to protect their liberty. An attack foiled is a liberty upheld.

The pre-legislative stage of the investigatory powers Bill this autumn and the passage of that Bill in advance of the axe falling on the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 in December 2016 is an opportunity to socialise, as far as prudence allows, the activity of the intelligence and security community honestly, openly and with candour. Fear of the unknown and the unseen always promotes mistrust. Reality is often rather dull, but in this context dull is good.

As defence and security face down the rather techie challenges of the future, we have to ensure that there is no 21st century equivalent of the wild west—no ungoverned space, nowhere for organised criminals and terrorists to go, no refuge for the ill-inclined state and non-state actors from where they can threaten the people whose interests we represent.

In addition to its vital inquisitorial role, I look forward to the reconstituted Intelligence and Security Committee being in the vanguard of the promotion of better public understanding of the intelligence activities carried out in their name, and reaffirming consent, reducing suspicion and improving the trust to which Anderson refers and to which the hon. Member for Dundee West alluded.

The other subject on which I think we might be at risk of parting company with the public is international development, which is a vital part of what we are debating today. Let me be clear that I, like most Members of the House, support spending substantial sums of money on international development, because it is right that we do so. I support the Government’s spending of £11.7 billion on aid.

Conflict states do not meet millennium development goals, and states cannot attain prosperity without stability. It follows that if we are serious about international development, we have to be serious about the kind of contribution that our armed forces can make to stability and up-stream conflict prevention. It is strange that we cannot count the cost of the 500 British servicemen in Kabul who are training up security forces simply because they are part of the military and the OECD does not recognise soldiers. It appears that we count finding mates for lovelorn tropical fish in Madagascar as aid, but not squaddies teaching Afghans how to prevent their country from collapsing into civil war. That is clearly wrong.

I am pleased that the OECD is this month belatedly considering its rules for official development assistance—ODA. Perhaps it is time for a parallel system: it has been called total official support for sustainable development, known as TOSSD—acronyms in this field are rarely attractive—which would encompass some element of peacekeeping and up-stream conflict prevention. I think that is well worth considering. The Prime Minister has said that he is open to spending more aid on peacekeeping and security, and he is right to do so. The vehicle is the highly successful conflict pool, which it seems would be far better aligned with TOSSD than ODA, and much easier to sell to a sceptical British public.