Immigration Bill (Eleventh sitting)
(9 years ago)
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The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)
Clause 31 deals with the important issue of rights of appeal relating to persons who claim to have a right to remain in the United Kingdom on asylum or human rights grounds, but whose claim has been refused. It has long been established that, in some cases, a person can be removed and deported before an appeal is brought or heard. Indeed, the previous Labour Government introduced powers in 2002 to certify claims that were defined as “clearly unfounded” such that persons bringing unfounded claims could be removed before bringing their appeal. That was extended to deportation in 2007. Then, in 2014, it was extended further so that arguable claims from foreign national offenders could also be certified when deportation pending appeal would not be in breach of that person’s rights under the European convention on human rights or the rights of any other person affected by the decision.
The context is important in this debate, because the proposed change builds on the success of previous alterations, which have represented an incremental approach. The 2014 framework was recently confirmed in the Court of Appeal—we will no doubt explore some of the issues relating to that judgment in due course. The changes have had a positive operational impact, with the accelerated deportation of hundreds of foreign criminals, which is why one of this Government’s manifesto commitments was to remove the limitation that the power can be used only for those subject to deportation—mainly criminals—so that all individuals who have sought but been refused a right to remain in the UK on human rights grounds can be removed more swiftly. Clause 31 delivers on that commitment. It is our policy to ensure more effective removals and to prevent people whose applications have been refused from remaining in the UK and potentially accruing article 8 rights after it has been decided that they have no right to be here.
The power to certify that an appeal must be brought from overseas when that would not breach human rights was introduced in the Immigration Act 2014 for persons liable to deportation—largely foreign national offenders, as I suggested a moment ago. Subsections (2), (3) and (6) of clause 31 extend the scope of the existing power to all human rights claims. Importantly, the power will not apply to asylum claims, meaning that all asylum appeals, except those that are clearly unfounded, will continue to be heard in the UK. The certification power cannot be used in cases when removal pending appeal would create a real risk of serious, irreversible harm or other breach of human rights, such as when there is a claim under article 2, the right to life, or article 3, freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. We are largely dealing here with cases that relate to article 8 and to a person’s family or private life. I emphasise that each case will of course be assessed on an individual basis, taking into account the impact of certification on family members, including children.
The power will not normally apply to unaccompanied children. Many unaccompanied children make asylum claims anyway, so this power is irrelevant to them. When an asylum claim is refused, a child will be granted leave until they are 18 years of age, unless adequate reception arrangements are in place for their return to their home country. When a child has been in the UK for seven or more years, they can be granted leave to remain on the basis of their private life rights when it would not be reasonable to expect them to leave the UK.
Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)
The Solicitor General is at pains to point out that the power would not normally be used on children, so I guess that he has taken account of the evidence that we received from the Children’s Society and others expressing such concerns. Why have the power at all if it is not intended to be used?
The Solicitor General
It is envisaged that the power could be used on certain occasions in the case of a much older child or young person. Particular circumstances could allow, on a case-by-case basis, a particular resolution, but it is envisaged that in the vast majority of cases that would not apply and it would be exceptional if it did.
Paul Blomfield
Will the Solicitor General clarify that point? We are straying into the territory of our previous debate, on how to define age. He said “much older”. What does he consider to be much older? Where does that threshold kick in?
The Solicitor General
We are talking about the 18-month period between 16 and a half to 18 years of age. That is the period we are dealing with. I have already made the point about age in previous debates, but I will develop the point I was making just now. For example, if a 17-year-old who lives in the UK with members of their wider family has made a human rights claim to stay that has then been refused, and if they have parents or family in another country to whom they can return and successfully establish their life there, these provisions might apply. To develop the general point about the interests of children, the welfare of children will continue to be a primary consideration in decisions by virtue of statute under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, so each case will be assessed depending on individual circumstances.
Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
The Solicitor General is dealing with a very important point and reassuring us that an assessment will be made, particularly when it involves children, but how precise will that assessment exercise be? How will the detailed circumstances be ascertained and what is the remedy if it is thought that a wrongful decision has been made?
The Solicitor General
The hon. and learned Gentleman has hit upon the more general point about successful appeals. It is wrong to assume that the reason for the number of successful challenges to Home Office decisions lies fairly and squarely at the door of the Home Office and any failures that it might exercise in using its discretion. We have due process, and he will of course be aware that when an applicant makes an application, they should do everything they can to provide the fullest evidence and information about their situation at the earliest opportunity. I would think that evidence about the welfare needs of children would be at the forefront of any applicant’s mind, or the minds of those who are instructed to represent them. It is therefore vital—this is a good opportunity for me to put this on the record—that everybody involved in such proceedings understands that early reliance on comprehensive evidence is essential if we are to avoid the issues that the hon. and learned Gentleman rightly raises.
On the handling of children’s cases, revised guidance has now been published following the recent Court of Appeal judgment, which we are well aware of, and is now available on the gov.uk website.
Keir Starmer
It may be my fault for not expressing myself clearly enough, but in relation to the assessment of the impact on a child who is required to appeal from abroad—which is a different assessment from the ordinary assessment of an impact on a child—how is that to be conducted? What is the guidance? For example, does the guidance say more than six months for a child under 10? Is separation from a parent acceptable or unacceptable? What is the guidance for the decision maker if they are presented with two children under 10 and a possible separation of six to 12 months? Are they told that that is okay or not okay?
The Solicitor General
The hon. and learned Gentleman has asked a specific question about the wording of the guidance. I am at a slight disadvantage because I do not have it to hand. It might be that I can get a response to him about that. However, guidance that goes into huge prescriptive detail on time limits or time indications is not really guidance. Guidance must give decision makers discretion and allow them to look individually on a case-by-case basis.
The Solicitor General
I will finish this point, then the hon. and learned Gentleman can by all means intervene again.
I want to give the Committee an example about individual circumstances. An example of where the welfare of a child might make a case unsuitable for certification by the Secretary of State is if the individual whose article 8 claim has been refused is acting as the primary carer for a child, even temporarily—for example, if the child’s parents had separated and the parent who is normally the primary carer is unavailable to take care of the child temporarily and the other parent is caring for the child while their appeal is being determined. In that example, welfare issues clearly come into play.
In each case, individuals will be asked to provide any reasons why the power should not be applied in their circumstances, which will be fully considered. Of course, they will be able to challenge the decision to certify; we must not overlook that important point. The decision to certify is an administrative decision that can be challenged by judicial review.
Keir Starmer
I want to probe the question of guidance. The Solicitor General’s example is of a primary carer. Unsurprisingly, it is not thought a good idea to certify in those circumstances—that case makes itself. The Children’s Commissioner published a report about a month ago about the impact of different rules, including the rules about the income requirement that must be met before a spouse can join a family, which focused on the impact on the child of not having access to one parent for months, and sometimes years. Has the Solicitor General or the Department taken those findings into account? They seem to be pertinent here, given the impact on a child of not having contact with one parent for a prolonged period.
The Solicitor General
The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a powerful point, but those sorts of considerations can be taken into account by the decision maker.
I now have to hand the guidance on the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 issued by the Home Office. The latest version is dated 30 October, so it is fresh off the printing press. The section 55 duty is described in paragraphs 3.6 to 3.8 inclusive, which I will read for the record:
“When considering whether to certify a human rights claim pursuant to section 94B, the best interests of any child under the age of 18 whom the available information suggests may be affected by the deportation decision must be a primary consideration.”
That is a very helpful start.
“Case owners must carefully consider all available information and evidence to determine whether or not it is in the child’s best interests for the person liable to deportation to be able to appeal from the UK. This is particularly relevant in considering whether deportation pending appeal would cause serious irreversible harm to the child. The case owner must also consider whether those interests are outweighed by the reasons in favour of certification in the individual case, including the public interest in effecting deportation quickly and efficiently.”
That is the balancing exercise in a nutshell.
Paragraph 3.7 might help the hon. and learned Gentleman:
“Case owners must carefully assess the quality of any evidence provided in relation to a child’s best interests. Original, documentary evidence from official or independent sources will be given more weight in the decision-making process than unsubstantiated assertions about a child’s best interests or copies of documents.”
Paragraph 3.8 states:
“For further guidance in relation to the section 55 duty, see…Section 55”.
It also contains links to an introduction to children and family cases and to criminality guidance for article 8 ECHR cases. I think that is a helpful encapsulation of the balancing exercise that decision makers have to carry out.
Keir Starmer
I want to explore that guidance. For clarity, if the assessment states that there will be serious harm to the child, but it would not be irreversible, that suggests that the decision maker would go ahead with the decision and certify. Is it right that the harm has to be serious and irreversible?
The Solicitor General
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to read the words in that way. We do not have the words “and” or “or”—we are back to “and” or “or”. He and I like these arguments because they are important; we do not indulge in them for the sake of semantics. However, what I am referring to is guidance, so it takes a different form from primary legislation or secondary legislation. It allows decision makers to get clear in their minds what the balance should be. There is a public interest in swift and efficient deportation. The party that the hon. and learned Gentleman represents had no issue with the principle when it introduced this power or when it was extended in the 2014 Act, so that principle is something on which he and I can agree.
Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)
Thank you, Mr Owen. I appreciate being given the opportunity to speak.
I think it has become abundantly clear in the Committee that I am not a lawyer. What I am is someone who wants justice and the law to be robust. To that point, I will describe a real case that will be directly affected by the clause. The legal difficulties caused by denying in-country right of appeal of Home Office decisions were outlined both in submissions to the Committee and in the evidence sessions. I want to give a real, human, ongoing example.
I represent an urban constituency, and a significant amount of my casework is immigration based. When I read the clause, one case in particular was immediately brought to my mind. During a surgery, I met a constituent who was in the midst of an asylum claim. He had been a very senior lawyer in Brazil. He represented a client in a case involving corruption in the local police force, as a result of which a police officer was arrested. Following the arrest, my constituent began to receive death threats and his client was later murdered. My constituent was forced to enter the state witness protection programme, but it soon became clear that he remained easily locatable, whereupon he fled to Britain and claimed asylum, together with his wife and two young children, to escape the ongoing threats.
Previous comments have carried the implication that some people come here for lifestyle choices and that they are irresponsible parents for doing that—how could they bring their children into this situation? For my client—[Interruption.] Sorry, my constituent—I watch “The Good Wife” too much; it is starting to seep into my vocabulary. For my constituent, this was not a lifestyle choice. He was not coming for a better life. He had a fantastic life. He came here to save the lives of his wife and his children.
The facts of my constituent’s case were not in any doubt. He was able to provide information from Government agencies that verified his story and that the Brazilian authorities were unable to protect him. However, his claim was rejected, and because Brazil is on the Government’s white list of countries deemed to be safe, he was prevented from pursuing an appeal from within the UK. I had every reason to believe that to remove my constituent’s family from the UK would place them at serious risk, yet he was unable to challenge the Home Office’s decision. I have no doubt that, on his return, he will be murdered, as will his wife and children.
My constituent’s case illustrates the dangers of presumption of safety. The principle that a country should be deemed safe regardless of whether or not it is represents a grievous risk to extremely vulnerable people. The Bill seems to drafted on the presumption that a majority of appeals are without merit and that those forced to leave the UK who would later successfully appeal their refusal would be relatively few in number. On the contrary, however, the reality is that the proportion of successful appeals is extremely high. Statistics for April to June 2015 show that some 39% of appeals were allowed by the first-tier tribunal, and that is before even considering appeals that are denied at first tier but later allowed by the upper tribunal. Of course, concerns have been raised for many years about the quality of Home Office decisions. In light of these reservations, it is difficult to conclude that the Home Office certifications would be robust and accurate. Given the serious consequences of inaccurate certification and the practical obstacles to mounting a challenge, it is deeply wrong to continue to extend such provisions.
Furthermore, by denying an in-country right of appeal, the Bill fails to take account of the realities of the appeal process. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras has said, most appeals take between six and 12 months to receive a hearing. That means that those people who are pursuing an application on the basis of article 8 are likely to be separated from their families for many months, or even years. A report commissioned by the Office of the Children’s Commissioner makes abundantly clear the serious, long-term impact on a child of separation from a parent, which will result from these changes. Separation has been shown to undermine the developmental, behavioural and emotional wellbeing of children, and even in some cases their physical health; some of those effects will probably never be reversed.
The withdrawal of in-country appeals also raises serious questions about access to justice. Removing an individual from the UK before they have the chance for a fair hearing in front of a judge is likely, in practice, to bar many people from exercising their rights and pursuing an appeal. Poor electronic communication, a lack of contacts in the UK to undertake work on an appeal and a lack of legal representation mean that, in practice, exercising appeal rights will be simply impossible. Effectively barring many people from pursuing their legal rights undermines the integrity of our immigration system.
The extension of the principle of limited in-country appeals must be seen as an attack on the legal rights of migrants. It represents a serious risk to vulnerable individuals, will divide families, potentially harms children and imposes serious barriers to justice. This process should be stopped and these provisions should be removed from the Bill.
Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)
It is alarming that we are, yet again, debating provisions that make it harder to access the appeals process when the ink is barely dry on the last Immigration Act. As in previous debates, I must raise the concern that we are now in the position of accelerating through further changes to the appeal process without properly evaluating the impact that the last set of changes have had on the individuals affected by them. In my view, that just serves to highlight that we are developing policy without the appropriate and sufficient evidence base.
Before I discuss clause 31, it is only right that I speak to the changes that were made to the appeal process under the previous Act, as that will provide some insight into what the impact of the clause, if it is accepted, will be. The previous Act drastically reduced the number of appeals available, but this Bill removes them entirely for some people. Following a question that I submitted to the Minister on 9 October, I received a very helpful answer, indicating that from July 2014 to August 2015, 1,700 individuals had been removed under the deport first, appeal later power. In my speech on Second Reading of this Bill, I made the point that we should remember that appeal routes exist for a reason—to correct a wrongful decision—and it would be reasonable to suggest that the Home Office does not currently have a good record in decision making.
In addition, appeal routes can also help to improve governance, as they highlight areas of the Executive that are not operating as effectively as we might hope. However, the deport first, appeal later policy, introduced in the last Immigration Act and accelerated in this Bill, effectively removes—for the majority of applicants—the ability to appeal a decision that has been made on their application to continue to live and work here. Indeed, the answer that I received from the Minister points to the fact that only 23% of those forcibly removed from the UK later appealed that decision. I accept that there might be a number of reasons why someone might not appeal, but we cannot ignore the salient point that it is harder—in some cases, almost impossible—for someone to appeal the decision that led to their removal from the UK.
Were we to investigate further, I would expect us to find that the most vulnerable people who have been deported have less chance or opportunity than other people to appeal the decision that has gone against them. Justice quite helpfully expands on this point and suggests that the policy removes people from appropriate justice. Justice expands on some of the factors that may prevent or discourage people from appealing after being removed from the UK. They include: the difficulty of obtaining, translating and submitting evidence, including submitting medical evidence to the courts, particularly in countries without the same quality of infrastructure or services as we have in the UK; difficulties in arranging to give evidence; and the demoralising effect of being removed from the UK. In turn, all these factors make it unpleasant, harder and, in some cases, impossible for someone to access the justice to which they should be entitled. Those are serious points.
It is only right that we should try to gain a greater understanding of the policy before we accept the clause. Yesterday, I submitted a series of questions on the policy’s impact, ranging from appeals to cost and so on. Those questions are a good start to reviewing the policy. I request that the impact of deport first, appeal later be researched before going ahead with implementation.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Solicitor General for setting out the provisions of clause 31 in detail. The clause is a wide extension of the powers that I accept already exist in relation to a limited class of individuals and will now cover very many people who are appealing their cases. I urge the Government to consider the impact, particularly on children, of separation in these and similar circumstances.
I have already mentioned the report by the Children’s Commissioner. I appreciate that the context is slightly different in that usually in those cases the spouse is already abroad, but the report gives powerful testimony about the impact on children of being unable to have any meaningful contact with one of their parents for a prolonged period. I do not think that has been assessed and taken into account in the guidance that has just been mentioned, because the timing probably would not have allowed that, but such separation should be considered and taken into account, and there should be a proper impact assessment of the existing remove first, appeal afterwards provisions.
We can dance around article 8, and we can argue as lawyers about whether or not that article has been breached, but among the most powerful points in the Children’s Commissioner’s report of a month ago were the human stories of the impact of suddenly depriving a child of one of their parents for a prolonged period. The report contained stories of children who were highly distressed because their father or mother was no longer available to them for contact for a prolonged period. Some of those families came to the launch and gave their evidence.
Sometimes we need to step out of these Committees and step out of our lawyerly, political selves. I am the father of a four-year-old and a seven-year-old. I heard those families describing what it was like trying to get their children to bed—the crying and distress during month after month of separation. In some cases it may well be that article 8 is breached and in some it may not be, but that is highly distressing for the children, and as a father I found it highly distressing to hear their testimony. I thought about what I would feel if I were separated from my children, whom happily I see nearly every day, for just a week or two. We should not lose sight of the idea of being separated for six months or a year because it does not tick the box of crossing a threshold into article 8, or any other legal provision. This measure will have a profound impact on human lives, and we need to approach this debate with that in mind.
The Solicitor General kindly gave us the statistic of a 42% success rate for appeals, which he puts forward as evidence that there is no obvious detriment in appeal after removal, but let us start by focusing on that figure: 42% of those removed won their appeal. So 42% of the families—if a family is involved—who suffered the human distress that I have described, whether or not there was a breach of the law, succeeded on appeal. That is an alarmingly high success rate in those circumstances.
The Solicitor General
The hon. and learned Gentleman is making a proper point about that, but we must be careful not to fall into the trap of assuming that that success rate is always due to failure by the Home Office. It is not. Very often it is due to the applicant’s failure to provide evidence that clearly would have helped in a timely way. It is not fair to keep beating the Home Office over the head for the failures of others.
Keir Starmer
I accept that, and I would accept the wider proposition that some cases will succeed on appeal without that necessarily meaning that the decision can be retaken with the same result, but it is still a high success rate compared with other areas of the law. It may well be that information has not been provided in the way that it should have been; equally, it may be bad decision making by the Home Office. I am trying not to overuse the 42% figure, but it is high.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
I have an ongoing case involving constituents of mine in which the quality of their immigration solicitor’s advice was, frankly, shocking. The hon. Member for Rotherham and I have had a conversation outside this place about this case. It amplifies the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General that a lot of legal advisers see this process as a gravy train: if they can provide slightly dodgy advice that does not get the person through the first time, hey presto, here is another piece of advice, another bill and another instruction to act on. Surely to goodness either the Bar Council or the Law Society should provide better and tighter guidance on quality for those people who are often advising under-resourced and vulnerable people.
Keir Starmer
I recognise some of what the hon. Gentleman has said. As he indicated, where that is a problem, it is for the professional bodies to regulate better or follow up in individual cases, and nothing that I say should stand in the way of that, but I do not want to step outside the human aspect. Ultimately, in cases where that is an issue, it is the individual who is removed who suffers as a result; if children are involved, it is the children who suffer. If an appeal is successful because bad advice was given months or years earlier and something relevant was not put before the decision maker or court, but it has come to light and been put before an appeal court, the impact on the individual who is not at fault should not be lost.
That is one difficulty with the proposed scheme for removing individuals. However, I recognise some of the picture that the hon. Gentleman has painted, and I agree that where professional follow-up can take place, it should as it would help in such cases. It is, however, also a fact that many appeals take a long time. If decision making were of a higher quality and decisions were quicker, a lot of the concern would evaporate, and we would not be debating the need for deport first, appeal later provisions.
I come to the practicability of appealing from abroad. We are familiar with the notion of a hearing in this jurisdiction. In some ways, a hearing is not dissimilar to the exchanges we have across this Committee Room, where physical human beings make submissions and listen to what is said against those submissions. Here, we have you, Mr Owen; in court, we would have a judge. That judge listens to the exchanges, takes into account the evidence and comes to a decision. Anybody who has ever been in any court of any form will know that many cases are determined through those exchanges, with the decision maker making their mind up as the process unfolds. Attention can be drawn to a particular piece of evidence, a point can be rebutted and additional evidence can swiftly be put before the court or the tribunal, if it is necessary to do so. If a judge has questions, they can be dealt with there and then by the parties.
That is how we have been doing things for 200 years —certainly in the criminal context—and it is a highly effective way of resolving differences between the parties. It is a very different experience if someone is appealing from abroad. In the first place, their submissions will probably be made in electronic or hard, written form way before the hearing. There is no prospect of the sorts of exchanges that get to the truth or resolve the critical issues between the parties. Until recently, it has been possible for some individuals to have representation in the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that they are abroad. I have a question for the Solicitor General: if the proposed residence test for legal aid comes into force, will that effectively mean that, for this large, extended category of individuals, the prospect of any representation is gone once they are removed, unless they have private money? That is a serious consideration. That proposal would fundamentally change how the scheme operates, when taken with the proposed change before us.
The Solicitor General
I can assist the hon. and learned Gentleman there. The position on legal aid is not altered by an individual having to appeal from overseas. Legal aid is not available for article 8 appeals before the tribunal, regardless of whether the appeal is lodged from overseas or within the UK. I hear the point he makes, but the issue he raises is immaterial to the question of legal aid. He also asked about residence, and I will see whether I can get a specific response on that.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful. I realise that may not be easy, so if the Solicitor General writes to me or the Committee, I will be grateful. The question was: what impact, if any, will the proposed resident test for legal aid have on those exercising their right to appeal from abroad? I would be happy to receive the answer by way of a letter.
There is, however, a more fundamental point here. There is a very real difference between a hearing at which the individuals are present and able to deliberate and to make submissions in the way I indicated, and one where the individuals are abroad. So my next question is: what practical steps will be taken to ensure that the procedure is as effective as it can be? To break that down: what steps are being taken to ensure that evidence can be made available by way of video, using the technologies available? As I understand it—the Solicitor General will correct me if I am wrong—an individual’s ability to use technical means to appear virtually, as it were, in the courtroom depends on the courtroom being set up to receive such evidence, and not many are. It is for the individual to finance that from wherever they have been removed to and I do not think that the procedural rules for such proceedings have been amended sufficiently to allow that to happen with any great ease or regularity.
Accepting those very real differences between a live appeal and an appeal from abroad, what steps are being taken to ensure the best possible access and ability to participate by those who have been removed? That would include steps to ensure that there is an exchange of submissions, rather than just a set of submissions that are put in in the first place. In other words, how does the appellant abroad deal with the points that the tribunal wants to make as the tribunal begins to make up its mind?
Paul Blomfield
The debate focuses on an important principle, which we need to consider fully. The main drift of the Bill is aimed at illegal migrants, but legal migrants will be the group mainly affected by the removal of appeal rights. We received a lot of evidence on the issue. The Law Society said that it felt that it would be
“an unjustifiable incursion into Article 8 rights.”
Although the Immigration Act 2014 introduced the principle of deport now, appeal later, that was on deportation cases where people had appealed serious crimes. The Court of Appeal has determined that that regime was lawful. There are some caveats in the case of Kiarie, cited by the Solicitor General, including the caveat on the principle of real risk of serious irreversible harm. The Court of Appeal said
“the real risk of serious irreversible harm is not the overarching test”.
Nevertheless, that regime was determined as lawful under the 2014 Act, but this provision extends that regime to all migrants making human rights appeals, regardless of any illegality or criminality and whether it has been established or even suspected. That is a fairly fundamental step for this Parliament to take. The Law Society made the point, very strongly, in its evidence:
“Restrictions on Article 8 rights which may be deemed justifiable in one context (for example, national security) cannot be extended to other contexts without further justification.”
We have not really received that justification. The Government have not made the case for the additional rights.
Using the test of serious irreversible harm or a breach of human rights as the only exception to an out-of-country appeal sets an extraordinarily high bar for vulnerable appellants seeking to contest removal from the UK. I come back to the point about the 42% success rate, which we discussed. We can debate where the responsibility lies. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras made it clear that we are not suggesting that this is all the fault of the Home Office. It may be the result of incomplete documentation or down to lawyers, as the Solicitor General suggested. Nevertheless, a substantial number of people are successful. The effect of this provision is that people who have committed no offence, who would in fact be granted the right to stay in the UK, will be forced to leave for an indeterminate period. In some cases, that would expose them to significant risks and would mean separation from their families. We are not talking about short periods. I represent the multicultural heart of Sheffield, where we have people who owe their origins to 120 countries and speak 160 different languages, so I have a fair amount of casework in this area.
We know that immigration appeals are currently taking about six months; a year or more is not unusual. There is no significant indication that that will improve. With such delays, out-of-country appeals would cause real disruption to family life, with potential longer-term consequences, for people who will, in significant numbers, ultimately be given the right to remain. Apart from anything else, as the Law Society pointed out, if the current appeal success rate is maintained, this could be a very expensive measure for the Government, and the taxpayer, because successful appellants could seek compensation over the enforced separation from their families.
In addition, the provisions could have a perverse impact on UK nationals. The Law Society again pointed out that, ironically, the spouse of a national of an EEA member, except the UK, would retain a full in-country right of appeal, whereas the spouse of a UK national would have to leave the country. The Daily Mail has clearly not picked up on that one. There are some perverse impacts, which I am sure the Solicitor General will want to comment on.
I also want to touch on the specific area of trafficking in relation to labour exploitation, which we debated earlier. We received powerful evidence from the charity, the Anti-trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It made the point of how difficult it would be for many of the clients it supports to challenge a negative human rights decision if the client was overseas. It said in written evidence:
“Our client group would be unlikely to have the resources or familiarity with modern technology to allow us to take instructions by skype or keep in regular contact with them. As many clients who fall into exploitation have little or no education they could not be expected to maintain any written communication with us or to draft any documents needed for an appeal themselves. Victims of trafficking are often submissive, frightened of authority figures and find it hard to establish relationships of trust.”
It goes on to say:
“Face to face relationships are essential when working with individuals who have been subject to abuse and exploitation.”
Across the House, Members are concerned about those individuals. That was the background to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in which Members of the House across party were involved. That is a serious consideration we should take into account.
I draw attention to the point made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the position of children. We again received powerful evidence from the Children’s Society, which made the point that even for those who are able to bring an appeal from abroad, notwithstanding all the difficulties and challenges, children will be subject to damaging and unnecessary disruption in their lives during the process. I am sure the Solicitor General will come back on how this will work in practice.
The Children’s Society expressed real concern that the Government have not protected unaccompanied children in this provision. In relation to unaccompanied children, we talked earlier about the age range. The Children’s Society made the point that
“This provision could see more cases involving unaccompanied children or young people over 18 who claimed asylum alone as children, being certified for an out-of-country appeal.”
Its next point relates to the age twilight zone that the Solicitor General referred to:
“According to Home Office statistics, of the young people who applied for asylum as unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and received an initial decision in 2014, 85 young people were refused and their claim was certified. 67 of those were over 18 at the time of the decision while 18 were minors at the time of the decision.”
Sarah Champion
We know from the extensive debate about age that we had in the Modern Slavery Bill Committee that some of those young people do not know how old they are, so there are all manner of loopholes that they can fall through.
Paul Blomfield
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are talking about young people who have been through, in many cases, deeply disturbing experiences, and it is not surprising that they might not know their age. They have come from countries such as Sudan, which was one of the countries mentioned in the Home Office statistics that I referred to a moment ago. The Children’s Society states that the provisions in the Bill
“would mean that more children and young people would not be able to appeal their claim in the UK”.
It makes the point:
“Without a multi-agency best interests determination process currently in place to assess the full impact on welfare, children could be returned to countries and circumstances where they may be at risk of serious harm including sexual abuse, neglect, homelessness, violence, forced marriage”
or
“forced recruitment as child soldiers”.
We are talking about very serious circumstances, and I urge the Government to give those points the attention that they deserve.
The Solicitor General
I am extremely grateful to all hon. Members for having made the debate a considered and wide-ranging one, which is what the topic deserves. First, I say to all hon. Members who—I make no criticism—pray in aid the human element that of course they are right. We all stand here as human beings and some of us, including me, as parents. It would take a heart of stone not to recognise that, in the myriad different cases, we are dealing with people and their lives.
That is why the role of decision makers, and the discretion that they have, is so important in assessing the evidence and coming to a reasonable conclusion. We call that due process. It is something that we treasure as part of our rule of law, and it is something of which we are rightly proud. I do not believe that our proposal does anything to undermine those important principles, and I will explain why. I will not repeat everything that has been said, but I will encapsulate it in the following way. The Court of Appeal has looked at the concept of out-of-country appeals and reminded us of our duties under the European convention, and I am satisfied that the procedures that will be used will guarantee the basic and fundamental rights of fairness and due process that we are so proud of.
The hon. Member for Rotherham said that she was not a lawyer. I think we are all lawyers in this place. This is the High Court of Parliament, and we are the law makers, so she is a lawyer and I am glad to welcome her into the fold. As somebody with whom I have worked well in the past on other Bills, I know that she comes to this with an entirely appropriate frame of mind and a genuine passion for doing the right thing not only by her constituents, but by people who are either affected directly by the legislation or part of our wider community, who want to see our enforcement system working well. There is a huge public interest, which we must not forget when we deal with these matters.
Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)
Sorry for backtracking, but I am a little confused by the Minister’s reference to judicial review. Many families will not have the money to pay for such reviews, so who would fund them?
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to the hon. Lady. I will get full clarification about the funding of applications in a moment and will come back to her.
If I may develop my point about the quality of decision making, several improvements have been made since 2010 in order to simplify policy and guidance. The introduction of a number of quality audit processes allows for the ongoing refinement of operating processes, which strengthens and enhances decision-making quality. The accumulation of those measures means that we now have tools and processes that help caseworkers to make more efficient, effective and fairer decisions in line with the relevant immigration rules and Home Office policy and guidance. I accept that there is still a way to go, but progress is being made.
Since 2010, UK Visas and Immigration has put in place measures to ensure the continuous review of its operations, so that proper feedback mechanisms can further improve quality and we ensure we make the right decision first time as often as possible. For example, UKVI has placed a focus on decision quality at the centre of caseworking objectives, introducing a quality objective in all caseworker objectives within performance appraisals. When it comes to ranking performance, the marking of quality assessment is an essential part of that process. Such measures are being put front and centre, which helps to answer the genuine queries and concerns of constituents, including mine.
The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North alluded to that. I am grateful to him for asking a number of parliamentary questions—in recent hours—about statistics that he regards as important indicators of the success or otherwise of measures that have been introduced in recent years. I note that some of the questions refer both to the power relating to EEA nationals and to section 94B. I am not making a criticism, but he asks a comprehensive range of questions, and we are today purely dealing with section 94B and not EEA nationals. Replies will be provided as soon as possible, but we must take care in reading across data from foreign national offender cases to all human rights cases. I think he would accept that. The case law clearly states that public interest is stronger when it comes to criminal cases, although there is of course a clear and strong public interest in the removal of any individual who has no right to be in the UK. I promise him that he will get answers to his questions.
The hon. Gentleman made the point about the best interests of children, which he wants in the Bill. May I give him some comfort? We already have primary legislation—section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009—that puts children’s best interests into print and are the guiding principles for decision makers when it comes to cases involving children. That is a sufficient safeguard, together with the guidance that we have debated and discussed, which will address the legitimate issues that he raises.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the difficulty of appealing from abroad. I accept, as did the Court of Appeal, that an out-of-country appeal will be, in many cases, less advantageous to an appellant than an in-country appeal. As I have said before, article 8 does not require the appellant to have access to the best possible appellate procedure or even to the most advantageous one. It requires access to a procedure that meets the essential requirements of effectiveness and fairness. I pray in aid the statistics that the Court used and that I mentioned this morning to give Members reassurance that we are in a situation in which there is not an obvious and clear detriment to appellants, bearing in mind the entry clearance statistics, which always involve out-of-UK appeals.
Paul Blomfield
I want to seek to confirm what seemed to be an extraordinary acknowledgment from the Solicitor General that out-of-country appeals would be prejudicial to the opportunity for an appellant to make as good a case as if it were in this country. That is a fairly significant step to take, as we said in relation to people who are likely in the long term to be successful, who have committed no crime and have proper rights. So is he acknowledging that this is prejudicial to their interests?
The Solicitor General
The words I used are the words of the Court of Appeal—not as advantageous—but that does not mean prejudicial. The points that the hon. Gentleman raises are a summary of the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the process itself, which I will try to help with in due course, but there is a difference. If the Court had come to the conclusion that there was a clear gap—an injustice gap—for individuals, I am sure the decision of the Court of Appeal would not have supported the submissions made by Lord Keen, the Advocate General.
On the point raised by the hon. Member for South Shields, I will write to her and set out the position in full. The point made by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about going further and using the statute to exclude children from the scope of the power is, with respect, an unnecessary step to take for the reasons that I hope I have clearly outlined about the necessary protection that children enjoy under section 55 and the guidance. I do not think that going a stage further would serve any particular purpose, however well intentioned.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised important points. I want to try to do justice to them in turn. First, I will deal with the issue he raised about the important report by the Children’s Commissioner. I remind the Committee that the power does not represent a blanket approach. It allows caseworkers to individually consider the impact on individual children—that human element that he prayed in aid so powerfully—and the range of possible effects that a decision to certify might have.
Keir Starmer
I wonder whether that is right. As I understand it, decision makers take into account whether there is serious and irreversible harm, not the distress and anxiety that I was talking about. The Children’s Commissioner’s report gives examples of children wetting the bed, being highly distressed for weeks on end, and so on, which may not reach the test of serious and irreversible harm—I do not know. People will argue differently about that, but it is highly distressing, and it is highly distressing to hear about it. Distress will probably be taken into account, but it certainly will not enable the decision makers lawfully to determine against certification.
The Solicitor General
I caution the hon. and learned Gentleman against using the term “test” about serious, irreversible harm. We must not forget that the overall test is the article 8 test. We are talking about the guidance. Of course, there will be input from the family, and there might be input from the school and social workers. Those people are best placed to provide evidence about what the impact will be.
It is a reality in our society that many parents and children have to live separately temporarily. Many parents work away—many in this room are in that position—and many are on active service and have to spend long periods of six months or more away from their children. I do not minimise—I really do not, from my own experience—how that affects the family dynamic and the effect that that has on children, but we have to be careful not to single out that category of individuals and say their experiences are sui generis, unique or wholly different from those of other families in those circumstances.
Family separation is sometimes in the best interests of the children. I can think of examples—although not involving examinations, because they take place when children are older—involving children who need a stable term in school, perhaps because they have particular special needs. We should be proud that our country leads the world in special needs provision. I can think of examples involving children who can be supported more effectively in special needs education in the UK. I hope that gives at least some insight into the Government’s thinking on the nuances that will appear in the cases.
The hon. and learned Gentleman made a point about the process itself. He said he is concerned about the fact that the process and procedure of out-of-country appeals are different from that of the hearings that he and I are familiar with. Technology is increasingly used in our courtrooms and, as he knows, the use of virtual technology is often in the best interests of children and vulnerable witnesses, in particular. We are exhorted, and indeed mandated, through statute and practice direction to use such mechanisms increasingly to move away from the effects that what I would call traditional court proceedings can have on individuals. His point is important, but I want to put it in context.
Keir Starmer
I do not want to be misunderstood. I championed the use of digital working in our courts. There was a very good pilot in a Birmingham court for criminal cases. However, it took a lot of resource and very good modern technology to make virtual hearings as close as humanly possible to actual hearings. Is the Solicitor General able to say whether steps will be taken for similar arrangements in these cases?
The Solicitor General
I am able to give the hon. and learned Gentleman this assurance. If a person appealing from overseas submits that oral evidence is needed, an application can be made to the tribunal for evidence to be given via video link, Skype or telephone. Of course, we have specialist immigration judges who are best placed to make an informed decision about whether the quality of the evidence will be enhanced if it is given in that way. That is similar to the tests that are applied up and down the country every day, increasingly as a matter of course, when it comes to the use of TV links, for example.
Immigration Bill (Twelfth sitting)
(9 years ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)
Clause 32 repeals section 3D of the Immigration Act 1971, which extends a migrant’s leave where that person’s leave to enter or remain is revoked or was varied with the result that he or she has no leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, and an appeal or administrative review of the variation or revocation decision could be brought or is pending.
Following the changes to the appeal system introduced by the Immigration Act 2014, it is no longer possible to appeal against the revocation of leave or the decision to vary leave where the consequence of that variation is that the person has no leave; it is also not possible to seek an administrative review of those decisions. Where somebody still has a pre-2014 Act appeal pending against the decision to revoke immigration leave or a relevant variation decision, there are transitional arrangements in place so that their leave extended under section 3D continues until their appeal is finally determined.
In a nutshell, given that section 3D no longer serves any purpose, it is right that it and references to it be removed from the statute book to avoid unnecessary confusion, and indeed to nod to a recent judgment by the Court of Appeal in which Lord Justice Elias said that he was concerned about over-complexity in the law in this area. It is in pursuance of that important function that I move the clause.
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
The clause will also cause problems for anyone seeking to have their claim handled in a just manner, because leave can be revoked if a person no longer meets the requirements for leave: for example, if someone is here as a spouse and they split up with their partner. Often, nobody is at fault, but imagine being the injured party who, to add insult to that injury, is then considered not to have the right to live where they have been living. By forcing the departure of those whose leave has been revoked but who are already well integrated into society and are law-abiding citizens and who have freshly been deemed illegal for whatever reason, including the one that I just mentioned, but who may in fact not be here illegally, the Government are making it difficult for justice to be done.
No immigration worker will make a correct judgment in all cases. I think we have all accepted that the accuracy of far too many judgments has been shown to be wanting by an appeal. The Minister talked about his frustration that Opposition Members seem to refer constantly to wrong decisions by the Home Office, and he is right—it is not always the Home Office’s fault—but sometimes it is about things that, although they may be the fault of the person applying, are trivial. For example, I had a friend who was married to a Sri Lankan and wanted her husband to live here with his wife and child, understandably. She was refused, and she had to start the entire process all over again because she inadvertently enclosed a photocopy of the wedding certificate instead of the original. [Interruption.] I can see from the Solicitor General’s response that we all agree that that is trivial. Sometimes it is the fault of the person applying, but the reasons are silly.
The Solicitor General
I am very familiar with cases of that nature, as I have many such constituency cases; I know exactly what the hon. Lady is talking about. There is an important policy purpose behind ensuring that we have original documents. I think that she can see the obvious point about the danger of relying on a copy that might not be a true representation of the original. If that is explained clearly to people—the guidance discusses the need for original documents rather than copies—hopefully such misunderstandings will cease. Probably in the case in question the application is entirely genuine, but there is a need to rely on original documents, and that is important.
Anne McLaughlin
I do not disagree, and my friend was very aware of the need to submit the original document; she just put the photocopy in accidentally without realising, but that meant that she had to start the entire process over again—and, if memory serves me correctly, she had to pay all over again. As well as people understanding how important it is to do the correct thing and provide the correct information, it would be useful if the Home Office could take into account the fact that someone made a mistake, and just ask them to sort it out. That is just one example.
The Government are looking at this situation the wrong way around. Instead of improving the accuracy of the original judgments or taking into account what we just talked about—the fact that problems could be sorted out relatively quickly—if feels as if they are trying to hinder reviews and appeals, worthy or not, by hampering appellants in submitting their claims. Human error alone will lead to faulty judgments which—given the consequences, such as having to appeal from overseas, or criminalisation for remaining in the UK—will inevitably lead to human suffering that could have been avoided. That is why previous legislators included a workable administrative review and appeals system. Those of us who have knowledge of that system will be familiar with its problems, but they pale into insignificance in comparison with the general policy of appeals from overseas and the criminalisation of those whose leave has expired.
There should be no doubt: those who support part 4 of the Bill will needlessly split up families. The fact that it will be impossible for families to stay together while appeals are dealt with makes a mockery of the Government’s professed support of family values. The family life of British citizens with foreign family members could hinge on such minor matters as faulty judgments, typos, stray documents or, to use my recent example, the accidental submission of a photocopy, which should be picked up during the appeal. Tat is no way to run an immigration system.
Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
I want to make sure I have understood the measure. As I understand it, section 3D leave was for people whose leave had been cancelled or curtailed by the Home Office for various reasons including deception, so that they could bring an appeal—so they would be entitled to remain to bring an appeal. That seems sensible. There might be an error and it is usually best to put errors right. I have worked in a big organisation of 9,000 staff making hundreds of thousands of decisions. There is an always an error rate, however well trained the staff. It seems sensible therefore that if there has been an error the person in question should have the right to remain and appeal.
What happened, I think, is that the right of appeal was removed last year, but on an undertaking that there might be administrative review. Again, that might be quite sensible: we will remove the right of appeal but provide a different mechanism so that someone can simply correct a wrong decision. I understand that the administrative review procedure has not been put in place. Now, in cases where a decision is made to cancel someone’s leave, the Government want to strike out section 3D on the basis that since they will not let the individual affected do anything about it, there is no point in it. So when a wrong decision is made about an individual, what are they to do—in a nutshell?
The Solicitor General
I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions to the debate. The hon. Member for Glasgow North East is concerned about the availability of administrative review. I am grateful for her more general observations, and I hope I answered them in response to the debate on clause 31; I hope that she will forgive me for not repeating my observations on those points. I mean no disrespect.
On the hon. Lady’s specific points, we do not think that administrative review should be available where a person has their immigration leave cancelled or revoked. There are a number of circumstances where it would not be appropriate. One example would be where a migrant worked in breach of their immigration conditions and had their leave cancelled. Another example would be a person whose conduct or behaviour has made it undesirable for them to remain here—people who facilitate sham marriages, for example.
Anne McLaughlin
Did the Solicitor General just say that the reason there should not be administrative reviews is because there are a number of circumstances in which they would not be appropriate? Surely we can surely write out the right for cases where it would not be appropriate, but still allow administrative reviews? If there are some cases where review would not be appropriate, there must be some where it would be very appropriate.
The Solicitor General
I will come to that point and the point that the hon. Lady made about error. It is an amplification of the intervention she kindly allowed me to have. In place of administrative review, the Home Office has an error correction policy for when immigration leave is cancelled. So an application for error correction under the policy does not extend the immigration leave, but it does allow errors to be raised with the Home Office. We are getting the balance right between effective immigration control on the one hand and the fairness point that the hon. Lady quite properly raised.
The Solicitor General
I will in a moment. I just want to finish this point. The Home Office contacts people who make applications and who have paid a fee to give them the opportunity to correct errors in their applications.
The Solicitor General
There are examples. The case of Iqbal, which we cited yesterday, was an example where individuals were invited to correct errors. So the process works. Statistics show that only 2.45% of applications were found to be invalid—invalid is when an application is made, but because of error it is of no effect, so the process is having an impact, which is good. I accept the point that the hon. Lady made about the case that she raised, but we believe that the error correction policy fills a particular gap and addresses the mischief that hon. Members have raised.
Keir Starmer
An error correction mechanism is a very good idea. I tried to introduce one in the Crown Prosecution Service to avoid people having to go to court. It provides a much quicker process and allows staff to understand where errors have occurred and correct them, but it is not foolproof by any stretch of the imagination, and there will be wrong decisions that are not picked up by an error correction mechanism. What happens in such cases? Simply saying there are some people who might bring inappropriate appeals, therefore there should not be a right of appeal, is, when broadened, an argument against any appeal in any case of administration decision. Of course some people will bring inappropriate cases.
The Solicitor General
Let us not forget the context here. We are dealing with situations in which people have had their leave revoked or varied because of due process, and a trigger event will have allowed that to happen. It is not fair to say we should look at such cases as a blank page where an administrative review might be the first opportunity for the issues to be aired. There is a residual and important right to judicial review of Executive decisions as well, so the checks and balances are there.
Keir Starmer
I am interested in this because, as we have gone through the proceedings, every time we hit the problem that there is no simple appeal or review, the suggestion is to go for a long shot—judicial review, which everyone knows is a long and expensive process. Has there been consultation with the judiciary on the policy of requiring all these cases to go to the High Court by way of judicial review as the only avenue of review? I think there would be concern about all these cases going to the High Court when they could have been dealt with much more cheaply, swiftly and efficiently.
The Solicitor General
in the context of how we approach judicial review applications, the hon. and learned Gentleman will remember that concern was expressed a few years ago by members of the coalition Government about the rise in judicial review applications. He will know that the lion’s share arose from immigration cases. As a result of the adjustments and changes made under the previous Government’s legislation, that rise will be checked. There will therefore be a situation in which, rather than adding to an additional upward trend, this measure will make little difference. To respond to his question, I do not have a formal assessment, but I am not overly alarmed or concerned about a potential spike in applications for judicial review.
The Solicitor General
I hope I can deal with clause 33 as expeditiously as possible. As I mentioned earlier, the 2014 Act reformed rights of appeal and refocused the appellate system on appeals against decisions that affect protection and human rights claims. Before the changes made by the 2014 Act, there was a right of appeal where leave to enter the United Kingdom had been refused. Paragraph 2A(9) of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act provided a right of appeal where a person who had been granted entry clearance prior to their arrival had had that clearance cancelled on arrival at the UK border. It did that by providing that such cancellation decisions equated to refusals of leave to enter—in other words, it brought them within the definition of section 3D of the 1971 Act.
The changes made to appeal rights by the 2014 Act mean that there is no longer a right of appeal against the decision to refuse leave to enter, so paragraph 2A(9) no longer serves any purpose. For the same reasons I outlined earlier, it is right to remove it from the statute book to avoid unnecessary confusion. There is a saving provision in place to preserve the appeal rights of persons with a pending appeal against the cancellation of entry clearance under the previous appeals regime. Transitional provisions are in place so that there is no undue prejudice to individuals whose cases are currently in the system. For those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Support for certain categories of migrant
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Immigration (James Brokenshire)
We now move to a new part of the Bill, part 5, which deals with support for certain categories of migrant. Some detailed amendments have been tabled to schedule 6, and clause 34 is almost like a bookmarker to insert schedule 6 into the Bill’s substantive provisions. It might help the Committee in its consideration of those amendments when we debate schedule 6 if I set out the Government’s overall intentions in introducing the measures and explain how they are intended to operate.
The starting point should be the basic policy that we are seeking to advance. We say that it is not appropriate for public money to be used to support illegal migrants, including those whose asylum claims have been found to be without merit, who can leave the UK and should do so. That is the starting point for understanding how schedule 6 will apply. It will restrict the availability of such support, consistent with our international and human rights obligations, and will remove incentives for migrants to remain in the UK when they have no lawful basis for doing so—I stress the latter point. In doing so, the Bill addresses long-standing issues with the system of asylum support.
James Brokenshire
If I may, I will finish this point and then give way.
The system that Parliament legislated for in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to discharge our international obligations towards those seeking asylum in the UK is too often used to support those whose asylum claim has failed and who have no lawful basis to remain in the UK. On 31 March this year, we were providing support to an estimated 15,000 failed asylum seekers, their dependants and others. In 2014-15, such support cost an estimated £73 million.
Paul Blomfield
The Minister said a moment ago that the Government’s intention for this measure is to remove the incentives for people to stay in the UK. Does he acknowledge that the Home Office’s pilot, among a wealth of other evidence, demonstrated that there is no indication that this measure will succeed in helping the Government to achieve that policy objective?
James Brokenshire
The hon. Gentleman, in his normal, sage way, has pre-empted me. I intend to address the 2005 pilot directly. I will explain to the Committee why we judge that the arrangements in schedule 6 are different and why they are appropriate. In some ways, we have learned from the provisions that applied under the previous Labour Government.
Let me return to my principal point about providing support for those whose appeal has been analysed by the court and who have, as the lawyers would say, exhausted their appeal rights in relation to asylum and article 8 and have not made further submissions—we will discuss a detailed amendment to schedule 6 that pertains to further submissions. We believe it is wrong in principle to provide support in those cases, because it sends the wrong message to people who do not require our protection and seek to exploit the system. It also undermines public confidence in our asylum system.
Under the current system, failed asylum-seeking families continue to receive Home Office support as though their asylum claim and any appeal had not failed. The onus is on the Home Office to demonstrate non-compliance with return arrangements for support to be ceased. We believe we need a better basis on which to engage with those families, with local authorities and others, and a process that secures more returns. Our judgment is that schedule 6 will support that aim. We should focus on supporting those who have not yet had a decision on their asylum claim and who may need our protection, not on those who the courts have agreed do not need our protection and should leave the UK, subject to certain caveats in relation to proposed new section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which we will debate in detail.
Schedule 6 makes two key changes to the existing support framework. First, those who have children with them when their asylum claim and any appeal is rejected will no longer be treated as though they are still asylum seekers. They will cease to be eligible for support under section 95 of the 1999 Act. Secondly, section 4 of the 1999 Act will be repealed, and support will be provided to failed asylum seekers and any dependent children only if there is a genuine obstacle that prevents them from leaving the UK. I appreciate that those changes raise important issues, as our public consultation highlighted. We have provided members of the Committee with a copies of our response to the consultation and the policy equality statement on these measures. I look forward to discussing many of those issues when the Committee debates the amendments to schedule 6.
Keir Starmer
The Minister dealt with the issue of cost and said that money ought to be spent on other cases, and he has now moved on to children. A concern was expressed in evidence about the duties under the Children Act 1989. Has there been an assessment of the likely cost overall—not to the Home Office budget but to public funds—of bringing these provisions into effect? In other words, has there been an assessment of how many are likely to go to local authorities and what the cost will be?
James Brokenshire
The hon. and learned Gentleman will have, in his detailed way, seen the impact assessment, which gives the macro impact on cost savings. I would make the point—which I will underline in further comments—about the new burdens analysis that we will conduct with local authorities. I have been clear in all my discussions with local government and other partners that this is not about trying to move a cost from one budget to another.
We will come to the detailed provisions of the separate support under schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which local authorities may have a duty to fulfil under their human rights obligations. There is a separate mechanism that can apply and can fall on local authorities in those circumstances. It is precisely the work we are doing with local authorities to ensure an effective join-up between this arrangement and the separate schedule 3 arrangements which would apply to local authorities. I will come back to some of these points when discussing later amendments, because I know that some of the cost issues and minimum support requirements are further explored by them.
We have reflected carefully on what the consultation responses said about the experience of the 2005 pilot of the cessation of support for failed asylum seeker families under schedule 3 to the 2002 Act. We have taken account of that experience in providing, under this Immigration Bill, what we judge is a different approach.
First, under schedule 3 to the 2002 Act, the onus is on the Home Office to show that a family is not co-operating with arrangements for return. To qualify for support under new section 95A of the 1999 Act, as provided for by this Bill, the onus will be on the family to show that there is a genuine obstacle to their departure.
Secondly, the 2005 pilot involved a largely correspondence-based process for terminating support in family cases that had exhausted their rights of appeal in the 11 months prior to the commencement of the pilot, so some of the cases in the study were actually quite old. By contrast, the new approach will involve a managed process of engagement with the family, in tandem with the local authority, following the end of the appeal process, to discuss their situation and the consequences of not leaving the UK in circumstances where they can do so. Rather than this being a sudden change, it is part of a continuing process and dialogue with those families who will be affected.
Hon. Members will no doubt have noted that the transition provisions make it clear that this is about new cases, thus underlining that sense of a transition from appeal rights being exhausted and the cessation of potential support. No doubt we will get into the cooling-off period in moving from that arrangement to the cessation of support. That is something we are still reflecting on, on the basis of the submissions we received during the consultation. It is important to see this in that way: Home Office support will remain available if there is a genuine obstacle to the family leaving the UK.
Thirdly, we think circumstances have changed. It is now generally recognised that the taxpayer should not have to support illegal migrants who could leave the UK. We intend to work closely with partners in local government and elsewhere to achieve that outcome, because this is not simply about changing the law; rather, it is about some of the practical join-ups for local authorities. As I have reflected, some of the other regimes equally apply to local government.
We continue to consult with local government colleagues, in particular on the details of the new arrangements. I am grateful to the Local Government Association, the Association of Directors of Children’s Services, the No Recourse to Public Funds network and other colleagues for their continued engagement with the Home Office on these issues. All are clear that we want to reduce overall costs to the public purse and encourage and enable more migrants, without any lawful basis to remain here, to leave the UK in circumstances when they can do so.
Chloe Smith (Norwich North) (Con)
I recall from our evidence sessions that many of the organisations that the Minister has mentioned agreed wholeheartedly that we need to be able to control our costs where somebody is not eligible for support in order to be able to do more where somebody is—I have in mind the 20,000 Syrian refugees whom we all wish to welcome to this country. Does the Minister agree?
James Brokenshire
My hon. Friend’s point relates to my earlier point about confidence in the asylum system and ensuring that we are using public funds effectively and appropriately. The Committee may differ on that principal point, but I respect that and we will no doubt come to discuss it.
I return to the point that, for those who have had an asylum claim assessed and considered invalid by the court and who have not made further submissions, then unless there are obstacles that mean that they should not return, we say that, as a matter of policy, public funds should not remedy that. The remedy is that those people leave.
Keir Starmer
Will it not cost more if families disappear, as they did under the 2005 pilot, when 16 families dropped off the radar? I do not know whether they were ever picked up again. Does the idea that money can be saved and slipped into the Syrian refugee budget take families disappearing into account?
James Brokenshire
I was certainly not saying that money would transfer in that direct sense. As the hon. and learned Gentleman will know, we seek to provide support through the official development assistance that applies in the first year. That was why I was making a point about overall confidence in the asylum and immigration systems and in the rules being upheld. That is the broader issue.
I underline that we are continuing, with local government colleagues, to look at whether further provisions would assist in reducing costs, perhaps in respect of schedule 3 to the 2002 Act, which controls access to local authority social care for migrants without immigration status. We are listening carefully to what local authorities are telling us about the scope for simplifying and strengthening some provisions. Some of the processes are quite clunky and complicated, such as the separate human rights assessments that local authorities must undertake, so we are having discussions with local government about implementing a clear, streamlined process that still recognises existing human rights obligations. We need to understand that properly and appreciate how the asylum and immigration systems sit alongside each other so that safety nets operate effectively.
On the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about people disappearing, this process is part of a continuum and is not a sudden arrangement. We will reflect further on the cooling-off period from indications being made and families being reminded of what will happen, which is currently 28 days. Discussions on such issues continue. We want families to be in no doubt. Clarity in the immigration system, in particular around assisted return, as we have debated previously, is really important to help people to make decisions.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Minister for his generosity in giving way. I understand his point about the policy objective and the rules on removal being complied with, but in circumstances when the desired objective is not achieved and when the family does not go and there are children, will the cost to the taxpayer go up or down as a result of the change?
James Brokenshire
The hon. and learned Gentleman is clearly thinking about some of the hypotheticals and the relationship with local government. Our regulatory impact assessment has given us the best assessment based on our analysis of the operation of the scheme in terms of the potential savings. It has therefore taken into account some of those detailed thoughts on whether this represents a transfer of a burden from one place to another. We continue to discuss that with local government, because it concerns the new burdens analysis. I believe that is the point the hon. and learned Gentleman is trying to make: what the new burden on local government might be as a consequence of these changes and how local government might see some issues arising. It is precisely on that detail that we are continuing our engagement with local government, in order to understand that as clearly as possible and to reassure local authorities that this is not about a budgetary transfer.
Keir Starmer
I am grateful to the Minister for allowing me to explore the matter in this iterative way. In order to make that assessment of cost, there must be some analysis of how many families will not leave as a result but will, in fact, stay. It is not possible to work out the cost to local authorities, however streamlined and whatever the discussions, without having in mind an assessment of how many families will not leave and will have to be provided for. What is that number and percentage?
James Brokenshire
Obviously we are looking at schedule 6 provisions and the changes under the new section 95A support mechanism within schedule 6. The regulatory impact assessment sets out our best analysis of the overall savings to the public purse, and it would be invidious for me to try to provide percentage assumption rates.
This is about departures and encouraging people to leave. It is also about section 95A support where there are barriers to removal. That is likely to be where there is no documentation or difficulty in obtaining it to facilitate departure, or medical issues. Let us not forget that, in conducting its duties, the Home Office will have obligations under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 which it will need to factor in when taking decisions.
Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck (South Shields) (Lab)
When referring to the impact assessment, the Minister said the cost was around £32 million. Is that not a drastic underestimation? I do not believe that takes into account the local authorities’ statutory duties under homelessness legislation, the Children Act 1989 or the principles of the Care Act 2014. Will the Minister please clarify?
James Brokenshire
I think the hon. Lady is alluding to some of the points I discussed concerning schedule 3 of the 2002 Act: the Human Rights Act assessments that local authorities need to undertake. We seek to continue our engagement with local authorities about the new burdens assessment.
The published impact assessment will be revisited and republished, if required, in relation to further analysis of the new burdens work. Although we have published our regulatory impact assessment based on the evidence provided at the date of the Bill’s publication, it will continue to be reviewed in the light of further discussions with local authorities.
It is not that our minds are closed on that. Rather, having given the best assessment of the savings that the hon. Lady has identified, we will keep this matter under examination. If the measures led to, or risked leading to, migrants being supported by local authorities when they would previously have been supported by the Home Office, we have made it clear through the consultation that we would wish to discuss and address those impacts and their financial implications with local authorities and the devolved Administrations in accordance with the new burdens doctrine.
Mrs Lewell-Buck
I think what the Minister is saying is that the £32 million is an underestimate.
Mrs Lewell-Buck
I am struggling with this. The Minister says that conversations are going on with local authorities, but should those conversations not have happened before the legislation was put in place? It seems a bit back to front to me.
James Brokenshire
No. As always with legislation, we have to have it in place and, as a result, that sometimes provokes further discussion. We have been running a consultation, which we published earlier this week, and the hon. Lady will find in it the response and the feedback, as well as some of the points that we have said we will reflect on further. That is the right and appropriate way in which to deal with the matter. We judge the provisions to be appropriate to the policy intent that I have outlined, so the clause should stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
The Minister rightly makes the point that if there are rules, they should be complied with, and that there is a public interest in ensuring that rules are complied with. I concur with that. He said that another objective behind the measure is to facilitate removal, according to the rules. That is the objective, but one of the concerns about the clause is that all the evidence suggests that that objective will not be fulfilled.
I will turn first to the 2005 pilot and then address the Minister’s points about what is in the Bill being different. The pilot, under the existing scheme, involved 116 families, and there were two reports or evaluations, one published in 2006 and the other in 2007. It is worth running through some of the numbers, because they show a lot of the causes of concern.
The 2006 evaluation, published by the Refugee Council and Refugee Action, found that of the 116 families, only one left the country as a result of the pilot under section 9 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, while three signed up for voluntary return and another 12 took steps to obtain travel documents. By contrast, 32 families—I think I said 16 earlier—went underground, without support, housing or access to health or welfare services. That was the impact. Nine families were also removed from the pilot because their cases were reviewed as part of the process and it was found that their claims should not have been refused. Many of the families had serious health and mental health problems. The 2006 review therefore found the approach in the pilot to be wholly counterproductive, even for the Government’s own objective.
The Home Office review was published a year or so later, in 2007, and concluded:
“In the form piloted section 9 did not significantly influence behaviour in favour of cooperating with removal—although there was some increase in the number of applications made for travel documents. This suggests that the section 9 provision should not be seen as a universal tool to encourage departure in every case.”
The scheme has been rarely if ever used since, because it was considered a policy failure, but now that failure is to become the norm under the provisions of the Bill. The Minister said that in the Government’s judgment there was such a difference between the new scheme and the one piloted in 2005 that the results of the pilot were unlikely to be repeated. He gave three reasons. First, the onus is now on the applicant and not on the Home Office to prove or disprove, as the case may be, the obstacle to return. I will hear whatever the Minister has to say on that, but I am not sure that that is a reason. It is a difference between the two schemes, but why that difference makes it more likely that people will leave, rather than not leave, as in 2005, he will have to enlighten me about.
Secondly, the old scheme was correspondence-based, but the new one is a managed process involving contemporary decisions. I can see that that makes a difference and it might have some impact, but the results of the pilot were so profoundly claimed by pretty well everyone to be a complete failure that it is hard to see that that difference will be the silver bullet.
James Brokenshire
Let me respond to the points raised in the debate. I want to underline the change in the nature of administration in the immigration system which has taken place. We scrapped the UK Border Agency and we have now established separate commands: UK Visas and Immigration, which processes asylum and other visa claims, Immigration Enforcement, and Border Force.
The proposals I have outlined are about embedding the work with local authorities. We are working more closely with local authority colleagues, drawing on their experience and ours of effective family engagement. In particular, that work will build on our existing family returns process, in which a dedicated family engagement manager works directly with the family. From 1 April to 2 October, the process achieved the return of 377 families. The point I therefore make to the hon. and learned Gentleman—perhaps this is why he did not grasp my third point, on the public policy objective—is about the alignment between activity in local and central Government, with that shared endeavour.
In many ways, that takes us back to the point made by the hon. Member for South Shields about these measures simply passing the cost of supporting destitute failed asylum seekers and their families on to local authorities. The proposals have been carefully framed to avoid that. The Home Office has consulted local authorities on the proposals and will continue to do so. There is no general obligation on local authorities to accommodate illegal migrants who intentionally make themselves destitute by refusing to leave the UK when it is clear that they can. None the less, we are considering whether it might be necessary or helpful to clarify that, perhaps in schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act provides that, across the UK, a range of local authority-administered welfare provisions are generally unavailable to failed asylum seekers and their families who remain in the UK unlawfully. It enables such support to be provided where necessary to avoid a breach of a person’s human rights, but such a breach will not generally arise if the person or family can leave the UK. We are working with local government on precisely that interface and whether further clarification may be helpful.
Let me provide further amplification of what I have said about the impact assessment. It currently assumes that 10% to 20% of individuals who lose Home Office support under schedule 6 may move on to local authority support, pending the outcome of a further non-asylum, article 8-based application to the Home Office. We have factored in a figure in relation to that. The figure will be reviewed as part of the “no new burdens” analysis, but as I have said, the legislation has been framed to avoid that. We have considered that as part of the impact assessment. Although the hon. Lady suggested the figure may be an underestimate, our judgment is that we have undertaken the best assessment and have carefully factored in some of those issues.
Keir Starmer
I think the Minister may be moving on from the question of what impacts on the minds of individuals and their families. In the end, whether the Government have aligned or realigned with local authorities or are working well with them is not the central question. The central question is: what operates on the minds of these individuals that improves the chances they will leave in circumstances where, in the past, they have not?
As I understand it, the 2005 pilot was a failure. The family returns policy, by contrast, is thought to have been successful, but that scheme runs under the current support regime. Rather than introducing an element that has failed in the past, would it not be far better to simply put the focus on improving the family returns process—in other words, to focus on what persuades people to go? We have a scheme that seems to be working pretty well, so we should focus on that and make it work even better. How does taking away support help to improve the scheme running at the moment?
James Brokenshire
I have two points for the hon. and learned Gentleman. The first comes back to my point about administration and public policy and aligning local and central Government to give families a consistent and clear message about the likely outcomes. This scheme will start before the cessation of support, and we have underlined that. A clear message is important in order to ensure that families understand what is likely to happen to them, and consistency is being provided by both the Home Office and local government.
Secondly, the hon. and learned Gentleman rightly touched on issues with assisted voluntary return and on family returns. This is about both elements combined. Assisted voluntary return for families is a scheme for families comprising a maximum of two adult parents and at least one child. Families who leave the UK under that scheme qualify for support in the form of advice and financial assistance both pre and post-departure, help with travel arrangements, medical assistance and support following arrival in the country of return.
From January, the assisted voluntary return programme will be administered directly by the Home Office, which we judge will enable us to work closely with local authorities and other partners to deploy the scheme more flexibly. In particular, we will be able to ensure that the scheme is targeted at and promoted effectively for newly appeal rights-exhausted families as part of a focused engagement with them about the available options and the consequences of not accepting the help and advice available. Those factors, together, respond to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about what is likely to change behaviour, and we judge that they are the right way forward to meet the underlying policy objective.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 222, in schedule 6, page 90, leave out lines 28 to 30 and insert—
‘(i) in subsection (2A) for “accommodation” each time it occurs substitute “support” and for “section 4” each time it occurs substitute “section 95A”, and
(ii) in subsections (6) and (7), for “section 4 or 95” substitute “section 95 or section 95A”’.
To provide a right of appeal against decisions of the Home Office to refuse or discontinue support under new section 95A for asylum seekers at the end of the process who are unable to leave the UK.
The amendment would provide a right of appeal against Home Office decisions to refuse or discontinue support, under new section 95A of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as inserted by the schedule, for asylum seekers at the end of the process who are unable to leave the UK.
The right of appeal would be against decisions on support that are wrong. To give some context, Home Office decision making about support is particularly bad. We have heard statistics about Home Office decision making in general, but the success rate for challenges to support decisions is very high indeed. For example, from September 2014 to August 2015, the asylum support tribunal received 2,067 applications for appeals against Home Office refusal of asylum support. Of those, 44% were allowed by the tribunal, and 18% were remitted to the Home Office for a fresh decision or withdrawn because of an acknowledgment that the decision making was flawed. Together, that is a 62% success rate.
I caveat that figure, as I have in previous discussions about appeal rates, but it is an incredibly high success rate. It beggars belief that, when the statistics are of that order, there is to be no right of appeal in a simple case of a wrong decision on support. It is another example of removing the ability of people—often vulnerable people—to challenge a decision that is wrong and put it right. Therefore, we have tabled the amendment.
Gavin Newlands (Paisley and Renfrewshire North) (SNP)
We have heard from other Members about the serious impact on individuals and their children of losing all forms of support. The amendment would ensure that we did not leave people, including children, helpless and possibly destitute while awaiting removal from the UK.
If the schedule is not amended we will be treating refused asylum seekers with complete contempt. We will be saying to them that we do not care how they support themselves while awaiting removal. I ask Members this: if that bleak scenario were to become a reality, what advice would they give those people when they came to their surgeries? Would Members walk past them in the street when they needed our help? Would Members close their eyes, put their heads down and walk past children who had been affected and needed something to eat or a place to stay? I think not, but that is what the schedule allows for. I hope that Members see the stark reality that faces us if it is not amended.
Liberty has pointed out that the Government’s own document, “Reforming support for failed asylum seekers and other illegal migrants”, states that the removal of any support for failed asylum seekers should be seen in the context of the wider enforcement powers that the Government have at their disposal. I have to say that that way of looking at the issue is crude, verging on inhumane. Are we honestly at a stage now where we are telling people to go cold and hungry to enforce immigration measures?
Not only is the position inhumane, but removing a person’s support does not achieve the aim of deporting them from the country any sooner, as was highlighted by the 2005 pilot that has often been mentioned in our discussions. I accept that the Home Secretary may wish to have the power to discontinue support for refused asylum seekers, but an avenue of appeal should exist to allow those affected to explain their circumstances and have their bare minimum support—let us not forget that they will have been surviving on a pittance—reinstated. The right of appeal proposed in the amendment is essential to ensure that impoverished asylum seekers are able to access the support that they are entitled to and desperately need.
As I have said, routes of appeal exist for a reason—to correct a wrongful decision. On the evidence of appeals against decisions on loss of support taken by the Home Office, we would conclude that a power of appeal against wrongful decisions made by the Home Office is of the utmost importance. The Immigration Law Practitioners Association has produced a helpful briefing detailing statistics from the asylum support tribunal. According to ILPA, 62% of appeals received by the tribunal had a successful outcome. From September 2010 to August 2015, the tribunal received 2,067 applications for appeals against a refusal of asylum support, of which it allowed 44% and remitted 18%. Furthermore, research conducted by the Asylum Support Appeals Project found that the majority of support cases are overturned at the appeal level, with the number of successful appeals varying between 6w0% and 80%. A range of sources put forward the strong argument that the Home Office has a poor track record of decision making when it comes to removing support from an individual, and the consequences are of the utmost seriousness.
Mrs Lewell-Buck
As always, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Owen. I will speak briefly to amendment 222, which would grant a right of appeal to those who are refused support by the Home Office, or whose support is discontinued. The right to appeal is important both for the individual concerned and because of the difficulties that the withdrawal of support for failed asylum seekers will create for local authorities, about which hon. Friends and I have already spoken.
It is necessary to set out the effect of clause 34 and schedule 6, to underline exactly why it is vital to have a right of appeal. The schedule as it stands will inflict destitution on families with children. Whereas in the past the Secretary of State could provide accommodation and support to help families survive, the new mechanism will impose a burden of proof on asylum seekers. They will need to show that they are destitute and that there is a genuine obstacle preventing them from leaving the country.
James Brokenshire
The hon. Lady has just said that the schedule will have an impact on asylum seekers; it will not. The mechanism in it relates to those whose asylum applications have been determined and have been found to have no grounds. I make that distinction because I want to underline that support is there for those who are having their asylum claims assessed.
Mrs Lewell-Buck
I thank the Minister and apologise for my semantics.
We do not know what the “genuine obstacle” that must be preventing people from leaving the country means, because it has yet to be defined in regulations. We are potentially talking about denying support to extremely vulnerable families, so the House should be able to discuss and vote on that in primary legislation. My hon. Friend the Member for Rotherham made that point well in our evidence sessions. That definition will effectively define the scope of support given to people, and it could leave families homeless and destitute. We should be debating that definition now. It is not something to be nodded through the House at the whim of the Secretary of State.
Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)
I do not know whether the hon. Lady was as struck as I was by the evidence sessions. There was only one organisation—I cannot for the life of me remember which it was—that actually prepared people who had gone to see it for a potential answer of no to their application. Everybody else just seemed to be keeping people’s hope alive and burning brightly. Does she agree that if more organisations prepared people for a no, people would be able to plan ahead and think about that, rather than wake up one morning and find, “Gosh, that’s a bit of a surprise”?
Mrs Lewell-Buck
I think we have different recollections of the evidence sessions. I do not recall just one organisation doing that.
Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)
I agree with my hon. Friend; I did not hear only one organisation say that. I will say that I used to run a children’s hospice and, even when people were told the reality of what was going to happen, they always had hope. Even if it is to someone through the entire process, not everyone listens to reality.
Mrs Lewell-Buck
I believe it is clear that whatever happens, the Government intend to introduce stricter conditions than currently exist for supporting failed asylum seekers, to try to encourage people to leave the UK more quickly once an asylum claim has failed. There is one obvious problem with that approach, which is that the evidence shows that it simply does not work. I will return to that when we discuss later amendments, but for the moment it is enough to say that cutting off support will make families less, not more, likely to engage with the Home Office and leave the UK voluntarily. Denying people support will be counterproductive if the Government aim to increase the number of voluntary returns. If those are the consequences of withdrawing support, having a proper right of appeal becomes even important.
The reason to support the amendment is simple. The right of appeal is needed because on far too many occasions, initial decisions are incorrect. Nearly two thirds of appeals are successful, and that amounts each year to hundreds of cases or, to put it another way, hundreds of people and families. When new section 95A comes into force, those people will be wrongly deprived of food and shelter.
The Home Office’s assessments of destitution are very poor. The asylum support tribunal overturns a high proportion of decisions; in 2011, the figure was an incredible 82%. If those people had not had a right of appeal, how would they have accessed the support that they were entitled to? How will they be able to do so in future? Without a right of appeal, the only recourse for those individuals would be judicial review, which is no substitute for a proper right of appeal. Judicial review, as we all know, requires time and money, which are things that people whose asylum claim has failed simply do not have.
Inevitably, hundreds of people who will have every right to support under new section 95A will be unable to access it. I cannot accept that the Minister and the Government are comfortable knowing that hundreds of people who are legally entitled to support will be left with nothing, but that will be the effect of schedule 6 if it is not amended. Ultimately, the debate is about the quality of decision making. Are the Government prepared to accept poor decision making and the injustices that stem from it? If they are not, they should accept our amendment.
Sarah Champion
I, too, want to speak in support of amendment 222. Throughout the Bill, the Government propose various measures to remove the right to appeal against Home Office decisions. Reading the Bill, one cannot but conclude that the Government are fundamentally opposed to their decisions being challenged in anything approaching an independent manner.
The consequences of the decision to deny support are potentially catastrophic. A migrant who is denied support has no right to work and no right to rent. Their bank account is closed and their assets are frozen. The choices that people in that position face are bleak. The Bill acknowledges the need to support refused migrants who have genuine obstacles to leaving the UK, but it has not been made clear what a genuine obstacle will be, even though my Opposition colleagues have been pushing for clarity. My hon. Friend the Member for South Shields has just raised the matter yet again. What is clear, however, is who decides whether the obstacle exists. It is the Home Office, without scrutiny, oversight or effective challenge. That is bad practice in any process, but in the light of the Home Office’s frankly miserable record of making the correct decision the first time, it will be disastrous.
There is currently a right of appeal on decisions made about section 4 support. Statistics from the asylum support tribunal should make for uncomfortable reading for the Government, because 62% of appeals between September 2014 and August 2015 were successful. The claims were allowed, sent back to the Home Office for a fresh decision or withdrawn in acknowledgement of a flawed decision.
The Home Office has a similarly poor record in assessing destitution. In 2014-15, the Asylum Support Appeals Project represented 168 asylum seekers whom the Home Office had denied support on the grounds that it did not believe that they were destitute. Of those decisions, 70% were overturned on appeal. Such figures cannot but lead us to the conclusion that there is a serious problem with Home Office decision making. During the Committee’s evidence sessions, witnesses offered various explanations for those failings, from inadequate training to overly complex immigration regulations, and Ministers have given other examples. Whatever the reasons, however, when nearly two thirds of decisions are being overturned on appeal, something needs to be done to address the problem.
The Government’s solution in the Bill and in previous immigration legislation is indeed novel: simply abolish the right to appeal. That will certainly result in far fewer Home Office decisions being reversed, but it is hardly a solution that will in any way contribute to better decision making. Children and families will be badly affected by the loss of appeal rights. Section 95 support will no longer continue for families with children at the end of the asylum process. That poses a serious risk of leaving children destitute with no judicial oversight, as was clearly detailed by my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields.
Given the high proportion of Home Office decisions that will be overturned by the tribunal, the lack of appeal rights will inevitably transfer the responsibility for supporting destitute children to local authorities. We have heard from the Minister that the Department is in good consultation with local authorities, which is great, but the reality is that children who should be being supported by the Home Office will instead have to rely on overstretched local authority budgets to meet those most basic needs.
Much has been said of the need to ensure that our immigration system is one in which the public can have confidence. However, the way to achieve that confidence is not to pander to sensationalist headlines, but to ensure that most of the time the Home Office gets it right first time. Abolishing the right to challenge poor decisions and forcing people into the most abject poverty will not in any way contribute to achieving a goal that I am sure we all share.
Paul Blomfield
I am pleased to have an opportunity to contribute to this debate. I will not repeat the woeful statistics that others have mentioned in relation to successful appeals, but I think that all those points should draw the Committee’s concern to the appropriate response, which must be about getting the process right, as opposed to abolishing people’s rights, because the net effect of the proposals will be that people who could otherwise win appeals will be left destitute.
The Minister talked at length about the dialogue between the Home Office and local authorities. I would like to share some concerns that local authorities in the region that I represent have expressed. They come together in an organisation called Migration Yorkshire, from across the entire county. They are anticipating that the impact of the provisions will be to leave significant numbers of refused asylum seekers destitute. They make a point, which is worth bearing in mind when the Minister says that measures such as this are about encouraging people to return: they ask, “Return to what?” We are talking about people who, in many cases, come from unstable and dangerous states. In their evidence, they cite Eritrea, Iran and Sudan. The choice of returning, or being destitute in Britain might not be a hard choice to make for many people, actually. Destitution in the UK is probably better than going back to a war zone and being destitute there.
It is clear that, under this policy, more refused asylum seekers will become destitute without the right to appeal. The local authorities’ concern is that the amount will increase in several towns and cities across Yorkshire, with all the related health and cohesion issues that will disproportionately affect some of our bigger cities, where we already face problems with the rise in rough sleeping and wider destitution. They are worried that local agencies will lose contact with refused asylum seekers, who will have very little incentive to stay in touch. They are concerned that unsupported, refused asylum seekers will feel compelled to use illegal forms of accommodation —to be in overcrowded, unhealthy conditions, potentially putting their friends in breach of tenancy agreements—and that they will feel compelled, in conflict with the Government’s policy objectives, to undertake illegal forms of employment to survive, opening themselves up to exploitation and abuse.
In Committee so far I have cited the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary; now I will turn to the thoughts of another member of the Cabinet. The comment is not contemporary, but arose from a 2008 study by the Centre for Social Justice, which, incidentally, stated:
“Making refused asylum seekers homeless and penniless is hugely counterproductive: it makes it much more difficult to work with them to encourage voluntary return or to ensure timely removal, and in driving them underground makes it harder to keep track of them.”
The foreword to the report was provided by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), now the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, who has provided inspirational guidance to the Government in a number of areas. We should pay serious attention to his words. He said:
“It also appears that a British government is using forced destitution as a means of encouraging people to leave voluntarily. It is a failed policy…still driven by the thesis, clearly falsified, that we can encourage people to leave by being nasty.”
I rest my case.
James Brokenshire
I will respond to each of the points made by Labour Members. The points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central undermine the appropriateness of the various measures in the Bill to confront illegal working, including the extension of the right to rent scheme to ensure against abuses. We are joining up enforcement against rogue landlords and those who are abusing their position in that way.
Furthermore, the immigration system in operation in 2008 was in a poor condition under the previous Labour Government. It was in need of significant change and reform to get it to do the job in hand. That is why I emphasised the coalition Government proceeding to scrap the old UK Border Agency and putting in a different form of administration, which we judge to be improving the system, rather than making it worse.
I will also respond to some of the statistics proffered in support of change, because that might paint a slightly different characterisation from the one we have heard thus far.
James Brokenshire
First, I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, who was trying to catch my eye.
Paul Blomfield
Indeed I was trying to catch the Minister’s eye. I think he would recognise—as I hope he will now—that the comments made by the now Secretary of State for Work and Pensions were not related to the particular forms of administration or organisation at the time. They were made about the principle of pushing people into destitution in order to create an environment that might encourage them to leave, which was one of the objectives that the Minister present said were behind his policy.
James Brokenshire
What I have said is behind the policy is a question of a firm and clear approach on the options and on the process that I outlined in the preceding debate.
I am sorry if the hon. Member for South Shields thought that I was trying to be pedantic in some way; I was not. There is an important distinction between those who are claiming asylum but have not had their rights assessed—it is appropriate to support them, but I am sure we will come on to those issues generally—and those who have had their claim assessed by the courts and determined to be not valid, or not grounded. In that context, therefore, if those families and people decide to remain here unlawfully, rather than leaving voluntarily, they should not automatically continue to receive Home Office support simply because they have made a failed asylum claim.
That is the principle. It is not about being “nasty”, as the hon. Member for Sheffield Central pejoratively sought to characterise things. It is about fairness, confidence and clarity in the system. That is the approach that we are setting out in the Bill and, as I hope he will understand, the approach that I have sought to annunciate in the manner in which I have put forward the proposals.
Paul Blomfield
Specifically on the point about fairness in the system—which we would all agree with—why is fairness assisted by removing the right to appeal?
James Brokenshire
I will come to that. The issue is equally one of fairness to those who play by the rules—those who put in applications, are here lawfully, and have not sought to overstay their visa or put in an asylum claim to try to drag it out in a further attempt to remain in the country. It is fair to those people who have done the right thing that people who do not have that right should leave. We need a better basis of incentives and possible sanctions and, together with local authorities, we need to engage with families in the process to secure more returns and to underline those clear messages.
Sarah Champion
I genuinely do not think that any of my colleagues are disagreeing that we want a strong, robust system. We are trying to argue that, looking at the number of appeals decisions that are overturned, the system is not strong and robust. We want a fair system too, but there are people falling through the net, who then get a fair outcome on appeal. To lose that right of appeal does not seem to provide that justice that the Minister seeks.
James Brokenshire
Obviously we have existing arrangements under sections 95 and 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. We are moving towards a different arrangement under proposed new section 95A, which will apply where there is a genuine obstacle to departure. To be clear, that will be defined in regulations. We expect that obstacle to be either the lack of necessary documentation or a medical reason. Of course, the person will need to show that they are making reasonable steps to obtain the relevant documentation. The Bill does not provide a right of appeal against the decision that no such obstacles exist because that should be a straightforward matter of fact for which a statutory right of appeal is not needed.
James Brokenshire
Before I give way to the hon. and learned Gentleman, I want to return to the issue of standards and Home Office decision making. I think the hon. Member for Rotherham said that her figures were from 2011. I point to the report of the previous independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, John Vine. I do not think anyone on the Committee would be backwards in coming forwards to identify weaknesses in the system and to expose matters of concern to him. It is worth highlighting his report of July 2014—a later period than that of some of the statistics that have been cited. He conducted an investigation of the whole system of asylum support. It is a long report, but the “positive findings” section of the executive summary noted:
“We found that the decision to grant or refuse asylum support was reasonable in most of the cases we sampled (193 cases out of the 215 cases—90%). We saw many examples of good practice, including staff taking extra steps to ensure that they made the right decision first time.”
He continued:
“In cases where applicants were refused support, we found that in 92 of 103 cases (89%) the decisions made by Home Office staff were reasonable. This was a good performance. Additionally, we found that of 12 cases where an appeal was lodged, only two (17%) were allowed by the First-Tier Tribunal. This is lower than the overall allowed appeal rate for asylum support refusals or terminations.”
The system has been characterised as not operating well and, in fairness to the Committee, it is important that I put that report on the record.
We always look for improvement, which is why we changed the system. We have separate directorates looking at different aspects so that we can hold to account and have better clarity of focus and attention. I will always challenge the relevant directors general to achieve that sense of continued improvement, but it is important to contextualise.
Keir Starmer
I want to take the Minister back to the question that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central asked about the fairness of removing the right of appeal. The Minister’s response was that, equally, we have to be fair to those who play by the rules and make their applications properly. What about the failed asylum seeker who establishes a genuine obstacle and takes on the onus? What happens if that is accepted but the assessment of whether he or she needs support—whether he or she is destitute—is wrong? He or she has done all they can and accepted the burden, but the assessment of whether they need support is wrong. The Red Cross told us that there are a number of cases where that is precisely the situation. The Red Cross often supplies a report, and it is a dead cert winner on appeal. Why is it fair to that person to remove their right to appeal when they will otherwise be destitute?
James Brokenshire
The issues that we are dealing with are specific matters of fact, and it remains open to the individual concerned to draw their circumstances to the Home Office’s attention. I take the hon. and learned Gentleman back to how we intend to operate these arrangements. We are not doing this by correspondence; it is being worked through as part of an overall process towards the removal of that individual. The judgment has effectively been taken, and contact is therefore being maintained with the individual, so it is more of the joined-up approach on which I have already responded. That is why, in our judgment, it is a question of looking at the simple elements and at what will be the barriers to removal.
Simon Hoare
I do not want to add an unnecessarily acid tone to the debate—[Interruption.] I do not necessarily want to do it, but that does not mean that I will stop myself. I hear what Opposition Members are saying about fairness, but was it fair to those who were making applications and appeals, and so on, who discovered post-2010 that the Home Office had shoved all their paperwork down the lift chutes of abandoned offices? The Home Office had let the whole damned business get so out of control and had become so overwhelmed that it decided that putting the paperwork into the “too hard to deal with” tray was the best option.
James Brokenshire
I know this message might not be appreciated by some members of the Committee, some of whom were not here when we experienced some of those practices after coming into government in 2010. I heard, and continue to hear, some extraordinary stories about some of the practices that existed before some of the arrangements that we have now put in place, which is why it is right to focus on some of the administration issues. That is why I referenced the chief inspector’s report. Yes, there is still work to do, and we have been clear on the change and reform that we seek to make to the effective operation of the immigration system. The situation that we picked up was pretty bad. My hon. Friend makes the point clearly and firmly on why some—
Simon Hoare
My right hon. Friend is being terribly kind and generous in saying that the situation was not very good. I thought that “not fit for purpose” was the description by the noble Lord Reid when he was Home Secretary of the situation that he discovered.
James Brokenshire
I appreciate your direction, Mr Owen, but I think that the history has some relevance to how we administer these rules and requirements and some of the evidence that has been adduced to the Committee. I have tried to bring us into the here and now with what these provisions are intended to do and, through reference to the ICI’s report, to give further clarity on the focus attached to this matter and the decision-making processes. I recognise that this debate is primarily about the rights of appeal. In many ways, we have strayed quite widely, but I appreciate that there are strong feelings on this issue. I respect that, and the House should be able to allow for lively and robust debate where there are differences of opinion. The debate has been helpful, I am sure. Obviously it will be a matter for you, Mr Owen, as to whether we have a subsequent schedule 6 stand part debate, given the wider discussions. I understand that there is a point of difference on some of the principles and I respect that difference. Obviously it will ultimately be for the Committee to determine the decision in relation to the amendment.
Keir Starmer
We should all support the measures to improve the decision making. It is good that decisions are improving, and if the success rate is going up in the way suggested in the latest statement, we should put it on the record that we support that; that is a good thing. But is there a target or expectation for right decisions? In other words, is there a target of 90% right or 95% right? What is the threshold? What is the level that the Home Office considers good enough to remove the right of appeal?
James Brokenshire
I think the hon. and learned Gentleman is seeking to frame this in a slightly different way. The figures that I referred to related to the system as was. Obviously we are contemplating changes. The point I have made to the Committee is about the nature of the decisions—the very fact-based approach that in our judgment should be clear as to whether there are those barriers to removal. It is on that basis that we judge the formal right of appeal. That is not to say that the person would not make representations to the Home Office—or, through the regular contact that we would have, that assessment could be made—but it is on that basis that we have formed that judgment.
Paul Blomfield
I would like the Minister to respond to statistics that have been cited. He made a powerful case and cited a report in favour of the effectiveness of the system, but by doing so sought to invalidate the suggestion of a 62% success rate in the appeal system. He will know, I think, that the Asylum Support Appeals Project receives the statistics from asylum support tribunals and analyses them. Does he recognise that the figure cited of 62% was based on that analysis, between September 2014 and August 2015, where, of the 2,067 applications for appeals against a Home Office refusal of asylum support, 44% were allowed by the tribunal and 18% were remitted—sent back—to the Home Office for it to take the decision afresh or withdrawn by the Home Office as it acknowledged its decision making was flawed? That 62% is therefore robust, is it not?
James Brokenshire
No. As I think my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General has highlighted, our judgment is that appeal statistics are not a good indicator of the quality of decision making. That is why I referred to the ICI’s report, in which he does the audits of performance. That obviously gives us oversight. Those figures do not, for example, take into account the fact that many appeals are allowed, as my hon. and learned Friend said, or remitted, because the appellant provides the necessary evidence of their eligibility to receive support only at a later stage. It is therefore important to contextualise this properly.
I recognise that there is a fundamental difference of opinion. We can continue the debate in the same manner, but our judgment is that, on the basis of the measure—ultimately, we are debating this particular amendment on appeals—and on the basis of my characterisation of how the system is intended to operate and how the administrative arrangements will function, the amendment is not needed. I therefore ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw it.
The Chair
Before I call Keir Starmer, the Minister was being helpful and measured when he talked about having a debate on schedule 6. We have a lot of amendments to go through; we might cover a lot more ground before we get to schedule 6. I will make a judgment at that time, so I ask Members to speak to the amendments before us, whether they be Opposition or Government amendment.
Keir Starmer
You have been generous in letting us discuss amendment 222, Mr Owen. In the course of those discussions and the interventions, probably everything that could be said has been said. I just have a final point. I accept that within the figure of 62% being successful on appeal, there will be cases in which the Home Office, in truth, was not at fault because, for example, information came to light after the event or circumstances changed. However, there will be many cases in which it was at fault. The Government cannot simply put a figure like 62% on one side and say that it does not demonstrate anything. There is palpably a need for a right of appeal in this type of case more than any other. Given those circumstances, I will not withdraw the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
James Brokenshire
I beg to move amendment 96, in schedule 6, page 91, line 2, after “(2)” insert “, (5), (6)”.
This is a minor and technical amendment. It is consequential on the repeal of section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Section 43(5) and (6) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 contain provision about tenancies granted to provide accommodation under section 4 of the 1999 Act.
James Brokenshire
I hope to be brief in explaining this group of amendments. Amendments 96 to 99 are all minor and technical amendment relating to the repeal by schedule 6 of section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Amendments 96 and 99 relate specifically to the repeal of section 43 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, which cross-relates to section 4 and tenancies granted to provide accommodation under section 4 powers. Amendment 98 is also linked to the repeal of section 4 of the 1999 Act. Amendment 97 is also a technical and minor provision. The term “claim for asylum” no longer appears in part 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, so the same change is needed in respect of section 141 of the 1999 Act.
Amendment 101 relates to persons supported under section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 when the new arrangements under schedule 6 take effect. Those persons will continue to be supported under section 4 by transitional arrangements. Section 4 support currently consists of accommodation and a weekly non-cash allowance to buy food and other essential items. The allowance is provided through an Azure card that can be used at supermarkets to purchase necessary items. There are no current plans to change those arrangements, but amendment 101 gives the flexibility to do so in future, subject to parliamentary approval of changes in regulation. Such a change might, for example, be appropriate if the numbers supported under section 4 decreased to a point at which the costs of administrating the Azure card outweighed the benefits.
That leaves amendments 100 and 102 to 104, which are minor and technical and relate to those who will remain supported under either section 4 or section 95 of the 1999 Act under transitional arrangements. The amendments will ensure that future and current dependants of those persons may be supported under the provisions. That will mean, for example, that a child born to a person already in receipt of support under section 4 or section 95 of the 1999 Act under the transitional arrangements will also be able to be supported under those arrangements.
Amendment 96 agreed to.
Keir Starmer
I beg to move amendment 223, schedule 6, page 91, line 7, at end insert—
‘(2A) Schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (withholding and withdrawal of support) is amended as follows.
(a) in paragraph 6(1), after “person” insert “who entered the United Kingdom as an adult”
(b) in paragraph 7, after “person” insert “who entered the United Kingdom as an adult””
To ensure that all care leavers—including young asylum-seekers and migrants who came to the UK as children—are given the support they need while they are in the UK by amending Schedule 3 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so it does not apply to people who initially came to the UK as children. It will not create an automatic right to support but make sure that a young person is not discriminated against on the basis of his or her immigration status.
I can deal with this amendment shortly. The intention is to ensure that all care leavers, including young asylum seekers and migrants who come to the UK as children, are given the support they need while they are in the UK by amending schedule 3 to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 so that it would not apply to people who initially came to the UK as children. The amendment would not create a right to support but would ensure that a young person was not treated differently on the basis of his or her immigration status.
I will come to the nub of what sits behind the amendment. For adults, support continues under schedule 3 to the 2002 Act until the individual fails to comply with removal directions, whereas support can be withdrawn for young people if they are found to be unlawfully in the UK but have not been served with removal directions. There has been criticism of the impact of schedule 3 by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Office of the Children’s Commissioner. The Refugee Children’s Consortium has also expressed concern about it. This is a narrow but important point.
Anne McLaughlin
I am going to speak very slowly and clearly. For many years, this country and other countries have struggled to support children who are leaving the care system. It has been well documented that those children’s life chances are measurably lower than those who do not go through the care system. Of course, various Governments have taken different measures to address that issue over time. When it comes to asylum seekers, however, we have a situation where children who are even more vulnerable find themselves destitute and without proper legal support when their appeal rights are exhausted, despite growing evidence that approximately 3,000 unaccompanied children come to the UK each year. This is another example of immigration legislation not keeping pace with the legislation protecting the rights of children and young people who are in our communities already but are no longer being supported by the Home Office.
We know that destitution forces young people into grave situations, some of which will be made worse by the Bill. Exploitation in all its forms, homelessness and ill health all follow on from the state turning its back on a desperate and isolated young person who has left care. It is worth highlighting an example given by the Children’s Society of a torture survivor from Iran who came to the UK aged 17. His initial claim was rejected and he went without legal representation for his appeal. Once that, too, was rejected, his support from children’s services was cut off and he was made homeless. He lost the support of the counsellor who had been helping him to deal with the trauma of the torture he had suffered. His health deteriorated further as a consequence of sleeping on the streets. I always find it useful to try to put myself in someone else’s shoes, and I think that sleeping on the streets for one night would be enough to finish most of us off. The good news is that he then received support from a charity and a fresh solicitor. His new claim was successful and he was granted leave to remain. His life was on course to be so much worse than I imagine it is now he has that support.
Amendment 223 is a sensible measure that would provide some protection for asylum seekers who have been in the care system and who are, by their very nature, among the most vulnerable in our society. I feel confident and hopeful that the Minister will support it.
James Brokenshire
I thank the hon. Member for Glasgow North East and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for their comments, which were brief, clear and to the point.
Simon Hoare
I too will oppose the amendment. I think that the hon. Lady has put her finger on the problem of why immigration has become such a huge issue in our constituencies, especially when juxtaposed with what we hear in the House and in Committee about councils’ central funding being reduced, and an overall cap on Government expenditure. I think that most ordinary folk in our constituencies, irrespective of their political affiliation, conclude on the basis of common sense that once a fair system has been tried, tested and exhausted, there must be a point at which the state, centrally or locally, withdraws.
Anne McLaughlin
The hon. Gentleman speaks about when rights have been exhausted, but the example I gave was not of someone who had exhausted his rights; it was someone who did not have the legal support to make a proper appeal, which is why he lost. When he managed to get the help of a charity it was found that he was entitled to support here. We are not talking only about people who have exhausted all appeal rights but about people who have had poor decisions or poor representation, or no representation.
Simon Hoare
I hear what the hon. Lady says, but I have to say I find it slightly surprising, given the quantum of those bodies that came to give evidence during our witness sessions. Most of those organisations—indeed, the lion’s share—were clearly focused, on either a regional or national basis, on providing advice, help and support to people who were seeking to make an application. I am not doubting the veracity of what she says, but I would be rather surprised if the problem she mentioned was large scale. Clearly, even the individual to whom she referred was ultimately able to find professional advice and support, and the response that they were looking for.
The nub of the issue is this: the British taxpayer—the council tax payer and income tax payer—cannot be expected to keep signing blank cheques to continue to support people to reside in this country when all of the systems have been tried and tested and their right to remain has not been proved or accepted. Just a few months ago, I am sure all of us heard on the doorsteps—
Simon Hoare
The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. There must be some very eccentric voters in his constituency. Every constituency will have had people—on the doorstep, in the market square or wherever—who will have said that this is a problem about which political correctness has become just a little too wayward.
Kelly Tolhurst (Rochester and Strood) (Con)
I support my hon. Friend. In Kent, we have seen significant numbers of unaccompanied minors over the past few months. I have noticed that the cost of looking after those unaccompanied minors has put massive pressure on our local authorities. Although we accept that we need to look after those young people and make sure that they feel safe when they come here, we must also recognise that we have a duty to the children already in state care in our county. When there is extra pressure on social workers and foster places, it is—
Simon Hoare
I am trying to explain why, like the Minister, I oppose the amendment, Mr Owen. My hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood is absolutely right. During our evidence sessions we were all concerned to try to ensure that the measures in the Bill helped community cohesion. When one section of the community feels that it is losing the local services, to which it has contributed through its taxes, in order to support the funding requirements of people who should not be here, people start to get annoyed and we start to see some of the rather ugly scenes we saw in Burnley and other areas where that little bit of racial tension became a little too hot and too heavy.
Simon Hoare
I think you are keen for me to finish, Mr Owen, so if the hon. Lady does not mind, I will not give way.
The Chair
Order. I am keen for you to address the amendment directly and not have a general discussion on immigration.
Simon Hoare
I am bringing in my generic thinking on the issue to explain why we should oppose the amendment. The amendment flies in the face of the common-sense approach that the British people want to see and that underpins the Bill.
In conclusion, the Minister made the apposite point that unless a clear message goes out to say that we are not a “soft touch”—I use that in inverted commas, because I appreciate that it could be inflammatory—or an easy target just because someone is a minor, far too many vulnerable youngsters will, I fear, be trafficked across the channel and elsewhere to come into the UK. This is all about signals and messages. That is why I oppose the amendment—argued for in a heartfelt manner, but fundamentally wrong—backed by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East.
Keir Starmer
I will be brief. We are talking about children coming out of care. It has been proposed that a message needs to go out to other countries—to be picked up by and to influence those coming to this country—that we treat those coming out of care unfairly. That proposition beggars belief. I will press the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.