Draft Unmanned Aircraft (Offences and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Keir Mather)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Unmanned Aircraft (Offences and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2025.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. The regulations, which were laid in draft before the House on 21 October 2025, set out criminal offences for breaching regulatory requirements relating to the operation of unmanned or uncrewed aircraft systems, including drones and model aircraft. The regulations will ensure that the regulatory requirements remain enforceable and that operators and pilots of UASs remain subject to appropriate penalties when they fail to comply with the regulatory framework.
I will start by providing some background information about the regulations. The Department for Transport commissioned the Civil Aviation Authority to review the regulatory framework for UASs. The CAA carried out a public consultation for this purpose on proposals to simplify regulation, improve education for the users of UASs, improve safety and security, and provide options for support for the sector during the transition to the new regulations. The CAA worked closely with Government, industry and law enforcement partners in developing a number of policy recommendations. Together with the regulatory updates made through the Unmanned Aircraft (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which were laid before the House on 21 October 2025, this instrument will implement the CAA’s recommendations and support a more future-proof, enforceable and robust UAS regulatory regime in the UK.
The draft regulations will revoke and replace existing offences for breaches of the UAS regulatory requirements, ensuring that the offences remain enforceable and facilitating the enforcement of new requirements. The instrument also makes consequential amendments to the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021 and the Police Act 1997.
The draft regulations set out criminal offences for breaching regulatory requirements relating to the operation of uncrewed aircraft, as set out in the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned aircraft. That implementing regulation was directly applicable in the UK prior to EU exit. Following EU exit, the regulation was retained in an amended form in the UK and was subsequently amended further. It now forms part of assimilated law in the United Kingdom.
The implementing regulation is amended by the Unmanned Aircraft (Amendment) Regulations 2025 to update the rules on UASs, simplifying the regulatory regime and ensuring a safe and secure airspace. The implementing regulation establishes a framework for the operation of UASs to ensure that they are used safely and regulated proportionately. This framework includes three risk-based categories of operation: “open”, or low-risk operations, “specific”, which carry a greater level of risk than the open category, and “certified”, which are the highest-risk operations. The implementing regulation includes requirements for registration and competency testing; it also provides for model aircraft operations in the framework of model aircraft clubs and associations under a bespoke authorisation.
The offences in this instrument largely replicate offences set out in the Air Navigation Order 2016. The draft regulations also provide for penalties for these offences, largely replicating the penalty provisions in the 2016 order. Owing to the amendments made by the 2025 regulations, it is necessary to revise the offences by removing them from the 2016 order and remaking them in this instrument.
The regulations will ensure that the rules for drones and model aircraft are safer and clearer for current and future use, and for that reason I commend them to the Committee.
Greg Smith (Mid Buckinghamshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. As the Minister acknowledges, the regulations are contingent on the Unmanned Aircraft (Amendment) Regulations 2025, which have been laid before Parliament under the negative procedure. I can offer His Majesty’s Opposition’s broad support for the instrument before us today.
If we are to implement changes to regulations on unmanned aircraft use, we must ensure that there are appropriate penalties for their misuse. The fact that the penalties outlined here are largely comparable to those already established under the Air Navigation Order 2016 highlights the fact that they are in line with the modern, proportionate enforcement regime that already governs this sector. More broadly, we must acknowledge that the principle of altering our regulation to ensure that hobbyists can go about their business while maintaining the safety of others is important. As the CAA recognised in its consultation, finding the balance between cutting red tape and implementing key safety measures is essential.
Recent European discussions on the risks that unmanned aircraft pose to the aviation sector remind us that those dangers are significant. It is in the direct interests of public protection and national security to ensure that they are properly mitigated. In my constituency of Mid Buckinghamshire, innovation in this sector is not theoretical; it is happening now. Companies such as Flare Bright and Skyports at Westcott Venture Park are at the forefront of cutting-edge unmanned systems, developing technologies that support our industrial strategy, national security posture and wider aerospace capabilities. That is why clarity, stability and practicality in the regulatory regime, such as the instrument before us today, matter. Real jobs, real investment and real technological leadership depend on it.
Regarding some of the specific changes that underpin the draft regulations, it appears sensible to improve the protection of restricted airspace using new technologies available to us. My understanding is that the proposals put the UK ahead of the European Union in areas such as geofencing—an example of where safety is being prioritised while enabling innovation. The Government’s analysis, including their de minimis assessments of geo-protections and remote ID, makes it clear that these steps can be taken in a proportionate manner that minimises unnecessary burdens.
I recognise the strong feelings about the shift from defining aircraft on the basis of weight to the new approach around toys, for example, about limits on legacy UASs and about the shortened transition period for remote ID. I appreciate that the Government have extended the transition period to mitigate the costs that could otherwise have fallen on low-risk users, in particular model aircraft flyers. The British Model Flying Association acknowledged recently that none of the new requirements will take effect for model aircraft until 2028 and that it is optimistic about a minimal impact on its members. That is an important reassurance, but does the Minister think the problem will persist after the transition period? Does he feel comfortable that the period provided is sufficient to address these concerns, and that we will not simply return to the same issue once the period expires?
I would like to raise the ongoing question of divergence from and conformity with European Union regulations. I understand that the new UK class marks will use different prefixes to ensure clear differentiation as standards evolve while maintaining broad alignment with the existing European class marking structure. Has the Minister engaged with the CAA on ensuring that lessons from other jurisdictions, particularly the United States of America, which has taken a markedly different regulatory path in several areas, are being fully considered? Alignment for its own sake cannot be the goal. Rather, we must ensure that our regulatory framework is the most effective for the United Kingdom’s safety, security and technological leadership.
I appreciate that this instrument is, by its nature, focused on offences and enforcement, and that the underpinning policy is found in the parallel amendment regulations. However, we must consider the whole framework together. Ultimately, enforcement must be effective and proportionate, but the regulations that sit beneath it must also be practical and allow the full spectrum of legitimate users, from companies pioneering advanced autonomous systems to long-standing model aircraft clubs, to continue benefiting from the extraordinary advances that we have seen in unmanned aircraft technology.
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
It is, as always, a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. On behalf of the Liberal Democrats, I offer broad support for the draft regulations. It is welcome that the CAA has lengthened the transition period in response to the consultation—the consultation seems to have been fairly well responded to. This is an example of the positive impact that hobbyists and private users can make on Government regulation. I encourage the Government to maintain that approach.
I echo the concerns about convergence or divergence with European regulations, but I sound a note of caution: there should not be divergence for divergence’s sake. Let us look at where there are advantages, compatibility or competitiveness with what is likely to be a larger market for products close by, and make sure that we approach that in a reasonable manner.
Can the Minister give some detail on how the CAA will engage with operating companies, particularly software manufacturers, to ensure that users are aware of the regulations? That is often done via apps and subscriptions. We must make sure that compliance is built in, especially with the geofencing altitude regulations and the night light operating rules. I thank the Minister for introducing the draft regulations and wish him the best of luck in boosting our competitiveness and the quality of the products we produce in the United Kingdom.
Keir Mather
I thank the shadow Minister and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for their comments. I also commend the work of businesses in Mid Buckinghamshire constituency, and thank the hon. Gentleman for his support of the draft regulations.
I have taken into account both the points raised on regulatory equivalence, and we have heard a diverse range of ideological perspectives on alignment with the European Union. In most cases, the draft regulations offer alignment with the European Union; that is incredibly important for regulatory alignment that facilitates international trade and the export of drones produced in the United Kingdom, which is an important piece of the puzzle. That being said, there are areas where we may want to carve out a competitive advantage for the United Kingdom by going further, faster—particularly with hybrid remote IDs. It is important to learn lessons from the aviation regulations of others across the world, and we intend to do that. We will go further, faster if we can, but it is good to have regulatory alignment where possible to facilitate trade where it is needed.
On the transition period and people being adequately trained, the CAA is taking on a lot of work to make sure that people are in the right place. It has emailed all registered drone users—some 500,000 operators—and promoted the changes via Google Ads and promotional messages on social media to reach specific audiences. The CAA also updated the drone code and flyer ID test on 22 September, ahead of the peak renewals period for pilots needing to retake the online test.
The CAA is well resourced to engage with operating companies and has done so through the consultation. It will very much continue to do that, as we make sure that these regulations suit and reflect the lived experience of drone users, while avoiding some of the inadvertent slip-ups that occur when they use regulated airspace and so on. This is an iterative process in which the CAA will have to work hard to make sure that it is answering the concerns of drone users, but I have every confidence that it has the resources and capability to do so. I finish by thanking both Opposition spokesmen for their considered contributions to this debate, and I hope the Committee will support the draft regulations.
Question put and agreed to.
Draft Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology (Kanishka Narayan)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Online Safety Act 2023 (Priority Offences) (Amendment) Regulations 2025.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. The draft regulations were laid before the House on 21 October. Before I proceed, I draw the Committee’s attention to the correction slip that was issued for the regulations in October. It relates to minor drafting changes in respect of the date of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in the explanatory memorandum and the order of the words in the title of the offence inserted by paragraph (2) of regulation 2.
The Government have committed to taking decisive action against the most severe and damaging online harms. Through this statutory instrument, we are strengthening the Online Safety Act 2023 by creating new priority offences to tackle cyber-flashing and self-harm. This will ensure that platforms take stronger, more proactive steps to protect users from these harms.
There is compelling evidence that cyber-flashing and content encouraging self-harm are widespread and cause serious harm to individuals. The frequency of these harms is significantly higher among young age groups: of those aged 18 to 24, 9% had experienced cyber-flashing and 7% had experienced content encouraging self-harm. That means that across the country around 530,000 people in that age group have seen cyber-flashing and around 450,000 have seen self-harm content. That is clearly unacceptable.
Some 27% of UK users who were exposed to cyber-flashing reported significant emotional discomfort, and exposure to self-harm content has been shown to worsen mental health. A 2019 study found that 64% of Instagram users in the US who were exposed to self-harm content were deeply emotionally disturbed by it, and a 2018 study found that 8% of adults and 26% of children aged eight to 18 who were hospitalised after self-harming had encountered self-harm or suicide-related content online. Those figures demonstrate that the content is not isolated but widespread. It affects a significant portion of the online population.
As Members will know, the Online Safety Act, which received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023, places strong duties on platforms and services to protect users. Providers must assess how likely their services are to expose users to illegal content or to be used to commit or facilitate priority offences. Providers then need to take steps to mitigate the identified risks, including by implementing safety-by-design measures to reduce risks and content moderation systems to remove illegal content when it appears. The Act sets out a list of priority offences for the purposes of providers’ illegal content duties. Those relate primarily to the most serious and prevalent online illegal content and activity. Platforms need to take additional steps to tackle such illegal activity under their illegal content duties.
The draft regulations will add cyber-flashing and content encouraging self-harm to the list of priority offences under the Act. The offences are currently covered under the Act’s general illegal content duties, but without priority status. Without that status, platforms are not obliged to carry out specific risk assessments for harm to users that derives from this kind of harmful content or to put in place measures to prevent users from seeing such content in the first place. Stakeholders have welcomed the additions. Charities such as the Molly Rose Foundation and Samaritans have long campaigned for strengthened protections for vulnerable users.
The changes to the Act will take effect 21 days after the regulations are made, which can be done after the regulations are approved by both Houses. Ofcom, as the online safety regulator, sets out in codes of practice the measures that providers can take to fulfil their statutory illegal-content duties. The safety duties on providers to prioritise tackling self-harm and cyber-flashing will fully take effect when Ofcom makes the relevant updates to its codes on the measures that can be taken to fulfil the duties.
We anticipate that Ofcom will recommend that providers should take action in a number of areas. It could include content moderation, reporting and complaints procedures, and safety-by-design steps, such as providers testing algorithm systems to see whether illegal content is being recommended to users. Where providers fail to meet the duties, such as by not having proportionate measures to remove and proactively prevent this vile material from appearing on their platforms, Ofcom has robust powers to take enforcement action against them, including a power to impose fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is the higher.
The statutory instrument upgrades cyber-flashing and self-harm content to priority status, thereby strengthening the impact of the Online Safety Act and protecting users from such content. Service providers will be required to take more proactive and robust action to protect, remove and limit exposure to this kind of illegal content. That will ensure that platforms take stronger steps to protect users, reduce the prevalence of these behaviours online and help to make the internet a safer place for everyone.
Dr Ben Spencer (Runnymede and Weybridge) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers.
This statutory instrument represents an important development in the obligations on platforms regulated under the Online Safety Act to protect people from encountering illegal content online. The OSA was enacted by the last Government with the primary aim of safeguarding children and removing serious illegal material from the internet. Tackling the most harmful content, such as that which is the subject of today’s discussion, goes to the heart of the Online Safety Act’s aims. His Majesty’s Opposition therefore welcome and support the draft regulations.
The experiences and opportunities offered by the online world change rapidly. It is right that legislators are responsive when new risks emerge or when certain types of unlawful content proliferate on the internet. Under the last Government, the OSA amended the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to criminalise several forms of sexual misconduct and abusive behaviour online. The new offences included cyber-flashing and the sharing of or threatening to share intimate images without consent. The amendments were made to keep pace with novel threats and forms of abuse, the victims of which are too often women and girls.
Baroness Bertin’s independent review of pornography, which was published in February this year, highlighted the damaging impact on victims of intimate image abuse, ranging from physical illness to mental health effects such as anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidal thoughts. The effects of cyber-flashing and intimate image abuse on victims is severe. It is therefore right that this statutory instrument brings cyber-flashing within the scope of the priority offences in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act, while retaining as a priority offence the sharing of or threatening to share intimate images.
We also strongly support the addition as a priority offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm, which is the other important component of this statutory instrument. Desperate people who contemplate self-harm need early intervention and support, not encouragement to self-harm. Under this SI, regulated services will be obliged to proactively remove the material when they become aware of it on their platforms and take measures to prevent it from appearing in the first place. One can only wonder why it has taken so long to get to this position. I am sure we will have a unanimous view not only in the House but in society of the importance of removing such material.
The regulations will work only if they are adopted by the industry and subject to rigorous oversight, coupled with enforcement when platforms fail in their obligations. That is a necessity, and why we had to introduce the Online Safety Act in the first place. It is right that Government regulators should look to identify obstacles to the implementation of the OSA and take action where necessary. Since the introduction of Ofcom’s protection of children codes in the summer, important questions have arisen around the use of virtual private networks to circumvent age verification, as well as data security and privacy in the age-verification process.
Peter Fortune (Bromley and Biggin Hill) (Con)
On that point, does my hon. Friend the shadow Minister agree that we need to give some thought to the rise of chatbots and their nefarious activity, especially where they encourage self-harm or encourage children to do worse?
Dr Spencer
I thank my hon. Friend for his question on a very important point, which was raised just last week in Department for Science, Innovation and Technology questions by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman) and others. The Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, also raised questions about the importance of the scope of regulations for chatbots.
The Government seem all over the place as to whether the large language models, as we understand them, regulate the content that comes into scope. Given the response we received last week, it would be helpful to have some clarity from the Minister. Does he believe that LLMs are covered by the OSA when it comes to encouraging self-harm material? If there is a gap, what is he going to do about it? I recognise that he is commissioning Ofcom to look at the issue, but in his view, right now, is there a gap that will need someone to fix it? What are his reflections on that? This is increasingly becoming a priority area that we need to resolve. If there is a gap in legislation, we need to get on and sort it.
Victoria Collins (Harpenden and Berkhamsted) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. The Liberal Democrats support this statutory instrument, which updates the Online Safety Act’s priority offences to reflect changes in intimate image abuse law. It is absolutely right to tackle the non-consensual sharing of intimate photographs and films, and to tackle self-harm.
However, this is also an important opportunity to say that the Act must go further still. The Internet Watch Foundation reminds us that it is not currently illegal to retain, re-upload or trade abusive intimate image material long after initial distribution. The Molly Rose Foundation and Samaritans have raised the issue of self-harm, and I am pleased to hear that being addressed today, but the point about AI chatbots is really important. As I mentioned in DSIT questions, the legislation on user to user and search seems pretty clear, but what about one-to-one chatbots when there is a single user? It is not clear who is accountable when self-harm content comes through chatbots that are not user to user. I appreciate that the Minister said the Department is looking into that issue with Ofcom.
The Act must also go further to address emerging online threats. The Internet Watch Foundation also reports that intimate images online are increasingly generated by deepfake AI, and that expert analysis now struggles to distinguish AI-generated content from real images or videos. At the beginning of this year alone, the IWF found 1,200 photorealistic videos of child sexual abuse material online. The Online Safety Act must do more to hold big tech companies to account, and to protect users from intimate image abuse at source, both real and AI-generated. Importantly, it must also tackle self-harm that is linked to AI chatbots, which are increasingly used by people of all ages.
Although this statutory instrument is a step forward, we need regulation that keeps pace with the rapidly evolving technology, not just changes in statute. We must ensure that Ofcom is sufficiently equipped and resourced to deal with emerging technologies. Will the Minister confirm what assessment has been done of the adequacy of Ofcom’s resourcing to ensure that this statutory instrument and the Online Safety Act can be applied and enforced in this fast-moving environment? When can we expect updates on AI chatbots and the scope of regulation? Will the Minister also confirm what the Government are doing to effectively regulate deepfake intimate content? What steps are being taken to hold tech companies to account for the continued harm facing children, vulnerable people and, given that experts can no longer differentiate between deepfake and real images, all internet users?
Kanishka Narayan
I thank Committee members for their valuable contributions to the debate. The update in the regulations will bring us closer to achieving the Government’s commitments to improve online safety and strengthen protection for women and girls online. We believe that updating the priority offences list with the new cyber-flashing and self-harm content offences is the correct, proportionate and evidence-led approach to tackling this type of content, and it will provide stronger protections for online users.
I will now respond to the questions asked in the debate; I thank Members for the tone and substance of their contributions. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, raised the use of VPNs. As I mentioned previously in the House, apart from an initial spike we have seen a significant levelling-off in the usage of VPNs, which points to the likely effectiveness of the age-assurance measures. We have commissioned further evidence on that front, and I hope to bring that to the House’s attention at the earliest opportunity.
The question of chatbots was raised by the shadow Minister, by the hon. Member for Bromley and Biggin Hill, and by the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted. Let me first clarify what I previously mentioned in the House: the legislation covers not only chatbots that allow user-to-user engagement but those that involve one-to-AI engagement and live search. That is extensive coverage of chatbots—both those types are within scope of the Online Safety Act.
There may be further gaps in the Act that pertain to aspects of the risks that Members have raised, and the Secretary of State has commissioned further work to ensure that we keep up with fast-changing technology. A number of the LLMs in question are covered by the Act, given the parameters that I have just defined. Of course, we will continue to review the situation, as both scope and risk need to evolve together.
Dr Spencer
I hope the Minister takes this in a constructive spirit. Concerns have been raised across the House as to the scope of the OSA when it comes to LLMs and the different types and variations of chatbots, which are being used by many people right now. Is he not concerned that he as the Minister, and his Department, are not able to say at the Dispatch Box whether they believe LLMs are completely covered in the scope of the OSA? Has he received legal advice or other advice? How quickly will he be able to give a definitive response? Clearly, if there is a gap, we need to know about it and we need to take action. It surely puts the regulator and the people who are generating this technology in an invidious position if even Her Majesty’s Government think there is a lack of clarity, as he put it, on the scope of the applicability of the OSA to new technologies.
Kanishka Narayan
Let me be clear: there is no lack of clarity in the scope of the Bill. It is extremely clear to a provider whether they are in scope or not. If they have user-to-user engagement on the platform, they are in scope. If they have live search, which is the primary basis in respect of many LLMs at the moment, they are in scope. There is no lack of clarity from a provider point of view. The question at stake is whether the further aspects of LLMs, which do not involve any of those areas of scope, pose a particular risk.
A number of incidents have been reported publicly, and I will obviously not comment on individual instances. The Online Safety Act does not focus on individual content-takedown instances and instead looks at a system. Ofcom has engaged firms that are very much in scope of the Act already. If there are further instances of new risks posed by platforms that are not currently within the scope of the Online Safety Act, we will of course review its scope and make sure we are moving fast in the light of that information.
The hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted asked about child sexual abuse material. I was very proud that we introduced amendments last week to the Crime and Policing Bill to make sure that organisations such as the Internet Watch Foundation are engaged, alongside targeted experts, particularly the police, in spotting CSAM content and risk way before AI models are released. In that context, we are ensuring that the particular risks posed by AI to children’s safety are countered before they escalate.
On the question about Ofcom’s spending and capacity more generally to counter the nature of the risk, the spending cap at Ofcom allows it to enforce against the offences that we deem to be priority offences. In part, when we make the judgment about designating offences as a priority, we make a proportionate assessment about whether we believe there is both severity and the capacity context for robust enforcement. I will continue to review that situation as the nature of the offences changes.
Finally, I am glad that the Government have committed throughout to ensure that sexually explicit non-consensual images, particularly deepfakes, are robustly enforced against. That remains the position. I hope the Committee agrees with me on the importance of updating the priority offences in the Online Safety Act as swiftly as possible. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.