Representation of the People Bill (Second sitting)

Zöe Franklin Excerpts

Wednesday 18th March 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Sam Rushworth]

Q What I am hearing in both of your answers is very little impact from personation, but a very high impact from people who want to vote not being able to.

Richard Mawrey: Yes, that is a different problem. People being turned away is a different problem. It does not involve an electoral offence, but it is none the less serious.

[Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)]

Q I had a quick question about the accessibility of polling stations for people with disabilities. As a quick example, I spoke to someone who talked about how their son, who has a severe learning disability, really wanted to vote. They had talked it through beforehand, but he really struggled in the voting booth, and of course, the parents cannot assist in the voting booth. What challenges do you see at the polling stations for people with a wide range of disabilities being able to use their vote?

Richard Mawrey: You bowled this one at me somewhat outside the wicket. There is provision in the 1983 Act for assisting people with certain levels of disability—for example, helping those who are blind. I think that there are provisions—this is entirely off the top of my head, because I was not expecting this—for people with learning difficulties.

There are certainly provisions for people who are physically incapable. If you require someone to push a wheelchair into the polling booth, you can do that. That is perfectly above board. The rules might be looked at there, but they exist. We have never said, “You are a blind man. You have to work out how to vote. You’re on your own.” You would never actually say that. That is provided for by the Act and has been, basically, for 100 years.

[Zöe Franklin]

Q I guess the question is whether there is more that could be done, potentially through this Bill, to empower every single person in our democracy to vote.

Councillor Golds: I have witnessed this several times in my life. I remember, after ’83, taking a blind woman to vote and watching the presiding officer do the process. He said, “I am clearing this area,” and he took the lady over and discussed it with her. He said, “Mr Jones, the Labour party candidate. Mr Smith, the Conservative party candidate. Mr Brown, the Liberal Democrat party candidate.” Then he asked, “Who do you wish to vote for?” She said so quietly and he marked the ballot paper. It was done incredibly professionally. I have seen it done with people with disabilities, where sometimes they are taken into a side room. What we are talking about goes straight back to where we began—it is the case that people do not know. The facility is there, you just need to get people to know.

Harry Busz: From our observations back in 2024, we found that there are two separate issues. One is the polling station building and whether that is accessible—importantly, independently accessible—for somebody to get to the presiding officer’s desk and a polling booth. Second is the type of aids that are there for them to be able to vote independently. It is very difficult to find the correct buildings and buildings that are accessible. Councils struggle, election to election, to go, “We have this much time. We need to find these spaces.” Over the last few years, we have seen a real improvement in the type of aids that are given to people. We have gone from just having a tactile voting device and maybe a pencil grip to a lot more councils having things like lighting and QR codes with audio lists of candidates on, which is really encouraging.

There are lots of countries around the world where we observe far greater levels of accessibility aids. I remember once seeing somebody in the USA, who was paralysed from the neck down, being able to vote independently by blowing through a straw—I did not really understand how that worked.

There are ways that we can improve. Obviously, it all costs a lot of money. Some of the opportunities to make elections more accessible for people could be through advanced voting, and having voting hubs and specialised pieces of equipment in a single polling station, which anybody could use if they were voting in advance of the election.

[Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)]

Q I should declare that when I was a councillor, I did a number of things with Councillor Golds on similar committees at the Local Government Association.

Harry, earlier you mentioned a percentage of people in your data who get turned away at polling stations. Was that all because they did not have the appropriate ID? I have seen people get turned away from polling stations simply because they have turned up to the wrong one. Do those people get included in your data, or is it just people who fail to bring the appropriate ID?

Harry Busz: That figure is just for people who fail to bring ID. We do see people who are turned away because they may not be registered or they may be at the wrong polling station, but they are not included in those statistics.

--- Later in debate ---

[Zöe Franklin]

Q It is interesting to hear you talk about how the Electoral Commission does not have the power it needs in order to act in this very challenging, complex and constantly evolving sphere. From your perspective, what are some of the key changes that would need to be in the Bill to enable us to have that protection and enable the Electoral Commission to keep on top of this?

Alexander Browder: Overall, there should be more strict and rigorous requirements for crypto donations, if those are permissible. Specifically, political parties should be required to release the cryptocurrency wallets they receive donations from; they should be required to store the cryptocurrency in UK Financial Conduct Authority-registered companies; and any amount should be reportable.

Not only that, but donations involving something called privacy coins should be stopped. A privacy coin is a recent development within the cryptocurrency space and is completely untrackable. One such example is Monero. Privacy coins should not be in the democratic process, because you are not able to verify the donor. Furthermore, laundering services like some I mentioned before—mixers—should not be allowed to be used for political donations, because they make it much harder for the Electoral Commission and political parties to investigate.

[Zöe Franklin]

Q I have a second question. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy recommended a temporary ban on crypto donations until there is statutory guidance. From your perspective and understanding of crypto, do you agree? Expanding a bit more, is there anything you would recommend in any guidance on crypto?

Alexander Browder: I saw that report, which was very good. As I mentioned, cryptocurrency as a whole may only be properly regulated, at best, by the end of 2027. It needs to be established that cryptocurrency can be regulated, and that that can be enforced properly, to stop bad actors like Russia from entering our elections. What also needs to be established is that the people who are donating are not foreign entities like Russia, but are UK citizens. This is a big issue; due to the inherent nature of cryptocurrency, you are not able to verify properly the source of funds.

[Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)]

Q To build on some of the lines of questioning that have been put forward, I am keen to get your perspective on what the best approach is to make sure we look at the next big challenge that could be posed by crypto donations, particularly if those come indirectly. How do you see us being able to challenge that problem and take it seriously if we find that crypto donations are reaching political parties in this country via an indirect route, particularly via companies or a third party, for example?

Alexander Browder: There need to be stricter “know your donor” requirements. Not only that, but the enforcement on parties should be greater. If they do not respect the political process, there should be higher fines and stricter policies.

On your last point, through my investigations I have found that Companies House has been abused by cryptocurrency exchanges. In one particularly egregious case, two IRGC-linked companies managed to register here in the UK under false names. They were operating for four years, while registered here in the UK, processing billions for the IRGC. That raises the question whether some foreign actor or criminal could set up a UK-registered company and donate through that? That definitely has to be looked at.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will come to you, Ms Shorten.

Jenny Shorten: May I cede the floor to Tom?

Tom McAdam: We are in favour of AVR. A YouGov poll at the last election showed that only 26% of Brits abroad understood their rights, so automatic registration, using the touch points that were previously mentioned, is something that we would support. On Imogen’s point about the free post, voters abroad should be making informed decisions and receiving literature from candidates in the same way as domestic voters, so we would support anything that enables, say, one free post or an electronic communication from candidates to citizens abroad so that they are able to make an informed decision.

Jenny Shorten: May I just add one other thing to the last point about the free post? If you look at the Select Committee report, it suggested a review of the general election process. It suggested that a good first step would be to centralise the records of overseas electors and have them all on one register. You could then start to have the target group effectively in one place. Informally, I chatted with electoral registration officers in the run up to the last elections Bill, and they were saying that we deal with pretty much everybody overseas—though not entirely everybody—by email, so our records hold that data. If you put together a centralised register and the fact that the councils already know where to find these people, you have the means by which to inform them.

It must be right that you can have the basic data flowing about who the candidates are. It is not about their vote, which is their choice—I am sure we will discuss digital in a moment—but about what their choice is. In this day and age, I do not think there is any excuse for why I am expected to vote for people I have never even heard of and who have not approached me.

[Zöe Franklin]

Q I want to talk a little about automatic and automated registration. This question is for all members of the panel: do you think that there should be active promotion of British citizens living overseas joining the register? A couple of members of the panel have already touched upon that. I have a second part of the same question, which Colin Blackwell has already touched on, in relation to the Passport Office. When overseas UK nationals renew or apply for a passport, might it be a sensible approach to provide those overseas individuals with information about registering to vote?

Colin Blackwell: Yes, in one word. That is really precisely what I was trying to say in my previous answer. I renewed a passport from overseas. I provided a local mobile phone number and an email, and there is a healthy two-way interaction: they tell me that my passport has been printed, that it is on its way and so on. There are plenty of opportunities within that interaction to mention it to the overseas citizen. They are already sending me something to ask whether I want to donate my organs, so why can’t they also send something that says, “Do you want to be on the electoral register? This is the link to do it”? Other Government Departments can also follow that.

Whether to register or not is ultimately someone’s choice, but they should have the facts, they should have the link, and they should have the knowledge that they have the right to vote.

Imogen Tyreman: I also agree. I think being prompted is very important generally, even in conversations with us. Everyone here is giving oral evidence as a member of a political party. We are aware that our right to vote came back, but speaking to our communities of Brits abroad and reaching out to friends and family, not everyone was aware. Some people were not aware that they had regained the right to vote. Renewing your passport is a basic starting point. I would not say it is the end goal, but it is the starting point for getting people back on the electoral register and able to exercise their democratic right in this country that they were given.

Richard Williams: I echo all that. The only thing I would say is: why not take things a step further and design an automatic opt-in? There have been studies of automatic opt-ins for organ donation, and you get a much higher acceptance rate if the default is set to opt-in and people are manually asked whether they do not want to let their organs be donated. Why not do the same thing for being on the electoral register? Assume people do want to be on it, unless they do not. Of course, you can then differentiate between the limited and open register and the full register, but I think, at least for the limited one that stays confidential, this could be looked at to make things even easier.

Jenny Shorten: Can I echo the point that was just made? If it is right that eligible voters in the UK automatically go on the register, why is it not right for British citizens eligible overseas to be treated in the same way? I think it is a very straightforward answer. It might have to be done by a different method, but the principle should be exactly the same.

[The Chair]

Mr Joseph, you have one minute for your question and the answer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Samantha Dixon]

Q Chris, you very ably pointed out how technology moves at breakneck speed and takes us forward, and it has been recognised that our electoral system is not keeping pace with it. Is there any way in which either of you feel that the Bill takes us forward and brings us up to speed—anything at all?

Chris Morris: It is not all doom and gloom. If we take the example of digital imprints, measures have been taken to extend the digital imprint regime. Our argument is simply that it does not go far enough, and it should go further. For example, it should cover things like fake newspapers or websites, which can be set up in seconds, that do not include their political party affiliation. The digital imprint regime is being slightly improved by the Bill, but it is simply not ambitious enough.

We also have to think not just of 2026, but of 2029. If you look at how technology has changed since the last general election in 2024, it is almost in a different league. I regularly ask my head of AI, “Where are we going to be in three years’ time?”, and he usually says, “I’m not sure where we are going to be in three months’ time.” We need to have the flexibility to make sure that the measures are as wide as possible, because even if we broaden them in the way that we suggest to include a wider variety of things, by 2029 we may be looking back and saying that it probably was not enough.

Azzurra Moores: It is very hard to disagree with Chris. The imprints work is huge progress. Obviously, it could go further, but I appreciate that a lot of the things we are asking for were not in scope when the Bill was being drafted. Does it cover the issues we are talking about? No, because it never intended to. That is where we are saying there is a real opportunity for the Bill to go further and be wider.

While it may have started with a narrow scope, perhaps once you hear what Philip Rycroft says through his review—and read our amendments slightly further—it will be appreciated that there is an opportunity to say, “How else can we make the Bill safeguard elections for the future?”

Chris Morris: To add to that, on a slightly different part of the legislation, it is good that the Electoral Commission will have greater powers on information sharing and enforcement, but we would like to see it have greater powers on information gathering.

There is a bit of a gap on who is responsible for regulating in that area. We would have liked to see that covered in the Online Safety Act 2023 and given to Ofcom. That did not happen, but one thing that could and should happen in this legislation is giving the Electoral Commission the power to compel people to hand over information or documents really quickly, such as in the heat of an election campaign, without having to turn it into a formal investigation, which as you probably know is laborious and takes time. A lot of this is about agility as well as transparency.

[Zöe Franklin]

Q For transparency, I have met representatives of Full Fact in preparation for the Bill.

I want to talk about doxing, and my understanding is that it is not currently within the scope of the Bill. For anyone who is not on top of doxing, it is where information is gathered about you and then dropped online so that people can find out where you live and other information. Given that the Speaker’s Conference and the Crown Prosecution Service have both spoken out about how important it is to address this, do you feel that it is a problem that doxing is not currently in or addressed by the Bill?

Azzurra Moores: What you are trying to address is the issue of online harassment. Doxing is one part of it, but online harassment takes many shapes. I certainly do not need to describe that to members of the Committee, who will have experienced it themselves.

We definitely feel that tackling online harassment is a massive missed opportunity in the Bill. For those of you who might have followed the work of the Online Safety Act Network, it has proposed a new code to tackle online abuse and harassment during elections. Again, that has not been tabled as an amendment to the Bill, partly because it was felt to be out of scope.

When looking at in-person harassment, we also need to understand that those in-person threats happen digitally as well. Certainly, the issues you are raising, such as doxing, could fall under that code. As I said, it is not something that has been tabled, partly because of the narrow scope of the Bill, but I encourage Members to look to that and perhaps have representatives from the Online Safety Act Network come in to give evidence.

[Zöe Franklin]

Q Can I go on to the issue of online attacks on candidates, their families and people involved in elections? Social media platforms play a massive role in the distribution of things like misinformation, disinformation and deepfakes. Is there more that the Bill could do to put a requirement on social media platforms to act more swiftly to address those issues?

Chris Morris: My one-word answer is yes, but let me explain it in various ways.

Broadly speaking, it is not unreasonable for us to ask the most powerful companies in the world—who have enormous power over our information environment and, therefore, increasingly over how everyone in this country gets information—to take on a more responsible attitude, some of which we believe should be made statutory.

As part of media and political literacy campaigns, for example, there could be education about why harassing candidates is not a good thing to do. Some of that behaviour comes from ignorance, and from people seeing how others behave on social media.

One of the recommendations we have made, and it is in our written statement, is that there should be a statutory obligation for the big tech companies, the online platforms, to make sure they are fully involved in media and political literacy campaigns. They do some good things, but we have to recognise, and we have to be realistic, that in the end their bottom line is their share price. Regulating how information flows is difficult. At the moment, we are essentially allowing them to regulate themselves, and I think sensible regulation of these companies—we know there will be howls of protest—is exactly what the Members of this House should be doing.

Azzurra Moores: Maybe I can quickly explain why we have gone for such a narrow scope in our recommendation on deepfakes. We recognise that deepfakes are a really complicated topic to regulate, and they need something far bigger than an elections Bill to regulate. Really, wholesale AI regulation is needed.

While the section 106 recommendation does not put new requirements on platforms, it starts to test the bounds on how you would regulate political deepfakes, which we appreciate is a really complicated topic. It is a slow and steady approach to amending legislation, rather than coming in and making big mistakes straightaway. This would be a first step, but obviously there need to be conversations within Government about how we could go further on that as well.

[Dr Chowns]

Q Thank you both for your work. You have made a powerful case for the danger of not better regulating disinformation. Can you share any lessons observed from how other countries have perhaps done this better? We have talked about the proposal for a repository of digital adverts. We have talked about deepfake labelling. What about other forms of disinformation, such as bot campaigns?

Secondly, do you agree that we need to regulate not just during the regulated period but all year round, because disinformation has corrosive effects all year round? Thirdly, do you have any comments on the need for better enforcement of existing imprint laws? Finally, you referenced the Rycroft review, which of course covers only foreign interference. Are we paying enough attention to domestic disinformation?

Azzurra Moores: There were lots of good questions there. You ask what more could be done on bots. Chris raised a proposal to increase the Electoral Commission’s investigative powers. For those of you looking at the amendment paper, that is new clause 25 tabled by Emily Darlington.

Tackling bots is going to be really complicated, but we think a really important first step is to give the Electoral Commission investigative powers on the back end of platform data, to try to understand the scale and scope of the problem. Part of the reason we cannot do much more at the moment is that we have a real evidence gap—a real evidence deficit. We need to start giving our regulators, which are on the frontline, more ability to understand the scale of the problem. For us, that would be a first step.

I am intrigued to see what the Rycroft review publishes. Demos gave evidence to Rycroft, and we highlighted that foreign misinformation is obviously impacting our democracy, but so is domestic misinformation. We are waiting to see what he publishes before going further on that.

On international counterparts, we have recommended that this Government establish a critical election incident protocol, modelling what happens in Canada. It is quite a complicated protocol, and it is proposed in new clause 26, but essentially, if there was any interference with an election—if there was an information crisis that impacted the integrity of the election—there would be a published protocol on what officials would do to react to that.

We are a real outlier here in the UK, compared with the other Five Eyes nations, in not having a public protocol. We think this elections Bill is another really important opportunity to say, “We know there are vulnerabilities. We know there are risks. We need to establish transparent public protocols so that, should any of these interferences happen, we have a set of measures that mean we know how to react in that instance.”