(5 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill 2017-19 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Marriage will always be one of our most important institutions. It is vital to our functioning as a society, as we all know instinctively from our own lives and from the lives of family and friends. Rightly, then, none of us is indifferent when a lifelong commitment cannot continue, but it cannot be right for the law to create or increase conflict between divorcing couples.
I am encouraged by the many colleagues and others who have told me that the law must change to take unnecessary conflict flashpoints out of the legal process. Like me, they believe in the importance of marriage but see the destructive effects of what the law demands. People going through divorce already have to face more than enough emotional upheaval without the conflict that can be created or worsened by how the current law works.
I have reflected at length on the arguments for reform, on what people have said in response to the Government’s proposals and on the painful experiences we all know from talking to family and friends. I have heard from people who have been through divorce, from people who support divorcing couples through the legal process and from people who say they cannot afford to live apart for two years—without finally sorting out their finances—but, at the same time, cannot bring themselves to throw hurtful allegations.
The Bill responds constructively to the keenly felt experience of people’s real lives. This is a Bill for anyone who agrees that the end of a relationship should be a time of reflection and not of manufactured conflict.
I warmly congratulate the Government and the Secretary of State on introducing this Bill. I think I have married more people than anybody else in this House, in the transitive use of the word. I was always painfully aware that, when two people come together, it may well be that, in the end, they need to part, but the idea that they would have to prove in court all sorts of reasons for why the marriage had fallen apart—relying on the common law understanding of adultery, for instance—is just nonsense and adds to the sense of pain that there could already be within a family.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his remarks, and this Bill is by no means anti-marriage. As he rightly says, this Bill seeks to ensure that, in those unfortunate circumstances where a marriage comes to an end, it comes to an end in a way that minimises the conflict between the parties. That, in my view, has to be a sensible way forward.
There is undoubtedly fault in a divorce but, in my experience from continual exposure at constituency surgeries, the attribution of that fault leads parents to use their children as weapons in a continuing battle with their former partner.
My right hon. Friend makes a good point, and it is worth bearing in mind that, where children are involved, it is all the more important that we minimise the conflict. The current requirement incentivises that sense of attribution of fault, which does nothing to ensure that the relationship between the two parents can be as strong as possible, and it is the children who lose out in those circumstances.
I have thought about this with care. Obviously, to practising Christians and those of other faiths, the end of a marriage is not to be taken lightly, but I am glad the Secretary of State has accepted the proposition put by my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) that causing more conflict at the end does not help.
Will the Secretary of State confirm that in no other respects any of the protections for often the more vulnerable party to a marriage, the woman, will be affected by this measure, particularly in relation to financial arrangements and the custody of children, and that it simply removes the evidentiary requirement for a fault to be attributed to one side or the other?
My hon. Friend, the Chair of the Select Committee on Justice, is right. This is about the attribution of blame and fault, and no more than that. Indeed, the protections in place for the vulnerable party remain just as they are. It is often the vulnerable party who suffers most from the need to attribute blame, because that can be difficult. In the context of domestic abuse, for example, it is striking how the likes of Women’s Aid have been very supportive of these measures because of their concern that there might be women trapped in marriages who do not want to attribute blame because they feel that may result in a further deterioration in the relationship.
The truth is that when a marriage or indeed a civil partnership has sadly broken down and is beyond repair, it stops benefiting society and the people involved. At worst, continuing in a legal relationship that is no longer functioning can be destructive to families, and the law ought to deal with the reality of marriage breakdown as constructively as possible. The current law does not do that. The requirements of the divorce process at present can often give rise to a confrontational position, even if the decision to divorce is mutual. The incentive to make allegations at the outset, to avoid otherwise waiting for two years’ separation, becomes ingrained. Divorce is traumatic, and children are inevitably affected when their parents separate—that goes without saying. I agree that marriage has long proved its worth for bringing up children, but the reality is that not all marriages last. The law should deal with that reality as sensibly as it can. When a marriage has failed, we have to take a serious look at how to reduce conflict for everyone involved, not least for children. Research shows that it is conflict between the parents that has been linked to greater social and behavioural problems among children, rather than necessarily the separation and divorce itself.
I very much welcome the proposals in this Bill. Getting rid of the fault-based approach to divorce and the conflict is a good thing, as is ensuring that people do not have to wait for two years. Does the Secretary of State agree with me and with Resolution, the organisation for family lawyers, that we also need to provide earlier advice for cohabitees who believe that common law spousal rights might exist for them? Legal advice on whether such rights exist would be beneficial. Does he agree that including provision for early advice in the Bill would be welcome?
Obviously, this Bill’s focus is on divorce for those who are married. There is a point about advice where we can have a wider debate. I will focus my remarks today on the contents of the Bill and the argument I am making about the problems with fault in the current divorce system, and I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s support on that. Clearly, there is a debate to be had as to how we can provide support to couples, be that about reconciliation or in other contexts.
Whatever family structure children grow up in, they benefit most from stable, loving and caring relationships with parents and other close family members. We are clear that when parents have taken this difficult decision, children’s best interests are served by minimising conflict during and after the legal process, to support co-operative parenting and positive parenting relationships. This Bill is in the best interests of children whose parents are divorcing. It will therefore remove the harmful requirement for wives, husbands and civil partners in England and Wales to hurl blame or to go through the waiting limbo of separate lives. It will help them move forward more amicably and constructively. It will make a genuine difference to many thousands of children and families who each year, sadly, experience divorce.
It is 50 years since the Divorce Reform Act 1969 gave rise to the law we now have, and few of us will have known anything else. Some among us will have divorced under this law. All of us will be conscious of the bitter experience of friends and constituents who have. Even so, the existing law is not always understood. It allows divorce only on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The court cannot hold the marriage to have done so unless it is satisfied of one or more of what the law calls “facts”. Three of the five facts—adultery, behaviour and desertion—relate to conduct of the respondent. The other facts are two years’ separation and five years’ separation, the difference being that two years’ separation requires both parties to agree to the divorce—the same applies to civil partnerships, except that the adultery fact is not available. But the fact someone chooses does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the real reasons the marriage or civil partnership broke down. Those reasons are often subtle, complex, and subjective. Who, if anyone, was responsible is a question that can be answered honestly only by the people in the marriage.
We are probably all aware of situations where a couple have sadly grown apart over time and jointly agree to divorce The current law does not allow them to do so, unless they are first financially able to live apart for two years. They might be forced to present events in a way that serves the system; minor incidents become stretched out into a pattern of behaviour to satisfy a legal threshold, which then bleeds over into how a couple approach negotiations over arrangements for children and finances; or there may be a coercive relationship, where one partner is desperate to divorce but is too scared of the consequences of setting out the evidence of their partner’s unreasonable behaviour to the court. It should be enough that the relationship has irretrievably broken down.
I do know where people are coming from when they say the requirement to prove a fact is useful, because they think that someone must be held responsible for the break-up of the marriage and that this requirement lets the court determine blame for that. The court, however, cannot do so, and the law does not require it to. Instead, making allegations or having to live apart in a marriage introduces conflict or makes it worse—this conflict can continue far beyond the legal end of the marriage and hurt children’s life chances. That is the reason for this reform.
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for the careful way in which he is taking us through these proposals and for his indication of support for marriage. Will he look, perhaps in the context of this Bill, at supporting marriages before they have broken down irretrievably and providing support where couples are under pressure, to reduce marital breakdown by intervening earlier?
The last two words, “intervening earlier” are key. Once the point of a divorce is reached, it is likely—the evidence suggests this—that it is too late. The question is: can we provide support earlier? In all honesty, I do not believe that the Bill provides the vehicle to address that point, because if we try to provide that support in the context of the divorce itself, we will be too late. Clearly, however, there is an argument—one that I suspect is for the next spending review—as to what assistance can be provided to couples at an earlier stage in the process. I completely understand where my hon. Friend is coming from and I very much agree that the point is about earlier intervention, but where someone is going through the divorce process, making that process more difficult and confrontation is counterproductive.
Does the Secretary of State understand the circumstances where a resident parent turns children against the non-resident parent where no abuse whatsoever is involved? That causes estrangement for the child, often for many, many years. Is it not time that we found a legal framework—early intervention is important in this respect—to tackle this problem? I have only recently become involved in this campaign on parental alienation, and I was shocked that hundreds if not thousands of parents are estranged from their children because the resident parent seeks to manipulate the child against a non-resident parent for no reason whatsoever.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention on a matter that I suspect all of us have had experience of as constituency Members of Parliament as well as citizens. These circumstances are hugely difficult. To some extent, the existing divorce law can somewhat encourage that behaviour, because of the need to attribute blame, but he is right to suggest that this is a wider issue, one that is hard to address in the context of divorce. He is right to highlight the difficulties that can exist and how parents can be alienated from their children in what are difficult circumstances.
When I became Justice Secretary last year, I was able to take a deeper look at the issue of divorce. What became clear to me was that making allegations does not serve any public interest. It needlessly rakes up the past to justify the legal ending of a relationship that is no longer a beneficial and functioning one. At worst, these allegations can pit one parent against the other. I remain deeply concerned that what the existing law requires can be especially damaging for children.
The law on divorce and dissolution is out of step with the constructive approach that family law takes in other areas and that practitioners take every day. It is time to change that. Resolution is the lead organisation representing family lawyers who subscribe to a non-confrontational approach. Resolution’s chair, Margaret Heathcote, has said that
“because of our outdated divorce laws”
practitioners have effectively been working
“with one arm tied behind their backs.”
The Bill will change that.
At the beginning of my speech, I spoke about the confrontational position that the law sets up and about its harmful impact on children. That confrontational position undermines not only good co-parenting but any prospect of reconciliation. I understand concerns about people being divorced against their will. The reality is that under the existing law the court can refuse a divorce only if a legal requirement is not met, and never simply because one party wants to stay married. Only about 2% of respondents say that they want to contest the divorce. Hardly anyone continues contesting all the way to a court hearing. Marriages are not saved at all by the ability of a spouse to contest the divorce.
When I got married, as a Catholic I did not think the option of divorce was open to us. I genuinely thought that under all circumstances our marriage would be forever; my wife decided otherwise. That was a very emotional time. Does my right hon. Friend expect that when the change comes in some people will find it easier to divorce and that there be a spike in the divorce figures? A period of reflection sometimes gives people the opportunity to save their marriage, and that opportunity might be missed under the proposed changes.
I agree with my hon. Friend about a period of reflection. In fact, the Bill will ensure that there is a longer minimum period of reflection for people in a marriage to consider whether reconciliation is the right course. The evidence suggests that by the time things get to that stage, reconciliation happens very rarely, but we are extending that period, so it is not really about making divorce easier but about making it less confrontational.
On my hon. Friend’s point about whether we anticipate a spike in divorces, there is international evidence as to what is likely to happen following such a reform. I shall be open with my hon. Friend: there will be people who are currently waiting for two or five years for a divorce, and that divorce will be brought forward, so the likelihood is that there will be an increase because of that waiting list. However, the international evidence suggests that once that initial spike has been dealt with, in a steady state the divorce rate is unlikely to increase; it is likely to remain much the same. I hope it is clear to my hon. Friend that although we would anticipate that some divorces will be brought forward, the change is unlikely to increase the divorce rate in a steady state.
Let me turn briefly to the measures in the Bill: it does not create a new process, but instead retains the framework of the existing law and removes those aspects that are considered to cause conflict. The Bill therefore retains the two stages of divorce and dissolution orders. The Government believe that the need to confirm to the court that it may make the conditional order, and to apply to the court for the final order, means that a divorce or dissolution is never automatic and that the decision to divorce is a considered one, with opportunities for a change of heart right up to the last moment.
The reform will retain irretrievable breakdown as the sole legal ground for divorce and dissolution. It will replace the current requirement to evidence irretrievable breakdown through a conduct or separation fact with a statement of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage or civil partnership. For the first time, couples will have the option to make this a joint statement, to reflect some couples’ mutual decision to divorce. It will remove the possibility of contesting the decision to end the legal relationship, as a statement of irretrievable breakdown will be conclusive evidence to the court that the marriage or civil partnership has irretrievably broken down.
The reform will introduce a new minimum period of 20 weeks from the start of proceedings to the point at which the applicant—or applicants jointly—can confirm to the court that a conditional order may be made. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North (Eddie Hughes) some reassurance about that moment of reflection. Our proposal will make the court process towards a conditional order less rushed and give couples further time to consider the implications of the divorce. Between 2011 and 2018, around two thirds of cases reached conditional order in less than our proposed 20-week minimum period. That included approximately one in 10 cases within eight weeks, and four in 10 cases between nine and 16 weeks. The Bill also modernises language such as “decree nisi” and “decree absolute”, to bring terms in line with the more modern terms used in civil partnership law.
The reforms I have set out will deliver a system of divorce that is fit for the 21st century. It is time to end the blame game. The system we have now does not support the reality of marriage and civil partnership breakdown. It has been criticised as a system that
“is, and always has been, a sham”.
Those are the words of Sir Paul Coleridge, former family judge and chair of the Marriage Foundation, who, like all of us, believes strongly in marriage but sees that by reforming the law to remove from it unnecessary requirements that can fuel conflict, we will not undermine marriage and will support people to look to the future as they go through very difficult times. For that reason, I commend the Bill to the House.
I am greatly encouraged by the quality of the debate that we have had today and by the broad support that the Bill has received from Members on both sides of the House. I particularly thank my hon. Friends the Members for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) and for Solihull (Julian Knight), the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian C. Lucas), my hon. Friend the Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris) and the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) for their support.
The Bill is intended to help to heal family relationships when division has become unavoidable. No one, of course, seeks such an outcome. Few stand at the altar, or before a registrar, contemplating an ending rather than a beginning—“till death do us part” remains the golden thread of marital aspirations—but such is the flawed and fragile nature of human relationships that it can never be avoided altogether.
I know that all Members have families’ interests at heart. I know, too, that we share a belief in the vital importance of the commitment that marriage and civil partnerships bring, not only to couples and their families but to the wider wellbeing of our society. However, I am keenly aware that we arrive at that belief on the basis of different views and experiences.
I recognise that some Members have misgivings about the Bill. I should confess, as a Catholic myself, that when the Secretary of State presented me with it six weeks ago, I took rather a large gulp. What could I, a good Catholic boy, do with a divorce reform Bill? But the more I studied the Bill and looked at it carefully, the more I saw a civil and human measure that sought to lessen acrimony and create space for reflection. The misgivings that people have, however, are no less a part of the debate, and I am grateful to the Members who have voiced their concern as well as those who have expressed their support.
I am very grateful to the Minister, not least because I have only just come into the Chamber.
I congratulate the Government on introducing this incredibly important Bill. I also pay tribute to Philip Marshall QC, my colleague at the Bar, who has campaigned on the issue of no-fault divorce for many years. Does the Minister agree, however, that we must not only pass this important Bill, but reintroduce legal aid so that couples who are considering divorce can be advised by solicitors at an early stage? That saves a lot of money in the long run, and it is much better for the entire family.
I may well deal with that point briefly later in my speech.
It is worth pointing out that the breakdown of a marriage and the legal process of divorce that comes after it are two very different things. There was a time when the only legal exit from a marriage demanded an act of adultery, but that never stood in the way of anyone walking out on anyone else, and the law as it stands today does not prevent it either. There are general protections for respondents and vulnerable parties in any proceedings, and those will remain. We are also extending to all respondents the ability to apply for the final order to be delayed while the court considers their financial position following divorce.
My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) raised a number of important points. I am not unsympathetic to her wider agenda on support for families, and I look forward to meeting her and, indeed, Lord Farmer in the coming weeks to discuss their manifesto for families. She will be aware of our reducing parental conflict programme, to which £39 million has been allocated, our troubled families programme, and many other initiatives across government. I take on board her point that we need to do far more to support relationships further upstream, because we do not wish to reach a point at which relationships fall apart unnecessarily. I also take the point made by many Members on both sides of the House about the need to reform the finances of divorce, but I consider that to be a much greater issue than can be contained in this Bill. It is highly complex, and there is, as yet, no consensus. However, we recognise that it is an issue that will need to be discussed at some point.
The hon. Member for Bath rightly mentioned adverse childhood experiences. What she said went to the nub of why I believe the Bill to be a humane measure. At the end of the day, children often bear the brunt of the unpleasantness that divorce can cause, and we do not wish to add to that unpleasantness by ensuring that the divorce process is dragged out or becomes more acrimonious than it needs to be.
Many Members have expressed concern about so-called unilateral divorce. We should bear in mind that as marriage is a voluntary union of two people, the moment one person decides that the marriage is over, it is indeed over. The current divorce laws do not prevent unilateral divorce. Only about 2% of divorces are contested, many owing to the mistaken belief that attributing fault can somehow prevent the divorce from occurring. Indeed, when a divorce is contested, the only reasonable option is to prove that there was some flaw in the validity of the marriage originally. It is important to bear in mind what the law actually does, rather than what we might seek to believe that it can do.
I hear the points made by the hon. Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) and others about legal aid. Legal aid remains available to those who need it, such as victims of domestic abuse. It also remains available for mediation when couples are in dispute about finances or child arrangements, which provides a non-litigious route to resolving issues and helping families to move forward constructively. I also hear the point about the bar on the dissolution of marriages in the first year. The remedy for domestic abuse remains a range of proactive orders that the court can make, including non-molestation and occupation orders. We hope that those will include the domestic abuse protection orders referred to in our draft Domestic Abuse Bill.
We have heard from many stakeholders—a wide range of third parties—who take an interest in these issues and who support the measures that the Government are taking, including, as was mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, the chair of the Marriage Foundation, Sir Paul Coleridge.
The Bill will not, in my view, make divorce more common. It will not make divorce any easier, and it will certainly not make divorce any quicker: the 26-week period will remain in place. However, it may make divorce less acrimonious, and for that reason alone I think it is a worthwhile Bill on which to embark. Divorce and dissolution will happen regardless of how the legal processes effecting them operate, because the irretrievable breakdown of some marriages and civil partnerships is, unfortunately, inevitable. The Bill deals with that reality with the minimum of acrimony by creating the conditions that will allow people to move forward and agree arrangements for the future in an orderly and constructive way, and for that reason I commend it to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 4 July 2019.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Rebecca Harris.)
Question agreed to.
Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill (Money)
Queen’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State.—(Rebecca Harris.)
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill 2017-19 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I am conscious of the time, and I want to bring the Minister in shortly. Does anyone else have a simple, straightforward question they have not had a chance to put yet? I guess it is over to you, Minister.
Q
Nigel Shepherd: The short answer is that the average time that court officials—this is now mostly done by legal advisers in regional divorce centres—have to scrutinise the evidence is four minutes per case, broadly. Although current legislation says that the court has a duty to investigate the situation as far as is reasonably practicable, the reality is that our process does not allow that to happen at all. If a petition goes in on behaviour, and it is not defended, the legal advisers looking at it are simply checking to make sure that the jurisdictional grounds are correct, and that there is the necessary legal connection between the behaviour and the breakdown—in other words, that the boxes are correctly ticked.
There is no investigation and, what is worse, if the respondent to that petition writes five pages on why it is all untrue, if it is not formally defended with an answer and a fee paid of £200, it is ignored. That is the worst of all worlds, because respondents, particularly those without the benefit of legal advice, think that they are saying that they disagree with something about the petition, but that nobody is listening. That makes it even worse. There is no realistic scrutiny at all in the system. It is impractical to have that scrutiny, because who knows really what goes on behind the closed doors of a marriage? That is why this change is fundamentally so important; it means that there is no pretence anymore. It is intellectually dishonest at the moment; that is what Sir James Munby said in the Court of Appeal in the case of Owens. We would be getting rid of that dishonesty and acrimony at the start of the process.
David Hodson: I can add to that as a part-time judge at the central London family court. Until two or three years ago, when we had divorce centres, part-time judges had to do four or five of these special procedures every time we sat. It took a matter of moments. We would give careful consideration to the document that had been drawn up by the legal adviser as to whether there were any procedural errors. We would look at the unreasonable behaviour allegations, but I find it difficult to remember in recent years—we have softened as the years have gone by—anything having been sent back. Sometimes it is so minuscule, but if it is undefended, it will go through.
The 1996 legislation had a knock-on effect. If Parliament decided in 1996 that no-fault divorce was appropriate, though Parliament subsequently did not bring it into force, should judges be turning around and saying no? Owens was a distinctive case. It was a defended case, whereas if it is undefended, as Nigel said, it will go through. That makes it a crying pity that people have got to go through that process in the first place.
Q
David Hodson: One of the Law Society’s concerns is the court fee. I appreciate that this is not in primary legislation, but may we express our concern? At the moment, it is £550.
Q
Nigel Shepherd: We are all in favour. It is absolutely right, and people ask for it all the time. People come in and say, “We both agree. Can we make this a joint decision? It is really important because we want to say to our children that this was a joint decision that we made as adults, rather than having Kramer v. Kramer—an applicant and petitioner against, with one person being blamed and the other not.” We are absolutely in support; it is a crucial part of the Bill.
Aidan Jones: We absolutely support that as well. We believe that is the right message. When the sadness of a divorce is approaching, it is the right message for the children to see that two adults can still co-parent and get on with each other. In the interests of the children, it is the best way forward.
David Hodson: We tried it under the present process in a number of cases where we had agreed particulars of unreasonable behaviour and cross-petitions. In other words, it went through on the petition of both the petitioner and respondent. Then we got the decree absolute, and we still had the original petitioner described as the petitioner, though it had gone through on the petition of the respondent as well, because there was a joint petition with jointly admitted unreasonable behaviour on both sides. That was so unfair. It is the unfairness of that decree absolute. If only we could have, “This is the marriage of x and y, and they have jointly asked for this.”
I think—we can discuss this—there will be a number of instances where there is a sole petitioner and a joint application for the decree absolute. Again, that embraces what we want to see—that by the end of the period before the application for the decree absolute, they have both come to terms with it. They may not have been okay with it at the beginning, but if at the end, they have come to terms with it, how much better that would be for the children, the future parenting and all those other issues. That is why we are desperately keen to see not only a change to our laws, but a change in the terminology—the way the forms are set out—because that signals so much more for the couple.
I thank the panel for the evidence. We will move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Liz Trinder and Mandip Ghai gave evidence.
Q
Mandip Ghai: Some of it has been mentioned already. Professor Liz Trinder has already mentioned how defending divorce petitions can be used as a tactic. One other thing that we find—I disagree with the previous panel, one of whom suggested that the time period of 20 weeks should start from service—is that sometimes perpetrators will avoid service, deliberately not responding to the petition even though they have received it, or avoiding being served with it, as a way to try to control the applicant and stop her from proceeding with the divorce. They might suggest that they will consent to the petition proceeding, or accept service, if she agrees not to make any financial claims or agrees various things related to children.
Professor Trinder: I agree absolutely with that. Defence is a very stark example; you get respondents defending—causing huge distress to and huge financial costs for the petitioner—not because they believe that the marriage is repairable or saveable but because they simply want to control the other party. Looking at the case files, there are very clear examples of that, so the removal of that ability to continue to control the petitioner in that way is a really welcome future from the Bill.
Mandip Ghai: The other way, which I mentioned earlier, is that sometimes the perpetrator will issue the divorce petition first to prevent her starting divorce proceedings based on his behaviour.
If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. Thank you. That brings us to the end of our oral session today. The Committee will meet again this afternoon to begin our line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Note that we will be in Committee Room 9 at 2 o’clock.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Matt Warman.)
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThis text is a record of ministerial contributions to a debate held as part of the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill 2017-19 passage through Parliament.
In 1993, the House of Lords Pepper vs. Hart decision provided that statements made by Government Ministers may be taken as illustrative of legislative intent as to the interpretation of law.
This extract highlights statements made by Government Ministers along with contextual remarks by other members. The full debate can be read here
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I will see what hon. Members have to say and then round up.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe, and to see so many people in the room, discussing what will be a very important piece of legislation. It is rare that we deliver social change in this place. It often occurs at a glacial pace. However, there are locks on the great canal of British history. Every so often, the locks open, the water flows and the ship of state moves on. It never occurs by unanimity. There will always be some in the avant-garde driving the canal boat through the locks, navigating carefully and ensuring that all the locks open and shut in synchronicity. Others may be less at the forefront—more at the bow of the ship perhaps, questioning, querying, holding to account and analysing the detail. Both are important as we consider any item of social change, and it is right that Parliament reflects all these views. As my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North has demonstrated, it is very rare to achieve unanimity on any social issue, not just among colleagues in this House but across the country as a whole. I would never object to anyone raising concerns about this sort of legislation when it comes before the House.
We all come to Bill Committees with expectations and enthusiasm. When I served on the Committee that considered the Deregulation Bill in 2014, we spent at least 45 minutes discussing the idea of abolishing the age limit for purchasing chocolate liqueurs. There was a great, furious controversy about how many chocolate liqueurs one had to eat to become inebriated, and no consensus was achieved. I therefore hope that we might achieve a somewhat more broad—in fact, unanimous—consensus on this Bill, which frankly is far more important than the age at which one can purchase a chocolate liqueur.
This Bill is exceedingly important to millions of people up and down the country who are facing the prospect of divorce, have gone through it in their past and have strong views as a consequence, or who are currently in a marriage and considering what they intend to do. Its provisions, taken together, provide for reformed legal requirements in England and Wales by which a marriage or civil partnership may be legally ended through a court order for a divorce or dissolution, or by which an order for separation may be made allowing the parties to a marriage or civil partnership to remain in a legal relationship, but to live apart.
I will start by stating what I hope is agreed by everyone, and is a core Government belief: that marriage is vital to our functioning as a society. It is deeply sad for all those involved when a marriage or civil partnership is beyond repair. The decision to seek a divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership is an intensely personal one. The Government have heard calls to reform the legal process so that it does not make matters worse—calls that are supported by evidence, including that which we have heard this morning, about the harm done by the current legal process and how it is out of step with reality.
The Bill does not seek in any way to diminish the importance of the commitment made when two parties enter into a marriage or civil partnership with each other; that is a profound and deeply personal commitment between two people. I declare an interest: like my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North, I am a Catholic, and I personally believe that marriage is a sacrament in the sight of God. Equally, I recognise that not everybody shares that point of view. We are looking purely at marriage as a civil institution; clearly, many people from many different faiths and none will have religious concerns, but today we are looking at the law on the dissolution of a marriage.
Relationships can, and ultimately do, fail. When a marriage or civil partnership breaks down and is beyond repair, the law must deal with reality, by creating the conditions for people to move forward with the minimum of acrimony and agree arrangements for the future in an orderly and constructive way. Above all, the legal process should not exacerbate conflict between parents, which is especially damaging for children. The process must better support and encourage parents to co-operate in bringing up their children.
The evidence is clear that the current legal requirements needlessly rake up the past to justify the legal ending of a relationship that is no longer a beneficial and functioning one. The requirement for one person to blame the other if it is not practical for them to separate for at least two years can introduce, or worsen, conflict at the outset of the process—conflict that may continue long after the legal process has concluded. Allegations about a spouse’s conduct may bear no relation to the real cause of the breakdown and can be damaging to any prospect that couples will reconcile or agree practical arrangements for the future. In the extremely difficult circumstances of divorce, the law should allow couples to move on constructively when reconciliation is not possible.
I will now deal with clause 1, which relates to divorce as a whole. This clause is key to the Government’s whole approach to this Bill and its principled approach to reducing conflict in divorce proceedings. Other clauses regarding the legal requirements for judicial separation, the dissolution of a civil partnership or the legal separation of civil partners reflect that same approach with the appropriate modifications. Clause 1 substitutes for section 1 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 a whole new section 1. The current section 1 contains the grounds for divorce, the legal requirements that a party must satisfy to establish those grounds to the satisfaction of the court, and the powers of the court to grant the divorce if so satisfied.
The sole legal ground for divorce—that the marriage has broken down irretrievably—is retained. Under the existing section 1, a petitioner for divorce is required to show one of the five facts to evidence irretrievable breakdown. Three of the facts relate to the other party’s conduct in terms of adultery, behaviour and desertion, and the remaining two relate to the continuous separation of the parties to the marriage before the petition for divorce is filed. In new section 1, the requirement to show a fact is removed and is substituted by a requirement that the divorce application be accompanied by a statement that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. The new statement is to be conclusive evidence of irretrievable breakdown, and where such a statement has been validly made the court must make the divorce order.
I wonder what the Minister thinks the purpose of that six-week delay really is. What does he think will happen in these marriages during that six-week period?
Part of the objective, I believe, is to improve the financial arrangements. People may wish to delay a little longer until such a point. It is not a maximum period; it is a minimum, and the process might well take longer. It is about ensuring that we take a progressive, step-by-step approach to bringing the marriage to an end, and people may wish to tie up further loose ends, which may take longer than six weeks. There has always been a six-week gap to ensure, if nothing else, that all the paperwork is in order.
Crucially, however, new section 1(5) introduces into the legal process of divorce a minimum period of 20 weeks between the start of proceedings and when a party, or either or both parties to a joint application, may confirm to the court that the conditional order may be made. Those two periods together will now mean that in nearly all cases a divorce may not be obtained in a shorter period than 26 weeks, or six months. The 20-week period is a key element of the reformed legal process. For the first time, a minimum period has been imposed before the conditional order of divorce is made. The intention is to allow greater opportunity for the applicant to reflect on the decision and to decide arrangements for the future where divorce becomes inevitable.
The prospect of a couple reconciling once divorce proceedings have started is low, but our intention is that the legal process should still allow for that possibility. It is never too late for a couple to change their mind, which is one reason why we have decided to retain the two-stage process for divorce.
Separately, the new section 1(8) inserted by clause 1 retains the ability of the court in an individual case to shorten the period between decree nisi and decree absolute, which are now the conditional order and the final order, and also extends this discretion to the new minimum period between the start of proceedings and when confirmation can be given that the court may grant the final order or divorce.
I will come on to some of the points that have been made by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North and by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bolton South East. My hon. Friend made some interesting and helpful points about how we can ensure, as I have just referred to, that this is as considered a process as possible, and how we can best utilise the 20-week period that I have just set out.
As my hon. Friend may have picked up during the evidence session earlier today, there is more going on to reform the divorce process than just what is in the Bill. There are a number of online initiatives to try to make the process smoother for those going through it, and one thing that we will look at is what changes we can make to that online process to signpost people towards mediation of some sort, counselling and so on, to make sure that they are aware of the broad range of options available to them, which they might not have thought of when they initiated the divorce process.
My hon. Friend also made a point regarding the Law Society’s concerns as to when that 20-week period should start. We have explored this at some length during the consultation. Starting the time period from the acknowledgement of service, as some have suggested, could incentivise an unco-operative party to delay a divorce and could enable a perpetrator of domestic abuse to exercise further coercive control, which is why we have erred on the side of starting it earlier than that.
It is also worth flagging the caveat that we should bear in mind at every stage of this process. When we talk about mediation at this stage of a divorce process, it is often around finances or childcare. The mediation that my hon. Friend and I might think of as laymen is more a form of marriage counselling and relationship support. We should always be careful about that: when we initiate a divorce proceeding, mediation takes on a slightly different meaning from what it might perhaps have during a marriage. As I mentioned to the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston, 20 weeks allows people more time to sort out their finances, in as constructive a way as possible.
The shadow Justice Minister mentioned the one-year bar on divorce and asked for the reason for that. I confess that I too have asked officials of the first rank what was in the Bill and why this might be. We consulted on it before the introduction of the Bill and there was certainly no broad consensus or hard and fast evidence either way. Many felt that it went against the grain of reforms that recognise marriage as an autonomous troth, as indeed did the Law Society and the Association of Her Majesty’s District Judges. Faced with a lack of consensus and a lack of hard evidence at this stage that the bar causes hardship or is a problem, we propose to keep the status quo. That does not mean to say that the law can never be changed, but we do not believe that it would be the right step at this stage.
Understandably, the shadow Justice Minister raised the issue of legal aid and indeed legal support for those going through a divorce. She will be more than aware that legal aid is already available for mediation for couples who have finances or child arrangements that are in dispute. This provides a non-litigious route, resolving issues and helping families to move forward constructively. We are also investing some £5 million to support innovation across the sector that will help people to access legal support as close to their community as possible.
The shadow Justice Minister rightly made a point about litigants in person. As I have said to her in the past at the Dispatch Box, we are doubling our investment in our litigant in person strategy, but the wider reforms that I have just mentioned with regard to online processes for divorce should make it simpler and more straightforward for people to initiate proceedings online, so they would have less need for active legal help at that stage of the process. The reform programme, the litigant in person strategy and the legal support action plan are all about opening up newer avenues to access legal support that are not just about someone getting that legal help as they come through the courtroom door.
On that particular note, I beg to move that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Judicial separation: removal of factual grounds
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Does anybody wish to participate in debate on clause 2? I do not see anyone who does. Minister, do you wish to make any concluding remarks?
I am not sure people will have the patience for me to read out all my notes on every clause.
I do feel I ought to. My notes are now all shorter than they were for clause 1. It might help Members if I make it clear for the sake of the record that clause 2 refers to the idea of judicial separation, by which a party to a marriage may obtain a judicial separation order. Judicial separation is rarely used nowadays, with fewer than 300 judicial separation petitions made annually in comparison with around 110,000 petitions for divorce. We recognise, however, that divorce is not an option for some couples because of deeply held religious or other beliefs. Judicial separation therefore continues to provide an important legal alternative for those couples, and that is why we have decided to retain it. Clause 2 broadly reflects the changes made in clause 1 and applies them to the issue of judicial separation. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Dissolution: removal of requirement to establish facts
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Minister, do you wish to make any opening remarks? Does anyone else wish to participate in debate on clause 3? I will take that as a no. Minister, do you wish to say anything in conclusion?
The only point I will make to colleagues is that, just as we had judicial separation in clause 2, clause 3—and indeed, clause 4 for that matter—refers to civil partnerships and the Civil Partnership Act 2004. It once again takes all the elements I referred to in clause 1 and translates them on to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 so that that is also up to date from where we are currently.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 4 and 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 6
Minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
We support the Bill very much. We had some concerns about the powers that the Lord Chancellor would have in relation to clause 6, but given that they are so limited in scope, we do not propose to object to them. However, we do not wish it go unnoticed that we have concerns about Ministers having—I will not call them Henry VIII powers in relation to divorce proceedings—draconian powers in pushing forward legislation that would remain as primary legislation. I will leave it at that. We do not oppose this clause, but I wish to put on record that we have wider concerns about Ministers’ powers.
I was going to say a few words on this clause, so I am grateful to have the chance to respond to the debate. The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly fair point about the delegated powers. We got the idea from the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which was introduced by the hon. Gentleman’s party. We are reflecting the changes in that Act in the Bill. The powers we are conferring on the Lord Chancellor were exercised by the High Court with the introduction of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. In 2004, when the legislation was updated, it was decided that the power was better vested in the Lord Chancellor for civil partnerships. We are now catching up across the broader spectrum of proceedings with that decision to move the power from the High Court to the Lord Chancellor. I can justify the devolved powers in question even to myself, and I can even call them Henry VIII powers.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clauses 7 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. It is customary to give a lengthy thank you to all those who have participated in the Bill. I fear I would end up making a speech longer than any other speech if I tried to do so, but I thank all Members for their contributions, even if they have been silent contributions of good will emanating towards us. That is good enough for me.
More importantly, I thank all the officials who have worked hard on the Bill for many months. They may even be disappointed that we have taken only 47 minutes to progress it through Committee. I will put them at their ease, because if it is only 47 minutes, it means there is far less chance for me to muck it up at any stage. There will be a sigh of relief at the Ministry of Justice, I suspect, that I have been hidden from scrutiny by taking a bit less time. I thank all my officials and I thank you, Mr McCabe, for chairing the Committee so adeptly. You have facilitated our rocket-powered canal boat moving down the great canal of British history through one more set of locks.
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I place on record my thanks to all Members who have attended today and those who spoke in the Chamber on Second Reading. I thank you, Mr McCabe, for your excellent chairing of this Bill Committee.