National Security Bill (Fifth sitting)
Thursday 14th July 2022
(1 year, 9 months ago)
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The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
Although the Bill provides a range of offences specifically targeted at state threats activity, it will not always be appropriate or possible for harmful activity to be prosecuted under the Bill. Where offences already exist on the statute book that deal effectively with the relevant state threats activity, there is no need to create a similar offence in the Bill. For example, the offence of murder deals effectively with state-sponsored assassinations.
While the Bill provides a suite of offences and accompanying tools and powers, there remain cases in which it will be difficult to secure prosecution due to the covert nature of the activities and the difficulties involved in presenting admissible evidence to a court to illustrate all the components of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In some cases, however, it might be possible or more appropriate to charge the individual with another offence on the statute book.
The aim of the aggravating factor in clauses 16 to 18 is to ensure that in such scenarios the state threats element is acknowledged in court and offenders are sentenced accordingly. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in cases where the foreign power condition—to which I have referred a number of times in Committee—is satisfied. Currently, if someone is convicted of an offence and it is known that the offence was linked to state threats activity, the judge may take that into account, but there is no formal mechanism to require the judge to factor that in when making a sentencing decision, and there are no clear definitions to enable the court to apply that consistently. This is in contrast to terrorism, where there is already a statutory requirement to acknowledge a terrorist connection when considering the seriousness of certain offences. That has been effective in cases such as those of the murder of Jo Cox MP, and Lee Rigby, where the seriousness of the offences was aggravated by the sentencing judge because of the terrorist connection, so a higher sentence was imposed.
The Government believe that the state threats aggravating factor should be available in relation to any offence. A state threat is a unique national security threat that can take a wide range of forms. We must ensure that our justice system is able to acknowledge all forms that such activity might take, and be able to penalise it accordingly.
Clause 19 ensures that the aggravating factor can apply to those who are convicted of offences in service courts. The service courts system applies to those who are bound by the Armed Forces Act 2006—for example, serving members of the armed forces. The state threats aggravating factor will apply in the same way in service courts as it does in civilian courts, in that if an offender pleads guilty to or is found guilty of an offence—for example, theft—and the foreign power condition is met, the offender’s sentence will be aggravated accordingly.
Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)
I support the proposals. My concern, which is one I will express throughout the passage of the Bill, is the Bill’s relationship with the Official Secrets Act 1989, under which the maximum penalty is two years. The Minister or his officials might not know the answer now, but I am happy for him to write to me. How will the two Acts intersect? Clearly, if someone has committed an offence, they will want to be found guilty under the Official Secrets Act, under which the sentencing powers are limited, as opposed to under the Act that this Bill will become. That will be the problem with the Bill—I still cannot understand why the Government did not do both: what they promised, which was the full reform, and a Bill for a new Official Secrets Act.
Stephen McPartland
As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are reforming the first three Official Secrets Acts, but not the 1989 Act, with the Bill. We will write to him with the information to explain how that is going to work.
In summary, the aggravating factor provides another tool for prosecutors to deploy, and helps to future-proof the Bill by ensuring that our judicial system can respond to any evolving state threats and activity in the future.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Ali. I very much welcome your early judgment call on jacket wearing; we are all eternally grateful.
Clause 16, as the Minister outlined, inserts new section 69A into the sentencing code to provide a new aggravating factor for sentencing when the foreign power condition is met in relation to an offence. The court will make its determination on the basis of the usual information before it for the purposes of sentencing, which may include the evidence heard at trial or evidence heard at a Newton hearing following a guilty plea. If the court determines that the foreign power condition is met in relation to conduct that constitutes the offence, it must treat that as an aggravating factor when sentencing the offender and must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
We are introducing a measure that will mean that, if an individual is found guilty of an offence that is not outlined in the Bill, but the foreign power condition can be proven, a judge may aggravate their sentence. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary provided a serious recent example to highlight why she felt the measure was needed, and we very much recognise the merit in that.
However, I note that a sentence would be aggravated only up to the maximum available for the original offence. I have sought a legal opinion about whether there is a precedent for aggravating an offence beyond the maximum sentence where deemed appropriate. Although the judge ultimately has discretion to sentence beyond the sentencing guidelines, it is far from common practice and will be subject to appeal.
I want to work through the application of the measure. For example, if someone acting on behalf of a foreign state were to commit a section 18 assault against someone who was going to speak at an event against that Government as a means of preventing them from honouring that commitment, it might be possible to prosecute them under some of the new offences in the Bill. If that is not the case and they are prosecuted for the section 18 assault, the foreign power condition having been met and the sentence aggravated, it is still subject only to the maximum sentence for a section 18 assault. I feel that the weight of the very serious sentences in this Bill will not be felt by the perpetrator in that instance.
Will the Minister outline why we are not able to push the sentences under clauses 16, 17 and 18 further? Will he comment on whether the usual so-called early plea discount will be ruled out in cases where the foreign power condition is met?
Clause 17 introduces the measure for offences in Northern Ireland, and clause 18 makes a corresponding provision to the one in clause 16 for sentences to be aggravated where the foreign power condition is met for offences in Scotland. Clause 19 amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make corresponding provision for service courts considering the seriousness of a serious offence for the purposes of sentencing. The case for tougher sentencing is even stronger in those circumstances, given that people serving in the armed forces and acting on behalf of our nation potentially have a level of access to the UK security apparatus that others do not have. We recognise the seriousness and necessity of these measures, and fully support them, but will the Minister address the points I have raised?
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Ali. I have one very short point. I am very supportive of these measures. Clause 18, as we have heard, relates to Scotland. As I understand it, it operates and is drafted similarly to other aggravations in Scottish criminal law. I just want to be absolutely sure that the Government are collaborating closely with the Scottish Government to ensure it fits with the schemes in Scottish criminal law. What discussions has he had with compatriots up there?
Stephen McPartland
I am very grateful for hon. Members’ responses and support for these clauses, and I will try to provide clarity on the points made by the hon. Member for Halifax.
Serious offences that have a state threat component, such as murder and violent offences, already have significant penalties, as the hon. Lady said, and the aggravating factor will therefore allow for those sentences. However, she is right that for lower-level offences such as harassment, stalking or common assault, this would be a useful example of how these powers can be used if someone is not able to use some of the other clauses, so that they can identify that this person is part of the problem, and the person can at least be prosecuted for something, whereas at the moment it would not really be possible to prosecute them.
Also, the aggravating factor allows for an increase in the sentence, but within the sentencing code. The hon. Lady is correct that if it was a one-year sentence under the guidelines, the aggravating factor would be a maximum sentence of one year.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 17 to 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Powers of search etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this, it will be convenient to consider the following: Government amendment 12.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Robust investigative tools are crucial to enable the police effectively to counter threats by state actors, which operate using highly sophisticated means and often have access to significant resources and are skilled in tradecraft.
Clause 20 introduces schedule 2, which provides the police with powers of search and seizure when investigating threats posed by state actors to the UK and its interests. These powers replace the power of search in section 9 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
Under the existing powers and those provided in schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed. This threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity.
Mr Jones
Can the Minister clarify what he means by “reasonable”? I know what it means in law, but I also know that there is a reasonableness test in the existing section 7 of the Act, which the security services say is not enough? So why is it okay here and it is not okay when it comes to clause 23?
Stephen McPartland
The difference is that under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or PACE, the police need to be able to identify in this situation that a crime has been committed, whereas for this measure the police are trying to intervene earlier, so that they can stop a crime from being committed. Effectively, that is what the difference is.
We will debate clause 23 when we get to it—
Stephen McPartland
No, no—we will debate clause 23 when we get to it. I will be very happy to talk about clause 23 then.
Stephen McPartland
No. [Laughter.]
As I was saying, clause 20 introduces schedule 2 to the Bill. Under the existing powers and those provided by schedule 2, the police can act on a reasonable suspicion that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed.
The threshold is a crucial element within the provisions to enable the police to act with the necessary speed to counter state threats activity. General search and seizure powers, such as those provided under PACE, are comparatively restrictive because they do not allow the police to act pre-emptively when there is intelligence to indicate that an offence is about to be committed. So, both the Ministry of Justice in 2014 and the Law Commission in 2020 reviewed the existing power, concluding that it was necessary and that reliance on PACE powers alone would limit the ability of the police to disrupt and investigate state threats.
These powers may only be used to deal with the most serious offences covered by this Bill, as well as where state threats activity involves violence or constitutes a serious threat to life or public safety.
Turning to the powers themselves, part 1 of schedule 2 legislates for powers of search and seizure as they apply in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. They provide for the police to gain access to material likely to be evidence of a relevant act, which covers specific offences or certain acts or threats under the Bill.
Where the relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed the powers in part 1 of this schedule are different, depending on the nature of the material sought to reflect the enhanced safeguards that are required to protect confidential material.
Under paragraph 2, for non-confidential material, the police can obtain a warrant to enter and search premises and to seize and retain material. There are two key conditions that a court must be satisfied are met for such a warrant to be granted: first, that a relevant act has been, or is about to be, committed and, secondly, that the material sought on a premises is likely to be evidence of that act and is not confidential material. Should the police apply for an all-premises warrant, an additional condition applies: it must not be reasonably practicable to set out all the premises that the person of interest occupies or controls, but that may need to be searched. To access confidential material, a production order must be obtained, should this course fail or be unavailable through a warrant.
Holly Lynch
I thank the Minister for his explanation. Clause 20 and schedule 2 deal with the power of entry, search and seizure in relation to the new offences created by part 1 of the Bill. There are a number of powers here that seem largely appropriate and proportionate for the reasons outlined by the Minister.
However, I will press the Minister on paragraphs 3 and 4 of part 1 in schedule 2, on the production orders relating to confidential material. These provisions set out the conditions that must be met in order for a constable to apply to a judge for a confidential material production order. I was listening carefully to what the Minister said on that. The person specified in that order then has to produce, within a specified period, any material that they have in their possession, custody or control.
The specified period is seven days. The clause says that it is seven days unless it appears to the judge that a different period would be appropriate in the particular circumstances of the application. Why is it seven days? Given the seriousness of some of the offences and the consequences of confidential material being in the hands of someone who should not have it—potentially to the benefit of a hostile state—that feels like quite a long period for such material to be able to be used against us. I would be grateful if the Minister explained the rationale for specifying the period as seven days.
My second point is that there is a lot going on in schedule 2, much as there is in schedule 3. While there are provisions for an ongoing review of the powers created by part 2 of the Bill, at clause 49, I think that part 1 should be reviewed by an independent reviewer to safeguard against any unintended consequences once the legislation is enacted. That is why the Opposition have tabled new clause 2; we will make the case for that provision when we reach the appropriate point.
Stuart C. McDonald
I broadly welcome the provisions. As the hon. Member for Halifax said, they are extensive powers, so I am very sympathetic to her suggestion that they should be subject to review in the same way that other parts of the Bill are. I appreciate that those extensive powers are modelled on the equivalent provisions in terrorism legislation. I have no problem with those provisions being borrowed from such legislation, but they need to be justified in their own context. The Minister has usefully set out why exactly they are needed here. The SNP is broadly supportive of that.
I have a couple of questions. I am not familiar with the idea of allowing police officers or sheriffs to order a person to explain material that is seized. I see that is borrowed from terrorism legislation. However, I wonder how that works alongside the right not to require someone to self-incriminate, particularly when there is an emergency power for police officers to require an explanation—if that is not complied with, it can be a criminal offence. I am interested in how that works; I assume it works in the context of the terrorism legislation, but it would be interesting to hear a bit more about that. I am also interested in the idea of what a “great emergency” amounts to. That is not a concept that I have seen before. Are we talking about threat to life and limb, essentially? I am not sure about that.
My only other point is that how the provisions on search and seizure apply depends largely on how the foreign power condition operates. I said at the outset of our debates on clause 1 that I have some difficulties with how broadly some aspects of the term were drawn. For example, the non-governmental organisations I referred to during that debate and journalists working for a foreign state broadcaster can be brought within the foreign power condition, meaning that they are subject to the search-and-seizure powers. We can probably come back to that in the context of clause 1, but it is relevant to our discussion. It could be those people who are searched or who have documents seized under the schedule, including confidential journalistic material.
Those are a couple of points to emphasise, but we broadly support what is in the clause and the schedule.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for Members’ support. To sum up, the important thing is to recognise that between 2017 and 2022, the powers relating to great emergency have been used seven times in England and Wales and once in Scotland, and they have never once been used by a senior police officer during that five-year period. This will not happen weekly or monthly; it will be a very rare event. We are trying to mirror the legislation that has proven to be successful in the Terrorism Act 2000. The seven days figure also mirrors the legislation in that Act. I totally accept the point made by the hon. Member for Halifax: if the judge has the evidence in front of him and wants to make it a different time period, that is then a judicial decision as opposed to any other kind of decision.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Powers of entry, search and seizure
Amendment made: 12, in schedule 2, page 62, line 9, after “rules” insert “and magistrates’ courts rules”.—(Stephen McPartland.)
This amendment enables Northern Ireland magistrates’ courts rules to make provision about proceedings under Schedule 2.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 21
Arrest without warrant
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Currently, the police must rely on the powers of arrest and detention available under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, as we discussed earlier, when tackling state threats activity. In contrast, under the Terrorism Act 2000 the police have enhanced powers to facilitate early disruption and the investigation of acts of terrorism and terrorism-related activity.
The enhanced police powers are available for terrorism investigations and have proven very effective at tackling the threat. We consider the risks posed by state threats to be similar and to require enhanced powers and tools. Clause 21 creates a new arrest power whereby a constable can arrest without a warrant anyone who they reasonably suspect is or has been involved in foreign power threat activity. If an individual is arrested under clause 21, the further provisions in the clause and in schedule 3 will apply. We will debate the latter powers shortly.
The police must currently arrest an individual for a state threats offence under the arrest power in PACE. On arrest under PACE, the constable must specify the offence that the person is suspected of committing or being about to commit. For example, that could be foreign interference under clause 13 or obtaining or disclosing protected information under clause 1. As we all know, state threats actors are highly trained operatives, with police often needing to rely on sensitive intelligence to build their case and understand the threat that the suspect might pose to UK national security.
In some circumstances, police might have evidence to suspect an individual’s involvement in state threats activity but might not yet have the full picture to determine the intended offence. In such circumstances, where police have the intelligence to indicate that state threats activity is imminent, police can deploy the arrest power in order to prevent that person from committing the activity. That early disruption by the police is critical in saving time and ensuring that the activity is not allowed to occur. That prevents harm to UK national security and potentially prevents harm to people’s lives.
The clause is modelled on the similar arrest power that operates under the 2000 Act, which has been shown to be effective in providing the police with an early disruption tool. I ask the Committee to support the clause.
Holly Lynch
The clause provides a power of arrest without warrant and includes provisions about subsequent detention. The explanatory note explains that the provisions are modelled on those in section 41 of and schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, as the Minister said, which give police officers the power to arrest persons suspected of terrorism-related offences without a warrant.
We recognise the importance of granting law enforcement officers this power. The sense within policing is that it will provide the police a window in which to work, in order to undertake the necessary analysis and investigative work needed to confirm if an act of espionage or sabotage has been committed. Once a more substantive offence is established, the person in question must then be arrested for that offence, which would trigger the further relevant detention powers.
I have a query from within law enforcement, which relates to subsection (9). If the warrant for further detention is refused, a person can still be detained in hospital or if they are removed to hospital because they needed medical treatment. I am not aware that any such provision to continue to detain someone on the basis they need medical treatment when the application has been refused exists within any other detention powers. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that point.
Stuart C. McDonald
The provisions are for very significant powers of arrest and people can remain under arrest for a quite striking period of time, so we should be cautious. The key issue for me is subsection (1), because arrest without a warrant is justified not by the suspicion of a specific event set out in the Bill, but by involvement in foreign power threat activity. Will the Minister say a little more about why that decision has been made?
We will obviously get to clause 26 and the definition of “foreign power threat activity” soon, but it is a much broader concept than being under suspicion of one of the particular offences in the Bill. It could be somebody providing assistance or support to individuals, or known to be involved in certain types of conduct. Why have these powers of arrest without warrant been drafted differently compared with the powers on search and seizure? The search-and-seizure powers relate to specific offences under the Bill. The power of arrest without warrant applies to a much broader category of people. Given the significance of the powers, and how long people can be detained for, it is important that we push the Minister a little bit further on why the Bill has been drafted in this way.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the contributions and the general support. On safeguards, the powers mirror the powers in the Terrorism Act 2000, which are very important and have proven to be very disruptive, as well as useful and effective in keeping the country safe. It is critical that the police have strong powers of arrest and I outlined the reasons for that. Currently, a person can be detained for 24 hours. These provisions allow a detention for 48 hours, which would have to be reviewed periodically after 12 hours, so there are safeguards. The provisions mirror the 2000 Act, which has proven very effective and very disruptive.
On the question asked by the hon. Member for Halifax, the detention clock stops if the individual goes to hospital. If a warrant is refused, they can only be detained for 48 hours. These may appear to be very significant powers, but a person is not going to be held for a huge number of days.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Detention Under Section 21
Holly Lynch
I beg to move amendment 45, in schedule 3, page 70, line 27, at end insert—
“(1A) A place designated by the Secretary of State under sub-paragraph (1) must be subject to an independent inspection by—
(a) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, or
(b) a different person or body appointed by the Secretary of State.”
I will speak to amendment 45, tabled in my name and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper). I will also address the wider schedule 3 powers.
The amendment reflects the place of detention powers at the start of schedule 3, which gives the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. The Minister’s predecessor was asked repeatedly whether he could clarify what types of buildings could be designated places of detention beyond police stations on Second Reading. In response, he said:
“I do not think that this is an appropriate forum in which to discuss the detail of such measures, but I hope I can reassure my hon. Friend on that particular point. As I have said, this is to allow for cases in which such capacity is required owing to operational need, and it cannot be outside the United Kingdom.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2022; Vol. 715, c. 636.]
I am still not convinced about the provisions based on that response.
Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)
The provisions in paragraph 1(1) of schedule 3 give the Secretary of State the power to designate places at which persons may be detained under section 21. However, sub-paragraph (2) states that in the entire schedule a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place that the Secretary of State has designated. That means that as long as the Secretary of State says, “I designate this place”, any building in the UK—it does not even say “building”—or any place can be a police station. Can that possibly be adequate and correct?
Holly Lynch
My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. I was just about to say that operational need provided a reason for the appalling asylum accommodation provided by the Home Office during the pandemic, and we now know that the official guidance was ignored. That leads to a great deal of concern about the ability to designate any type of building as a place suitable to detain somebody.
To introduce some safeguards, we propose an amendment whereby any such place designated as a place of detention must be subject to an inspection regime. We have given the Government some discretion to determine who the most appropriate body to do that would be, given the absence of any steer at all, as my hon. Friend has just said, about what type of buildings might be used. Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue might be the most obvious choice. I hope the Minister will reflect on that and adopt our sensible and measured proposal.
Schedule 3 is massive—32 pages of powers. To consider the implications of it all once enacted is an enormous undertaking. That is why I come back to this principle when making the case for new clause 2.
Mr Jones
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Ali. I have some sympathy with the amendment as I am always against things that give Ministers or the Executive broad powers. As my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax has already said, the powers seem to be unlimited. We are talking about national security and the confidence that we should have in our agencies to act in our interests, with the best of intentions and proper oversight, so the amendment is important. What does “any site in the UK” mean? My hon. Friend said that that was quite a broad power, and I want to ask about sites in the UK that are not under the control of the UK Government, such as US sites. Could Mildenhall airbase, a US airbase in the UK, be designated as one of these sites? I raise that because it limits UK authorities’ oversight and jurisdiction.
People may ask why that is important, but I am very conscious that we should always ensure that civil servants, Ministers and others have historical knowledge and take into account what happened in the past. I served on the Intelligence and Security Committee when we did our inquiry into detainee mistreatment and rendition in 2018. I have to say, it did not make for pretty reading. We did not shy away from the facts, and the actions of our agencies and certain Ministers—including some Ministers in the Government I served in—did not come out of that report very well. Guidance and regulations were put in place to ensure that did not happen again. I would like some clarity about whether such bases could be designated under this measure? Some of those sites could potentially have been used for what the ISC report on rendition highlights. They certainly were abroad, but this is about sites that are actually in the UK.
Stephen McPartland
I looked at the amendment in a lot of detail, and I discussed it with my officials and challenged them. I think the hon. Member for Halifax makes a very, very important point and has a strong case, and she will be delighted to know that, although I will resist the amendment today, I will commit to consider it and whether the Bill should clarify that only sites located in the UK can be designated as places of detention. I share her concerns about the possibility of rendition and stuff outside the UK. I will go into a bit more detail for her, and hopefully that will help the right hon. Member for North West Durham—
Stephen McPartland
Sorry—North Durham.
I am grateful for the way the hon. Member for Halifax has tried to help us improve the Bill. She has been constructive throughout.
Paragraph 1 provides a delegated power for the Secretary of State to designate places where someone may be detained after arrest for foreign power threat activity under clause 21. If arrested under PACE, suspects are taken to a designated police station and held in a custody cell, unless they are being questioned, when they will be in an interview room. When arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000, suspects are taken to a TACT custody suite. If a TACT suite is not available—for example, because the nearest one is located too far away—as an alternative a police station can be used.
There are five TACT suites in England and Wales, one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland. Currently, they are all located inside police stations. Police use TACT suites in the first instance because they are designed to hold suspects for longer periods and address their specific personal needs. They are also designed to take into account the operational requirements for handling those suspects. For example, they are bigger and they ensure that, when multiple arrests have been made, suspects cannot communicate with other. The staff are also specially trained to deal with those types of suspects.
Under the designation power in paragraph 1, the Secretary of State will issue a certificate to the chief officer in charge of a facility to affirm its accreditation. The designation will be published through the routine Home Office circular update, so it will be publicly available to view. In order for a facility to be designated, it must meet the technical standards of custody suites set by the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. The power means that a bespoke custody suite or other suitable facilities built or identified in the future outside a police station, where they meet the standards above, can be designated as a place of detention by the Secretary of State. That is just future-proofing.
Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services already independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces. It already regularly inspects police custody conditions and, in 2019, published a joint inspection with Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons of TACT custody suites in England and Wales.
Maria Eagle
The Minister has just given a great deal more information than is written in the Bill. Paragraph 1(1) states:
“The Secretary of State may designate places”,
and, at sub-paragraph (2), that
“a reference to a police station includes a reference to any place”
so designated. That could be a square in the middle of a field. Will the Minister consider inserting into the legislation some of the detail that he has just put on the record to make it clear that a specific power is being taken to designate more custody suites?
Stephen McPartland
As I have said, I am very interested in the amendment and am looking at possibly doing something along similar lines. I am trying to get the facts out. I heard what was said about the response on Second Reading so I am trying to be open and transparent and to put stuff on the record, in the official record of the sitting. I am doing the best that I can to be open, so that people are not concerned about rendition or people being taken overseas.
Maria Eagle
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I am glad to hear about the amendment, but that is of course about inspecting such places. As he is doing more work, does he mind also taking away the suggestion that I have just made? He might like to make it clearer in the legislation that we are talking about custody suites and not about squares of ground in the middle of a field or any other such place.
Stephen McPartland
I am always happy to take away the hon. Lady’s suggestions.
My initial concern with the amendment is that, as drafted, it adds little value, just a statutory requirement for Her Majesty’s inspectorate to fulfil a role it is doing already. I note all the concerns of hon. Members, however—
Stephen McPartland
I have given the right hon. Gentleman the blink and he still wants to intervene.
Mr Jones
It takes a lot to get that in a Bill Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood is right—this needs clarifying in the Bill. When the Minister goes away to think about it, will he look at and ask officials about the issue of those sites that are in the UK, but outside the control of Her Majesty’s Government? I will not say too much, but we occasionally work with organisations and countries in certain places in the UK, but do not control what goes on there. Will he reflect that when doing his work?
Stephen McPartland
I will come back to the right hon. Gentleman on that. As I have said, we will be designating sites and that information will be publicly available. I am not sure that he would want to make the information about the sites he mentions publicly available.
Mr Jones
But that is not what the Bill says at the moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood said. It gives sweeping powers to designate things, and I am always against giving such sweeping powers to the Executive—whether it is the present Government or the Government I was a member of—or to anyone. When the Minister comes back, clarification would be welcome, even if that is for the Bill to require publication.
Stephen McPartland
I hear what the right hon. Gentleman says. If the hon. Member for Halifax is kind enough to withdraw the amendment, I commit to considering it further. I will look to provide further clarity in the legislation.
Holly Lynch
I am very grateful to the Minister for the spirit in which he has responded, taking our concerns about this element of the Bill seriously. I am reassured by his commitment, that he understands what we are trying to achieve with the amendment and that he will seek the best way to deliver that in the Bill.
Slightly separately, the clarity and detail that he has been able to provide about the minimum standards for the places of detention were welcome. In addition to putting that on the record today, however, I think that he has understood the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood on the need for it to be put on the face of the Bill and that he will continue to have a positive personal impact on some of the detail of the provisions. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephen McPartland
I beg to move amendment 13, in schedule 3, page 81, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert—
“(3) In any other case, paragraph 19 material must be destroyed unless it is retained under any power conferred by paragraphs 20 or 21.”
This amendment and Amendments 15, 18 and 22 make provision for the indefinite retention of fingerprints, data and other samples taken from a person who is or previously has been convicted of a specified offence.
Stephen McPartland
As we have discussed, clause 21 provides for a state threats power of arrest. If an individual is arrested under that power, the further provisions in schedule 3 will apply. As part of that, schedule 3 provides for a new regime whereby biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA profiles, that are collected on arrest for foreign power threat activity may be retained for an initial period of three years, with the option to extend the retention period for a further two years where considered necessary. A similar provision is made in schedule 9 for those subject to state threats prevention and investigation measures, or STPIMS. These are the same timeframes and procedures that operate for arrest under the Terrorism Act 2000—once again, we are trying to mirror the terrorism legislation.
The group covers a number of technical Government amendments to the biometric regimes in schedules 3 and 9. I turn first to amendments 13, 15, 18, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 36, which relate to the indefinite retention of biometric data in certain circumstances. Again, the amendments put the new retention regime in line with what already operates for arrests made under PACE and the Terrorism Act. The law rightly sets strict limits on how long biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, can be retained where a person is investigated but ultimately not convicted of an offence. In certain circumstances, including under the Bill, biometric data taken in the course of an investigation can be retained for longer periods, and further retention of that data can be authorised, but the principle is that the data will be deleted unless further retention is specifically provided for. Where a person has been previously convicted of an offence, their biometric data can be retained indefinitely, subject to the requirement for ongoing review that is set out in the Data Protection Act 2018.
Both the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Terrorism Act 2000 allow for the indefinite retention of biometric data taken during an investigation, if it is found that an individual has previously been convicted of a recordable offence. This means that if an individual has previously been convicted of any offence that could carry a term of imprisonment, their biometric data taken during any new investigation can be held on the police national database indefinitely, irrespective of the outcome of that new investigation.
Maria Eagle
Generally, these are very sensible measures. There has obviously been some major redrafting of the schedule for the Government amendments to be necessary, and it would be interesting to hear why that is. I am looking at Government amendment 18, which says:
“For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if…the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity”.
Why is that instance included here? The person has been found not guilty by reason of insanity. They have not admitted the offence, unlike in the situation described in proposed new paragraph 20A(1)(a)(i), whereby a person has received a caution and admitted the offence. By contrast, this person has been found not guilty.
Stephen McPartland
I know, and I will write to the hon. Lady, because I do not know the answer.
As we have already discussed in Committee, state threats activity poses a serious and enduring risk to UK security, and the Bill must provide law enforcement agencies with the tools they need to combat hostile activity. Indefinite retention of biometric data enables the police and the security services to use the data to support investigations into state threats offences and other criminal activity. That mirrors the approach taken in PACE and the Terrorism Acts.
Given that threat, it is right that where an individual with a previous conviction for a recordable offence is arrested under the state threats arrest power in clause 21, or is subject to a STPIMs notice, biometric data taken under those regimes should be retained indefinitely. Accordingly, the amendments provide for indefinite retention of biometric data in these circumstances in schedules 3 and 9 respectively.
Out of an abundance of caution, the provisions were not included when the Bill was introduced while we considered the questions raised by the Gaughran judgment. Based on the UK response to that judgment, I am pleased to confirm to the Committee that these provisions are indeed compatible with the European convention on human rights and, therefore, should be included in the Bill.
As highlighted, state threats investigations can be complex and resource-intensive. By bringing forward the amendments, we are strengthening the ability of the police to use biometric data to support criminal investigations. Not agreeing to the amendments would create a position where the police’s ability to retain biometric data of a person with a previous recordable conviction would be more restricted than in other cases.
Aligning our approach with that of TACT and PACE ensures consistency in respect of biometric regimes. The requirement for ongoing review of retention, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 2018, ensures that interference with the right to respect the private and family life of persons to whom the data belongs is necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. I will now speak briefly to the remaining amendments in the group, which are comparatively minor and technical.
Stuart C. McDonald
Before the Minister moves on, I get the general thrust of why those amendments have been tabled but my concern is the inclusion of people who have accepted a caution or even a youth caution. It seems quite extreme to make them subject to lifelong retention of significant information on them. They have not been tried and the fact that they have had a caution means that, presumably, the circumstances were not the most serious. Does he have anything to say about those circumstances?
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the intervention. What we are trying to do is to mirror what is in TACT and PACE to keep the regimes identical so there are not different ones for different areas. Obviously, if someone has accepted a caution, they have in essence accepted that they were guilty of an offence—they have just not proceeded to court.
Maria Eagle
Would not an additional safeguard in those circumstances be to ensure that before a youth caution is offered and accepted in any given case, it is made clear to the individual concerned that if they were to accept it, it would mean the retention of their data for their entire life? In those circumstances, the individual concerned could consider whether they really wanted to accept the caution or go for a trial.
Stephen McPartland
The hon. Lady makes an important point. I would add that it is “may” be held indefinitely not “will”. There is still an element of choice and discretion.
Maria Eagle
The Minister is correct about that, but perhaps the individual who may be considering accepting a youth caution and their adviser ought to be advised, before they do so, that there “may” be a consequence of biometric data and so on being kept for that person’s entire life, so they can make a proper decision about whether they want to accept the caution in full knowledge of the potential consequences.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that that what happens under TACT and PACE, and that would be the intention for what would happen under this legislation, so the regimes mirror each other.
Amendments 16 and 17 to schedule 3 separate the reference to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland from those in England and Wales in the list of chief officers who can extend the period of biometric retention. They make no practical change to the provisions.
Amendments 14, 25 and 27 address some unnecessary duplication in the list of databases against which biometric data obtained under the powers in schedules 3 and 9 can be searched. Amendment 26 provides that data obtained under the powers in schedule 9 can be searched against data taken under the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
Holly Lynch
Having heard the Minister’s detailed explanation for this group of Government amendments, I will come back to the issues in the slightly wider discussion on schedule 3, which is the next proceeding.
Stuart C. McDonald
I do not need to say much more. The Minister understands from my intervention that I have some reservations about the lifelong retention of the materials. I shall give that further thought. Other parts of the relevant amendment are perfectly sensible, so I will not oppose the amendment at this stage. Further thought should be given to it, though. The Government have explained a number of times how they are copying what is in the counter-terrorism legislation, which is fine and understandable but does not in of it itself justify the measures in this sphere of behaviour. I will look at the matter again. I want to put on the record that I am slightly uneasy about that type of provision.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the support for the amendments.
Amendment 13 agreed to.
Amendments made: 14, in schedule 3, page 82, line 22, leave out “or 42”.
This amendment removes reference to paragraph 42 of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 from a list of provisions under which fingerprints, data and other samples may be taken. Reference to paragraph 42 is not needed because its contents are already covered by paragraph (e).
Amendment 15, in schedule 3, page 82, line 26, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
“(2) Paragraph 19 material may be retained indefinitely if—
(a) the person has previously been convicted—
(i) of a recordable offence (other than a single exempt conviction), or
(ii) in Scotland, of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) the person is so convicted before the end of the period within which the material may be retained by virtue of this paragraph.
(2A) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) the reference to a recordable offence includes an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute—
(i) a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there, or
(ii) a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there,
(and, in the application of sub-paragraph (2) where a person has previously been convicted, this applies whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) the reference to an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment includes an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence under the law of Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment if done there (and, in the application of sub-paragraph (2) where a person has previously been convicted, this applies whether or not the act constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(2B) Paragraph 19 material may be retained until the end of the retention period specified in sub-paragraph (3) if—
(a) the person has no previous convictions, or
(b) the person has only one exempt conviction.”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 16, in schedule 3, page 83, line 37, leave out “and Northern Ireland”.
This amendment and Amendment 17 clarify the identity of the specified chief officer of police in Northern Ireland.
Amendment 17, in schedule 3, page 84, line 5, at end insert “, and
(c) the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, where—
(i) the person from whom the material was taken resides in Northern Ireland, or
(ii) the chief constable believes that the person is in, or is intending to come to, Northern Ireland.”
See Amendment 16.
Amendment 18 in schedule 3, page 84, line 5, at end insert—
“20A (1) For the purposes of paragraph 20, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if—
(a) in relation to a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland—
(i) the person has been given a caution or youth caution in respect of the offence which, at the time of the caution, the person has admitted,
(ii) the person has been found not guilty of the offence by reason of insanity, or
(iii) the person has been found to be under a disability and to have done the act charged in respect of the offence,
(b) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has accepted or has been deemed to accept—
(i) a conditional offer under section 302 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(ii) a compensation offer under section 302A of that Act,
(iii) a combined offer under section 302B of that Act, or
(iv) a work offer under section 303ZA of that Act,
(c) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been acquitted on account of the person’s insanity at the time of the offence or (as the case may be) by virtue of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
(d) a finding in respect of the person has been made under section 55(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment,
(e) the person, having been given a fixed penalty notice under section 129(1) of the Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 in connection with an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has paid—
(i) the fixed penalty, or
(ii) (as the case may be) the sum which the person is liable to pay by virtue of section 131(5) of that Act, or
(f) the person, in relation to an offence in Scotland punishable by imprisonment, has been discharged absolutely by order under section 246(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
(2) Paragraph 20 and this paragraph, so far as they relate to persons convicted of an offence, have effect despite anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 or the Rehabilitation of Offenders (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 (S.I. 1978/1908 (N.I. 27)).
(3) But a person is not to be treated as having been convicted of an offence if that conviction is a disregarded conviction or caution by virtue of section 92 or 101A of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph 20—
(a) a person has no previous convictions if the person has not previously been convicted—
(i) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence, or
(ii) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, and
(b) if the person has previously been convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence, other than a qualifying offence, committed when the person was under 18 years of age.
(5) In sub-paragraph (4) ‘qualifying offence’—
(a) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 65A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in respect of a recordable offence committed in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 53A of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)).
(6) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)—
(a) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in England and Wales of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of England and Wales if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(b) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Northern Ireland of a recordable offence if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute a recordable offence under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(c) a person is to be treated as having previously been convicted in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment if—
(i) the person has previously been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, and
(ii) the act constituting the offence would constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment under the law of Scotland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted);
(d) the reference in sub-paragraph (4)(b) to a qualifying offence includes a reference to an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom where the act constituting the offence would constitute a qualifying offence under the law of England and Wales if done there or (as the case may be) under the law of Northern Ireland if done there (whether or not it constituted such an offence when the person was convicted).
(7) For the purposes of paragraph 20 and this paragraph—
(a) ‘offence’, in relation to any country or territory outside the United Kingdom, includes an act punishable under the law of that country or territory, however it is described;
(b) a person has in particular been convicted of an offence under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom if—
(i) a court exercising jurisdiction under the law of that country or territory has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is not guilty by reason of insanity, or
(ii) such a court has made in respect of such an offence a finding equivalent to a finding that the person is under a disability and did the act charged against the person in respect of the offence.
(8) If a person is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purposes of calculating under paragraph 20 whether the person has been convicted of only one offence.”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 19, in schedule 3, page 84, line 21, at end insert—
“(ca) the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,
(cb) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or”.
This amendment enables the Chief Constables of the Ministry of Defence Police and the British Transport Police Force to make a national security determination in relation to fingerprints, data and other samples.
Amendment 20, in schedule 3, page 89, line 36, leave out paragraphs (j) to (l).
This amendment removes reference to the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Military Police and the Royal Air Force Police from the definition of “police force”. Those forces should not be included in that definition because members of those forces do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 3.
Amendment 21, in schedule 3, page 90, leave out lines 1 to 3.
This amendment removes reference to the tri-service serious crime unit from the definition of “police force”. Members of that unit should not be included in that definition because they do not have the power to obtain fingerprints, data or other samples under Schedule 3.
Amendment 22, in schedule 3, page 90, line 3, at end insert—
“‘recordable offence’ —
(a) in relation to a conviction in England and Wales, has the meaning given by section 118(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and
(b) in relation to a conviction in Northern Ireland, has the meaning given by Article 2(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12));”
See Amendment 13.
Amendment 23, in schedule 3, page 90, leave out lines 6 to 24 and insert—
“‘responsible chief officer of police’ means—
(a) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;
(b) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the British Transport Police Force, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;
(c) otherwise—
(i) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in England or Wales, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief officer of police for the relevant police area;
(ii) in relation to relevant physical data or samples taken or provided in Scotland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland;
(iii) in relation to fingerprints or samples taken in Northern Ireland, or a DNA profile derived from a sample so taken, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.”
This amendment and Amendment 24 make provision identifying the responsible chief officer of police in relation to fingerprints or samples taken by a constable of the Ministry of Defence Police or the British Transport Police Force.
Amendment 24, in schedule 3, page 90, line 24, at end insert—
“(2) In the definition of ‘responsible chief officer of police’ in sub-paragraph (1), in paragraph (c)(i), ‘relevant police area’ means the police area—
(a) in which the material concerned was taken, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, in which the sample from which the DNA profile was derived was taken.”—(Stephen McPartland.)
See Amendment 23.
Question proposed, That schedule 3, as amended, be the Third schedule to the Bill.
Holly Lynch
I want to conclude some earlier remarks that I made as part of the discussion on amendment 45 and the discussion on some of the Government amendments. There is an awful lot going on in schedule 3. I repeat the point: it is massive—it is 32 pages of powers. An ongoing consideration of the implications of all those powers is quite a significant undertaking. That is why I come back to making the case for new clause 2, which would ensure that part 1 of the Bill is subject to the same ongoing scrutiny as part 2, under clause 49, and as counter-terrorism legislation, which a great deal of this Bill is already based on.
We have talked about part 1 of the schedule; the delay in the exercise of rights under part 2 should also be kept under review, alongside the points about the retention of biometrics that were made by right hon. and hon. Members. Even if the Minister cannot share with the Committee some justification for all the measures today, I very much hope he will discuss that further with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the deliberations on the Bill that he has promised to have with the ISC.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her support. I know that we will debate things later on. As I have said, we are currently in discussions about how we can securely provide further information to help to provide further clarity. I cannot say more than that.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 3, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 22
Border security
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen McPartland
Under schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and, if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through the UK border. As part of a schedule 3 examination, counter-terrorism police are able to retain protected materials by following a lengthy authorisation process. Protected materials include confidential business and journalistic material, as well as legally privileged material. The powers are a vital tool for counter-terrorism police and form part of a range of national security checks that enable the determination of whether a person at a UK port or border area has current or previous involvement in hostile state activity.
The use of protected materials in investigations, particularly confidential business material, can be a helpful insight into a person’s involvement in hostile state activity, whether it be espionage or a disinformation campaign. To use protected materials seized during a schedule 3 examination, an examining officer must currently seek authorisation from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is a serving or retired High Court judge. In most cases, the material must not be examined or used for investigations until authorisation has been granted. Currently, that can take up to six weeks.
Clause 22 will remove the definition of confidential business material—material defined as acquired in the course of trade—from the definition of protected material under schedule 3. This will remove the requirement for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to authorise the retention of copies of confidential business material. The Bill will replace that authorisation process with a new safeguard: the requirement for a counter-terrorism police officer of at least the rank of superintendent to authorise access to such material.
The clause will bring the schedule 3 safeguards for confidential material into line with those that apply to schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. It will mean that police do not face lengthy and unnecessary delays to examining material in a schedule 3 stop.
Mr Jones
I have some sympathy with this clause; the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has a big job on their hands anyway. I wonder whether the Minister could say whether he has given any thought to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner not just looking at the material and giving it authorisation but having retrospective powers to dip in and see whether things have been done correctly.
Stephen McPartland
I will take that idea away and consider it. We do not want to enable somebody at the border to say that something is confidential material so that the police cannot look at it for up to six weeks. That would just be the easiest defence. We are dealing with incredibly sophisticated experts and they will know what to say to ensure that the material will be held in abeyance.
The Government are only amending the safeguards for confidential business material and will not change the authorisation safeguard for other material within the definition of protected material or confidential journalistic material, for which judicial authorisation is a proportionate safeguard. I am sure Members agree that it is only right that the security services should be able to use critical information in real time during a schedule 3 examination to address live national security risks posed to the UK. I assure Members that this essential amendment to schedule 3 to the 2019 Act will strengthen and streamline state threats investigations to disrupt and deter hostile state activity.
Holly Lynch
The drafting of clause 22 is complicated and I have had to speak to a number of experts to try to unravel it. It amends schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019, as the Minister outlined. In essence, it allows examining officers a right to confidential material that would currently require the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I am grateful to the commissioner, Sir Brian Leveson, in his capacity as the independent reviewer of schedule 3, and his office for their insight on the clause.
If I have understood it correctly—I am sure the Minister will correct me if I have not—the clause amends schedule 3 to the 2019 Act to reflect the position of schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Schedule 3 subjects are far more likely to possess confidential business records than those stopped under schedule 7. That means the requirement for judicial approval is engaged in the majority of schedule 3 stops. It is therefore important to assess whether the requirement for a judicial authorisation in such cases is necessary and proportionate, taking into account both the sensitivity of the category of protected material and the purpose of the statute specifically to counter hostile state activity.
The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office said
“We are not aware of any other statute that requires judicial authorisation for the retention of confidential business records acquired direct from a person in a public setting such as a port”.
The closest is perhaps schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, commonly known as PACE, although this is restricted to material on private premises. There is no requirement in PACE to seek judicial authorisation to seize or retain confidential business material found during the search of a person in a public place, or if such material is unexpectedly encountered on private premises.
Confidential business records are protected in PACE as “special procedure material” because they have a degree of special sensitivity that Parliament has decided merits certain access requirements in the context of criminal investigations. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 does not include any similar requirement for judicial authorisation to acquire confidential business records using covert investigatory powers. The sensitivity of this category of material is not the same as that of legally privileged or journalistic material, the safeguards for which will not be affected by the proposed amendment to schedule 3—I hope the Minister can confirm that that is the case.
The statutory purposes in schedule 3 go well beyond criminal investigations and include national security or protecting life and limb. On that basis, it seems unlikely that the interests of the business, trade or profession would outweigh the interests of national security in any circumstances, or that judicial authorisation should be necessary for the retention and use of confidential business records in circumstances that might prevent death or serious injury.
Having considered those points in the round, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has concluded that the Home Office’s proposals to replace judicial authorisation for confidential business records with one of internal authorisation from a senior officer strike the right balance and align the definition of confidential material with that of the 2016 Act. Inevitably, that view has very much shaped our judgement on clause 22, but I suggest that it is another area where keeping the provisions under review to mitigate any unintended consequences is the responsible thing to do.
Let me turn to who has the powers to make and retain copies of confidential material. Page 35 of the explanatory notes outline that “examining officers” have that power. However, schedule 7 to the 2000 Act defines an examining officer as a constable, immigration officer or a customs officer. In paragraph (j) of the policy background section of the explanatory notes, it states that part 1 amends schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019
“to allow counter-terrorism police officers to retain copies of confidential business material…without the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. This will allow counter-terrorism police to progress operations and investigations into state threats…at the required pace and reflects the position in schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000”.
Paragraph 17 of schedule 3 to the 2019 Act, on the power to make and retain copies, confirms that the examining officer, only when they are “a constable”, can retain copies when necessary and potentially needed as evidence in criminal proceedings. The references to various different roles in the different supporting documents to the Bill make it a bit of a mess. I was listening carefully to the Minister, but I would like further clarity about who has the powers. Given that we have references to examining officers—who can have different roles—to counter-terrorism police specifically and to an examining officer who can be a constable, I wonder whether the Minister can tidy it up for us on the record and be explicit about who has the powers at the border.
Stephen McPartland
My understanding is that the amendment of the authorisation safeguards to access confidential business material in schedule 3 brings it completely into line with other policing powers. It is not likely that access to confidential business material would be subject to a higher level of safeguarding where there is already consistent precedent set by PACE 1984, the IPA 2016 and schedule 7 to the 2000 Act. As we have said, it does not affect legal, profession or journalistic material, and the provisions are reviewed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as part of their statutory function. Only trained counter-terrorism officers will be able to use the powers. I hope that provides the clarity that the hon. Lady requires.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)
Thursday 14th July 2022
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate National Security Act 2023 View all National Security Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
The Minister for Security (Stephen McPartland)
This is the clause that many of us have been looking forward to. I am not going to take interventions during my speech; I will set out the reasons why I believe the clause is correct, then I will listen carefully to speeches from hon. Members and then sum up.
Collaboration with key international partners is a vital part of intelligence and national security work. We cannot maximise our national security capabilities and keep people safe without sharing intelligence and benefiting from the capabilities and expertise of our close and trusted allies. Those individuals who work on behalf of the UK are highly skilled and experienced in ensuring that UK activity is necessary and proportionate. Domestic and international law is applied to all activities and there are robust safeguards in place.
The Serious Crime Act 2007 creates offences when an act is done that is
“capable of encouraging or assisting”
an offence and the person “intends” or believes that their act may encourage or assist an offence. Those offences, which were predominantly introduced to ensure that law enforcement had the tools to tackle those orchestrating serious organised crime, are complex and create an incredibly low threshold for liability. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence that may be encouraged or assisted. The contribution can be small, it can be indirect, and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed.
At present, the UK intelligence community and armed forces are required to apply those complex offences to the many and varied scenarios in which they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. They exercise significant caution in their engagement with partners to prevent SCA thresholds being met and the risk of liability for individuals being realised. The impact of that approach is that vital and otherwise legal intelligence opportunities are currently being delayed or missed as the SCA risks are worked through.
There is also an important point of principle here. The Serious Crime Act offences mean that it is the individuals working within intelligence, security and military organisations who carry the risk of liability, despite operating within all authorisations and in the interests of UK national security.
The Committee heard oral evidence from both Sir Alex Younger, the former head of MI6, and Sir David Omand, the former head of GCHQ, on the fairness and appropriateness of individual officers carrying this risk. They believe that the liability risk sitting with individuals is “not right”, and is “morally wrong”. The Government agree with them and do not think it is right or fair to expect the risk of liability to sit with individuals who are acting on behalf of our intelligence services or armed forces for their authorised purposes. Instead, responsibility should sit with the UK intelligence community and the armed forces at an institutional level, where they are subject to executive, judicial and parliamentary oversight.
The clause removes criminal liability for offences of encouraging or assisting crime, but only where the activity is necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the security and intelligence services or the armed forces in support of activity taking place overseas. This is not a broad general immunity from prosecution; rather we are amending a targeted piece of legislation in response to specific operational issues that are impacting the ability to keep us safe today.
The clause means that in instances where an individual has operated in good faith and in compliance with proper processes they would not face the risk of liability for the offences under the SCA. The risk I have outlined would be removed for activity that we ask of individuals in the course of their roles in keeping us safe.
I am confident that the SCA amendment is appropriate and proportionate, because the UK has one of the most rigorous intelligence oversight regimes in the world. There are myriad safeguards and processes in place that manage the way that UKIC and the MOD work with and exchange information with international partners to prevent potential wrongdoing.
I also have confidence in those we are providing protection to. They are expert and highly trained men and women undertaking intelligence and security work, whose judgment and skill we should respect and have faith in. Of course, those working with our international partners will still need to comply with all other domestic and international law and be beholden to the statutory frameworks and policies that govern the UK intelligence community and armed forces activity.
The policies include the overseas security and justice assistance guidance and the Fulford principles, the implementation of which is assessed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner annually and reported to the Prime Minister. That means that clause 23 does not in any way make torture legal, for example. UKIC’s activities also remain under the regular inspection of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—
Stephen McPartland
I am not giving way. And they are regularly scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee.
Stephen McPartland
The right hon. Gentleman will have the opportunity to make his own speech, and I will listen.
Let me also be clear that clause 23 will not enable activity by individuals who, acting outside the proper functions of their organisations, contribute to criminal activity by others or commit criminal offences themselves. We will retain the ability to prosecute anyone for other offences should their behaviour in support of international partners amount to a criminal offence. Further, it will not remove the ability to challenge the UK intelligence community or armed forces on their activities through judicial review, civil damages claims, or a complaint to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in relation to the use of intrusive powers.
To conclude, clause 23 is really about supporting UKIC and armed forces officers, who we ask to undertake vital work on our behalf, by ensuring that when they work with our partners in good faith, according to wider domestic and international law, and in support of vital national security aims to keep this country safe, they do not risk personal criminal liability for any actions of that partner state. Responsibility for any action that we cannot support should surely sit at an institutional level, which is what will be the case under clause 23.
Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)
It will come as no surprise to the Minister—we have had the opportunity to discuss this—that we are extremely concerned about clause 23, which amends the Serious Crime Act 2007. We have had the opportunity to discuss this privately with the Minister and his predecessor, and with the UK intelligence community directly, and I am minded of just how much detail of those conversations we might want to put on the record. The clause was a big focus for Members from across the House on Second Reading. As the Minister knows, crucially, it did not have the support of members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which has statutory responsibility for oversight of the UK intelligence community.
The Labour Party will always work with the intelligence services to find solutions to any barriers that they face in undertaking their invaluable work and keeping the UK safe. As things stand, we have been unable to get an operational understanding of exactly what is broken and requires fixing. I have heard directly from the security services about why they believe they need clause 23—the Minister has sought to outline that again in his contribution. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act allows for a risk of liability to individuals conducting their proper functions on behalf of the UK intelligence community. An offence can arise where support—for example, intelligence sharing—provided in good faith later makes a small or indirect contribution to unlawful activity by an international partner. The security services are keen to convey that their caution in this regard is having an operational impact that requires a resolution.
Mr Jones
My hon. Friend is outlining the protections. SIS and GCHQ staff also have protection under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, where there is ministerial authorisation. Like her, I struggle to understand what incidents there could be of an individual being liable, if they were covered by these authorisations and the Act that she refers to.
Holly Lynch
My hon. Friend makes an important point, which I will explore in more detail in a second. I go back to the point that the security services have conveyed to us that their caution is having an operational impact, which requires a resolution. We are sympathetic to that. We recognise that a junior member of staff facing that burden of potential liability when carrying out their proper functions under instruction does not feel right. However, I look to the Minister to find a way through the matter that does not involve what can feel somewhat like a gold-plating of exemptions for the security services, which stands to entirely erode appropriate safeguards and due diligence when considering the risks and consequences of sharing information with partners. As the Minister knows, there is an existing reasonableness defence in section 50 of the Serious Crime Act, which recognises that there may be occasions when it could be shown that an individual’s actions were justified in the circumstances.
Maria Eagle
My hon. Friend is right to refer to the defences that already exist because to agree with the clause, we would need to see that the existing offences and defences are not working. There does not seem to be much evidence of that. Section 53 of the Serious Crime Act sets out the factors to be considered in determining whether it is reasonable for a person to act as he did. That includes any purpose or authority he claims to have been acting under. An individual working for our intelligence service has clearly got extensive protection under that existing provision. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Holly Lynch
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As a lawyer, she has a great deal of experience navigating some of this legislation, and she makes a powerful point about the reasonableness defence. In addition, a prosecution would have to be deemed to be in the public interest.
Mr Jones
This morning we saw the Minister use reasonableness in clause 20, but he is not prepared to use it here. Does my hon. Friend agree that reasonableness in law is a well-established notion? Does she find it odd that the Minister relies on it in one clause, but in this one he prefers to say that it will somehow not work?
Holly Lynch
My hon. Friend makes the point that, while we will get into the detail of reasonableness and the concern that it is potentially untested in these circumstances, it is a well-established principle across British law. Again, that certainly supports the robustness of the existing defences around reasonableness. On further probing of these defences, and this is exactly his point, it seems that it is not the case that the reasonableness defence is not strong enough, rather that it is untested in these specific circumstances, as no such case has been brought against the intelligence community. We do not believe that that is a strong enough case for the proposals in clause 23. We hope that properly authorised activity to protect national security would and should be interpreted as being reasonable.
I am not currently satisfied, and neither are members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who we will hear from shortly, that there are grounds to support clause 23 as drafted. I have taken further legal advice, including from a QC with a great deal of experience of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Can the Minister answer the following questions? First, as has been said by the hon. Member for Garston and Halewood, given that we already have section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act—this relates to the serious end of some of what we are talking about here—which allows the Secretary of State to give immunity from civil and criminal liability for pre-authorised crimes abroad, why do we need these changes?
Importantly, the existing scheme requires the UK intelligence community to secure permission from the Secretary of State in advance, requiring their personal approval, with safeguards within the decision-making process and oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who is a senior judge.
Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)
I understand that clause 23 seeks to address a specific operational challenge currently faced by the UK intelligence community and the armed forces. The clause removes criminal liability for the offences of encouraging or assisting crime, but only where that activity is
“necessary for—
(a) the proper exercise of any function of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ, or…the armed forces”
and only in support of activity taking place overseas. That is because in a specific scenario legislation is affecting the ability to collaborate with key partners and achieve legitimate shared national security objectives.
Essentially, we are trying to avoid there being a disincentive to sharing information that makes us safe. Looking at it the other way, we are trying to remove the liability from a brave young officer who is doing their job and keeping us safe.
Ben Everitt
That is probably beyond what I can say here, and indeed beyond what I am aware of. It is one of those situations in which, were I a Minister, I would be happy to write to the hon. Gentleman—but I am not. Far from gold-plating, as referred to by the hon. Member for Halifax, clause 23 does not create a blanket criminal law immunity for our intelligence officers. It does not change the application of other criminal law offences that overlap with those underneath the Serious Crime Act 2007. It provides no change to the UK’s international law obligations.
I assume that the Minister agrees that the approach undertaken in the Bill is more limited and targeted than the approach other key allies have deemed necessary to protect those working on their behalf. Indeed, last week we heard from Alex Younger, the former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service. During his oral evidence he noted that there is an international precedent for such measures. He was referring to Australia; I understand that it was section 41 of the Australian Intelligence Services Act 2001, where there is a much broader immunity. That Act states:
“A staff member or agent of an agency is not subject to any civil or criminal liability for any act done outside Australia if the act is done in the proper performance of a function of the agency.”
Clause 23 is much more limited than that example. Rather than a proposal for wholesale immunity, it will just remove the legal risk for individuals’ actions that are done in good faith and following all authorised processes. That risk should not be underestimated given the chilling effect that we have discussed over the past couple of weeks. That effect can prevent or even delay the sharing of critical intelligence with international partners. Thus, the line of argument that the provision is too broad does not really hold when considered in the context of what our key allies are doing in relation to sharing information.
I express my support for clause 23, and the core principle that this is the right thing to do. We do not expect the current criminal liability of the Serious Crime Act offences to sit with trusted individuals who are conducting authorised, highly sensitive and vital national security work to keep our country safe.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
I rise to support a lot of what the hon. Member for Halifax has said already. Nobody on the Committee doubts the importance of collaboration; we all recognise how crucial that is. I do not think that any of us doubt that the services have approached the Government having identified what they perceive to be a problem, and that the Government are genuinely engaged in trying to resolve that. One of the challenges that we face as parliamentarians is the degree of confidentiality and secrecy that surrounds their operations, which sometimes makes it difficult for us—particularly if we are not members of the Intelligence and Security Committee—to properly understand the nature of the problem and how it can be resolved.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who is a member of the ISC, for clarifying that. For that reason, I am not dead set in my opposition to the clause by any stretch of the imagination—I am open to persuasion. However, we need evidence through the ISC that there is a problem and that clause 23 is the best way to solve it. As matters stand, I cannot say that I have been persuaded of either of those things.
First and foremost, it remains difficult to see how officers of the services in question can commit an offence under the 2007 Act unless they intend an offence to be committed, or, secondly, unless they have a belief that their action will assist an offence. That is a high threshold, even before defences kick in.
We have heard already that the section 50 defence of acting reasonably applies. Given the “purpose” and “authority” under which any action of information sharing would take place, it surely seems very likely that that defence could easily be made out. That point has already been made by a member of the ISC this afternoon. It almost looks like that defence, in section 50(3) of the 2007 Act, was designed with employees of the agencies in mind. The Minister has asserted that the defence is vague, but they seem to be a perfect fit for some of the circumstances that we are considering.
Even if the Minister is correct, perhaps the better response would be to amend the defence, rather than disapplying schedule 4 altogether. It is not clear why it can be argued that the reasonable defence is any more vague than the concept in this clause of
“the proper exercise of any function”.
It is not clear to me what conduct that concept is and is not supposed to cover. We need clear explanations and I do not think we have been given them.
Will the Minister give an example of conduct that is a proper exercise of any function of the services, but that is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore be saved by the Bill? Why is such conduct not able to get over the threshold of the reasonable defence already? Why, as has been asked, is such conduct not able to be authorised under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994? What type of data sharing is subject to this chilling effect and what causes that effect? Is it the remote possibility of data being used for a very serious crime or the significant chance it could be used for a less serious crime? Is it both? Is it neither? It is very hard to get a handle on what precisely the provisions are aimed at.
The Minister knows that concerns were raised on Second Reading about the potential for the clause to have a much more significant effect on actions that could, for example, support rendition or torture. He has set out today and in correspondence that domestic and international law means that such action would not be protected by clause 23. We will give that further consideration, but, in my view, the Government have much more to do to persuade us that there is a real problem here, and one that requires legislative intervention.
Even if a problem does have to be addressed, I am still to be convinced that this is the right response. Are there other options we could look at? Of course there are. For example, in last week’s evidence there appeared to be the suggestion that it was not so much the risk of conviction that was feared, but the risk of an investigation and being dragged to the courts and having to establish a defence of reasonableness. That was one of the problems.
Different things could be done. The clause could be moved around so that it is not a defence, where the burden lies on the person accused. We could make it an intrinsic part of the offence in the first place, so that nobody is dragged to court and has to establish the defence. There are other things that could be done—for example, requiring certain authorisations for prosecutions and so on.
Let us have that discussion, assuming that we can be persuaded that there is a problem here. Are there different ways to address it? For the moment, we remain a little bit in the dark on what precisely the nature of the problem is, and are unconvinced that the provisions in the clause are the best way to resolve any problem that does exist.
Sally-Ann Hart (Hastings and Rye) (Con)
Our intelligence and security services are this country’s frontline of defence, and we need to ensure that they remain the best and most professional in the world. To do that, they need to know that if an individual makes a decision in good faith and in accordance with all relevant procedures, to keep us safe, that individual should not be at risk of criminal liability. That responsibility must lie with the organisation.
Sally-Ann Hart
In a moment.
Last week, Sir Alex Younger, former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, said the issue was a point of principle. Contrary to some alarmist news reports and those opposed to clause 23, Ministers and spies will not be given immunity from committing crimes overseas. Clause 23 does not have any effect on any other criminal offences that might apply to an individual’s actions.
Mr Jones
I thank the Minister for reading his speech very well, but I take issue with the implication of what he said at the end, and I feel a bit annoyed about it.
The implication is that if someone ask questions about clause 23, somehow they are not supportive of our security services. I am the longest serving member on the Intelligence and Security Committee and a former Defence Minister, and I think most people who know me in the House know that if I am anything, I am a supporter of our security services and defence forces. It is therefore a bit churlish for people to argue that asking questions somehow means that I want to inhibit the work of our defence and security services; I certainly do not.
Having been on the ISC since 2017, I am aware of the bravery involved in the difficult jobs of our security services. I never cease to be amazed when I hear about some of the things they do. The general public would have no idea of the difficult judgment calls they sometimes have to make.
However, I am also a big supporter of proper oversight of our security services. We have the ISC, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and that is the web we have in our democracy to ensure that the security services operate legally and that they are supported in what they do. In fact, the director general of MI5 often says in front of the ISC that those three organisations give it the legitimacy to operate. That is a good thing in a democracy, and I agree with him.
What worries me is the justification for why clause 23 is needed. We have heard it before, but we just heard the hon. Member for Milton Keynes North use the phrase “a chilling effect”. In their evidence, Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand also supported this provision. I have huge respect for those two gentlemen: they are good public servants whose service has done this country a huge amount of good. However, from reading the transcript—I was abroad when they were here last week; I apologise—I do not quite get the point that they were getting at. They used words, which have just been used again, such as principles and morals, and the idea that the onus somehow lies on the individual officer.
If that was the case, I would totally agree that the onus should not be on the individual officer because, having seen what they do, I know they have to make key judgment calls. In their evidence, I do not think that Alex Younger or David Omand gave us any examples of why this measure is needed.
Ben Everitt
I have been listening carefully to the right hon. Gentleman. He mentioned oversight as a key part of the functions of our security services. I waited for him to develop the point further into liability, which is what we are discussing here. Will he elaborate on what he means in relation to oversight when, I think, clause 23 specifically refers to liability?
Mr Jones
It is about both. I will come to liability, because I do not think that individual officers are liable due to existing legislation. As for what I mean by oversight, I am clear that the structures we have for the authorisation of things that are not pleasant should include oversight—whether from the ISC, the tribunal or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We do not live in a society—thank God—where Ministers and the Executive can just say to the security services, “Do x, y and z.” That would be wrong. That is why it is important to have oversight and checks and balances in the system, which were not always there. This morning, I referred to a very sad time in our history—I was a Minister at the time. It was not a good time for our security services, and we should have been ashamed of some of the things that were done.
I want to see an example of what Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand were talking about last week. If there is a specific problem, I would be sympathetic and say, “Right, we need to get that sorted.” It may be a broad notion. We are talking about principles and morals, and it is very difficult to legislate on morals—certainly the Conservative party gets into difficulty when we talk about morals—but I would like to know specific examples that would lead to a liability.
Let me turn to the existing protections. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 includes the offence of encouraging, assisting or commissioning an offence abroad. Clause 23 amends schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act to disapply that offence when the activity is deemed necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence agency or the armed forces. The Government are basically asking for a carve-out, which I find extremely rare.
Maria Eagle
Does my right hon. Friend agree that putting in legislation a carve-out from an entire class of offences—in this case, the inchoate offences of crimes committed abroad—engenders more suspicion among those who worry about the intelligence services than would be the case if the law applied properly to them with appropriate defences?
Mr Jones
I do. Since I have been on the ISC, I have always been amazed when I read accusations made in this place or in public about what the security services get up to. Frankly, if they did, good—but, given the scope of their ability to do things, we should bear in mind the difference between fact and fiction.
The important point is that what the security services do must be proportionate, legal and in the interests of this country’s national security. As I say, they have to take some difficult decisions, and there is a difference between a ministerial authorisation to do something and what happens on the ground. The Minister is not sat there with a pen, saying, “No, you can’t do that. You can do that.” It is down to the individual officer, and I accept that there are huge issues around that. That is why we had the consolidated guidance, which then developed into the Fulford principles. That came out of that dark time.
I was on the ISC when we did our very long inquiry into detention, mistreatment and rendition in 2018, and it was not pretty reading. Ministers—in some cases, we named them—took decisions that were not legal. I have been assured by the agencies in evidence that I and the ISC have received that the consolidated guidance has since been updated to the Fulford principles, and a large exercise has been undertaken to ensure that all officers at all levels understand the principles and how to enact them.
That gives us that legal protection. There are people who want to attack our security services. That large exercise gives me huge assurance, and it means that parliamentarians are in a strong position, when people start accusing the security services, to stand up and say, “Well, actually, that is rubbish. These are the rules that we follow, and they are of the highest standard.” They protect not just the work that the security services do, but us as a country.
Carving this out worries me, as it does my hon. Friend the Member for Garston and Halewood. The Government want to disapply the measure, but there is already a reasonableness protection. We discussed reasonableness this morning. Section 50(3) of the Serious Crime Act 2007 sets out that:
“Factors to be considered in determining whether it was reasonable for a person to act as he did include…any purpose for which he claims to have been acting”
and
“any authority by which he claims to have been acting.”
I think that is very clear.
If we now have a situation whereby the agencies and armed forces are concerned that the conduct may not be reasonable, it is difficult to see how it would be deemed necessary for the proper exercise of the functions of the intelligence services or military. The reasonableness test is there and, as I have already said, we have other protections whereby the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ also protect their staff from liabilities in relation to offences committed abroad through ministerial authorisation under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. The important thing about all that is whether the Investigatory Powers Commissioner can ensure that it is done properly.
To get back to the point, what is the problem? I do not see it. Call me old-fashioned, but if there is a problem, I am up for solving it. However, I do not think that we should try to change things if there is not a problem, and none of the agencies has yet come forward to explain in detail what the problem is.
I accept what was said earlier about the ISC. The individual examples, if there are any, will cover highly classified information—that is why the ISC is there: we can take evidence and look at that information—but there has been no attempt at all by Government Ministers or the security services to give us the examples. One of my colleagues will speak in a minute, but I speak on behalf of the ISC, because we have discussed this issue. We cannot give clause 23 a nod through at this point until we have been convinced that there is a need for it.
My hon. Friend the Member for Halifax made a point about scrutiny. The great thing about having the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is that they can look at warrants and ensure that they are not just legal but proportionate. If we have this provision, who will oversee the individual cases? I get the point that the two former heads of security services made in their evidence about the onus being on the individual. Yes, it is, but those individuals rightly have a huge degree of protection. I would not want to see that in any way diminished because they have the law behind them. In some cases, they also have ministerial warrants, which add to the judicial process.
For those who say that if someone ask questions about this provision, they are against the security services, let me put it the other way. If it is not justified, it will be used as a way to say that the security services now want to go back to the bad old days when things happened that were not under the scrutiny of either Parliament or the judiciary. That would be a retrograde step and would give opponents—as I say, they are against whatever the security services do—a stick to beat them with. I am certainly not in favour of giving those people anything with which to beat the security services.
We could vote against the clause, but I do not think that is the right way forward. I and other members of the ISC would like the Government to provide us with examples of where the chilling effect has been a problem for intelligence sharing, so that we can at least have a look. I accept that other members of the Committee might wonder why they cannot see it—trust me when I say, “You can’t.” I think most people would understand the reasons why that is.
Stephen McPartland
I wanted to be very clear earlier—I wanted to make a point. I agree that the Government will give the ISC examples.
Mr Jones
That is very welcome, but we do not just want that in writing—we want to have the agency heads actually come and speak. I think we have a meeting with them scheduled for some time in October. We would like to get them to come and argue why they need these changes. We need that as well.
The Minister might need to give it a bit more thought, too. I accept that he is new to his post, and he obviously has time to look at this over the summer—depending on what happens at the beginning of September. I know that I have poked fun at the Minister, but we get on well, we have worked closely on other Committees and I even got him promoted on a Committee once, which he was eternally grateful for. Can he just look at the oversight, too? If the Bill does go through, what are the oversight mechanisms for it?
Maria Eagle
I will not go through all the points that have already been made, although I do feel quite strongly about some of this. I generally endorse what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax and my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham—my fellow member of the ISC. Like him, I do not think it is true to say that anybody on this Committee or any of our parliamentary colleagues are intent on trying to stop the intelligence and security services doing their job. They do a very important job and they do it very well. It is dangerous work and we want to support them as much as we can.
But we are a democracy. One of the things that concerns me about clause 23 is its wholesale disapplication of an area of the law that applies to all the rest of us. If we are going to do that for the intelligence services, it is important that we are very clear that it is necessary. It applies only for a certain type of offence in a certain place—overseas—but it is a wholesale carve-out. The clause says that an entire schedule to the Serious Crime Act 2007, which sets out inchoate offences abroad, does not apply if “any relevant behaviour” was necessary for
“the proper exercise of any function”
of the relevant services. That is a wholesale carve-out. I cannot think of too many other examples of that. I do not know if the Minister has a list of examples of other wholesale carve-outs from liability from the criminal law for particular officers of state organisations, but I think it is quite rare.
In those circumstances, I could tell from the evidence we were given that the Government have been asked for this by the relevant services. It did not seem to me that it was coming from the Government—that the Government were saying, “You must have these extra powers.” I accept that they are responding to requests, but because this is a wholesale carve-out from liability for criminal acts, it is important that it is properly justified. We all know about the difficulties of properly justifying it, because a lot cannot be brought into the public domain, but what we have had in the public domain has not been very convincing.
I expect that many people in their day-to-day life would like to have impunity from criminal liability for something that they might do, but it is not something we should be granting easily. The arguments for it need to be very strong. There are already defences that make it harder for people working in the intelligence community to be found guilty of some offences. They have defences that others do not. By the way, it is probably philosophically right that the law should apply to those people but that they should have extra defences. In legislative terms and for the good of society as a whole, it is probably better to do it that way round than to disapply the law to a particular type of person.
I would expect to hear why the current arrangements do not work, but I have not heard that. I did not hear it in the evidence we took from Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand. If I can characterise the issue in this way, they both said, “We would rather have this. We feel very strongly that we would rather have this,” but they were unable to give us any examples of why the current arrangements did not work. In fact, I asked Sir Alex whether some of the current arrangements worked. I asked him about the ministerial authorisation, and he just told me that he was not a lawyer, which is not a convincing answer when someone is asking for a whole area of the criminal law to be disapplied. Sir Alex obviously felt strongly about the matter—I could see that. That is perfectly legitimate, but as a scrutiny Committee and as parliamentarians, we need to hear a little bit more.
I hope the Minister will understand—I do not particularly like the fact that he refused to take interventions, but that is his choice—that everybody on this Committee is seeking to do the right thing. We do not want to make a change to the law that opens up our intelligence and security services and our armed forces to accusations that they can act with impunity abroad. Based on some of the evidence that has been sent to the Committee from those who campaign on these issues, some people think that the clause does precisely that. I do not agree with some of what is in the submission from Reprieve that we received recently, but that submission contains quite a representative sample of what people in our society would probably think if they were to take a look at this clause.
A wholesale carve-out from liability under an area of the criminal law is a very serious step to take. I am not saying it is not the right thing to do, because we should take requests from the agencies and armed forces seriously—as the Minister is clearly doing—but I remain unconvinced. Such a carve-out could have unintended consequences, such as making it much less likely that thoughts will be focused on making sure that activity is lawful. We need to make sure these proposals are the right way forward, and that their advantages outweigh their disadvantages. We have been told that reasonableness is a vague concept, but it is vague only in the sense that it is very flexible and can, and does, apply in many areas of the law; its meaning is relatively well known. To my mind, if the agencies and armed forces are concerned that their conduct might not be considered reasonable, it is difficult to see how it could be necessary for the proper exercise of their functions.
Maria Eagle
It would be a very high bar to get over. If we are being told—there was an element of this in the evidence we heard—that there is a chilling effect on individuals trying to do their jobs, those individuals may need to be a bit better trained in what the law says, what it means and what they are able to do. In any event, whatever the law ends up being—whether it is this Bill, or what we already have—it is not a bad thing for those who operate at its margins to know precisely what they can and cannot do. I worry slightly that having a complete carve-out from liability might swing activities a bit too far in the other direction.
There are pros and cons to any way of doing this. I do not want the Minister to think I am being hostile; I am certainly not. I just want us, as the House of Commons, to be sure, when we consider this further, that this way is right and will work better than what we already have. I, for one, cannot see how this will be better than what we already have; I think that in many ways it will be worse.
Stephen McPartland
It has been a great pleasure to listen to the debate and Members’ speeches. I can feel the frustration in the room. I share that frustration, because I have been told by the intelligence services that we need clause 23 because the schedule it amends is having a damaging impact on critical operational activity aimed at keeping the UK safe. That is the reason why we need clause 23. I wish that we could tell the Committee everything, and that we could just all agree to it, but that is what I am told by the intelligence services, so I have frustration too.
I will try to answer some of the questions, and then sum up. We have been asked about section 7 authorisations. Some of the Committee have been in their roles a little longer than I have been in mine, so they will be aware that section 7 authorisations can be sought only by SIS and GCHQ—not by the MOD or MI5—so this is about trying to create reassurance across all the UK intelligence community.
On section 50 and the reasonableness defence, the defence has never been tested in the context of activity of the intelligence services and the armed forces, so we feel it is more appropriate for them to demonstrate that their actions were carried out as necessary in the proper exercise of their functions.
Maria Eagle
If what the Minister says is accurate—that the defence has never been tested—how can he say that it does not work?
Stephen McPartland
What I am trying to say is that we want our UK intelligence services to be focused on keeping us safe and not to worry about whether or not they will be able to deal with a long court case on their actions. As things currently stand, the UK is—
Sally-Ann Hart
Let me give an illustration of the issue. If my hon. Friend saw someone in need of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the floor, would he give them mouth-to-mouth and pump their chest? Is that something he would do? Would he do it if he thought he could be prosecuted for causing grievous bodily harm if he broke a rib? That would be his defence. That is a simplistic example to illustrate the issue.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. I do not think I would be any good at giving anybody CPR. However, I understand the spirit in which she made the intervention and am grateful for that.
Stephen McPartland
I do not want to get distracted, because this is very serious. I will give way to you in a minute, Kevin; I want to get this point across. [Interruption.] Sorry—I will give way to the right hon. Member for North Durham in a moment.
As the law stands, a member of staff acting in the proper exercise of their organisation’s functions would bear the burden of proving that they had acted reasonably when there is no precedence as to what “reasonably” means in those circumstances. The provision would change that position so that the prosecution would need to prove that a member of staff’s actions were not necessary for the proper exercise or function of their organisation, taking into consideration all the information about the legitimate ways in which those functions could be exercised.
Mr Jones
The Minister has just said that the reasonableness test has not been used. The Attorney General would also have to get over that bar. Alongside that sits the old consolidated guidance—now the Fulford principles—which is quite clear about what actions officers should take in certain circumstances to avoid what we had before. If it has not been tested, I cannot see what the problem is.
Stephen McPartland
The problem is that the UK’s intelligence services are telling us that, every single day, their operatives are second-guessing themselves on operations to keep this nation safe. I believe what they are telling me.
The provisions in section 47 of the Serious Crime Act mean that a person need only believe their activity will encourage or assist such an act, but they might also be reckless as to whether the act is done, with all the necessary elements required for that particular offence to be committed—the offence does not have to be committed. We are talking about the intelligence operative’s state of mind at the time of sharing intelligence. That is what is relevant.
Mr Jones
If that is the justification, why do we not just bin the consolidated guidance and the Fulford principles, on which such judgments are based? The rendition inquiry has great examples of where we passed on information knowing that it would be used for rendition and torture. I have been assured by the agencies, and I have no reason to doubt them, that there has been a huge training programme to ensure all officers fully understand the consolidated guidance and the new Fulford principles. This is clutching at straws, frankly.
Stephen McPartland
I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s point of view.
Clause 23 is primarily aimed at removing the risk and fear of prosecution from individuals within these organisations when undertaking their necessary authorised duties. Sir Alex Younger said:
“Through this legislation and other measures, we can make sure that these risks are attached to the appropriate person or people or entity. I am much less comfortable as a leader about the idea that we therefore ask individual men and women in the UK intelligence community to suck it up. I do not think that is right.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 14, Q26.]
We have already had a conversation about the difference between theory and practice, and the reality is there is a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanctions for doing their job. I agree with Sir Alex Younger that that risk should not exist.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
The foreign power condition
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move amendment 54, in clause 24, page 19, line 5, at end insert—
“(2A) The conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is not to be treated as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if financial or other assistance of a foreign power under subsection (2)(c) is provided otherwise than specifically for the conduct or course of conduct.”
This amendment ensures that organisations that receive funding from foreign powers are not guilty of offences if that funding was not for the conduct or course of conduct that would otherwise amount to the offence.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clause 25 stand part.
Stuart C. McDonald
We now come to two of the most important concepts in the Bill: the foreign power condition and the meaning of “foreign power.” Proving that the foreign power condition has been met is crucial to establishing many of the serious criminal offences for which we are legislating in this Bill, and all sorts of consequences flow from it in the powers to seize and search. It is vital that we get clauses 24 and 25 absolutely correct.
On the whole, the concepts are broadly in the right area, particularly in clause 24. The concept includes an agent acting on behalf of a foreign power, and with knowledge, or reasonable knowledge, that that is the case. The idea of “ought reasonably to know” being sufficient to make out a connection is perhaps a concern, but I understand why it is required for the legislation to work. I look forward to hearing more from the Minister on the thinking behind it.
To cut to the chase, the Committee will recall that, thanks to a briefing from Article 19 on clause 1, I raised the potential problem that the foreign power condition could be attached to certain unintended groups, and I highlighted two groups in particular: non-governmental organisations that receive some funding from foreign powers for perfectly good and positive reasons, and I gave an example of NGOs that fall within that bracket; and journalists who work for state broadcasters, including in countries that are our very close allies. These two groups are at risk of being caught up in the Bill because the foreign power condition is expressly met when conduct is
“carried out with the financial or other assistance of a foreign power”.
The Minister set out three protections during our consideration of clause 1: the foreign power condition itself; the discretion of the Attorney General; and the public interest test applied by the Crown Prosecution Service. Several members of the Committee spoke about why the AG’s oversight and the CPS’s discretion are insufficient. We had a debate about the chilling effect, a concept that we have just been discussing, and the fact that that would essentially leave NGOs and journalists to make decisions about whether to publish information or not based only on the very vaguest of ideas that the CPS or the AG might come to their rescue. That is not really protection at all.
As for the third protection—the foreign power condition —as far as I recall, the Minister did not dispute or expressly accept that the foreign power condition would be met in these cases. Does the Minister accept that the conduct of those NGOs and journalists could meet the foreign power condition, simply because of what they do? That is the most important question I will ask him in this debate.
Our amendment tries to stop groups being caught up in the provisions of the Bill as a result of simply receiving funding from a foreign power, when that funding has been put to perfectly legitimate and reasonable uses. The amendment requires there to be a connection between the funding and the conduct that is being complained about. For example, if the US State Department funds an NGO for human rights research, completely unrelated conduct, in particular the publication of “protected information”, would not be treated as a foreign power activity or espionage unless it was specifically linked to that funding. I accept that my amendment may not be perfect, and I can see there would be problems with it, but I think there has to be an acceptance that the clause as it stands is not perfect and there has to be protection for NGOs and journalists.
I have another concern about clause 24, particularly subsection (5) and the interaction between subsection (5) and (6). The idea of someone being brought within the ambit of espionage legislation on the basis that their act is motivated by an attempt to benefit a foreign power, even an unknown foreign power, and that is all—none of the other factors in clause 24(2)—seems dangerously liable to be able to attach itself to behaviour to which it should not be attached. Behaviour that is motivated by trying to help people in a foreign country could suddenly take on a new angle and be seen as helping a foreign power.
I will give a final example of what I am trying to get at here, which is basically whistleblowing. What if a person working for an international company here discloses a trade secret of that company to a regulator in an allied country, because the product that that company supplies there is a dangerous breach of that other country’s regulations? It seems to me that the drafting of the foreign power condition confuses whistleblowing with some of the espionage offences. Have we drawn the foreign power condition too broadly?
In relation to clause 25, on Second Reading I wondered whether the definition of foreign power was too narrow and might not cover enough of the damaging actors who engage in some of the behaviours we are so concerned about. However, the key point is that an actor can form part of an indirect relationship between the conduct of the foreign power under clause 26.
I will close my remarks there. Does the Minister accept that some of these examples are caught by the foreign power condition, in particular NGOs, journalists working for a foreign state broadcaster and whistleblowers who reveal a trade secret to a regulator working overseas? Are they caught by the foreign power condition? If so, surely we must change the drafting of the Bill.
Holly Lynch
I will speak to clauses 24 and 25 and, having heard the contribution from the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, about his amendment 54.
Clause 24 provides for the foreign power condition that is fundamental to almost all the new offences created by the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister has confirmed that we will see the detail of a foreign interference registration scheme before we return to Committee in September, but it will be particularly interesting to see how the provisions in clause 24 interact with a registration scheme, and what an asset that stands to be if it is done properly.
Clause 24(1) provides that the condition is met if a person’s conduct or a course of conduct is carried out for or on behalf of, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power. In addition, for the condition to be met, the person must know, or reasonably ought to know, that the conduct has that relationship to the foreign power, which I think is clear enough.
Subsection (2) sets out a welcome but non-exhaustive list of different types of relationship between the foreign power and the person engaging in the conduct that would result in a person being considered to be acting for or on behalf of the foreign power.
Under this clause, conduct is deemed to be carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is instigated by a foreign power, it is directed or controlled by a foreign power, it is carried out with financial or other assistance from a foreign power, or it is carried out in collaboration with or with the agreement of a foreign power. It strikes me that thousands of people in the UK could meet all the foreign power stipulations in subsection (2) without ever engaging in any criminality—for example, if they work for a legitimate state-owned company, such as an airline operating out of the UK, or in a foreign embassy. I am keen to see the detail of the registration scheme, so that we have transparency and clear lines about what is welcome and entirely appropriate conduct on behalf of a foreign power and what is not.
Subsection (6) states that is not necessary to identify the particular foreign power that the person intends to benefit. That provision is intended to cover when a person attempts to help a foreign power, but has not yet determined the particular foreign power. I can see how this part of the clause rightly captures the conduct of someone motivated by financial gain, who seeks to sell information or intellectual property to the highest bidder, or perhaps by a desire to cause harm to the UK as a result of a grievance.
For the reasons I have outlined, I imagine that we will come back to clause 24 when debating further parts of the Bill. It would have been advantageous to consider the clause alongside the detail of the foreign influence registration scheme. We will have to undertake that separately, but we recognise that clause 24 is fundamental to this legislation.
Clause 25 defines a foreign power for the purpose of clause 24 and sets out the persons and bodies that comprise a foreign power. We welcome the much-needed update and clarity of what constitutes a foreign power for the functioning of clause 24 and the new offences created by the Bill. I note that the Law Commission’s report, “Protection of Official Data”, made a clear case for replacing “enemy” with “foreign power” and looked to the Canadian Security of Information Act 2001 and the US Congress’s Espionage Statutes Modernisation Bill, which was introduced in 2010, as starting points.
The Official Secrets Act 1911 provides that it is an offence for a person to make or obtain
“any sketch, plan, model, or note”
or
“any secret official code word, or pass word…or other document or information which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy”.
The Law Commission felt that as the term had been drafted with enemy states in mind, it was unclear whether a court would construe “enemy” broadly enough to encompass non-state actors, such as an international terrorist group. It was further concerned that the inclusion of the term “enemy” had the potential to inhibit the ability to prosecute those who commit espionage. We have already heard quotes from Sir Alex Younger’s testimony last Thursday. In response to a question about how threats to the UK have changed, he said:
“What I would call grey threats…often presented us with real challenges, particularly when actors or states felt themselves at war with us and we did not feel ourselves at war with them.”––[Official Report, National Security Public Bill Committee, 7 July 2022; c. 11, Q21.]
I therefore welcome the change from enemy to foreign power to ensure that we can secure prosecutions against the right people.
That said, concerns were raised in submissions to the Law Commission’s consultation and I wonder if the Minister can respond to those. Guardian News and Media gave the following example:
“If a journalist obtains information that a nuclear defence installation is unsafe, that concerns have been reported to the appropriate authorities, but have been discounted, and the journalist then proceeds to investigate whether the information is true, they should not be placed at risk of prosecution. Under the existing wording of section 1 OSA, the ‘of use to the enemy’ requirement would it is submitted make such a prosecution unlikely, however if that wording were changed to a foreign power, and a foreign state-owned institution was thinking of bidding to decommission the plant, this could catch the journalist. Such activity by a journalist should not be considered to be espionage.”
Again, it would have been advantageous to consider this clause alongside the foreign influence registration scheme, which will presumably be clear about who needs to register and why, aligned with subsections (1) and (2) of clause 25, but I hope that the Minister can respond to the concerns raised in that example.
Stephen McPartland
We have already spoken in some detail about the foreign power condition, but I will now specifically address that condition and the meaning of “foreign power”. In doing so, I hope to cover some residual concerns from our first day in Committee and some concerns that I have heard today.
Throughout the Committee’s sittings so far, I have tried to demonstrate that I am listening and am trying to work with colleagues across party lines to get to a position in which we are providing what the United Kingdom’s intelligence community needs and are comfortable that we have scrutinised the Bill. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East may be reassured when I get to the end of my speech, just as the hon. Member for Halifax was reassured about her amendment earlier.
Stuart C. McDonald
I just want to repeat that I find that potentially worryingly broad. If somebody does something motivated by the interests of the people of country Z, I worry very much that they could suddenly be treated as if they were benefiting the Government of Z. The foreign power condition would therefore be met and they could be guilty of espionage for whatever act they had undertaken. It just seems incredibly broadly worded. Someone who is simply doing something for the benefit of a people could be caught up in this legislation.
Stephen McPartland
I think the intention that we are trying to get across is clear. I understand that the hon. Gentleman has a concern about how broad the scope is, so if he gives me a few moments, I will try to move on to that point.
My view is that clause 24 forms a key concept that will determine the circumstances in which activities will come within the scope of the Bill or beyond it. Amendment 54 seeks to make it explicit that those who receive funding from a foreign power legitimately will not be guilty of an offence under the Bill where that funding is entirely unrelated to the harmful conduct. I want to reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that this reflects the intention of the provision. The provisions are designed to provide that the funding of an organisation must have a sufficient link to the offence in order for the foreign power condition to be met and an offence to be made out; a tangential link will not suffice. To help contextualise that, and reflecting on Tuesday’s debate, I thought it would help to provide a bit more detail on how the foreign power condition interacts with the offences.
Using the offence of obtaining and disclosing protected information as an example, the offence will be made out only if all the limbs of the relevant test are satisfied. This means that a person would commit an offence only if they obtain, disclose or carry out other specified conduct in relation to protected information. That conduct is for a purpose they know, or reasonably ought to know, is for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, and the foreign power condition is met in relation to that conduct.
I want to be really clear that a person who engages in the harmful conduct above would commit the offence only if they have a purpose prejudiced in relation to that specific conduct. So it is not sufficient to prove that a person has a genuinely prejudicial position against the UK; the conduct has to be carried out with that prejudicial purpose.
The same is true of the foreign power condition. The foreign power condition has been designed to apply in relation to the conduct that is caught within the offence. So where the foreign power is satisfied because the conduct in question, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is for or on behalf of the foreign power, the defendant must also either actually know or should know that to be the case.
The hon. Member cited the example of an NGO that receives funding from a foreign power. My and the Government’s interpretation is that there would have to be a link between the funding they receive and any activity that they carry out that could meet the offence for that activity to be for or on behalf of the foreign power. So the NGO would also have to know the conduct was linked to this funding, or they should know that it is. They should not be convicted of an offence unless that link was demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law.
I want to be really clear. The foreign power condition, as a standalone concept, is not a statement of wrongdoing. So a person can meet the foreign power condition while carrying out wholly legitimate activities. It is an issue only if the foreign power condition is met in relation to harmful conduct specified in the Bill. In the case of a person who obtains or discloses protected information, the offence is designed so that a person would commit the offence only if they had a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK and then either knew or ought reasonably to have known that they were acting for or on behalf of the foreign power in relation to that conduct. For example, they had an arrangement with the foreign power under which they would obtain or disclose that protected data, or they intended the foreign power to benefit from obtaining or disclosing of protected data.
So the foreign power condition would not cover a case where a foreign power incidentally benefits from activity. Nor has it been designed to apply in cases where a person receives general funding from a foreign power not linked to the relevant conduct. But clearly it is right that a person can be prosecuted for an offence where all the relevant conditions, including the foreign power condition, are satisfied and can be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
I hope the Committee is reassured that the intention behind our provisions and the hon. Member’s amendments align, but I recognise the importance of ensuring that the legislation clearly gives effect to that intention, and while I do not think the hon. Member’s amendments are the answer, I will consider further whether there is any more that we can do to ensure that this intention is properly reflected in the legislation.
Having set out the conditions under which acts in the Bill will be considered as linked to a foreign power, I now turn to clause 25, which gives meaning to the term “foreign power”. The Bill follows the Law Commission’s recommendation to replace the existing link of “an enemy”, as set out in the Official Secrets Act 1911, with a definition of a foreign power. As we have already debated, the concept of an enemy no longer serves to reflect the modern age. The change from “enemy” to “foreign power” is accompanied by a wider set of changes in the structure of the Bill, such as the foreign power condition itself, which ensures that the Bill’s provisions are appropriately targeted at the harmful activity that we need to combat.
It is important that the legislation captures the various components of a state that could seek to influence or direct harmful activities in or against the UK. As such, a foreign power will include a Head of State acting in his or her public capacity, a foreign Government or parts of the Government, or person exercising such functions, a local government organisation, an agency or authority of a foreign government, part of Government or local government, and a political party that is a governing political party of a foreign Government.
Clause 24, and indeed the Bill as a whole, recognises and respects the unique circumstances and nature of politics in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, clause 25 excludes a political party that is both a governing political party in the Republic of Ireland and a political party registered in Great Britain or Northern Ireland from the definition of a “foreign power”. This reflects the fact that there are political parties that contest elections in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom, and ensures that the provisions in the Bill do not inadvertently impact cross-border politics. The foreign power definition provides the parameters within which persons and bodies will comprise a foreign power for the purposes of the Bill and is a critical part of ensuring that the provisions in the Bill address the right harmful activity.
Stuart C. McDonald
I am grateful to the Minister for setting that out. It is particularly helpful to hear his views on the NGO scenario and his explanation of the requirement for some sort of link between the financial arrangements and the specific conduct being complained of. The reason for tabling the amendment is that we did not think that that was necessarily clear enough on the face of the Bill. We will give further thought to whether this aspect needs to be tidied up, so that it is absolutely clear, and I am grateful for his undertaking to look at that as well. I will have to work through some of the other scenarios as well, but it has been helpful to get quite a lot of that on the record. We shall give it some further thought, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 24 and 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Thursday 14th July 2022
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 View all Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of this Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk.
Clause 84
National development management policies: meaning
Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 84, page 92, line 9, leave out lines 9 to 16 and insert—
“(2) Before designating a policy as a national development management policy for the purposes of this Act the Secretary of State must carry out an appraisal of the sustainability of that policy.
(3) A policy may be designated as a national development management policy for the purposes of this Act only if the consultation and publicity requirements set out in clause 38ZB, and the parliamentary requirements set out in clause 38ZC, have been complied with in relation to it, and—
(a) the consideration period for the policy has expired without the House of Commons resolving during that period that the statement should not be proceeded with, or
(b) the policy has been approved by resolution of the House of Commons—
(i) after being laid before Parliament under section 38ZC, and
(ii) before the end of the consideration period.
(4) In subsection (3) ‘the consideration period’, in relation to a policy, means the period of 21 sitting days beginning with the first sitting day after the day on which the statement is laid before Parliament under section 38ZC, and here ‘sitting day’ means a day on which the House of Commons sits.
(5) A policy may not be designated a national development management policy unless—
(a) it contains explanations of the reasons for the policy, and
(b) in particular, includes an explanation of how the policy set out takes account of Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change.
(6) The Secretary of State must arrange for the publication of a national policy statement.
38ZB Consultation and publicity
(1) This section sets out the consultation and publicity requirements referred to in sections 38ZA(3) and 38ZD(7).
(2) The Secretary of State must carry out such consultation, and arrange for such publicity, as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in relation to the proposal. This is subject to subsections (4) and (5).
(3) In this section ‘the proposal’ means—
(a) the policy that the Secretary of State proposes to designate as a national development management policy for the purposes of this Act or
(b) (as the case may be) the proposed amendment (see section 38ZD).
(4) The Secretary of State must consult such persons, and such descriptions of persons, as may be prescribed.
(5) If the policy set out in the proposal identifies one or more locations as suitable (or potentially suitable) for a specified description of development, the Secretary of State must ensure that appropriate steps are taken to publicise the proposal.
(6) The Secretary of State must have regard to the responses to the consultation and publicity in deciding whether to proceed with the proposal.
38ZC Parliamentary requirements
(1) This section sets out the parliamentary requirements referred to in sections 38ZA(3) and 38ZD(7).
(2) The Secretary of State must lay the proposal before Parliament.
(3) In this section ‘the proposal’ means—
(a) the policy that the Secretary of State proposes to designate as a national development management policy for the purposes of this Act or
(b) (as the case may be) the proposed amendment (see section 38ZD).
(4) Subsection (5) applies if, during the relevant period—
(a) either House of Parliament makes a resolution with regard to the proposal, or
(b) a committee of either House of Parliament makes recommendations with regard to the proposal.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State's response to the resolution or recommendations.
(6) The relevant period is the period specified by the Secretary of State in relation to the proposal.
(7) The Secretary of State must specify the relevant period in relation to the proposal on or before the day on which the proposal is laid before Parliament under subsection (2).
(8) After the end of the relevant period, but not before the Secretary of State complies with subsection (5) if it applies, the Secretary of State must lay the proposal before Parliament.
38ZD Review of national development management policies
(1) The Secretary of State must review a national development management policy whenever the Secretary of State thinks it appropriate to do so.
(2) A review may relate to all or part of a national development management policy.
(3) In deciding when to review a national development management policy the Secretary of State must consider whether—
(a) since the time when the policy was first published or (if later) last reviewed, there has been a significant change in any circumstances on the basis of which any of the policy set out in the statement was decided,
(b) the change was not anticipated at that time, and
(c) if the change had been anticipated at that time, any of the policy set out would have been materially different.
(4) In deciding when to review part of a national development management policy (‘the relevant part’) the Secretary of State must consider whether—
(a) since the time when the relevant part was first published or (if later) last reviewed, there has been a significant change in any circumstances on the basis of which any of the policy set out in the relevant part was decided,
(b) the change was not anticipated at that time, and
(c) if the change had been anticipated at that time, any of the policy set out in the relevant part would have been materially different.
(5) After completing a review of all or part of a national development management policy the Secretary of State must do one of the following—
(a) amend the policy;
(b) withdraw the policy's designation as a national development management policy;
(c) leave the policy as it is.
(6) Before amending a national development management policy the Secretary of State must carry out an appraisal of the sustainability of the policy set out in the proposed amendment.
(7) The Secretary of State may amend a national development management policy only if the consultation and publicity requirements set out in section 38ZB, and the parliamentary requirements set out in section 38ZC, have been complied with in relation to the proposed amendment, and—
(a) the consideration period for the amendment has expired without the House of Commons resolving during that period that the amendment should not be proceeded with, or
(b) the amendment has been approved by resolution of the House of Commons—
(i) after being laid before Parliament under section 38ZA, and
(ii) before the end of the consideration period.
(8) In subsection (7) ‘the consideration period’, in relation to an amendment, means the period of 21 sitting days beginning with the first sitting day after the day on which the amendment is laid before Parliament, and here ‘sitting day’ means a day on which the House of Commons sits.
(9) If the Secretary of State amends a national development management policy, the Secretary of State must—
(a) arrange for the amendment, or the policy as amended, to be published, and
(b) lay the amendment, or the policy as amended, before Parliament.”
This amendment stipulates the process for the Secretary of State to designate and review a national development management policy including minimum public consultation requirements and a process of parliamentary scrutiny based on processes set out in the Planning Act 2008 (as amended) for designating National Policy Statements.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Hollobone. We had an extensive debate on Tuesday about the powers provided by clause 83 and the fact that they represent, in our view, an unacceptable centralisation of development management policy and a downgrading of the status and remit of local planning. Clause 84 is important, and the provisions in it relate directly to the previous debate, because it sets out what constitutes a national development management policy and provides the statutory basis for such policies and their operation.
As hon Members will note, the clause provides an extremely broad definition of what a national development management policy is, with proposed new subsection 38ZA(1) clarifying that an NDMP can be anything relating to development or use of land in England that the Secretary of State, by direction, designates as such a policy. Proposed new subsection 38ZA(2) provides for powers that allow the Secretary of State to modify or revoke a national development management policy, and proposed new subsection 38ZA(3) makes it clear that they have to consult about any modification or revocation only if they believe it is appropriate to do so. Given the fact that, as we spent a lengthy period of time considering in the last sitting, it is the Government’s intention that national development management policies will override local development plans in the event of any conflict between the two, we are strongly of the view that the powers clause 84 provides the Secretary of State with are unacceptably broad.
I ask Government Members to look up from their digital devices for a moment and to consider precisely what the Government are proposing here and the future implications of that for their constituencies and the individual communities they represent. These powers would allow a future Minister, of whatever political allegiance, to develop an NDMP that could encompass literally any policy designated by them as relating to development or use of land in England; to determine not to consult on the development of that policy or its modification if they saw fit; and then to use that policy to overrule any local or neighbourhood plan in conflict with it at the stroke of a pen. No one who values localism and the role of effective local and neighbourhood plans in enabling communities to develop a shared vision for their area should feel comfortable with the provisions in the clause.
Amendment 87 simply seeks to impose a degree of transparency and accountability when it comes to the use of the powers, by clarifying the process by which the Secretary of State must designate and review a national development management policy, stipulating, first, that it must include minimum public consultation requirements, just as there are intensive consultation requirements for local plan policies, and secondly, that it must be subject to the same level of parliamentary scrutiny as is currently the case for designating national policy statements, as set out in the Planning Act 2008. It cannot be right that national policies that will have a far greater impact on local communities than any existing national policy statement and that the Government intend will trump local development plans in the event of a conflict can be developed without any public consultation or parliamentary approval process.
If the clause is left unamended, the danger is twofold. First, we fear that the use of the powers will be viewed by the public as yet another means of disempowering communities and hoarding more control at the centre, with all the implications that has for public engagement in a planning system that already suffers from low levels of trust and confidence, with people feeling that their concerns are overlooked and their interests subordinated to other priorities.
Secondly, without a minimum of public consultation or parliamentary oversight in designing NDMPs the Government are far more likely to get it wrong, because they will be developing and designating national policy without appropriate input from communities and their representatives about how the needs and aspirations of their areas are best served. If the Government are determined to force through a suite of NDMPs covering the broad range of policies that, to repeat the test set out in the policy paper, “apply in most areas” and to render local development plans subordinate to them in the event of a conflict, the least they can concede is that the Secretary of State be directed to consult with institutions, authorities and other bodies before making, revoking or modifying NDMPs—not just the initial suite of NDMPs, but any that follow in future years—and to ensure that appropriate parliamentary oversight takes place.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his amendment and the speech he has just made. This is the pivotal part of the whole Bill. It is about ensuring that there is a full and proper process—one that should eliminate risk and maximise the representation of local interest.
We had a really helpful discussion on Tuesday that explored why the amendment was needed in the first place, and I am sure the Minister soon recognised the democratic deficit the Bill would create. The Government have left a hole in the Bill, because it defines the process for establishing a national development management strategy but not the extent to which the strategy could apply, and it also fails to take forward the considerations of our communities. This provision does not belong in primary legislation, and the Minister should reflect today and over the summer on what his Government are trying to do.
The Minister said that he will be developing more detail over the summer, but we are considering the Bill line by line today. As my hon. Friend outlined, his amendment has done the work on how to govern the process for the Minister. First, on designation, there must be an in-depth consultation and any issue must come before Parliament. If an issue is of such magnitude that it requires Government to say that they need to override a local plan, surely there has to be a proper process. After all, planning does not just suddenly occur. I was scratching my head about what would constitute a national emergency that required planning permission. The only thing I could think of—the Minister may correct me—would be a war, but then we would have separate legislation to address that. On Tuesday, the Minister himself struggled to articulate where the thresholds would be and exactly what would constitute such a situation.
I have been thinking further about how our planning process is devised and the importance of co-production within our planning process. Why would this national development management strategy override a process of local planning? There could be no reason. If we think about unpopular things that the Government want to force through, such as mining hydrocarbons, fracking and so on, they should not be happening, because our planet cannot sustain their use. The same applies to building road infrastructure, but then again there are processes and national policy statements that can be made for those things.
High Speed 2 or an airport are perhaps the only other examples. We cannot sustain more air travel because of the climate crisis, and HS2 had a national policy statement —again, it has had its own legislation and processes. I really cannot imagine what is in the Government’s mind that is of such magnitude that it should require the overriding of a local plan and the hopes and aspirations of our local communities. Certainly in my community, local people have not had their aspirations heard in the planning process, because we have not had a local plan. There has been imposition by developers, using the powers they have, and it has just run into conflict, gridlock and pain. I cannot see why a Government would want to excite that in a community.
I am sure the Minister will give serious consideration to this matter, if not today, then through the summer. Opposition Members have made it clear that these clauses are an unnecessary development, but I am sure the Minister will hear that point even louder from Government Members.
Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your guidance today, Mr Hollobone. This proposal from the Government feels rather tin-eared, and the amendment—or something like it, at the very least—seems appropriate. It is good that the official Opposition have put forward a route that the Government could choose to go down.
It seems odd that there is not a worked-out process for properly scrutinising and consulting on national policy statements that could have huge ramifications for every part of this country. This is a very diverse country: we have four nations, and communities that are rural, urban and suburban. National planning policy could have many different ramifications on different communities.
I think of my own community, with 67 parish councils and the need for them to be involved and to understand the issues. Further north in Cumbria, we have the very live issue of Britain’s first new coalmine in 30 years potentially being given permission later this summer—we will wait and see about that. It will be hugely significant for the community it could impact directly, but it will also have a national impact. For us not to have a level of scrutiny and consultation for national plans—something that a local authority would be slaughtered for not doing with its own local plans—seems to be very wrong and, as I say, somewhat tin-eared.
It goes back to a theme that I have tried to develop throughout debates on this Bill, which is about trying to understand the motivation. It could be that the Government are just being tin-eared and have not thought this through properly. That is entirely possible—Governments do that. The question is, who is this for? Is this devolution? Is this empowering local communities? That is what the Government claim it is. Or is it just for the convenience of central Government? If there are national plans and a national planning framework allowing Government to take forward their central agenda without proper consultation of local communities—be they rural or urban or in any part of this country—that will meet with huge opposition, including in the constituencies of Opposition Members.
The Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Mr Marcus Jones)
It is a pleasure and an honour, as ever, to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I thank the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich for tabling this amendment. The national development management policies are an important change to the system, and I understand the desire to ensure that they are properly considered.
The amendment has three elements: consultation, parliamentary scrutiny and policy review. I will deal with each in turn. On consultation, the existing clause already imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to ensure that such consultation and participation as are considered appropriate take place. The previous Secretary of State was clear in his comments to the Levelling Up, Housing and Communities Committee that consultation on the national development management policies will indeed be carried out. The consultation specified by the amendment is therefore unnecessary.
Moreover, we need to bear in mind the possibility that circumstances may occasionally arise in which the Government need to make urgent change. I heard what the hon. Member for York Central said earlier, and I would like to give her an example that became apparent during the pandemic of when we had to act quickly. Hon. Members will recall, during the first part of the pandemic, the significant issue with food supply. One of the decisions that was therefore made at a national level was to disapply planning conditions relating to the hours during which supermarkets could be served by delivery vehicles. Because of the way supply chains were at that point, it was extremely important to get food through to the stores. In those circumstances, it may not be feasible to do everything that the amendment seeks to do, for reasons that I hope she understands.
Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)
In relation to consultation, the Minister just said that it depends on what the Secretary of State thinks is appropriate. Is there anywhere else in our legislation where things are left to the whim of a particular Secretary of State in that way? I cannot believe that the Minister thinks that is an acceptable way to conduct planning.
Mr Jones
I thank the hon. Member for her question. We need to look at what is being put forward today. Clearly, the passage of the Bill has some time to run, and we have to look at this issue in the context of the national planning policy prospectus that is being put out later this year so that hon. Members get a wider understanding, and I hope they will be able to respond to that.
Mrs Lewell-Buck
I thank the Minister for giving way again. Surely the prospectus should come first, before we consider implementing this legislation. It seems like things are being done in a completely back-to-front way, and I do not understand why. This is not a good way to make legislation.
Mr Jones
I understand what the hon. Member says, but clearly this process will take some time. There are other parts of the process that follow today’s proceedings and Committee stage. By the time we get to that point, I am sure hon. Members will have been able to see the national planning policy prospectus and understand it more fully.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful that the Minister was able to produce an example of where a national planning decision would override a local plan, but he talked about logistics, which does not come into the local planning process. That example was operational—it was not actually to do with planning. Can he drill down to say when a national development management policy would override a local plan?
Matthew Pennycook
Further to that point, is the Minister seriously saying that a logistical issue about the opening times of supermarkets is the type of policy that will be covered by an NDMP?
Mr Jones
What I am explaining is an example of where powers need to be taken, sometimes at short notice, in the national interest.
To move on, let me turn to parliamentary scrutiny. I have listened to the debate with interest, and I appreciate the points that have been made. The existing provisions for scrutiny of national policy statements, on which I believe the amendment has been modelled, play a particular role, given the way that those statements provide a framework for decisions on nationally significant infrastructure projects, which are decided by Ministers.
National development management policies will serve a broader purpose and will sit alongside policies in locally produced plans as the starting points for considering the suitability of development proposals. They will carry forward the role that successive Governments have played since the 1940s in setting high-level national policy that influences plans and decisions. The sort of things that we envisage them covering are standard policies—for example, avoiding inappropriate development in a green belt and areas at significant risk of flooding or coastal erosion; protecting nationally important habitats and heritage, and assets such as listed buildings; and ensuring that access for pedestrians, cyclists and people with disabilities or reduced mobility is taken into account when assessing development proposals.
As I have said, we have committed to consulting on national development management policies, and this is the first step in the process. The prospectus, which we will publish shortly, will set out more of our initial thinking on the scope of the policies, and the principles for their production. I am sure that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will read that document with interest when it comes out, and I hope that it will provide further reassurance on our commitment to transparency and full engagement as we develop the policies.
As the national development management policies will be public, parliamentarians and the public may still hold the Government to account, in the usual way, for the content of those policies. The nature of national development management policies differs from national policy statements, so we believe that the clause strikes the right balance.
We will continue to keep national policies under review by listening closely to colleagues, to the public and to the evidence presented to us, as Governments of all complexions do as a matter of course. It is not clear to me that the amendment would necessarily fit into that context. I have listened to the strength of feeling during the debate, and I hope that the national planning policy framework prospectus, when published, and my response to the three major issues that have been raised in discussing the amendment, will reassure Members. I will continue to reflect on the issues that have been raised, particularly in relation to responses to the prospectus. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I am extremely disappointed by the Minister’s response. The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale was right to use the phrase “tin-eared”. That is what the Minister’s response was, and I hope he will reconsider.
The amendment and the clause go to the heart of the problem with the Bill. Is it a vehicle to empower communities and their representatives, or to override them when the Government of the day think that is the appropriate thing to do? Where the Government fall on that question is clear from the Minister’s answer. Let me reiterate that the level of scrutiny that we are asking for is not excessive or inappropriate; it is a minimum public consultation requirement in the way that currently applies to local planning policies, and the same level of parliamentary scrutiny as for designated national policy statements.
The Minister’s response was very telling. He said: “Well, the Secretary of State”—the previous Secretary of State now—“has committed to consultation.” That is all well and good, and I hope the prospectus will come in the summer, but it is not about that or about what the previous Secretary of State said; it is about what the Bill says. The Bill says that a Secretary of State needs to consult on an NDMPs if he or she considers it “appropriate”. If a Secretary of State in a future Labour Government brings forward an NDMP, does not consult on it, and uses it to override a local development plan in a constituency of one of the Members now on the Government side of this Committee, those Members would be the first to cry foul the use of such powers. The clause guarantees only that a Secretary of State needs to consult if he considers it appropriate.
On parliamentary scrutiny, the Minister said that NDMPs are different from national policy statements because they have a broader purpose. If they have a broader purpose, surely there is all the more need for basic parliamentary accountability and scrutiny, in the way that currently applies to such statements under the Planning Act 2008.
I am extremely disappointed by the Minister’s response, as he can tell. I hope that he will go back and reconsider this issue and those that we raised in the debate on clause 83, because we will certainly discuss these matters again, if not on Report in this place, then in the other place. I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I urge him to reconsider. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Jones
Clause 84 provides the statutory basis for national development management policies in England. As they will play an important part in the planning process, the clause puts a necessary safeguard in place: they must be designated by the Secretary of State so that their status is clear, they must relate to the development or use of land and, most importantly, they must be subject to appropriate consultation before they can have effect.
The clause is necessarily broad in scope so that national policies can address the various planning considerations that apply across the country, from basic policies for protecting the green belt to those for avoiding areas of high flood risk. That will free up local plans to focus on matters of local importance.
We intend to consult fully on the scope and content of these policies before they are first introduced to ensure we have heard a wide range of views before deciding what is best set out at a national level, and before deciding what the policies themselves will say. Alongside clauses 83 and 84, they will be instrumental in making it easier to prepare local plans that reflect communities’ priorities for their areas while providing a sound basis to address the general planning considerations that apply across the country. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85
Contents of the spatial development strategy
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 85, page 92, leave out lines 26 and 27.
This amendment would remove an additional legal test within London’s Spatial Development Strategy that could preclude the insertion of policies which contribute to the effective strategic planning of Greater London but would also apply to other urban areas or are not specific to Greater London.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 94, in clause 85, page 92, line 27, at end insert—
“(c) supporting policies within the Spatial Development Strategy that achieve objectives for the benefit of strategic planning of Greater London.”
This amendment would enable the Mayor of London can include policies in a Spatial Development Strategy that contribute to the effective strategic planning of Greater London.
Amendment 95, in clause 85, page 93, line 5, at end insert—
“(2DA) The determination of whether a matter is of strategic importance to more than one London borough for the purposes of subsection (2D) lies solely with the Mayor of London.”
This amendment is intended to remove ambiguity about whose opinion is relevant in relation to whether or not a matter is of strategic importance to more than one London borough.
Amendment 96, in clause 85, page 93, line 9, at end insert—
“(2F) The spatial development strategy must include statements dealing with the general spatial development aspects of—
(a) such of the other strategies prepared and published, or to be prepared and published, under the enactments mentioned in section 41(1) above as involve considerations of spatial development, and
(b) such of the Mayor of London’s other policies or proposals as involve such considerations, whether or not the strategy, policy or proposal relates to the development or use of land.”
This amendment would retain provisions relating to the Mayor of London’s Spatial Development Strategy which relate to the spatial development aspects of the other Mayoral strategies.
Amendment 97, in clause 85, page 93, leave out lines 13 to 19.
This amendment would remove inserted subsection (10), which would place constraints on the Mayor of London’s Spatial Development Strategy relating to national development management policies.
Amendment 91, in schedule 7, page 241, line 16, leave out “with respect to design”.
Amendment 92, in schedule 7, page 241, line 18, after “met” insert
“in support of plan-making or”.
Matthew Pennycook
Clauses 85 and 86 relate to the spatial development strategy in London. I hazard a guess that the subject is not likely to set Government Members’ pulses racing, but it is important none the less, and I feel duty bound to do it justice as the only Member present who represents our glorious capital city.
On the surface, clause 85 appears relatively innocuous. It would seem that it is simply a matter of bringing the London plan in line with other spatial development strategies and providing greater clarity on the matters that can and cannot be covered by a spatial development strategy. However, once one digs into the detail, as I have, it quickly becomes apparent that taken together with two proposed changes set out in schedule 7—proposed new section 15CC, on supplementary plans—it is far more insidious. It amounts, in effect, to the rolling back of London’s strategic planning powers in important ways.
Let me say a little at the outset about why curtailing the strategic planning powers that Greater London enjoys would be harmful. London’s devolved strategic planning powers have been a huge success story over the past two decades under successive mayoral administrations. Since the first draft London plan was published in 2002, successive plans have facilitated a step change in the planning of our country’s only global city. London has been able to lead the way in planning policy approaches in a wide range of areas, whether focused on tackling climate change, addressing biodiversity loss, improving fire safety, addressing poor air quality or increasing the supply of affordable housing and the pace of its delivery.
The results speak for themselves: since the creation of the Greater London Authority, annual net housing supply has doubled and new homes in London lead the country in design, quality and energy efficiency. Indeed, the co-ordinated strategic planning approach that London has adopted has been so successful that the Government are proposing, through this Bill, to allow the new combined county authorities essentially to adopt it.
Despite the tacit recognition of the success of London’s strategic planning powers that the provision of the new power to CCAs implies, clause 85 and parts of schedule 7 explicitly curtail their effective use by putting in place significant additional restrictions on the preparation of future iterations of the London plan. They do so in four ways: first, proposed new subsection (2A)(b) states that policies can be included in a future London plan only if they are designed to achieve objectives that relate to the
“particular characteristics or circumstances of Greater London”.
We believe that is unnecessarily restrictive. There are many objectives that the London plan should appropriately be working toward that are not specific to the characteristics or circumstances of London, whether that is climate change, biodiversity and green infrastructure, supporting town centres and high streets, or parking and suburban housing development.
Tim Farron
I am very concerned about this part of the Bill. If we ask people in England which part of our country has the most autonomy and sovereignty and is listened to the most, most of them will say London—and they would be broadly right. It is really concerning to any person in this country who cares about genuine devolution and the empowerment of local communities that the part of England with the most powers devolved to it is having many of those powers curtailed, qualified and restricted by the clause, and the amendments are important because they put a spotlight on that issue.
Some of the language around levelling up may in fact be divisive, because it is about setting ourselves against one another. Rural communities are the poorest and most needy in England, but there is much that binds us all together. We need to consider ourselves as a United Kingdom and to make common endeavour, but we can do that only if we trust one another, give communities genuine sovereignty and power, and trust them.
Again, there is a theme with the Bill: it is about levelling up and devolution in name, but in reality it is about a lack of trust in the local electorate, local communities and local leaders—in this case, the Mayor of London. Anybody in this country—in England at least—who is concerned about their autonomy, their sovereignty and the devolution they want for their community should be deeply concerned about this proposal and should stand in solidarity with communities in London, who seem to be having theirs curtailed in the Bill. That is the opposite of levelling up and the opposite of devolution, and it increasingly sounds not like devolution but like delegation.
Mr Jones
Clause 85 reaffirms the vital role of the London plan in setting strategic policy for the capital. However, the London plan is intended, and was originally designed, to deal only with matters of strategic importance in London. Those are limits to which the London plan has not always strictly adhered, and it now often touches on matters that no one would consider as strategic in nature, but rather as instances of applying the strategy.
Let me give an example of where the Mayor of London has overstepped that strategic objective. Policy H16 in the London plan refers to laundry, bedding and linen services, which do not seem overly strategic. The inclusion of non-strategic matters means that the London plan is far lengthier and more detailed than it needs to be—the current London plan is over 500 pages long. Not only does that increase the time taken to produce it, but it makes it more complicated for the people of London to work out what policies apply in their area and how those interact.
One of our most important objectives in reforming the planning system is to give a distinct and clearly defined role to each part of the development plan. By clearly specifying that the London plan must cover matters of strategic importance to London, we are making the plan’s role and its relationship to individual local plans easier to understand.
The text that amendment 93 proposes to remove also underlines that policies should relate to the particular characteristics or circumstances of London. During the preparation of the London plan, there is nothing in the Bill that would prevent the Mayor of London from considering matters that affect London but relate to areas outside Greater London. However, I hope we can agree that the policies themselves should relate to the area for which the Mayor has jurisdiction. Likewise, on amendment 94, it seems entirely reasonable that any policy included at the level of the London plan should have more than a local impact. Otherwise, it would be properly a matter for the appropriate local planning authority’s local or supplementary plans.
On that subject, under the provisions in the Bill, the Mayor of London may prepare a supplementary plan relating to design matters for the whole of Greater London, and amendments 91 and 92 concern that new power. I agree entirely with the intention behind amendment 92, but the amendment is needed to achieve that aim, because the Mayor’s supplementary plans will be part of the development plan, and schedule 7 inserts proposed new sections 15CA(5)(g) and 15CC(8), which provide that, in preparing local and supplementary plans, London boroughs—as local planning authorities—must have regard to the development plan.
Turning to amendment 91, supplementary plans provide local planning authorities with the flexibility to bring forward policies for specific sites, or groups of sites, quickly—for example, in response to a new opportunity that had not been identified in the local plan, or to set design standards too detailed for the local plan itself. They are not intended to supplant the primacy of the local plan or to circumvent the fuller process to which local plans will be subject. Supplementary plans are therefore primarily intended as a tool for local planning authorities to set more granular policies. Allowing the Mayor to set such policies would be contrary to the strategic—rather than locally specific—role of the Mayor. The Mayor’s role should be in setting design standards on a London-wide basis.
That is what the Mayor’s supplementary plan power provides for, while not precluding the Mayor from producing guidance on particular planning matters—a tool that I understand he has made good use of. However, the Mayor of London does not allocate sites in the London plan. Therefore, the ability to produce site-specific supplementary plans is not necessary. In the same way, in the current system, the Mayor does not produce supplementary planning documents.
That leads on to the effect of amendment 97. The London plan has never been able to allocate specific sites. It will retain its ability to identify broad locations for development, which will inform site allocations in individual local plans produced by London boroughs. Local plan making is the correct level at which to allocate individual sites for development, as boroughs work closely with their communities to identify the most suitable sites.
The Mayor should therefore not be able to allocate sites for development through either a supplementary plan or the London plan itself. That preserves the defined roles for strategic planning relative to the local plan. For that reason, it would be inappropriate for the Mayor alone, as suggested by amendment 95, to determine what should constitute “strategic” across more than one borough. That is not to say that the Mayor’s opinion on what constitutes a strategic matter is not essential. However, it is legitimate for other organisations and people, including the boroughs and those examining the London plan, to take a view on the issue.
In addition—although I do not think we need to repeat our earlier debate on this point—we have included the requirement not to be inconsistent with, or to repeat, any national development management policy, to ensure that the whole planning system, from national to local level, is consistent. That allows those matters that are best dealt with at the national level to have status, without requiring repetition in the development plan, potentially at both the strategic and local plan level.
Finally, on amendment 96, we want to remove unnecessary obligations from plan makers. Removing the requirement for the Mayor to include statements on general spatial development aspects of their other strategies and policies does not bar the Mayor from so doing. It merely allows the Mayor to judge how far it would be helpful to do so. I hope we can agree that that is a more sensible position.
I am aware that I have spoken at some length on these points, but I hope that has been helpful for the Committee. In the light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I must confess that I am slightly disappointed with that answer. I appreciate that, in reading his remarks, the Minister has addressed each of the amendments in this group, but I do not think he has provided a convincing defence of why the Bill as it stands needs to be that way or of how restricting the Mayor’s powers in the way the Bill intends will not lead to harmful impacts of the kind I set out. I do not intend to press the amendments, but I very much hope that the Minister will continue to engage in dialogue with the Greater London Authority about these specific points. In one way or another, I think we will come back to these issues; if not, I expect that the noble Lords in the other place will do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Jones
The Localism Act 2011 abolished regional spatial strategies, which acted as strategic plans for the regions of England. The exception was London, where the Mayor has retained the power to produce a spatial development strategy, better known as the London plan.
The London plan acts as the strategic plan for the capital, and local plans produced by London boroughs must be in general conformity with it. It sets out the planning framework for the capital, which includes the setting of a London-wide housing target broken down into individual housing targets for boroughs. It cannot allocate sites, but it can identify broad locations for development, the details of which are established in subsequent local plans. Local plans require closer consultation between plan makers and the people they represent, making them better placed to identify specific sites for development.
Since 2011, the power to produce an SDS has been extended through devolution deals to three mayoral combined authorities—Greater Manchester, the Liverpool city region and West of England—with the intention to give the equivalent power to West Yorkshire in the future. The Bill will expand the power to produce an SDS to all local planning authorities in England outside of Greater London and the mayoral combined authorities I have mentioned. Groups of authorities will be able to use the powers on a voluntary basis when they feel that they would benefit from such a plan.
Spatial development strategies are prepared by an elected Mayor or a combined authority to provide the strategic policies for the development and use of land in the area they cover. The Government wants the development plan system to be clear and efficient. By setting out clearly what a spatial development strategy can and cannot do, clause 85 will be instrumental in achieving a system that is easier to engage with.
Spatial development strategies enable a co-ordinated approach to planning across multiple local authorities and are an effective mechanism for resolving cross-boundary issues. The London plan has broadly been seen as a useful plan at that spatial scale, with each newly elected Mayor choosing to commence work on a new London plan shortly after entering office. It provides a clear and accountable mechanism for setting planning policy across London boroughs and for redistributing housing need across the city.
The London plan is intended to deal only with matters of strategic importance to London. However, that intention has not been strictly adhered to, as I mentioned earlier, and increasingly the London plan has included detailed development management policies on a range of issues that are not usually considered to be of a strategic nature. That increases the length and detail of the plan and the amount of time taken to produce it. It also means that the London plan encroaches on aspects of policy that should be dealt with at either local plan level or national level, which creates overlap between several types of plans and makes plans longer than they need to be.
The amendments made by clause 85 will ensure that the distinction between spatial development strategies and local plans remains clear. The clause will amend the provisions of section 334 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 to update the permissible content of a spatial development strategy and will ensure that the purpose and scope of this type of development plan is clear.
In particular, at proposed new subsection (9), it is clear that a spatial development strategy must not be site specific, and nor can it be inconsistent with or repeat national policy. Proposed new subsection (9) also prohibits spatial development strategies from identifying particular sites, preserving that level of detail for the local plan, where such specificity is more appropriate. Unfortunately, only one member of this Committee is from London, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich would accept that his particular local authority knows local people on a more granular level than the Mayor does, because the Mayor works at a strategic level. Therefore it is a far better principle for the local authority to identify sites and make decisions on them.
The amendments made by the clause will mark a change to the current scope of the London plan and mean that it needs to be consistent with national development management policies. Proposed new subsection (2D)(b) introduces a new and additional requirement for strategic matters to be of strategic importance to more than one London borough. The clause deliberately uses the same wording as proposed new section 15AA of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, as inserted by schedule 7 to the Bill, which applies to the content of a joint spatial development strategy. The strategy can be prepared by partnerships of other local planning authorities around the country outside of combined authority areas, meaning that a spatial development strategy will have the same effect whichever system it is produced under. Again, that will help to clarify and demystify the planning system.
London plan policies would, in future, need to avoid conflict with national development management policies, which the Bill empowers the Secretary of State to prepare, and to be of strategic importance to more than one borough. The Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill will not affect how the Mayor consults on or gains approval for the London plan or the role of either the Mayor or the Secretary of State in relation to it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 85 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 87
Plan making
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr Jones
The clause introduces schedule 7, which will replace the majority of part 2 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, namely sections 15 to 37. Schedule 7 contains new provisions relating to different elements of the development plan—specifically joint spatial development strategies, local plans, minerals and waste plans, and supplementary plans. The details of those provisions will be debated throughout these sessions.
In summary, the proposed changes will ensure that plans are faster for local authorities to produce, easier for communities to navigate, engage with and understand, and more focused on things that matter locally. The reforms will support local planning authorities to produce local plans and keep them up to date—something that has proven challenging for many under the existing system. Local planning authorities and communities invest considerable time and effort in preparing local plans, but many plans take too long to produce. The average plan takes seven years, and plans are frequently out of date and can be difficult to understand.
Decisions on planning applications are meant to be plan-led, but in practice local plans cannot always be relied on for guiding decisions, especially when they are not up to date or do not set clear standards for development to follow. To make the system more responsive and flexible, local authorities will be given new powers to collaborate voluntarily with each other on joint spatial development strategies. They will also be able to introduce new policy at pace through supplementary plans.
There are two specific elements of the current plan-making system that the Government are not looking to retain. The first is the requirement for local planning authorities to produce a statement of community involvement. Such statements do little to drive meaningful dialogue with communities during plan production. Instead, the Secretary of State will produce guidance setting out much clearer expectations around how local planning authorities should engage people in the planning process.
Secondly, we do not propose to retain the duty to co-operate. The duty has been widely criticised as inflexible and burdensome, causing significant delays to the production of local plans. It will be replaced with a more flexible policy-based approach to addressing strategic issues that cut across authorities. That will be set out in a revised national planning policy framework in due course.
Matthew Pennycook
Just to check that I understood the Minister correctly, is he saying that the new flexible alignment test, which is to follow in the Bill, will come in only at the point that the NPPF is finalised in 2025? Is he saying that that is when we should expect this new test to appear?
Mr Jones
Clearly we will need to ensure that the new test is workable. We will have to consider that very carefully, and we will no doubt consult on it. I will need to come back to the hon. Gentleman about the timeframe in order to provide him with that information. However, given the important changes that this clause enables us to introduce, I commend it to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 87 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7
Plan making
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 112, in schedule 7, page 224, line 14, after “authorities” insert “or county councils”.
This amendment and amendment 113 would enable county councils to prepare joint spatial development plans.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 113, in schedule 7, page 224, line 16, after “authority” insert “or county council”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment 112.
Amendment 103, in schedule 7, page 224, leave out lines 19 to 22.
This amendment would leave out inserted section 15A(2)(b) and make combined authorities eligible for a joint spatial development strategy.
Amendment 102 in schedule 7, page 233, line 41, at end insert—
“15AJ Duty to co-operate in absence of joint spatial development strategy
(1) This section applies in any area in which a joint spatial development strategy is not operative.
(2) Each person who is—
(a) a local planning authority,
(b) a county council in England that is not a local planning authority, or
(c) a body, or other person, that is prescribed or of a prescribed description, must co-operate with every other person who is within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) or subsection (10) in maximising the effectiveness with which activities within subsection (3) are undertaken.
(3) In particular, the duty imposed on a person by subsection (2) requires the person—
(a) to engage constructively, actively and on an ongoing basis in any process by means of which activities within subsection (4) are undertaken, and
(b) to have regard to activities of a person within subsection (10) so far as they are relevant to activities within subsection (4).
(4) The activities within this subsection are—
(a) the preparation of a joint spatial development strategy,
(b) the preparation of development plan documents,
(c) the preparation of other local development documents,
(d) the preparation of marine plans under the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 for the English inshore region, the English offshore region or any part of either of those regions,
(e) activities that can reasonably be considered to prepare the way for activities within any of paragraphs (a) to (d) that are, or could be, contemplated, and
(f) activities that support activities within any of paragraphs (a) to (d), so far as relating to a strategic matter.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), each of the following is a ‘strategic matter’—
(a) sustainable development or use of land that has or would have a significant impact on at least two planning areas, including (in particular) sustainable development or use of land for or in connection with infrastructure that is strategic and has or would have a significant impact on at least two planning areas, and
(b) sustainable development or use of land in a two-tier area if the development or use—
(i) is a county matter, or
(ii) has or would have a significant impact on a county matter.
(6) In subsection (5)—
‘county matter’ has the meaning given by paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the principal Act (ignoring sub-paragraph 1(1)(i)),
‘planning area’ means—
(a) the area of—
(i) a district council (including a metropolitan district council),
(ii) a London borough council, or
(iii) a county council in England for an area for which there is no district council,
but only so far as that area is neither in a National Park nor in the Broads,
(b) a National Park,
(c) the Broads,
(d) the English inshore region, or
(e) the English offshore region, and
‘two-tier area’ means an area—
(a) for which there is a county council and a district council, but
(b) which is not in a National Park.
(7) The engagement required of a person by subsection (3)(a) includes, in particular—
(a) considering whether to consult on and prepare, and enter into and publish, agreements on joint approaches to the undertaking of activities within subsection (3), and
(b) if the person is a local planning authority, considering whether to agree under section 28 to prepare joint local development documents.
(8) A person subject to the duty under subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance given by the Secretary of State about how the duty is to be complied with.
(9) A person, or description of persons, may be prescribed for the purposes of subsection (2)(c) only if the person, or persons of that description, exercise functions for the purposes of an enactment.
(10) A person is within this subsection if the person is a body, or other person, that is prescribed or of a prescribed description.
(11) In this section—
‘the English inshore region’ and ‘the English offshore region’ have the same meaning as in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, and
‘land’ includes the waters within those regions and the bed and subsoil of those waters.”
This amendment would require local authorities and other public bodies to co-operate on local planning measures in the absence of an operative joint spatial development strategy on the lines of section 33A of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. This duty would encompass co-operation by all relevant local authorities on preparation for such a strategy.
Matthew Pennycook
Schedule 7 is 40 pages long and it contains a very wide range of provisions on plan making, many of which are complex. The amendments in this group relate to the provisions concerning joint spatial development strategies.
We support the new power in proposed new section 15A that allows two or more local planning authorities to work together to create one of these strategies. If done well, we believe they that will provide a high-level investment framework, more choice of where to direct development, greater opportunity to deliver sustainable growth and a means of translating national policy priorities, from levelling up to net zero, on a place-based basis.
In our view, joint spatial development strategies are likely to provide a much more attractive and deliverable strategic planning model than provided for by existing joint strategic plans, which have proved problematic, given that they are prepared and tested by means of an arrangement essentially designed for detailed local plans. Allowing groups of authorities to come together and collaborate to prepare and test strategic planning policies in relation to matters that cross local boundaries, whether that be infrastructure or affordable housing, by means of a joint spatial development strategy, is clearly a good thing, and it is crucial that more authorities do that.
Tim Farron
This is an important part of the Bill. I am comfortable with much of the direction that the Government seek to go in, but if we are to offer the power to develop joint spatial development strategies, it should be to everybody. I will make particular reference to national parks in England and the duty to consult with them.
It is worth bearing in mind that national parks are quasi-local authorities. In many ways, they have the functions of a local authority, particularly when it comes to planning and some other associated issues. They do not have council tax-raising powers and they are not directly elected in any shape or form in England or Wales. In Scotland, there is an element of direct election to the national parks.
I will make two suggestions. First, the needs of national parks and areas of outstanding natural beauty are significant. They are parts of the country that we have collectively decided are so important that they need to be protected for environmental reasons, to provide education and enlightenment about our heritage and our culture, and to protect the communities within them. I am especially concerned about that latter point.
In national parks, decisions are made about housing, planning and development that have a huge impact on the lives of the people who live within them. The Lake District national park has between 40,000 and 50,000 full-time residents, a not inconsiderable number of people whose lives are affected by an unelected authority. By the way, the national parks do a great job—I have a lot of time and praise for what the Lake District national park and the Yorkshire Dales national park in my constituency do—but it is not true to say that they make their decisions entirely democratically.
When we are consulting and imposing a duty to consult, we must have a duty to consult the national parks. They must not be considered things to be overlooked, and communities must not be overlooked. We need to remember that decisions made about affordable housing and allowing farmers to do something on their farms that might enable them to diversify and to provide a home for agricultural workers, or a home for a farmer to retire into so that a young farmer can come and take their place, are often decided by people who do not live in the national park and who are not elected by the local community.
It would be interesting if the Minister could reflect on the extent to which the Government might consider learning from the Scottish example, whereby a number of members of national park authorities are directly elected. When we place a duty to consult, which means that we bring in the national parks, we should consult people who are there representatively, who are democratically elected and who are there to speak on behalf of the community. If we do not do that, the national parks will continue to be considered simply places for people to visit, not places for people to live. It is essential that we consider the living, vibrant communities of our national parks, as well as the fact that they are huge assets for the nation as a whole.
Mr Jones
Although I understand the reasons for the amendments, our intention is for the reformed planning system to be district-led. As we have discussed previously, we do not want to see planning or any other powers being drawn upwards as a result of our reforms. As such, joint spatial development strategies need to be driven by the authorities closest to their communities.
We agree that county councils should play an important role in the plan-making process. They will have significant influence over the development of a joint spatial development strategy, and we envisage that they will be closely involved with its day-to-day production. To make sure that happens, we are giving them the formal status of statutory consultee so that they can bring their experience and expertise in a range of issues, particularly highways, transport, flood mitigation, education and the rules on waste, to the creation of a joint spatial development strategy. Planning inspectors examining the joint spatial development strategy will want to see evidence of work on those key issues and to make sure that any views expressed by the county council have been properly taken into consideration.
The approach that we are proposing strikes a balance between ensuring that joint spatial development strategies are developed at the right level and ensuring that the views and expertise of county councils are part of the process. Likewise, in areas with an elected Mayor, we believe it is vital that the Mayor is formally involved in the production of a spatial development strategy, in order to provide clear and accountable leadership for it. That is why combined authorities should not be eligible to produce a joint spatial development strategy. In such cases, the Mayor, with the support of all the member authorities, can approach the Government to ask for spatial development strategy powers to be conferred on them as part of their devolution deal.
I hope that was the response that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich was looking for. His amendments seem to view spatial development strategies as a co-ordinating layer in the planning system. Amendment 102 seeks to resuscitate the duty to co-operate, which is widely agreed—most Conservative Members would agree, at least—to have been an ineffective mechanism, criticised as inflexible, bureaucratic and slow. That is why the Bill abolishes it. We can all agree that it is vital for local planning authorities to work together to make sure that cross-boundary issues are properly addressed. We expect them to plan for, and deliver, the housing and infrastructure our communities need. The planning system provides a number of mechanisms to assist them in doing so to which we are adding.
We intend to replace the duty with more flexible policy within the revised national planning policy framework, upon which we will consult. This will enable local planning authorities to address any issues of alignment during the preparation of a plan. At present, if an authority fails the duty its local plan must be withdrawn. The Bill also introduces a new requirement to assist with plan making, which we will consider more fully in due course. That will ensure the involvement of those who are vital to production of plans, including the delivery and planning of infrastructure. As such, joint spatial development strategies should not be seen as a co-ordinating function, replacing the duty to co-operate. I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will agree to not to press the amendments to a vote.
Matthew Pennycook
I am grateful to the Minister for that response. On the issue of mayoral combined authorities and combined authorities, I cannot say that I am entirely convinced. However, I note the detailed response he gave me to the amendment, and I will give it further consideration. On the issue of county councils, the Minister says that they will be closely involved. I remain concerned that not giving them equality of status will be harmful. I am aware that the Department is concerned that if we do not get county councils to bring resources to the table for the new joint spatial development strategies, it may have effects that the Government do not want.
On the issue of the duty to co-operate and the voluntary nature of those new powers, I remain concerned about what happens and how that impacts on the Government’s wider policy objectives in areas where authorities do not make use of the power when we have removed the only statutory arrangement to enable them to co-operate. I urge the Minister to go away and give that some thought. If the Minister is not comfortable reintroducing the duty for those who have not taken up those powers, will he at least think again about whether the incentive structure might be tweaked to ensure that the majority of areas make use of the powers? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gareth Johnson.)
Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
Thursday 14th July 2022
(1 year, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 View all Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 July 2022 - (14 Jul 2022)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 8 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Because it is so hot, I am happy for Members to remove their jackets, if they so wish.
Schedule 7
Plan making
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
I beg to move amendment 121, in schedule 7, page 227, line 15, at end insert—
“(e) other community organisations representing members of that community”
This amendment would extend the group of determining bodies to include community groups.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mrs Murray. Given that planning has to be about our local communities, I find it astounding how little agency communities, community groups and residents have in the process. As we heard this morning, it seems that their voices will be diminished by the Bill, rather than expanded. Therefore, I believe that my amendment would help give communities some agency within the planning process.
The Opposition really value civil society, and we value individual residents and their different views. We value businesses and our community groups, and I believe that their knowledge and passion for the local area is irreplaceable. They know the challenges, the investment that is needed, and the people. They should be the drivers of development, and they should be seen as central participants in any planning process or development. The amendment is designed to ensure that copies of reports are received by local communities, whose voices seem diminished in the Bill, because Labour wants to amplify the voices of the people most affected by planning.
In my constituency, there are just too many groups to mention. However, if we are looking at the planning process for transport, I think about the York Bus Forum, Walk York and the York Cycle Campaign, which provide the best analysis of the current and future transport needs of our city. York Civic Trust has just undertaken a piece of deliberative democracy to establish a future transport strategy, and it would want to receive a report in order to reflect on the findings and to ensure that it can fully participate in the planning process.
In York, we have a city full of historians and archaeologists who understand the value of place making; we have a university full of housing specialists; and we have York Central Co-Owned, or YoCo, which has been engaging residents in dialogue on future developments. York Disability Rights Forum can highlight issues of access. Our local enterprise partnership, universities and colleges, and business partners are working on York’s future economy. They, too, would want to be engaged in the planning process, yet community groups seem so absent and do not even receive reports of strategies in order to be able to take planning forward and to be part of the consultation on the future of what they spend 24 hours a day working for.
We have resident groups that are actively looking at planning. We all have such groups in our constituencies, and I am sure that all hon. Members will recognise their strength. We are proud of them because of their dedication and attention to detail, and the inclusion of the community is urgently needed in the planning and consultation process. My amendment would build on that expectation and stop communities being locked out of planning, because our planning system is all the poorer without them. I will shortly go on to explain why their prominence must change but, for now, I believe that the first step is to involve communities in consultations by sending over copies of strategies, which is something that the Minister should not block.
If we have such expertise in our communities, let us bring it into the heart of the planning process so that we get the very best housing, economic space and environment, and so that the people who know their area best—the local residents and other stakeholders—have greater agency in planning processes. I have tabled a number of amendments to stimulate the Government into working through how residents can have a greater say over the future of their communities.
York Central is a classic example. Right from the start of the process, the community have been told that they will have a voice in the project at the next stage. As we go through each stage and are told that their time will come, my conclusion is that they may get to choose the colour of the spring bulbs, but nothing significant. At every step of the process there is no opportunity for real community engagement. The promised voice never comes. Residents have organised into community groups with the hope that their collective voice will be heard, yet it is not.
Whether for York Central or the York local plan, the very people who should have the greatest voice have the least. In both scenarios, political expediency of the ruling council parties has placed political self-interest over the interests of the city. In York Central, the partners’ agenda is to secure the opening of the National Railway Museum by 2025—we all understand the importance of that. Network Rail getting a capital receipt has further blocked and locked out local people’s voices. The contempt is staggering.
The Minister would weep at the conduct of his own party, not to mention the Lib Dems and Greens, in the political process of planning in York. I will talk more about the solution in my next set of amendments. I urge Government to think more about the brilliance that will come from more community inclusion in the consultation processes, engaging our community groups by ensuring that they are included in the information and are sent a copy of the strategy. Surely that is the first stage.
Matthew Pennycook (Greenwich and Woolwich) (Lab)
It is a pleasure, as ever, to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for York Central on this sensible amendment, which I am very supportive of. It simply specifies, as she so clearly articulated, that local community groups be included in the list of bodies that are sent a copy of any joint spatial development strategy adopted.
The Government have extolled the virtues of this legislation in part on the basis that it will demonstrably improve local engagement in the planning process. It surely follows that Ministers would welcome the engagement of community organisations when it comes to the new strategies that schedule 7 provides for. Given that all the amendment does is to ensure that a copy of any such strategy created and adopted is sent to the representative community organisations, I cannot for the life of me think of a convincing reason why the Government would not accept it.
Tim Farron (Westmorland and Lonsdale) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your guidance, Mrs Murray. I am also keen to support the sentiment behind the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for York Central. Confidence in the planning process is at an all-time low. In any of the constituencies of right hon. and hon. Members, confidence in communities in the planning process will not be great. In mine, land is of such enormous value around national parks and areas of outstanding natural beauty.
To have an amendment to the Bill that allows us to formalise a greater level of consultation and involvement of local communities seems very wise. If we can get the consent of local communities and have communities shape how they are developed in the years to come, the chance of people having confidence in the decision-making process and local democracy of the planning process is that much higher.
I am very lucky to have a constituency where every square inch is parished—there is not a single part of my community without a parish council. We have a default consultee on behalf of the community in every single town, village and valley in Westmorland and Lonsdale, and throughout much of the rest of Cumbria as well. There are community groups that ought to be formally involved in that process, so that the right decisions are made. People feel so frustrated.
In our community, we are the opposite: we want houses to be built. We see the decimation of our local communities—I can talk elsewhere about the evaporation of the housing market to second home owners and holiday lets. We desperately need homes that are affordable and available for local people. We do not get people saying, “Not in my backyard”; they are saying, “In my backyard now.” But we want houses that are useful to us: affordable, social rented and guaranteed for a local working population and those who are retired.
People are frustrated by a lack of adequate provision when it comes to drainage, flood prevention, sewerage, school places—all those sorts of things. If the community were properly involved, it would give its consent and approval to schemes that would otherwise get opposition.
We also see an imbalance in the process—the developer can appeal and the community cannot—which adds to the general sense that planning is a process by which things happen to communities, not by which communities decide what happens to them. The sentiments behind this amendment are good, and I really hope the Government will take it into account.
The Minister of State, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (Mr Marcus Jones)
It is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Murray. Although I understand the reasons for the amendment, the list of bodies in proposed new section 15AB(3), to which participating authorities should consider sending a draft joint spatial development strategy, is already comprehensive and can reasonably be assumed to include most community organisations. That includes voluntary groups, bodies representing religious groups and bodies representing the interests of racial, ethnic and national groups. However, it is not exhaustive, and authorities are free to send drafts to whichever organisations they feel necessary.
Our approach strikes the right balance between ensuring wide consultation while not putting unreasonable burdens on participating authorities and making the process unnecessarily onerous. I hope that, with those reassurances, the hon. Member for York Central will withdraw her amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I appreciate the debate that we have had on amendment 121. The parish system is incredibly good at engaging people because it is so local. The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale highlighted its establishment in the rural environment, but it is less prevalent in more urban environments, so we need to look at how to encourage the growth of parish councils across the country. They can be of real value and can get people to engage in their communities. Indeed, they are a first step for many in politics, as they are a less political environment in which to make decisions about their local community. There is some real strength in that. We will talk about neighbourhood plans, and it is important that we look at their inclusion as we work through the Bill.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich for his comments about the importance of putting people at the heart of planning; they often seem very much at the periphery. I looked very carefully at the Bill before drafting the amendment, and there is a bit of a vacuum in it, so it could be strengthened. Later this afternoon I will talk a little more about the importance of agency and voice, because they are absent.
I hear what the Minister says about the other organisations that are included, and his comments are helpful. If community groups feel excluded from the process, the Minister’s words highlighted that the clauses do not exclude them. Therefore, if they are unable to get hold of a copy of a report, I am sure those words will be very valuable in raising a challenge in the planning system to ensure that people get access to data. I am happy to withdraw the amendment, but I will be returning to the scene very shortly. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 88, in schedule 7, page 228, leave out line 5.
This amendment, along with Amendment 89, would explicitly ensure that people would have a right to be heard at an examination in public in relation to the Joint Spatial Development Plan part of the development plan.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 89, in schedule 7, page 228, line 9, at end insert—
“(8) Any person who makes representations in relation to the strategy must (if that person so requests) be invited to appear before and be heard by the examiner.”
See explanatory statement for Amendment 88.
Amendment 90, in schedule 7, page 246, line 29, leave out lines 29 and 30.
This amendment would prevent the general rule for hearings for supplementary plans taking the form of written representations and would instead enable the examiner to determine the form of the examination.
Matthew Pennycook
As I mentioned this morning, this is an incredibly technical schedule. It covers measures as diverse as powers to intervene in local plan making, a duty to prepare local design codes, neighbourhood priority statements and many other things. The three amendments relate to the important issue of public participation in the two new constituent parts of local development plans that the schedule introduces—namely, joint spatial development strategies, which we have already discussed; and supplementary plans.
It depends whether a local planning authority is in Greater London or subject to other devolutions deals, but in the main it is local and neighbourhood plans that presently constitute the development plan for most parts of England. Clause 82(3) expands the list of what can be included in a development plan to include spatial development strategies and supplementary plans, both of which will have the same legal status as a development plan in decision making, ironically taking us back to a situation where development plans are comprised of a suite of documents, not unlike what was introduced in the 2004 reforms and scrapped in 2011 on the basis that it was all too complicated.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what he is saying and I want to give an example to add some context to his comments. York is due a local transport plan and is behind on the timetable for delivering that, so York Civic Trust set up a process of deliberative democracy and engaged city stakeholders. They have created a plan for the future of our city, which is gaining a lot of interest. That demonstrates that if local people are involved, the plan will be robust and address some of the major challenges that slow down local authorities from engaging in that process. I thought that example would be a useful addition to my hon. Friend’s comments.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, which is a useful illustration of what local people and local community groups can add to the plan-making process.
Our specific concern is that the denial of the right to be heard on the two new documents means that, in important ways, the process of formulating a local plan could be constrained. Let me illustrate what I mean. It should be remembered that these documents are designed to resolve issues such as the local planning authorities’ approach to the green belt or strategic infrastructure. Once set, local plans will need to be in conformity with these strategies, but it will be impossible to make use of the right to be heard vis-à-vis a local plan on important issues affecting a community, because it will be in effect impossible to challenge a decision that has already been resolved by means of a spatial development strategy, in relation to which no right to be heard will exist.
The Minister will no doubt be briefed to say that rights to be heard do not apply to other strategic plans, such as the London plan or the now abolished regional plans. That is true, but the justification for the abolition of regional plans was that they were not accountable or trusted by communities. If the aim is to increase participation, why not grant these important safeguards?
On Second Reading, both the previous Secretary of State and the previous Minister championed this legislation in part because they argued that it would tangibly improve local engagement. Why, then, are the Government content to consciously and deliberately shut down the opportunity for such engagement when it comes to new joint spatial development strategies and supplementary plans?
Amendments 88 to 90 would resolve this glaring contradiction in the legislation. Taken together, amendments 88 and 89 would enshrine in the Bill the right to be heard at an examination in public in relation to a joint spatial development strategy, while amendment 90
“would prevent the general rule for hearings for supplementary plans taking the form of written representations and would instead enable the examiner to determine the form of the examination”
as they saw fit. We believe that these amount to simple but appropriate changes to schedule 7 that would restore the right to be heard and thus enable communities to engage fully at every stage of the development plan formulation process. If the Government are genuinely open to further honing and refining the Bill before it is given Royal Assent, as previous Ministers always maintained, they should accept these amendments, and I hope to hear that this Minister is content to do so.
Tim Farron
It is worth observing that a previous Government ripped up completely the spatial development strategy process, largely because of the sense that the populations of this country felt that it was utterly disconnected from the plans, desires and priorities of their communities.
If we are to go down this route and not enable a formalised process by which communities can have their voices heard when it comes to spatial development plans, we are just setting ourselves up for the same mistake that the previous Government made. If we want people to feel confident in these plans and believe that they are in their interests and right for the future of their communities, children and grandchildren, we need to give them the chance to have their voices heard and to have their say. The amendments seem entirely sensible to me.
Mr Jones
As we discussed in relation to digital reforms of the planning system, we absolutely share the objective of improving community engagement in all parts of the planning system. It is, however, appropriate to allow different procedures for that engagement, based on the role of the plan or strategy in question.
The current procedure for the examination of spatial development strategies is now well established. It is true that, unlike for local plans, there is no formal right to appear in person. However, we are confident that the current arrangements are fair, proportionate and effective. Experience shows that planning inspectors go to great lengths to ensure that a broad range of relevant interests and views are heard at examinations for spatial development strategies. The Committee may like to know that the most recent spatial development strategy examination, for the London plan in 2019, took place over 12 weeks and the list of participants ran to 27 pages.
The fundamental difference between spatial development strategies and local plans is that they do not designate or allocate specific land for development; that remains the role of the local plan. It should also be remembered that written and oral evidence carry equal weight at examination, and there is no limit on the submission of written evidence.
That brings me to amendment 90. We intend supplementary plans to replace supplementary planning documents, and, once they have successfully passed through consultation and independent examination, to be afforded the same weight as a local plan and other parts of the development plan. We are committed to a fair examination process, which is why we have based it on the arrangements for neighbourhood development plans.
The Bill sets out that, as a general rule, the independent examination of a supplementary plan is to take the form of written representations. That is expected to be more appropriate to their role in setting more specific policies for smaller areas than the local plan. The examiner must, however, hold a hearing if they think that is necessary by virtue of the issues raised or to ensure fairness. We expect there to be a need for guidance to support the independent examination of supplementary plans in general. We have been clear that we will work closely with the sector to refine our implementation plans, and we will be keen to hear views on whether further clarification on the matter of public hearings is necessary.
We have also committed to producing new guidance on community engagement in planning, which will describe the different ways in which communities can get involved and will highlight best practice. The guidance will cover supplementary plans. Given that the processes for both joint spatial development strategies and supplementary plans build on proven existing processes that have been designed to reflect their intended role, I hope the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will feel able to withdraw the amendments.
Matthew Pennycook
As the Minister would expect, I am disappointed by his response. He said that improving community engagement was an objective of the Bill. I do not see how he can reconcile that with the decision to deny the right to be heard when it comes to the two new documents, which have the same legal status as a development plan in decision making, and, as I have argued, will constrain the local plan in many cases because they will effectively filter what local residents can have a say on in that local plan by already setting out the parameters in, for example, a joint spatial development strategy.
I am not minded to push these amendments to a vote at the moment, but we will come back to the issue. I just say to the Minister that anyone watching our proceedings who is interested in planning from a local perspective will see a pattern here of the Government constraining the ability of residents and community groups to engage, and—this is the most damaging aspect—further undermining trust and confidence in a system where trust and confidence are already at rock bottom. I urge him to reconsider over the summer. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 122, in schedule 7, page 234, line 27, at end insert—
“(j) the timescale for the deliberative democracy process as set out in section [Deliberative democracy: local planning].”
This amendment along with Amendments 124 and 125 and NC42 will introduce a deliberative democracy process to the local plan timetable.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 124, in schedule 7, page 238, line 31, at end insert—
“(3A) Prior to establishing a local plan, the local authority must carry out a deliberative democracy process as set out in section [Deliberative democracy: local planning].”
See explanatory statement for Amendment 122.
Amendment 125, in schedule 7, page 239, line 14, at end insert—
“(ha) the deliberative democracy process as set out in section [Deliberative democracy: local planning].”
See explanatory statement for Amendment 122.
New clause 42—Deliberative democracy: local planning—
“(1) Before the preparation of any development or outline plan the local planning authority must undertake a process of deliberative democracy which involving the community to set—
(a) the balance of economic, environmental, infrastructure and special plans,
(b) the type of housing to be delivered,
(c) the infrastructure that is required to be hosted,
(d) the type of economic space, and
(e) environmental considerations, including making sites sustainable.
(2) A process of deliberative democracy under this section must—
(a) invite all residents of the local authority area to apply to be a representative in the deliberative democracy process,
(b) include measures to try to ensure that there will be a diverse representation of that community in the process, and
(c) provide for a forum of representatives that—
(i) will determine its terms of terms of reference, number of meetings and agenda at its first meeting, and
(ii) will produce a report from the deliberative democracy process.
(3) A report under subsection (2)(c)(ii) may determine the scope of development on a site.”
This new clause would introduce a deliberative democracy forum comprised of members of the public prior to the formation of a new development plan or outline plan.
Rachael Maskell
We have started the conversation and we need to take it to the next level, to strengthen the voice and agency of people in our communities—not just residents but all stakeholders, including businesses, community groups and people working in our public services.
We know from the pilots run by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport that deliberative democracy is a way of addressing challenging issues with a broad spectrum of the community and drawing out conclusions. The outcomes are more robust, consensus can be built, and challenging proposals can be brought into a place of understanding. People from all parts of the community engage, so we get true agency from different people in it. We want a modern and effective form of democratic engagement. We want to ensure that the planning process is not only robust and refreshing, but will resolve significant issues. That can be brought about by deliberative democracy.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this group of amendments, which raise an incredibly important issue that the Bill is silent on.
Debates about whether and how to formalise arrangements for deliberative democracy within the planning system have occupied those engaged in planning policy and practice for some time. I do not intend to try to do justice to those debates or to set out the case for considering amending the Bill to introduce a deliberative democracy process within the local plan timetable—my hon. Friend has admirably made the case for the benefits that deliberative democracy can bring.
All I will say is that we support this group of amendments because we think it is right that we look to do more to encourage public participation in the planning process beyond the existing right to be heard that applies to the examination of a local development plan, if not to the new spatial development strategies and supplementary plans that this schedule gives effect to.
Tim Farron
The hon. Member for York Central will forgive me if I do not get into the internal politics of York city, but all the same I think her proposals have real merit.
It seems that the housing market—in York, in the lakes and dales, elsewhere in Cumbria and in other parts of the country as well—has got into such a ludicrous situation that our planning law is just not able to keep up with it or to provide local communities with any kind of protection or agency when it comes to challenging that spiralling, out-of-control housing market.
Fairness in the planning system is essential. It is utterly frustrating—in fact, it is absolutely heartbreaking, as the hon. Member said—when communities see the desperate need for affordable homes for families who either are local or who will become local and for those working in social care, hospitality and tourism, schools and every other part of our economy, but the planning system permits us to build for demand and not for need. Communities must have that power and that agency.
Structured fairness in the planning system is essential, but it will require resourcing because the better planning decisions are those made with the community fully involved and with the planners getting out of their offices and meeting developers and communities semi-formally on site long before a proposal has been put in, so that we end up with a proposal that is, effectively, agreed on almost in advance.
When communities feel they are having things done to them, and when whole neighbourhoods are evicted and expelled through section 21 evictions, which the Government are yet to do anything about, those communities are bound to be desperate to have control and agency, to make sure that we make the best use of the resources and powers we have. What a slap in the face it would be for communities if we went down the deliberative route and then found at the end that communities do not have any power to enforce 100% affordability on any development or the permanent occupancy of houses that are developed.
We need to give communities that proper engagement and involvement, and we need there need to be enough planners, with enough resources, so that they can get out of the office and help to communicate with the community and indeed with developers in a consensual and pragmatic way. However, if we do not have the powers and the control at local planning level, we will find people who have been consulted but who still feel completely and utterly powerless.
Mr Jones
I thank the hon. Member for York Central for tabling the amendments and the new clause, because they provide us with an opportunity to talk about community engagement.
The English planning system already gives communities a key role, so that they can take an active part in shaping their areas and, in doing so, build local pride and a sense of belonging. We are strengthening that role through the Bill. Communities must be consulted on local plans and on individual planning applications. However, we know that current levels of engagement do not match our ambition of community involvement. That is why, through the Bill, we will increase opportunities for the community to get involved in planning for its area, to ensure that development is brought forward in a way that works best for local people.
The Bill reforms the process for producing local plans so that it is simpler, faster and easier for communities to engage with, and a number of measures in the Bill will create wholly new opportunities to engage. Neighbourhood priority statements will make it easier and quicker for local communities to determine priorities for their area, which will need to be taken into account in preparing local plans. Mandatory design codes will ensure that communities are directly involved in making rules on how they want developments to look and feel. Finally, street votes will provide a new way for residents to permit the additional development they want on their streets.
We intend to set out in regulations the minimum consultation periods on local plans, of eight and six weeks respectively, before a plan can be submitted for independent examination, which is longer than the current statutory requirements.
Rachael Maskell
I will respond more fully shortly, but I just wonder whether the Minister could set out the timescale for the guidance.
Mr Jones
I will come back to the hon. Member with the exact timescale on the guidance. We expect it to work in conjunction with the measures in the Bill. As we have discussed, we are keen to see more community engagement. The guidance may well recommend that some of the approaches set out in the amendment are the right things to do. However, it is critical that we ensure that authorities have the flexibility to respond to the needs of their area, and the amendment would impose a top-down structure that might suit some areas but not others. In the light of that and the steps that, as I have set out, we are already taking within and beyond the Bill, I hope the hon. Member will be minded to withdraw her amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful for the debate we have just had. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich for his comments, which highlighted the importance that Labour places on community engagement and agency in the planning process.
The hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale made the point for me, when he said that he did not want to engage with the politics. This process should not be about the politics. That is the challenge: this should be about addressing the need that is clearly there in many of our communities. Where we have significant demand and need, we should be able to address that. Ensuring that the resourcing is there is, of course, a challenge for all local authorities at the moment, and we need to ensure that planning gets the injection of resourcing that it needs. We are also losing skills, so we need to ensure that we get them coming through for the future.
I thank the Minister for the consideration he has given to my amendments and new clause. He set out the things that he will bring forward through the planning system, but I still believe we are on the old track, as opposed to looking at new opportunities, so I will look at this guidance with great interest when it is published.
Quickening the process and improving some of the consultation times is of course welcome, but I am talking about a period of 76 years and trying something different after that amount of time. There is still real conflict and pain in York over what is happening with the planning system. We absolutely want to come to a good decision in the future, looking at new opportunities, particularly after all the work that DCMS did. The pilots were successful and did bring people together. It is delightful to hear about the work Steve Rotheram has been doing in Liverpool. He is really putting young people at the heart of his agenda and ensuring that people from the most deprived communities have real agency and voice. I would expect nothing less of the Metro Mayor in Liverpool, because I know his passion for that great city.
However, there needs to be more from the Minister. There needs to be more in our planning system. There needs to be opportunity and a voice for the people we represent. The Minister said it in his own words: the levels of engagement are still so low. We are engaging in digital and we see the opportunities there, but we also see the barriers to digital. The Minister spoke about QR codes in Watford and 3D models, which are great— they help people like myself, who are more visual, to be able to identify things. I understand all of that. However, it is ultimately about the voice, knowledge and emotion, which we do not often see in planning. That is what actually makes the difference. That is what people bring. We need people to be able to determine and shape their future. As my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich said, we need to have those reports heard, engaged with and included in the planning system.
Although I will not press my amendments and new clause today, it is my intention to bring this issue back on Report. If the Minister were willing to meet me in the interim to talk about some of the challenges we have and some of the opportunities we want to build for my city of York, I would be happy to do that.
Rachael Maskell
I will close now, and I thank the Minister for that offer. I very much hope he will still be in his position—I appreciate that other events might take over. We may have a 24-hour period in September when we are able to meet. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 123, in schedule 7, page 238, line 6, at insert—
“(4A) A local plan may provide that the local planning authority may review and change any outline planning permissions in place prior to the establishment of a local plan, including on sites where work has already commenced, to bring those permissions in line with requirements set out in the plan.”
This amendment will allow Local Planning Authorities to require Outline Planning Applications to be adjusted where they conflict with Local Plans.
In my own mind, I have dubbed this the York Central amendment. I am sorry that I am going to talk about a real case study again. It highlights how planning that has been wrongly advanced due to the wrong motivations can be changed. If planning is going to be ruinous for an area, there must be an opportunity for proposals to be reworked.
Stakeholders across my city very much want Government to be able to assist in this matter. There are a number of developments that I can name in York that have been a complete disaster, and the features are all the same. Examples include the proposals for the old gas works, Hungate and the old Terry’s site. Developers extract what they can for what they want, and do not provide what people need in my city.
York Central is the largest brownfield development site in the country. It is vast. The development is threatening to take premium, valuable economic space next to the station, and it will choke off future economic opportunities —not only for the city of York and North Yorkshire, but for the gateway to the north.
The site is estimated to provide just 6,500 jobs. If we compare this to the Curzon Street, Toton or Crewe developments, those involved have understood the value of sites adjacent to stations of major connectivity. They have understood the opportunity to invest in the jobs that will provide people in my city with a good income in the future. We are a very low-wage economy in York because of the hospitality and tourism sectors. Not only do we want to level up York, but the north too.
I am so excited by the potential of the site, and yet the disaster of placing high-density housing for the super-rich in my low-income city is choking off the opportunity for York to level up or for the Treasury ever to reap its return. With the pace of capital receipt, 2,500 properties, mainly flats, are going to be built on the site. People in York want a home and garden, and 80% of the need is for family housing. However, luxury apartments across the city are going to be for investment, not residential purposes. My residents cannot afford to buy those places. York Central will be far worse, as the land value is higher. Just yesterday, a colleague in this place told me how their acquaintance had purchased seven of these luxury apartments and is turning them into Airbnbs. Is this really what development is meant to be all about?
This is what is really happening, and the Government need to get on top of it. Instead of the site being economically valuable and bringing investment in good jobs for the people of York, it will let property investors extract what they can out of our city. Empty units such as the ones we are seeing across our city, as well as second homes and Airbnbs, are not helping a single resident of York. Worse, they are heating up York’s housing market, so that it moves further away from my constituents’ dream. House prices are going up, and rent is going up. We have the extraction of housing, wealth and hope. It is a disaster. There are no additional homes in my community, and space is being taken up. High-value jobs will be lost for generations. Instead of my community being levelled up, it is spiralling down into even deeper debt and despair. I say to the Minister, this case study shows what is really happening right now.
We have to be able to work through things if they are wrong and if wrong decisions have been made, even if those decisions were made for political expediency, which they were. It is catastrophic. Even Homes England has said that York Central will become an Airbnb city, yet the Government have ploughed millions of pounds of taxpayer’s money into this site. I am not going to talk again about the transport challenges the site will bring as it gridlocks the city and turns it into a car park.
There must be a mechanism to stop disastrous developments. When mistakes have been made, we cannot just keep going on the treadmill, saying that the next stage is coming, when all it will do is cause more harm. This development could be stopped now, and the Minister should stop it—my amendment would give him that power. If he tells me that he already has those powers, then I earnestly ask why he has not used them. My city and my whole community want to know. Between us, we could fix this. This development could become a badge of pride, not just for my city but for the nation. York Central is a nightmare. I want it to turn into people’s dreams. We need to ensure that where poor planning decisions have been made, it is never too late to see change.
Tim Farron
The amendment is very helpful. I mentioned last week a decision taken recently by the Yorkshire Dales national park authority to ensure that 100% of all new developments will be for permanent occupancy. Although I would like to be wrong, I am pretty sure that it will not be able to enforce that condition. The amendment suggests how the Government might allow planning authorities, be they national parks or local councils, to have that kind of power.
In a community like mine if we build it, they will come. There is no problem meeting demand. If we build a three, four or five-bedroom property anywhere in the lakes, the dales or elsewhere in Cumbria, there will be a person who will pay top dollar for it. It will probably not even be their first home. Meeting demand will always be an answer that developers put forward; the properties will not stand empty—or at least they will not stand unowned. However, we have a planning regime that does not allow communities the agency and control to ensure that we build not for demand but for need.
One of the many blessings of having two national parks in a constituency is that we can compare them and try to encourage one to learn from the other. The Lake district does a great job, but the Yorkshire Dales national park authority has been far-sighted in saying, “These are the houses we need in our community. We don’t need more half-a-million, three-quarters-of-a-million or million-pound barn conversions. We need affordable homes for local families—or for those who will become local families.”
We are welcoming to offcomers from anywhere if they put down roots and contribute to our community. If the local plan could overrule outline planning permission, so that we can ensure that we deliver the homes, properties and business developments that we actually need rather than those that happen to have a place in the market, that would be a real power for communities like mine. I encourage the Minister to take the amendment seriously.
Mr Jones
I thank the hon. Member for York Central for the amendment. I thought she was almost tempting me to work with her during part of her speech. I could not quite understand why she seems to want me gone so quickly from this role.
It is good to have the opportunity to debate the amendment, which seeks to allow local plans to amend the details of existing outlined planning permissions so that they are in accordance with the local plan adopted after the grant of those permissions. Our planning reforms seek to ensure that local plans have a greater influence over individual planning decisions to ensure that development reflects what local communities want. In particular, our new decision-making framework under clause 82, which the Committee has debated, will lead to a more plan-led system, providing greater certainty to all.
I must say to the hon. Member for York Central that I cannot accept the amendment. To enable local plans to alter existing outline planning permissions, even when development has already started, runs counter to the long-standing position that the grant for planning permission is a development right. That right provides the certainty that developers need to raise finance and implement the permission. Allowing local plans to effectively rewrite permissions, even when they had already started, would create unnecessary uncertainty, and could see developers, especially small and medium-sized builders, faced with significant wasted costs and delays at a time when we need to support them.
Local planning authorities already have channels to revoke or modify existing planning permissions under section 97 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Importantly, those powers cannot affect works previously carried out and require the local planning authority—this is an important point—to pay compensation in respect of expenditure, loss or damage, so their use should be considered only as a last resort.
Furthermore, as developers often seek in practice to amend outline planning permissions, local planning authorities already have the opportunity to take account of new local plan policies when considering section 73 applications to vary planning conditions. That will also be the case under our new route to make minor variations to planning permissions, as set out in clause 98. For those reasons, I am sorry to tell the hon. Member for York Central that we will not be able to accept the amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful for the opportunity to set out why the amendment is so important. I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale for highlighting the actions taken in national parks.
The amendment is important because sometimes decisions are wrong. If, as is the case in York Central, the spade has not gone in the ground yet, it seems ludicrous to continue with something that will be ruinous to our city and will lead to 2,000 Airbnbs suddenly landing in it. That is not our tradition, it will not help anyone and it will ruin a beautiful city that should be a world heritage site. We are deeply concerned and disturbed by what is being done by developers that have control over our city. I am deeply worried about what is happening, and we need to find a way through it. There will be constant conflict as more and more people become disengaged and disenfranchised in York. The anger will build in our communities, but the Government have the opportunity to do something.
Mr Jones
The hon. Lady has returned to the subject of local plans in her area many times during our deliberations over the past couple of days, but do not elected councillors in any area—I am not talking about York—have the responsibility to sort themselves out, get things together and create a local plan in consultation with local people that stops the type of situation she describes?
Rachael Maskell
If the Minister could have a word with his party’s councillors in York, that might help to move things forward.
Mr Jones
Clearly, I am not completely au fait with the political situation in the hon. Lady’s city, but my perception from having looked at it quickly is that the Conservatives have not controlled the council since 1980. There have been several short periods over the years in which the Conservatives have had the leader in a minority administration, but it seems squarely down to the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens over a number of years—particularly the Liberal Democrats and the Greens.
Rachael Maskell
We are not here to talk about politics—well, maybe we are. Before the last election it was a Conservative-led administration with the Lib Dems’ support. The Minister is right that the Lib Dems and the Greens are in charge of the administration. Labour has not had control for a significant time, although there are elections next year, so we will see.
The key point is that when there is poor planning, as there is for the site I am thinking of, and we are in a deadlock situation that will be ruinous for the future of the community, we need a resolution and tools that can be deployed to find a solution. As I have described, the site is not providing the housing that our city needs. It will block off the economic opportunity for something that is so valuable for the levelling-up agenda not just for York and North Yorkshire but for the north. We need to find some solutions and stop the exploitation of land on that site.
I thank the Minister for his comments. I will not press this amendment to a vote, but I will consider how we will come back to the issue because it is important that we get it right. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 99, in schedule 7, page 238, leave out lines 16 and 17.
This amendment removes the requirement in inserted section 15C(7)(b) that a local development plan must be consistent with national policies at the development plan formulation stage.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 100, in schedule 7, page 239, line 19, at end insert—
“(but may not require a local plan to be consistent with any national demand management policy)”
This amendment would provide that regulations made under inserted section 15C could not require local plans to conform with national policies.
Matthew Pennycook
The amendments relate to a matter that we have already considered at length. As such, I do not intend to detain the Committee for long in speaking to them. Their purpose is simply to draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that there are two aspects of the issues that we debated in relation to clause 83, which concerned the Government’s intention to accord primacy to national planning policy in the form of NDMPs and, as a result, to provide for a large measure of central control over local development plans.
In stating that any conflict between local development plans and national development management policies should be resolved in favour of the latter, clause 83 relates specifically to the point in time at which any planning application is determined. Proposed new subsection (5A) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 makes it clear that proposed new subsections (5B) and (5C) are
“for the purposes of any determination to be made under the planning Acts”.
They therefore do not relate to the point at which the local development plan is put together.
In schedule 7, proposed new sections 15C and 15CA of the PCPA 2004 specify that local plans must be formulated in accordance with national development management policies. That matters, because even if we had been successful in convincing the Minister to leave out proposed new subsection (5C) in section 38 of the PCPA, proposed new sections 15C and 15CA would constrain the resulting local flexibility that we would have secured at the point that a planning application is determined, because they provide for a large measure of central control over what can be in a local or neighbourhood plan in the first place.
Amendments 99 and 100 seek to address the issue by removing the provisions in proposed new sections 15C and 15CA of the PCPA that local plans should be consistent with NDMPs. In the same way that amendment 86 to clause 83 sought to give precedence to local plans when a planning application is determined, the amendments seek to ensure that local and neighbourhood plans can have a degree of flexibility within a nationally set planning policy framework at the point that they are developed, rather than the content of local and neighbourhood plans being dictated in large part by central Government.
I know the response that the Minister will give me but I again urge him to reconsider according national planning policy in the form of NDMPs precedence over local development plans—in this instance, in relation to the point in time at which local plans are developed, rather than when planning applications are determined.
Mr Jones
I thank the hon. Member for his amendment to the plan preparation provisions in schedule 7 that prevent inconsistency with national development management policies. I feel this is almost like groundhog day on this particular point.
National development management policies would sit alongside those in local plans when certain planning decisions are made, and have clear statutory weight. National development management policies will primarily be nationally important policies used for making decisions, such as green belt protection. At present, local plans take too much time to produce and are too long, and they are often hard to digest. Notably, there can be a lot of overlap with policies in the national planning policy framework of common importance, such as flood protection and the green belt, where the protections are rightly uniform throughout the country.
A critical objective of our proposed changes to the planning system is to reduce the time it takes for local plans to be produced. Reducing the need to repeat common policies on nationally important matters in local plans removes an unnecessary burden on local authorities while underpinning key national policy protections with statutory weight such as policies for controlling development in the green belt, which I have mentioned several times.
Preventing plans from being inconsistent with national development management policies will also allow local plans to focus on the issues that matter to local communities, which will be enabled to focus on crafting local policies that are tailored to local circumstances. We have heard about one set of local circumstances at some length; clearly we want to make sure that local people and their representatives can craft local polices that are tailored to local circumstances.
Matthew Pennycook
As I said, I expected that answer. The Minister said our exchanges feel somewhat like groundhog day; it will start to feel like that, because we will return to this issue. We all know how the film “Groundhog Day” ends: when the main character, Phil Connors, reforms his ways. I hope the Minister can find it in his heart to change and to shift on this issue. I will not press the amendment to a vote but we will return to this issue, at the root of which is the status and scope of local plans, on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 126, in schedule 7, page 239, line 14, at end insert—
“(ha) Environmental Outcomes Reports,”.
This amendment would require local planning authority to have regard to Environmental Outcomes Reports in preparing a local plan.
I will be brief because we are going to say more about this issue when we deal with the environmental outcomes reports later in the Bill. If the amendment is not made, too little consideration will be given to the assessment of environmental impact. Nothing can be more important than to look at what is happening with the climate challenge. On Monday, many of us had the privilege to listen to top scientists talk about the climate risk and sketch out the profoundly troubling outcomes. We have struggled to get through this week because of the heat and people we know in our neighbourhoods are dying because of it.
We have to ensure that all outcomes seriously consider how we mitigate the climate catastrophe that we are living through. The planning process has a central role to play in that, whether in respect of transport, home heating, housing design or the industrial impacts that are having a great effect. As we all know, the current situation is not sustainable, and the Government have to focus on that at every turn. We have flooding and droughts side by side. I have tabled amendments for further discussion later in the Bill. Clause 116(2) sets out why this amendment is so important and why we must protect and restore our natural environment.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendment which, as she has set out, seeks to ensure that the Bill makes it clear that local planning authorities should have regard to environmental outcomes reports in preparing their local plans. We support any practical revisions to the Bill that are aimed at strengthening and enhancing the delivery of environmental outcomes. If the Government will not accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, I hope to hear from the Minister not only a convincing argument as to why but an explanation of how the Government believe the new EOR regime that is set out part 5 will interact with the preparation of local plans.
Mr Jones
The Government are clear that environmental outcomes reports will form part of the consideration of whether a local plan is adopted. The Bill already includes provisions in clauses 118 and 117 to define which plans will require assessment and how such plans should be taken into account. Although the list of plans that require assessment will be set out in secondary legislation, our commitment to the non-regression of environmental protection makes it clear that the relevant local planning authorities will need to produce an environmental outcomes report as part of their local plan adoption process. The reports will ensure that environmental outcomes are taken into account during the preparation and adoption of local plans.
The regulations will set out which projects and plans will require the preparation of an environmental outcomes report. The exact list of projects and plans that will require assessment will be worked out through consultation with the sector and relevant stakeholders. That will ensure that we can capture and use expert feedback in the design of the system.
In writing the regulations, we will be constrained by our commitment to non-regression on environmental protections. In line with that commitment, local plans will require environmental assessment, as they do in the existing system. Setting out the exact list in regulations, rather than in primary legislation, will allow flexibility, which is key, given the type of changes we see. Flexibility will mean that we can take into account new situations and the emergence of new technologies or development types. With that explanation, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw her amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich for his comments, and for his pertinent questions to the Minister. This issue is central not just to planning, but to the future of our planet. The climate crisis is at a point where non-regression is not enough. I appreciate that the Minister is new in his role, but I very much hope that he is brought up to speed quickly. Our climate is changing with such rapidity that we will have to do much more than not regress if the next generation, let alone future generations, are to have a place on this planet.
This is a deeply troubling time, and I am glad to hear that the EORs will have a role in local planning, but that role and the relationship need to be strengthened. I very much hope that the Minister and his officials can find ways to achieve that, and to do much more. We simply do not have time to do only what the Minister said. We will certainly return to the issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 127, in schedule 7, page 241, line 14, at end insert—
“(1A) To have effect a supplementary plan must be agreed within 5 years of the commencement of preparation of the local plan to which it relates.”.
This amendment requires supplementary plans under inserted section 15CC to be agreed within 5 years of the commencement of the local plan process.
I will try not to dominate the afternoon’s proceedings, but I have tabled a number of amendments. This amendment is similar to a previous one. It seeks to ensure that supplementary plans are agreed within five years, so that we have the up-to-date data that is necessary for shaping local plans. The theory is obvious: something as important as a local plan needs to be built on rock-solid, up-to-date evidence and data. I am staggered that the planning process does not necessarily embrace that theory.
For example, on Tuesday, I referred to transport planning in York, and detailed how data from 13 years ago was determining how our local plan should be developed for the future. I have raised that point with the inspectors in York again this week. We cannot depend on something so out of date. Data must be up to date, whether it is mineral and waste plans, reports from the Environment Agency, local transport plans or any number of other reports.
We have just had a census, which has set out the demographic changes in our constituencies. We need to draw on up-to-date data to understand the rhythm of what is happening in planning and in our communities, and to ensure that they are in sync. The first stage of that is supplementary plans, on which local plans are built. They need to be secure and timely.
The amendment would ensure that, within existing constraints, supplementary plans remain relevant and up to date. In York, they simply are not, and I am sure that is the case in many other places, too. When local plans are put together, the opportunity should be taken to bring in wider considerations. For instance, right now, we need another hospital in York, but there is no facility to even think about how we can sequence that into the planning system. These things do not happen immediately; we need to plan in a timely way for the future. We must not lock out opportunities as we create green belts and everything else, important though they are. We must think our way through this. We should think about the structure of supplementary plans, ensure the data is up to date, and ensure their relevance. That should feed into the local planning process, and strengthen local plans and the planning process. My amendment 127 seeks to achieve that.
Tim Farron
This is one of many really helpful amendments being put forward today. I hope the Minister will seriously consider it.
In communities such as mine, there is a housing catastrophe—“crisis” is not an adequate word for it. There is a huge change in the demographic, as well as in the nature and the usage of the housing stock; I am sure that the situation is similar in your constituency, Mrs Murray. The nature of rural and holiday-destination communities has put us in a desperate state, so there is a need for urgent action.
One of the reasons why I am delighted to be a member of this Bill Committee is that it gives us the opportunity to talk about policies that could lead to urgent change. We do not have the time to be deliberative, and to take forever over all this; the crisis is happening now. The horses are leaving the stables at a canter. We need to shut the stable door at the very least, and then put some more horses in, if hon. Members do not mind me flogging a dead horse of a metaphor.
We need to think about this very seriously because so much has changed in the last few years. The timeliness of local plans is critical. We would make poor decisions if we used demographics on housing tenure and demand from 10 years ago; actually, we would probably make poor decisions if we made them on the basis of the way things were three years ago.
The recent census results show that in my community, there has been a 30% rise in the proportion of people who are retired—brilliant! But there is a drop in the number of people in the working-age population. It is therefore unsurprising that we face an absolute care crisis. We cannot find staff to provide support for people in their older age, or at other points in their life when they need care or support. Likewise, there would be 60,000 people working in the hospitality and tourism industry, which is utterly fundamental and the biggest employer in Cumbria, if we could fill the vacancies.
There has been a clear and very quick change in the nature of our demographic, with whole clearances of the working-age population. Long-term rentals are collapsing, and at least 50% of those properties are moving into the short-term Airbnb sector. We need to ensure that plans for development in our communities are based on live, current data. That is essential, so I hope the Minister will take this amendment seriously.
Mr Jones
In the new planning system, supplementary plans will replace supplementary planning documents. Once they have successfully passed through consultation and independent examination, they will be afforded the same weight as a local plan under the parts of the development plan.
Supplementary plans will provide local planning authorities with the flexibility to make policies for specific sites, or groups of sites, quickly. That could help to address urgent site-specific matters, for example in response to a new regeneration opportunity that had not been identified through the local plan, or to set out design policies outside the normal local plan process. We envisage a connection between local and supplementary plans in some cases—for example, where a local plan allocates a site-specific plan, and the supplementary plan sets out a design code for that site.
However, imposing an arbitrary tie between local and supplementary plans, as proposed by this amendment, could fetter the ability of authorities to use supplementary plans to respond positively to changes in their area at pace in the way that was intended. We have made clear our intention to bring forward in regulations a requirement for all local plans to be updated at least every five years. It is therefore not necessary to require supplementary plans to be made within five years of a local plan being adopted.
Rachael Maskell
I am conscious that some local transport plans date back 10 years. The local plan process may move forward at a different pace from supplementary plans. That is why I think that the Minister’s point strengthens the argument for the amendment.
Mr Jones
I hear what the hon. Lady says, but this plan is there to provide local planning authorities with the flexibility to bring forward policies for sites or groups of sites quickly. That is different from the example that she gave. Again, requiring supplementary plans to be made every five years after a local plan is adopted is not necessary. I hope that my assurances will enable the hon. Member to withdraw her amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful once again for the opportunity to debate this issue, and to hear the Minister’s arguments. A theme is starting to emerge: the question of how to do planning in a timely way. We all recognise that: the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale set out clearly how rapidly our communities can change—demographic, housing and transport changes. We want to ensure that we keep up with that. As we become more digitised, technology can, in many respects, ensure that we stay current in setting local plans. That is another theme running through the Bill, which I would like to consider as it progresses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 139, in schedule 7, page 250, line 15, at end insert—
“(8) For a period of 6 months following a local election, a local planning authority may review a local plan that has already been adopted and submit a proposal to an examiner to change or adjust their plan.”
This amendment would allow newly elected Councils to amend local plans following an election.
Briefly, I understand that the whole point of a local plan is to create stability, and to ensure, based on evidence, that a plan delivers for a community. However, a plan adopted by a previous administration could strangulate an incoming administration, and prevent it from delivering economic or housing opportunities for their community. Their hands could be tied for the whole period of the administration.
A local plan should not be discarded. As I have said before, we should start thinking about planning as being about evolution rather than revolution; plans should be updated and should move forward rapidly. A new administration, whether in Government or local government, want to make a difference for their community, and to demonstrate that they can respond to need. We have talked so much—and will do so again—about the rise of Airbnbs and the many new and growing challenges. We need a rapid change in direction.
I want to give new authorities, of whatever colour, the opportunity to consider new structures and mechanisms for delivering for communities. Being able to look at a local plan at that moment could be a powerful intervention.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome the amendment, because it probes the Government on an intriguing, if not uncontroversial, issue of whether a formal mechanism should be put in place to ensure that local plans can be revised in line with the local electoral cycle. She made the case that that would give us the flexibility to adjust to new political priorities. Also, one of the potential benefits of allowing for a six-month review period following a local election would be that political parties in a given local authority area would at least have an incentive to raise the issue of the local development plan as part of the democratic process, thereby raising public awareness of and engagement with it.
Given the steps being taken to ensure that every local plan is reviewed at least once every five years—the Minister spoke to that—the electoral cycle as a period of time is not too out of alignment with the time period we are talking about for the review. On that basis, I welcome the amendment as a way of probing the Government on the issue, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the case that my hon. Friend made.
Mr Jones
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Government’s proposals to get more up-to-date local plans in place. Paragraph 15GA in schedule 7 already enables a local planning authority to revise its plan at any time once it has come into force, irrespective of whether the authority has recently changed political control. My concern, however, is that by explicitly making a link between local elections and planning, the amendment risks turning a local plan into a political football. The hon. Member for York Central has told us all about what she thinks was a political football situation in her area.
For authorities that have elections in thirds, rewriting plans on the basis of election results could lead to updates three times every four years. That could lead to a constant change of direction. It would leave communities and other interested parties in a permanent state of uncertainty about what development should take place and where. Our reforms will provide welcome predictability in the local plan-making process; there will be a requirement for plans to be prepared within 30 months, and updated every five years. We think that is the right balance. I hope I have provided sufficient reassurances for the hon. Member for York Central, and that she will withdraw her amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I am grateful for the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich. We have heard from both sides about the positives of more engagement with local planning, but also about the politicisation of local planning. Ultimately, we want something that is robust, flexible and fit for purpose. I thank the Minister for pointing out that in schedule 7, paragraph 15GA, local authorities have flexibility of review. I am therefore happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Rachael Maskell
I beg to move amendment 140, in schedule 7, page 252, line 24, at end insert—
“(c) consult with relevant stakeholders, including residents, via a deliberative process.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult local stakeholders on the local plan.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 141, in schedule 7, page 262, line 7, at end insert—
“(1A) A neighbourhood priorities statement must be prepared with the input of local stakeholders and community groups.”
This amendment would ensure that community groups and stakeholders are involved with the development of a neighbourhood priorities statement.
Rachael Maskell
I have gone into detail on why the Government should consider deliberative democracy. I will not repeat myself, but there is a real opportunity to enable deadlocks to be broken and to move forward with a process of engagement, so that we have a strong voice in setting neighbourhood priorities and can strengthen community voices in the planning process. I will say no more on that now, but I will return to the subject on Report. I welcome the opportunity to raise the issue again.
Matthew Pennycook
Briefly, I have made it clear on previous occasions that we support any measures in the Bill that increase local democratic control over engagement with the planning process, principally as a means of restoring trust and confidence in the planning system. Although the Bill requires a body preparing a neighbourhood priority statement to publish the proposal in draft so that people who live, work or carry on business in the neighbourhood to which it relates can comment on it, I appreciate that the thrust of the amendments is to ensure that a degree of proactive consultation takes place at the point when the proposal is being put together, rather than providing the opportunity to comment on it once it is finalised. On that basis, we are happy to support the amendments, which would ensure that local stakeholders and community groups were treated as statutory consultees in the preparation of those statements.
Mr Jones
It is of course vital that communities are given every opportunity to have their say on draft local plans and supplementary plans. The English planning system already gives communities a key role, so that they can play an active part in shaping their areas and, in doing so, build local pride and belonging. In the Bill, we are not changing that; in fact, we are strengthening it. I have set out elsewhere how that will be achieved.
The powers we are discussing have been used only sparingly in the past. That is expected to remain the case under the reformed plan-making system. However, they act as an important safety net to ensure that all areas can benefit from having up-to-date plans in place. I provide reassurance that were the Secretary of State or a local plan commissioner ever to take over plan preparation using the powers in the Bill, the plan would need to undergo public consultation, like any other plan. Like other procedural requirements, that will continue to be set out in secondary legislation, akin to the existing Town and Country Planning (Local Planning) (England) Regulations 2012, using powers set out elsewhere in the Bill. Incorporating the amendment into proposed new section 15HA is therefore unnecessary.
The hon. Member for York Central raises the important issue of engagement with the community on the preparation of neighbourhood priority statements. I hope that I can reassure her that the amendment is not necessary. The purpose of neighbourhood priority statements is to provide communities with a simpler and more accessible way to set out their priorities and preferences for the local area, including in relation to the use and development of land, housing, the economy, the environment, public spaces and local facilities.
Proposed new section 15K(6) under the schedule gives the Secretary of State powers to set out in regulations the procedures that neighbourhood planning groups must follow when preparing their neighbourhood priority statements. The Government’s intention is to use the power to set out the requirements that neighbourhood planning groups must meet in order to ensure that they engage widely. We are testing different approaches to community engagement through our simpler approach to neighbourhood planning pilot, which got under way earlier in the year.
I hope that I have provided sufficient reassurances for the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Rachael Maskell
I think that we have to part ways on the issue of the planning process. I am not satisfied that it gives residents their rightful voice. I will not press the Committee to a Division, but giving our communities the opportunity to have a real say will be a major theme on Report. The Government are taking away their voices, but we want to empower them. After all, when people said, “Give us back control”, it was these very issues—their lives, communities and neighbourhoods—that people wanted control over. The Government have not heard that message, whereas we clearly want to respond. Even though my amendment would have enabled us to address why plans run into difficulty and fail to progress, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 109, in schedule 7, page 262, line 7, at end insert—
“(1A) A local planning authority must have regard to the content of any relevant neighbourhood priorities statement in the exercise of its planning functions.”
As we have just discussed, proposed new section 15K introduces a new neighbourhood planning tool, the neighbourhood priorities statement. According to the Bill’s explanatory notes, these statements will allow communities to identify key priorities for their local area, including their preferences in relation to development, with the intention of providing a simpler and more accessible way for communities to participate in neighbourhood planning.
The provision is clearly a response to the fact that the vast majority of the 1,061 neighbourhood plans made to date have emanated from more affluent parts of the country, where people have the time and the resources to prepare and implement them, rather than from less affluent areas and more complex urban environments. We very much welcome the fact that the Government are engaging with this real problem.
Tim Farron
This is a wise amendment and I hope that the Minister will take it seriously. I mentioned earlier the fact that fewer than 1% of the county’s population engaged with a consultation on local government reorganisation in Cumbria. The fact that they were ignored probably explains why people do not engage so much: never have we been more consulted as a society, and never have we been less listened to.
It is important to flesh out the status of neighbourhood priority statements. When people make representations on the future of their communities, we need to know whether they hold any status whatsoever. For example, a parish might identify a specific need for supported living for younger people with learning disabilities or for older people. There may be a specific need, as is the case in many parishes in my constituency, for on-farm agricultural dwellings for farmers to retire to or for agricultural labourers to live in while working on site. Such special needs identified by district and parish absolutely should be incorporated into the planning process.
Furthermore, neighbourhood priority statements should be taken into even greater consideration in planning discussions and decisions in those areas where the planning committee is not elected. I mentioned national parks earlier. Not a single member of the national park planning boards in England and Wales is directly elected. They are good people—most of them are very good people—who do their very best, but it does not seem right that people who make decisions are not directly accountable to those affected by them. That should be addressed in other ways, but in the meantime it is important that even greater consideration is given to neighbourhood priority statements in those communities where democracy is not part of the planning process.
Mr Jones
I welcome the Opposition’s support for neighbourhood planning. However, I do not agree that the amendment is necessary to ensure that neighbourhood priorities statements are properly considered in the planning process. The amendments made by schedule 7 set out that local planning authorities must have regard to any neighbourhood priorities statements in their areas when preparing their local plans. That will be tested independently at examination, which I think is an important point. The new local plan will be informed by any neighbourhood priorities statements and, alongside any neighbourhood plans in force, will form the basis for decisions on individual planning applications and enforcement decisions.
To respond to the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, the intent is not for neighbourhood priority statements to replace a community’s ability to engage and form a neighbourhood plan. However, we do not want to create another layer to the formal development plan by turning priorities statements into a form of plan. That would make the planning system more complex and go against what we are trying to achieve with our reforms.
We are clear that the planning process must be more democratic, which is why we are making it easier and simpler for communities to engage. In addition to neighbourhood priorities statements, communities will be also be able to engage through new measures, including mandatory design codes, allowing communities to be directly involved in making rules on how they want developments to look and feel, with a much greater emphasis on environmental sustainability; street votes, allowing residents to propose developments on their street and for a vote to be held on whether planning permission should be given; and measures on street names, removing a local authority’s ability to impose street name changes on a community and instead requiring it to first obtain support from a majority of the local electorate on the street.
We are clear that communities should be at the heart of the local plan-making process, which is why we intend to include a requirement for two rounds of community engagement, for a minimum of eight and six weeks respectively. That is longer than the current statutory minimum.
We will create new guidance on best practice in community engagement, including digital approaches to engagement with sector experts, to provide local authorities and developers with a toolkit to improve local engagement. We will ensure that all members of the community have the opportunity to engage if they wish, supported by digital tools to make engagement easier and more accessible, bringing the current system into the 21st century. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich will withdraw his amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I welcome the Minister’s response and the clarification he provided. I am largely reassured, although I am still not entirely clear on the weight that those statements will have in development management decisions on individual applications. I will, however, review what he said, so on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 101, in schedule 7, page 270, line 31, at end insert—
“(4) In this part—
‘mitigation of climate change’ means compliance with the objectives and relevant budgetary provisions of the Climate Change Act 2008;
‘adaptation to climate change’ means the achievement of long-term resilience to climate-related risks, including the mitigation of the risks identified in relation to section 56 of the Climate Change Act 2008, and the achievement of the objectives of the relevant flood and coastal erosion risk management strategy made pursuant to section 7 of the Flood and Coastal Water Management Act 2010.”
This amendment requires references to climate change mitigation and adaptation in the inserted sections on plan making to be interpreted in line with the Climate Change Act 2008.
The debates we have had so far in relation to planning have focused heavily on the detailed procedures for how plans are made. We have spent far less time considering the practical outcomes that we want the planning system to help achieve and its role in enabling us to meet a number of significant challenges that we face as a country. I recognise that we will have time to do so after the summer recess, when we consider any proposed new clauses on the purpose of planning. However, we feel it is important that we also seek to amend those parts of the Bill that touch on some of those challenges but that do not necessarily ensure that we are doing what is necessary to meet them.
Of all the challenges we face, the most pressing is that of runaway global heating. Despite the desire of several Conservative party leadership candidates to abandon it, there is broad public support for bold climate action, and a strong cross-party consensus about the importance of the UK’s net zero target. Yet, in its latest annual progress report, the Committee on Climate Change found that the current Government’s policies
“will not deliver Net Zero”,
that the country is on track for only eight of 50 key indicators of progress, with 11 significantly off track, and that no credible plans exist for 61% of required emissions cuts.
When it comes to planning, one can point to a few exemplar development schemes across England, but, in general terms, we have failed to ensure that the planning system is playing its full part in tackling the climate emergency. Indeed, one might go so far as to argue that it is actively hindering our ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change in myriad different ways, whether that be planning decisions enabling the building of new homes in places prone to flooding or unplanned development resulting in new communities that are entirely dependent on cars. More must therefore be done to ensure that the planning system effectively contributes to the delivery of our emission reduction targets and that new development produces resilient and climate-proofed places.
The amendment seeks to achieve that aim by ensuring that the process of plan making is fully aligned with the commitments set out in the Climate Change Act 2008 and the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. It would do so by clarifying the meaning of climate change mitigation and adaptation in the Bill in such a way as to tie them directly to those Acts, thereby strengthening the duty placed on plan making via a 2008 amendment to the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 that ensured that all plans contribute to the mitigation and adaptation of climate change.
By ensuring that there is genuine coherence between the country’s planning system and its climate commitments, the amendment would also provide the foundation for more detailed national policy on how planning will contribute to achieving net zero emissions by 2050 and mitigating climate change as fully as possible in the forthcoming NPPF review. I hope that, in his response, the Minister will be able to pick that up and provide us with an update on when we might see that issue addressed in that NPPF review.
To conclude, we all know that the planning system must be aligned with net zero if we are to achieve our legally binding interim targets. I can think of no reason whatsoever that proposed new section 15LH, set out in schedule 7, should not be amended to give effect to that objective in relation to changes made to plan making in the Bill. On that basis, I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment.
Tim Farron
I, too, am deeply concerned by the noises from some of those seeking to become leader of the Conservative party, and therefore Prime Minister, on issues to do with climate change and net zero. I think that they are unwise, politically. When all is said and done, the public are convinced of the need to take serious and radical action. They recognise it as the biggest earthly threat that we face. We must face it together, or we will indeed fall together.
This is where local authorities have the opportunity to make a huge difference in the planning process. I am going to pull out two examples to illustrate why it is so important for the planning system to be tied very closely to the need to comply with the terms of the Climate Change Act 2008. The first is, of course, zero-carbon homes. When we are building new buildings, whether they be homes for us to live in or business properties, we should ensure that they are all compliant. We know that planning committees currently want to make new developments zero carbon, to ensure that they are contributing to renewable energy and minimising any wastage of energy whatsoever, and yet in the final analysis they cannot do so, because it is not enforceable. This Committee has the ability to make the law so that they could do that. Why would we not do that? Why would we not give communities the power and agency to actually enforce zero-carbon homes and buildings in our communities?
As I said earlier, at some point in August—after an eight-month delay—we expect the inspector to announce whether the UK will open its first coalmine for 30 years, in west Cumbria. We obviously should not do that. We will wait and see what the inspector says, and then we will wait and see what the Secretary of State says in response. It should be a no-brainer. If we are acting in line with the terms of the Climate Change Act, we are not going to be sanctioning the digging up of more fossil fuels for any purpose at all.
Those powers should be held by local authorities so that planning authorities can put in practice what we as a national community and family have agreed are our priorities. That power is not present. This amendment, I hope, provides the possibility that it could be.
Mr Jones
I am sure we all agree that climate change is one of the central issues of our time. It is therefore critical that the reformed planning system addresses that issue effectively. That is why the Bill sets out that local plans
“must be designed to secure that the development and use of land in”
the local planning authority areas
“contribute to the mitigation of, and adaption to, climate change.”
I think we can all see from the last few days and what is likely to happen early next week that things have changed even since a few short years ago, when you and I first came into this House, Mrs Murray. Also, the national planning policy framework already requires local planning authorities to plan in line with the objective and provisions of the Climate Change Act 2008. But we recognise the need to do more. That is why the Government also made a commitment to update the framework to ensure that it contributes to climate change mitigation and adaptation as fully as possible. I heard what the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich said. I have undertaken previously during this sitting to write to him about the review of the national planning policy framework, and I will include the response to the question that he has just asked.
We will also be consulting on this as part of wider changes needed to deliver on the Bill’s ambitions after Royal Assent, and we will consult shortly on some immediate changes to deliver on commitments in the British energy security strategy, to help lower energy bills and increase our energy security.
Therefore, although I understand the spirit of this amendment, the Government must oppose it to ensure that this important issue can be properly considered and addressed through a review of national policy, which will go out to consultation next year, but I will come back, with further information, to the hon. Gentleman. On that basis, I hope that he will withdraw his amendment.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the Minister for that detailed response, but what I did not hear was a convincing argument as to why the Government cannot accept this amendment, which would simply alter the definitions of climate change mitigation and adaptation in the Bill so that they aligned with the legislation that we have been talking about. We feel quite strongly on this matter, and I will press the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr Jones
On the basis that we have today spent significant time debating the content of schedule 7, I would like to commend schedule 7 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 7 accordingly agreed to.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gareth Johnson.)