(5 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCopies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the room.
We will start with amendment 1 to clause 1, with which it will be convenient to debate clause 1 stand part. For clarity, that means there will not be a separate debate on clause 1; it will be debated now along with the proposed amendment to it. Members who wish to discuss clause 1 should seek to catch my eye.
Clause 1
Rules for an online procedure in courts and tribunals
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 1, page 2, line 9, at end insert—
‘(6A) A person’s choice to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means, does not prevent them from then deciding at a subsequent stage to continue by non-electronic means.”
The amendment would allow persons who have started the specified kinds of proceedings by electronic means, to change to non-electronic means.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Gary.
We have tabled amendment 1 to allow people to continue to conduct proceedings on paper. While we accept the advent of digitalisation and that increased use of the technology available is helpful and appropriate for our court procedures, making matters easier and perhaps saving time, it is also important to ensure that people are aware that they can use conventional paper methods and procedures.
Members will be aware that many members of the public, in particular the older population —I do not mean this disrespectfully—are not very computer savvy. They may not have the internet at home, and they might be confused about the procedures to adopt, where to file things online and whether they have to get the internet installed at home. All those challenges arise, so they must be able at the beginning of proceedings and during the course of proceedings, if it becomes appropriate, to switch to the paper system. The amendment would deal with that issue.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Gary. It is important to recognise, as we all do, that the eyes of the world and the nation are upon us in this room, as we are the most important political event of the day. I am sure we will try to live up to that level of scrutiny.
As we are considering the entirety of clause 1, I will make a few preliminary comments. The clause deals with the foundations of the new approach to the online procedure. It provides that there are to be online procedure rules that require specified civil, family or tribunal proceedings, including proceedings in employment tribunals, and that the employment tribunal should be subject to the online procedure. It allows those kinds of proceedings to be initiated, managed and resolved by electronic means. Rules may provide for all or any part of the procedure for conducting proceedings online, including starting and defending proceedings or participating in hearings. Different rules may be made for different proceedings and for circumstances in which rules are not to apply or cease to apply. This allows flexibility and proportionality in giving effect to all procedure rules and ensuring that the right types of proceedings are supported by the right types of rules.
The clause also permits rules to provide for specified proceedings to be taken in a different court or tribunal from the one that would normally take them, and for central proceedings that would normally be heard in different courts or tribunals to be taken together. To ensure that the online procedures rule committee works for the benefit of all users, the power to make these rules is to be exercised in so far as it ensures that the procedure is accessible and fair, the rules are simple and simply expressed, disputes are resolved quickly and efficiently, and the rules support the use of innovative measures on resolving disputes.
The requirement for clear, accessible, simple and intelligible rules will make it easier for ordinary court users to navigate the system and access justice. Although the rules have been designed to be of particular benefit for ordinary court users, we expect them to be equally helpful for IT technicians and legal practitioners to make overall sense of the underlying framework of the IT and online service. It also strengthens the emphasis on innovative methods of dispute resolution, which might include online tools that support parties in resolving their issues without having to resort to a formal court hearing. The Government believe that these innovative methods are likely to widen access to justice further, to a wider cohort of users than now.
The clause also requires that when the committee make the rules, it must have regard for
“the needs of those who require support in order to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means”,
to ensure that the committee is always aware of people who are digitally disadvantaged. Clause 1 specifies that if the online procedure rules require someone to participate in proceedings by electronic means, the rules must also provide for them to participate by non-electronic means. That was an amendment that the Government added in the House of Lords, and it demonstrates our commitment to paper proceedings.
Clause 1 gives effect the schedule 1, which deals with practice directions. These powers are similar to those that are currently provided in the Civil Procedure Act 1997, the Courts Act 2003, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the Employment Appeal Tribunal (Amendment) Rules 1996. The powers will enable the Lord Chief Justice or his nominee, with the approval of the Lord Chancellor, to issue practice directions in civil and family proceedings to which online procedures apply.
Amendment 1, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South East, is designed to to give users the ability to opt out of using online services at any time, and switch instead to a paper route. Our ambition is to develop online services that are so easy to navigate that, over time, digital channels will become the default choice for the majority of our users. Nevertheless, I absolutely agree that it is right to ensure that people can choose a paper option at different stages throughout proceedings, and vary that choice at different points where that is their preference. I must clarify that the Bill already provides for this—indeed, we amended the Bill in the other place to ensure that this is absolutely clear.
Subsection (6), inserted by the Government amendment in the other place, provides that
“Where Online Procedure Rules require a person to initiate, conduct, progress or participate in proceedings by electronic means”,
the rules
“must also provide that a person may instead choose to do so by non-electronic means.”
Litigants will not be tied to a particular channel. There is nothing in the Bill that requires a litigant who begins proceedings online to continue to do so throughout the entirety of their case. The Government are aware that some litigants might be less able or confident in using some parts of our digital services, so we will allow them to transact with us easily via a mix of paper and digital channels. To be clear, litigants will be able to choose to use paper or online options at different points during the same proceedings if they wish to do so, and Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service’s approach is built around providing and supporting that choice. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. It does not add anything to the Bill, so I urge her to withdraw it.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown for his observation about the new Government. I hope the Bill is not the first to fall victim to a catastrophic U-turn, because that would be a great disappointment to us all.
On the point about the reliability of technology, the Bill is an insurance policy against any unreliability, not because of any particular system being inherently unreliable, but because occasionally someone might not plug something in—it could be as simple as that. I recognise that it is important to have alternative means available.
We could put many provision in the Bill that do not necessarily need to be in the Bill. We cannot see where technology will take us in 10 to 20 years’ time. Who knows? Who foresaw the internet in the early ’80s, for example? The point is that whenever anyone engages with the online systems, the opportunity to use non-electronic means is a clearly advertised joined-up process. It does not need to be in the Bill. Indeed, such a provision might be outdated in a few years’ time.
Also, and more important, the Bill sets up an online procedure rules committee. I do not want to fetter the decision-making powers of that committee on the correct online procedures for every type of case that it deals with. It will have to deal with this question on a case-by-case basis. As much as I love Christmas trees, turning every Government Bill into a Christmas tree on which we hang our own individual baubles is equivalent to erecting a gravestone over our political efforts, so I once again ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
No one on the Opposition Benches is asking for their own baubles on a Christmas tree. The amendment is sensible and friendly. We want it written into the Bill so that the provision is crystal clear. I therefore want to press the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 2, in clause 4, page 4, line 13, after “proportionate” insert
“including, but not limited to, a free help-line”.
This amendment would require the establishment of a free help-line to provide support to digitally excluded people.
Essentially, amendment 2 is designed to protect people who are normally digitally excluded. The clause refers to a “proportionate” level of support, which we believe should include, but not be limited to, a free helpline. As I said earlier, there are people who do not have internet facilities in their home, have no access to the internet or cannot use computers—people have different challenges.
The helpline should be free because the very same people who are excluded from the internet also tend to be those who are financially in the worst position. Quite often, the helpline numbers for Government and other bodies or public officials may charge 3p, 4p, 5p or 10p a minute, which amounts to a lot of money for someone on a very limited income who has to spend half an hour or 40 minutes on the telephone. We therefore ask for a free telephone helpline for those people, so that they can make calls and get the information they need. We hope it will assist them, but at least it will not cost them.
I do not know whether other hon. Members have the same experience, but in my constituency there are many people who do not have a contract phone. They are often on pay-as-you-go, because it costs the least, and they try as far as possible not to use up too much credit. Not everybody has a contract phone that gets them free calls to certain numbers, and even for people who have one, many numbers are not free. That is why we are asking for a free helpline; it would probably not cost the Ministry of Justice that much more, but it would ensure that people who are digitally excluded can access free legal advice and assistance without having to pay either for the billing costs or for having someone help them.
I am always nervous when telling the hon. Gentleman, who is an experienced lawyer, how the courts work. He has spent far more time in courts than I have in my life. If I may rehearse my earlier point, clause 4 is a legally binding duty on the Lord Chancellor to arrange for the provision of appropriate and proportionate support to those litigants who may be digitally excluded.
In my view, that legally binding duty will encompass telephone supportbut it will be for the procedure rule committee to determine in each and every example where it has to formulate rules for online procedures whether that should include at least telephone support or over and above that. It will be within the ambit of the Committee to stipulate whether it wishes to do so, and whether a wider range of means of support may be appropriate for the technology of the time when it seeks to make those rules.
I am not trying to be difficult, but we will push the amendment to the vote for two reasons. First, clause 4 states:
“The Lord Chancellor must arrange for the provision of such support as the Lord Chancellor considers to be appropriate and proportionate, for the purpose of assisting persons to initiate…”
Do we know what “appropriate and proportionate” mean? Although the rule committee presumably will decide what is appropriate and proportionate, it is important for it to know that our amendment adds the consideration of a free helpline. The support is not limited to that—other things could be included. It is important to include free phone lines so that the rule committee is assured that it can look at all possible options, including free telephonic support at the point of use.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 5, page 4, line 29, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—
“(c) one of each of the following—
(i) a barrister in England and Wales, and
(ii) a solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales, and
(iii) a legal executive appointed to the Committee by the Lords Chancellor in concurrence with the Lord Chief Justice;
(iv) a magistrate of England and Wales appointed by the Lord Chief Justice; and”
This amendment would require that the Online procedure rule committee has representatives from different parts of the legal professions.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 4, in clause 5, page 4, line 31, leave out “two” and insert “three”
Amendment 5, in clause 5, page 4, line 37, at end insert “and;
(iii) one of whom must have experience representing the views of people who are digitally excluded.”
This amendment is consequential on the earlier amendment. The amendment would require a members of the Online procedure rule committee to have experience representing the views of people who are digitally excluded.
We believe that the procedure rule committee should be larger than currently proposed and that members should be a member of the Bar, a solicitor, a legal executive or magistrate. The reasons for that are twofold. First, it is surprising that the Government envisage the Online procedure rule committee as having a very small number of members, yet the Family procedure rule committee and the Civil procedure rule committee have somewhere in the range of 11 to 16 members. The Online procedure rule committee seems to have by my calculation about five members. We believe that is too small a number to be able to deal with a committee that is going to be pretty revolutionary in what it is designing. It would be wrong to exclude a legal executive, solicitor, barrister or magistrate from that, because the idea behind the committee is to deal with the smaller cases from the civil and criminal courts, and it is legal executives and solicitors who are often involved in the preparation of those cases.
We want the amendments to be put to a vote because we want to make it clear to the Government that these issues are important, and not only to us; they are fundamental to a proper Online procedure rule committee. Although the Minister says that the committee may do this and that, that is all open, and up in the air. We want concrete specifics, and for that to be written into the text of the Bill that such people must be part of the committee. Otherwise, the committee could say, “Well, we don’t need so and so. We don’t need such and such.” Alternatively, they might say, “If the Government wanted us to consult other people, or call on other people to become members of the committee, they would have put it in the legislation.” Because it is not in the legislation, there is no reason why they should be looking at other people. We say that the experience that legal executives, magistrates, solicitors, barristers and digitally excluded persons have is crucial to the committee, in being able to come up with a good set of rules. That is why it important to us to put these amendments to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 7, page 7, line 35, leave out “negative” and insert “affirmative”.
This amendment provides that regulations made under Clause 7 which allow changes to certain requirements relating to the Committee are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 7, in clause 8, page 8, line 18, at end insert—
“and subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”
This amendment provides that rules made by the Committee are contained in statutory instruments subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
We think the Government are being a bit naughty in not allowing Parliament an oversight—[Interruption.] My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington expresses surprise. Clause 7 states at the end:
“Regulations under this section are subject to negative resolution procedure.”
Members of the Committee know what that implies. It basically means that it does not come to Parliament, does not get a full discussion, does not get a full hearing, and goes through the on the nod procedurally. When the power is given to change things relating to the committee, the legislature must make a decision—at the end of the day, Parliament is supreme. We accept that a number of different people will be consulted. We have asked for a small amendment to the effect that we have an affirmative resolution procedure rather than a negative resolution procedure.
All parliamentarians should push for that. We should show that we have a complete say. We accept that clause 7 refers to the fact that a number of different people will be spoken to, that discussions will be held and that decisions will be made but, at the end of the day, Parliament is supreme and therefore we ask that, whatever changes are made, and whatever changes are made by the Lord Chancellor under clause 7, they should be subject to an affirmative resolution procedure and not a negative one.
Amendment 6 seeks to change the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure whenever the Lord Chancellor wants to make a change to the committee’s membership. As I have explained, we envisage that the new committee will be agile, focused and flexible—I fear that those words will be chiselled on my gravestone.
Over time, as the scope of the online procedure widens, the Lord Chancellor may wish to make changes both to the number and to the expertise of committee members. The amendment would have the effect of hampering the committee’s ability to respond quickly and effectively to new situations. If the committee needed to draft new rules in a new area, it may decide that additional expertise is required, and may need new members to help to form a considered view. The amendment would mean that a debate in both Houses of Parliament would need to take place before an additional person could become a member of that committee. That would be an inappropriate use of parliamentary time, and is counter to our aim of ensuring that the online procedure rule committee can always access the expertise it needs quickly and efficiently.
Requiring changes to membership of the online procedure rule committee by way of an affirmative procedure would also be inconsistent with provisions for amending the membership of the civil, family and tribunal procedure rule committees. I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw amendment 6 because of that.
Amendment 7 seeks to change the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure when the committee makes court or tribunal rules. In the other place, a number of concerns were raised by noble Lords about the constitutional implications of the Bill. I take this opportunity to assure hon. Members that the Bill has been drafted precisely to ensure that the existing constitutional balance is protected.
The Bill mirrors the existing rule-making powers in legislation for the civil, family and tribunal procedure rule committees, which means that the process for making rules follows the traditional and usual method, in which the committee holds regular meetings and consults appropriate persons before making rule changes. Once drafted and signed by the committee, the rules are then allowed by the Lord Chancellor. Finally, the Lord Chancellor lays a statutory instrument in Parliament subject to the negative resolution procedure. It is clear that, if rules are drafted and agreed by the committee as well as by the Lord Chancellor, we do not need to have two further debates.
If rules laid before Parliament under the powers were subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, it would not only place the new committee out of step with existing procedure committees, but significantly reduce the flexibility of the committee and hamper its ability to support in a timely fashion new online services as they quickly adapt and improve. In addition, minor changes to the rules are made regularly throughout the year, so requiring a debate in both Houses of Parliament every time a change is made would be time-consuming and disproportionate. I consider that the negative procedure strikes the right balance between ensuring sufficient parliamentary scrutiny and allowing the new committee to operate effectively. I urge the hon. Lady to withdraw amendment 6 and not to press amendment 7 to a Division.
We will press the two amendments to a Division. Parliament spending time looking at procedures does not waste time or clog up the parliamentary timetable. In fact, the parliamentary timetable is quiet, so we have enough time to deal with a few more regulations. I am not sure the Minister’s argument is the best one. We believe that Parliament should be able to see what is happening and therefore should be able to subject such regulations to the affirmative resolution procedure.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
It is a pleasure to go first for a change. On Third Reading, the other place voted to amend clauses 9 and 10 so that the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy must obtain the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice when the Lord Chancellor or the BEIS Secretary gives notice requiring the committee to make rules to achieve a specified purpose, or the Lord Chancellor makes consequential amendments to existing legislation to ensure that the online procedure rules operate properly. Previously, the Lord Chancellor could use the powers without the need to obtain agreement from the Lord Chief Justice. The powers originally reflected the legislative procedures in place for the existing rule committees, which have worked well for many years, and which I believe should be retained.
The amendments in the other place have also altered the constitutional position. I do not consider it acceptable to use the Bill as a vehicle for significant constitutional reform. I also strongly believe that the amendments made to clause 9 in the other place fetter the Lord Chancellor’s power to give effect to Government policy through the online procedure rules. The clause now requires the Lord Chief Justice to take a decision on the implementation of that policy, which contradicts the traditional role of the independent judiciary and the concordat: a long-standing agreement between the judiciary and the Executive that specifically refers to the Lord Chancellor’s power to require committees to make rules to achieve a specified purpose.
The concordat also refers to the power to amend, repeal or revoke any enactments governing practice and procedure to facilitate the making of rules considered necessary or desirable following consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, as was originally provided for in clause 10. It is important that the Bill reflects the position in the concordat. The Lord Chancellor is directly accountable to Parliament for any rules that are made, so it is right that the responsibility lies with him alone. Therefore, with amendments 9 to 12, the Government seek to overturn the amendments made in the other place and to revert to the original wording. When these amendments are seen alongside Government amendments tabled in the other place, I hope Members will agree that there are sufficient safeguards in the Bill to allay concerns.
We amended the Bill in the other place so that before laying regulations to bring new types of proceedings online, the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice and the senior president of tribunals is required. That is in addition to the requirement already in the Bill of an affirmative vote in each House agreeing to any such regulations. The regulations set out the framework in which the rules will operate, and the Lord Chief Justice must agree to that framework. The Lord Chancellor cannot direct the rule committee to make rules outside the framework that the Lord Chief Justice has agreed to, so the safeguards in clauses 2 and 3 provide the requisite assurances.
Furthermore, the power under clause 10 can be used only for changes that are consequential on the online rules, or that are necessary or desirable to facilitate online rules. We therefore consider that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure the appropriate use of the powers, and there is no need to provide for concurrence with the Lord Chief Justice and senior president of the tribunals in clauses 9 and 10 as well. We have actively engaged with the peers who had concerns and we will continue to discuss this part of the Bill with them ahead of its returning to the other place, where I am hopeful of achieving agreement to the changes.
Amendment 8, tabled by the hon. Member for Bolton South East, seeks to allow the committee to decline a ministerial direction to make rules on a specified topic. It is my position to ensure that lawful government policy can be given effect to and that the relevant Minister should be able to direct the Committee to make rules. The rules might be required to ensure that the online procedure is operable, and so might need to be made urgently, without additional procedure. Concern was raised about the clause on Second Reading, and I hope to be able to assure hon. Members that it is not a power grab by the Executive. The power already applies to existing rule committees and to other procedural rules not subject to the Bill.
Clause 9 reflects similar provisions agreed between the then Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice under the concordat of 2004 and given effect in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. In practice, the power is not frequently used—indeed, there is just one example of its having been used in the existing civil procedure rule committee. Nevertheless, it is an important power and reflects the established constitutional arrangement. The amendment could cause a problematic constitutional situation whereby a rule committee could refuse to draft rules following the written request of a Minister who sought to implement a specific policy. There would be democratic concerns if a committee was able to refuse to prepare rules on a policy that the Government had been elected to deliver. Such a situation would risk embroiling the judicial members of the committee in a political debate. We should all seek to avoid that.
The proposed amendment would also lead to a situation in which the new committee operates differently from other committees that deal with civil, family and tribunal proceedings. It would diminish the power of the appropriate Minister to respond rapidly to changing circumstances, and would effectively give the new committee a power of veto to make rules, which could lead to delays for users who are required to engage with the justice system or for HMCTS in delivering the reforms. As the Minister is the one who is answerable to Parliament, ultimate decisions on policy making should be in their hands, not in the hands of the committee. I urge the hon. Lady not to press amendment 8, and I commend amendments 9 to 12 to the Committee.
We think amendment 8 is important to ensure that there is no control by the Executive. If it is asked by the Minister to change the rules, the committee that has been charged with the task of preparing the procedures should be able to decline the request. That is important because it ensures that the committee is independent of the Executive, the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice. The committee should be free to do as it wishes. The Opposition therefore believe that the amendment is an important safeguard for the OPRC to be able to determine the rules as it wishes. It will give written notice to the appropriate Ministers, and I am sure it will explain its rationale. We believe that it should ultimately be a procedure committee’s decision whether to change a procedure because of a request from a Minister; the Minister should not be able to take control of that. It is a power grab by the Executive, and we have to avoid that as far as possible.
I am one of the few people in the room who does not have a legal background. I have an IT background, and I used to spend a lot of my time trying to explain to people that IT cannot always do the magical things that they think it can. One of the flaws in this discussion is that there is nothing about the digital infrastructure that underpins the Bill. The proposed amendment is actually rather sensible, given that the only IT expertise in this process seems to sit with the OPRC. I would like reassurance from the Minister that some thought has been given to the processes that will underpin the Bill. Has he considered whether it would be sensible in some cases for the Committee to say, “Actually, this is not going to work.”?
On a point of order, Sir Gary. I will be as brief as I can, because I know that colleagues wish to yodel and ululate at the Queen Elizabeth II Centre imminently. May I thank you, Sir Gary, for chairing the Committee, and the officials who have got us through it so speedily?
I also thank my Bill team, who successfully worked through the weekend, delivering me acres of notes; my Parliamentary Private Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon, for delivering one note that proved that it was worth his turning up as a member of the Committee; and my Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness, who guided me through every step of the way. I also thank all Members who made their individual contributions—even those who do not like Mozart and Bach.
Further to that point of order, Sir Gary. I echo the Minister’s sentiments. I thank you, Sir Gary, for your chairmanship, and those in the Public Bill Office for all their help in tabling our amendments, and assisting us in preparation. I thank all Members who attended the Committee. Specifically, I thank Opposition Members who helpfully supported me and intervened at the right junctures. I welcome their support in considering the Bill. We now await the next part of proceedings.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberAs a general rule, the adoption of new technologies in our justice system is something to welcome. It should, if done carefully, lead to better, more agile courts that increase access to justice. Labour recognises the need for an online procedure rule committee, given the increased use of digital courts. Our aim now is to focus on amendments that improve the proposed committee and ensure that any rules strengthen, rather than weaken, our hard-won rights.
Although digitisation is necessary, it needs to be done with diligence and accuracy. Most importantly, it must not be done simply to achieve savings. Given that digitisation will have a substantial impact on our justice system, it is incredible that there still has not been any proper, publicly funded academic research into the impact of digital courts on access to justice. Instead, the Ministry of Justice seems happy to shell out huge consultant fees—over £60 million last year—and roll out untested and ad hoc changes.
In 2018, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee expressed concern about the scale and pace of the changes the Ministry of Justice was attempting. It expressed little confidence in the capacity of Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to deliver this hugely ambitious programme, not least because it found that Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service had failed to indicate
“what the new system would look like.”
That is a vital point and one that this Bill fails to deal with.
Far too often in the last year, the changes pursued by the Ministry of Justice have had a vague direction, instead of a particular, definable endpoint; after all, we have had at least seven Secretaries of State for Justice in the last nine years. The only consistent characteristic of these reforms seems to me to be related more to ideology than judicial policy: the desire ceaselessly to cut the budget year on year. Again, in the last nine years, the Ministry of Justice has had the highest budgetary cuts in comparison with other Departments.
The Law Society has noted the backward illogic of the reform programme, criticising the decision to close courts
“before the technology that is intended to replace the need for physical hearings has been tested, evaluated and proven to work.”
With half of our courts estate already sold off since 2010, we now have little choice but to move towards online courts. Finance appears to have triumphed over sense in deciding what to do in relation to justice.
On the current Bill, it is notable that the Government have chosen to go well beyond the relatively modest recommendations of Lord Justice Briggs in 2016. Further, instead of piloting individual areas, the Government’s desire appears to be to digitise whole swathes of the courts system, with limited oversight. Amendments put forward in the other place tried to ensure that the piloting of new stages would be mandatory. That still seems a reasonable measure to ask for, bearing in mind how many internet breakdowns we have had in the court system in the last few months. It is really important to try out a pilot scheme to see how these things work. However, the Government do not appear to want to do this.
Another matter of importance in this debate is the question of whom the Bill authorises to make future decisions. Currently, it states that the relevant Minister may require amendments to be made, with little clarity about exactly what would justify such a requirement. The suggestion discussed in the other place was that the committee be allowed to decline the Minister’s request, and we think that was a very relevant and valuable suggestion. Although that did not pass, the amendments to clauses 9 and 10 provided some balance on the power of the relevant Minister, as they must seek the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice.
While we welcome those important provisions, we believe that the Minister should not be the final arbiter in deciding whether the procedure rule committee makes a rule that he or she wants; that should ultimately be within the province and remit of the procedure rule committee. What is the point of having a committee to set out rules if the Minister is going to say, “No, I want you to change this”? If we have selected people to make the rules, they should be the ultimate arbiters of what the rules should be. That is very important because the Executive and Ministers cannot be allowed to get away with dictating what they want. While we accept that there needs to be a balance between a Minister and the committee, we urge the Government to reconsider and rethink this aspect.
At the moment, it is unclear how far Parliament will be able to scrutinise the rules put forward by the committee. Given that the online procedure rule committee will have the power significantly to alter the way many people engage with our justice system, it seems reasonable that an elected body should also have a say in this matter. As was highlighted by the Bar Council in relation to the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill in 2018, this Government frequently adopt a “drip-feed”—its word—approach to change in order to avoid a full debate and proper legislative scrutiny of their court plans. That cannot be allowed to happen through this Bill. My counterpart in the other place suggested adopting the affirmative resolution procedure for clauses 8 and 9. That seems patently sensible, as it would provide parliamentary oversight of potentially major changes to our justice system.
The make-up of the proposed online rule procedure committee also merits consideration. Our amendment in the other place was to enlarge the committee to ensure representation from each of the legal professions—the Bar, the Law Society and legal executives—but, again, that was denied. That is really strange, bearing in mind that the civil procedure rule committee has 16 members, the family procedure rule committee has 15 members and the tribunal procedure rule committee has nine members, while the number here is much lower.
I heard what the Minister said in his opening speech to my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous). I may have misheard him, but the Minister suggested that there is nothing in the proposed legislation to stop an increase in the composition of the committee. That, however, is not accurate. The committee says that currently it does set out how many members there should be or who they should be. Therefore, unless the number and composition of committee members are put into primary legislation, we cannot just change it.
In my discussion with the Minister yesterday on the telephone, I explained the importance of having a barrister, a solicitor and a legal executive on the online procedure rule committee. When I practised at the Bar, solicitors would send me instructions on all the procedural parts of the case, such as starting the petition, issuing the summonses or laying the charges. All those procedural matters were undertaken by legal executives and solicitors. Barristers would often just turn up at court to speak and do the advocacy part. Therefore, to exclude from the committee the very people involved in the procedural side does not make any sense. I am sorry, but I am not reassured by the Minister that the committee can somehow change itself. Again, I may have misheard. It is important for the legislation to spell out that there will be a member of the Bar, a solicitor from the Law Society and a legal executive. That is really important in ensuring the system works, because they are the people involved in all the procedural aspects.
The amendments we supported and argued for in the other place were also supported by Mind and the Law Society. I continue to feel that including non-lawyers with experience of disability and digital exclusion would significantly reduce fears that the Bill fails to properly ensure access to justice. We tried to promote gender balance on the committee, again without success. This would be an important measure. It is no secret that power in our court system resides with a group who are highly unrepresentative of our national population. We think provisions to require gender balance would rectify some of the imbalance and be an important step towards increasing diversity in our justice system. What assessment has the Minister made of the make-up of the committee in terms of both its composition and size? The Minister and I discussed this issue yesterday on the telephone.
We also raised concerns that the Bill could lead to digitisation by default. Whether proceedings are criminal, civil, tribunal, probate or family in nature, there are good reasons to feel that making digital the default option will, in many cases, restrict or entirely remove access to justice. We believe that both sides involved in a case should be able to decide on whether online or traditional measures are used throughout the case. Again, I had an encouraging conversation with the Minister on that point yesterday, but I would like to see proper guarantees in the Bill to ensure that both litigants are provided with the choice of using traditional methods and that this option is made very clear and easily available, so that most people do not feel that they should be going down the online route or that the in-person route is in any way exceptional as opposed to the norm.
My hon. Friend mentions the digitally excluded. For some people, only a face-to-face physical hearing will do. That leads to the point about insufficient weight or prominence being given to legal advice or representation, because that may well influence what decisions people make when they are faced with a choice about what to do with regard to digitisation. Does she agree that for everyone to be treated fairly and equally, not being forced down the path of digitisation is of the utmost importance?
Absolutely. We can imagine a lay person being told to follow, or being pushed towards following, the online procedure. They are not going to be told that the paper procedure or turning up is just as doable and straightforward. I will come on to this point later, but ensuring that people have access to legal advice is even more important with the introduction of digitisation and there seems to be nothing in the Bill to deal with that issue.
Sadly, in many areas of the reform programme, digitisation has frequently been imposed from the top down. Clause 4 recognises the Government’s duty to
“make support available for digitally excluded people”
in so far as the Lord Chancellor feels it to be “appropriate and proportionate”. It is vital that support is not just there but properly funded and—importantly—sufficiently advertised. Even when there are mechanisms available to provide support, we worry that all too frequently they are poorly promoted. They work to show evidence of action, while providing little meaningful aid to those who need it. Since it was set up in February 2018, a helpline for those who need help to use video links in court has averaged less than one call a day. The Public and Commercial Services Union has questioned how widely HMCTS would advertise alternatives to digital justice and I share its concern.
Another point we are concerned about relates to clause 1(3)(d), which refers to the use of
“innovative methods of resolving disputes.”
Despite the probing of my counterpart in the other place, it is still unclear precisely what that means. Greater clarity on the wording would be useful. We are very concerned that the Bill does not lead to digital justice becoming an inescapable default setting across the justice system.
Access to legal aid and legal advice is very important, and it is regrettable that the Bill is pretty silent on that. The Bill should include the ability for those who go through the online procedures to at least be able to make a phone call to access legal advice. That phone call should not be a premium number or a chargeable number; it should be a free number, so that people can access proper legal advice. Many people do not have contract phones, with free mobile phone calls. A lot of people are still on pay-as-you-go, so they need a system that is free to use. It would therefore help if the Minister was able to ensure, when he responds to the debate or in Committee, that the Government deal with that point.
I emphasise that point because of my own personal experience as a practitioner. I can remember being in courts, whether civil or criminal, which were attended by unrepresented people. None of us gave legal advice as such, but lawyers and solicitors would at least provide them with some guidance, a signpost and somewhere to go. When we have online courts and people are sitting at their computers, they will not have human advice, guidance and signposting. It is therefore crucial that such people can access legal advice, even on a phone, so I ask the Government, the Ministry of Justice and the Minister to think about that.
Let me recap a few issues that really concern us, which I hope the Minister will address in his response. First, so far no rational reason has been produced as to why the committee needs to be so small. Secondly, how will he ensure that the rights of disabled people are properly represented in the committee? Thirdly, how will he ensure that there is real parliamentary oversight of potential major changes to our justice system? I would really appreciate answers to those questions.
Finally, I reiterate that fair and equal access to our justice system needs to be at the justice system’s heart. It is well known that the most stable countries in the world are those that have the best legal and judicial systems, where people feel that they will get justice in the end. Therefore, what will the Government, the Ministry of Justice and the Minister do to ensure that people are protected, that no harm comes to them and that justice is properly and fairly accessible to all those who need it?
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI very much hear what the hon. Gentleman is telling me. He will recall a debate that we had in this Chamber a couple of weeks ago on that point. We have no plans to close any further courts at the moment, but he will recognise that there is a need to make sure that our court estate is used appropriately, and he will recognise that where court buildings are not used, or indeed are used for less than half the time for which they could be available, we have to look at making sure that what we do in our courts best meets the needs of our estate and of the people using our courts system.
Last year, the Government made a huge fanfare about their female offenders strategy but announced only £5 million for it. Recently, legal aid was increased by £8 million, but that pales into insignificance compared with £67 million spent on consultants to provide cuts to our courts. Instead of throwing money at the consultants, surely there should be a proper debate in this House on the Government’s disastrous court closure programme.
When I speak to most sensible people across the entire justice system, there is a recognition that our justice system has to modernise. If we do not transform or modernise the system, the service will become increasingly unsustainable and will deliver a progressively worse service for the people for whom I know the hon. Lady wants to get the best outcomes possible—I do too. If we do not modernise, our district system will not be able to maintain that level of service.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI completely understand the hon. Lady’s point. That is why I am trying to set the context: my very personal view is that the system worked in my particular case, but I completely accept that it will be different for others, as we heard in our evidence session this morning.
My point is simply that we have all visited websites that have asked us to tick a box to agree to terms and conditions. It is highly doubtful whether any of us has ever read all the terms and conditions before ticking the box, because we know that we are entering into a contract that will be really easy to get out of. We have all done it—we have all pressed the button to enter into a contract really quickly, because we know that it is easy to get out of. I am scared about any move in that direction with regard to marriage, because my personal belief is that it is more important than that, as a contract and a spiritual union.
Anyway, I have some points and questions for the Minister about clause 1. The written and oral evidence submitted to the Committee by Mr Hodson raises several key points that really engage with the clause and that arguably highlight the need for amendments that I hope the Government will consider.
The 20-week reflection period is clearly of huge importance. The Bill is about removing fault from divorce, not about minimising the opportunity within the divorce process for couples to gain access to mediation and have a rethink. This may come as a surprise to some right hon. and hon. Members, but in some instances the first occasion on which a spouse finds out that their marriage is in difficulty is the commencement of divorce proceedings. That is the first opportunity they have, with that knowledge, to try to put things right. At a time when the annual cost of family breakdown to the Exchequer stands at £51 billion, according to the Relationships Foundation’s annual assessment, it is imperative that policy makers and legislators seize every opportunity provided by the 20-week reflection period to maximise the opportunities for mediation and reconciliation. Without any expression of commitment to the importance of marriage, the Bill will sound very hollow.
One key measure by which the success or failure of the removal of fault in the legislation will be judged will be the extent to which it creates a better environment within which couples can rethink and save their marriage. To this end, the 20-week reflection period defined in clause 1 is clearly of the utmost importance. At the moment, on the basis of the evidence submitted by Mr Hodson, it seems vulnerable on several points.
First, in a case in which one member of a couple initiates divorce proceedings, if the 20-week clock starts ticking from the moment that they initiate, as clause 1 currently proposes, the other spouse will on some occasions inevitably end up with less than a 20-week reflection period. That is clearly neither fair nor transparent. Will the Government amend the Bill so that it is clear that the 20-week clock will only start to tick from the moment it is clear that both members of the couple know about it?
Secondly, in order for the 20-week reflection period to work well, it is plainly important that a good part of the 20-week period, if not all of it, is made a litigation-free zone, so that the focus can be on mediation. That must extend to ancillary financial litigation. Will the Government amend the Bill so that at least most of the 20-week period, if not all of it, is made a litigation-free zone, including ancillary financial litigation?
Thirdly, will the Government consider changing the point in the process at which the partner seeking the divorce should lodge their statement of irretrievable breakdown? Having it at the start, as the Bill proposes, makes it extremely difficult for the other partner to respond constructively if the intention is for a period of reflection.
Finally, mindful of the importance of the 20-week period referred to in clause 1 for reconciliation and mediation, what new provisions will the Government make to ensure that all couples are offered effective reconciliation and mediation specifically during this period, in an effort to increase the numbers of divorce proceedings that are not concluded, thereby increasing the number of marriages saved?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr McCabe. I put on the record the fact that the Opposition do not object to this legislation, which is one reason why no amendments or new clauses have been tabled. We welcome this piece of legislation, which has for many years been required and called for, and it is great that the Government have brought it to the House. This morning, Members heard from experts in this area who deal with these types of cases day in, day out, and it was quite clearly their unanimous opinion that this legislation is important, welcome and needed.
No one goes into a marriage expecting it to fail, but it is an unfortunate reality of life that couples may choose to go their separate ways. It is even more unfortunate that, when they pursue a divorce, they do so under archaic law. Among the five permissible grounds for divorce are adultery, desertion and unreasonable behaviour, which involve the allocation of blame to one party. That is unfair and could damage a couple’s children as well.
For decades, campaigners have been asking for this change to the law. This situation was crystallised recently in the case of Owens v. Owens, which ended up in the Supreme Court. Sir James Munby, then president of the family division of the High Court, said in 2017 that
“the law which the judges have to apply and the procedures which they have to follow are based on hypocrisy and lack of intellectual honesty. The simple fact is that we have, and have for many years had, divorce by consent, not merely in accordance with section 1(2)(d) of the 1969 Act but, for those unwilling or unable to wait for two years, by means of a consensual, collusive, manipulation of section 1(2)(b).”
We heard about that this morning. It is interesting that in Scotland, where the requirement for fault has been abolished, only 6% to 7% of divorce applications are based on fault, yet in England 60% are based on allocation of fault. That raises the interesting question, as Professor Trinder said this morning, of whether we are worse behaved than the Scots. It is not that. In Scotland, people do not have to go through the intellectual dishonesty, as Sir James Munby said, of creating issues of fault.
The Minister will set out the law as it stands, but I point out that if a couple want to divorce in less than two years, they need to start pointing the finger of blame, with one citing the other’s adultery, unreasonable behaviour or desertion. That in itself causes unnecessary strife. However, in most cases, neither party contests a divorce, so they can go their separate ways.
The need to apportion blame, and ratchet up the acrimony, is one of the main reasons why the Opposition want to see an end to fault-based divorce law, not least because of its impact on children. The ground of unreasonable behaviour, for example, requires allegations from one spouse against the other that are hardly ever challenged and can be exaggerated, which will inevitably exacerbate the relationship between the parties and make arrangements regarding children even more difficult. It is therefore unsurprising that most of the legal community supports the changes. About 1.7 million people have assigned blame in a divorce process. Many need not do so, so again legislation is very important.
The Law Commission has called for the current fault-based system to be scrapped. In fact, it recommended that in 1996. It has made several criticisms of the current law, of which many hon. Members are aware, but perhaps they are worth repeating because some believe, and indeed the hon. Member for Walsall North alluded to the fact, that somehow such reform will lead to more people filing for divorce. In a number of cultural and religious communities divorce is actually very easy but the divorce rate is tiny. I do not accept the suggestion of a correlation and that the divorce rate will spike because of a change in the law. It is about societal issues or particular challenges in people’s lives and communities. I do not think a correlation can be seen between changing the law and an increase in the rate of divorce from looking at other countries, cultures and societies where there is a more open or easier divorce system.
One of the problems with our current system is that the law is confusing and misleading. It says that the only ground for divorce is that a marriage has “irretrievably broken down,” but that can be proved only in one of five ways, three of which involve fault. Therefore, the fact used as the peg on which to hang a divorce petition may not in any way bear relation to what caused the breakdown in marriage. The law also pretends that the court is conducting an inquiry into whether and why the marriage has broken down when in fact it does no such thing. Even if a petition is defended, it requires only that the fact is proven.
The current system is discriminatory, favouring those who can afford to live apart for two years before seeking divorce, with the remedies that go with that. Many poorer parties, including many who are victims of domestic violence or abuse, cannot afford to separate unless and until they get orders, which are obtainable only on divorce. Matrimonial home orders under part IV of the Family Law Act 1996 were originally intended to provide a sensible interim housing solution, but the provisions of our current law exclude parties from being able to access it.
The current system is unjust. Adultery and unreasonable behaviour suggest that one party has to blame the other, but many of the technical bars under the old law were abolished. There is little or nothing to stop the more blameworthy one relying on the conduct of the less blameworthy one. It is difficult, expensive and may be counter-productive to defend or cross-petition to try to put matters right.
On a point of order, Mr McCabe. It is customary to give a lengthy thank you to all those who have participated in the Bill. I fear I would end up making a speech longer than any other speech if I tried to do so, but I thank all Members for their contributions, even if they have been silent contributions of good will emanating towards us. That is good enough for me.
More importantly, I thank all the officials who have worked hard on the Bill for many months. They may even be disappointed that we have taken only 47 minutes to progress it through Committee. I will put them at their ease, because if it is only 47 minutes, it means there is far less chance for me to muck it up at any stage. There will be a sigh of relief at the Ministry of Justice, I suspect, that I have been hidden from scrutiny by taking a bit less time. I thank all my officials and I thank you, Mr McCabe, for chairing the Committee so adeptly. You have facilitated our rocket-powered canal boat moving down the great canal of British history through one more set of locks.
Further to that point of order, Mr McCabe. I place on record my thanks to all Members who have attended today and those who spoke in the Chamber on Second Reading. I thank you, Mr McCabe, for your excellent chairing of this Bill Committee.
It is certainly close to a record, Minister, but it must be down to the quality of the Committee.
Bill to be reported, without amendment.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
Nigel Shepherd: The short answer is that the average time that court officials—this is now mostly done by legal advisers in regional divorce centres—have to scrutinise the evidence is four minutes per case, broadly. Although current legislation says that the court has a duty to investigate the situation as far as is reasonably practicable, the reality is that our process does not allow that to happen at all. If a petition goes in on behaviour, and it is not defended, the legal advisers looking at it are simply checking to make sure that the jurisdictional grounds are correct, and that there is the necessary legal connection between the behaviour and the breakdown—in other words, that the boxes are correctly ticked.
There is no investigation and, what is worse, if the respondent to that petition writes five pages on why it is all untrue, if it is not formally defended with an answer and a fee paid of £200, it is ignored. That is the worst of all worlds, because respondents, particularly those without the benefit of legal advice, think that they are saying that they disagree with something about the petition, but that nobody is listening. That makes it even worse. There is no realistic scrutiny at all in the system. It is impractical to have that scrutiny, because who knows really what goes on behind the closed doors of a marriage? That is why this change is fundamentally so important; it means that there is no pretence anymore. It is intellectually dishonest at the moment; that is what Sir James Munby said in the Court of Appeal in the case of Owens. We would be getting rid of that dishonesty and acrimony at the start of the process.
David Hodson: I can add to that as a part-time judge at the central London family court. Until two or three years ago, when we had divorce centres, part-time judges had to do four or five of these special procedures every time we sat. It took a matter of moments. We would give careful consideration to the document that had been drawn up by the legal adviser as to whether there were any procedural errors. We would look at the unreasonable behaviour allegations, but I find it difficult to remember in recent years—we have softened as the years have gone by—anything having been sent back. Sometimes it is so minuscule, but if it is undefended, it will go through.
The 1996 legislation had a knock-on effect. If Parliament decided in 1996 that no-fault divorce was appropriate, though Parliament subsequently did not bring it into force, should judges be turning around and saying no? Owens was a distinctive case. It was a defended case, whereas if it is undefended, as Nigel said, it will go through. That makes it a crying pity that people have got to go through that process in the first place.
Q
David Hodson: One of the Law Society’s concerns is the court fee. I appreciate that this is not in primary legislation, but may we express our concern? At the moment, it is £550.
That is a lot.
David Hodson: For that, you get a few minutes—I will not say moments—of judicial time, and there is perhaps some scrutiny of the procedure. We hope to go to a no-fault divorce process, mostly online, with almost no or no judicial involvement, because there will not have to be any.
The £550 is very unfair on the poor—for those on welfare benefits, there is an allowance, but it is very unfair on those above that. The great worry has to be that we have a lot of limping marriages in our society between people who just cannot afford that. There are no financial claims—there is no money to make any financial claims—but they just cannot afford to bring the divorce forward.
The Law Society—Resolution would probably agree—would like to make a plea: can the Ministry of Justice review the fees? Again, that is for a secondary instrument. We have some of the highest in the world, probably second or third highest, and they are much too high. Particularly with the new process that will be going through, there is not that cost to society or to the Ministry of Justice of running it, so can we make the plea to reduce the fee of £550, so we do not have marriages out there that came to an end a long time ago?
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberThis debate has seen considered and valuable contributions. There have been many points of agreement across the House—and obviously some differences.
I thank all Members who participated, starting with the hon. Member for Newton Abbot (Anne Marie Morris), who is not in her place. She talked about the importance of marriage while recognising the challenges, issues and realities when people get married and things go wrong. She referred to the 50:50 rule for dividing property, about which there is some misunderstanding. As I understand it, from the many years I studied family law, the 50:50 rule applies to people with long-lasting marriages—30 or 40 years—and maybe several children. Often with short marriages, the rule does not apply. The crux of her argument, however, was that marriage is important but that things can go wrong.
The hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) talked about the importance of the Bill and why the law needs to change.
I thank the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), who earnestly talked about the importance and stability of marriage for people and children. I know she holds these views very dearly, as do many across the country and the House. I also thank the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) for his many contributions in the form of interventions.
Finally, I cannot finish without mentioning the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill), the Chair of the Justice Committee, who, with all his different hats on, gave a very considered speech about why the Bill is necessary. He made the particularly important point that many people were having to exaggerate, lie or invent fault to be able to expedite a divorce. We should not be making our citizens do these things.
In an era when we better understand the complexities of human relationships and the freedom that people deserve to decide how they live their lives, it is clear to most of us that the old and outdated divorce rules need to change. That was crystallised and highlighted by the case of Owens v. Owens, to which the shadow Lord Chancellor and the Chair of the Select Committee referred. Mrs Owens asked for a decree nisi, which was not granted, even though the Supreme Court accepted that the marriage had irretrievably broken down. The law said that there had to be an attribution of fault to one of the parties, so the law as it stood did not allow the marriage to be finished. Subsequently, the then president of the family division, Sir James Munby, said that this aspect of law and procedure was based on
“hypocrisy and a lack of intellectual honesty”.
The Supreme Court also said that it was not for the judiciary or the courts to change the law but for Parliament. I am pleased that Parliament is debating this and that the law will be changed for the betterment of all.
As the Nuffield Foundation put it, the reliance on fault and blame as a key pillar of divorce law is
“at odds with the thrust of wider reforms in the family justice system, which have focussed on reducing conflict and promoting resolution”.
We understand that 1.7 million people currently use fault to get a divorce when fault is not the reality. Given that 90% of family lawyers represented by Resolution say that the current law makes it harder to reduce conflict between ex-partners and that 69% of the public are in favour of no-fault divorce, the time is right to change this archaic rule.
I would, however, like to raise some omissions from the Bill and to hear what the Lord Chancellor has to say. Divorce procedure is just one part of the wide tapestry of our legal system. As has been raised in debate with Ministers, this tapestry is fraying due to decisions made by their party over the past decade. The reforms we have discussed today are welcome attempts to reduce unnecessary conflict and prevent needless emotional stress for divorcing couples and their children, but in other areas of justice and family policy this does not seem to be an issue of concern for the Government.
The deep cuts to legal aid mean that the legal representation required to reach the right divorce settlement will be available only to those with the funds to pay for it. A lack of legal support makes it difficult for people to understand the intricacies of important changes such as these and therefore will reduce the positive impact of the no-fault divorce procedure, which we welcome today. Did the Lord Chancellor agree with the Law Society when it said the Government should, alongside these reforms, reintroduce legal aid for early legal advice to support divorcing couples and help them to reach the best possible settlements for themselves and their children?
I strongly support what my hon. Friend is saying to the Lord Chancellor. One of the major concerns I hear in my constituency surgeries is about individuals seeking advice concerning contact with children and matrimonial proceedings. It is a very emotive subject, as we heard earlier in the debate, and needs to be addressed.
I thank my hon. Friend for that helpful intervention. I hope the Lord Chancellor was listening to that and to everything else we are saying on the Opposition Benches.
More could be done in the Bill to support the most-at-risk people seeking a divorce. The Bill does not remove the bar on petitioning for divorce in the first year of marriage, despite charities and campaigners pointing to the impact this will have on victims of domestic abuse. We know that big life events such as marriage or pregnancy are hotspots for abuse and controlling behaviour to begin or increase. That first year of marriage is for some not a honeymoon period but a nightmare. It is clear that in 2019 we should not be trapping people in potentially dangerous situations because of an outdated law that does not give people the agency to get themselves out. Can the Lord Chancellor explain the rationale for this omission?
Overall, we welcome the reform, but we urge the Government to put this progressive shift into the context of the wider changes required to our justice system. There is so much more to do to ensure that anyone going through a tough time, such as a divorce or other conflict, has a positive and fair experience while seeking justice. I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will deal with some of the questions we have raised. That said, this is a very welcome Bill, which is why the Opposition support it.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome the Minister to his new position. We worked together on the Justice Committee and, as always, he is eloquent in trying to convince the House to pass something that I am sure, in his heart of hearts, he knows is not correct. As a lawyer and advocate, he must understand the concerns that have been raised, especially in the other place. I am sure he is well aware that the other place voted against this statutory instrument and the rebellion included a number of Conservative Members of the House of Lords. I ask him, even at this stage, to reconsider whether this statutory instrument should be approved.
The Opposition understand the sentiment and the principle behind this statutory instrument in terms of assisting public inquiries into groups where spent convictions may or may not be relevant. The request came from Sir John Mitting, the chair of the inquiry into undercover police operations from 1968 onwards, including whether the police were justified in launching undercover operations against this particular group.
The request makes sense because one of the issues in this particular undercover operation is whether any of the convictions occurred because of agents provocateurs, which is where a person has committed an offence because an undercover police officer somehow encouraged or facilitated it, or put the idea in their head. The concept of agents provocateurs is a complex legal issue, and it is clear from some of the allegations that this may have happened in this set of undercover police operations, so the convictions of some of those who may give evidence will be pertinent and relevant because they might shed light on the actions of the police officers. Therefore, we understand that for this particular inquiry this approach may be relevant and spent convictions will add a critical context to the inquiries that we would not have under the current system. However, we believe that the wording of this proposal is far too wide and is not properly structured. As my colleague Baroness Chakrabarti said, it seeks to use
“a sledge-hammer to crack a walnut.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 May 2019; Vol. 797, c. 1786.]
It is too far-reaching and too blunt to be effective without seriously threatening rehabilitation and privacy.
The powers granted by the order would mean that the spent convictions of past offenders under investigation would become unspent in terms of policing and inquiries, and, crucially, may become unspent in the public eye. It completely goes against the spirit of rehabilitation that served sentences may be reopened for potentially unconnected investigatory purposes. In this information age, the checks and balances proposed by the Minister, whereby an inquiry’s chair may rule spent convictions inadmissible, may come too late to protect the individual; this information may be raised and shared by counsel in countless different circumstances before the chair can decide whether it is relevant and, therefore, admissible. Furthermore, given the speed at which information travels on the internet, any ruling by a chair could become a bit of a lame-duck decision, because the information would probably have already reached the public sphere. Indeed, Lord Hogan-Howe, the former Metropolitan Chief Commissioner, pointed out that the internet hive mind may mean that
“the public may know more than the inquiry chairman.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 May 2019; Vol. 797, c. 1791.]
In essence, once the information is out, the information is out, and it is unrealistic to expect every subject of this instrument to have the energy, time and resources to lodge a judicial review or request a restriction order to maintain anonymity. In any case, a restriction order from the chair of the inquiry would be likely to come too late to prevent the damage being done.
It is worth noting that, since the introduction of the 2005 Act, there have been only 23 public inquiries and this is the first time that a provision such as this has been proposed. Surely we should not be setting such a troubling precedent because of one inquiry; 22 others have not sought such blunt and excessive powers. It would only take someone to overlook a potentially minor and irrelevant conviction in their past and fail to mention it to their representative for their credibility and witness evidence to be undermined. This really calls into question how far the justice system will try to support rehabilitation, when spent convictions can be brought into public inquiries with limited oversight.
The checks and balances proposed seriously threaten article 8 of the European convention on human rights because they presume, first, that information regarding spent convictions will not reach the public eye without prior approval and, secondly, that the subjects of the instrument have the time, energy and resources to ensure that their rights are properly protected. I re-emphasise this point because we must recognise that, with the legal aid cuts and all the other cuts that have been carried out, and with a lot of people who are involved in these inquiries often not being financially solvent, trying to get legal assistance to maintain a judicial challenge or review is almost impossible. The lives of these ordinary people are being made even worse with this particular legislation, given the wide nature of its current format; people’s rights will not be properly effected.
At the heart of our criminal justice system is a need for the rehabilitation of convicted offenders, and the need for fair and transparent public inquiries is of real public interest. If the alternative to this overreaching order is to individually discuss the procedures of each public inquiry, that is a use of parliamentary time that accurately reflects public interest; I would much sooner the House establish the admissibility of spent convictions in terms of a public inquiry in advance of each inquiry.
Again, I say to the Minister that it is still not too late to take this SI away and reconsider the issues we have raised. We are talking about real issues, such as the fact that vulnerable witnesses may be dissuaded from giving evidence to a public inquiry for fear that a spent conviction for a minor offence committed when they were a child could come up and be in the public domain, and their families could find out, as could prospective employers. The consequences for those victims may be enormous, so they may not wish to engage in any particular inquiry, in which case we would not be being very effective. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee expressed serious concerns about
“the breadth of the power and what impact it might have on the lives of those who have been rehabilitated.”
As I have said, we successfully tabled a motion of regret about this SI in the other place. We gained sizeable support on this matter, including from some on the Conservative Benches. A Conservative peer, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, who is a member of that Committee, said that the concerns of the Committee and the other House were raised with the Ministry of Justice but its response was “largely fanciful” and “not realistic”. We therefore ask the Government and the Minister to seriously reconsider this SI, for all the reasons that have been mentioned.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend is absolutely right to highlight the importance of forensic science in convictions —increasing the number of cases that go through court and result in convictions—and therefore of the role it plays in reviewing cases post-conviction. If he wishes to write to me with further details of specific issues in that context, I will be very happy to write back to him responding to those points.
Both the Charlie Taylor and the Lammy reviews recommended changes to our criminal disclosure system for young people. On each count, this Government decided that they knew better, leaving us with one of the most punitive approaches to youth justice in the western world. Now that the Government have lost their case in the Supreme Court, will they recognise that our current disclosure system for children is outdated, ineffective and cruel?
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberOf course, the Attorney General has done a review in relation to disclosure more broadly. I am very happy to meet the hon. Lady to discuss any ideas that she would like to put forward on those matters.
Since 2016, payments to consultancies by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service have shot up from £3 million to £20 million. The Government appear to think that expensive private consultants are the solution to all their problems, even in the face of spiralling costs. Does the Minister really believe that the way to increase access to justice is to hand over yet more public money to private consultants at a time when our courts are facing unprecedented cuts?
We are in the process of a £1 billion court programme—one of the most ambitious across the world in relation to how we transform our justice system—and it is appropriate that we get the best and right advice to manage that process. Sometimes we find that it is cheaper to instruct experts than it is to develop that expertise internally, so we use consultants where appropriate.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I thank the Justice Committee, its Chair and the hon. and right hon. Members who serve on it for the excellent report they have published. I also thank the Committee and House staff who do the painstaking work of writing the report and the recommendations. I was a member of the Committee from 2010 to 2015. I can honestly and sincerely say that today’s debate has been one of the best I have attended in the nine years that I have been in Parliament. Every Member of Parliament who has spoken today has spoken with real passion, conviction and sincerity and with a real desire to change a very important aspect of people’s lives. It will be a pleasure to be able to say that we were in the debate today.
Before I go into the details of my speech, I want to acknowledge all the Members who have contributed. The hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) eloquently went through the whole report and explained in detail for us, and those watching, what the report said. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) for his review, which I will refer to later in my speech, and for the work that he has done. The report emphasises the high proportion of BAME children in the criminal justice system. The hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) talked about the impact of housing. Let’s face it: to have a decent life you need a decent home to live in. That is such an important factor.
My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham West and Penge (Ellie Reeves) talked about the importance of employment and jobs, without which it is difficult to survive in life. I am so pleased that the hon. Member for Banbury (Victoria Prentis) was able to hotfoot it from the Chamber. Clearly, with the work that she does, she is in the thick of it, as they say. Her contribution was absolutely brilliant. She went through the whole system and what needs to change. Like my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham, she eloquently put the case for race and class and the effect that it has on whether people end up in the criminal justice system. The hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) alluded to the issue of class and he also made a succinct point. I understand that everybody has commitments and I want to acknowledge their contributions.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (David Hanson), a former Justice Minister, talked about education and employment, which are crucial. He touched on whether a conviction should be disclosed when someone applies for a job or whether it should be left to the end of the process, after someone has been considered on merit. That is an important point. Last but not least, my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens South and Whiston (Ms Rimmer) rightly talked about children in care. A lot of the children also have mental health issues and autism. We know that the child and adolescent mental health services in our local authorities have long waiting lists for children to be assessed. As she was speaking, I was reminded of a case that I had when I was a prosecutor many moons ago.
A young man of 14 or 15 was in a care home. He attended court to give evidence against his mother’s ex-boyfriend, who had been charged with indecent assault on his younger sister. He turned up at the court and, on seeing him, his mother went over to him and punched him in the stomach twice, and he burst into tears. He went back to the care home and set light to a curtain. He quickly realised what he had done and tried to put it out, but the fire brigade was called. That goes to exactly the point that my hon. Friend the Member for St Helens South and Whiston talked about. Because the young man was in a care home, the police and prosecuting authorities got involved. I wanted to recommend no further action on the grounds of public interest. Sadly, my boss overruled me and said that we must proceed, so we came to a compromise and she at least agreed to a caution. That illustrates the point that if that incident had happened at home, the outcome would have been different; sometimes when children do things in anger at home, nothing happens.
For me, listening to all the speeches today has been important, and I hope the Minister and the civil servants are paying attention. I will now return to my scripted speech.
At the heart of any proper youth justice system is an attempt to rehabilitate an offending young person while protecting their fellow members of society. Although those two aims do not need to be opposed to each other, a knotty issue they throw up is deciding what information those with convictions and cautions must disclose later in life. In many cases some disclosure is essential to ensure that offenders are not exposed to vulnerable people in dangerous circumstances. Unfortunately, it is increasingly clear that our balancing act between personal rehabilitation and societal protection is worryingly skewed in favour of the latter. In fact, our wrong-headed, punitive approach means that we might be shooting ourselves in the foot, as forcing people to disclose largely irrelevant information years after a crime often deepens pre-existing social divides, as we have heard.
As was noted in both the 2017 Justice Committee report and the Government’s response last year, forcing people to disclose their criminal record is a power that needs to be carefully applied. Past convictions can have an impact on a person’s capacity to find housing or to take up a place at an educational institution, and can have an impact on finding work. Sadly, by forcing people to reveal past convictions years after they have served their time, we throw up barriers and prevent them from becoming fully integrated members of society. For some, it leads to long periods on benefits, at significant cost to the state. Even worse, many return to the kinds of criminal activity that we should have provided every opportunity for them to escape, and end up in prison, at even greater cost to the national purse. Locking individuals into negative patterns is particularly foolish and cruel when they committed crimes as young people.
We are well out of line with other countries internationally. A 2016 report by the Standing Committee for Youth Justice compared the treatment of childhood criminal records across Europe and America and found that the system in England and Wales was distinctly more punitive. A criminal record acquired by a child in England affects them longer and in more restrictive ways than in any of the other jurisdictions studied. Not only do we criminalise an unusually high proportion of children, but the processes by which those criminal records can be hidden from employers are arcane and inflexible.
The 2017 Justice Committee review provided persuasive justification for wide-scale reform, listing 21 conclusions and recommendations. Although the Government’s response addressed each of the recommendations, I am afraid that in too many areas they chose to kick the can down the road. One justification for that was that they chose to take their case to the Supreme Court to defend our system of disclosures, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham said, the Government or the MOJ should have followed the Court of Appeal and dealt with the issue and not pursued it to the highest courts. It comes as no surprise to those of us who agreed with the findings of the original Select Committee report that a Supreme Court judgment this year found that our disclosure scheme is contrary to article 8 of the European convention on human rights on two key fronts: the rule that requires the automatic disclosure of all convictions where a person has more than one conviction, and the requirement that some childhood cautions be disclosed indefinitely. Importantly, we have a mechanism by which previous offences can be taken off DBS checks—a process termed “filtering”. However, that process also has major flaws. The current filtering will remove a spent childhood conviction from a DBS standard or enhanced certificate only when five and a half years has elapsed since the date of the conviction. It must also be the individual’s only offence and it must not appear on the list of exempt offences that will never be removed from a certificate.
I—and clearly, going by what they have said today, other right hon. and hon. Members—urge reform on all three counts. Although five and a half years is significantly less than would be required for an adult—there is an 11-year wait before filtering can take place—that is still an incredibly long and pretty much arbitrary period. It means that it is difficult for 19-year-olds to get jobs because of offences—often minor—committed at the age of 14. That makes no sense, especially when they have not committed other offences. During those years, most of us are growing, changing and maturing, and the law should be flexible and forgiving enough to recognise that.
The fact that convictions remain unfiltered if there has been more than one conviction or when the conviction is on the exempt offences list also holds back young people at a crucial time in their lives. The offences include those involving a degree of violence, drugs, and some sexual offences. That is a broad range of offence categories, and putting them on an unfilterable list prevents individual discretion and creates a single rule totally at odds with the need to achieve personalised restorative justice for young people. We need a child-specific system that recognises that the offences in the list are diverse and complex.
I very much agree with the hon. Lady. Does she agree that her point about the need for a different approach for younger people is strongly reinforced by the conclusions in the February 2017 Law Commission report, which states precisely that the system bears disproportionately harshly on young offenders, and argues that some offences that might justifiably be non-filterable for adult offenders should be filterable for young offenders? She says that a different approach is needed, and the commission also said so.
I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman and with the Law Commission’s recommendation. I hope that the Minister and Ministry of Justice civil servants will also be listening, and will be reminded of what the Law Commission said. I hope they will take those things on board and that we will not find that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Delyn said happened when he was a Minister, civil service-speak means we do not quite know what will happen.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham has spoken about the Lammy review, which he carried out. I will touch on it, because it is important. I am worried that its findings, which are relevant to the issue that we are discussing, are being ignored, as many other recommendations have been ignored. When we look at how unequal outcomes are for BAME children and for those in care when they pass through the criminal justice system at a young age, it is clear that there is something particularly wrong about tying them for the rest of their lives to crimes that they committed as children—worsening pre-existing inequalities. I hope that the Minister will be able to throw some light on that, and suggest what actions the Department is taking on issues set out in the Lammy review.
Another issue emphasised by the Select Committee was the need to recognise that young people mature at different rates up to their mid-20s—a point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Tottenham. The right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Theresa Villiers), who is not in her place at the moment, concurred and reinforced the point. While I welcome the Government’s acceptance of that basic fact, will the Minister clarify what concrete steps are being taken to enshrine that recognition in law? Further, now that we have received confirmation that the Government’s disclosure rules are in breach of international law, can we have some clarity on the timescales on which the Government hope to bring their regulations up to date? Scrapping the current exempt list and the two-offence rule would be great first steps and I should like to know whether the Minister recognises that the Government need to make up their mind, make up for their inaction and move quickly. Finally, do the Government plan to take steps to introduce a review mechanism by which individuals can apply to have their convictions filtered? That would allow for a genuinely case-by-case approach to justice.