Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Twentieth sitting)
Thursday 8th September 2022
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 View all Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 September 2022 - (8 Sep 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Hon. Gentlemen are welcome to take off their jackets if they wish to do so. I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink, except for the water provided, is permitted during sittings of this Committee. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. I welcome the Minister to his place.
Schedule 11
Infrastructure Levy
Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 162, in schedule 11, page 288, line 11, after “development” insert “of the area”.
This amendment seeks to ensure consistency with inserted section 204A(2) on page 282 and ensure that consideration of viability relates to the area as a whole.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 163, in schedule 11, page 289, line 33, leave out “or require”.
This amendment and Amendment 164 would prevent the Secretary of State imposing a nil rate, differential rates, reductions, or a minimum threshold below which IL is not charged and ensure that rates are set by the charging authority.
Amendment 164, in schedule 11, page 289, line 36, leave out “or require”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 163.
Matthew Pennycook
It is a pleasure to reconvene with you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. I warmly welcome the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam to the caretaker role that he has bravely taken on today. He is the third Minister I have engaged with in proceedings on the Bill. The shadow Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities team are setting new records when it comes to the ministerial attrition rate. It may be overly ambitious to hope that we can get through five Ministers by the completion of proceedings on the Bill, but we live in hope.
On a serious note, I place on record our thanks to the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr Jones) for his efforts in taking the Bill through Committee in recent weeks, including before the summer recess, and for the constructive way in which he did so. I hope that we can continue in that vein today.
We had, in our last sitting, an extensive debate on the infrastructure levy, and touched on the issue of viability as part of the design of any new proposal. This group of amendments relates to the infrastructure levy rate-setting process, and how viability testing will be used to inform it. Once again, allowing for the fact that we do not have the detail we need, and for the fact that the required forthcoming regulations will be subject to further consultation, I am assuming for the purposes of these amendments—largely because of the remarkable similarity between schedule 11 and the provisions in the Planning Act 2008 that gave effect to the community infrastructure levy—that the Government are minded to base the IL rate-setting process on that which applies to the process for adopting a CIL charging schedule.
If that is the case, the process will require charging authorities to undertake—if not directly, then by commissioning consultants for the purpose—an area-wide viability assessment. Such assessments would be similar to—and indeed could, where appropriate, be combined with—the area-wide viability testing that forms part of the evidence base for the examination of new local plans. As “full viability assessments”, these will involve a large number of residual land valuations for different development typologies, and potentially strategic sites, to test what IL rates could be supported in different circumstances. It is likely that they would have to consider all aspects of development appraisal, including average values, costs, profit and land value, rather than using gross development value as the value-based metric used to determine specific IL liabilities.
The new levy has broader scope than the CIL, incorporating as it does both infrastructure and affordable housing. Higher rates will be necessary as a result. Given that, and given that GDV—the metric to be used—does not take into account site-specific development costs, IL has the potential to result in significant non-negotiable liabilities, so the stakes involved in the IL rate-setting will be far higher than those that pertain in the CIL charging schedule adoption process. Thus it is almost certain that the IL rate-setting process in any given area will be heavily contested; landowners and developers will task their representatives with challenging the scope of the assessment, its methodology, inputs, assumptions and conclusions, with a view to reducing IL rates and their future liability. There is therefore a strong case for putting in place additional measures to ensure that the IL rate-setting examination process is fair, and I hope that the Government are exploring what might be done to ensure that the Planning Inspectorate is able to draw on the necessary expertise so that that is the case.
The aim of amendment 162 is to ensure that the bar for viability testing in the IL rate-setting and examination process is not set unreasonably high, and that there is therefore a more level playing field between charging authorities and those who might potentially object to a proposed IL rate or rates. The amendment seeks to avoid authorities being compelled to either undertake onerously detailed analysis, bring forward overly complex charging structures or set artificially low rates to compensate for the risk that the Bill creates of developers arguing that specific projects in an area are unviable. It does that by specifying, using the language used in proposed new section 204A(2) of the 2008 Act, that when setting IL rates, charging authorities must consider the economic viability of development in the area as a whole. That would make it clear that in the rate-setting process, the test of viability should not be so specific as to relate to individual sites, unless perhaps they are of strategic significance to the charging authority area, but should instead take into account viability across a range of sites, and the overall delivery of the amount of development envisaged in the local plan. That is in line with current practice, and would mean that IL rates would not be unduly influenced by the characteristics of development sites that may not be typical of the area, and that could result in nil or particularly low rates being set across the whole of it.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. It is clear that the system is not working, because when going through the planning process many developers argue that the site is no longer viable, and therefore make changes to the plans. What should be put in place to ensure that we have more accurate viability testing before planning permission is granted?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for that well-made point. We had, as she will know, an extensive discussion on viability in the last sitting. The system is flawed in many respects, but there are ways in which it has been improved in recent years, and it could be improved further. The Mayor’s threshold approach in London is a good example of how that can be done; it draws in relevant expertise to ensure that contentious sites undergo a full viability assessment.
Our issue with the proposed system is that it is premised on removing the viability issue from the process entirely, but the point here is that the system certainly does not do that; at the rate-setting stage, viability is very much an issue. That needs to be addressed through the amendments. Amendment 162 would ensure that IL rate-setting testing and examination cannot be unfairly manipulated by developers seeking to drive down levy rates, because the amendment would clarify that charging authorities will not be expected to test every development site in their area. It would mitigate the risk that the infrastructure necessary to support development will not come forward, and that amounts of affordable housing will be reduced.
Amendments 163 and 164 are necessary to give full effect to the Government’s commitment that the new system will be, to quote the policy paper, a “locally determined Infrastructure Levy”, with Il rates set locally by charging authorities. The amendments do that by altering the provisions that give the Secretary of State the power to impose specific IL rates, nil rates or minimum thresholds that have not emerged as a result of an examination, or been justified with reference to local evidence. By preventing the Secretary of State from overriding a charging authority in those respects, the two amendments seek to avoid a scenario in which a charging authority is either prevented from developing its own IL rates or, after the lengthy and resource-intensive process of determining the IL rates and thresholds appropriate for its area, and after having them verified by an independent examiner, has them overridden by the Secretary of State.
There is nothing in the Bill to ensure that IL rates imposed by the Secretary of State in the way that the Bill allows would be based on local evidence or subject to independent assessment. There is therefore an obvious risk that the Secretary of State may, on occasion, be persuaded to bypass the IL rate-setting process on spurious grounds. We feel strongly that the process should be genuinely local, and that charging authorities should be confident, if they develop a rate or rates that are approved in examination, that they will be able to apply those without interference from the Department. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on each of these important amendments.
The Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Paul Scully)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray, and to address the Committee and answer the questions raised. The hon. Gentleman talked about attrition rates, which are important for all of us as constituency MPs, and we all want to make sure that we get this right. I, too, thank the former Minister for Housing, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Nuneaton (Mr Jones), for the work that he has done over the summer.
I begin by acknowledging the work of the Committee so far. The planning reforms will clearly be important in supporting our growth agenda, so I look forward to the next few days. I understand why the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce the amendments. I will try to clarify some of the points, and to explain why we do not believe that the amendments are necessary. I will start with amendment 162.
Local planning authorities will be responsible for setting infrastructure levy rates, and for charging and collecting the levy, and they can spend the levy revenues on local priorities. When setting rates, they must have regard to the economic viability of the development of the area. I reassure the hon. Gentleman and the Committee that proposed new section 204A(2) of the Planning Act 2008 already ensures that that is the case. It states that the overall purpose of the levy,
“is to ensure that costs incurred in supporting the development of an area and in achieving any purpose specified under section 204N(5) can be funded (wholly or partly) by owners or developers of land in a way that does not make development of the area economically unviable.”
The overall purpose of the levy applies to all levy regulations, including those made under proposed new section 204G(4)(a), to which the hon. Gentleman has proposed additional text. This means that when charging authorities set rates or other criteria, they must have regard to matters specified in levy regulations relating to the economic viability of development. Although I understand his point, I hope that with that explanation, he will agree that amendment 162 is unnecessary.
Amendments 163 and 164 would prevent the Secretary of State from requiring, through regulations, that differential rates of the levy be set. They would also prevent the Secretary of State from specifying in regulations the basis on which a threshold for such rates may be determined. Again, I recognise that the aim of the amendments is to ensure that the rates are set solely by the charging authority, but I reassure the Committee that local rate-setting is indeed essential to the levy design. However, the levy must be charged in a coherent and consistent way, so that it meets its objectives of capturing more value and raising more revenue for local planning authorities, while maintaining the viability of developments across an area.
How the levy is charged should reflect the different amounts of additional value that might be generated across different kinds of development. In some circumstances, it might be necessary to require in the levy regulations that rates be set at higher or lower levels. For example, the additional value created by new floor space might be a lot greater than that created when existing floor space undergoes change of use. Similarly, the additional value generated by a residential development might be a lot higher than the amount generated by some types of commercial development, and it is right that the difference in value is reflected in levy rates.
There might be types of development on which it is simply not appropriate to charge the levy, or on which it would be appropriate to charge a reduced rate. Providing for that in the levy regulations will ensure the coherence of the regime that I talked about.
How much additional value is generated by a development depends in part on how much it cost to build, and on the value of the land before development takes place. The minimum threshold will broadly account for the costs of development in an area by charging the levy on the final gross development value. Above the minimum threshold, the levy is charged only on the additional value of a development. Without a minimum threshold, the levy would not be able to reliably capture more of the value uplift in different development types and land uses, while maintaining viability. The ability for levy regulations to require that thresholds for nil or reduced rates be determined in a specified way, including the ability to adjust them with reference to the cost of development in a charging authority’s area, is key to ensuring that this aspect of the levy function works in a coherent and consistent way.
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate that comprehensive answer from the Minister, but I am afraid to tell him that I am not reassured. I am not sure—I will happily go back and check the record—that he addressed my specific points. As I said, our concern is that the language in proposed new section 204G(4)(a), when it comes to specifying how viability is handled within the rate-setting process, refers simply to “development”. It is not consistent with the language in proposed new section 204A(2), which specifically refers to “development of an area”.
The Minister spoke in general terms about the local rate-setting process. I take no issue with that. It is absolutely right that the local charging authority looks at viability as part of that process, but the specific concern that we have, as I said, is that it may be forced to assess the viability of every site in the area that it oversees, rather than being able to undertake a general assessment of viability in that area and not have specific sites skew the results. This could potentially have very serious implications for the levy rates that are set and the ability of developers to try to drive down those rates as part of the process. We are not satisfied on that score.
On amendments 163 and 164, we do not take issue with the fact that there needs to be a minimum threshold or the need for specified ways of setting or adjusting the levy rates. Our issue is with the powers that the Bill provides for the Secretary of State to intervene and overturn a locally determined rate that has gone through an examination process. The Minister has not convinced me that there is a good reason for those powers. On that basis, I am keen to make the point that we think this is one of the many weaknesses in the Government’s proposed infrastructure levy, so I am minded to press amendment 162 to a vote.
Paul Scully
Let me just answer a couple of points as the hon. Member considers whether to press the amendment to a vote. I assure him that charging the levies is very much for the local authorities. The intention is to not have a system that is different for every single development, because that becomes incredibly unwieldy—that is the point of introducing this system rather than the existing, technically complex system, where developers, who have deeper pockets than many local authorities, and more expertise, get round section 106 and CIL and so on. If they so choose, local authorities should be able to have different levies in different areas within their remit, but that should not be just from development to development. That is the intention of the measures here.
The powers of the Secretary of State reflect the current system. As I mentioned, the Secretary of State has powers under the existing system and we are reserving that same right, which is to be used only very sparingly.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the Minister for that useful further clarification of the Government’s intention, but in many ways he made my point for me. No one is taking issue with the fact that the Bill specifies that local charging authorities set the rate. That is absolutely right. It is an advantage of the proposed system vis-à-vis that outlined in the 2020 “Planning for the Future” White Paper, which envisaged a nationally set rate or rates. The issue we have—the Minister spoke directly to this point—is the inequality of arms between developers and local planning authorities. Our concern is that the language in the Bill will allow developers, not in the way they do with the current section 106 system but under the new system, to use their extra resources, skills and expertise to drive down levy rates at the point at which they are set, due to the way that viability is dealt with in proposed new section 204G(4)(a). I am not satisfied by the Minister’s comments, and I will press amendment 162 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 168, in schedule 11, page 288, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) IL regulations must make provision for a sliding scale of charges increasing in proportion to the share of the development that is on greenfield land, for the purposes of incentivising brownfield development, unless any development on greenfield land is offset by the re-greening of an agreed area of brownfield land in a densely developed or populated area.”
This amendment is offered as an alternative proposition to Amendment 59, adding safeguards intended to prevent extremely dense development in urban centres with an undersupply of open space.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 59, in schedule 11, page 288, line 25, at end insert—
“(4A) IL regulations must make provision for a sliding scale of charges increasing in proportion to the share of the development that is on greenfield land, for the purposes of incentivising brownfield development.”
This amendment would require rates of the Infrastructure Levy to be varied in line with the proportion of the development that is on greenfield land in order to promote brownfield development.
Rachael Maskell
It is good to see you in the Chair again, Mrs Murray. I welcome the Minister to his place.
Amendments 168 and 59 have the same objective. Labour has set out clearly that we believe it is important that brownfield sites be developed on first. Many sites across the country have been wasteland for too long. We have a housing crisis and there are economic opportunities, so we very much want to see developments. Such sites are often old industrial areas, which are begging for housing development.
York has the largest brownfield site in the country, adjacent to the station, so we have obviously given much thought to this issue. I am glad that the Government supported our call to make it a site of development. What will go on there is another matter of dispute, but it is welcome that, the site having been derelict for 30 years, we now see roadworks on it—I was looking at them just last weekend—thanks to the additional funding to release it that has been locked in by the railways, but my amendments seek to go further than that.
The White Paper—it is important that we refer to it—suggested that development could be brought forward almost on street corners if sufficient land was available in developed areas. Of course, that takes away vital green space from local communities. My amendments therefore seek to recognise the value of green space in urban environments. It is crucial that we join up the agendas across Government—I often think the Government think too much in their own silo—when looking at the opportunities to create green spaces in urban areas. They could address environmental issues, including drainage and flooding, and mental health issues.
In my constituency, brownfield sites’ being turned over for development has led to a very heated-up urban centre, which has serious consequences. The York Central site and other developments on the west side of the city are taking up spaces that were either old industrial land or school playing fields, which means that we have more traffic. As a result, the west side of York will become gridlocked because the development has not been properly thought through. Within the planning process, the developers are referring back to our local transport plan from 2011, which is well out of date.
If we keep developing on brownfield sites without thinking about the wider consequences, it will have a significant impact on the urban environment and will ultimately create more congestion and pollution, which will have a significant impact on the local community, whose frustrations will grow. We have to make sure that we talk about infrastructure and the transition from car use to public transport or active travel, and we need to take a more holistic view rather than focus on brownfield site development, but my amendment seeks to go further than that in recognising the importance of having some of that land converted into green spaces.
I can give a fantastic example in Tang Hall, a densely populated area of York. It used to be the old refuse site and would have been classified as rich for development, but it was turned into St Nicks environment centre and an incredibly important space for wellbeing. The centre runs opportunities for people experiencing mental health challenges and engages in environmental projects, thereby improving the wellbeing of all residents in the local area. That was a project of yesteryear, but as the housing crisis, which is significant, has grown in York, I have noticed that areas where there is the greatest deprivation—somewhere such as Clifton, where life expectancy is 10 years less than elsewhere in York—also have the least green space.
The former Bootham Park Hospital was on public land, and people would go there and walk around. That space will be handed over to a private company with the disposal of the hospital, but Bootham School will take over the land for its playing fields, which will lock out the public. However, the rest of the estate, where there is currently green space, will be turned into further housing. That involves changing somewhere that is green but categorised as a brownfield site into a developed area, which means that the area will lose public green space. People will not be able to walk their dogs, get fresh air and improve their mental health. We know the correlation between mental health and deprivation, so that is really important.
I can give another example. Acomb had a secondary school in what was the old Acomb Park area, and the school had playing fields. Although the school has been disposed of, the area has been used by the public as a free park for the community, which has been really important. However, the land would be categorised as a brownfield site, and our local council has the intention to develop the site and put more housing there. We desperately need housing—I am not decrying that—but we should re-categorise some brownfield space as green space and then use some current green space as brown space, thereby getting the green lungs into the city. We know from research that that was very much the focus over 100 years ago, because that was how York was built out.
Putting in green lungs will increase the opportunities to improve mental and physical health, to have a better environment and to address some of the issues around pollution and so on. It will also improve the whole area by creating public space and a sense of community. If we see a direct swap with current greenfield sites, I do not believe that the area should be penalised for not building on brownfield sites but choosing to build on greenfield sites. This is about providing greater opportunity and recognising that we can develop brownfield sites first but put in those green lungs in order to place the proposed housing in other areas. We should not penalise local authorities for improving public health and wider aspects of their community. That is a perspective that a joined-up Government would be looking at: how we improve not just homes and units, but communities and people, which is what planning should be all about. My amendment seeks to provide that opportunity, recognising the reality of this in highly populated areas in particular.
Greg Smith (Buckingham) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. I join you in welcoming the Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam, to his place on the Front Bench. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for York Central; I recognise the point she made about green lungs in urban environments, and about parkland and green spaces being in towns and cities up and down the land.
Listening to her comments, I remembered my own time in local government some moons ago, in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham. We gave planning permission to one of Europe’s largest regeneration projects on brownfield land, crossing the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, around Earl’s Court and West Kensington. That development had multiple parks and lots of green space locked into its design, and into the planning permissions that were granted. It was, in fact, the incoming Labour council in 2014 that undid all of that and turned it over. While I have not been there in some time, I think I am right in saying that Earl’s Court still sits in rubble, as opposed to housing and beautiful green parks.
I will speak principally to amendment 59, which is tabled in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers), to which I too have put my name. It goes to the nub of the concerns that many Members across the House have about planning reform and the way we should go forward. There is a debate about where we should build; should we build on brownfield, or should we build on green space—green belt, greenfield, agricultural land and so on? When I look at my constituency, covering 335 square miles of north Buckinghamshire, 90% of that land is agricultural land. We have seen substantial development over the last 20 or 30 years. Some villages that started off small are now almost unrecognisable because of the vast housing estates that have been built, and which continue to be built on greenfield land around them. I think of villages such as Haddenham—close to my home village, for total transparency—where, yet again, another huge acreage of agricultural land is being built on for homes right now. Buckinghamshire Council, a good Conservative-run council, has a clear vision to build the housing the county needs through the light densification of some of the towns in Buckinghamshire.
However, what amendment 59 principally talks to is the need to incentivise developers to consider brownfield sites when they look at where to build the homes needed in Buckinghamshire and the rest of the country, and that they are not disincentivised because it is so much easier for them to build on greenfield, where they do not have the decontamination costs and all the other expensive costs of developing out brownfield sites. We can use the infrastructure levy to do that. If there is a sliding scale that says to developers that we can create that incentive through the taxation system and the infrastructure levy and potentially make these things cost-neutral, we can take the challenges of decontamination and other costs associated with brownfield land out of the equation for them. In that way, they will pay less infrastructure levy for building out on brownfield sites than they would for destroying the great British countryside.
It is not a perfect solution by any stretch of the imagination, because we still need the money for the roads, the GP surgeries, the schools and everything else the infrastructure levy is there to provide. However, unless we can create a system that really does come good on the Government’s welcome and solid commitment to building on brownfield first, I fear—and I had another developer in my inbox yesterday wanting to build out on a partially greenfield site in Waddesdon in my constituency—that all we will see is planning applications come in for greenfield development, and the brownfield first policy will not be realised.
I therefore urge the Minster to consider how we can use the infrastructure levy, in the spirit of amendment 59, to ensure that there are not financial penalties on developers for developing on brownfield land, so that we make that brownfield first policy come true. In that way, we can give local authorities that have lost a considerable chunk of greenfield and agricultural land in recent years—food security is important to all of us, and it is a pretty simple proposition that the more agriculture land we lose, the less food we can grow—the tools and powers as planning authorities to say that certain proposals are not what they need right now. In some areas, the proposals might be fine and might be what they want but, to use Buckinghamshire as an example, we could put in the differential rate enabled by this amendment to protect our greenfield and agricultural land and to drive development of the homes, commercial units and businesses we need on to the brownfield sites that exist predominantly in towns, and in some villages, in Buckinghamshire.
I urge the Government to look at the spirit of the amendment and to incorporate it into what will undoubtedly, after the leadership election, be quite a different Bill by the time it emerges on Report, to see whether we can make these proposals a reality.
Matthew Pennycook
First, I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for York Central on amendment 168. She rightly speaks about the importance of green space in urban areas and about how we can increase the rate of it, if anything, when it comes to individual planning applications.
I will speak primarily to amendment 59, because I think it is worth putting the following on the record. I understand the point that the hon. Member for Buckingham is making, but my reading of the Bill is that the framework established in part 4 already allows charging authorities to set different IL rates according to existing and proposed uses, and those could include different rates for greenfield and brownfield sites. So the means to resolve the issue he is driving are already in the Bill, and Buckinghamshire Council will be able to set different rates on brownfield and greenfield sites if the Bill is given Royal Assent.
Our concern is that, by seeking to make mandatory a sliding scale of charges relating to land type or existing typologies by site, amendment 59 could result in reduced infrastructure contributions and lower levels of affordable housing in areas where development mainly or exclusively takes place on brownfield land, because it would prevent charging authorities from setting rates that are effective and suitable for their area and that consider local circumstances. For example, a mandatory sliding scale of charges, as proposed in the amendment, could result in the expectation that a charging authority whose development sites are entirely or mainly on brownfield land would set low IL rates to incentivise development in that area and disincentivise development in other areas with fewer brownfield sites.
Furthermore, brownfield development in higher-value areas will almost certainly generate sufficient values to support higher levels of contributions than would be possible on greenfield sites. As such, a mandatory sliding scale of charges would mean the loss of developer contributions that could viably have been delivered on brownfield sites, with no assurance that this would be offset by a higher level of contributions on greenfield land. Labour firmly believes in the principle of brownfield first, as do the Government, and that is absolutely right. However, we feel strongly that the setting of different IL rates for different land types should ultimately be determined by individual charging authorities taking account of local circumstances, rather than by the method proposed in amendment 59.
Paul Scully
The Government are already providing strong encouragement for the take-up of brownfield sites—we are all agreed on that—and are prioritising suitable brownfield land for development wherever possible. There is significant investment through the £550 million brownfield housing fund and the £75 million brownfield land release fund to unlock brownfield land across different communities across the country. Our national planning policy framework makes it clear that local authorities should give substantial weight to the value of using suitable brownfield land in settlements for homes and other identified planning need.
We recognise the importance of delivery on brownfield sites, as has been raised by the hon. Member for York Central and my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham. However, we believe that that is better achieved through planning policy rather than through a fixed algorithm that automatically increases levy charges on the basis of the proportion of greenfield to brownfield. This further amendment would add a new element to the levy formula, which would still allow for greater greenfield development in certain circumstances, but would remain a formulaic approach rather than a policy-driven one.
The proportion of greenfield development within the local authority should continue to be policy driven at that local level, as we have heard. I agree with the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich that it should be the local authority—the charging authority—driving that, based on their local circumstances. In any case, proposed new section 204G(5) and (8) in schedule 11 already contains powers for the levy regulations to permit or require local planning authorities to set different levy rates for different kinds of development, and proposed new section 204G(4) makes it clear that the local authority must have regard to the increases in land value that result from planning permission. That provides a framework where, if increases in land values are higher, as we have heard is often the case with greenfield development, higher rates can be set. On that, we agree in terms of policy.
In answer to the hon. Member for York Central, I totally understand her drive when she talks about buildings going up to five storeys, and it is important that it is the local area that determines exactly these things. Whether it is the view of the Minister or the affordability of properties, that should not be determined centrally with an artificial algorithm. It very much needs to be locally driven, so that local families and communities benefit from housing themselves and from the economic value of bringing in new people and new investment. It is about getting that balance right, and that will change for different areas. It was interesting to hear the hon. Member’s tour de force—that tour of York, and I suspect I will get a bit more about green spaces later this morning.
Paul Scully
A lot more, the hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position.
Clearly, we do need those green lungs, as my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham said. Those of us who have an urban, suburban or semi-urban area need to get that balance right, and I would much rather that that was done through a policy framework than by an algorithm, which can be game-played by developers. It is important to get this right at a local level, so it is important to get for local authorities to get the local plan in, so that they can shape their place. They have the determination to do so. For those reasons, amendments 168 and 59 are not necessary.
Rachael Maskell
I thank the Minister for his authoritative words in recognising the importance of green lungs in urban environments, because they are so important. Often in planning we lose the wider benefits we are trying to achieve when we look just at bricks and mortar as opposed to people and places. It is so important that we bring that to the fore in this debate, so I will certainly refer back to his speech when talking about this issue. It is important to draw that out as we consider how we take planning forward.
Of course, I am disappointed that the Minister does not want to advance my amendment, but I will withdraw it at this stage and see on Report whether the Government will recognise the opportunity to stress the importance of green in brown areas. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 169, in schedule 11, page 294, leave out lines 15 to 28 and insert
“(a) roads and other transport facilities, including routes for good quality active travel including cycling, walking and micro-mobility, parking facilities and street infrastructure including benches,
(b) flood defences,
(c) schools and other educational facilities including nurseries, play areas and family friendly areas,
(d) medical facilities including dentists, diagnostic hubs, general practices and other community spaces to address mental health and promote wellbeing,
(e) sporting and recreational facilities including youth centres and skate parks,
(f) open spaces,
(g) affordable houses,
(h) facilities and equipment for emergency and rescue services,
(i) facilities and spaces which—
(i) preserve or improve the natural environment, or
(ii) enable or facilitate enjoyment of the natural environment,
(iii) provide outdoor space for communities including allotments and forest schools,
(iv) provide flood and drought mitigation,
(j) space for energy generation
(k) space for business incubation
(l) community buildings for social, cultural, religious purposes,
(m) community facilities including post offices, cafes, libraries, support and advice centres
(n) day centres for the elderly or disabled people, including for the purposes of state-provided day or residential care.”
This amendment broadens the scope of inserted section 204N(5), which defines “infrastructure” for the purposes of the Infrastructure Levy.
I appreciate being able to talk about this amendment, not least because although the schedule—I do not mean any offence—is a list of areas the infrastructure levy could be focused on, it is not a comprehensive list. Therefore, I wanted to expand on areas I think are important for the Government to consider in the planning process at this stage.
We are going through perhaps the greatest change to our economy in our lifetimes, whether that was caused by Brexit, covid or, now, the energy crisis, and none of us knows what is around the corner. As we look at planning, we need to think in a more holistic way. Many of these crises are forcing us into that space, and in many ways we have had to do that thinking, which could be positive. Therefore, in looking at the opportunities available to us, I would argue that the definitions in the schedule are too narrow and that the list should be more expansive.
It could be argued that my amendment puts down an even more expansive list but still is not comprehensive, and I will come back to that in a moment because I recognise that a number of other areas could be included. I am sure the Minister will argue that many of the things that I have listed in my amendment could easily fit into some of the points already in schedule 11. However, my amendment provides an emphasis. For instance, proposed new section 204N(3)(a) in schedule 11, which covers
“roads and other transport facilities”,
sets out a car-focused future. Of course, our future should not be dependent on roads and cars. We have active travel, so we should be talking much more about cycleways and footpaths, and opportunities for micro-mobility, which we are seeing the advent of. Proposed new paragraph (a) emphasises development around a hydrocarbon future, as opposed to moving away from that.
I could talk a lot about many of the other areas. We will concur around such issues as flood defences—York is unfortunately at the top of the league for flooding—but I want to come on to such things as schools and other educational facilities. For instance, what about nurseries and play areas? We know that investment in early years is really needed. That goes beyond an educational facility; we need play areas for children. I would argue that play is education, but would that fit within the definition when we came to argue such points within our local planning systems? We need to ensure that there are family-friendly areas and areas where people can feel safe and included. Looking at expanding the definition under proposed new section 204N(3)(c) is very important.
On medical facilities, the world of medicine is changing. Diagnostic hubs are coming forward from the Government, which I very much welcome. We are seeking to get them in my constituency, and we need to think about health in a very different way than we have in the past. Medical facilities will not necessarily just be clinics or hospitals, as we have seen in the past. We are moving much more into social prescribing, particularly on mental health. When it comes to mental health and wellbeing facilities, we need to look at the most advanced place pioneering mental health work, the city of Trieste in Italy, which does not have hospitals for mental health, because people have facilities in the community. Would that be included here, or would it be seen as something very different? Again, I would argue that the brief definition in the Bill is quite outmoded within its own context.
Proposed new section 204N(3)(e) covers “sporting and recreational facilities”, but what about youth centres and youth clubs? The Government brought forward a proposal to develop 300 new youth facilities, and of course we welcome them into our communities. Sadly, in York we are losing ours, but if we introduce more youth clubs and facilities where do they fit into the proposals? We know that we absolutely need them.
My amendment goes further in looking at some of the areas that we particularly need to focus on. My proposed new section 204N(3)(i) focuses on the need particularly for allotments. We have not heard much about allotments in the debate on planning, but I have been talking to the York Allotments Charitable Incorporated Organisation, which oversees our allotments. YACIO has been talking about the impact that allotments have on mental and physical health. We need to go back over 100 years, and look at New Earswick for the model regarding allotments. Many will know that New Earswick is the first garden village in the country. It is not in my constituency; it is in that of my neighbour, the hon. Member for York Outer (Julian Sturdy). It was designed for urban clearance—for moving people out of the slums and tenant homes in York into a new village—but every home was allocated an allotment. This was family housing, where people had some garden space, but also an allotment.
If we think of today and the food crisis, and the mental health challenges that we all face in our constituencies, having allotments available for families is incredible for the community and for wellbeing. In York 1,500 people are currently waiting for allotments. There is a real shortage. Being able to develop allotments through the amendment would be really good for the wellbeing of our communities and for the people waiting for them. I said that 1,500 people are waiting, but we have 1,350 allotment spaces, so some people are being told that it could be 10 years before they get an allotment. Bringing plots forward could, again, join up Government, tick lots of boxes, and make things available for our wider communities. I think that is really important. s
What the Rowntrees achieved there with their pioneering social work could have a significant impact if we think about the need. In urban spaces in particular, more and more flats and apartments are being built, but people do not have any green spaces, so where do they have the opportunity to grow their own veg? Community gardens and community allotments where there is a collective share are really important in giving people the opportunity to grow their own food. At a time when there is a food crisis, this is a step for many families in food poverty towards greater resilience. These crises are focusing our attention, and we have to think about these things in our modern age.
Turning to my proposed new section 204N(3)(j), the Government are missing a massive trick—I want to stress that this is so important. I was just listening to a BBC World Service programme, which a constituent drew to my attention, about what other countries are doing in relation to energy. It was a fascinating listen; I do not know whether the Minister heard it. Particularly in the Netherlands, but also in Scandinavia, they are making facilities for local energy production on the outskirts of areas. We are currently in an energy crisis, and we all obviously want the very best for our constituents. I notice that the energy debate has started in the main Chamber; I am sure we are all longing to see what the exact proposals are, but in Scandinavia, they allocate land to be used for energy development and production. That is renewable energy production for a local community, so there is a dependence on local energy, which of course can be built into wider networks.
It is really important that the Bill puts into the planning system those allocated opportunities for the IL to be used for future energy production. If we do not have that in the Bill, those spaces will disappear, and we will miss that opportunity. If we are looking at the opportunity presented by wind, solar and in other areas, this could be part of the solution, not only in relation to local energy prices and the costs that people are having to pay now, but also job opportunities on those sites and for future energy supplies. The fact is that other countries are ahead of us. We often focus on what is happening here in the UK, trying to get those plasters out and stretch them as far as we can, but if we look to Finland, we can see that they are instituting microgeneration and large generation of energy for their local communities. That creates a direct relationship, but it is also fantastic for the climate.
We should be thinking about future opportunities. I think it is remiss of the Government to not include those opportunities in this Bill, so I want the Minister to give this issue some thought as the Bill goes through Parliament. Obviously, it would be great to have support for that today, but if at a later stage of the Bill we can ensure that there is space for energy generation, that would be a real advance and would represent a commitment to the people that energy challenges will be addressed.
I also want to draw attention to my proposed new section 204N(3)(k), which deals with business incubation. We know where there are opportunities for investing in business growth. Often, we think about growing out housing, but we also need to build a high-skill economy with good wages for the future. We want to give our entrepreneurs opportunities; they need incubators and accelerators to grow their businesses, root them and ensure they are successful. We know the great success that comes from businesses, but they need those start-up opportunities. Again, I have been hearing about amazing projects that are building that infrastructure, but it has been because somebody has given them a peppercorn rent or they have had generosity from elsewhere. If we are building new conurbations in particular, we need to think about rooting opportunities in those areas for new businesses and ensuring they get the support that they need to grow, but getting that first building—that first step—can be incredibly challenging. I would certainly want to see that in the legislation.
That takes me to my final proposed new paragraph, although it also draws into some of the other areas. When seeing new developments, we often see a lack of opportunity to celebrate the diversity of our communities. I have been greatly concerned about that in York. Many moons ago, there was a proposal for a cultural centre that was kiboshed for whatever reason and never went forward. We do not have a cultural centre in York. We are increasingly seeing a diverse community and that is fantastic, but not places where people can congregate and socialise. We are seeing greater isolation in our communities, particularly among old people. Nine million people are lonely in our country and they do not have somewhere safe to go and meet other people. Therefore, it is important to be able to build community centres, as well as new churches, mosques and places of worship.
If we think about the old villages and towns, there was no place in the country without a church in every community—a place where the community could gather and members could have their spiritual, social and so many other needs met. Those pillars in our community were the pub and the church. I appreciate that some of those pubs have been facing many challenges, but the church still stands—those buildings still stand.
We need to see those opportunities coming forward for new developments so the community’s needs are met. Those things need investment. The infrastructure levy can be used to support vital community infrastructure. That is drawn out through proposed new paragraph (m), which looks at local facilities, and they can be pooled. It is possible to have a church that is a post office. I do not know whether it could be a pub as well, but it certainly could be a café. We are seeing a lot of those facilities coming together.
Where is the heart of community if we just build? We have all been to those horrific estates where there is no community centre and where there is just housing, housing, housing or flats, flats, flats, but the community is not pulled together. I have seen that in developments in York and it is horrid. People are not centred; they do not know their neighbours, they do not know anybody around them and they are increasingly isolated. As I said, 9 million people in our country experience loneliness. If we think about that wider context of where that goes because of the type of housing—increasingly flats and apartments—being built, if we do not invest in that social infrastructure as well, we are going to end up with a massive mental health and isolation challenge in the future.
Paul Scully
It has been interesting moving around some of the areas where the infrastructure levy can be used, whether for cycles, footpaths or micro-transport. The hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich mentioned from a sedentary position that we are going to get the good experience of York. I did not realise that we were going to have the experience of Trieste in Italy as well. It is interesting to hear about that, although I understand that in Trieste they do not have mental health provision in hospitals either because they tend to keep to people suffering with their mental health in their homes. It is a different cultural situation, but the point was taken.
The hon. Member for York Central talked about allotments. I do not want to see the community levy contributing to a dulling of good developers who want to provide community facilities as part of their place-shaping. Allotments are comparatively low cost to design and implement, but have massive social and community value. I very much understand that point. Having been the Hospitality Minister for two years, and now the Minister for Faith, I find the hon. Lady’s proposal to combine those roles in the church/pub really interesting—we will see how that goes.
This is the problem with putting lists in Bills. The list is not supposed to be exhaustive and comprehensive—there are plenty of things that charging authorities can, should and will be looking at, such as those the hon. Lady has outlined. The Bill gives a starting point, but I do not think we need to go further at this stage, because the rest of the Bill gives the local authorities wide powers, allowing them to spend the levy on the infrastructure that their communities need, rather than it being imposed by us in the detail proposed by the amendment.
I reassure the hon. Lady that, should a local authority wish to spend the levy on items of infrastructure that are not expressly stated in the list in proposed new section 204N, as long as it is infrastructure in the common sense and natural meaning of the word, it will indeed be able to do that. The levy can be spent on any infrastructure that supports the development of an area, including funding the provision, improvement and replacement, operation or maintenance of infrastructure, providing that it is in accordance with the original aim of the levy as set out in proposed new section 204A.
The Bill also allows for regulations to add, remove or vary the content of the list to support infrastructure delivery through the levy if it is necessary and if any clarification is needed.
Rachael Maskell
Energy should get particular mention in a redrafting of the Bill. Other countries are further advanced; we are behind. That is a specific point, and we should see that change. Does the Minister conclude that all the other issues in the amendment would be facilitated by proposed new section 204A, as set out in that broader definition of the Bill? If that is the case, I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Paul Scully
I do not see the need to put energy generation in the list because, absolutely, that and the other areas she raises are included. I am happy to give her that reassurance. As long as the local authority thinks something is needed, and it fits within the definition of infrastructure—I think we can agree that all the points she raises fit within that definition of infrastructure—the answer is yes.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. Just for clarity: if the authority were to bring forward a proposal for microgeneration of energy or an energy facility in order to support a local town, conurbation or whatever, that would be included, too. I made the point about energy having a separate mention in the Bill because it is such a big issue and much broader than some other areas, but would that also be covered?
Paul Scully
Yes. If the local authority thinks it is needed, then absolutely. The discourse around housing is often just about the supply of housing, but clearly energy, and energy generation of all sorts, needs to be brought into it. We need to bring in schools, hospitals and medical facilities of all types, and indeed allotments, as she said. Yes, I can give her that assurance, and ask her to withdraw the amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I have heard what the Minister has said. I will take his words as authoritative—they will be in the Hansard record of today’s debate—and, as a result, I will withdraw my amendment. The point about energy is significant, not least if I look at the Derwenthorpe development by the Joseph Rowntree Housing Trust in York, which has put energy and a community centre at the heart of that social/private development. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 165, in schedule 11, page 306, leave out from line 38 to line 2 on page 307.
This amendment would limit the circumstances under which the Secretary of State could direct a charging authority to review its charging schedule.
This amendment, much like amendments 162, 163 and 164, which we debated earlier in relation to the IL rate-setting process, is concerned with ensuring that the new levy system is genuinely local and that charging authorities are fully in control of developing its discretionary elements at a local level. It would remove proposed new section 204Y(1)(b), which provides the Secretary of State with the power to direct a charging authority to alter its charging schedule in a range of circumstances, including
“in any other circumstances that IL regulations may specify”.
That is of particular concern.
Given that the Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to revise individual charging schedules at their sole discretion, with no need to justify that intervention by means of any objective evidence-based criteria, we are concerned that, as drafted, it could have significant implications. For example, it could allow a future Secretary of State to require a charging authority to amend its locally developed charging schedule as a result of lobbying by a developer, without having to provide any evidence that the levy as implemented in the area in question is impairing viability and frustrating development.
We believe that this amendment is necessary to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot direct a charging authority to alter its charging schedule merely due to the passage of time or any other circumstances they see fit, given that the only justified rationale for an intervention from Ministers in relation to a charging schedule—namely, its impact on viability—is already covered by subsection (1). I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Paul Scully
Proposed new section 204Y(1)(b) enables the Government to require an authority to review—not necessarily alter—its levy charging schedule if a significant amount of time has passed since its last issuing, review, revision or replacement. Proposed new section 204Y(1)(c) enables the Government to require a review in any other circumstances as may be specified through regulations. It is important to have a power to direct a review to be undertaken after a significant period has elapsed since the schedule was put in place or revised. That is because there may be occasions when a schedule has been in place for many years without a proper review, and so is not up to date.
The levy will be a mandatory charge, and for many local authorities operating a levy on new developments it will be a novel means to capture land value. Monitoring and reviewing charging schedules will therefore be important, especially for authorities that are unaccustomed to charging a levy. That is why we want levy charging rates to be reviewed on a timely basis. We will issue guidance on what that might reasonably mean in terms of time and circumstances. I hope that provides reassurance, including for communities and developers, that the rates remain appropriate. We want to make sure the approach is balanced.
Historically, local planning authorities have not always reviewed and updated key documents, such as local plans, in a timely fashion, which is why it is appropriate to take this power to direct a charging authority to issue, review, revise or replace. Furthermore, it is entirely consistent for the Bill to secure timely reviews of charging schedules and to require that local authorities introduce a charging schedule in the first place. Levy charging schedules are underpinned by evidence on local economic circumstances and viability. Reviews either provide confidence that the charging schedule remains appropriate or starts a process of revision if they are considered not to be.
We also consider it important to have the power to regulate for any other circumstances in which the Government may want to direct that a review be undertaken, such as if a new local plan is issued soon after the publication of a charging schedule. Any further circumstances identified will be introduced through affirmative regulations, and so will be laid before this House and debated and approved here. With that clarification, I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw the amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate that response from the Minister. I am partly reassured, and I note the point that he made about the use of “review” as opposed to directly “revise” in terms of the power available to the Secretary of State. I also note what the Minister said about the forthcoming guidance. I remain slightly concerned about how broadly defined line 2 of page 307 is, in that it does allow the Secretary of State to call for that review on the basis of anything that might come forward in future regulation, subject only to the affirmative procedure. We all know the limitations of that.
I am not going to press the amendment to a Division, but I hope the Government will reflect on the Opposition’s concerns about the ability in the Bill, as presently drafted, for the Secretary of State to intervene in a number of ways that should be the preserve of local charging authorities. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 166, in schedule 11, page 308, leave out line 25.
This amendment would prevent IL regulations making unspecified provision about how powers under section 106 of TCPA 1990 (planning obligations) are used.
The Committee will be relieved to hear that this is the last of our amendments on the infrastructure levy. It relates to the interaction of the infrastructure levy with other existing powers. As drafted, proposed new section 204Z1(1) in schedule 11 provides for future IL regulations to make unspecified provisions about how a range of existing powers, including CIL and section 106 planning obligations, are to be used or not used.
Our specific concern relates to the application of those broad powers to the use of section 106 agreements. While we appreciate fully that there are circumstances where the use of section 106 will have to be limited—for example, to avoid double charging a development for the same infrastructure item—we feel strongly, for reasons that I went into in exhaustive detail on Tuesday in relation to that part of the Bill in the round, that section 106 agreements have a crucial role to play in ensuring we secure sufficient levels of affordable housing. We are concerned that proposed new subsection (1) could be used to unduly restrict their use.
By deleting line 25 from page 208, amendment 166 simply seeks to ensure that future IL regulations cannot make unspecified provisions about how section 106 agreements are used once the levy system is operational. I hope the Minster will seriously consider accepting the amendment. If not, I feel that we need, at a minimum, far greater clarity about the precise circumstances in which the Government expect to have to restrict section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
Paul Scully
Proposed new section 204Z1 in schedule 11 enables the Secretary of State to prescribe how certain powers are to be used or not. As we have heard, proposed new subsection (1)(c) enables the Secretary of State to prescribe how section 106 applications may or may not be used alongside the levy. That power has been used previously to make provision under the community infrastructure levy regulations to ensure that section 106 obligations are necessary in planning terms, directly related to the development, and fair and reasonably related to the scale and kind of development.
We need to be able to continue to ensure, under the new system, that section 106 obligations are used in ways that are appropriate, necessary and fair. We need to be able to delineate between matters that should be funded by the levy, and contributions to infrastructure or mitigation that should be secured by the more narrowly focused section 106 agreement. That means that developers will know that they will receive consistent treatment across different local authorities.
Removing section 106 from the list of powers will mean that the Secretary of State is unable to provide clear, coherent and consistent boundaries between what the levy should be used for, and what section 106 agreements can and cannot be used for. That would remove a key provision that will provide for coherence across the levy and the planning obligations regime. It is important to remember that the levy will take most of that. It will be more complicated, niche or bespoke schemes for which section 106 will remain. That coherence is why we want to keep that power and consistency. For that reason, I hope the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will withdraw the amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
That is a welcome additional clarification from the Minister, and I do not want to rehearse the previous debates that we have had. As I set out at length, we believe that the infrastructure levy should be discretionary and that, if it is not discretionary, affordable housing should not be within scope, so we remain concerned about the ability of this power to restrict how section 106 agreements are used. However, I will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 114
Power to designate Homes and Communities Agency as a charging authority
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
I have a question relating to clause stand part. The Homes and Communities Agency, which operates under the trading name of Homes England, can already be designated as a local planning authority under the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The clause amends section 14 of the Act to provide that, if a designation order is made under section 13 to designate the HCA as a local planning authority for all or part of a designated area, the designation order may also make provision for the HCA to be the IL charging authority for all or part of the designated area.
The current situation with CIL is that the Homes and Communities Agency, urban development corporations and enterprise zone authorities can also be collecting authorities for development where they grant permission, but only if the relevant charging authority agrees. It would appear that the new provision in the clause allows Homes England to be a charging authority for the area where it acts as the planning authority, without the need for agreement from the local planning authority, as is currently the case with CIL.
Given the circumstances, I am more than happy for the Minister or his successor to respond to me in writing at a later date, but I would be grateful if he could explain the rationale behind the change of approach, what engagement and consultation Homes England will be required to carry out with other relevant local bodies in the absence of an explicit agreement to exercise the relevant powers, and what processes Homes England will use to decide how IL should be spent in that area.
Paul Scully
I will write to the hon. Gentleman with further details. As he rightly says, the clause is designed purely to act as a framework for having Homes England become a charging authority as well as a local planning authority. That power has not be exercised to date, but if it were, Homes England could become a charging authority. It is important to have the power in order to allow the Homes and Communities Agency to become the charging authority as well as the local planning authority, and to specify the purpose and kinds of development. Without the clause, the levy may not be able to function effectively in areas where the Homes and Communities Agency may be designated as the local planning authority. I commend the clause to the Committee, and I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with further details, should he require them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 114 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Gareth Johnson.)
National Security Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Thursday 8th September 2022
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 September 2022 - (8 Sep 2022)
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
On a point of order, Ms Ali. I bring good news to the Committee: yesterday, I met the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who is alive and well. We asked why he did not attend the Committee, but we have not yet had an explanation from the Government. From what he told me, I understand that the reason why he was told to stay away was that he would not move part 3 of the Bill.
Related to that, however, we also raised the issue of losing a day last Tuesday because the Government insisted on adjourning the Committee. Has any thought been given to an extra day next week—if we need it—to complete the Bill’s proper scrutiny?
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. On both occasions that the Committee met on Tuesday, although only for a short time and without being able to make any progress on the Bill, I asked the Minister in charge, the Government Whip, for an explanation of why the former Minister had not turned up to the Committee. Had he engaged in dereliction of his duty—he said he would stay in post until the new appointment and then did not turn up—or had he been asked to stay away? My right hon. Friend put forward—we would call this hearsay in the courts—an explanation that he heard from the hon. Gentleman in question, but I had asked the Whip to tell us. I think the Committee deserves to hear why that happened. Will one of the Ministers tell us what the Government’s explanation is? It has been requested since Tuesday.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
Further to that point of order, Ms Ali. The right hon. Member for North Durham made the request for additional time. Given how much is yet to be done, in particular the most contentious new clauses—contentious in the minds of some perhaps—especially relating to the public interest defence, which may take substantial time to deal with fully, will proper consideration be given to replacing at least the day lost earlier this week?
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
This is the first time that I have spoken on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government. It is an enormous privilege to be here. I realise that I enter this process—this lion’s den—at a moment when other lions have been through the Bill a few times before—there are an awful lot of Christians in this Committee and only one lion.
Before I say anything further, I pay enormous tribute to the Bill team, who have been phenomenal. The very fact that this has continued at all in such a professional way—
Tom Tugendhat
It has. That is because they have held it together and been a phenomenal asset to the Home Office. I am grateful to them.
On the various points that have been made, the hon. Member—
Tom Tugendhat
My apologies: the right hon. Gentleman. He is quite right. He asked some questions, as did the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, or the right hon. Member for Garston and Halewood—
Tom Tugendhat
I will endeavour to find out what the reason is. You will understand, Ms Ali, that I was not appraised of this situation. I have spent rather a long time reading the Bill in the past 36 hours and not so much time asking about the movements of former Ministers.
On the point made by the right hon. Members for North Durham and for Dundee East about time, I will endeavour to do what I can to ensure that we have time available. Let us see how we go today. If time is needed, I will talk to the Whips team about it.
The Chair
The Minister has addressed the key points. I have nothing further to add in response to the point of order, so we will now begin our proceedings.
Clause 41
Variation of measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 42 to 44 stand part.
That schedule 6 be the Sixth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
As the comparable sections in the terrorism prevention and investigation measures legislation make clear, clauses 41 to 44 are technical elements that improve the regime and make it work in practice. Clause 41 mirrors TPIMs by making provision for the measures imposed to be varied while they are in force. That will allow changes to be made to the restrictions where necessary, in response to changes in the individual’s personal or family circumstances or to the assessment of the risk they pose. Those provisions will be important in ensuring that the regime is able to respond dynamically and flexibly to changing circumstances, and that the individual is able to live as normal a life as is possible without posing a threat to the British people.
The provisions will also be important to securing the effective operational management of state threats prevention and investigation measures. Critically, the underlying requirement that the measures imposed must always be necessary and proportionate remains, and that is explicitly the case for any variation that has the effect of strengthening the measures imposed.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under you as Chair once again, Ms Ali. They say a week is a long time in politics: never has that been truer than this week. I am very pleased to see the Minister in his place, but—for the second time over the course of this Committee—not quite as pleased as the hon. Member for North Cornwall that he once again has a Minister in place. I welcome the Minister to his role; as others have said, he is the fourth Minister we have had over the course of this Bill. We welcome the opportunity to continue to work together, now that we can make some vital progress on this really important piece of legislation. I also look forward to working with him on this policy area beyond just the legislation that is in front of us.
Turning to the detail of this group of clauses, clause 41 makes provision for the measures imposed under a part 2 notice to be varied in a number of different circumstances, as the Minister has outlined. Subsection (2) makes it possible for the Secretary of State to vary a relocation measure in a part 2 notice if considered necessary
“for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to the individual”.
We are satisfied with those measures, and recognise the necessity of the remaining provisions in the clause.
Clause 42 provides a power for the Secretary of State to revoke a part 2 notice at any time by serving a revocation notice, whether or not in response to a request by the individual. The Secretary of State may exercise that power where they consider it is no longer necessary for the part 2 notice and the measures imposed under it to remain in force. The explanatory notes say that
“although the measures may no longer be necessary at the time that the Part 2 notice is revoked (for example because the individual has been detained in prison), they may subsequently become necessary again (when the same individual is released from prison, perhaps following an unsuccessful prosecution for a criminal offence).”
As I have said before, the assumed prosecution rate for state threats in the Home Office impact assessment is just 33%, so I am concerned that we might need that level of flexibility, depending on the circumstances.
Subsection (6)(a) of the clause also provides a power for the Secretary of State to revive for a period of a year a notice that has previously expired without being extended, without the need for evidence of new state threat activity. Surely if a person continues to be a threat, the notice should not be allowed to expire; alternatively, if the notice has been allowed to expire because the person is no longer deemed a threat, reviving a notice without any new information surely could not be justified. On that basis, I would be keen to hear any further rationale for the provisions in subsection (6)(a).
When considering the revocation of part 2 notices, it is also worth considering what Jonathan Hall QC described as the “TPIM Catch-22” in his annual report on the terrorism equivalent of these part 2 measures:
“On the one hand, in order to test whether an individual would revert to terrorism-related activity in the absence of TPIM measures, there may be no alternative but to reduce or remove measures; for example, by allowing an individual to associate or move more freely.
“On the other hand, association and movement measures have been imposed precisely to counter the risk of terrorist-related activity. In the absence of evidence of risk reduction, to do so might put members of the public at risk of harm.”
It is not easy to step down from STPIMs once they have been imposed and there is a clock ticking on the restrictions imposed on a suspect, so what efforts are we making to establish best practice on this, so that clauses 41 and 42 can be deployed as effectively as possible?
Clauses 43 and 44, also in this group, make provision for circumstances in which a part 2 notice is “quashed” or directed to be revoked as a result of court proceedings, and schedule 6 rightly provides other circumstances in which an individual who is convicted of an offence under clause 50 has a right of appeal against that conviction.
Other than the points we have raised, we are satisfied that these measures strike an appropriate balance.
Stewart Hosie
I welcome the Minister to his place.
In this group, clause 41 allows for the variation of STPIMs, either on application by the individual on whom it has been served or by the Secretary of State, when certain circumstances apply. Most of the clauses in this group seem to make sense, but there is some slightly odd wording. I know the Minister described these measures as “technical” and said that they would improve provision, but will he give some clarity?
Clause 41(1)(c) provides the power to vary, which is available if necessary
“for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity.”
Why is that? The words “purposes connected with” appear to be a slightly odd formulation. Why is the requirement not simply to prevent or restrict involvement in “threat activity”?
That same question arises in relation to clause 41(2)(a), but in that paragraph what is meant by allowing a new relocation measure to be invoked when
“necessary for reasons connected with the efficient and effective use of resources in relation to the individual”?
What does that actually mean? The Minister described these provisions as “dynamic” and “efficient”. Are we saying that people may be moved for a second time simply to save money? The explanatory notes suggest that is the case, so I seek reassurance that such a provision will not be used unless genuinely necessary.
Clause 42 allows for the revocation of notices, including on application, but it does not appear to restrict the number or frequency of revocation applications. It also allows the Secretary of State to make a “revival notice” in regard to a part 2 notice that has expired or been revoked. It protects against expired notices already extended to the maximum limit, but it seems to leave open the possibility of revoking a four times extended part 2 notice and then reviving it, despite the time limit. That seems to be expressly permitted in clause 42(7)(b), although clause 42(9) appears to stop that. Will the Minister confirm that revival notices cannot be used to try to circumvent the absolute maximum of five years and that clause 42(9) will prevent that happening?
Turning briefly to schedule 6, which covers circumstances in which a person has been convicted of breaching a part 2 notice but the notice or extension is “quashed” so that the offence would not have been committed had it been quashed earlier. There are some very tight timescales in this schedule. For example:
“An appeal under this Schedule to the Court of Appeal against a conviction on indictment in England and Wales or Northern Ireland…may not be brought after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the right of appeal arises”.
The same 28 days is used in relation to
“an appeal under this Schedule to the High Court of Justiciary”—
the Scottish High Court of Appeal—
“against a conviction on indictment in Scotland”.
There is a 21-day deadline on
“an appeal under this Schedule to the Crown Court against a summary conviction in England and Wales”.
There is a 14-day time limit on
“an appeal under this Schedule to the Sheriff Appeal Court against a summary conviction in Scotland”.
Some of these timescales, particularly the 14 day one, are very tight and it may be very tricky to know precisely when the clock starts ticking, as that depends on when a different clock has run out.
We may be slightly over-cautious. However, it appears ridiculous if people are left with convictions for breaching what would have been illegal orders. Would it not be more sensible in those circumstances, to avoid people having to go to appeal courts of one sort or another in short timescale, simply to automatically quash them? Why is there a time limit on the ability to appeal in any circumstance?
Tom Tugendhat
Let me answer some of the questions that have just come up. The hon. Member for Halifax and the right hon. Member for East Dunbartonshire, if I am correct—
Tom Tugendhat
Forgive me; the right hon. Member for Dundee East. They have raised some interesting points. The first is on the notice to be revived without new evidence of a lapse. The reason for that variation is to allow for prison sentencing. Should an individual find themselves being sentenced for a crime in the middle of an STPIM, that allows the STPIM to be paused for the purpose of imprisonment and revived afterwards, without having to go through the whole process again. The purpose is practical, rather than that of having a massive legal effect. Therefore, I believe it is entirely proportionate with the requirements of security.
Stewart Hosie
That seems a slightly illogical formulation. If the prison sentence is substantially longer than the maximum the STPIM could provide for, it seems preposterous that the remainder of the STPIM’s time would be added to the end of a sentence once it was fully discharged. That does not appear to be fully thought through.
Tom Tugendhat
Perhaps the hon. Member will appreciate that not everybody who spends time in prison will do so for the offence for which the STPIM might have been applied. It is perfectly possible that somebody might spend six months in prison for something completely unconnected—a driving offence, a minor theft, or whatever—and therefore a pause would be entirely in keeping with that. The STPIM is about controlling different people’s ability to move and communicate, in which circumstances prison would simply not be a relevant application because the prison sentence effectively supersedes the controls that would have been put in place. In that sense, it is merely a way of recognising that, in certain circumstances, different applications would apply.
Clause 39 requires police to keep under review criminal investigations. STPIMs are a civil measure to protect against national security threats when a criminal prosecution is not possible. They are not overlapping; they are compatible and, indeed, complementary.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 42 to 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 45
Appeals
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause set out the rights of appeal of a person subject to an STPIM notice and the function of the court on considering such an appeal. Those rights of appeal are in addition to the automatic review of each case and ensure that the individual subject to a notice is able to appeal against all relevant decisions taken by the Secretary of State using the powers contained in the Bill—for example, to extend or revive a notice, to vary the measures or to refuse an application for measures to be varied.
In determining an appeal brought under the clause, the court must apply judicial review principles. That is a particularly intense level of scrutiny and will ensure that the Secretary of State’s decisions are subject to independent consideration. Clause 45 makes clear the powers of the court on considering an appeal, which include to quash the extension or revival of the notice or the measures within, or to give directions to the Secretary of State for the revocation of the notice or in relation to the variation of the measures specified in the notice. As I have said already, a key feature of the Bill is the extensive and multi-layered approach to judicial oversight, which will ensure that the courts can be involved at every stage of the process, and that every decision of the Secretary of State can be reviewed by the judiciary and can be overturned if the court so decides.
To recap, there is an initial permission stage before measures are imposed. There is then the automatic full review of the decision to impose measures, and there are the extensive rights of appeal contained in the clause. Taken together, those provide important safeguards.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. It is absolutely right that clause 45 sets out those rights to appeal. I have nothing further to add at this stage, but we will come back to oversight when we discuss later amendments and new clauses.
Stewart Hosie
Clause 45 includes the important power to appeal to the court against the decision to review or revive a part 2 notice; against variations, or the refusal of them; against unlimited revocation applications; and in relation to permission applications. As the Minister said, the function is to review the decision, and the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.
That sounds fine—so far, so good—but why is there no right to appeal against a clause 35 permission to impose STPIM decisions, as made clear in clause 47? Is it because it is expected that other procedures will have the same effect, for example an application to revoke, or is this an attempt to limit in statute the ability of those subject to STPIMs having access to court to appeal in those circumstances?
Mr Jones
I warmly welcome the Minister to his position. He and I go back a long way: when I was a Minister in the Ministry of Defence, he was a bright, fresh young officer, and I think we both have fond memories of our time working together. One of the dangers he faces is being appointed to a position that he knows a lot about. That is always a downer for any Minister and strikes fear into the civil service. I wish him well, and he will do a good job.
Throughout the entire Bill, there should be an ability for the individual to have recourse to appeal. That is not because I am somehow soft on terrorism or on the individuals we are dealing with. It is because we must have a system whereby, when the state takes hard measures to limit someone’s freedom, they need the counterbalance of the ability to appeal. That is why I welcome the measures. My problem with the Bill is that, although this measure is present in this part of the Bill, there are no safeguards in other parts of the Bill. Those types of appeal mechanisms balance state power and the individual.
I have two specific points on the process, which I support. How will the appeals be done in the court? Some of the information that the Secretary of State will rely on will be highly classified, so how will the process work? It will mean the disclosure of some information that we would not want disclosed in open court. I shall not rehearse the arguments on part 3, but it is clear that, if part 3 is retained, the individual will not have recourse to legal aid for an appeal. I am opposed to that. That is not because I am on the side of individuals who wish us harm, but we must ensure that we have a system that is robust in ensuring that justice is done, and people must not be arbitrarily detained or subject to those restrictions if they clearly have legitimate arguments against what the state is trying to apply.
Tom Tugendhat
Before I come to the right hon. Member for Dundee East’s words, I will just address the very generous tribute from the right hon. Member for North Durham. I remember that I used to call him sir; he never called me sir, and he still will not. I do not feel special in that; I do not think he has ever called anyone sir in his life. It was very kind of him.
On the question raised by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, clause 38 means that there has to be a review wherever a STPIM notice is imposed, which is in clause 35. The individual can attend the automatic review. I will come on to that element, because as the right hon. Member for North Durham rightly says, there is likely to be material that is extremely sensitive. That is why the procedure relates to what is already established with special advocates. The right hon. Member knows much more about Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings, and the various ways in which advocates can have access to information that is relevant to a court but is not then shared with somebody for whom that would not be conducive. That is the way that the proceedings will work, and I think that provides the right balance between disclosure, justice and protection.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Jurisdiction in relation to decisions under this part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
Members will be pleased that this is very brief. Clause 46 makes an important but largely technical provision. The purpose is to provide absolute clarity that the High Court is the appropriate forum for judicial proceedings arising from decisions relation to STPIMs, or in Scotland, the Outer House of the Court of Session. That is important given that such proceedings may rely on closed material, which we will come on to next.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 47
Proceedings relating to measures
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 7 be the Seventh schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 47, and schedule 7, to which the clause gives effect, make further provision for court proceedings in relation to decisions taken under the Bill. I will spend slightly longer on those measures, given the important issue raised by some of the key aspects of those provisions.
Subsection (1) makes clear that an appeal against a court decision in STPIM proceedings may only be brought on a point of law. That limitation is appropriate. The court of first instance has the expertise in fact finding for national security determinations. It has developed expertise and a body of knowledge in an experienced judiciary who hear national security cases. That means it is right that the court of first instance, which has significant expertise, has the final determination on points of fact.
In such cases, it is therefore right to limit the right of appeal to a point of law, as higher courts will not have available the national security information or expertise to make a fair determination on the facts. The approach is reflected from the provisions in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, and the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
Schedule 7 makes further provision relating to court proceedings under the Bill, including, in particular, powers to make rules of court about various matters. Critically for the operation of the scheme, the rules will make provision that court proceedings in relation to STPIMs will operate with both open and closed elements given the sensitivity of the evidence that will be a key component of why an individual cannot be prosecuted and why the use of a STPIM is necessary. It would fundamentally undermine the scheme if closed proceedings, where sensitive intelligence and national security arguments can be made, were not available. The individual, and his or her chosen legal representatives, can be present at the open hearings, and see all the material used in those hearings, but they cannot be present at the closed part of the proceedings or see the closed material.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to the Minister for that introduction to clause 47 and schedule 7. I am particularly interested in what he had to say on special advocates and I will perhaps come on to that.
Schedule 7 introduces provisions relating to prevention and investigation measures and proceedings, as we have already heard. As outlined in the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2 will take into account closed elements of proceedings where sensitive material is not disclosed as it would be contrary to the interests of the UK’s national security to do so, with paragraph 3 setting out the rules for the court on disclosure. In previous exchanges, we have examined the balance that needs to be struck on both these issues, so we expect the commitments to both transparency and national security to be weighed delicately in each instance.
We certainly welcome the guarantee around article 6 of the European convention on human rights, which is set out in paragraph 5. Paragraph 10 provides for the appointment of a special advocate in relation to any closed proceedings. A special advocate attends all parts of the proceedings—both open and closed—and plays a key role in scrutinising material while acting on behalf of the individual subject to the proceedings. The explanatory notes say that part of the function of the special advocate is to ensure that the closed material is subject to independent scrutiny and adversarial challenge, including making submissions in closed session on whether the closed material should be disclosed to the individual.
I think that the Minister confirmed that the special advocate would be a barrister, but I could not find any detail within the Bill or the explanatory notes about how a special advocate would be appointed and what their experience and background would be expected to be in such circumstances, when they would be providing such a specialist function. I would be grateful if there was a commitment to ensuring that those things are clear in the Bill and the explanatory notes that accompany it.
Stewart Hosie
Schedule 7 empowers the court to make rules in relation to reviewing proceedings and onward appearance, and the rules of court must secure not only a proper review of decisions, but
“that disclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the public interest.”
We can have determinations without a hearing, without full reasons being given for a decision—the Minister described that—and, when sensitive information is to be laid, hearings without the accused. There is a duty of disclosure on the Secretary of State, but he or she can apply not to disclose certain information on the grounds that disclosure would be
“contrary to the public interest.”
That rule means that the Secretary of State might be able to ignore other requirements to disclose information. That is Kafkaesque.
The Minister, rightly, prayed in aid national security; he was absolutely right to do that. We can all understand that there could be circumstances where such rules would be necessary, but does the legislation describe those circumstances appropriately? The watchwords appear to be “public interest”, but is that not far too wide or far too vague? Given he prayed in aid national security, why do we not only allow the avoidance of disclosure on genuine national security crimes?
Mr Jones
I think the Minister has explained that. I take the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East, but as I said earlier on, I think the rules are a sensible safeguard in terms of what we need. Frankly, with no access to legal aid they are for the birds, because no one will be able to use them. We will come on to that debate later.
I want to ask the Minister about the issue of juveniles, which is an increasing problem for our security services. For example, the “Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism” report that we just produced in the Intelligence and Security Committee found that, increasingly, those individuals are young people—some as young as 15. If we are going to apply the rules in some possible circumstances to those individuals, what are the protections for them? If the Minister does not know the answer, I am quite happy for him to write to explain the situation. We are perhaps fixated on thinking that this is about Islamic terrorists and grown-ups, but certainly according to the ISC report, very sadly, in many cases those who are now coming before the courts are minors.
Tom Tugendhat
Let me quickly answer the question on who is the appropriate advocate. That is somebody appointed by the Attorney General under schedule 7(10)(1). The person has to be an appropriate law officer, so a barrister or a solicitor. That is how it is determined.
On the question of genuine national security, I understand the point made by the right hon. Member for Dundee East. He will understand that this is a matter of concern for many of us who are devoted, as he knows I am, to the application of the rule of law and the access to justice that this country and many countries in Europe have secured over the past century. That is vital to the provision and protection of liberty in our country. I appreciate his point and the right to a fair trial is essential.
However, it is simply the reality of life in our world that sometimes we need to frame that justice within certain provisions to allow it to be real, and not to be silenced by the inability to bring together evidence that would otherwise protect British people. That means that we have to find ways of balancing it. That is why these court proceedings, which are less than ideal and not the ones that we would like to see, are sadly necessary because of the security restrictions that apply.
On the point made by the right hon. Member for North Durham, he knows that I spent some time in the past few decades hunting people who sought to do our country harm, and he is absolutely right. Sadly, it was not always the people who we see on the various TV shows. Very often, it was people who came at it from a very different angle. I therefore appreciate his point; I will look into it and come back to him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 47 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 48
Reports on exercise of powers under this part
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 49 stand part.
New clause 2—Reviews of Parts 1, 3 and 4
“(1) The operation of Parts 1, 3 and 4 of this Act must be reviewed by a person, or people, appointed by the Secretary of State.
(2) The operation of Part 3 must be reviewed by the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006.
(3) The operation of Parts 1 and 4 must be reviewed by either—
(a) the person appointed by the Secretary of State under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, or
(b) a different person appointed by the Secretary of State.
(4) Reviews under this section must be carried out in respect of—
(a) the 12-month period beginning with the day on which any section in this Part comes into force, and
(b) each subsequent 12-month period.
(5) Each review under subsection (1) must be completed as soon as reasonably practicable after the period to which it relates.
(6) The person or people mentioned in subsections (2) and (3) must send to the Secretary of State a report on the outcome of each review carried out under subsection (1) as soon as reasonably practicable after completion of the review.
(7) On receiving a report under subsection (6), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
(8) Section 36(6) of the Terrorism Act 2006 shall be read such that the ‘expenses’ and ‘allowances’ mentioned therein may include the discharge by the person or people of their functions under this section.”
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 48 requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament every quarter on the exercise of her powers under this part of the Bill. The Committee will recognise the parallel to similar measures in the TPIM Act 2011. Although details of the operation of the system and of particular cases will necessarily be sensitive and cannot be disclosed publicly, the clause acts as an additional safeguard by welcoming public scrutiny of the use of the regime and powers, and offers reassurance that crucial information about the operation of the regime will be public and kept up to date. Crucially, that information will include the extent of the Secretary of State’s use of her powers and the number of cases in which measures are imposed. It will also include details of court judgments handed down in the relevant period that relate to the use of those powers.
Clause 49 requires the Secretary of State to appoint an independent reviewer to review the operation of part 2 annually. First, the reviewer is required to undertake a review of the operation of the STPIM regime as soon as is reasonably practical at the end of each year, and a report on the outcome of the review must be sent to the Secretary of State as soon as is reasonably practical after the review has been completed. Then, the Secretary of State is obliged to lay the report before Parliament. That replicates the approach in TPIMs, for which the annual reports have been an effective way of examining the Government’s use of their powers.
The independence of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, combined with their unrestricted access to Government papers and intelligence, has led to real insight and informed reports that have aided the functioning and development of the TPIM regime. Using the same approach for STPIMs will ensure similarly robust scrutiny. Omitting the clause would undermine the level of oversight and transparency of the regime. I hope the Committee agrees that the provision is important for the effective operation of STPIMs.
New clause 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Halifax, proposes commitments to review annually the operations of parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill. I thank the hon. Lady for tabling the new clause and I understand the intention behind it. Appropriate oversight of national security functions—particularly the use of intrusive powers—is important. A range of oversight mechanisms are in operation and govern both the UK’s intelligence agencies and the police, which are the primary bodies that will utilise the new powers in the Bill.
As I have just mentioned in addressing clause 49, the Government have made a commitment to an independent reviewer of part 2 of the Bill. Although there may well be merit in extending oversight of the legislation beyond part 2, careful consideration must be given to how that is done. In some cases, it could create an undesired overlap of duplication of responsibility. The Committee discussed that earlier—a little bit before my time—in the context of the hon. Lady’s proposal for an independent body to monitor disinformation. There are further examples of potential duplication, such as the powers in clause 22, which are already the responsibility of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
The new clause also proposes that part 3 of the Bill be reviewed by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. As the Committee knows, part 3 contains measures to freeze civil damages awarded to claimants who are seen as representing a real risk of using their award to fund acts of terror, and measures to restrict access to civil legal aid for convicted terrorists. As a result, it is already in the remit of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review those measures. An explicit commitment to oversight of part 3 of the Bill is therefore unnecessary and would duplicate the existing discretion of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to review and report on terrorism-related legislation.
With those points in mind, the Government cannot accept new clause 2 at this stage. Although I fully appreciate the purpose behind the new clause, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw it for now. The Government take oversight of the Bill seriously, and we will consider the best way to approach it. I will be in touch with her about that.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful for the way the Minister has approached the new clause. I accept entirely the volume of work he has had to do in the past 24 to 36 hours.
We feel quite strongly about some of the proposals we are advocating for in new clause 2. There is an acceptance of the real value of the work undertaken by the independent reviewers right across the agencies that work with this type of legislation. We think we are largely doing the Government a favour in putting these proposals forward.
Stewart Hosie
Clause 48 requires quarterly reports by the Secretary of State on the exercise of powers to impose, extend, vary, revoke or revive part 2 notices. Clause 49 requires an independent reviewer of this part—that is, the STPIMs. Annual reports are to be prepared and laid, and that is all good and well. The only issue we have is the scope of the clause 48 report, in that its requirement is
“the exercise of the powers”,
while the scope of the clause 49 review is about
“the operation of this Part”.
It is important that the review includes information about the workings of what I described as potentially Kafkaesque rules for reviews and appeals in schedule 7. I will be very brief, but new clause 2, in the name of the hon. Member for Halifax, which calls for a broader review requirement to cover parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill, does seem rather sensible.
Mr Jones
The amendment from my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax is, as I said earlier, part of a broader piece about ensuring that we get the balance right between giving our security services, agencies and people the powers that I personally support, and providing proper scrutiny for the individual and for the operation of the Bill. That is the thing that has been missing from the Bill. Knowing Sir Brian Leveson, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, I know that system works well in terms of warrantry and so on. If we are going to give powers to our agencies to do their job rightly, we have to ensure that they are robust and reviewed as things change.
I know the Minister is only a day or a bit into his job, so he might not be able to accept an amendment today, but I think this aspect needs to be looked at throughout the Bill. It was certainly raised with his predecessor, though I cannot remember if it was his immediate predecessor or the one before that.
My other point is to do with this issue of laying before Parliament. I support that, but the report will be very anodyne in terms of what it can provide in public, so I might look to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am not looking for work for that Committee, but it has the ability to access material that cannot, for obvious reasons, be put in the public domain. The Minister will soon learn about the battles going on at the moment with parts of the Cabinet Office, Home Office and various other agencies about our role and access to material. We already get, for example, the independent commissioner’s report, but we have an ongoing row about our access to the annex, which we had in the past but for some reason are now not allowed to have. Given the role of Parliament and for its reassurance, will the Minister consider the ISC having access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain? That would be helpful. I accept that some people think the ISC just agrees with everything the agencies do, but it is another review body that can give assurance to the public and Parliament that the powers are proportionate.
We know that once we implement the Bill, we will learn and powers will change. I am not against Brian Leveson, the independent tribunals and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—they do a fantastic job. They have helpfully pointed to some of the lessons that need to be learned, for example, from the terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. The ability of parliamentarians at least to ask the questions and have access to the information that cannot be put in the public domain would be an added layer of scrutiny, allowing the public to know at least that we have a full spectrum to ensure that such things are done proportionately and are working effectively.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank hon. Members for the tone of this discussion. I appreciate that scrutiny is important. This is about protecting not just the rights of individuals, but the agencies that are carrying out such important work on our behalf. Their heroism and courage on operations need to be protected, so that the agencies are not later found in legal difficulty in areas where they have acted not only with integrity but with enormous courage. I therefore appreciate the tone.
Briefly, I will touch on the question of scrutiny and laying before the House. I will make an absolute commitment to bring forward reports as soon as possible. I appreciate that there have been a few issues of late, which may have delayed things. I assure the hon. Member for Halifax that I will do my best to ensure that those timelines are reduced and are as sharp as possible. I absolutely appreciate her point. The issue of being laid before both Houses is made absolutely clear in the publication.
To touch on the question of who the commissioner might be, that has not been resolved as yet. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point and there is merit on both sides of the argument, but either way, there is huge merit in ensuring that whoever is doing TPIMs has a very close connection with whomever is doing STPIMs. Whether that is a newly appointed individual or the extension of a role, I am happy to ensure that they work closely together.
Holly Lynch
We have been probing that during the passage of the Bill. Because that role is so crucial to the oversight that needs to follow the rest of the provisions in the legislation, can the Minister, as an absolute minimum, confirm that that person will be in post and that that issue will have been resolved by the time the Bill is enacted, so that that is not an ongoing question that starts to run into the legislation being enacted?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member will be aware that I have been in post for only a few hours, so I will be cautious about making commitments that I cannot keep, but I can assure her that I will do my absolute damnedest to make sure that they are in post, because I can see exactly the point that she makes and I appreciate it. As I say, this is about protecting the rights not just of those who are subject to the provisions but of those carrying out the protection of our state and our nation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 49 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 50
Offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause provides for a criminal offence of breaching a measure specified in a part 2 notice without reasonable excuse. This echoes, as do many of the provisions, a similar provision in the TPIM regime, and includes cases in which a person has permission from the Secretary of State to contravene a measure and does not adhere to the terms or conditions of that permission. For the sake of enforceability, it is vital that a part 2 notice is reinforced with effective penalties if the subject does not comply. Hence the maximum penalty on conviction is a custodial sentence not exceeding five years, unless the travel measure is breached, in which case the maximum sentence is 10 years.
Holly Lynch
The clause provides for an offence of contravening without reasonable excuse any measure specified in a part 2 notice. That, again, mirrors section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. According to the Government’s most recent transparency report, in December 2020 the total number of individuals who had been served a notice since TPIMs were introduced in 2011 was 24, so compliance is relatively high. But so are the stakes when someone breaches the terms of such measures.
According to the “Statistics on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation” quarterly report from the Home Office, the number of people who have been prosecuted and convicted under section 23 of the TPIM Act, meaning that they contravened an order, is 10. Like TPIMs, the primary function of STPIMs is to be able to control and monitor those who represent a serious threat to our national security but cannot yet be prosecuted. We have been assured that the primary function of an STPIM is to be able to manage a person while an investigation into a part 1 offence is established, rather than simply creating a situation where a prosecutable breach is highly likely.
We note the particular focus on travel in clause 50, and that under subsection (2) an individual who travels without permission loses any reasonable excuse defence. Given that we anticipate that there might be a higher number of foreign nationals and dual nationals in this cohort due to the state threat nature of the offences, it is possible that we might have higher numbers of requests to attend overseas births and deaths of family members and loved ones among the cohort. However, the risk of permitting that travel, which might mean a return to a very hostile state that we fear is sponsoring the individual’s activity, presents a massive challenge. To ensure there are robust decision-making processes around those considerations and to have good reporting and a review of those elements of the clause would be welcome additions.
Stewart Hosie
As the Minister said, the clause creates a criminal offence of contravening without a reasonable excuse a measure in a part 2 notice, but there is no defence of reasonable excuse if the subject leaves the UK when they are restricted from doing so. In normal circumstances, a breach of a part 2 notice would leave the individual subject to five years’ imprisonment on indictment, or 12 months’ imprisonment on a summary conviction in Scotland, but that becomes nine years’ imprisonment on indictment for a breach of a travel measure.
I wish simply to get to the bottom of why some of the breaches of a part 2 notice appear to be disproportionately harsh. The Minister said that much of this provision mirrors the provisions of TPIMs; does this bit—the doubling of the tariff for a breach of a travel measure—mirror the TPIMs provisions? If it does, how often was such a penalty imposed for such a breach under the existing provisions?
Tom Tugendhat
It is quite clear that any order given must have consequences if it is disobeyed—I do not think anyone in this room would disagree with that—and it is important that the penalties for disobedience against a lawfully given order must be proportionate. The penalties are proportionate, and it is normal to have an increased penalty for an aggravated offence, whatever that may be. In the circumstances, travelling abroad would be considered an aggravation and therefore have a greater penalty attached. That is entirely appropriate, so it is entirely reasonable to have that increased sentence.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 51
Powers of entry etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider that schedule 8 be the Eighth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause gives effect to schedule 8, which provides the police with powers of search, entry, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to STPIMs. For the sake of ease, I will cover the clause and the schedule together.
Before I go into the detail of the clause, I remind the Committee that STPIMs will be a tool of last resort. The Government will use every other tool at our disposal before resorting to such significant measures. Again, I remind the Committee that these measures mirror those in the TPIMs regime.
In order to effectively enforce the regime and check an individual is complying with the measures under their STPIM, the police will have the powers they need to enter premises, conduct necessary searches and seize and retain items as necessary. They will also be able to arrest the individual for a “breach of” offence if they fail to grant police access.
Schedule 8 provides powers to the police to enter and search premises without a warrant to locate an individual for the purpose of serving an STPIM notice or another specified notice on them; to search an individual or premises when serving an STPIM notice for the purpose of discovering anything that might breach any measures specified in the STPIM notice; to search premises on suspicion that an individual subject to an STPIM notice has absconded; and to search an individual subject to an STPIM notice for public safety purposes. It provides a power to police with a warrant to search an individual or premises to determine whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the STPIM notice. There are also powers for a constable to seize and retain items found in the course of such searches.
I remind the Committee that the STPIM itself is kept under review and requires a court’s permission to impose the measure. That means that a court will have already agreed with the assessment of the Secretary of State that the individual meets the meet five conditions in clause 33, which the Committee has already agreed to. That means it is proportionate in terms of a national security determination for the police to be able to undertake the aforementioned activities without a warrant. The powers will be essential to managing and enforcing the measures imposed under STPIMs and, importantly, they provide the right balance between effective powers and safeguards for the rights of the individual.
Holly Lynch
I have a couple of queries on schedule 8, which provides powers of entry, search, seizure and retention in a number of scenarios relating to part 2 notices.
I have queried the use of the word “constable” in legislation before, but it seems to be standard. Paragraph 9(9) states:
“The warrant may be executed by any constable.”
Previous schedules specify certain ranks and specialisms, such as counter-terrorism officers, to undertake such duties. Are we satisfied that further stipulations on who may execute a warrant are not required?
Sub-paragraph (10) states that a warrant issued by a court to search the individual, the individual’s place of residence, or other premises specified by the warrant, expires after 28 days. That period feels a bit odd to me. We want officers to have the flexibility they need, but I cannot imagine a scenario in which they have grounds to apply for a warrant but then take more than 20 days after it is issued to execute it. I am grateful to counter-terrorism police for sharing a bit more about their operations and how these warrants are used, which has provided some reassurance on this front, but will the Minister confirm that a warrant cannot be executed more than once in the 28-day period?
Stewart Hosie
Clause 51 applies schedule 8, which makes provision about various powers of entry, search, seizure and retention—to enter and search premises for the purpose of personally serving, to search for items that breach the notice, and to search when there is a suspicion of absconding. A warrant is required to search people or premises for the purposes of determining whether an individual is complying with the measures specified in the notice, and the warrant is to be granted only if necessary.
However, some of the powers in paragraph 10 appear to be rather broad, allowing a person to be searched without a warrant to see whether they might be
“in possession of anything that could be used to threaten or harm any person”.
I am not quite sure what that means. Unlike in the case of other warrantless powers, there is no requirement even for suspicion that someone is likely to threaten or cause harm. What is the justification or the reason for that?
Paragraphs 11 and 12 contain very strong powers to retain certain items which are seized, with no time limit other than
“as long as is necessary in all the circumstances.”
There follows a non-exhaustive example of what could represent necessity, but necessary for what? Is there provision for a person to challenge the ongoing retention of property seized by police under these powers? Is there a model for this drafting that has been used elsewhere? If there is, and if a piece warrantless search and retention legislation exists, how frequently is such a measure used?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Member for Halifax asked about the use of the term “constable”. It is standard, and she will realise that mostly it will be counter-terrorist police who lead on STPIMs, and who the most appropriate person is will be reviewed by the operational commander. The use of the term “constable” and the equivalent ranks in other forces and relevant services is standard for these purposes.
The provision on when a warrant may be executed is operationally beneficial to those who may have reason to delay or have to wait for a window to open when action can be taken. I will not go into the potential operational requirements on any element, but clearly they will vary: in some circumstances, it will be appropriate to act immediately; in others, it may be necessary to wait.
The provision on retention for
“as long as is necessary”
is also standard, including in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Bill also contains provisions allowing people to apply to have property returned.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clause 52
Fingerprints and samples
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss that schedule 9 be the Ninth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The clause will give effect to schedule 9, which makes provision for the taking and retention of biometric material from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. I will cover the clause with the schedule.
The biometric data retention provisions relating to state threats prevention and investigation measures are in line with those existing elsewhere in the statute book, including in TPIMs, which have been well established for more than 10 years. The schedule makes separate provisions for taking the fingerprints and samples of an individual subject to a specified prevention and investigation measure in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to that of Scotland. That ensures that provisions are in line with different police procedures and legislation.
constable may take biometric data, which could include physical data, from an individual subject to a part 2 notice. The individual will be informed of the reason for the fingerprints or sample being taken. Police can require an individual to attend a police station for the purpose of providing biometric data, and that material may be checked against other such material held under a variety of other powers. The schedule requires the destruction of relevant material, including fingerprints, DNA profiles or relevant physical data, unless there is a power to retain, which I shall come to.
The purpose of the provisions is to ensure the right balance between the protection of the public and individual civil liberties. Under paragraph (11), any samples taken from the individual must be destroyed as soon as a DNA profile has been derived from that sample or, if sooner, within six months of taking the sample. Paragraphs (8) and (9) contain powers to retain biometric data. Where there is no relevant previous conviction, fingerprints, DNA profiles and physical data may be retained for six months after the end of the relevant part 2 notice being in force.
Under paragraph (9), a national security determination can be made by a chief officer of police, enabling the police to retain for up to five years data relating to an individual who may pose an enduring national security threat. All national security determinations that can be reviewed must be reviewed by the biometrics commissioner, who has continued oversight of the retention and use of such data.
We recognise the importance of safeguarding individuals’ right to privacy, so paragraph (12) sets out the limitation of uses for any retained material taken from a person subject to a part 2 notice, which are in the interests of national security, for the purposes of investigation foreign power threat activity, for the purposes of a terrorism investigation, for the detection and prevention of crime, or in the interests of identification only.
Holly Lynch
I listened intently to the Minister. Schedule 9 makes provision for the taking and retention of fingerprints and non-intimate samples from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. Schedule 9, like schedule 3, is subject to several Government amendments. As the explanatory notes explain, fingerprints and non-intimate samples have the same meaning as that given in section 65 of PACE 1984. I would be grateful to the Minister for some clarity on that, which he may need to provide in writing. There is a lot going on in relation to biometrics in different parts of the Bill.
Paragraphs (6) to (11) make provision relating to the destruction and retention of material taken from individuals subject to a part 2 notice. The explanatory notes say that where an individual has no relevant previous convictions, fingerprints and DNA profiles may be kept for only six months after the part 2 notice ceases to be in force. Paragraph (11) goes on to state that, as provided in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, material taken under PACE, for example, or that is subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 or the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, need not be destroyed if a chief office of police determines that it is necessary to retain that material for purposes of national security. Given that we are dealing almost exclusively with matters of national security in schedule 9, can we assume that the majority of biometric evidence taken from individuals subject to part 2 notices may be held indefinitely under this provision?
I am reliably informed that the biometric retention provisions in the Bill are designed to bring the powers into line with similar provisions in terrorism legislation. Schedule 9(8) deals with the retention of biometrics collected in the course of the service of a part 2 notice under the STPIM provisions. That provides us with a retention of six months prior to a national security determination being made, and is therefore in line with the provision under schedule 6 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
A separate provision for the retention of biometrics can be found in paragraph 22 of schedule 3. It provides for a retention period of three years for those detained under schedule 4 provisions, in line with biometrics collected under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and section 41 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which qualify terrorism offences.
Beyond the initial retention period, both provisions are capable of retention by way of a national security determination process. I have lost track—I do not know whether other Members have—of whether we are keeping biometrics for an initial six months, as schedule 9 seems to outline, or for three years, which is the case elsewhere in the Bill. I suspect the Minister is unable offer absolute clarity right now—although I have no doubt that the civil servants think it is absolutely crystal clear—but I would be grateful if he could outline, perhaps in writing, the rationale for the different provisions.
Government amendment 32 specifies that the chief constables of the Ministry of Defence police and the British Transport police, and the director general of the National Crime Agency, are added to paragraph 9(4) of schedule 9. The responsibilities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary are different from those of other forces, but is the Minister certain that it does not need to be added to the list?
Stewart Hosie
I am aware that similar provisions were debated in relation to schedule 3, and concerns were raised then that the provisions may end up allowing the indefinite retention of the material of people who have accepted cautions—indeed, even youth cautions—meaning that they were never charged, never mind convicted. The Minister has not provided much of a justification for that, other than that he wants the legislation to mirror the provision in other Acts. He used the same argument in his introductory remarks.
That is not enough. Provisions on the ability to retain material indefinitely on whatever grounds must be justified in their own terms in this legislation. I know that the Minister is new to the job, so if he cannot do that now, he can write with that explanation, as the hon. Member for Halifax said. Notwithstanding the fact that we all want the maximum powers necessary to tackle the state threat and the terrorist threat, if his explanation is not compelling or convincing, the provisions will need to be revisited at a later stage.
Tom Tugendhat
I do appreciate that elements are being raised about which I will write to various Committee members, and I will follow up on areas that I have not covered in detail.
Although the operational use of biometrics remains the same across provisions, we are taking a different approach to the powers provided under STPIMs and the powers in schedule 3. That ensures the right balance and proportionality in tackling foreign state threat activity while protecting individuals’ right to privacy. Although there is the option to make a national security determination under both regimes, under our police powers the initial retention period is longer than for STPIMs to reflect the seriousness of an arrest made for suspected involvement in foreign power threat activity.
Following arrest for involvement in foreign power threat activity, an individual’s biometric data may be retained for three years, with the option of extending that, irrespective of whether there is no further action, or whether they are charged or acquitted. Certain national security offences under this Bill will be added to the list of qualifying offences in PACE to reflect the seriousness of the offence that justifies longer retention periods.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9
Fingerprints and samples
Amendments made: 25, in schedule 9, page 133, line 1, leave out paragraph (f).
This amendment removes paragraph (f) from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Paragraph (f) is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (g).
Amendment 26, in schedule 9, page 133, line 9, at end insert—
“(ia) any of the fingerprints, data or samples obtained under paragraph 1 or 4 of Schedule 6 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, or information derived from such a sample;”.
This amendment inserts a reference to the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 under which fingerprints, data or samples may be taken, so that fingerprints, data or samples obtained under paragraph 1 or 4 of Schedule 9 may be checked against fingerprints, data or samples taken under that Act.
Amendment 27, in schedule 9, page 133, line 13, leave out paragraph (k).
This amendment removes paragraph (k) from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Paragraph (k) is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (g).
Amendment 28, in schedule 9, page 133, line 30, after “paragraph 8” insert “, 8A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 29, in schedule 9, page 134, line 4, at beginning insert—
“(Z1) This paragraph applies to paragraph 6 material taken from, or provided by, an individual who has no previous convictions or (in the case of England and Wales or Northern Ireland) only one exempt conviction.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 30, in schedule 9, page 134, line 4, leave out “Paragraph 6” and insert “The”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 29.
Amendment 31, in schedule 9, page 134, line 26, at end insert—
“8A (1) This paragraph applies to paragraph 6 material taken from, or provided by, an individual—
(a) who has been convicted of a recordable offence (other than a single exempt conviction) or of an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) who is so convicted before the end of the period within which the material may be retained by virtue of paragraph 8.
(2) The material may be retained indefinitely.
8B (1) For the purposes of paragraphs 8 and 8A an individual is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if—
(a) in relation to a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland—
(i) the individual has been given a caution or youth caution in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, the individual has admitted,
(ii) the individual has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity, or
(iii) the individual has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged in respect of the offence,
(b) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has accepted or has been deemed to accept—
(i) a conditional offer under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(ii) a compensation offer under section 302A of that Act,
(iii) a combined offer under section 302B of that Act, or
(iv) a work offer under section 303ZA of that Act,
(c) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been acquitted on account of the individual’s insanity at the time of the offence or (as the case may be) by virtue of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(d) a finding in respect of the individual has been made under section 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment,
(e) the individual, having been given a fixed penalty notice under section 129(1) of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 in connection with an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has paid—
(i) the fixed penalty, or
(ii) (as the case may be) the sum which the individual is liable to pay by virtue of section 131(5) of that Act, or
(f) the individual, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been discharged absolutely by order under section 246(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
(2) Paragraphs 8, 8A and this paragraph, so far as they relate to individuals convicted of an offence, have effect despite anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27)).
(3) But a person is not to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if that conviction is a disregarded conviction or caution by virtue of section 92 or 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(4) For the purposes of paragraphs 8 and 8A—
(a) an individual has no previous convictions if the individual has not previously been convicted—
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence, committed when the individual was aged under 18.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) ‘qualifying offence’—
(a) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 65A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 53A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in England and Wales of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Northern Ireland of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(c) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment under the law of Scotland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(d) the reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a qualifying offence includes a reference to an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence under the law of England and Wales if done there or (as the case may be) under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(7) For the purposes of paragraph 8, 8A or this paragraph—
(a) ‘offence’, in relation to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, includes an act punishable under the law of that country or territory, however it is described;
(b) a person has in particular been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom if—
(i) a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or
(ii) such a court has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.
(8) If an individual is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of calculating under paragraph 8 or 8A whether the individual has been convicted of one offence.”
This amendment and Amendment 36 make provision for the indefinite retention of fingerprints, data and other samples taken from a person who is or previously has been convicted of a specified offence.
Amendment 32, in schedule 9, page 134, line 40, at end insert—
“(d) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,
(e) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or
(f) the Director General of the National Crime Agency.”
This amendment enables the Chief Constables of the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police Force and the Director General of the National Crime Agency to make a national security determination in relation to fingerprints, data and other samples.
Amendment 33, in schedule 9, page 135, line 32, after “8” insert “, 8A”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 31.
Amendment 34, in schedule 9, page 137, line 34, leave out paragraphs (h) to (j).
This amendment removes reference to the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police from the definition of “police force”. Those forces should not be included in that definition because members of those forces do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 9.
Amendment 35, in schedule 9, page 137, leave out lines 38 to 40.
This amendment removes reference to the tri-service serious crime unit from the definition of “police force”. Members of that unit should not be included in that definition because they do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 9.
Amendment 36, in schedule 9, page 137, line 40, at end insert—
“‘recordable offence’ has—
(a) in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in Northern Ireland, the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));”.
See Amendment 31.
Amendment 37, in schedule 9, page 138, leave out lines 5 to 19 and insert—
“‘responsible chief officer of police’ means—
(a) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the British Transport Police Force, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) otherwise—
(i) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in England or Wales, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief officer of police for the relevant police area;
(ii) in relation to relevant physical data or samples taken or provided in Scotland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(iii) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in Northern Ireland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;”.
This amendment and Amendment 38 make provision identifying the responsible chief officer or police in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police or the British Transport Police Force.
Amendment 38, in schedule 9, page 138, line 22, at end insert—
“(2) In the definition of ‘responsible chief officer of police’ in sub-paragraph (1), in paragraph (c)(i), ‘relevant police area’ means the police area—
(a) in which the material concerned was taken, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, in which the sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
See Amendment 37.
Schedule 9, as amended, agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Twenty First sitting)
Thursday 8th September 2022
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 View all Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 September 2022 - (8 Sep 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee that Mr Speaker has asked me to read out. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes @parliament.uk.
Clause 115 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 116
Power to specify environmental outcomes
Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 173, in clause 116, page 133, leave out lines 13 to 20 and insert—
“(a) protection of the natural environment, cultural heritage and the landscape from the effects of human activity;
(b) maintenance, restoration or enhancement of the natural environment, cultural heritage or the landscape;
(c) protection of people and their long-term health, safety and wellbeing from the effects of human activity on the natural environment, cultural heritage and the landscape;
(d) protection of the climate from the effects of human activity;
(e) monitoring, assessing, considering, advising or reporting on anything in paragraphs (a) to (d).”
This amendment would broaden the definition of environmental protection to allow the Secretary of State to specify outcomes relating to climate change obligations and public health objectives.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. Part 5 of the Bill concerns the Government’s proposed new approach to assessing the potential environmental effects of relevant plans and major projects —namely, environmental outcomes reports. The reports are intended to replace the partly European Union-derived systems of strategic environmental assessment, including sustainability appraisals, and environmental impact assessments.
The Government’s rationale for the change in approach—this is gleaned not only from reading the Bill and its accompanying documents, but from the 2020 White Paper—is that the SEA and EIA systems can lead to duplication of effort and overly long reports, which inhibit transparency and add unnecessary delays to the planning process, and that the EOR framework will provide for clearer, simpler and presumably shorter assessments, with designated environmental outcomes that are easier to understand and monitor, and therefore to mitigate, remedy and compensate for, and will ensure that strategic and project scale assessments are properly joined up.
The Government’s critique significantly overstates the weaknesses of the SEA and EIA systems. That is not to suggest that they are perfect; for example, they can rightly be criticised for too often producing assessments that are too complex and cumbersome to be used effectively. However, the Government already have the necessary powers to improve many aspects of the SEA and EIA systems, if they chose to exercise them. Overall, the existing systems have made an enormous difference to how the environmental impact of development is considered. They are well established and understood, and when used correctly, they provide for rigorous, evidence-based, comprehensive assessments of the direct and indirect effects of projects and their mitigation in a way that involves the public.
As things stand, we really have no idea whether the proposed system of environmental outcomes reports provided for by part 5 will ultimately improve the process of assessing the potential environmental effects of relevant plans and major consents, because, as with so much of the Bill, the detail required to understand how EORs will operate in practice is simply not available. For example, we have no idea what range of factors the EORs can consider, or when EORs will be mandated. These and a wide range of other questions will be answered only when the regulations that set outcomes emerge in due course. Given the wide-ranging powers provided for in this part of the Bill, that is a cause of real concern.
When it comes to the basic EOR framework provided for by clauses 116 to 130, we take the view that an outcomes-based system could be an improvement on the present systems, given that they assess on the basis of the significance of effects on all relevant environmental receptors—although, again, it is impossible to arrive at a considered judgment on how much practical difference the EOR system will make when we have no idea how detailed or ambitious those outcomes will ultimately be, or what timeframe they will involve.
However, while we recognise the potential for an outcomes-based approach to establish an improved system of environmental protection, we are extremely concerned that part 5 is likely to lead to an approach that is too limited in scope, is insufficiently aligned with important obligations and requirements in environmental and climate legislation, and—for all the assurances to the contrary—provides an opportunity for environmental regression in the future.
It is essential that we have confidence that the new environmental outcomes report system will maintain the robustness and scope of the strategic environmental assessment and environmental impact assessment frameworks, and will lead to tangible improvements in our natural environment, as well as helping to fight climate change. If we are to build that confidence and provide reassurance that the new system will deliver improved outcomes, the EOR framework provided for in clauses 116 to 130 needs strengthening in a number of important respects. Amendment 173, and others that will be debated later, are designed to achieve that aim.
Clause 116 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations that set out specific environmental protection outcomes against which relevant plans and consents will be assessed, and sets out what the Secretary of State must have regard to when making those regulations. Subsection (2) sets out the definition of environmental protection for the purposes of the Bill. The Committee will note that it includes
“protection of the natural environment, cultural heritage and the landscape from the effects of human activity”,
as well as protection of people from the effects of human activity on each of those, and their maintenance, restoration or enhancement.
We take no issue whatsoever with any of the definitions in subsection (2). Indeed, the Government’s decision to explicitly include references to cultural heritage and the landscape in what is meant by “environmental protection” is welcome; but we still believe that the definition is too limited. Specifically, protection of the climate, and protection of people’s long-term health, safety and wellbeing from the effects of human activity, should be explicitly included in the Bill’s definition of environmental protection. Amendment 173 provides for that broader definition, and would enable the Secretary of State, when making regulations under part 5 of the Bill, to specify environmental outcomes relating to both climate change obligations and public health objectives.
In short, the amendment would expand the range of possible environmental outcomes that Ministers could, if they chose, specify by regulation in the future, and therefore expand the range of things that assessments under the EOR regime could encompass. It would allow the Secretary of State to, for example, specify as a desired outcome the long-term flood-proofing of key infrastructure, so that it is climate resilient; or measures to promote walkability and urban cooling, so that development promotes key public health objectives. This is a sensible and proportionate amendment, and I hope that the Minister will consider accepting it.
The Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Paul Scully)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. As we have heard, the amendment seeks to expand the definition of “environmental protection” in clause 116 to include explicit reference to public health and climate change. Before I turn to the detail of the clause and the introduction of the new environmental outcomes reports, I should say that the Government have been clear that the new system is intended to improve the assessment of projects’ environmental impacts, and to place environmental matters—including climate change and public health—at the centre of decision making.
In line with that ambition and the commitment to non-regression, the definitions in clause 116 reflect and build on the definitions in the Environment Act 2021. Many of the terms used in the EU system of strategic environmental assessment and environmental impact assessment duplicate existing processes, or are poorly understood. Our broader approach to defining what outcomes may be covered will allow the Secretary of State greater flexibility to consider all relevant matters, including those that form part of the current assessment regime, such as human health and climate change.
As set out in subsection (2)(b) of the clause, the definition of environmental protection includes the protection of people, which would allow the Secretary of State to consider matters relating to health when setting outcomes. Subsections (2)(a) and (b) refer to protection from the effects of human activity, which would include protection from the impacts of climate change. Further, the definition of environmental protection is covered by the definition of the natural environment in subsection (3). This definition includes natural systems, cycles and processes, to ensure that matters such as climate change are properly built into consideration of outcomes under the new system.
While climate change and human health will undoubtedly be important considerations in setting outcomes, it is not necessary to make more explicit reference to them in primary legislation; doing so would risk limiting the range of outcomes that can be set, and risk our suggesting that climate change and health will be considered above other environmental topics that may, in individual cases, be equally important.
It is right that environmental outcomes reports focus on the full range of environmental issues. Developing the detail of what outcomes will be covered in secondary legislation will allow us to consult stakeholders, so that we can ensure that climate change and public health commitments, as well as other environmental matters, are captured. Outcomes will also draw on the extensive commitments made across Government, including the requirement in subsection (5) for the Secretary of State to have regard to the latest environmental improvement plan when setting outcomes. Setting out details around climate change and public health in secondary legislation will also enable us to minimise the risk of duplication and ensure alignment, as these are important considerations across other policy areas in the planning and consenting systems. In the light of these assurances, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich is able to withdraw his amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate that response, but I do not think it addresses the concern raised by the amendment. I very much welcome what the Minister said about the Government’s intention to put public health and climate at the centre of decision making. The concern, though, is that although the clause gives a comprehensive list of what “environmental protection” means, it does not explicitly reference public health—human health—or climate, and I cannot for the life of me understand how inserting those things in the Bill explicitly would in any way limit the outcomes that could be set. We would merely be specifying and clarifying that outcomes relating to those two objectives were caught under the powers in the Bill.
I note what the Minister says about forthcoming secondary legislation capturing those objectives, but this issue speaks to our concern that there is a real gap in how the Bill addresses climate and public health. We feel that while opportunities to reinforce the Government’s commitments are woven through the fabric of the Bill, those issues are often neglected or left out.
I will not press the amendment, but we shall come back to the issue of public health and climate, because they need to have a much more central role in this legislation, and to be written into the Bill in many important respects, including in clause 116. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 116, page 133, line 29, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) Before making any EOR regulations which contain provision about what the specified environmental outcomes are to be, the Secretary of State must ensure they are in accordance with—
(a) the current environmental improvement plan (within the meaning of Part 1 of the Environment Act 2021),
(b) biodiversity targets including those required under sections 1 and 3 of the Environment Act 2021,
(c) the duty to conserve biodiversity as required under section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006,
(d) local nature recovery strategies as required under section 104 of the Environment Act 2021, and
(e) lowering the net UK carbon account as required under section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008.”
This amendment would ensure that when using EOR regulations to specify environmental outcomes the Secretary of State would have to ensure they are in accordance with the current environmental improvement plan and additional criteria.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 52—Super-affirmative procedure for major regulations made under Part 5—
“(1) If the Secretary of State proposes to make EOR regulations which fall under section 192(5), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a document that—
(a) explains the proposal, and
(b) sets it out in the form of draft EOR regulations.
(2) During the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the document was laid under subsection (1) (‘the 60-day period’), the Secretary of State may not lay before Parliament draft regulations to give effect to the proposal (with or without modifications).
(3) In preparing draft regulations under this Part to give effect to the proposal, the Secretary of State must have regard to any of the following that are made with regard to the draft regulations during the 60-day period—
(a) any representations, and
(b) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft regulations.
(4) When laying before Parliament draft regulations to give effect to the proposal (with or without modifications), the Secretary of State must also lay a document that explains any changes made to the proposal contained in the document laid before Parliament under subsection (1).
(5) In calculating the 60-day period, no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than 4 days.”
This new clause would require major EOR regulations made under Part 5 to be subject to the super-affirmative procedure.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 116(5) simply states that before making any EOR regulations that contain provision about what the specified environmental outcomes are to be, the Secretary of State must have regard to the current environmental improvement plan within the meaning of part 1 of the Environment Act 2021. At present, that environmental improvement plan is the 25-year environment plan, which was published in 2018 and is due to be reviewed next year. We welcome the fact that the Bill makes it clear that when making EOR regulations, the Secretary of State will have to have regard to that 25-year environment plan, although I encourage the Minister and his departmental colleagues and officials to do what they can to ensure that its review is completed before this Bill receives Royal Assent, so that the measures in the plan are fully aligned with the now operable Environment Act 2021, and so that the nature of the safeguard provided for in subsection (5) of this clause is clear and unambiguous.
However, while the explanatory notes to the Bill make it clear that the Secretary of State can draw on other relevant material when developing outcomes, there is nothing in the Bill to ensure that the Secretary of State must have regard to other important obligations and requirements set out in environmental and climate legislation beyond the environmental improvement plan.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I am grateful for the work that my hon. Friend is doing on the environment, and to try to ensure that the climate is front and centre in the Bill. Commitments were made at COP26 and COP15. We need the application of those commitments to come through in planning; there is nowhere else that they can come through. Is it not important that the determinations reached at those summits be brought into the planning process?
Matthew Pennycook
It absolutely is. The amendment seeks to ensure that the obligations we have made, and the way that they are written into domestic legislation, is accounted for in the framework that part 5 provides for. After all, we are talking about how to assess the environmental impact of development. It stands to reason that requirements and obligations that flow from things such as the Climate Act 2008 should be written into the Bill explicitly. Leaving them out is problematic because it would lead to important EOR regulations being made without there being sufficient regard to significant relevant targets, duties, strategies and obligations, which, we should remember, the Government themselves legislated for.
Amendment 174 seeks to replace subsection (5) of clause 116 with a subsection containing a more comprehensive list of requirements that the Secretary of State should have regard to—it is only “should have regard to”—before making any EOR regulations that make provision about specified environmental outcomes. In addition to the environmental improvement plan, the Secretary of State would have to have regard to: biodiversity targets, including those under sections 1 and 3 of the Environment Act 2021; the duty to conserve biodiversity, as is required under section 40 of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006; local nature recovery strategies, as is required under section 104 of the Environment Act 2021; and lowering the net UK carbon account, as is required under section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008.
Putting that expanded list of requirements in the Bill would strengthen the EOR framework by making it perfectly clear that the Secretary of State has to take into account those important legislative commitments when making EOR regulations.
In addition to expanding the list of requirements that the Secretary of State must have regard to before making any EOR regulations relating to specified environmental outcomes, we also believe there is a compelling case for greater parliamentary oversight of any such regulations that are proposed. The explanatory notes to the Bill make it clear that set outcomes will be subject only to public consultation and the affirmative parliamentary procedure. I will not detain the Committee with a digression on the limitations of the affirmative procedure as a means of effective parliamentary scrutiny—we are all familiar with them, and have discussed them in the context of the Bill previously.
Clause 116 and the other clauses in part 5 provide the Secretary of State with expansive powers allowing them to pass, by regulation, as yet unspecified, and potentially far-reaching, measures affecting the environment and environmental law, so we strongly believe that any such regulations should be subject to the super-affirmative procedure. New clause 52 would provide for use of that procedure for regulations made under part 5. I hope the Minister will give the new clause consideration, along with amendment 174.
Paul Scully
I understand the hon. Member’s concerns, but I hope to explain why the approach that we have taken in the Bill is sufficient. Amendment 174 would require environmental outcomes to be set in accordance with the environmental improvement plan, biodiversity targets, local nature recovery strategies and the Climate Change Act 2008. The environmental improvement plan, the current iteration of which is the 25-year environment plan, is where the Government set out how we aim to leave the environment in a better state than we found it. The Government have made it clear that an outcomes-based approach will be developed to support our environmental ambitions. For the purposes of this legislation, the environmental improvement plan is the most relevant document in informing the setting of outcomes. It is where the breadth of the ambitions are captured, and it is itself informed by a wide range of commitments and matters from other sources.
The Environment Act 2021 created a duty on the Government to prepare annual reports on the implementation of the environmental improvement plan, and to review and, if necessary, reissue the plan every five years. As such, it is a dynamic document that will evolve over time and reflect the most up-to-date position on the Government’s efforts to support the environment.
The environmental improvement plan also sets interim targets in respect of each of the key matters for which the Government have applied legally binding environmental targets, which will be reviewed regularly. That includes the biodiversity target mentioned in the amendment. Other more general duties and local strategies will also be informed by this overarching plan.
The amendment would also introduce a duty to act in accordance with a range of existing legislative provisions, and therefore risks creating potential conflict and unnecessary confusion. It is unclear how, for example, a national outcome could be set in accordance with a local nature recovery strategy, which is by definition spatial and site-specific.
Outcomes will cover a broad range of topics. The intention is not to create an exhaustive list of everything that will be considered when they are being set; rather, it is to recognise that the environmental improvement plan is at the heart of the Government’s agenda. Other duties will of course be reflected in outcomes at the moment they are set, but the duty to have regard to the current environmental improvement plan is the clearest way of ensuring that outcomes reflect the Government’s environmental ambitions.
With that in mind, it is important to note that the environmental improvement plan and commitments such as those under the Climate Change Act 2008 were not conceived as a way of informing outcomes for the EOR. As such, it would not be appropriate to set a hard requirement that EOR outcomes be set in accordance with those commitments.
The purpose of environmental outcome reporting, as is true of the existing system, will be to ensure that the right information is gathered to inform the right decisions, not to prioritise any one particular policy over another. Not everything in the environmental improvement plan will be relevant to development and environmental assessment, and there will be ambiguity as to how the plan should best be translated into outcomes for individual plans and developments. Equally, we will want to set outcomes in respect of landscape and cultural heritage, which are not in the scope of the plan.
When making EOR regulations that specify outcomes, we will have regard to the environmental improvement plan and other relevant considerations. Just as importantly, we will use the process of public consultation to ensure that we are capturing the outcomes that will best support the delivery of our environmental priorities. The amendment therefore risks both confusing and limiting the process by which outcomes are set. Given that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will be able to withdraw the amendment.
New clause 52 seeks to make the EOR regulations subject to the super-affirmative procedure—something comparatively new to me. We have sought to take a proportionate approach to parliamentary scrutiny and consultation, placing the strongest requirements on the core elements of the new system. Clearly, we want to ensure that we have the best debates, consultations and discussion on such incredibly important issues. The use of powers in this particular part of the Bill, however, is tightly constrained with broad use of the affirmative procedure to ensure that Parliament gets the opportunity to scrutinise regulations properly in detail.
In addition to requiring the affirmative procedure, clause 125 ensures that EOR regulations that cover the most significant aspects of the new regime—for example, those that specify outcomes—will also require public consultation or consultation with stakeholders. That will provide stakeholders and parliamentarians with the opportunity to consider the details of the proposed regulations in advance of their being laid. Regulations requiring public consultation will be followed up by an official Government response on how those views have been taken into account in setting the detailed policy.
Before engaging formally on the detailed regulations, after the Bill achieves Royal Assent we plan to launch a high-level consultation on the core elements of the new system—for example, on the outcomes-based approach to assessment and the use of the mitigation hierarchy in assessing reasonable alternatives. That will be combined with conceptual roundtables and expert policy forums to inform the design of the new regulations and wider implementation.
As such, the super-affirmative procedure would duplicate the consultation and the approval requirements, so we do not deem it necessary. It would only serve to slow down the process of bringing forward necessary reforms that we believe will help to improve the environment in the long run. Given that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member will agree not to press new clause 52.
Matthew Pennycook
I am somewhat reassured by that response from the Minister. However, I take issue with it in a number of respects. I appreciate fully that the 25-year environment plan is the current environmental improvement plan. It may be the most relevant document, but it is limited. I note the point about biodiversity targets, but the document does not contain all the other requirements in the legislation listed in the amendment. The environment plan may be informed by those other requirements, but it does not contain them and does not operate in the same way.
If I am honest, I struggle to understand the issue with the insertion of language relating to legislation the Government have passed, which one would hope has been aligned and made compliant with other bits of legislation that could create potential conflicts during the process of passing it. We remain concerned that the reference in subsection (5) is too limited and we would like to see a wider set of requirements written into the Bill, but I do not intend to press amendment 174 to a vote.
On new clause 52, I welcome the Minister’s comments on the processes that the Government intend to follow when it comes to designing EOR regulations. That measure of public involvement is welcome and will be an important part of the process, but we are still concerned that, overall, the safeguards are insufficient—I will come on to talk about the other safeguards provided in part 5. We do not believe that they tightly constrain the use of the powers; in fact, we think they do the opposite, and there are a number of loopholes that need to be closed.
I cannot for the life of me understand how a public consultation would duplicate the parliamentary oversight that would be afforded to this place by the super-affirmative procedure. I go back to the point I made on a previous amendment. These are broad, expansive powers, which are as yet unspecified. There is a need for greater parliamentary oversight, as well as other stronger safeguards. I am not going to press the new clause to a vote at this point, but we will come back to this and other matters on this part. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
I have said already that we are committed to delivering a modern system of environmental assessment that properly reflects the nation’s environmental priorities. The Bill allows us to introduce a new framework to replace the EU’s systems, while recognising the important role that environmental assessment plays. The previous regime could be overly bureaucratic and disproportionate. Expanding case law has led to a situation where unnecessary elements are being assessed for fear of legal challenges. The costs for big projects run into hundreds of thousands of pounds on occasions; yet, despite the lengthy reports, they often prove ineffective at securing better environmental outcomes or encouraging development to support the country’s most important environmental priorities.
The 25-year environment plan acknowledges that the UK is one of the most nature-depleted countries of Europe. The 2019 “State of Nature” report led by conservation research organisations found that 41% of UK species are declining and one in 10 is threatened with extinction. Given the urgency with which we need to restore the environment to leave it in a better place for future generations, we desperately need a new approach.
The powers in the Bill will extend to all regimes currently covered by the EU system, to ensure the best approach for the interoperability between regimes, particularly for projects that are often in the scope of more than one regime, such as planning and marine. The new approach will be centred around the creation of environmental outcomes reports, which will directly set out how consents and plans should support the delivery of environmental priorities by assessing the extent to which they support the delivery of better environmental outcomes. That moves us away from the uncertainty of assessing likely significant effects to a more tangible framework that provides more clarity on what should be assessed and when.
Assessing consents and plans directly against those outcomes will ensure that reporting is focused on those matters that will make a real difference to environmental protection. In turn, that will support more effective decision making and make reports more accessible to the public.
The outcomes will be fairly high level and user-friendly, simply setting out environmental priorities. It will be the job of indicators underpinning those outcomes to measure the delivery towards the outcomes. Indicators will be created and outlined in guidance for the different types of plans and projects and for different spatial scales. For example, indicators could set out which air pollutants should be measured and against which limits to measure the contribution towards an air-quality outcome seeking to reduce emissions.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 175, clause 117, page 134, line 26, at end insert
“relative to the current status of the environment as assessed in a prepared baseline study”.
This amendment would ensure that the preparation of a baseline study which sets the context for assessing the environmental effects of a proposed project remains a core requirement of producing an EOR.
This amendment relates to a technical matter, but still an important one. Clause 117 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations requiring the preparation of an environmental outcomes report for relevant plans and relevant consents, the criteria for which will be set out in due course in regulation. It is this provision that establishes the outcomes-based approach to assessment, which the Minister has just described, wherein anticipated environmental effects are to be measured against the specified environmental outcomes, which clause 116 provides the power for the Secretary of State to specify.
Clause 117 ensures that where an EOR is required, it must be taken into account when considering whether to grant planning consent and the terms on which it is given, or to bring a plan into effect. The core requirements of what an EOR should contain are set out in subsection (4). It specifies that an EOR
“means a written report which assesses—
(a) the extent to which the proposed relevant consent or proposed relevant plan would, or is likely to, impact on the delivery of specified environmental outcomes”.
Paragraph (b) specifies any steps that may be proposed in terms of mitigation, remediation or compensation, and paragraph (c) discusses any proposals about how paragraphs (a) or (b) should be monitored or secured.
It would therefore appear that, when it comes to EORs, the Government have in mind, essentially, a simplified environmental assessment report—one, as the explanatory notes make clear, based on the mandatory information required in the reporting stages of the environmental impact assessment directive and the strategic environmental assessment directive. However, in setting out the core requirements of what an EOR should contain, subsection (4) contains no reference to the need for an environmental baseline assessment to have been prepared. We believe that oversight needs to be addressed.
A baseline study is an essential part of preparing an EIA because it is necessary to assess the current status of any given environment prior to development taking place. It covers, for example, what habitats exist within the environment and how they are changing, or the type and number of species present, in order to accurately judge the expected impact of development on the outcomes previously specified. Indeed, because baseline studies are an integral part of the existing SEA and EIA systems, we believe their removal could well contravene the non-regression safeguard provided for by clause 120, which we will debate in due course.
When it comes to EORs, it is difficult to conceive of how they will operate in practice without some kind of baseline study taking place, because quantifying the impact of development on any given outcome requires that the precise characteristics of the locality in question are known.
By amending subsection (4)(a) of clause 117, amendment 175 simply seeks to ensure that the preparation of a baseline study, which would set the context for assessing the environmental effects of a proposed plan or consent, remains a core requirement of producing an EOR. I look forward to hearing from the Minister that the Government are content to accept the amendment or, if not, an explanation as to why the Government believe that baseline studies are no longer required when it comes to assessing the environmental impact of any given development.
Paul Scully
As we have discussed, amendment 175 would give an explicit requirement for the impact of a consent or plan to be set up relative to a baseline study on the current environmental state. Subsection (4)(a) of clause 117 explains that an environmental outcomes report must demonstrate how the plan or consent would affect the delivery of specified environmental outcomes. The environmental baseline is a reference point against which the assessment is carried out. It will remain part of the process of demonstrating how a plan or project supports the delivery of environmental outcomes.
While outcomes will reflect national priorities, it is important that they can be translated to the regional or local level, given that that is the level at which the plans and projects, which will require EORs, will normally take place. As such, outcomes will be underpinned by a set of specific indicators, which will measure the contribution of a plan or project towards outcomes. Those indicators will be relevant to the geography of an area and will change over time to reflect the latest scientific understanding. Indicators will outline how a plan or project shows whether they are contributing to outcomes, and will be tailored to the needs and characteristics of different outcomes.
The details of outcomes and indicators will be developed, as I have said, through consultation with relevant stakeholders, and we will work with experts to gain insights on how best to utilise baseline data to inform them and ensure that overall environmental protections are maintained. Following that, clear guidance will be provided setting out how a plan or project should use indicators to demonstrate that they are supporting outcomes.
I do not think that we are that far apart in this, and I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will accept my explanation that although the baseline data is clearly important in measuring those outcomes and using those indicators, we do not need the duplicative nature of having it in the Bill. I therefore hope the hon. Member will withdraw his amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I appreciate that response from the Minister. I think we would still like something to be written into the Bill regarding baseline studies. However, I very much welcome the clarification that he has just provided—that they will “remain part of the process” , and that they will be translated and tailored to the regional and the local level. I think that is very important and, on that basis, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
The outcomes-based approach to assessment will ensure that the Government’s environmental commitments and priorities are placed right at the centre of the consenting process, in a system that is streamlined, transparent, accessible and clear. As outlined in the previous clause, we would want to make reports user-friendly and concise, enabling communities to understand what forms part of the assessment and how impacts are measured via indicators. We also want to improve the accessibility of reports and the data that underpins them by improving their format and avoiding multiple PDFs of tens of thousands of pages, for example.
In order to introduce the new outcomes-based approach to environmental assessment, the Government need the power to require the production of an environmental outcomes report for relevant proposed contents and plans. In taking that power, the Government are able to ensure that, where a report is required for a relevant consent or plan, the report must be completed before consent is granted or a plan is adopted.
Furthermore, the clause ensures that where an environmental outcomes report is produced, it must be considered by the relevant decision maker, which means that decisions are informed by quality information that fully considers the environmental effect of the plan or consent. It also sets out what the content of the reports should be. They will primarily assess how the proposed consent or plan would impact on specified environmental outcomes, supporting our ambition to move towards an outcomes-based system.
In structuring the clause, we recognised the need to provide powers to support the reform of a wide range of environmental assessment regimes across Government, but we have sought to ensure that core requirements are brought to the fore. For example, reports must consider reasonable alternatives to the proposed consent or plan and assess any steps taken in line with the mitigation hierarchy. This is the first time that explicit consideration of the mitigation hierarchy has been included in environmental legislation. Importantly, that hierarchy recognises that prevention is better than cure. In every consideration, plans and projects should first seek to avoid the impact happening in the first place, before considering mitigation and finally compensation, which should be absolutely the last resort. That sequential approach will finally be enshrined in law.
Having the powers to set out specifics in regulations rather than on the face of the Bill will ensure that the new system is more dynamic, allowing for updates to our approach to be considered and consulted on as our understanding of the environment deepens. It will also allow the differences between regimes to be accommodated. The clause sets out crucial provisions required to implement environmental outcomes reports and ensures that reports have sufficient weight and status in the decision-making process. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 117 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 118
Power to define “relevant consent” and “relevant plan” etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
Clause 118 gives the Government a constrained power to set what plans and consents require an environmental outcomes report. The Government want to be clear about which consents and plans require assessment, and we will use subsequent regulations—bounded by the commitment to non-regression—to provide clarity on when an EOR is required. By clearly setting out the different categories for consent and the types of plan that require assessment, we will be able to address the key issue with the current system, where debate about whether assessment is required acts as a block to moving forward with meaningful assessment.
We want to avoid unnecessary screening work, so it is more likely that more plans and projects will automatically be subject to a proportionate report and only in borderline cases must a criteria approach be followed. Developers will know where they stand up front, and local planning authorities can save the time and resources that are usually taken on screening of opinions.
Let me reassure the Committee that the clause will be used to reduce uncertainty, not assessment. The Government remain committed to ensuring that all plans and projects assessed in the current system will continue to be assessed, while removing troublesome uncertainty. The Government will also consult on which projects and plans should be subject to EORs. Parliament will have the opportunity to debate and approve the regulations that set that out. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Moving on to clause 119, the Government have made it clear that the protection and enhancement of the natural environment is a policy priority, and the measures designed to achieve that should be consistent and long term. The existing system does little to follow through on the commitments made during the assessment process—for example, whether the mitigation measures actually work or are implemented in the first place. Environmental statements are often created at great length, only for the follow-up monitoring and reporting of the impacts on the ground to be inconsistent at best.
Our proposed reforms to environmental assessment therefore provide a renewed and stronger emphasis on monitoring, to ensure that stated outcomes are delivered and that remedial action is taken where required throughout all stages of the development process. That means that achieving environmental outcomes does not stop once a consent is granted or a plan adopted. Importantly, clause 119 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring action to be taken when monitoring or assessment processes have highlighted that a given outcome is not being delivered.
Those actions align with the mitigation hierarchy and the principles of avoidance, mitigation and compensation being built into that process to ensure accountability and to address fully any unanticipated or cumulative adverse effects on the environment.
Rachael Maskell
I have been listening carefully to the Minister. My concern about what he has been saying is that the process does not have sufficient teeth in the event that the EOR is not delivered. Can he clarify whether planning permission would be granted if the EOR requirement is not adhered to? Should that not be a condition for planning?
Paul Scully
The point is that some of that is to be looked at now. At the moment, an environmental assessment is effectively prose that may or may not be adhered to, whereas an environmental outcome is far more data driven, so it can be measured and mitigated, as I have said. That will happen in the lead-up to planning, but a lot will clearly be about how it is followed up after planning permission is given. As we have just been discussing, that effectively sets a baseline, saying, “That is the report; that is what you said you are going to do. You must now adhere to that, and we can follow up afterwards.” This is clearly a framework, and the teeth that the hon. Lady describes will need to be set out through enforcement teams and so on, but the measures provide a far more evidence-based approach to be able to follow up afterwards.
That is the point, because we will then have a dynamic monitoring process, which will account for any changes in conditions and available data to inform mitigation strategies. That is a significant benefit of the new system: it ensures that we take an ongoing approach to environmental protection rather than having just a snapshot in time. Monitoring the impacts over a longer period will allow for the collection of more high-quality data that can be used to drive better decision making and improve environmental outcomes.
We do not want an EOR to be an extra burden; we see it more as a rebalancing of resource and effort. We want a streamlined pre-consent process that provides up-front requirements and guidance, allowing more time to be spent on post-consent monitoring, which will be of far more value to the system in terms of both securing positive outcomes and making better use of the data produced so that we can learn from it.
Capturing that data also links to the digital powers in the Bill, and will ensure that the rich source of environmental data is put to use to inform future interventions and give a deeper and far wider understanding of the environment. It will be easier to form best practice and avoid making the same mistake twice. The clause is integral to ensuring that the environmental assessment process considers potential long-term environmental impacts, ensuring accountability and the delivery of outcomes, and ensuring that mitigation is working as it should. For all the reasons I have mentioned, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome the detail provided by the Minister, but I will push him a little further on both clauses. Again, in the circumstances, I am more than happy for him to write to me to elaborate on his answers if he feels he needs to.
As the Minister said, clause 118(2) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out those consents that should be considered category 2. Although category 1 consents will always require an EOR, category 2 consents will be required to produce one only where they meet criteria set through regulations made under the provision. I would be grateful if the Minister gave the Committee an idea of the criteria likely to be set through regulations under this provision that will require a category 2 consent, and of the rationale behind those criteria.
Clause 118(4) allows the Secretary of State to make regulations imposing a requirement for a consent in relation to a project. The requirement will be used, as in the current environmental impact assessment agriculture regime, where no other consenting mechanism exists. The Bill simply states that
“EOR regulations may impose a requirement for a consent in relation to project, which is to be a category 1 consent or a category 2 consent”.
Can the Minister explain the rationale for not specifying that the Secretary of State may impose a requirement for a consent in relation to a project only where no other consenting mechanism exists?
Clause 119(1) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out how the delivery of specified environmental outcomes should be assessed or monitored. Can the Minister tell us whether the Government have a general sense of how outcomes will be assessed and monitored under this new framework and, if so, will he share it with the Committee?
Finally, clause 119(3) states that EOR regulations may make provision requiring action to be taken, if an assessment or monitoring under subsection (1) or (2) determines that is appropriate for the purposes of compensating for a specified environmental outcome not being delivered to any extent. Will the Minister explain the thinking behind the penalties and remedies available in the new EOR system when it comes to environmental outcomes not being delivered, and will he tell us whether the Department has undertaken any work to research the impact of introducing an outcomes-based approach on rates of delivery and non-delivery of environmental targets in development projects?
Paul Scully
Let me try to answer some of those points, and I will happily write with extra detail should I fail in my objective. We will clearly be consulting on which developments require an EOR when certain criteria are met, and we will publish those following Royal Assent. In line with our commitment to non-regression, we will ensure that any plan or project requiring assessment under the current regime because of its potential impact on the environment will continue to do so under the new framework. We want to avoid unnecessary screening work, so it is likely that more plans and projects will automatically be subject to a proportionate report, but only in borderline cases. As I said, we will work towards that through a consultation process on the criteria approach.
The regulations will determine the process for considering whether the plans or projects meet the criteria for a full environmental outcomes report, and clearly we will work with stakeholders to inform our approach to the criteria, and the processes for determining whether those criteria have been met. We want to ensure that the development management system continues to determine projects. We want the EOR to reform the process, but we do not want to replace it. The majority of consenting regimes base the consenting decision on a range of different factors. They will need to make a subsequent decision following assessment, but we want to ensure that the Secretary of State effectively has a light touch on this because, having done the consultation with stakeholders, this should be done at a local level as best we can.
The hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich talked about monitoring. The detail of monitoring regimes, including how long monitoring should be carried out for, will be set out in regulations to reflect the different approaches required for each assessment regime. It is not a one-size-fits-all system, because that is unlikely to be optimal, but the intention is that, with a more streamlined pre-consent process, more time and resource can be put into post-consent monitoring, which will likely be of far more value both in terms of securing positive outcomes and gathering useful environmental data to feed back into the system.
One thing that I am not sure I brought out enough in my speech is that the data that the exercise provides, being more data driven rather than the prose that I was talking about, will not only be useful for permissions and monitoring but have a far wider effect on our understanding of the environment in general, because some really interesting data will be brought out that cannot be captured in the analogue system that we have at the moment. I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman’s question about the research to date, so I will write to him on that, and other points that I have not covered.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 118 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 119 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 120
Safeguards: non-regression, international obligations and public engagement
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 176, in clause 120, page 137, line 21, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) The Secretary of State may only make EOR regulations if doing so will result in no diminution of environmental protection as provided for by environmental law at the time this Act is passed.”
This amendment would ensure that the new system of environmental assessment would not reduce existing environmental protections in any way rather than merely maintaining overall existing levels of environmental protection.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 177, in clause 120, page 137, line 26, leave out from “Kingdom” to end of line 28.
This amendment would ensure that for the purposes of making EOR regulations international obligations are not limited to those that regulate the process for environmental impact assessment.
Matthew Pennycook
The clause provides for a series of safeguards premised on a commitment to non-regression of environmental protection, suitable opportunity for public engagement and international obligations. While we welcome the inclusion of these safeguards in the EOR framework set out in part 5, we feel strongly that they are insufficiently robust. When it comes to public engagement, we note that subsection (3) of the clause specifies that
“the public will be informed of any proposed relevant consent or proposed relevant plan”,
and should have an opportunity to engage in the process, as per the requirements of the Aarhus convention. We are concerned the force of the provision is undermined by the fact that “adequate public engagement” is defined in subsection (4) as whatever the Secretary of State “considers appropriate”.
When it comes to international obligations, it is welcome that subsection (2) specifies EOR regulations
“may not contain provision that is inconsistent with the implementation of the international obligations of the United Kingdom”,
but we are concerned that in qualifying this constraint by specifying it only applies to those international obligations
“relating to the assessment of the environmental impact of relevant plans and relevant consents”,
the Bill could restrict applicable international obligations to those that simply regulate the process for environmental impact assessment. The Minister may say it is entirely appropriate that they do so, but we feel qualifying the constraint in this way could have the effect of ensuring that international obligations relating to air or water quality standards, for example, need not be considered because they would not form part of the actual “assessment” of environmental impacts. We believe the constraint provided for by subsection (2) should be less ambiguous, so as to close a potential loophole. Amendment 177 would achieve that objective by deleting the relevant qualification to make clear that EOR regulations may not contain provision that is inconsistent with the implementation of any international obligations that apply to the UK.
Finally, we welcome the inclusion of a non-regression clause in the Bill, on the grounds that any additional safeguard that constrains the use of the regulation-making powers in this part of the Bill is beneficial. However, we have three serious concerns about the effect of the non-regression provision set out in clause 120(1). Firstly, its application is entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State; it is they who have to be satisfied that making the regulations will not result in environmental regression. As such, it is an entirely subjective constraint, and one that is unlikely to ever be challenged in the courts. Secondly, we are extremely concerned about the practical implications of specifying the Government’s non-regression commitment applies only to the
“overall level of environmental protection”.
In failing to make clear that the principle of non-regression, as it relates to the EOR framework, applies to specific aspects of environmental protection, we fear the new system will engender, as the CEO of Wildlife and Countryside Link, Richard Benwell, put it to the Committee in the oral evidence he provided many weeks ago,
“a runaway offsetting mentality where the assurance that things will be better overall can be taken to obscure a lot of harm to the natural environment at the local level.”––[Official Report, Levelling-up and Regeneration Public Bill Committee, 23 June 2022; c. 117, Q146.]
Thirdly, we are also concerned about the definition of “environmental law”, cited in subsection (1) and set out in subsection (4) of the clause. In limiting the non-regression constraint in the Bill to environmental law as defined in the Environment Act 2021, a number of relevant considerations would not be covered—including some of those set out on the face of the Bill in clause 116, such as cultural heritage and landscape—as they fall outside of the definition used in the 2021 Act. Section 46 of the Environment Act 2021 defines environmental law as “any legislative provision” that is “concerned with environmental protection”. A literal interpretation of environmental law, so defined, would cover only UK law. The Minister may argue that is unproblematic, given the commitments relating to “international obligations” set out in subsection (2), but for the reasons I have addressed we are concerned they are defined on the face of the Bill in an overly restrictive manner that will limit how much protection they provide against potential future regression.
We therefore believe that subsection (1) should be replaced with a new subsection specifying that the Secretary of State may make EOR regulations only if doing so will result in no diminution of environmental protection as provided for by environmental law at the time that the Act is passed, as provided for by amendment 176. The amendment would significantly strengthen the non-regression constraint provided for in the clause, so that Ministers cannot determine to make EOR regulations that increase environmental harm in some areas if they judge they are somehow offset in others, but must ensure there is no diminution of environmental protection whatsoever. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to these two important amendments.
Paul Scully
The new system that we have been discussing is all about improving environmental assessment, not weakening environmental protection. Moving to the outcomes-based approach that I have outlined will allow the Government to set ambitious outcomes, building on the Environment Act 2021 and other environmental commitments.
I understand the spirit and reasoning behind amendment 176, which proposes to amend the wording of the non-regression provision in clause 120 so that regulations must “result in no diminution of environmental protection”.
However, in drafting the Bill, we recognised the need to provide assurance that the new system will continue to support the protection of the environment, and the clause was drafted specifically to mirror the provisions of the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement. That ensures that these reforms live up to our commitment to non-regression with our partners in that area. If we are to meet the complex environmental challenges that we face, we need to take a holistic approach and focus on how well the system delivers for the environment overall. We will concentrate on the aspects of the system that deliver real, positive outcomes for the environment, rather than on bureaucracy.
Where needed, we will seek to streamline the system, for example in areas where there is duplication of other existing processes, thereby allowing resources to be better focused elsewhere. However, along with the commitment to non-regression, we have also included significant duties to consult with the public and relevant stakeholders. We are also giving Parliament the opportunity to scrutinise subsequent regulations through the affirmative procedure, which is entirely appropriate. In the light of those reassurances on our commitment to maintaining environmental protections, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will withdraw amendment 176.
Amendment 177 provides that EOR regulations must not be inconsistent with any international obligations, rather than specifying consistency with international obligations relating to environmental assessment. The inclusion of clause 120(2) demonstrates the Government’s commitment to legislating in a manner that is consistent with our international obligations. The clause seeks to provide explicit assurance of the importance of international obligations in respect of environmental assessments, and those commitments will be at the foundation of the new process of environmental outcomes reports, which builds on the core principles at the heart of the current practice.
Ultimately, the focus of EORs is the assessment of the environmental impact of relevant plans and relevant consents, which is why clause 120 refers to our international obligations relating to the assessment of the environmental impact of relevant plans and relevant consents. That ensures that relevant international obligations, such as those under the Espoo and Aarhus conventions, are properly reflected. To make the provision broader would sacrifice clarity and risk introducing confusion as to which areas of international law are particularly relevant and pertinent in such cases. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will also consider withdrawing amendment 177.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome the Minister’s clarification. Particularly on amendment 176, it is extremely useful to hear that the wording was chosen specifically to mirror that in the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement. I do not want to digress into that agreement in any way—no one on the Committee would thank me for doing so—but it is a useful clarification.
I take what the Minister said about amendment 177; I do not intend to press it to a vote. However, we strongly feel that, international obligations aside, when it comes to safeguards the Bill still contains too many loopholes, many of which I mentioned when I was speaking to the amendment. In particular, what concerns us about the non-regression provision in clause 120 is the reference to only
“providing an overall level of environmental protection”.
We are extremely concerned that that might mean that environmental harm could take place at a local level because the Government could say, “Overall, we are satisfied that the level of protection has been maintained.” For that reason, and to make very clear how strongly we feel about the point, I am minded to push amendment 176 to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Paul Scully
As I have said, we are committed to ensuring that the new system of environmental assessment will provide at least the same level of overall environmental protection as the existing system. The clause enshrines that commitment, building on the landmark Environment Act 2021, and is in line with our commitments in the EU-UK trade and co-operation agreement.
It is a vital commitment, and it will ensure that EORs support the Government’s objective to be the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than we found it. We want to make it clear that, in introducing these reports, we are not trying to lower standards or bypass important environmental protections, and so it is important that we enshrine in legislation this commitment to non-regression.
We have also ensured that the Secretary of State’s powers are tightly constrained when considering whether overall levels of protection have been maintained. We have provided significant commitments to consultation and secondary regulations, which will be laid under the affirmative procedure and will thereby enable parliamentary scrutiny on this issue.
This clause also sets out that regulations made may not be inconsistent with the implementation of the relevant international obligations of the UK. As in other parts of the planning system, public engagement is a crucial feature of environmental assessment, and the clause sets out our commitment to maintaining opportunities for public engagement to take place. This will ensure that the public can be involved in the process of preparing an environmental outcomes report, in line with the requirements of the Aarhus convention, which includes provision on public participation in decision making on environmental matters. The clause provides a strong commitment to non-regression and to maintaining opportunities for public engagement, as we move to that new system, and so I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 120 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 121
Requirements to consult devolved administrations
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 178, in clause 121, page 138, line 3, leave out “after consulting” and insert “with the consent of”.
This amendment, along with Amendments 179 and 180, would ensure that EOR regulations which contain provision within devolved competence can only be made with the consent of the relevant devolved administration.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 179, in clause 121, page 138, line 16, leave out “after consulting” and insert “with the consent of”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 178.
Amendment 180, in clause 121, page 138, line 34, leave out “after consulting” and insert “with the consent of”.
See explanatory statement to Amendment 178.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 121 specifies that, where EOR regulations contain provisions within devolved competence, the Secretary of State must consult the relevant devolved Ministers. Our concern is that this is an unduly weak requirement that could see EORs imposed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland without the consent of their respective devolved Administrations. Because the requirement is only to consult with the relevant devolved Ministers about EOR regulations containing provision within devolved competence, we could see EORs imposed without consent. We fear this could lead, advertently or inadvertently, to environmental regression if an EOR specified weaker outcomes than that sought by the relevant devolved Administration.
These three amendments simply seek to ensure that the consent of the relevant devolved Minister is obtained when EOR regulations contain provision within devolved competence to safeguard against that particular scenario. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to them and the concerns they are designed to address.
Paul Scully
It is a delight to hear the one-man show. In bringing forward the EOR system, we are absolutely committed to respecting the devolution settlements. We are currently in active discussions with the devolved Administrations as to how the powers should operate across the UK, including whether there is any scope to extend them to provide a shared framework of powers across the UK.
The provisions in the Bill are focused on the environmental assessment regimes in areas reserved to the UK Government, but there are limited circumstances in which the UK Government have historically legislated in areas of devolved competence, such as between the inshore and offshore regimes for marine works. As such, to maintain the current position, the clauses as introduced include a limited power for the UK Government to legislate in areas of devolved competence where the relevant devolved Administration has been consulted. A failure to include that power risks introducing a legislative gap that could undermine the delivery of certain types of development, which is clearly not something we want to happen.
When the discussions with the devolved Administrations have concluded, the Government will bring forward any necessary amendments to implement what is agreed with them. Rather than doing that here and now in Westminster, we want to do it in full consultation with the devolved Administrations: we want them to be absolutely at the heart of those discussions. I hope that on the basis of that explanation, the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I accept those assurances, and on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
I will be brief, because I think my previous remarks addressed the point about transposition of the EU directive leading to the creation of a range of environmental assessment regimes that have different territorial extents and applications. As I have already explained, discussions are ongoing with the devolved Governments regarding how best to work together to ensure a consistent and coherent approach to environmental assessment across the UK. We are hopeful that we can work closely with devolved Governments to extend the powers in the Bill to place all the nations on an even footing. For those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 121 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 122
Exemptions for national defence and civil emergency etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
In some rare cases, particularly those relating to national defence or responding to a civil emergency, it may be necessary for the Secretary of State to direct a project to progress without an environmental outcomes report when the production of one would usually be required. The provisions in clause 122 enable that. The clause does not aim to bypass environmental protections, which are important for all the reasons I have set out; it simply accounts for those rare instances in which there is an urgent need to progress with development. Clause 122 replicates a similar provision in the existing regulations, and would only be used in the most extreme circumstances.
In addition to the civil and defence needs, the clause also provides powers via regulations for the Secretary of State to be able to direct that no environmental outcomes report is required in other circumstances. Such directions will, of course, be presented in regulations subject to the affirmative procedure, and will be consulted on and constrained accordingly.
Rachael Maskell
I appreciate the Minister highlighting that there could be extenuating circumstances in which the measures could be suspended, but he has not set out what mitigations will be put in to address that, either in close proximity to that or elsewhere. Could he say a bit more about that?
Paul Scully
Good question! As well as the non-regression clause that I talked about earlier, we have a built-in power under these clauses that allows aspects of the regulation to apply even if a project can initially progress without an EOR. That is a good way to manage those high-risk needs with environmental protection and get that balance right. It allows a project to progress without a report, but still requires certain aspects of the regulations to be adhered to, such as monitoring and remediating effects once the plan or project is in operation. I again highlight the fact that that would only relate to the plans and projects in greatest need, relating to matters of national importance.
Paul Scully
Exactly. This is why you get paid the big bucks, Mr Hollobone. Thank you very much.
Matthew Pennycook
The Minister touched on a number of the issues that I wanted to raise. This is a series of important clauses and therefore I have a couple of questions for him. I hope that I can draw out a little more detail, but as ever, he is more than welcome to write to me if he requires to do so.
Clause 122(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may direct that no environmental outcomes report is required to be prepared in relation to a proposed relevant consent which is solely for the purposes of national defence or preventing or responding to civil emergency.”
Subsection (2) of that clause further states:
“EOR regulations may provide for further circumstances in which the Secretary of State is to be able to direct that no environmental outcomes report is required to be prepared.”
Can the Minister give the Committee some examples of the “further circumstances” in which no environmental outcomes report may be required as per subsection (2), given that civil emergencies and national defence, as he said, are already covered by subsection (1)?
Clause 123 is a new provision that sets out the enforcement provisions that can be made in respect of EORs. The Minister touched on a few, I believe, but I would be grateful if he could provide any further detail as to how enforcement of EORs will operate and how they will operate compared with the current SEA and EIA systems.
Clause 125(2) specifies that the Secretary of State, as the Minister has also said, may consult only
“such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”
before making certain EOR regulations, or issuing, modifying or withdrawing certain guidance. Can the Minister give us some idea of which persons or bodies the Secretary of State would be likely to approach before making or modifying regulations and guidance? Specifically when it comes to statutory consultees, which he spoke about, is there any rationale for not specifying statutory consultees in the Bill?
Paul Scully
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that contribution. On the formal consultation, I cannot yet give him details as to whom specifically we will speak to, barring the fact that, as I said earlier, we will clearly seek to speak to all the key stakeholders that we work with really closely. Indeed, we have worked with a number of those in the lead-up to the Bill. We want to ensure that we get the expert advice of people not only who can contribute to our knowledge, but who will be using the system, so that we can get the benefit of that on-the-ground experience, because what we do not want to have is unintended consequences.
On enforcement, the Bill amends and strengthens the powers and sanctions available to decision makers. We want to ensure that the new system is effective at delivering on the outcomes, so it will be necessary for the regime to have enforcement mechanisms. The exact details of the new system are in the process of being developed. We will be working with the same stakeholders on the design of the new system, in terms of enforcement as well as exemptions, and we want to ensure that we have a full consultation.
In addition to consultation, there will be parliamentary debate. I hope that reassures the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich that we are prepared to work collaboratively to ensure that this regime—the framework that we are talking about now—works well in practice, and that that coherent approach makes it easier to understand and enforce. Enforcement is no good if we just have a bit of prose that means nothing; we need to make sure we enforce that as well.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 122 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 123 to 126 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 127
Interaction with existing environmental assessment legislation and the
Habitats Regulations
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 181, in clause 127, page 141, line 32, leave out “in particular” and insert “not”.
This amendment would ensure that any specified environmental outcomes arising from EOR regulations made would augment not substitute those arising from existing environmental assessment legislation and the Habitats Regulations.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 182, in clause 127, page 142, leave out lines 12 and 13.
This amendment would ensure that EOR regulations cannot be used to amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 127 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations on how the EOR framework provided for by part 5 interacts with existing environmental assessment legislation and the habitats regulations. The explanatory notes accompanying the Bill state:
“This is necessary to ensure that where an Environmental Outcomes Report is prepared, where appropriate, this is capable of meeting the requirements of existing environmental assessment so as to avoid duplication.”
It would be recognised as meeting both.
Our serious concern is that by providing for requirements undertaken in relation to an EOR to satisfy the requirements under the habitats regulations, this clause could allow the Secretary of State to substitute the protections afforded by those regulations with weaker requirements that had undergone only limited parliamentary scrutiny under the affirmative procedure. In our view, this is deeply problematic because the habitats regulations provide for an extremely high level of environmental protection for our most precious and vulnerable habitats and species, indeed for greater protection than the SEA and EIA systems, requiring as they do applications proposing a development that will affect a site to first prove that mitigation is in place to avoid significant harm, or that there is an overriding public interest reason to proceed and compensatory measures are necessary. In revising subsection (2) of the clause, amendment 181 would address that concern by ensuring that any specified environmental outcomes arising from EOR regulations made would augment, not substitute, those arising from existing environmental assessment legislation and the habitats regulations.
An additional concern with this clause comes in the form of subsection (3), on page 142 of the Bill, which provides for EOR regulations under the clause to
“amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation”.
Even with the list of what constitutes “existing environmental assessment legislation” set out on the face of the Bill in clause 130(1), we believe this provision is unnecessarily broad. Amendment 182 therefore seeks to remove clause 127(3) to ensure that EOR regulations cannot be used to amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation.
It is essential, as the Minister himself accepted during debate about an earlier clause, that we recover nature and that we do so quickly, or we risk irreparable damage to the natural world upon which life depends. To that end, proven, effective laws should be maintained and strengthened rather than undermined in any way. For that reason, I hope the Minister will appreciate the concerns we raise and give both of these amendments serious consideration.
Paul Scully
Given the scale of the underpinning legislation, as we transition from the current complex system of environmental assessment to the new framework of EORs, the Government require powers to manage the interaction between the old and new systems.
The interaction provisions in clause 127 are designed to ensure that when an EOR is prepared, it is capable of meeting the requirements of existing environmental assessment legislation where appropriate. That allows the Government to guard against duplication while the various assessment regime owners bring forward regulations to introduce environmental outcomes for their regimes. It also allows existing environmental assessment legislation to meet the requirements of an EOR, which is to avoid duplication and manage co-ordination across the different assessment regimes. We all know that it takes time to consolidate the complex legislation covering a number of Departments and agencies, and we want to make sure there are no gaps in the process.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the Minister for that response. I note and accept what he said about amendment 182, although I will go back and satisfy myself that the concerns raised in that regard are fully addressed.
We continue to have concerns about the issues raised by amendment 181. I heard what the Minister said about the Government’s intention for these provisions to avoid duplications and enable co-ordination, but I remain concerned that, as drafted, they could lead to the powers substituting rather than augmenting the protections provided for by the habitats regulations, in particular. The Minister’s defence was that we are protected in that regard by the safeguards in clause 120, but he has heard our concerns about their robustness. Along with our concerns about clause 120, that is one of the fundamental weaknesses of part 5 that we would like to see addressed. For that reason, I will press amendment 181 to a Division. This will be the final one today.
Paul Scully
As we have already heard concerns about clause 127, let me use this opportunity to clarify its intention and to provide the reassurance that it is does not allow any amendments to the habitats regulations.
The clause serves two purposes. First, it enables us to make sure that assessments under the new EOR system will be interoperable with those required by existing environmental assessment and habitats legislation. Secondly, it gives the Government the power to repeal, revoke or amend the current SEA and EIA regulations in each of the relevant regimes once the new framework for an environmental outcomes report is in place.
The provision is about providing powers in relation to the interaction between the new system and existing environmental assessment legislation and the habitats regulations. It does not remove the need to comply with the habitats regulations. It is an ancillary power. Any regulations must relate to the purpose of the clause, which is about interaction between processes. Regulations can set out how an EOR report can meet the requirements of existing environmental assessment legislation or the habitats regulations, but only in so far as the processes interact.
There has been some misinterpretation, or a difference in opinion, about subsection (3), which allows regulations to
“amend, repeal or revoke existing environmental assessment legislation.”
The habitats regulations are specifically excluded from that power, meaning that it is not possible to make any changes to the habitats regulations under it. This is simply about streamlining within the constraints of the legislation. We want to avoid overlaps, such as, for example, repetitions in evidence, while optimising the synergies—for example, the effects identified in the habitats regulations assessment that could help to inform the contribution to outcomes in the EOR. This is about how the two are co-ordinated and how they work together. The clause must also accord with our commitments to non-regression under clause 120, so any interaction between assessments must maintain overall environmental protections.
In parallel, the Government have indicated our intention to improve the habitats regulations regime, while maintaining or enhancing the level of protection it provides. DEFRA has recently consulted on that via the consultation on the “Nature Recovery” Green Paper, which the Government will respond to in due course. There are real opportunities to improve processes across the piece, and the clause allows for that interaction between processes and for the benefits of efficiencies and streamlining. I hope the Committee is reassured on the purpose of the clause, which is heavily constrained and seeks no powers to make any changes to the habitats regulations. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 128
Consequential repeal of power to make provision for environmental
assessment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Paul Scully
Clause 128 is a straightforward provision to remove what will become an obsolete regulation-making power, along with references to that power, after the powers contained in the Bill come into effect. It was a broad power, allowing the Secretary of State to make regulations for consideration to be given to environmental effects. It will no longer be required, as the new powers will cover the consideration of the environmental effects of development. The provision simply aims to clear it from the statute book.
Clause 129 gives power to make regulations on a variety of procedural and technical matters relating to environmental outcomes reports. Those include, for example, setting out who should prepare reports, to whom completed reports should be given and how information should be collected and provided. It also makes provision for regulations to state the level of assistance required from local authorities in the production of those reports, when reports that fail to meet various requirements can be declined, and how appeals and reviews of decisions should work. The clause also makes provision for the collection of fees. We intend to keep fees to a minimum, but we will seek views from stakeholders in future consultations.
While those matters are generally procedural or technical in nature, they are all important and necessary for the successful implementation of environmental outcomes reports. Setting those out in regulations allows for those matters to be decided following consultation, and allows for flexibility in the system. That means that the specific technical ways that the system works can be more easily updated in the future, and it will allow the difference between regimes to be accommodated.
Finally, clause 30(1) is a straightforward provision that simply lists all the current regulations that implement the EIA and SEA regimes. As such, those are the regulations that the powers in this part will allow the Secretary of State to replace with EOR regulations. They implement the assessment regime in a similar way across a broad range of sectors, from transport to energy production to town and country planning. It is our intention that this remains the case for the regulations implementing the new system.
Subsection (2) is primarily a reference list, bringing together the various definitions used in this part. It also introduces some straightforward definitions such as “public authority” and “relevant document”.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 128 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 129 and 130 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gareth Johnson.)
National Security Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Thursday 8th September 2022
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 8 September 2022 - (8 Sep 2022)
The Minister for Security (Tom Tugendhat)
Let me briefly say that we all pray for Her Majesty; it is an extraordinary moment. God save the Queen.
Clause 53 sets out how certain part 2 notices are to be served. A part 2 notice, an extension notice, a revival notice or a notice of a variation of the measures without consent must be served in person to the individual in order to have effect, whereas other notices may be served through the individual’s solicitor.
Schedule 5 contains a supporting power for the police to enter and search premises to find an individual for the purpose of serving a notice on them. This is so that the individual is informed in person and the implications of the notice can be explained to them.
Clause 53 also provides that when a subject is served the relevant notice they must be provided with a confirmation notice that sets out the period for which that notice will remain in force. This will give the individual certainty regarding the period of time for which the measures apply to them.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
Clause 53 states that a confirmation notice must be served on an individual who is served with a state threats prevention and investigation measure, or a revival notice or extension notice, setting out the period, including dates, for which the individual will be subject to the STPIM, unless it is quashed or revoked before its expiry.
We recognise the need for the clause, and it is right that there is a great deal of emphasis on serving the notice to an individual personally. There is, however, a distinct lack of detail in the Bill about who can serve a notice. Counter-terrorism police have again been very helpful in taking me through how such work might be undertaken operationally, but I put it to the Minister that it is not clear in the legislation that it would need to be a constable of a certain rank, or that it would need to be a constable. Other areas of the Bill do specify that.
It is not just a case of serving the notice: it is also the point at which a person is informed of the terms of the part 2 notice notice and presumably relocated and monitored to ensure their compliance with it. I wish to probe whether the provisions in clause 53 would benefit from being ever so slightly tightened up in that specific regard.
Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)
The Minister has laid out clearly what clause 53 does. It sets out the requirements for notices to be served and for how long they are in force, and it makes it clear that the individual is not bound unless they have been personally served the notice. I have one question: although the list of different sorts of notices is very clear in the legislation, are individuals to be told in the documents with which they are served of their rights to challenge, seek a revocation or seek a variation of the notice served upon them?
Tom Tugendhat
I hope the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me, but I will have to write to him on that question. As for the question about the rank of the officer, a constable or any warranted officer is the answer.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 54
Contracts
Holly Lynch
I beg to move amendment 67, in clause 54, page 38, line 29, at end insert—
“(2) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must publish a statement setting out how the Secretary of State intends to exercise the power under this section. The statement must include an list of illustrative examples of the kinds of contracts or other arrangements this power relates to.”
Holly Lynch
Clause 54 makes me uncomfortable and requires some thorough consideration. Amendment 67 seeks to flesh out some of the detail as to what the clause means in reality.
The explanatory notes say:
“This clause grants the Secretary of State authority to purchase services in relation to any form of monitoring in connection with measures specified in Part 2 notices. This would include, for example, electronic monitoring of compliance with the residence requirement provided for in Schedule 4.”
Frankly, the Government have a somewhat chequered history in awarding contracts, and while I will not go through the back catalogue, it is against that backdrop that we ask for more detail before we sign off on this clause. Section 29 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 includes the same provision, so I hope that the Minister is in a position to share with us how private companies have been involved in the monitoring of those subject to TPIMs, so that we can gain a clearer understanding of how that would be replicated with STPIMs.
I am looking for reassurance on two fronts. The first is that we are not using contractors who are vulnerable to hacking or other forms of cyber-attack. There will be marked differences between the cohort of people currently subject to a form of monitoring—and even those subject to TPIMs—compared with STPIMs, which stand to present different challenges, so what tech will be used for monitoring someone subject to a part 2 notice, and how do we ensure that we, but no one else, knows where that individual is? I am assuming, based on what little we are asked to go on in the clause and explanatory notes, that we could be talking about wearable technology or monitoring hardware and software. I suspect that at least some component parts will be made overseas, if not all of them.
We sought to establish where the ankle monitors that are currently used come from. With some help from the House of Commons Library, we found that in November 2017 the Ministry of Justice awarded a contract for the supply of electronic monitoring services, which includes software and hardware, to G4S, and it appears to have been extended, but we could not establish where they were purchased from or just how robust they are. How do the Government plan to address that concern operationally and ensure that there are no holes to be exploited in the technology itself? How do we write those protections and technical specifications into contracts under clause 54?
Secondly, we are dealing with particularly capable people, potentially with the support of entire nation states. I want to know that our security services and trained police officers are undertaking this monitoring work, rather than private contractors who stand to be overwhelmed if not equipped and trained adequately. I had a look at what happens currently. The National Audit Office’s recent report published in June 2022, called “Electronic monitoring: a progress update”, states on page 22 that G4S supplies tags and home monitoring equipment as part of HM Prison and Probation Service’s tower delivery model for its tagging transformation programme.
HMPPS is an agency of the Ministry of Justice and is responsible for tagging. The report explains that the tower contracting approach has four different suppliers, each responsible for a different element of the national programme: supplying and fitting tags to offenders; running a monitoring centre; providing underlying mapping data; and providing the communications network. HMPPS acts as an integrator to co-ordinate work across the four suppliers. Can the Minister confirm that that is the same model, which has a number of private contracts and moving parts, presumably with the exchange of a lot of information between those moving parts, that we use for monitoring those subject to TPIMs, and that it is therefore the same way in which we will monitor people subject to STPIMs?
I would greatly appreciate some clarification from the Minister on that, to ensure that our national security cannot be outsourced and that we have specialist and trained people from our dedicated services undertaking this really important monitoring, using technology that can withstand the threat of outside interference. Given the situation in which we find ourselves, I urge the Minister to consider the merits of amendment 67.
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 54 grants the Secretary of State authority to use third parties to assist in relation to any form of monitoring in connection with the measures specified in part 2 notices. As the hon. Member for Halifax rightly identified, the electronic monitoring of compliance with the residence measure, such as by entering into a contract with a third party to provide tagging services, is exactly the form of contract that is envisioned. In practice, the Government will ensure efficiency by aligning, where possible, with existing contracts, and therefore may use ones that are already set up for comparable provisions in law, such as TPIMs.
The intention of the amendment is to seek clarity about what types of contracts the Home Secretary might enter into in relation to STPIMs and how she intends to exercise the power. Though the Government do not feel that publishing further detail on any such contract is necessary, I absolutely assure the Committee that the clause is not designed to do anything to outsource intelligence services. Instead, it is a standard approach that we have with TPIMs, where in some instances it is necessary for the Government to outsource some services. An example of such is the contract for ankle monitoring services to which the hon. Lady referred. She will be aware of my own views on outsourcing technology to various states; she can be absolutely assured of my own interest in making sure I prosecute this.
Stewart Hosie
I understand perfectly well what the Minister is saying about the occasional need to outsource. I also understand why he would say that much of the contractual information should not be released. However, there are valid questions about the clause. What information would a third-party contracting company have about the subject? For example, would that company be told that the subject may not even have been convicted of committing a crime, but was the recipient of a state threats prevention and investigation measures order?
Tom Tugendhat
As the right hon. Member will be aware, in all such circumstances there will be a great variety, because what might be shared with somebody providing one service may not be the same as what is shared with another. It is also evident that the normal regulation on protecting privacy would apply where appropriate, and the Government would therefore abide with all due legal requirements. I cannot give a further commitment than that, for the obvious reason that the variety in which such contracting would apply is enormous. I can therefore only assure him that the existing previsions would endure.
Holly Lynch
I have listened carefully to what the Minister has said. He talked about the convenience of extending existing contracts; however, given the cohort of those who will be subject to STPIMs, that is the exact point that concerns me. We are talking about a volume of those who have committed more typical types of crime, but we need to think much more carefully about the types of technology, the software and the individuals involved in monitoring those subject to STPIMs.
Given the Minister’s reputation and understanding of the detail, and as he has already given me those assurances, I am willing to give him the benefit of the doubt that he will go back to officials and interrogate clause 54, so that he and I are satisfied that there are no vulnerabilities in that approach. I hope we can continue that conversation with the Minister. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Legal aid in relation to Part 2 notices
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
I thank the hon. Member for Halifax; she can be assured that my commitment to protecting our security through electronic means, as through every other means, will endure.
Clause 55 will extend the scope of legal aid so that it will be available for state threats prevention and investigation measures. It will allow individuals to access legally aided advice and representation in relation to a part 2 notice, subject to means and merits tests. That replicates the position in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
The measures are a civil order designed to protect and mitigate the risk to the public from individuals who pose a threat but cannot be prosecuted or, in the case of foreign nationals, deported. Legal aid will be made available in those cases due to the restrictive nature of the measures that an individual may be subject to. It is right that we balance robust investigation and prevention measures with the access to justice and judicial oversight that this House would demand.
Holly Lynch
As we have already heard, clause 55 inserts a new paragraph in schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2021, to enable individuals subject to part 2 notices to receive civil legal services in relation to those notices.
The Chair
Order. Will the shadow Minister speak up, for the benefit of colleagues at the back?
Holly Lynch
Thank you for that helpful observation, Chair; I will certainly will.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley will discuss part 3 of the Bill shortly. However, clause 55, which is in part 2, and clauses 62, 63 and 64, which are in part 3, pull in completely opposite directions in principle. Dare I say that it is almost as if they were produced by two different Government Departments that have not been speaking to each other?
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
My hon. Friend is making an important point. Does she agree that the reasoning appears to be that this is such an intrusive and important provision, affecting people’s rights in such a potentially serious manner, that legal aid, subject to merit and means, ought to be available? Would that not also be an argument for getting rid of the whole of part 3 of the Bill?
Holly Lynch
My hon. Friend makes a really powerful point: there are very different principles evident in this element of part 2 compared to those in part 3. We will get into the details of part 3 shortly, but my hon. Friend is exactly right. Part 3 prevents civil legal aid from being available even to British children with any spent terror convictions, yet we are providing legal aid to those who we suspect of engaging in espionage on behalf of hostile foreign states. There is absolutely a powerful case for that, but my hon. Friend is right that that powerful case extends beyond the provisions in part 2 and should also be considered in relation to part 3.
There is a distinct lack of rationale and consistency in the proposals. When we continue into the debate on part 3, I would be grateful if the Minister could provide us with a greater understanding of why those differences occur in the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
I will restrict myself to discussing clause 55 now rather than considering part 3, because clause 55 covers a particular use of legal aid, which is the use of legal aid in relation to the subject who may be under an STPIM notice. It is therefore a very particular application of legal aid. The question to which the hon. Lady refers, which I understand, is one that, as she knows, we have already discussed, and I look forward to having further discussions with her on it because it does raise questions.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56
Interpretation etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 56 gives the meaning of numerous terms used throughout this part of the Bill. Subsection (2) sets out that the Secretary of State can consider evidence that was relied upon for the original part 2 notice when assessing whether to continue with measures or to impose new measures on a subject. This will be alongside evidence of engagement in
“new foreign power threat activity”,
where relevant for a new notice. This ensures that the Secretary of State is able to consider all the relevant information that may imply a pattern of behaviour. It does not weaken what we discussed when we considered clause 33: evidence of
“new foreign power threat activity”
is required if a further part 2 notice is to be applied after five years.
Subsection (3) provides that
“if a Part 2 notice is revived under section 42(6)”
when considering whether there is
“new foreign power threat activity”,
which could allow for a new STPIM after five years, that new activity must take place at some point after the original imposition of the measures and not necessarily after the revival.
Stewart Hosie
I want to raise one issue in relation to clause 56(5), which relates to a provision in cases in which the Secretary of State does not bother to respond to an application to vary or revoke a part 2 notice. That is treated as a decision not to vary, but from when? Given the importance of the tight timescales within which to lodge appeals, in respect of a decision not to vary when the Secretary of State chooses not to respond, does the clock start ticking when the application is sent to the Secretary of State, when it is received at the ministerial office or when the Secretary of State takes a decision not to respond? When does the clock start ticking to allow subsequent action in the courts to be taken if the Secretary of State simply chooses not to respond and that is taken to mean a thing?
Tom Tugendhat
The clock does not start ticking until the notice is enforced. At that point, the timing begins.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 57
National security proceedings
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 59, in clause 58, page 42, line 2, at end insert—
“(2A) If the court concludes following its consideration under subsection (2) that the claimant has not committed wrongdoing involving—
(a) the commission of a terrorism offence, or
(b) other involvement in terrorism-related activity,
subsection (3) does not apply.”
Clauses 58 to 60 stand part.
Tom Tugendhat
Under the Bill, courts can formally be required to consider whether to reduce or withhold damages awarded when they find for the claimant in a national security claim where the claimant’s own wrongdoing of a terrorist nature should be taken into account. I will set out the detail of the reforms when I speak to clauses 58 and 59.
On clause 57, it is important to set out the types of cases in which the powers that would be exercised in clauses 58 and 59 would apply, and those in which they would be excluded from applying. The clause establishes that the reforms to reduce damages would apply only in cases that relate to national security proceedings. Those are cases in which one of the parties in the proceedings has presented evidence or made submissions to the court on a matter of national security. That particularly applies to specified types of claims—for example, those involving the use of investigative powers or surveillance, or the activities of the UK’s intelligence services, and cases relating to terrorism-related activity in the UK or overseas. However, the legislation excludes claims brought under the Human Rights Act 1998. The clause specifies that the reforms apply only to claims that are brought against the Crown, which reflects the fact that this cohort of cases is aimed at actions brought against our national security services.
Clause 58 details the measures under which courts can be formally required to consider whether to reduce or withhold damages awarded when the court finds for the claimant in a national security claim, but the claimant’s wrongdoing of a terrorist nature should be taken into account. This measure is aimed at those cases where a claimant, often based overseas, makes a claim against UK security services that is based on, or related to, the claimant’s own involvement in terrorist activity. Although courts already have discretion over the amount of damages to award, they can in theory make a declaration on a finding of fact outcome with no award. In civil tort cases, however, this approach is very rarely taken. In such cases, the courts follow a regular pattern by seeking to establish liability, calculate compensation and award damages. The Bill would go further by requiring courts to consider reducing or removing damages in exceptional cases. These are cases involving matters of national security in which the claimant’s case relates to their involvement in terrorism—for example, to personal injury sustained in the course of such activities—where a claim is then made against UK security services.
It is important to note that the Bill does not fetter the court’s discretion; judges will still be able to determine cases fairly, independently and objectively. However, we think it is appropriate in these cases that they consider the claimant’s conduct as well as the state’s. Here, as in the companion measures on damages freezing and forfeiture, the Government have an overriding duty of public protection and the safety of society. The measures will reduce the prospect of large sums in damages being paid to people associated with terrorism, who may use those resources to fund acts of terror.
In addressing amendment 59, I have spoken about the duty imposed on the court to consider, in the circumstances of the case and on the evidence presented, whether it would be appropriate for the claimant’s damages award to be reduced, including to nil. The key word there is “consider”. The legislation is not fettering the court’s discretion. Judges will assess whether, on the balance of probabilities, the factors set out in subsection (2) are made out, and if they are, whether a reduction in damages is appropriate. If the court is satisfied, it will assess what an appropriate reduction in damages should be. In making that assessment, the court will receive submissions from both the security services and claimant, and there will be a right of appeal. The proceedings will be able to rely on the closed material procedures where necessary, to ensure that there is a fair trial and that the evidence is tested. It is also important to note that the claimant will have a right of appeal against the decision of the court.
Amendment 59, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, seeks to make it explicit in the Bill that the court will not be required to consider reducing damages when the claimant has not been involved in the commission of terrorist offences or other terrorist-related activity. The Government’s intention is not for this reform to apply in national security cases where a claimant had no involvement in wrongdoing of a terrorist nature; nor is it contemplated that the security services would make an application for this duty to be exercised by the court in such cases. The Government will seek to introduce an amendment to clarify this point in the Bill once consultations with parliamentary counsel have concluded. In such case, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment, and I will be happy to discuss the issue with her in advance of the Government tabling its proposed amendment.
Clause 59 provides some supplemental procedural requirements, including safeguards, for the Crown’s application for the court to exercise its duty under clause 58. As I have outlined, the measure is aimed at those cases where a claimant, often based overseas, makes a claim against the UK security services that is related to that claimant’s involvement in terrorist activity. Clause 59 supports and supplements clause 58 by setting out the essential requirements of an application made under that clause. The procedural and evidential requirements are set out, as well as the grounds on which the court may refuse an application. We are confident that our measures provide a reasonable, proper and proportionate balance between the right to access justice, and the need to protect national security and to properly deploy the resources devoted to it. The reforms will have a deterrent effect on litigation, so that the UK is no longer seen as such a soft touch for litigation of this nature.
Finally, clause 60 is designed to ensure that interpretation of the legislation by the courts and others will be consistent with terms defined and understood in existing statutes that concern national security, and in measures to combat terrorism. As such, the clause defines relevant terms used in the Bill, such as “terrorism offence” and “intelligence service”. That ensures that there is no inconsistency or ambiguity in the wider legal framework, and that the Bill complements existing legislation. The clause clarifies the relatively narrow cohort of cases at which these reforms are aimed, which are those brought against the Crown on matters of national security, in which a claimant has had some involvement with terrorist activities or offences.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I have heard what the Minister said. The Committee is finding common cause on these matters, as we do on much of the Bill. This is in no way a criticism of him, his speech or what he is offering, but it is a shame that there has been no Justice Ministers on this Bill. Frankly, part 3 of the Bill is far more concerned with justice measures than it is with home affairs in the classic sense. I have felt for some of the many Home Office Ministers who have been in front of us during this Committee in the role of Security Minister; they have had to justify things that did not relate to their Department.
My problem with part 3 more generally—then I will come on to my amendment—and this was clear from the evidence sessions, some four Ministers ago, concerns the nature of deterrents. As we go through the Bill and look over each acronym—we have all learned them like a second language by now—we are seeking to protect and secure our nation. Nobody in this room has any greater claim to do that than anybody else. That is all we seek to do. The trouble with much of part 3—evidence on this has been presented to us—is that it potentially reverses that. Parts of it are of concern for the prevention of terrorism. That is a fundamental line that needs to be drawn. Labour certainly wishes the Government, with their new slew of Ministers, to go back and investigate whether prevention is at the very heart of what is being suggested in part 3 more generally.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
My hon. Friend makes a good point. Sadly, over the past 12 years, legal aid has been cut back in this country. It is now a tax on the innocent, in my view. Would she agree that, while people find legal aid for potential terrorists abhorrent, there is a long list of other people that the public might want to withdraw legal aid from? That could include rapists, paedophiles, murderers—you name it. The core point is that those individuals need to go before a court. That is not just for those individuals, but for the potential victims, so that we can ensure that the truth comes out and justice is served.
Jess Phillips
I agree 100%. For much of my career, I have been painted as being very one-sided on such matters, but I know that justice has been properly served to the victims I have worked with in my life by a justice system that is properly resourced.
I have seen the degradation of legal aid harm victims’ processes in court. It holds things up and, in lots of cases—certainly in the civil courts, which is what part 3 is largely about—it has caused a perverse situation whereby perpetrators are able to cross-examine victims, as neither has access to any advocacy because neither qualified for legal aid. There is therefore the perverse situation that victims of domestic abuse or rape can, in family court, be cross-examined by their rapist. There is potential for that same unintended consequence as a result of what is being proposed in the Bill. I say that it is an unintended consequence; I think that the will to do what has been put in the Bill comes from a decent, if somewhat misguided, place.
Mr Jones
I am not sure that I agree with my hon. Friend. The problem with the Bill, as she suggests, is that we have a Home Office Minister, and an MOJ shadow operation in the back. The lifting of that shadow, via the dismissal of the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), might help the process and ensure that we get a Bill that is at least functional and does everything we want it to do.
Jess Phillips
Throughout this Committee, a lot of people have been called on to comment on what is going on internally on the Government Benches. I may be less qualified than others, but I suspect that what my right hon. Friend says about the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton may well be true. I wish him the best of luck on the Back Benches.
I will move on to the amendment. I have heard what the Minister has graciously said about the Bill not intending to come in the way of people who are caught up in acts of terrorism. However, its drafting leaves that open. I also hear what he says about proposing further amendments in this space.
Amendment 59 seeks to protect innocent bystanders, or even victims of crime, from being excluded from seeking damages for harm caused by the state. The Bill provides for a duty on the court, in cases where evidence is related to the intelligence services, to consider reducing damages that could be paid in a claim against the state. Potentially, the whole amount can be denied. While we of course support the concept that public money via damages should not be used to fund terrorism, the drafting of the clause is incredibly broad. The potential consequences of such loose and opaque language are disturbing and must be taken seriously if we are not to undermine the values we seek to uphold with this legislation.
I will demonstrate the issues—as I am sure nobody here will be surprised to hear this—through a gendered lens. In the discourse on security and terrorism, we commonly forget about women. In the assessment, analysis and debate, the impact and experiences of women do not often play a central role. I will use the platform I have to unpack the issues through consideration of how they will affect a victim of gendered violence.
Earlier this year, a case hit the headlines. The BBC claimed that an MI5 informant—I shall call him X—used his status to abuse his partner. I will share just a few of the details from the investigation. Beth—not her real name—a British national, met the MI5 informant online. As time passed, she became aware that he collected weapons, and he made her watch terrorist videos of violence. She realised he was a misogynist and extremist. Beth claimed he sexually assaulted her, was abusive and coercive, and used his position in the British security forces to terrorise her. She said:
“He had complete control. I was a shadow of who I am now,”
and:
“There was so much psychological terror from him to me, that ultimately culminated in me having a breakdown, because I was so afraid of everything—because of how he’d made me think, the people that he was involved with, and the people who he worked for.”
Beth says X told her he worked as a covert human intelligence source, infiltrating extremist networks. Beth claimed he told her that his status meant she could not report his behaviour:
“It meant that I couldn’t speak out about any of his behaviour towards me, any of the violence I went through, sexual or physical, because he had men in high places who always had his back, who would intervene and who would actively kill me, if I spoke out”.
In a video filmed on Beth’s phone, X threatens to kill her, and attacks her with a machete. She is screaming as the video cuts out. A few hours later, Beth says he tried to cut her throat. X was arrested and charged, but the case was dropped, and the BBC claims its investigation uncovered serious issues with the police response to this incident. That is an entirely different speech for an entirely different day. Heartbreakingly, Beth had a mental breakdown and was hospitalised.
Another previous partner—we will call her Ruth—says that X also abused and terrorised her. He threatened her life and that of her child:
“He said he would be able to kill me and my daughter, too, and then put our bodies somewhere and no one would ever know who I am.”
Ruth was unable to speak due to trauma and was also admitted to hospital. She said:
“I was psychologically broken, really broken”.
There are many issues to discuss around this case, regarding how the state and intelligence services should balance the need to safeguard individuals and the need for informants who infiltrate the darkest circles of society. What I want to outline, however, is the horrendous, hellish experience of those two women at the hands of this man X: the trauma, the violence, the abuse, the isolation, and how the man exploited his position to terrorise those women, who had done nothing wrong. Under the clause, if those women had sought damages for harm caused by the state, those damages could have been limited, or reduced to zero.
Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
Does the hon. Lady agree that it is not the state doing harm, but the individual?
Jess Phillips
There is almost certainly always going to be an ideological difference between the hon. Lady and me on personal responsibility and the responsibility of the state. It is of course the individual doing harm, but it is the state that intervenes to protect the parties, or the state that allows cases to be closed. The idea that the state does not have a responsibility for the human rights of a victim of crime such as this when it comes to how they are treated when they try to interact with the state is, I am afraid, for the birds. Almost every single rape victim I have ever met—I have met thousands—tells me that the initial trauma they were put through is almost nothing compared with the trauma of going through any particular state system.
The provisions of the clause, as it stands, mean that if the women had sought damages for harm, those damages would be limited, potentially, to zero. These are completely innocent bystanders, victims of crimes in which the intelligence services and their power were weaponised to abuse and control them. These women could be denied redress even if wrongdoing by the state was proven. This case, where a man was videoed attacking a woman with a machete, was then closed. Even if it were found and proven that the state was responsible, the woman would still not have a claim. The current drafting does not require that the matter over which damages are sought is directly related to terrorist activity.
I have used this case—a covert human intelligence source case—as an example, but the concerns apply to many other situations and many people whose actions will have had nothing to do with criminal activity. That cannot be right. The provisions are simply too broadly drawn.
The amendment would mean that the limitations to seeking damages apply only to those who have committed wrongdoing involving terrorism. I have made my feelings clear about part 3 of the Bill, but this is simply an amendment to make sure that innocent people definitely do not fall within the scope of the provisions when they are caught up in a terrible situation, which I am very glad the Minister has recognised. The Bill must include this constraint.
There are other broad, loose elements in the Bill that are concerning. I raise them now and urge clarification from the Minister. Seeking damages is a tool to hold the state accountable. The clauses apply only when courts have already found the UK Government liable for wrongdoing. How are the Government going to ensure the provisions in these clauses are not used to allow the Government to evade being held accountable for their actions?
The current drafting seems to suggest that, if there is any evidence related to national security or the intelligence services, the damages for harm could be reduced or erased. The Law Commission has highlighted that that could create a perverse situation where the state could introduce pointless or insignificant national security evidence in order to avoid paying damages under the provisions in the Bill. How will the Government safeguard against that situation? It is a perfectly reasonable to want to have safeguards against that situation in place.
Reprieve has argued that clauses 57 to 60 could limit the ability of victims of torture to seek legal redress for harm done. The state could claim, for example, that in becoming complicit in torture or abuse, the UK was seeking to prevent or limit some other risk of harm, and so reduce or erase damages for a claimant.
Clause 57 rightly excludes from the definition of “national security proceedings” any claims under the Human Rights Act 1998. Our concern is the breadth of the clauses. They potentially enable the state to avoid paying out for UK complicity in torture and abuse under UK civil law. Most survivors of torture seek redress through ordinary civil claims. I will not go into details because it is sub judice, but the case of Jagtar Singh Johal, which was debated in the House yesterday, springs to mind.
We seek reassurance that the clauses will not be used to evade accountability and redress for complicity in abuse. Furthermore, the involvement of the intelligence services in other countries is covered by the Bill, but how do the Government intend to ensure that conduct is legal and ethical under UK law? What safeguards exist around that?
Many concerns and questions remain about the drafting of this part of the Bill, and we urge that our amendment be included in it. We will seek to vote on this issue at the next Commons stage of the Bill’s passage should we not be satisfied, but I have heard the Minister’s words and I thank him.
Maria Eagle
I endorse what my hon. Friend has just said from the Front Bench regarding the breadth of some of these provisions, but before the Minister replies I want to put another point to him. There is going to be a question about the necessity of the provisions, and whether or not they give a court any real, additional power beyond what it already inherently has.
There is a general requirement that judges would apply in any case to those coming before the court and seeking redress, which is that they have to come with clean hands. If any court has a case before it where some ne’er do well is trying to take advantage of court proceedings to get damages for something that they then intend to use for nefarious purposes, it is perfectly normal for that court, under its inherent jurisdiction and the rules of equity, to take into account, when deciding damages, whether or not the applicant has come to the court with clean hands.
Mr Jones
Does my hon. Friend agree that what tends to get the headlines in newspapers is when people bring claims in these kinds of cases? Some of the cases seem quite horrific and brazen, but what never gets reported is that they are usually thrown out, because, as my hon. Friend has outlined, the courts already have powers to do so. The fact that someone has the ability to bring a case does not necessarily mean that it is going to be successful.
Maria Eagle
Indeed. Certainly, my experience of the courts is that judges are not daft: if they have somebody arguing a case before them and seeking damages who has been a very badly behaved individual, that person is less likely to get damages in the first place, and to the extent that they get any damages, they are likely to be exceedingly small—probably not enough to cover the costs they have incurred in bringing the case. Where those cases have been legally aided, zero damages would certainly be an option in most of them.
As such, I wonder whether any of these provisions are actually necessary. They are setting out requirements for judges, telling them what they must do in all cases and creating extra procedures, but they do not go an awful lot further than the inherent jurisdiction of the court under the general rules of equity. As I say, judges are not daft: they know what their powers are, and they tend to apply them.
My other concern regarding these provisions is that, if they stay in the Bill and ossify into court procedures that have to be undertaken in each case, there will be a slippery slope. This legislation addresses instances where especially badly behaved people are coming before a court, seeking damages that they intend to use for nefarious purposes. In this particular case, it is terrorism-related offences, but what about gangsters? What about murderers? We can all think of other dodgy characters who could go to court without clean hands, seeking damages to further their nefarious behaviours.
Once all these procedures are set in aspic, in statute, it is very easy for draftsmen—well, I am not having a go at parliamentary draftsmen, who work very hard. It is easy for the next outraged junior Minister, clearly not from the Home Office but from some other Department, to say at some point in the next couple of years, “We will use those provisions that were in the National Security Bill.” We may see a slippery slope, where these provisions are extended to other nefarious characters who might decide to go before the courts seeking damages. All the while, judges have an inherent jurisdiction and can make their own decisions. I am really not sure that the measures are at all necessary, and while the Minister is looking at some of these things, I invite him to think about removing them entirely. In any event, even if he decides that these unnecessary measures will remain in the Bill, they are certainly too broad.
Mr Jones
There is lots in the Bill on which there is cross-party agreement. We want to achieve a situation whereby law enforcement, our agencies and others have maximum powers to stop the real threat out there from those who wish to do us harm. Clause 57, and the ones on legal aid, which we will come to next, seem to have been plonked into the Bill as headline-grabbing measures—“We will do this because it will look as though we’re tough on terrorists.” I do not think they add anything to the ability of our security services to do their work; nor do they ensure that our courts deal with such cases effectively, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood has outlined.
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley mentioned a case. I will not refer to it in detail—my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood and I are members of the ISC, which has looked at it in detail—but it comes back to the checks and balances point that I made this morning, and not just in terms of security. When the state does something that leads to a wrong being committed against a citizen, there needs to be a redress mechanism, and I share the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood that the provision will be extended to other areas. The measures will get a nice headline for the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton, who clearly wants to be seen as tough on terrorism, but I am not sure that, in practice, they represent anything of the sort.
Increasingly—and this is a slippery slope of which politicians need to be wary— we in this country react to newspaper headlines about what the courts do, such as “They have got X, Y or Z wrong.” Is the justice system or the jury system perfect? No, they are not, but they are robust. As my hon. Friend has just said, judges know in most cases when someone is pursuing a claim that is not grounded—they are experienced. I believe that we should leave that to courts and judges to decide.
When a newspaper rings up to say, “This judge has just done X, Y and Z. Isn’t this terrible?”, I always urge colleagues to dig into it because in most cases, the headline is completely different from the facts of the case. Without hearing the facts of the case in detail, making an instant judgment is difficult. I do not accept that our judges and judiciary are somehow woolly liberals who are prepared to turn a blind eye to justice; they are robust individuals who want not only to uphold the law, but to ensure that they get the right balance between the rights of the state and the rights of the citizen, as I mentioned earlier.
I accept that the Minister cannot accept the amendments today and that he perhaps does not want to carve out this piece of the Bill now, but discussion needs to be had on this—we will come to the next bit in a minute. If it does not get carved out here, when it goes to the other place, which is full of legal experts and people with a lifetime and huge experience in this area, it will get sliced to pieces. It is not just bad drafting; it is Ministers trying to put provisions in Bills for political purposes, rather than because they make common sense. As I said the other day, what irritates me is that, if we are going to take the provision out, we should do so in this House rather than allow it to go to the House of Lords. It will not survive that process, and we need to be honest about that. It is far better that we do it, and actually do our job, which is scrutinising legislation.
I said the other day, when the Minister was not here, that there is something that has built up over the last 21 years that I have been in the House: Ministers take it as a slight if a provision gets dropped when a Bill goes through the Commons, as though that is a weakness of the system. No, it is not: it is proper scrutiny. With a certain amount of co-operation, much of the Bill could go straight through, but measures such as this cannot, unfortunately.
Tom Tugendhat
First, I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for her comments. I appreciate the tone with which she approached this matter, and the intent with which she seeks to amend the Bill. She also heard my comments, and my commitment to listen more closely. There are slight differences—important differences—between terrorism and other crimes: one is a direct attack on the state, and a betrayal of the very protections that the state affords to everyone, whereas other crimes are by their nature of a different nature. That is not an absolute, and I appreciate that that raises different elements, but it is worth noting.
It is also important to remember that we have already instructed parliamentary counsel to prepare a redraft of part of the Bill, to make it narrowly drawn and to capture only those involved in terrorism. I appreciate the points that the hon. Lady made. I would argue that, as I mentioned, courts do not generally consider reducing damages in these cases, and we are not telling them to do so but inviting them to consider doing so. Courts are still independent, and I appreciate her point.
Tom Tugendhat
The point of this House is to indicate opinion as well. I do know two judges, under whose roofs I have lived, and both of them left me in absolutely no doubt as to who takes the decision. I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s point.
As I said in my opening speech on the clause, the courts when awarding civil tort damages will only very rarely exercise their right to limit them. That is why we believe it is right to require the courts to consider doing so, even if they then do not do so. I hope that answers the questions at this stage, and I repeat my commitment to engage in further conversation with members of the Committee.
Jess Phillips
Given the Minister’s words and the offer to work together, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 57 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 58 to 60 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Damages at risk of being used for the purposes of terrorism
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 58, in schedule 10, page 140, line 12, leave out
“there is a real risk that”.
This amendment would ensure the court was satisfied on the balance of probabilities that damages were to be used for terrorism purposes before frozen funds could be forfeited.
That schedule 10 be the Tenth schedule to the Bill.
Tom Tugendhat
The Bill contains measures that will enable a Minister to apply freezing and forfeiture orders where they assess that there is a real risk of the damages awarded being used to fund acts of terror. That will be done only at the request of law enforcement or security services, but I am sure that the whole House, and the Committee, will appreciate the importance of avoiding accidentally enabling those acts against us. The measure is designed to meet the Government’s overriding policy objective of protecting the public and society. We believe it is important, fair and proportionate that damages can be frozen at source, at the point of award, where there is a real risk of their being used to support terrorism.
Maria Eagle
Can the Minister tell us whether these provisions have been based on some existing case, or cases, where the Government think this has happened and needs to be stopped, or are they just being made in anticipation of the unlikely circumstances in which damages are used in the way these provision seek to prevent? Are there existing cases the Government are concerned about?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Lady asks a fair question. This is a plan for the future or rather a concern over the future, rather than provisions based on existing cases. It is the Government, I hope, doing a responsible thing and looking forward, which is, I hope, what we would expect them to do.
Let me give an example. When making their application, the security services will provide evidence of the claimant’s involvement in terrorist activity and relevant associations, together with their risk assessment of the likelihood of the claimant’s using the money to fund terror activities.
Mr Jones
I like the idea of the Government being able to look into the future. We have established that there are no cases so far, so what are the limitations of the existing legislation on the statute books? What is the difference that explains why we need this provision? I ask because I am never in favour of putting on the statute book things that are already covered by an existing freezing order, provisions on proceeds of crime, or anything else.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Member will know that I am going to write to him about that, because he raises some interesting questions. I will come back to him.
At the freezing stage, the court is looking at essentially the immediate term, given that a freezing order lasts for two years, so the court will want to be satisfied that the claimant’s involvement in terrorism is current and is such that an award of damages is at real risk of being used at once, or within a short timescale, for terrorist purposes. However, the court has the comfort of knowing that the money is only frozen. It may be given to the claimant at a future date if the security services assess the risk as having abated sufficiently, or if the court hearing a later application overturns this.
At the forfeiture stage, the stakes are much higher: the claimant’s award would be permanently withheld. The court knows that the evidence of risk will need to justify that greater intervention. Evidence of entrenchment, of a markedly poor outlook, and that, given their activities, they are always likely to represent a risk will no doubt be uppermost in a court’s mind in a way they may not be for a freezing order. Questions of alternatives to forfeiture such as periodical payments to care providers in order to remove that risk will no doubt also come to the fore. But, where the strength of the evidence cannot be avoided and points to that risk, it is right that the money is forfeited. The court will also be aware that a forfeiture order interferes with property rights under the European convention on human rights and it will need to know that interference is proportionate to the risks, in the context of the need to protect the public.
It is important to note that the Bill does not fetter a court’s discretion in considering whether the risk has been proven. For the finality of the forfeiture application, the court will be able to require the Government to meet the evidentiary burden that it considers to be commensurate to it. The claimant will therefore have a total of three chances to fully challenge in court the evidence that the Government present, before forfeiture can occur. That test does not therefore reflect a low standard; instead, it reflects the right standard.
There are already terrorist freezing provisions, but the process is complicated and the compensation is not frozen at source. As I have said, and to further reassure the Committee, this measure includes provision that a court will have discretion to award part of the damages. This is an equitable measure designed to ensure that a court may award a sum to cover, say, legal expenses or essential care costs in the circumstances of an individual case. We trust our courts and judges to make these assessments while being mindful of the context of public protection. I ask the right hon. Member for Dundee East to withdraw the amendment and I will be communicating with the right hon. Member for North Durham again as well.
Stewart Hosie
I thank the Minister for his remarks on clause 61 and schedule 10. He said that these were about concern for the future. I think we are all concerned about the future. He said that they were designed to tackle something that might happen in the future. I think we all are concerned about ensuring that nothing bad happens in future, but it appears from what the Minister has said that we are measuring risk on a very subjective basis—"real risk” is not a commonly used term.
Let me speak to amendment 58 to schedule 10. The schedule relates to civil proceedings where a Minister can apply to the court to freeze a possible award of damages if the Court is satisfied that there is a real risk of those damages being used for terrorist purposes. That, of course, is lower than the ordinary standard of proof and does not require the claimant to have even been convicted of a criminal offence. It requires only that there is a possibility that they might. Therefore, they will be deprived of any compensation for other matters that they are due. That is a very challenging provision. We clearly understand the policy intent, but what about other moneys than compensatory payments: earnings, pensions, savings, a lottery win or an inheritance? If this is about freezing cash because of a real risk that it may be used for terrorism, why do we need a specific provision for damages legally and properly awarded by a court after full consideration?
Stewart Hosie
My right hon. Friend is right that there is already legislation on terrorist financing. As the Minister pointed out in his opening remarks, there is already a way of freezing terrorist assets, but he said that it was complicated. If we are not just to do things properly and legally but to be seen to be doing them properly, legally and fairly, it may be worth going through those processes to do that.
Schedule 10 proposes, as the Minister said, a freezing order for two years under paragraph (1). Then, an extension is possible for four years under paragraph (2) and, even more drastically, the funds can be forfeited altogether. But the standard of proof in the Bill—the real risk—means no criminal conviction for anything. Even if the court were to think that damages would probably be used for legitimate purposes, but there was a real possibility that they might be used for something else, the damages could be frozen or forfeited entirely.
I can just about live with a general scheme—none of us is naive and none of us wants to see money from any source used to finance terrorism—but, surely, such a drastic step requires actual proof, at least on the balance of probability, that there is a risk of the funds being used for terrorism. That is precisely what the amendment, which removes reference to “real risk”, would achieve.
Jess Phillips
I want to speak to the amendment and to the desire of my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood, who is momentarily not in her place, to speak to a case, although the Minister said that the schedule was not based on any particular case.
The right hon. Member for Dundee East asked about other moneys, specifically a lottery win. Why should the schedule be just for damages? What if we thought somebody’s lottery win, for example, was going to be used? That seems outrageous and unlikely, except it happened to me. The only time I have ever had any personal relations with anti-terror police was when they turned up mob-handed to my office, because of threats to my life that I had received from inside a prison. The threats were jihadist in nature and largely about how the person in prison—obviously a risk factor, on the balance of probabilities—was working with people on the outside to kill me and my family. The terror police came and we undertook a case against the man.
It came to pass—through the process of convicting the man, who is now in prison for a term of another 10 years for the crime against me—that the reason why the police had such grave concerns, even though they were not sure whether he was part of a particular network or indeed working with anyone else, was that while on mental health day release, he had won the lottery and had access to quite substantial sums that could have been used in the commission of crimes against me while still in prison.
Mr Jones
I do not know whether my hon. Friend is aware of the international comparison with the gangster in Boston called Whitey Bulger. He was a notorious gangster whose unexplained wealth was explained by a lottery win, which was outside the jurisdiction of the courts in the United States.
Jess Phillips
That is brilliant. I am in good company with Chicago gangland—
Jess Phillips
With Boston bosses.
One of the risk factors in the case was that issue of a lottery win. There was a certain evidential threshold in the case that was easy to prove in court, because he was threatening to kill me! Please excuse me laughing—one has to laugh at such things, because life becomes ridiculous otherwise.
Why stop with damages? Why should we have a different rule? Nothing could be done in the case that I outlined. I think it is a one in 1.8 million chance of my case happening, so if we have no cases to base it on, I wonder why the focus is on this and not on the case that I outlined.
Mr Jones
The Ministry of Justice and the Home Office employ a wide variety of talents among the individuals whom they recruit, but I did not realise that they actually recruit fortune tellers. That is what we are into here. We have established that there have been no such cases. I am not aware—perhaps the Minister can provide some examples—of why the security services think this is a risk. If that does not exist, this is in the realms of predicting the future, and if there is one thing that we can all agree on—possibly everyone—it is that we cannot predict what happens in the future.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley just said, why only the damages? There is already extensive legislation on the statute books to freeze proceeds of crime and bank accounts if they are to be used for criminal activities. What extra weapons will we give to the courts? I do not see anything that is not there at the moment.
As for using the measure—as opposed to freezing, for example, as I said to the right hon. Member for Dundee East—there is already legislation on the statute book to prevent someone from financing terrorism. In such a situation, what evidence would the Government or the state actually put before the courts? They cannot say simply, “We think he or she might use their proceeds for terrorist activity in future”; it has to be based on intelligence. Again, putting the evidence into court would still expose the state. I presume the existing process would be followed, but it would still mean that we might be putting intelligence in the courts that is not just historical, but actually live, in terms of things such as associations. I just think it is a very clumsy way of trying to proceed. We do not want any money, wherever it comes from, to be used for financing terrorism, but I do not understand where the proposal has come from in the first place. I would be interested if the Minister could find out, because I am also clear that we should not put measures on the statue book unless we have to.
Another point—it is quite amusing in one respect—is the idea that we can decide that an individual who is going to potentially fund terrorism is only going to get half or part of their settlement. I am reassured that the lawyers will be getting their fees, because it would be dreadful if they were having to go to food banks after not getting their pay from a case. However, the Minister then said that care costs and other things would be taken into account. How would the decision be made? Using care costs as an example, if a person gets a certain amount in damages, they might need them for a few years to come if their care costs are ongoing. So, we could not really cap where that is going to go, and that affects the individual’s ability to claim on the state for their care costs. This is a mess. It is one of the examples in the Bill where the odd thing is just thrown in that is not needed. If the Minister could demonstrate to me why this is so important to include in the Bill, I would back him 100%. However, I think that the measure is clumsy, that it will never be used, and that it will damage the reputation of this Bill, which some people have done a good enough job of doing as it is. The Minister certainly will not accept the amendment, but this is another issue that he might want to cogitate on, and decide whether it is worth the candle.
Tom Tugendhat
I welcome Committee members’ comments. I notice that Occam has many cousins in this place, and that his razor is very sharp. On that basis, I merely mention that the issue is with not just damages payments, but the enormous resource currently used in fighting such claims.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Member and I will delight in having a conversation about this when I have written to him.
The reality is that this is looking at an identifiable risk, which is from court proceedings, rather than an unidentifiable risk, which is lottery winnings. I have put that on record and we will no doubt discuss this later. It is also worth making the case that the courts are experienced in calculating case costs and ongoing costs. I will leave it there.
Stewart Hosie
I am not sure that we are particularly enlightened by the Government’s response. I must say I share the scepticism of the right hon. Member for North Durham. How many times are the Government going to have to spend huge amounts of money to fight against somebody who has been awarded some damages on the grounds that they may then wish to use those damages to support terrorism? I am not dreadfully convinced by that argument.
I will not press the amendment, but given we are into the sphere of crystal balls, subjectivity and a judicial threshold that is far too low for this action, I would not be at all surprised if a similar amendment to this one sees the light of day at a later stage of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 61 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clause 62
Legal aid for individuals convicted of terrorism offences
Jess Phillips
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 62, page 44, line 21, leave out “F” and insert “G”.
This amendment is a paving amendment for Amendment 60.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 60, in clause 62, page 45, line 3, at end insert—
“(7A) Condition G is met where the offender is seeking legal aid for the purposes of—
(a) pursuing a civil order, where the purpose of the order is to protect a victim of domestic abuse, or
(b) participating in family court proceedings, and where the offender is a victim of domestic abuse.”
Amendment 62, in clause 62, page 45, line 42, at end insert—
““domestic abuse” has the same meaning as in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021;”
This amendment provides a definition of “domestic abuse” for the purposes of Amendment 60.
Clause stand part.
Clauses 63 and 64 stand part.
Jess Phillips
The second element of part 3 of the Bill would prevent people with terrorism convictions from receiving civil legal aid—it is important to stress that it is civil, not criminal. Again, the breadth and consequences of such a broad-brush approach cause me some alarm. Our amendments would address some of those concerns.
Once again, I am looking at the issue through a gendered lens and considering the impact on domestic abuse victims and their children, who are directly referred to in my amendments—amendment 62 refers to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. My right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham commented about things being dropped and changed in Committee and during Commons stages, and the passage of the 2021 Act was a good example of where that was done completely and utterly. Obviously, I still think that more things should have been included in that legislation, but what we sent to the other place was the work of everybody in Committee. My amendment 62 draws directly on the definition of domestic abuse contained in that Act.
The clause suggests that restrictions disallowing offenders from accessing civil legal aid will last for 30 years for adult offenders and 15 years for youth offenders, and will apply to any person convicted, irrelevant of the severity of the crime or the sentence imposed for the offence. Those restrictions apply to terrorists who commit the most heinous of mass murders, and also to those who participate in crimes that receive non-custodial sentences, such as encouraging terrorism, disseminating publications or downloading terror manuals. It is an automatic restriction—a court has no discretion to apply or revoke it in any circumstances. The restrictions do not require that the seeking of legal aid be related to the terrorist conviction of the claimant, or specify what the purpose of the civil proceedings might be. It is a blanket restriction covering any civil proceedings; it could be absolutely anything in the civil courts.
The disproportionate and oppressive nature of the drafting becomes stark when we place it in the context of the types of civil cases that legal aid can be needed for. People find themselves in civil proceedings and family court proceedings, and in need of legal aid support, for a multitude of reasons, with housing issues, debt problems and domestic abuse being just a few examples. It is a realm that not everyone may know much about, but anyone who has worked in domestic abuse for as long as I have realises the role that civil and family cases, and the courts, play in people’s lives and their ability to live in the free and safe society that the Government have claimed that they are trying to protect all the way throughout our consideration of the Bill.
For example, a victim of domestic abuse might need legal aid to help her to seek an injunction against her abuser. Non-molestation orders protect a victim or their child from being harmed or threatened by their abuser, while occupation orders decide who can live in a family home or enter the surrounding area. Such injunctions protect victims and children in particular. They protect women. They save women’s lives—huge improvements are needed in how they are served and upheld, but that is not an argument for today. Funnily enough, I noticed on BBC News today that the Government were heralding some of the changes in domestic violence protection orders in cases of domestic abuse, which are usually handed out in a civil environment, and how they were helping to prevent domestic abuse. That was this morning’s news. These injunctions are not some unnecessary add-on or bonus; they are legal measures that protect women from violence and are crucial for the type of society we desire to build and protect.
Jess Phillips
I am not sure he would agree with the Minister on many other things, but maybe we will get the two of you together. I am sorry to slag off my husband in here—although, actually, it is the perfect place, as he cannot do anything about it, can he?
This is incredibly naive. The reality is that anyone who has worked with female offenders, as I have for many years—this is why we ran their services out of Women’s Aid—recognises that the pathway to offending for the vast majority of women offenders is an abusive man.
So, yes, “Don’t be a terrorist,” is a great thing to say if your abuser is a terrorist. It is very easy to say that when the person who has complete and utter control over your every waking minute is also involved in something you do not necessarily agree with. For example, say that you made a phone call on his behalf. It is easy for everybody to sit and say, “I wouldn’t do that, because I am not a terrorist,” but we all might if we were terrorised. The fundamental thing we should all seek is to prevent that, and to prevent the idea that somebody might then fall into terrorism. The actions in the Bill mean it is much more likely that women in these cases will end up stuck with a terrorist making them be a terrorist, rather than being able to escape them.
There is a broader point to highlight about the connection between domestic abuse and terrorism, because of how commonly terrorists are also abusers in a domestic setting, and also because of female offender patterns, which I have already alluded to. Research carried out by the Home Office in 2021 showed more than a third of suspected extremists referred to the Government’s anti-radicalisation programme Prevent had experienced domestic violence. The police said that of 3,045 people referred to the scheme in 2019, 1,076 had a link to domestic abuse as an offender, victim or both. The male referrals were more likely to be offenders; the female referrals were more likely to be victims. As the national co-ordinator for Prevent, Detective Chief Superintendent Vicky Washington, said:
“This initial research has resulted in some statistically significant data which cannot, and should not, be ignored. Project Starlight has indicated a clear overrepresentation of domestic abuse experiences in the lives of those who are referred to us for safeguarding and support. It is absolutely vital that we use this information to shape what we do, and strengthen our response across all of policing, not just in counter terrorism.”
In short, tackling domestic abuse is critical to tackling terrorism. Any legislation, such as the current draft of this Bill, that undermines our ability to protect domestic abuse victims and stop domestic abuse perpetrators does nothing for the security of our country. Our amendments seek to address the breadth of the current drafting, and to tackle the issues and protect victims of domestic abuse.
I have two further points. Many people have raised concerns about the removal of legal aid. They argue that these clauses are counterproductive in protecting the public, due to the impact of effective rehabilitation. I have a deep concern for individuals who, years after a conviction and successful rehabilitation, find themselves in difficulty, facing homelessness, or are victims of abuse, or are in debt. Okay, if someone has been convicted of something to do with terrorism, they get what they deserve, but there are people working for organisations such as HOPE not hate who have completed rehabilitation pathways and who have then been used to protect the lives of people who work in this building, lest we forget. I have real worries that the blanket provision in the Bill over people who may very well have been rehabilitated could well stop them being able to get the support they might need to continue to be productive members of society. Does it help the rehabilitation, or does it create an environment where a person may make bad choices and cause harm?
As Jonathan Hall argued in the evidence session,
“I have certainly come across cases where the terrorist risk from the individual—the chance of their stabbing someone, for example—goes up if they are not taking their medication or if they are homeless.
My concern about the legal aid is that it will make it harder, for example, for a terrorist offender, maybe 10 years after they have been released and who is facing eviction, to get legal aid. That means that you might have less good decisions made…My real concern is people becoming homeless or falling into debt when they might otherwise be able to get legal assistance.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 11, Q19.]
If our primary driver is to protect the public and reduce risk, we must consider that point. The breadth of the Bill could undermine the very thing that it is trying to protect: a society where people do not live in fear of violence and danger.
Mr Jones
The media’s portrayal of legal aid is of giving out huge sums of money to the undeserving and those who are guilty of crimes, but we should start from the basis, as I always do, that people are innocent until proven guilty. The other motive for the Bill is clearly to get some headlines that say, “We are being tough on terrorists.” I will come on to some examples, especially the issue of under-18s, but the Bill does nothing of the sort.
There is also a more fundamental point: if someone is accused of a crime, we want to ensure that the facts are put before the court and that they are properly legally represented so that they can argue their case, and the Crown can argue its case against that evidence. At the end of the day, it is then up to the jury and the courts to decide whether that person is innocent or guilty, and the courts then decide on sentencing. That process is not just some woolly notion of a justice system that this country is proud of; it is actually fundamental to the victims. It is important that the victims of terrorism, or any crime, are assured that a person who is guilty is sentenced and gets the appropriate punishment.
When we talk about terrorists, we are talking about the appalling individuals who perpetrated the Manchester bombing or the London atrocities. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has just said, that is not the spectrum we are talking about here, as the Bill sets a broader one.
I suggest people read the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on extreme right-wing terrorism. In taking evidence for that, the most disturbing fact was that the people who are now being drawn to extreme right-wing terrorism are youngsters, some as young as 14 or 15. It is mainly online, but they are committing offences. There are quite a few—some have been reported publicly—who have been, rightly, imprisoned because they have met the threshold for the court to decide that they committed an offence.
Suppose a 15-year-old is found guilty of a terrorism offence. We are saying that, for the next 15 years, whatever they do—whether another terrorist-related incident or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, a criminal case or a civil case such as eviction—they will be barred from access to legal aid. I might be unpopular for saying this, but legal aid helps the system of justice. The idea that it is doled out willy-nilly to everyone is absolute nonsense: it is hard to meet the thresholds that have been introduced over the last few years. Those thresholds have gone too far, because they are basically a tax on justice for a lot of innocent people. I do not understand where that comes from.
I come back to the point about youngsters and rehabilitation that my hon. Friend made. It is possible that there is a perception that there is an average terrorist. We know what a terrorist is: someone who carries out horrific bombings or activities. However, that is not the case with some of the other thresholds for terrorism offences. For some youngster—a 15-year-old, or someone even a bit older—who has been imprisoned for that type of terrorism, our aim surely is to work with them to get them out of that pathway. The legal aid measures will do nothing at all to help that rehabilitation process. I am sure that many people in the room made decisions when they were 15 that they would perhaps regret now. I am sure that the Minister was a perfect child, but people make mistakes, and they hold views that 15 years later they will not hold. The idea that we penalise those people for life is unacceptable.
The measures have been parachuted into the Bill, and I would like to know the rationale for including them in the Bill. They will not make the process very easy for the Crown, either. If someone cannot get legal aid, what are they going to do? Represent themselves? All that does is make the trial very expensive and not a good process for the victims who are watching.
The broader issue is that there are many people whom we—and, I am sure, the tabloids and others—do not like. We do not like murderers, paedophiles or rapists. If we apply the measures to terrorists, why not extend them to the other people we do not like? I am not proposing that we should. If we did, that is fine: the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) might think that he will get a newspaper headline for being tough on terrorism. But it would make the situation worse. It would slow down the legal process; it would victimise people for many years. What we should be doing with those youngsters is working with them to try to get them away from some of the sick ideologies outlined in the right-wing extremism report from the ISC. We should get them back into society. Look at some of the best examples around the world of rehabilitation of terrorists or extremists—it is about rehabilitation, not punishment.
If someone has carried out an horrific terrorist attack and killed people, I am happy for them to stay in prison for the rest of their lives. I have no problem with that. However, there are those who are on the verge of doing that. It is worse these days because of the internet and social media, which is slowly corrupting some young minds; it leads them to hold ideologies and, in some cases, take steps that cause them to meet that terrorist threshold.
Tom Tugendhat
I appreciate enormously what right hon. and hon. Members opposite have said. As I have been familiarising myself with the detail of this Bill, I will be asking questions and engaging in conversation with colleagues from all parts of the House. I will absolutely be engaging with Opposition colleagues.
I am sure right hon. and hon. Members will appreciate it if I cover the clauses as they stand. Clause 62 will narrow the range of circumstances in which individuals convicted of specified terrorism offences can receive civil legal services. That includes individuals convicted of terrorism offences listed under schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code, where there is a minimum penalty of imprisonment for two years or more, as well as for offences where a judge has found a terrorism connection.
The restriction will apply to future applications for legal aid for individuals convicted of terrorism or terrorism-connected offences from 2001 onwards. The restriction will not affect ongoing cases.
Tom Tugendhat
My understanding will be clarified in a letter to the right hon. Gentleman very shortly, unless it is clarified in the moments to come.
Tom Tugendhat
I am assured that it is retrospective. I will, of course, be looking at this as part of the whole. [Interruption.] It is retrospective to 2001 for past offences. I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman on that.
The effect of the restriction is a suspension on accessing civil legal aid from the date of conviction. The restriction will last for 30 years for individuals convicted when aged 18 years old or over, and 15 years for individuals convicted when under 18. The restriction will not apply to individuals under 18 years old, but will take effect when they turn 18 and make a new application for civil legal aid.
As the clause is drafted, access to the exceptional case funding scheme will remain available for those subject to the restriction who can demonstrate that, without legal aid, there is a risk of a breach of their ECHR rights or their retained enforceable EU law rights. Applications for exceptional case funding are generally subject to means and merits tests.
Clause 63 ensures that—
Mr Jones
In effect, this measure is going to be useless, isn’t it? I would think that if, for example, someone with no means is subject to one of these orders, it would not take a great legal genius to argue in a court that it infringed their rights to a fair trial. Is it not therefore the case that, in most cases, they will get special legal aid anyway? It is a bit odd to implement a thing that might sound tough but, in practice, will end up with people getting legal aid anyway.
Tom Tugendhat
Occam is making his case. The right hon. Gentleman will be assured that I will respond in full, and in kind, as soon as we have had the opportunity to have this discussion among a slightly wider party of colleagues.
Clause 63 ensures that the correct data-sharing and data-processing powers are available to enforce the restriction on access to civil legal aid for those convicted of specified terrorism offences. To enforce the restriction effectively, we must be able to check that an individual has a relevant conviction that would prevent them from accessing funding. To do this, a legal gateway must exist within the legislation to use conviction data for the purposes of administering legal aid. The clause will allow the details of an individual’s conviction status to be requested from the director of legal aid casework and shared from a competent authority that holds the criminal conviction data. This data can be used only for the purpose of identifying whether an applicant for legal aid has been convicted of a specified terrorism offence, in order to determine whether the restriction will apply. Such information may include an individual’s name and date of birth, and the dates of any convictions.
Jess Phillips
The Minister has described the process, which, as with all Government processes, always works smoothly. Will they have to do that check on every single person who applies for legal aid?
Jess Phillips
It is going to be quite a slow process. The suggestion is that, for every single person who applies for legal aid in any civil remedy or order, we will start writing to a competent authority to get any previous terrorism convictions.
Tom Tugendhat
I will clarify the process for the hon. Lady. It is not that unreasonable, frankly—
Tom Tugendhat
Hang on a minute. It is not that unreasonable to check with competent authorities before various provisions are made. It is pretty standard, and this measure is another check. I appreciate the hon. Lady’s point, and I will come back to her with how this is done and how it is followed up.
Finally, clause 64 makes a minor amendment to clarify how civil legal aid is available for terrorism prevention and investigation measures proceedings. I want to make it clear that the clause will not change that fact. The clause seeks to reduce unnecessary complexity in the administration of the legal aid scheme, and it will ensure that all legal aid decisions for TPIMs are made under one paragraph of the statutory framework, rather than being funded under multiple paragraphs. The clause will also remove references to “control orders” in the legal aid legislation; control orders were the predecessors to TPIMs and have now been phased out.
Tom Tugendhat
I see the right hon. Gentleman’s point. We are going to move on, because he knows that we will be talking about this later.
I thank both the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling their amendments, which seek to carve out an exception from the restriction where the case type involves domestic abuse. I recognise the strength of voice that the hon. Lady has brought to the scourge of domestic violence, and the voice that she has given to so many victims in the House. It is an enormous tribute to her that she is recognised around the country for it, and I certainly listen to her very carefully on this issue. I reassure her that I will be looking at not just the provisions in the clause but the amendment she has tabled. I will also be looking at the exceptional case funding scheme, and I will be discussing it. It is certainly true at the moment that 74% of applications to the ECF are granted, but she has already made the point that there is a hurdle before approaching the 74%. I accept that, and I will be looking at it. I will be taking it seriously. I ask her to withdraw the amendment ahead of future conversations.
Jess Phillips
I appreciate the tone that the Minister has taken, and I will withdraw the amendment with a view to see where we get before Report and Third Reading. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 63 and 64 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 39 to 44.
That schedule 11 be the Eleventh schedule to the Bill.
Clause 66 stand part.
Government amendment 64, in clause 67, page 48, line 25, at end insert—
“(za) regulations under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);
(zb) regulations under section (Meaning of ‘political influence activity’);
(zc) regulations under section (General exemptions);”
This amendment provides that regulations made under the specified provisions are to be made using the affirmative procedure.
Amendment (a) to Government amendment 64, line 4, at end insert—
“(zd) regulations under section (Registration information);
(ze) regulations under section (Information notices);”
Government amendment 65.
Clauses 67 to 73 stand part.
Tom Tugendhat
Clause 65 introduces schedule 11, which makes minor and consequential amendments to other legislation. I will not dwell on paragraphs 1 to 3, which repeal the Official Secrets Acts 1911, 1920 and 1939, and which are no longer needed in the light of the Bill. I am aware that the Committee has already touched on paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 8 when discussing the powers of arrest, detention and biometrics.
I will briefly speak about paragraph 6, which makes a necessary consequential amendment to the Official Secrets Act 1989. The 1989 Act already, and quite rightly, provides that it is an offence under the Act to make an onward disclosure of material obtained through an offence under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 —that is, espionage. The Bill replaces the reference to the 1911 Act provision, which has been repealed, with the relevant provisions in the Bill, which are designed to criminalise the same conduct. Other references to the 1911 and 1920 Acts have also been replaced with the relevant provisions in the Bill.
Turning to the Government amendments, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 contains a list of offences, referred to as “qualifying offences”, whereby when a person is arrested but not convicted of such an offence police have the option to retain biometric data such as fingerprints for three years. Qualifying offences currently include terrorism offences, murder, rape and kidnap. Schedule 11 of the Bill already amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act to include the most serious offences in the Bill, such as obtaining or disclosing protected information and sabotage, in the list of qualifying offences, which also includes attempts or conspiracy to commit those offences.
Schedule 11 amends PACE to insert the most serious offences in the Bill under the heading of “National security-related qualifying offences”. Amendments 39 to 44 seek to add the offence of preparatory conduct in clause 15 to the list of qualifying offences, as well as to the definition of national security-related qualifying offences. As we have already discussed in Committee, malign actions by states have the potential to cause significant damage to the United Kingdom and its interests, and the preparatory conduct offence ensures that law enforcement can intervene at an early stage when preparatory activities are under way. I ask the Committee to support all the amendments.
Clause 66 provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to make, via regulations, additional consequential amendments to other legislation where necessary. That will ensure that the legislative framework remains coherent. Clause 67 makes provision in relation to the powers to make regulations in the Bill, including specifying the parliamentary procedure applicable to specific provisions. The powers that, when exercised, will require regulations made under them to be subject to the affirmative procedure are specified in paragraph 6. These are regulations that make consequential amendments to primary legislation, and that require the use of, and bring into force, a code of practice on making video recordings of interviews of detained suspects under schedule 3.
Government amendments 64 and 65 are technical amendments relating to the foreign influence registration scheme. While I will briefly set out the practical effect of the amendments, I am mindful that the next Committee sitting will consider the substantive amendments—so we will touch on them then in greater detail—and the new clauses relating to the scheme. I therefore do not intend to cover the substance at this point.
Government amendment 64 provides that three powers to make regulations under the foreign influence registration scheme are to be subject to the affirmative procedure. The first is where a foreign power, part of a foreign power, or an entity subject to foreign power, is to be specified by the Secretary of State for the purposes of enhanced registration requirements. The second is where the Secretary of State wishes to make provision for further cases, in addition to several proposed exemptions, to which the registration requirements or prohibitions do not apply. The final power is where the Secretary of State wishes to specify a person exercising functions on behalf of the Crown for the purpose of extending provisions relating to registerable political influence activities to capture communications made to that person.
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to the Minister for that comprehensive run-through of the different elements within this part 4 grouping. I will speak to the collection of clauses and amendments, which encompass the remaining provisions in part 4. Clauses 65 and 66 give powers to the Government to consequentially amend legislation based on the content of the Bill. We spoke to the House of Commons Library in order to assure ourselves that this was a conventional allocation of powers, and did not go beyond what was necessary. I am grateful to the Library staff for their feedback.
Government amendment 64 provides that regulations made under the specified provisions for the foreign influence registration scheme, which we have not yet got to, are to be made using the affirmative procedure. It seems an odd arrangement that we are debating the process for the regulations without having first considered in detail the substance of those provisions. However, here we are. We will come to the FIRS provisions; despite how long the scheme has been in the pipeline, it is fair to say that a great deal of the detail of those measures is still to be determined—and is yet to be determined in regulation. It is right that they are subject to the affirmative procedure and to proper scrutiny when that detail has been worked through. We hear and understand that it may take some time yet, but it is an important point.
Further to Government amendment 64, there are two more provisions for regulations on registration information and information notices, which merit the same approach for the reasons I have just outlined. Our amendment to Government amendment 64 seeks to extend it only to ensure a consistent level of scrutiny of what will be serious new measures. It would allow the measures to be considered by hon. Members in Committee and would ensure that they deliver what is needed. On that basis, I ask the Minister to adopt our small, but entirely appropriate, change to Government amendment 64.
Tom Tugendhat
I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s point. I want to correct a comment that I made. I said the provisions apply to the Crown and this meant that Crown servants could not commit the offences. What I meant was they can commit the offences in the Bill, and that is the whole point of the regulation and this change to allow the freedom that is required.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11
Minor and consequential amendments
Amendments made: 39, in schedule 11, page 141, line 29, after “offence” insert “under section 15 of the National Security Act 2022 or”.
This amendment inserts a reference to offences under clause 15 (preparatory conduct) into the definition of “national security-related qualifying offence”.
Amendment 40, in schedule 11, page 141, line 30, leave out
“the National Security Act 2022”
and insert “that Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 39.
Amendment 41, in schedule 11, page 142, line 8, after “offence” insert
“under section 15 of the National Security Act 2022 or”.
This amendment inserts a reference to offences under clause 15 (preparatory conduct) into the definition of “qualifying offence”.
Amendment 42, in schedule 11, page 142, line 8, leave out
“the National Security Act 2022”
and insert “that Act”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 41.
Amendment 43, in schedule 11, page 142, line 15, after “offence” insert
“under section 15 of the National Security Act 2022 or”.
This amendment inserts a reference to offences under clause 15 (preparatory conduct) into the definition of “qualifying offence”.
Amendment 44, in schedule 11, page 142, line 15, leave out
“the National Security Act 2022”
and insert “that Act”.—(Tom Tugendhat.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.
Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67
Regulations
The Chair
Does the hon. Member for Halifax wish to move amendment (a) to Government amendment 64?
Holly Lynch
I will continue to engage with the Government on that issue, but I will not move the amendment.
Amendments made: 64, in clause 67, page 48, line 25, at end insert—
“(za) regulations under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements);
(zb) regulations under section (Meaning of “political influence activity”);
(zc) regulations under section (General exemptions);”
This amendment provides that regulations made under the specified provisions are to be made using the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 65, in clause 67, page 49, line 2, at end insert—
“(11) If a draft of a statutory instrument containing regulations under section (Requirement to register foreign activity arrangements) would, apart from this subsection, be treated for the purposes of the standing orders of either House of Parliament as a hybrid instrument, it is to proceed in that House as if it were not such an instrument.”—(Tom Tugendhat.)
This amendment provides that regulations under NC11 are not to be treated as hybrid instruments.
Clause 67, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 68 to 73 ordered the stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 7
Obtaining etc material benefits from a foreign intelligence service
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person—
(i) obtains, accepts or retains a material benefit which is not an excluded benefit, or
(ii) obtains or accepts the provision of such a benefit to another person,
(b) the benefit is or was provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and
(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the benefit is or was provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service.
(2) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person agrees to accept—
(i) a material benefit which is not an excluded benefit, or
(ii) the provision of such a benefit to another person,
(b) the benefit is to be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, and
(c) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the benefit is to be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service.
(3) Material benefits may include financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information.
(4) A material benefit is an excluded benefit if—
(a) it is provided as reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services, and
(b) the provision of those goods or services does not constitute an offence.
(5) A benefit may be provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service directly or indirectly (for example, it may be provided indirectly through one or more companies).
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if—
(a) the material benefit is or was, or is to be, provided in or from the United Kingdom, or
(b) in any case, the person engaging in the conduct—
(i) is a UK person, or
(ii) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).
(7) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) by virtue of retaining a benefit, it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for retaining the benefit.
(8) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) or (2) it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—
(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom,
(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions, or
(c) in accordance with an agreement or arrangement to which—
(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or
(ii) any person acting for or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.
(9) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (7) or (8) if—
(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and
(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(10) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).
(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2) is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine (or both).
(12) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—
“financial benefit”;
“foreign intelligence service”;
the “law of the United Kingdom”;
“UK person”.”
Brought up, and read the First time.
Tom Tugendhat
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause contains two offences concerned with obtaining, accepting, agreeing to accept or retaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. These offences add to the new toolkit for law enforcement and the intelligence agencies in responding to espionage activity.
FIS operations in the UK run contrary to our safety and interests. In order to operate successfully, a FIS needs to recruit, fund and support networks of agents to support their undeclared activity in the United Kingdom. One of the most important motivating factors that a FIS is able to deploy to recruit agents is financial inducement or the provision of benefits in kind. It is often the case—this is reflective of the tradecraft of such organisations—that only the money or other material benefits can be evidenced to a satisfactory criminal standard. The new offence will enable early intervention to prevent further harm from being caused and will further strengthen our ability to prevent FIS activity, building on clause 3.
The first offence, in subsection (1), concerns a person who obtains or accepts a material benefit for themselves or another person, or who retains a material benefit, from a FIS. That could involve obtaining or accepting legal or school fees intended for someone else’s benefit. Some benefits are excluded benefits, which I will come on to in a moment. That offence would attract a maximum penalty of 40 years.
The second offence, in subsection (2), concerns a person who agrees to accept a material benefit from a FIS for themselves or another person, which is not an excluded benefit. This offence, where no benefit is obtained, accepted or retained, would attract a maximum penalty of 10 years. For both offences, the benefit must also be provided by or on behalf of a FIS, and the person must know, or ought reasonably to know, that the benefit came from a FIS.
We must be alive to the tradecraft of foreign intelligence services and their ability to adapt and potentially overcome any narrow definitions in this area. Accordingly, we have drawn the meaning of “material benefit” wider than just financial benefit. Material benefit will include money and money’s worth, such as gifts. It will also capture wider benefits such as information, including information on a business arrangement, as well as anything that has the potential to result in a financial benefit. We have safeguards in place to ensure that legitimate activity is not brought into scope of the new clause.
Subsection (8) replicates the defences in clause 3, which means that a person does not commit an offence if they are complying with a legal obligation, conducting public functions or acting in accordance with an agreement to which the UK is a party. As with other offences in the Bill, Attorney General consent must be obtained before prosecution.
In addition to those protections, the new offences have an additional layer of protection in the form of the excluded benefit for those who have legitimate reason for receiving a material benefit—for example, because they provide services to diplomatic missions in the United Kingdom that are known to accommodate declared intelligence officers.
Under subsection (4), a benefit is an excluded benefit if it is provided as reasonable consideration for the provision of goods or services and the provision of goods and services does not constitute an offence. For example, a shopkeeper does not commit an offence by selling groceries to a person who happens to be a member of a FIS. Another example of the type of contact that is excluded through this exemption is a person who lives in Northern Ireland and works in the Republic of Ireland for the police force.
The effect of introducing the concept of an excluded benefit will mean that in cases where someone is believed to have committed an offence of obtaining a material benefit, the prosecution would need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the benefit was not an excluded benefit.
In addition to the concept of an excluded benefit, we have made provision for a reasonable excuse defence in subsection (7), which relates only to the offence of retaining a benefit contrary to subsection (1). This has been done to allow people who, for example, may be unable to return a benefit and so are forced to retain it. It will also enable law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to target those people who do not have a legitimate reason for retaining such a benefit. Although, crucially, subsections (4), (7) and (8) allow us to take a wide range of legitimate activity out of scope, we have been careful to ensure that the offence captures all types of activity we are concerned about.
The definition of a FIS would include a police force or other body with intelligence functions, which is the same definition found in clause 3. As I said when I introduced that clause to the Committee, we have drawn it in that way because it is increasingly common for organisations and foreign Government agencies to undertake activity more traditionally associated with intelligence services.
Holly Lynch
Before I turn to the detail of new clause 7, I appreciate that the Minister is not responsible for some of these challenges, but throughout the process of the Bill there has been a great deal of support for seeing the detail of the legislation scheme that makes up the basis of most of these new Government clauses. We probed consistently and asked that we could see the detail of that as soon as possible, given that as we came into the presentation of the legislation prior to Second Reading, it was a key factor that the Government promised would be a component part of the Bill.
The Minister’s predecessor, the hon. Member for Stevenage, made a commitment that that would be added to the Bill before we returned from recess for the second Committee sittings of line-by-line scrutiny. Most of the Government new clauses were tabled just last week—I think they were tabled last Tuesday and published on Wednesday. In that sense, his predecessor upheld that commitment in principle but not in spirit.
The new clauses were tabled only last week and there is a great deal in them to get through. We certainly want to support these provisions, but there is a lot to interpret and understand, and we want to have the opportunity to engage with those who can make use of these provisions so that we can do our due diligence at this point. I am not being unreasonable and I am being kinder to the Minister than the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), was to the Minister’s predecessor’s predecessor, the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Damian Hinds), on Second Reading, but I want to put it on record that we may be forced to return to the Committee with more detail once we have had the opportunity to consider these provisions further.
Turning to the detail, as the Minister has said, Government new clause 7 creates new offences of obtaining, accepting, retaining and agreeing to accept a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service. The clause is explicit in referencing material benefits from a “foreign intelligence service”. In relatively recent instances finances have been traced back, not to intelligence agencies as such but to forms of Government Departments, such as the United Front Work Department, referred to by the Chinese Communist Party as one of its “magic weapons”. Are the definitions in this clause too narrow to capture those kinds of transactions?
Subsection (7) says:
“In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) by virtue of retaining a benefit, it is a defence to show that the person had a reasonable excuse for retaining the benefit.”
Given just how tight the definitions in relation to this offence are as the Bill stands, referring exclusively to a foreign intelligence service, I am keen to understand what might constitute a “reasonable excuse” in that situation.
We have worked through the notion of and the thresholds of proof around the phrase “ought reasonably to know” in earlier proceedings of this Committee, which I appreciate the new Minister might not yet be across. In subsections (10) and (11), pretty serious custodial sentences are outlined, as the Minister said, for committing offences under subsections (1) and (2). So I would be grateful to learn what the fines would be for those offences.
A query was also put to me following a specific overseas case as to whether someone who is in receipt of benefits of a sexual nature could be prosecuted under this new clause. If someone were to offer sex in exchange for information in such a way that it could be proven that they knew or ought reasonably to have known the purpose of that activity, could that lead to a prosecution on the basis of the sex being a material benefit, in principle, under the Government’s new clause?
Mr Jones
I broadly welcome the new clause, because it is obviously another weapon in the armoury to counter foreign state interference, but I just want some clarification to be made in terms of the broad nature of what is actually being proposed.
One of the examples that I want to raise is the issue of academia. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax has already said, the United Front Workers Department of the Chinese Communist party is active across the globe and influencing academics and even legislators here in this country and in other countries, for example, Australia. So I just want some clarification about how someone would get caught under this measure.
As I say, one example is academia. I cannot remember who—I was trying to rack my brains to think of the name of the academic at Harvard University who I think is currently being prosecuted in the United States. It relates to the definition of “intelligence service”. We know that the Chinese Communist party does not work directly; it will work through front organisations. As I say, I am trying to think of the name of the academic in the US; it will come back to me in a minute.
However, let us suppose a British academic is approached by an entity in China or an individual based here, who then says to that academic, “Will you do some academic research? Will you write a paper for us?” And they give the academic money for that. There are examples of this happening, and I think that in the example from the United States, which is currently ongoing, the academic then received a retainer for providing research information for a Chinese university. I think there is evidence that suggests that that was a way in which the Chinese Communist party or the Chinese security services were funnelling money to academics.
I would be really interested to know how we will differentiate between the academic who quite clearly wants to do research, and co-operation with China. The benefit they get—for example, being paid for a visit to a conference, for an academic paper or for research—does not fall within the scope of this measure, because, to be fair to the academic, the source of the funding might not be clear—it might be clear in some cases, but not in all.
I can understand if, for example, the security services approach an academic and say, “Are you aware that your money for your paper is coming from x intelligence agency?”, and the academic says, “Oh well, I’m not bothered. I’ll keep on doing it.” That is fine. However I just want to know—and I think some guidance has to be given to academics.
The other example is a bit closer to home, which is my hon. Friend the Member for Brent North (Barry Gardiner), who received large amounts of money from a woman called Christine Lee. She made quite a substantial donation for him to run his office. I am still baffled as to the reason why, but still. It was proven later that that she was working on behalf of the Chinese Communist party and the Chinese Government. Would an individual like that—a Member of Parliament—be dragged into this, under the new clause?
Certainly, I am sure that most of us, if someone offered us half a million pounds, would actually want to know why we were getting it, but people make their own decisions. Would that be classed under this? There are clear examples of the Chinese in particular using academia as a cover for intelligence gathering and actually funding things that will obviously influence, such as stealing academic research. For example, if a paper is normally worth £1,000 and someone is getting £20,000 for it, does that mean that the rest is a bung and that they should really raise questions about it? I doubt many academics are going to be saying, “I am not worth £20,000”. It comes back to the point on this, which I would like some more information on. I am not against what is being proposed, but I think that it has some issues that will raise alarm bells in certain sections, and academia is certainly one of them.
Tom Tugendhat
I will pick up on the second set of points first, if the hon. Member for Halifax does not mind. I will pick up on those points because I am glad that it is not just me who is baffled at what the United Front thought it was gaining from this relationship. I think we are all equally mystified, but it appears that they had the resources not to care.
It does suggest, however, that we have to take this extremely seriously in all of our duties—not just when we talk about people outside this place, but when we talk about people inside this place because we have a particular responsibility to the service of our country and our communities. So I think that this needs to be looked at extremely carefully. I am not going to go into individual cases for various reasons, except to express surprise.
Mr Jones
It is wider than just that one case because, when the ISC did its Russia report, there was clear evidence of certain Members of the House of Lords, for example, being given posts as consultants and other things. Whether there is any proof that they were actually given by the intelligence services, I do not know, but it has certainly, in some cases, raised certain questions that ought to be asked.
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that there are certain individuals in our society—some of whom, sadly, have seats in this Parliament—whose actions are questionable and demand further investigation. He can be absolutely assured that that is something that I take extremely seriously. He knows that I drafted a policy paper a long time ago on updating our Terrorism Acts. This debate is not about that, but there are various reasons why I took that seriously so many years ago and why I am very pleased to be doing this job. I accepted this job from the Prime Minister because this is a matter that I think is of enormous importance in the United Kingdom, particularly today. I will not go into the details of it, but he can be absolutely assured that I will be looking at it as soon as I have got my feet a little bit further under the desk, if he will forgive me.
These provisions, of course, do apply in various different ways, and he has highlighted some of the ways in which foreign intelligence services pay agents. Disproportionate or excessive payments can be considered in different ways, such as bribery. While the individual in question may of course claim that they were worth what they were paid, I think a reasonable benchmarking process would normally establish that they were, at best, surprised, if not actually encouraging the situation, which was not conducive to the safety of our country.
I am not, as I have said, going to go through individual cases, but this entire new clause refers to benefits in various different ways, such as to a benefit received through a business; it does not have to be direct. I am going to have to come back to the hon. Member for Halifax on her question about the nature of sexual inducements. I cannot answer that question now, but I will come back to her.
Mr Jones
I accept that the Minister has done a lot of work in this area. Would it be possible for Committee members to be briefed on the reason for this provision, but also how it will act in practice because, once it is implemented, guidance is going to have to be given to companies and to academia? I think just getting some understanding of how it would work in practice would reassure many of us in Opposition.
Tom Tugendhat
Personally, I commit, absolutely, to engaging with Committees, not just the right hon. Gentleman’s own. The Intelligence and Security Committee is an important one. This Committee is another one, of course, but the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee and various other Committees would, I am sure, have an interest in this area. I absolutely do commit to engaging to ensure that this clause is understood properly.
I would add, however, that to be a benefit in this area, and to be in scope of the offences, it would need to be a material benefit, so either money or money’s worth. Forgive me, I have received an answer. Before bringing a prosecution, a careful consideration of the nature of the benefit and the circumstances would be undertaken. A person has to know that they are obtaining a benefit from a foreign intelligence source, and there are several protections to avoid capturing legitimate activity. Legitimate activity, of course, as I said, refers to supporting an embassy that is in pursuit of its diplomatic functions or working with a police force, for example in the Republic of Ireland when an individual lives in Northern Ireland.
The hon. Member for Halifax also made points about the timing of this. I appreciate that entirely, and I entirely respect her position. We must ensure that this goes through with the consent of the House.
Mr Jones
The Minister is being very helpful, but could I clarify something? If, for example, somebody received a benefit from a university, but it was subsequently found that the money was coming from a foreign intelligence agency—or if someone did work for a company then found out that it had been involved—that person perhaps did not know that. Am I assuming that, as it is written, if they continued after they were made aware of it, then they would fall into scope? If they could actually say that they did not know about it, is that a defence?
Tom Tugendhat
The right hon. Gentleman is exactly right. The point of the defence of “reasonable” is that, in order for this to be an offence, the individual needs to be aware that the benefit is supplied by a foreign intelligence source. Therefore, so long as they are unaware of it, it is not an offence. When they become aware of it, it is an offence.
The last point that I wish to make is on the delays. I know that the hon. Member for Halifax will understand that the Ukrainian situation, and a certain change of Government office holders most recently, may have interrupted the provisions. However, on that note—
Holly Lynch
I am really grateful to the Minister. I appreciate that he is winding up. I think, if I have understood his response to my question about sex in exchange for information, that, for something to be a benefit, it would have to have a monetary value. Therefore, if there was an exchange of sex for information, that could not be prosecutable under this new clause.
I just wanted to say that because a case was brought to my attention. Partly because I am reluctant to gather any further information by typing the word “sex” into a search engine on the parliamentary estate—I am always incredibly reluctant to do that, for obvious reasons—I could not establish any further details about a specific case. Will the Minister undertake to have a look at that in a bit more detail, just to ensure that we have not missed anything through narrow definitions within this clause?
Tom Tugendhat
The hon. Lady can be absolutely assured that there is no way that I would like to leave out any form of inducement that a foreign intelligence service could use to entice somebody to commit a serious crime. Therefore, of course, I would be very happy to look into that.
The clause, as written, says:
“Material benefits may include financial benefits, anything which has the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information.”
Therefore, it is pretty broadly worded. I will talk to officials about how we could make it clearer if that is necessary, but I will certainly undertake to do that. Before I sit down, I will just say, God save the Queen.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 7 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)