Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I acknowledge the Minister’s willingness to engage with Members across the House to explain the Government’s intentions with regard to this legislation. I express the hope that he will exhibit an equal willingness in answering the very particular questions that noble Lords have now posed with respect to the provisions of the Bill.
I propose that Clause 1 not stand part of the Bill. That clause will remove the right of a defendant to elect for a jury trial in the Crown Court in the case of “either way” offences. I must observe that I was concerned by the remarks made by the Minister for Courts and Legal Services in the other place. She said that
“we need a better system, one in which courts, not criminals, triage cases”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/1/26; col. 284.]
Her characterisation of all defendants as criminals is concerning in itself. It suggests, I hope inadvertently, that Ministers have lost sight of the essential principle that a defendant is presumed innocent unless and until they are found guilty. That principle cannot be lost sight of simply because of a backlog in the Crown Court. I hope the Minister will be able to clarify the remarks made by the Minister in the other place and to reassure us that the principle of presumption of innocence is not being pushed aside just for the benefit of convenience and timing.
On these Benches we will always stand up for the ancient right to trial by jury. It has been a fundamental protection against arbitrary justice for hundreds of years, and it has stood the test of time. More generally, the Bill seems to be driven more by ideology than by evidence, and that is a point to which we will return. Throughout the 2000s, the then Labour Government brought forward a number of Bills that sought to undermine the right to trial by jury. This House opposed such measures then, and we on these Benches oppose such measures today.
The Government have failed to justify their proposals with clear evidence. Indeed, I noted the observations of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the Government are pressing ahead without evidence. The noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, noted that the evidence in support of these proposals is “painfully thin”.
We have tabled this stand part notice because we need to hear from the Government what evidence there is that these proposals will reduce the backlog in the Crown Court system and are the only necessary route to achieving such a goal. In the absence of that evidence, we remain sceptical about the impact of these proposals. If the Minister could point us to the relevant evidence in his closing remarks, I would be grateful.
Is there evidence that these proposed reforms will reduce the Crown Court backlog in one year, in five years, in 10 years or, more likely, never? If the backlog is cleared, does the Minister accept that the Bill should be repealed? If the size of the backlog is the sole reason the Government are seeking this legislation, surely the absence of a backlog will render it unnecessary. Will the Minister answer that point?
In addition, it seems likely to us that these measures will simply move the backlog from the Crown Court to the magistrates’ court, as other noble Lords have observed. Clearly, other groups in Committee will address the issue of the magistrates’ courts, so I will not linger or expand on that point at this time. However, how much do the Government expect these measures to impact the magistrates’ system and what measures are being taken to avoid that system being overwhelmed by these measures?
Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, alongside my noble friend Lord Hailsham, probes whether the representations of defendants with good character who have not previously been convicted of a crime could be given greater weight. We acknowledge that this is an interesting point, and the noble Baroness is right to question how the treatment of defendants will differ based on their criminal history. It is important to consider whether a defendant with previous criminal history is more likely to receive a jury trial, so I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Amendment 2, in the names of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Burnett and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy, seeks to question what guidelines will be provided as to the allocation of “either way” offences. Clearly, Clause 1 contains a substantial change to the way in which such offences may be tried and there has to be a consideration, if Clause 1 stands, as to how such guidelines would operate.
Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, again signed by my noble friend Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seek to question the appeals process. I hope that the Minister will again consider those points and the concerns that have been expressed regarding the appeals system.
Finally, Amendment 5 in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton seeks to exempt offences relating to contested speech from the provisions of this clause, so that a defendant’s right to elect for a trial by jury can be maintained. My noble friend makes compelling arguments defending the importance of freedom of speech, and today was no exception. Although I acknowledge his concerns, it might be unusual to make an exception for only one type of offence, but he raises an important point in recognising the value and importance of the jury. I hope again that the Minister will respond to the points made.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Baroness Smith of Cluny) (Lab)
My Lords, this has been an important and informative debate about a fundamental part of the Bill. Given that there is opposition to Clauses 1 and 2 standing part, I will take a moment to set out the principal reasons for them and deal with some general points that have been brought up in the debate, and then I will deal with the specific amendments.
Clause 1 will remove the defendant’s ability to choose to elect for a Crown Court trial for all triable “either way” offences so that venue decisions are made solely by the courts. In doing so, it redresses the balance between victims and defendants by ensuring that they are based on the seriousness and complexity of the case and not the defendant’s preferences. Clause 2 is consequential on Clause 1 and ensures that the written plea procedure will operate consistently with the wider reforms once commenced.
We have heard contributions about confidence in the justice system, particularly in the context of jury trials. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, have raised these issues, while the learned and noble Lord, Lord Keen, raised the presumption of innocence, another foundational principle. The Government are concerned about public confidence, and that is a reason why we are bringing forward the Bill. Those clauses will ensure that Crown Court time is prioritised for the most serious and complex cases, ensuring a more proportionate use of limited court resources and sparing victims unnecessary delays.
Magistrates’ courts are fair, robust and independent, and these clauses recognise that. Safeguards remain: both prosecution and defence can make representations on venue, and defendants retain full rights of appeal to the Crown and High Courts. Fundamentally, the Government do not believe that a defendant should be able to override the court’s judgment and secure lengthy delays in the hope that victims and witnesses walk away and the case falls apart before it is heard.
Some general points that have been raised include concerns about magistrates, particularly the complement of magistrates. This was raised by my noble friend Lady Bi, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. We are increasing the numbers: we have a target to nearly double the complement of magistrates from a historic low in 2022 by 2028-29. Noble Lords will hear more detail about this from my noble friend Lord Lemos during this Committee, so I will not spend time on it just now.
I wish to address the request for evidence from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen—indeed, it was raised by more than one person. Again, my noble friend Lord Lemos will deal with this subject in more detail, but detailed modelling has been published by the Ministry of Justice showing the impact on the backlog of the measures. I am happy to point the noble and learned Lord in its direction and share it with him.
Before I turn to specific amendments, I want to address the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: what is the collective term for noble Lords of nobility and learning? I wonder if I might suggest “a wisdom” of noble Lords, or indeed “a wisdom” of noble Baronesses —but perhaps others can suggest different terms as the debate goes on.
Amendment 2, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, would require the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the allocation of “either way” offences. He acknowledged that this is a probing amendment. I will address the points that he has raised, and indeed I hope to continue the conversation with him beyond this. The noble and learned Lord raised the question of judicial input. The Sentencing Council is currently the body that issues the guidance that is used. That council is chaired by judges; it has judicial membership and indeed it consults judges. It is of course an independent organisation, which is an important safeguard.
The further question that was raised was: should the sentence be determinative of the factors taken into account? Sentencing is not the only factor, but I acknowledge that it is significant. The noble and learned Lord raised important points that were raised also by the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald and Lord Marks. This debate is a good opportunity for us to consider these issues, and I would be happy to continue the conversation after today’s Committee.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I am just concerned to question whether the noble and learned Baroness is right in her argument that allocation decisions regularly made by the magistrates are the end of the matter, because, of course, in cases triable either way, the defendant has the right of election. The magistrates may say, “Well, we take the view that this case can be tried by the magistrates”. The right of election then supersedes that to give the defendant the right to choose jury trial, so it is wrong to say that the final allocation decision is taken by magistrates. I do not know whether that does not make a difference. I suggest that it does make a difference to the question of whether there ought to be a right of appeal.
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
I wonder if it is simply a question of how you analyse the sequence of the events that take place in court, but I would argue that the allocation decision is made by the magistrates. The fact that it can be displaced by the right to elect does not in any way take away from the steps and the process that those magistrates have to undertake to make the allocation in the first place. The right to elect does not suggest that the allocation decision was wrong; it is simply a right to access the Crown Court. It is not implicit in a defendant exercising that right that the allocation decision was wrong. In my view, the magistrates are already undertaking the task that they will and are doing it very ably.
Magistrates also already make important venue decisions in other contexts, including youth cases, without a bespoke right of appeal against those decisions. Defendants will retain the right to appeal against any conviction or sentence in line with the reform process established by the Bill. The Government therefore do not consider a new appeal mechanism to be necessary or proportionate.
Amendment 1, tabled by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, seeks to give greater weight to the representations of defendants of good character, and where they are likely to receive a sentence of between one and three years if convicted. The Government do not consider there to be a principled basis for this. The court must apply the statutory allocation criteria as set out by the independent Sentencing Council in every case and, as I have mentioned, provide reasons. Our view is that the allocation should be determined by the seriousness of the alleged offending, not by the personal characteristics of the defendant. Previous convictions are an established aggravating factor and it is therefore right that they are relevant to the assessment of likely sentence and case seriousness. There is also no statutory or straightforward definition of good character. This amendment would create different allocation outcomes for defendants based on their personal characteristics, departing from the principle that defendants should be treated equally before the law. I note the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and my noble friend Lady Levitt in that regard and align the Government with them.
Finally, on Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, we are absolutely committed to upholding freedom of speech. It is a fundamental right and a defining value of our open and diverse society, and our legislation reflects this. The Sentencing Council’s allocation guidelines already take account of the seriousness and complexity of cases, and creating offence-specific exemptions would introduce a different allocation framework for a particular class of offences. This would undermine the principle that the venue should be determined by the court on the facts of the case rather than by the nature of the offence. A key safeguard is a fair trial before an independent court, not a defendant’s ability to choose the venue. Defendants charged with these offences will continue to receive fair and impartial justice, regardless of where the case is heard. This amendment would not support the aim of the Bill, which is to ensure that cases are heard in the most appropriate venue, based on their seriousness and complexity, preserving Crown Court capacity for the most serious and complex cases.
This is a Bill to deal with the acute crisis in our justice system in England and Wales, which the Committee is well cognisant of, but it is also a Bill based on principle. The findings of the review from the noble Lord, Lord Leveson, are much more than a set of practical fixes; they are principled proposals that make sense quite separately from any crisis. Removing the right to elect is the correct thing to do in principle, and I say that as someone who has conducted many criminal trials in a system that has no such right but none the less manages the important rights of defendants as well.
I thank all Members for these amendments. They are an important part of this debate, and I hope the explanations I have given of the Government’s position will allow your Lordships to support these clauses standing part of the Bill.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
Before the noble and learned Baroness sits down, might I raise one point with her? Alluding to the right to elect for jury trial, she described it as the means to “secure lengthy delays”. Are the Government seriously contending that the right to jury trial should be removed because they perceive that it is being abused at the present time?
Baroness Smith of Cluny (Lab)
I am not sure that that is what I did say; if I did, let me correct the record. The purpose of these clauses is to ensure that Crown Court time is prioritised for the most serious and complex cases, ensuring a more proportionate use of limited court resources and sparing victims unnecessary delays.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am so grateful to the Committee and to all who spoke on such important matters so thoughtfully and temperately. In particular, I am grateful to the noble, learned and distinguished silks from north of the border, who echoed that tone on both Front Benches. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for his support, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for reminding us of the importance of consistency and of a potential role for guidance, and for his gentle wake-up call to those who celebrate not having judges sitting alone via the front door that that it is a possibility via the back door with the Bill in its current form.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames—another distinguished silk—for his riposte to the suggestion from a few noble Lords that character does not matter, and that I have launched an affront to universal human rights by suggesting that it does. Forgive me, but character does matter. Nobody said that character should not matter in sentencing; it is a crucial factor. As long as sentencing is important, decisive or determinative in mode-of-trial decisions, I am afraid that character will matter. At the moment, it will matter to the detriment of people facing a potential first-time conviction. That is the logic of the Bill in its current form. To say that character is just a characteristic, such as hair colour or even race or sex, is a mistake that will warrant further discussion and thought from all noble Lords and my noble friends in government. With that, for today at least, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for raising this issue in Amendment 4. As is the case with a number of his amendments, I note he has the support of other noble and learned Lords—the noble and learned Lords, Lord Burnett of Maldon and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, as well as my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy. It appears to us that the Bill will necessarily require some reassessment of summary offences, so we welcome the point that the noble and learned Lord has raised with the Government.
Should this Bill become law as it stands, even without the original clauses that the Government have already removed, we will be making a significant, indeed fundamental, change to the way many offences are tried. Indeed, should the regulation-making power under Clause 5(1)—that is, the power to increase the magistrates’ maximum sentence—be implemented, we will see a great many more cases, some relating to serious offences, being tried in the magistrates’ courts on a summary-only basis. If the Government are going to proceed with these plans—and we sincerely hope that your Lordships’ Committee is able to demonstrate to the Government how flawed some of them are—Ministers must, as an absolute minimum, undertake a reassessment of the offences that may be tried as summary-only offences.
That said, we have some concerns about subsection (2) of the proposed new Section 22B of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. That subsection would require the Secretary of State to specify those offences that are triable as summary-only offences. As noble Lords across the Committee will appreciate, whether an offence is triable as a summary-only offence is defined in primary legislation, and it would be concerning to establish a regulation-making power for the same purpose, unless, of course, the regulations made under subsection (2) were merely intended to be descriptive of existing laws set out in primary legislation. Perhaps the Minister can clarify that point.
On Amendment 51, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, with regard to out-of-court settlement, where such settlements are appropriate then they should be considered, and they might well help to reduce the backlog that already exists in both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court. That said, an additional requirement placed on the courts through primary legislation may not be the best way to promote appropriate out-of-court settlements. I suggest that that is a matter for further and more detailed consideration going forward.
We are a little curious about the proposal that courts be permitted to adjourn a case for a period of up to 28 days to enable an out-of-court settlement to be considered. It appears to us that there is room for that to be abused by more cynical defendants who may find themselves in court. We would have to consider what impact that might have on further delays in both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court; as all lawyers will know, an adjournment for a period of up to 28 days can transmogrify into something materially different.
Having said that, we understand the force of the point being made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and, while it may not be a matter for primary legislation, it is surely a matter for further detailed consideration.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
My Lords, as this is the first time I have got to my feet, I thank all noble Lords for meeting me and for the various discussions we have had. In relation to this amendment, I thank the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Burnett, Lord Phillips and Lord Bellamy, for meeting me yesterday specifically to talk about their amendments. I hope we can continue that conversation.
Amendment 4, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, seeks to reclassify certain triable “either way” offences to summary-only, in line with the recommendations, as he said, of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, in his independent review. The Government considered the recommendations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, but concluded that they would not result in significant sitting day savings and would carry risks for the wider justice system and public protection. I know noble Lords will say in response to that that the Government are obsessed by backlogs and sitting days, and I shall address that point in my remarks in a moment.
Offences that are triable either way are, by definition, treated as sufficiently serious to warrant the possibility of longer sentences and broader police and prosecution powers, including longer investigatory time limits. None of the noble Lords who have spoken to this amendment has addressed this specific point and it is one that we will need to return to in the discussion of reclassification.
Reclassifying offences as summary-only—as I said, the Government have considered this—would restrict important operational powers and reduce maximum sentences for those offences to six months. This would be particularly concerning in domestic abuse cases, including breaches of protective orders. We do not believe that it would be right to constrain the justice system by restricting the investigative period when the protection of the public and victims is at stake. Tackling violence against women and girls remains a top priority for the Government, of course.
Nevertheless, we recognise the benefits of retaining more cases in magistrates’ courts because of their efficiency, which is why, as we discussed on the first group, we are bringing forward measures to remove the right to elect and to increase magistrates’ court sentencing powers, which we will return to later today. This will deliver many of the same benefits as reclassification without undermining the protections and powers attached to offences that are triable either way.
I want to address comments made by several noble Lords, on this group and the previous one, that the Government’s only concern is the backlog. I want to be completely clear, as my noble and learned friend Lady Smith was: of course the Government are committed to fair trials. That principle is completely intact and inviolate in the Government’s thinking on this. Our concern with the backlog is perhaps better expressed as being about waiting times and their impact on victims’ experiences. The backlog is a problem for administrative reasons, but it is much more important for victims of crime.
We do not think, as a matter of principle, that defendants should choose their own mode of trial. However, I am happy to continue the discussion with the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Leveson, and others, on the suggestion for reclassification.
On Amendment 51, I recognise that the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is to increase use of out-of-court resolutions, which can provide an effective and robust alternative to prosecution. I do not think the phrase “out-of-court resolution”—or, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, the word “diversion”—will travel very well on the streets. We want to ensure that, in the circumstances described by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, justice is done rapidly for the vulnerable people he spoke about, including vulnerable parents. My preferred description, for further revision if necessary, is “rapid justice” that addresses the root causes, which was the point the noble Lord made. I agree entirely with his comments about parents.
The Government are not suggesting, and would not support any suggestion, that the use of out-of-court resolutions amounts to decriminalisation or making those offences irrelevant. That is not our view. Keeping your children from school is an offence but we think it can perhaps be addressed in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, referred to youth justice. The Minister in the other place, Jake Richards, is concerned about addressing root causes in his work on youth justice. I thank the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, for their reference to restorative justice, which is an important area where much could be done.
Let me set the position out clearly for the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The Government are committed to strengthening the use of out-of-court resolutions and diverting low-level offenders away from court with conditions that address the underlying causes of crime and therefore reduce the risk of future reoffending. However, the police are already required to assess whether the public interest can be served by an out-of-court resolution instead of prosecution. Prosecutors also make this assessment when making prosecution decisions. Courts also already have the power to inquire about an out-of-court resolution and CPS guidance provides that, where the prosecutor in court concludes that such a resolution is appropriate, the matter should be referred to the police and an adjournment sought.
An additional duty on the court would therefore duplicate these processes—I think this is the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was making—and may add unnecessary delay. However, as outlined in the Government’s response to the recommendations from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, we are urgently examining the legislative and delivery framework for out-of-court resolutions to ensure that it supports our ambitions and that such resolutions are considered whenever appropriate.
Although I cannot at this stage support the amendments in this group, I was grateful for the opportunity to meet the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and others to have a constructive discussion on these issues. Although the Government have, for the moment, reached a different conclusion on these proposals, I look forward to continuing those discussions and to further discussing the question of out-of-court resolution with the noble Lord, Lord Marks. With these reassurances, I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I thank all who have participated in this short debate. There are no easy answers to dealing with the backlog. There have to be compromises along the way, which we have discussed in the previous debate and in this one. We appreciate the problems that arise by classifying as summary-only, as regards the way that the police should be required to act with greater expedition, but we did not intend by this reclassification to suggest a reduction in the maximum sentence, which would be below two years if the Government take those powers under the Bill or one year if they do not. However, I am very grateful to all who have spoken about it and I hope we can look at this again.
I am most grateful to the Minister for our discussions yesterday and our continuing discussions in relation to finding an answer, because what is critical is that we end up with something certain, so that we produce the same result in every postcode, and that we do not get appeals. We cannot have appeals on the question of allocation.
Also, on the suggestion by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on out-of-court resolution, I think I can recall this subject going back at least 20 years. One of the problems has been in getting some system to bring together the magistrates, the police and the prosecution service. One suggestion—this was probably 15 or 20 years ago —was that magistrates should play a role in looking at the way in which local police forces dealt with out-of-court disposal. That was never proceeded with. There are lots of other ideas, but it is plainly part of the system of justice that we get out-of-court disposals correct. It is not decriminalisation; it is finding a means of an effective deterrent for future criminality, rather than sending people into the criminal justice system. I welcome the proposal raised by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and hope we can carry it further. With those observations, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, my answers are always unambiguous.
Amendment 6, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, would apply Crown Court legal aid financial eligibility rules and pay Crown Court-level fees to providers for triable “either way” offences, even if that case takes place in the magistrates’ court. Amendments 8, 67 and 75, from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would extend the same financial eligibility criteria which were applied at the Crown Court to proceedings heard at the magistrates’ court, and provide for these changes to come into force before implementation of the Bill’s wider provisions. The noble Baroness laid some emphasis on that, as did the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and I heard the strength of feeling on this subject at Second Reading.
These four amendments are not limited to triable “either way” offences impacted by the removal of the right to elect a Crown Court trial. The effect would therefore be to apply Crown Court rules on legal aid financial eligibility to all defendants and cases in the magistrates’ court, including all summary-only cases. Under current financial eligibility rules, the majority of defendants—something that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, referred to—charged with triable “either way” offences would be eligible for legal aid at the magistrates’ court. That tells you something about the social make-up of who appears in our magistrates’ courts.
For individuals who do not financially qualify for legal aid, there are already measures in place in the magistrates’ court to provide support. The hardship review mechanism can provide legal aid to some individuals who fail the means test but face higher than usual outgoings. In addition, unrepresented defendants may access the free magistrates’ court duty solicitor scheme, which may provide legal representation at the first hearing for those charged with an imprisonable offence.
None the less, we have been listening carefully to the concerns raised at Second Reading around eligibility and the potential impacts of reform on litigants in person, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. We have accepted in principle the recommendation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, to increase the legal aid income thresholds at the magistrates’ court. In so doing, we recognise the importance of ensuring that legal aid is available for those who need it most, and the financial eligibility thresholds reflect this. I think that is fairly unambiguous. Once court reforms introduced by the Bill have been fully implemented, we will be better placed to take final decisions on income threshold levels, subject to future funding decisions and operational considerations. I have no doubt at all that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others will press us on that point, but I am repeating the formulation that I used at Second Reading. We are also examining the measures that are currently in place for litigants in person and considering additional options for support.
I think noble Lords would acknowledge that amendments to align Crown Court and magistrates’ court eligibility would add complexity to the magistrates’ test through the introduction of a contributory system which assesses income and capital. This may negatively impact efficiency in the magistrates’ court and create additional administrative burdens. I spent some time this morning reading about how this works, and it was interesting.
In relation to remuneration for legal aid lawyers in Amendment 6, I am afraid that, with regard to the point made by my noble friend Lord Shamash, I do not think that we will be paying legal aid lawyers the same rates as lawyers in the City are paid—but then the job is much more interesting. I say that as someone who worked in the City for quite a long time.
Fee schemes are specific to the court where the case is heard and are designed to reflect the differing processes and nature of work in the magistrates’ court and Crown Court. The magistrates’ court fee scheme is designed to be simple to administer and for providers to use, reflecting the greater speed and case volumes through that court. There is also a non-standard fee route for cases in the magistrates’ court, which ensures that work on complex cases is appropriately remunerated. I hope I have set out where the Government stand on that and demonstrated that the Government have listened. With that, I would ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken of the importance of this point—the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald, Lord Shamash, Lord Jabbar, and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. Although we welcome what the Minister has said, we all regard it as imperative that, if the more serious work is being transferred, that should be done simultaneously with a change to legal aid. That is critical. We cannot wait, because it will cause problems in the magistrates’ courts and with magistrates’ courts recruitment—a point particularly made by the noble Lord, Lord Shamash. It is getting very much more difficult to find people prepared to do magistrates’ courts solicitors’ work. Of course, the Government could not afford to pay City rates; that is out of the question. But at least pay a decent rate for the hard job people do, to encourage them to come into that part of the profession. I agree with the Minister: much of the work is far more interesting than working on infinitely uninteresting schemes in the City.
I wish also to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her amendments and also for pressing the point about getting eligibility brought into line. Maybe the answer is to look at the complexity and see whether that can be simplified as well. With those remarks, I thank noble Lords and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I have lent my name to Amendment 10, but I recognise that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has provided what he describes as a raft of amendments which are intended together to establish a bulwark that will give a stronger safeguard against the removal of jury trial. In that sense, they are a secondary defence to the provisions in this Bill. We would rely on the primary defence, which is the retention of jury trial as it presently exists, but I acknowledge the reasoning behind my noble friend’s amendments—I just hope they will not be required because the Government will see sense with regard to the primary position.
We will come on to discuss related issues in the next three groups, and in particular whether we should see these fundamental changes to the justice system coupled with Henry VIII powers as reflected in Schedule 1 to the Bill. This is an ecosystem. All these elements are interconnected and if you interfere with one, you have an impact on the other.
Finally, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the important distinction between public interest and the interests of justice. I would add only that the interests of justice can be seen as being orientated towards the interests of the defendant in a way that the public interest will not necessarily be, and therefore that distinction is important.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for meeting me beforehand and setting out his views in trenchant form, not just on this set of amendments but on the Bill as a whole. All these amendments seek to add new safeguards to Clause 3: “judge alone” trials for complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases. That clause already contains robust and careful safeguards, and it is important that I go through them. Cases can qualify for the policy only if they involve a scheduled fraud or financial offence and do not involve excluded homicide or indictable-only sexual offences. That is a very important exclusion. A preparatory hearing must have been ordered for the case, something that can happen only to manage exceptional seriousness, complexity or length—to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made. The case must be sufficiently complex or lengthy that jury trial cannot be in the public interest, and judges can decline to make an order for any other reason where jury trial is more appropriate. It is Crown Court judges who will be making these decisions and the Government’s view is that we trust them to apply the test set out by this policy properly.
Amendment 9 would allow an order to be made only when all co-defendants in a multi-defendant case were charged with an eligible fraud or financial offence. Amendment 10 would mean that every defendant would have to be charged only with fraud or financial offences. Ancillary offences, such as theft, would make a case ineligible—the link with theft is important. Defendants involved in the same alleged criminal schemes are often tried together, even though they are charged with different offences. Defendants in large-scale fraud and financial cases often face related charges, such as theft, that should, rightly, not be scheduled offences on their own. Severing charges, as these amendments suggest, or defendants, would not in the Government’s view be an efficient use of court time by requiring another separate trial. These amendments could encourage artificial charging decisions or unnecessary changes to the indictments to circumvent the statutory test.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, and certainly before the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, stands up, I would just question the Minister’s assertion that, because there is an appeal against a conviction that would continue, Amendment 25 is otiose or not needed. Under new Section 42A(5) on page 6 of the Bill, there is no right of appeal against a decision to make or not to make an order. If it is intended that a decision to make or not to make an order under this section could be raised as a ground of appeal in the Court of Appeal following conviction, how is that clear in view of the bar on appeals under new subsection (5)?
Lord Lemos (Lab)
The noble Lord makes an interesting and important point, and we can certainly discuss it. However, as I have said, the Government’s view is that the designation of these trials is protected very carefully and thoroughly, and that should be sufficient.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, after 40 years in Parliament, I have come to revere the guidance given by St Brevita and the wise words of Father Concision, both of whom are doubtless known to the present occupants of the episcopal Bench, so I shall confine myself to three points. First, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for her support. I always welcome it; we very frequently think along the same lines. Secondly, I am glad that Members of your Lordships’ Committee focused on the words “appropriate” and “public interest”. That is a matter of some concern and perhaps one that we should refer to later. Lastly, these amendments—all the occupants of the raft—raise a number of serious issues which we may well revert to on Report. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the temptation to leave the country is there, but I shall seek to resist it.
The amendments in this group—in particular, Amendments 12, 13 and 22—appear to us to be intended to try to find a halfway house that would give some protection to the right of jury trial, while giving the Government some opportunity to reduce the number of cases that are tried by a jury. We disagree in principle with the Government’s overall approach, and so it would be difficult, and indeed inappropriate, for us to support the ideas that underpin these proposed amendments. It is in these circumstances that we express no particular support.
I note the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. It is an issue that has been raised before and that might be subject to further consideration in the light of the evidence from other common-law jurisdictions, but it is not one that immediately arises in the context of this group.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, Amendments 12, 13, 22 and 32 all relate to allowing defendants to apply for trial by judge alone in the Crown Court. Amendments 12, 13 and 22 would introduce a role for defendant applications into Clause 3, which provides for “judge alone” trials in certain complex or lengthy fraud or financial cases. Amendment 32, from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, would allow any defendant in the Crown Court to apply for trial by judge alone, so that goes significantly further, and he set out the case very eloquently.
Amendment 22 would allow defendants to apply for the court to make an order under Clause 3. The court would have to apply an “interests of justice” test —the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made that clear—before accepting an application. All co-defendants in a multi-defendant trial would have to apply, and the prosecution could not apply. Amendments 12 and 13 would make defendant application a mandatory condition of “judge alone” trials for complex or lengthy financial cases. The court could not move on its own to make an order, and neither could the prosecution apply.
Any defendant in the Crown Court would be able to apply for “judge alone” trial under Amendment 32. It is not limited to fraud and financial offences. The exact process would be set out in Criminal Procedure Rules. The court would determine the application by applying an “interests of justice” test, but must have regard to various matters including exceptional complexity, prejudicial publicity, national security considerations and other named criteria. I recognise that it is similar, as he has just said, to a recommendation made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, himself.
However, the Government are unable to accept this proposal. The Government agree with the conclusion of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, that court choice, rather than defendant choice, should determine the appropriate mode of trial. This central principle runs through the Bill and we wish to maintain it, so I am making almost exactly the converse of the case made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, with the same sense of consistency.
The Government’s view is that we must redress the balance between defendant and victim. We have heard from victims that they feel the balance is currently tilted in favour of defendants, who get too much control over questions of venue or mode of trial, when victims have no say in this. Our reforms would achieve the right balance by placing the decisions on mode of trial squarely in the hands of the court. Decisions should be based on whether a case meets the statutory test, not the preference of a defendant.
Let me be clear that this is not to say that the views of the defendant would be absent entirely under Clause 3. Parties must be given the opportunity to make representations on a potential order and the court must take those views into account when determining whether to make an order.
I thank all noble Lords for a fascinating debate. I am sorry to hear that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, is leaving the country, but I hope we will hear from him again before he does; surely, it is not that bad. Given this position, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, will consider withdrawing his amendment.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have spoken in this short debate. I am bound to say that, at the moment, I am disappointed by the position taken by the Minister. I can see his reasoning, but I am not sure that there is a great deal of understanding of the position of defendants or the arguments put particularly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and in relation to Crown Court trials generally by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I appreciate that goes much further than my amendments do. Nevertheless, that may be something we can continue to discuss. I would envisage further thought on whether jury waiver by defendants would not be appropriate in the Clause 3 cases. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, this measure is about reducing the ask we make of members of the public. I think we can all agree that being required to serve on a jury, not for the typical two weeks but for months, could have significant consequences for someone’s personal and professional life, and the impact is likely to be worse for someone self-employed or with caring responsibilities.
Clause 3 follows a long line of similar recommendations made by distinguished judges and independent reviewers, including Lord Justice Auld, in 2001, and Lord Roskill, as far back as the 1980s. Fraud and financial crime have continued to evolve since then, becoming enormously more complicated and with vast volumes of digital evidence, which are still dramatically increasing. That means that, for a very small number of cases, we need a new model that is fit for the modern age.
In relation to the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I want to make it clear that we are not suggesting this is going to save an enormous number of court days or reduce the backlog. This is about the jury experience, as I said in relation to the last group; it is not about jury competence. We do not think that there will be many of these cases. This is not about who can understand dishonesty better but about reducing the burden on ordinary people’s lives from sitting on long trials, with which I am sure the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would agree, at least in principle.
I agree that disclosure and the case management of fraud cases must improve, and this Government have agreed in principle to many of Fisher’s part 1 recommendations and others made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson. However, even after effective case management, some trials are likely to remain highly complex or lengthy. This is for those exceptional cases—and I stress the word “exceptional”.