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Viscount Hailsham
Main Page: Viscount Hailsham (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Viscount Hailsham's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 days, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberI am grateful to my noble friend for that rhetorical question, to which I feel the Committee knows the answer. I understand all the points about the backlog, the costs and our concern to speed up justice, which victims are crying out for, but, at the same time, a vindication for someone wrongfully accused or for victims who have been denied that vindication of their rights means that juries really matter to ordinary people in this country. I know that noble Lords in this Committee understand that, because a brief conversation with any number of their friends, neighbours and family members who have nothing to do with the legal profession, or perhaps any other profession, will indicate as much.
My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness; we agree very often on matters of this kind, and I particularly agree with the two amendments that she has tabled and to which I have put my name. I will make two brief preliminary points before I come to the substance. First, I apologise that I was not able to participate at Second Reading. I am sorry about that, but I had long-standing commitments which would have been very difficult to break. Secondly, and quite differently, although I have practised at the Criminal Bar off and on for around 40 years, I have to admit that I have not been in a criminal court since 2010—although I still practise as a legal assessor to regulatory panels connected with healthcare professionals—so I do not have a professional or technical interest to declare.
At the heart of this matter, which I think my noble and learned friend Lord Keen will address at some length, is the stand part debate on Clause 1. I shall support my noble and learned friend if he moves a Division on Report, because my view is that it should not stand part. He will argue the reasons, which he set out very fully at Second Reading, and I will therefore summarise them only with the greatest of brevity.
The right to jury trial in “either way” offences enjoys widespread professional and public support. There is very little appetite for change. To change it therefore requires the most compelling of reasons, and I suggest that they do not exist. There is a backlog, but jury trials are not the principal, primary or, perhaps, only significant cause of it. As my noble and learned friend said at Second Reading, when he posed a number of questions, the backlog was caused by a number of factors which have now passed: Covid, for example, or, I regret very much to say, the industrial action among junior members of my profession, of which I deeply disapproved. But there were other considerations: the failure of Governments, who I supported, to provide adequate funding for judicial time and appropriate courts. Administrative action could be taken to remedy this backlog, but we are taking measures to remedy it to which the backlog is not related. In any event, it is not self-evidently sensible to displace a backlog in a Crown Court to one in a magistrates’ court. That seems to me rather surprising. So I am against Clause 1, but I have to recognise the possibility that this Government will seek to ram it through Parliament. Therefore, it is the Committee’s business to try to remedy the faults in Clause 1 or to correct its omissions.
I come first to Amendment 1, so clearly moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It cannot be right for a disparity to exist between a defendant with a long string of previous convictions, who is likely to get a lengthy sentence, and a defendant without convictions who is a person of good character. The former is likely to get a jury trial; the person of good character is likely to be denied it. That cannot be right. The noble Baroness has put down a very clear amendment to address precisely that point, and I was pleased to support it.
Amendment 3, to which the noble Baroness also referred, concerns the right of appeal. I know the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, shares her views on this. I would like to think that, on Report, we could make common cause together and put it to a Division. However, if the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will forgive me one point, her amendment on appeal is somewhat narrowly drawn. I would prefer to incorporate the concept of fairness and the principles of natural justice, but that is a matter for subsequent discussion.
I am a great supporter of Amendment 2 from the noble and learned Lords. It would be very sensible to introduce the concept of guidelines, because otherwise we are likely to see a judicial postcode lottery. We all know from our experience in politics that a postcode lottery will become deeply unpopular, so the concept of guidelines is a very good one, subject to this proviso: I do not read in the amendment, or in anything naturally associated with it, the suggestion of judicial input. I would like to see judicial input into the guidelines. I shall support all these amendments should they be pressed to a Division on Report.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 2, which stands in my name and those of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Bellamy, who very much regrets his inability to be here today.
As its explanatory statement makes clear, this is a probing amendment. It is made in circumstances where the time has come for some further structural change to the cases that go to the Crown Court and those that go to the magistrates’ court. The backlog in the Crown Court has the effect of denying justice, particularly to victims. I do not believe there is any alternative to dealing with the backlog. When I have encountered it in the past, I have found that it gets worse if it is not dealt with, because it has a spiralling effect as people game the system. There is nothing new in making an adjustment, and it is a question of detail as to how this adjustment is best made. I am very grateful to the Minister for his engagement with us to discuss the various amendments put forward in our names.
The purpose of Amendment 2 is to probe two areas. The first is to work out the way of getting the greatest possible consistency across the country on which cases are retained in the magistrates’ courts and which go to the Crown Court. The second is an issue that has not much been debated so far: are the cases that are retained in the magistrates’ courts to be decided by three magistrates or by judge alone—that is, by a district judge or deputy district judges? Before I turn to that in a little more detail, it is important to explain the background. Because these reforms have been put forward without the very detailed and careful analysis that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, put to his recommendations, at present it is not possible to work out the best way to proceed.
I will briefly explain the present position. The position as to allocation is set out in Section 19 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, which simply requires the court to decide whether it is more suitable for trial on indictment or summary trial on the allocations issued by the Sentencing Council. Those allocation guidelines are drafted against the current sentencing powers of the magistrates. In essence, they say that cases should be tried summarily unless the outcome would clearly be a sentence in excess of the court’s powers, after taking into account personal mitigation and potential reduction for guilty pleas. The guidelines go on to say that cases of unusual factual complexity should be tried in the Crown Court. Those are exceptions—the rest are to be tried in the magistrates’ court, if they are within its sentencing powers —and such exceptions are likely to be narrow and rare. So at the moment the guidelines are structured so that the potential sentence is determinative of the way the case should be tried. The question is: is that the appropriate way to continue?
The second issue is the distribution of work in the magistrates’ courts. The way in which work is distributed in the magistrates’ court is governed by the listing practice direction issued by the Lady Chief Justice last month. That direction followed what was, in essence, the product of work done in 2012 by a group chaired by Lord Justice Gross, with representatives of the magistrates present and the senior district judge in HMCTS. It sets out the presumptions for trial by district judges, including long cases. It also provides for a share of routine business and for the occasional sitting of mixed Benches.
The question that arises is: should we say that these are matters for the Sentencing Council and for the practice direction issued by the Lady Chief Justice, or should Parliament prepare guidelines and issue those through the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor? At the moment it is not possible to be more specific about the way in which the guidelines might operate. We do not know at present the basis of the figures that have been used to calculate the savings in time. Is it assumed that magistrates will operate the existing guidelines, primarily determined by the sentencing powers that they have? Secondly, the distribution of work between the magistrates and the district judges and deputy district judges is not clear, because although large numbers of magistrates are being recruited, there is a substantial recruitment of deputy district judges and district judges. Both those issues are important. We need to decide whether guidelines should be made.
In her Amendment 1, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has proposed that matters such as good character should be taken into account, but there may be other matters that need to be looked at. For example, one needs to bear in mind that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, recorded at paragraph 38 of chapter 5 of his report, there were concerns about how ethnic minorities would view changes of this kind. That would be a very difficult matter, if it was a matter to be taken into account, to be dealt with other than by Parliament.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 9, I shall also speak to a number of the other amendments I have tabled in this group. I apologise for the fact that there are 14 such other amendments. I will therefore, I am sure, be forgiven if many of my arguments are summarised very briefly and if I rely on the explanatory notes that appear on the Order Paper.
Behind this set of amendments, of course, is one’s anxiety about “judge only” trials. That is indeed a very important issue that we are going to address, I think, in group 6. I share the very serious reservations about “judge only” trials, but the arguments will be deployed in group 6. I shall not deploy them now. But it would be prudent, against the possibility that the Government will press ahead with “judge only” trials in certain circumstances, for this Committee to consider how faults and omissions within the present Bill can be remedied. That is what my raft of amendments is designed to achieve.
I will start with Amendment 9, which is the lead amendment in this group. It is designed to ensure that “judge only” trials can be ordered only when all the defendants on the indictment are charged with the relevant offences. It seems to me to be rather hard that a defendant who is not himself or herself charged with a relevant offence should be swept up into a “judge only” trial, because other defendants are. That seems to me to be bad news and I would like to see it addressed by my amendment.
I turn to Amendments 14 and 15. I am deeply concerned with the proposition that a “judge only” trial can be ordered when a court is satisfied that, because of the length or complexity of the trial, it is more appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury. As a Minister of very long standing—I was a Minister for 13 years—I know that the word “appropriate” is a weasel word. It is used by Ministers, the Executive, civil servants and, no doubt on occasion, the judiciary to cover anything they want it to cover. It is a bad word to use and it is not, in my view, a judicial word.
What I have tried to do in Amendment 14 is ask myself what one is trying to address. I suggest what one is trying to address is when the length or the complexity of the case is such that it cannot reasonably or fairly be tried. That is different from “appropriate”. It is a judicial concept, a concept of justice, which I very much hope would commend itself to your Lordships’ Committee.
Rather similar observations arise in the context of my Amendment 15. Looking at the substantive bit of the Bill, we see that judges are required to determine whether it is not in the public interest to hold a jury trial. But, again, the “public interest” is not really a judicial concept. What we should be doing is determining in this context whether it is fair to a defendant to have a jury trial. That is what Amendments 15 and 16 are designed to do. I hope that that might commend itself to the Committee.
I am conscious that I am standing on a raft of many amendments, and I do not want to weary the Committee. So, I will just summarise in brief the other amendments in my name, pointing to the explanatory note wherever possible. Amendment 18 is a procedural amendment designed to ensure that a defendant can make full representations, oral and written—a hearing if required—when this issue has to be determined. That seems to me to be wholly fair: very difficult to argue against, I would think.
Amendment 19 concerns the filter of the Lord Chief Justice or a nominated judge; this, again, is a very useful protection. Amendments 20 and 28 concern rights of appeal—I know the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is at one with this. Amendments 23 and 24 deal with the circumstances in which an order can be revoked. Again, we should be considering questions of fairness and justice; that is what my amendments are designed to do.
I come to Amendments 26 and 27. These, though procedural, are very important. The purpose is to ensure that a defendant has an early statement of the outcome of the proceedings. In the general run of cases, the defendant is entitled to know the outcome within not more than seven days of the conclusion of the proceedings, and they are entitled to a full and proper written judgement. These procedural requirements are not apparent on the face of the Bill.
Having gone through my amendments at a bit of a scamper—it was a broad raft and I am conscious that 14 amendments is an awful lot—I conclude by expressing the hope that some at least might find favour in the eyes of this Committee. I beg to move Amendment 9.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
The noble Lord makes an interesting and important point, and we can certainly discuss it. However, as I have said, the Government’s view is that the designation of these trials is protected very carefully and thoroughly, and that should be sufficient.
My Lords, after 40 years in Parliament, I have come to revere the guidance given by St Brevita and the wise words of Father Concision, both of whom are doubtless known to the present occupants of the episcopal Bench, so I shall confine myself to three points. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support. I always welcome it; we very frequently think along the same lines. Secondly, I am glad that Members of your Lordships’ Committee focused on the words “appropriate” and “public interest”. That is a matter of some concern and perhaps one that we should refer to later. Lastly, these amendments—all the occupants of the raft—raise a number of serious issues which we may well revert to on Report. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to my two noble and learned friends who have just spoken and to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for their comments in support of the principles behind these amendments. I should say that my Amendment 32 goes further than the other amendments because it is intended to allow such applications to be made by a defendant for trial by judge alone, and not just in lengthy and complex cases.
My amendment asks for a new right to apply for—not to select but to apply for—trial by judge alone. Many noble Lords who have spoken in the debates today and at Second Reading strongly support the right to elect trial by jury. If we have such enthusiasm for the right to elect trial by jury, why not allow defendants to elect trial by judge? That would set out a level playing field. It seems entirely logical and something that we have overlooked. Speaking only for myself to this extent, I have been waiting a long time to find a Bill in which the proposal in Amendment 32 is in scope. It is not entirely dependent—it is not dependent at all—on the rest of the Bill, but here we have the vehicle to create this new right that would save time and money and give a greater sense of justice.
In a very dusty basement in my inn of court, Gray’s Inn, there were two shelves full of the manuscript notes of every single case that I ever did from 1971, when I started practising at the Bar. Later, they were reduced to computerised form, which really put me in my place, because the expert who reduced them, every word of them, managed to put them on a single stick, which I have in a drawer at home. I am able to access this very personal library of all the cases that I have done. I do not do criminal trials any more, but one thing that I always used to do was to make a note at the end of my notes about what I as an individual—not just as a barrister but as a person—thought was the right or wrong result of the trial. On a number of occasions, only a few cases but significant ones, I placed words like, “Wish we’d been able to have judge alone”. In a number of others, I placed the words, “Made a mistake —we did not apply for trial in the magistrate’s court and should have done”.
There are many cases where trial by judge alone, or indeed trial not by jury but in the magistrate’s court, is not only in the best interests of the defendant—and probably of the witnesses and victims, because of the reduced machinery required in presenting the evidence in court—but is actually in the interests of justice. In one of those cases, an appeal took place, in 1988—16 years after I was junior counsel in a murder case in which our client was convicted. There were no court records whatever, but I was able to provide from my library of notebooks the only record that the Court of Appeal could use. I had to redact a limerick that I had written about a rather pesky judge, but otherwise it was the record of the case. It was not a case in which I would have advised asking for trial by judge alone, but I had written at the end, “Maybe without the jury he would have been acquitted”. It took 16 years for him to be acquitted by the Court of Appeal, and there are such cases.
I have great respect for jury trials. As a prosecutor or as a defender, if you like that sort of thing, there is nothing like making your story the one that the jury hear, enjoy and adopt. An advocate in jury trials is working with a jury; it is quite a different discipline from working with a judge. When you have a trial in front of a judge alone, you have a much more mechanical process—that is not to criticise judges for being mechanistic, but it is just a fact—in which the judge looks at the issues and tables them on one side of the page, as it were, and on the other side of the page tables the issues that have to be determined by the court. I am looking at the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, opposite, whose husband is an experienced and highly respected judge in the north-west of England.
I have great respect for jury trials, but for some cases there are disadvantages about them. There is the potential lengthening of the case in front of a jury. I once did a case in London in which my client, a respected chartered accountant, was accused of fiddling the VAT in relation to some somewhat dubious services provided in a basement club somewhere near Soho. He had to wait a very long time to be acquitted in a case in which the judge quite plainly, if trying the case alone, would have said, “There just isn’t the evidence here. Why have we wasted all this time?”
As well as potential length and complexity, there are issues that have already been mentioned such as the publicity, the unforeseen consequences of publicity and, above all, the absence of written reasons for a verdict. As I mentioned at Second Reading, in Northern Ireland there are courts that deal with cases—admittedly, a special kind of case, cases involving terrorism issues and matters arising from the Troubles—that are heard by judges. I reviewed them for the Government during the time that I was Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. The acquittal rate in those courts in Northern Ireland is higher than the acquittal rate in front of juries in so far as you can describe comparable cases. With a judge in an appropriate case, you have a reasoned judgment explaining why the judge has reached a particular decision. That is applicable especially in historic sex cases and in accountancy-heavy cases, and, as Northern Ireland has shown, it can often leave a defendant more satisfied that he or she has had a fair hearing.
I suggest that this is a simple amendment which would probably save some time, which would ensure that the right to jury trial was extended or removed in a proper way and which would add something creditable to our system which is replicated in some Commonwealth countries that have almost exactly our systems of trial.
My Lords, I want to make only two brief points. First, I find the arguments made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, very compelling. I would like to associate myself with them, and I very much hope that the Minister will give them serious consideration. Secondly, and differently—I hope it will not be thought by the Committee that I am making an unfair point—I revert back to group 4, where we discussed the meaning of the words “appropriate” and “public interest”. I am sure the Minister will note that, in Amendment 32, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, he used the phrase “interests of justice”, and in Amendment 22, the same phrase was used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. Neither used the word “appropriate” and neither used the words “public interest”. I wonder why.
My Lords, I find myself in the quite awkward and unhappy position of having serious reservations about amendments proposed by noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who I so respect.
In the context of the proposed scheme, whereby there will be no right of election in “either way” cases for jury trial any more, it is proposed that there should be a right not to elect for a “judge alone” trial but to apply for one. The arguments have, of course, been put eloquently. However, I ask the Committee to think about how this might be received. I do not need to pepper my brief comments with references to particular high-profile cases, recent or historic, but how might it be received if, for example, in a high-profile case of misconduct in public office, a sex-offence case, or another case involving people of significant standing, around which there perhaps has been some publicity, they apply for a “judge alone” trial rather than face 12 members of the public? How might that be received in such a high-profile case, in the light of what I suggest is a current crisis of trust in democratic and rule-of-law institutions in this country? I ask the Committee to reflect for a moment on how it might go down.
Further, in the interest of protecting the judiciary, how might it be if, in response to one of these applications in a high-profile case—it could be fraud, misconduct in public office, sex offences, et cetera—it is decided to welcome that application and agree that the case be heard by a judge alone? In the case of a high-profile acquittal, with which no doubt the defendant would be very happy, what protection will there be for the judge alone, and for the judiciary in general, given the context of how the public have been feeling in recent years about the institutions of our state? I ask the Committee to pause and reflect on that. That is my concern.
My Lords, I wonder whether at this point I might make a general point about the issues we are discussing. If ever I have seen a case of having your cake and eating it, this is it. Having listened to the Minister’s response to my Amendment 32, it is breathtaking to see the Government’s response to that compared with Clause 3. The amendment of Section 42A in Clause 3—on page 6 in subsection (4) —allows the prosecution and the defendant an opportunity to make representations. So the Government want to allow the defence, if they feel like it, to make representations that there should be a trial by judge alone. As it happens, I am with the Government on this; I agree with them on Clause 3 in broad terms. But I suggest that calling on principle as the justification for what they are doing in relation to these sorts of cases and the broader range of cases I referred to in my Amendment 32 is pretty hypocritical.
My Lords, I will say a very brief word or two on the Clause 3 stand part debate. I know that my noble and learned friend will advance the arguments very fully, so I will say only some very brief words. I am very concerned about the concept of a “judge only” case. I have practised off and on at the Bar for 50 years. I am bound to say that I was only ever a jobbing barrister; I do not claim to have the legal distinction of many noble and learned Lords in this Chamber. But, when I started at the Bar, and it truly was 50 years ago, there were many judges whom one did not want to appear in front of. One went to great effort, if one could, to move the case from judge A to judge B, because one knew perfectly well that judge A was likely to convict. That may well have improved a great deal, and I will accept that it has, but judges, even in an ideal world, become case-hardened, and one needs to keep that in mind.
I have one further point, if I may. I still practise as a legal assessor to regulatory panels connected with the healthcare profession. Those panels comprise three panellists. It is very much in my mind that frequently it is the collective decision of three that leads to a fair decision. Had there been just one panellist, I am conscious of many cases where I think I would conclude that the judgment was unfair—so I am very much in favour of collective decision-making. That is what a jury is about and not, of course, what the single judge is about.
Viscount Hailsham
Main Page: Viscount Hailsham (Conservative - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Viscount Hailsham's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 days, 22 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will move my Amendment 29 and address the question of whether Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. Amendment 29 seeks to remove the Henry VIII power to amend the list of offences considered complex and lengthy by only secondary legislation. To change the cases for which a “judge only” trial is permitted with a statutory instrument would, we suggest, be a completely unacceptable step and the Government have set out no reasoned basis for why such a step would be necessary.
The report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was published last week. It described the power to amend part 1 of the new Schedule 3ZA as an “inappropriate delegation of power” and recommended its removal. Indeed, as evidenced by the number of Peers tabling amendments to that effect, there is cross-party consensus that this is not a good use of delegated powers. Allowing the Secretary of State to add any offences to this list and to broaden the list to include crimes beyond the current scope of fraud and financial crime is a significant power that requires more scrutiny than the affirmative procedure for secondary legislation would provide for. The fact that there are only very narrow exemptions for the offences that could be included is also highly concerning.
At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne referred to this as “a Joseph Stalin clause”. He was certainly right to point out how far this power extends. I hope that the Minister will listen closely and take account of the concerns expressed by noble Lords on all Benches.
Even if we were to support removing juries from fraud cases, which we do not, your Lordships cannot be asked to effectively scrutinise such a significant provision when we have not been told of its scope. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have two comments. I entirely agree with what my noble and learned friend said. Although I always welcome the affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure, one has to recognise that the affirmative procedure does not provide proper parliamentary control for the fundamental reason that statutory instruments are not amendable. I have never, in 40 years, understood the reason of principle why statutory instruments are not amendable by the House. I recognise that it is for the Executive’s convenience, but that is not the same thing.
Once more I find myself in unity with the Privy Council Bench opposite. My friend may be only a mere Viscount but I join him in his campaign against Henry VIII. I declare an interest as a council member of Justice and a member of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee. In that committee, the spirit of the late, great and learned Lord Judge does not just sit but is always in the room. He would do this better, more swiftly and more powerfully, but the committee was in total unanimity when it found this to be a completely inappropriate delegation of power. The committee said:
“It confers on the Secretary of State a significant power to amend, by order, principal aspects of the policy contained in the Bill. We are unconvinced by the Government’s justification for the power in the Memorandum”.
It should be removed. It was not a debate about procedure but a unanimous assertion that the power should be removed.
I am conscious that, on an earlier group, my noble friend the Minister made an argument that is often made in relation to Henry VIII powers: “This is the 21st century. There is technology, there is AI, so further offences might be created that we might want to add to this list that would potentially be appropriate for a trial by judge alone”. With respect, those offences would likely be created, I hope, by new primary legislation. That legislation could deal with the appropriate mode of trial. This is a completely unacceptable power.
I advise the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 34 because of pre-emption.
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendments 69, 71 and 72. My concern is that already expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Once Clause 1 is enacted—if it is—and the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts are increased, there will be a very large increase in the business of magistrates’ courts and they will be overwhelmed. The effect of the amendments I have tabled in this context is to limit the ability of the Government to implement the clauses unless the magistrates’ courts have increased the number of magistrates to 21,000, which seems to be the figure generally accepted as sufficient to handle the increased business. My amendments also provide that, in the event of the number of magistrates falling below 21,000 for a sustained period of three months, the statutory instrument will lapse. The purpose is to try to ensure that there are sufficient magistrates. I have grave doubts that there will be, and that is why I tabled these amendments.
My Lords, I oppose Clause 5. It will allow the Government to increase the maximum custodial sentence that magistrates can impose from 12 months to 18 or 24 months. As we have heard, it will also give the Secretary of State the power to make that change through regulations rather than through Parliament, which would allow us to consider the matter through primary legislation. My concern is about not just the length of sentences but the combined effect of this clause and Clause 1. The Bar Council has warned that this is a “dangerous experiment”, particularly at a time when prisons are already at capacity and the backlog in magistrates’ courts is growing. Increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers does not address the underlying problems of an underresourced justice system.
Like many other noble Lords, I am also concerned about the delegated powers in this clause. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has specifically recommended that Clause 5(1) be removed. Its chair warned that the clause oversteps the proper limits of ministerial discretion. We should not hand the Government such a significant power to change sentencing limits without proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have not made a convincing case for this change. If they think magistrates should have greater sentencing powers, why will they not justify that proposal to Parliament instead of leaving the decision to future regulations? I told the Minister that I would not say this, but, while he is extremely emollient in trying to calm our fears, I am afraid he has not done so. The Government are faced with opposition from all around the Chamber. The Greens are linking with the Conservatives, Labour and the Lib Dems. Might that give the Government pause to think that perhaps they have got it wrong?
Amendment 35 and my consequential Amendments 58, 70 and 71 would replace Clause 5 with a single, simple provision. It removes the Henry VIII power of the Secretary of State to change by regulations how long a magistrates’ court can send someone to prison for, for an “either way” offence. At Second Reading, I said that I could not support expanding magistrates’ sentencing powers. This amendment offers the Government a constructive alternative, taken directly from the review on which this Bill is built.
Paragraph 14A of Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 is a Henry VIII power. It allows a Minister to rewrite an Act of Parliament by statutory instrument, subject only to a negative procedure. That is appalling. We are not a democracy when that sort of action gets taken. Since 2022, the limit has been raised from six to 12 months, cut back to six months in March 2023 and raised to 12 months again in November 2024. That is three changes in under three years, driven by Crown Court backlogs one year and prison capacity the next. Clause 5 widens this even further. It allows the Secretary of State to set the limit at 18 or 24 months, up to double today’s maximum—again, by regulations.
The Minister told your Lordships’ House at Second Reading that the Government intend to raise the limit to 18 months next year, depending on Royal Assent. That is not what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, recommended. In recommendation 15 of Part 1 of his independent review of the criminal courts, he recommended that the power to change magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed and that the 12-month maximum should be made permanent. My amendment, therefore, does exactly what recommendation 15 asks.
I absolutely despair of this Government, in the sense that they seem to be backtracking on all the democratic ideas they had when they were in Opposition. I sat here and listened to all the colleagues here on the Labour Benches when they were in Opposition, saying wonderful things that I could agree with. Now, I just see the other Tory party sitting over there. It is very depressing to sit over here these days.