Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Tom Hayes Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Kenneth Stevenson]

Yes. I apologise—I think I have cut across the Minister, because she asked a very similar question, but, if you could give us an idea of how those three things that you spoke about before could be helped by the Bill, that would be really helpful.

Rob Jones: When we identify somebody from the UK who is involved in organising small boats crossings, for instance, we have to get very good, sophisticated surveillance control over that individual to get enough evidence to be able to produce a full file submission to the CPS for a section 25 facilitation offence. That could mean months of surveillance, or covert activity, in terms of eavesdropping and audio recordings.

In the meantime, we are seeing that individual with a public profile on social media, researching crossings, communicating with people overtly and meeting people. When you are looking at the commissioning of the offence, and you are living with somebody who is involved in serious organised crime, you are seeing that play out in front of you.

These clauses allow us to take elements of their business model—as they are meeting people, as they are researching, and as they are taking the preparatory steps to the section 25 offence—then go to the CPS and say, “We think we’ve got enough; we think we could go now.” That gives you more momentum, more speed and more agility.

It is the same mindset as trying to prevent attacks in the CT world. You would not choose to reactively investigate a terrorist attack; we would not choose to reactively investigate highly dangerous crossings in the English channel during which people get killed. We would choose to pre-emptively stop them, and that is what the new offences would introduce.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

Q My question is regarding the asylum decisions backlog that the country faces, which we are now starting to move through. As a consequence, of course, some people will have their grants rejected and others will have them accepted. Where the grants are accepted, what would you say to anybody who claims that that could be a pull factor for people to try to access this country?

Then, just picking up on your point, Mr Jones, about criminal gangs starting to feel the pressure because of this new suite of tools, would you say that the tools provided for in this Bill, which will have a disruptive effect, could in consequence also have a deterrent effect on the criminal smuggler gangs?

Rob Jones: I will take the second question first. Obviously time will tell but, adding to what we are doing already, these tools will rack up the pressure, and that starts to change behaviour. It increases costs and increases friction in the business model. Those things contribute to deterring people from getting involved, and we see that with other areas of criminality. I will allow others to answer the asylum question.

Sarah Dineley: I am going to dip out, rather, and say that it is not really a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service, but I can tell you that the Home Office is undertaking a piece of work looking at what the pull factors are for migrants wanting to reach the UK, and at what point they reach the firm decision that the UK is their final destination.

[Tom Hayes]

Q If I reframe the question, then, have you seen any evidence to suggest that it may be a pull factor?

Sarah Dineley: There is nothing that I have read in any interview provided by a migrant to suggest that that is a pull factor.

Jim Pearce: I have a personal view, but I am speaking on behalf of the national police chiefs, and I am not sure that I am in a position to do that. That is probably a question for either Immigration Enforcement or the Home Office.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Q Thank you for the really interesting testimonies that you have brought today; we really appreciate it. I have two questions. We heard from the Migration Observatory earlier that one of the challenges in this world is that demand is essentially inelastic: they could double the price of the crossings and there would still be a market of people who would pay it, even for very flimsy boats. Picking up Tom’s question, it strikes me that the Rwanda scheme, which this legislation repeals, was ostensibly focused on deterrence and therefore trying to tackle demand—but, because demand is inelastic, it was not having the effect. It sounds like you are saying that this legislation is focusing on the supply and just making it impossible for people to cross the channel, no matter how much demand there is for it. Is that right? Have I understood that correctly?

My second question is for Sarah. I should probably declare an interest because I was previously the home affairs attaché at the embassy in Paris. You talked about international co-operation and mentioned things like JITs and Eurojust and the challenges we face there. We heard from a previous witness about how the UK no longer being in Dublin is being cited by migrants as one of the reasons that they are going in. Can you say more about the challenges that the UK is facing post Brexit? How do we build relations with key allies to overcome them?

Sarah Dineley: I will start with how we rebuild relations with key allies. I have talked about our network of liaison prosecutors. We regularly engage and hold engagement events with our overseas prosecutors: this year alone, we have had engagement events in Ireland, Spain and, two weeks ago, Italy. That is about building those relationships and finding out what their challenges are, as well as finding out about their legal systems and what barriers there are to the co-operation that we are seeking. I think we do have to recognise that different countries have a different legal framework, and we cannot simply impose our framework on another country; we have to be able to work around their framework to try to get what we need from them.

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[Mike Tapp]

Yes, we are. It is coming in this year.

Tony Smith: We do not have a biometric entry/exit system. The EU is bringing in EES, which means Brits will have to give their biometrics on entry and exit. We are bringing in the electronic travel authorisation—the ETA—but that is different from an entry/exit system.

[Tom Hayes]

Q My question is for Mr Williams. In a previous panel, I asked Dr Walsh whether he thought it was difficult to make emphatic assessments of the fiscal burden of migration, given the quality of the data available. You authored a February 2025 report that makes broadly the same points about some of the quality gaps. I would welcome you talking about the gaps in that data, which obviously affects the ability to make emphatic assessments.

I also want to ask you about that report. In a previous answer, you raised the importance of counterfactuals. In reaching the overall recommendations and assessments in your report, did you consider counterfactuals such as the fact that migrants might move up the wage and skills distribution and might not always remain on low pay? In the absence of migrant workers, for instance in health and care settings, there would need to be other people who could do their work. Did you consider the economic impact of having nobody in those roles to do that health and care work, and whether that would affect the worklessness in our country? Did you consider whether there could be a reallocation of British workers into higher-skilled and higher-wage jobs as a consequence of those migrant workers? Did you think about the economic impact of potentially more people doing unpaid care because of a lack of paid carers?

I ask those questions not because I feel we should rely on migrant workers—I do not—but because your report has been lauded by the shadow Home Secretary and other Conservative Members of Parliament. I want to make sure that if it is being used as a point of reference, the data and the assessments have integrity. If you were to consider those counterfactuals, I wonder whether that would affect your report.

Karl Williams: To clarify, we are talking about the report on indefinite leave to remain that came out recently, not the report from last year.

[Tom Hayes]

I forgot the name of it. The “Here To Stay?” report?

Karl Williams: Yes, that is the one. That is purely about the fiscal impact. There is some analysis, which I can go into in a minute, on the broader economic picture in the previous report, but this report was more tightly focused.

[Tom Hayes]

But inevitably the counterfactuals would have an impact on the fiscal burden carried by the state.

Karl Williams: Indeed, yes. The counterfactuals we did think about were different levels of stay rates and different rates among different wage profiles. Migrants earning more as they go through the system clearly does happen to some extent, whether through out-migration or through career progression. In conducting that analysis, we stuck to the fiscal profiles used by the OBR, because, as you say, the data quality is fairly poor. That was the best there was, without trying to construct our own estimates for ingoings and outgoings as migrants progress over their life course in the UK. The OBR models it by age, so it captures the different wage contributions that you make at different points in your life, which will be higher in some points and lower in others. It also captures the different burdens of, for example, healthcare in old age.

I am glad that you have raised the quality of the data. We have repeatedly pointed out, as have the Governor of the Bank of England and the Office for National Statistics, that the labour force survey is very broken. In that report and in previous reports, we have always pushed the point that we need better data. Everyone needs better data. This is one area where there is broad consensus, whether you are restrictionist or want more migration or whatever else. I understand that the reference here is to Denmark and the Netherlands.

[Tom Hayes]

Q Would you feel cautious about Members of Parliament emphatically assessing that there would be a fiscal burden of £234 billion over the lifetime, as your report concludes, based on your concerns about data, but also the fact that consideration of some of the counterfactuals I listed—and there could be many more—would impact that overall figure?

Karl Williams: The report is very clear about the assumptions we have made at various points and the unknowns. With any modelling exercise, whether you are conducting a fiscal model of an effect of a tax change or whatever else, you have to make reasonable assumptions.

[The Chair]

Thank you. That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions of this panel. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses very much for their evidence.

Examination of Witness

David Coleman gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I had Tom Hayes to ask a question, but we have literally 20 seconds.

[Tom Hayes]

Q Professor Coleman, would you on a level accept the description of being a eugenicist?

David Coleman: No.

[Tom Hayes]

Q In that case, I will use the rest of my time. Are you familiar with the—

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us, unfortunately, to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witness for his evidence.

Examination of Witness

Professor Brian Bell gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Hayes]

Q My questions are speculative. First of all, are you familiar with a report by the Centre for Policy Studies called “Here to Stay?”

Professor Brian Bell: Yes.

[Tom Hayes]

Q Could you comment on that? There is a headline figure that says that, in its analysis, the fiscal cost of those who might be granted indefinite leave to remain in the next four or five years would amount to £234 billion.

Professor Brian Bell: That is a speculative number. It is actually extremely difficult to work out the fiscal impact of migration. We are doing it at the MAC at the moment. We can only do it because we have access to data that the CPS could not possibly have. I do not know how you do that kind of analysis without making really very brave—and some may say foolhardy—estimates of what these people are going to do when they are in the UK. To give a very simple example, we currently do not know what dependants do when they come into the country. Let us say we issue a skilled worker visa and a dependent comes in. We will know nothing about what they do because the Home Office, quite fairly, does not pursue finding out about that dependent because they are here legally, but you need to know how much they earn and if they are in a job to work out what their contribution will be over the next 50 to 60 years of their life.

I think it is very dangerous to just make broad assumptions about, “Oh, they are going to be like this and they are going to earn this”, and then you can come up with a very big number. I could choose a big group of British people who will also have very big negative effects, because if you just choose people who are low earners and perhaps people who are disabled, you automatically get those numbers because they are entitled to more benefits in the long run, and they do not pay as much tax. I am not particularly sure what that tells us.

[Tom Hayes]

Q I am going to smuggle in a very quick question. Could you comment on the validity of the comparison between the Australian offshore processing immigration approach and the Rwanda scheme? Are they actually comparable, and do you have anything to say about the efficacy of the Australian approach?

Professor Brian Bell: As I understand it, the big difference is that in the Australian system, if your asylum application was granted, you were brought to Australia; the system was just offshore processing of the application. That is very different from the Rwanda scheme, where we were essentially washing our hands of any responsibility going forward for those asylum applicants. The Australian model is worth thinking about if you could find countries that would be willing to process the applications, because we are spending—let us be honest—an absolute fortune on housing asylum seekers here while we consider their claims. If you could find a cheaper and more effective way of doing that, while still recognising that we have the responsibility to take those asylum seekers who have claimed asylum in this country, that would be worth considering.

[Tom Hayes]

Q So it is not entirely appropriate to compare the Australian offshoring approach to the Rwanda scheme?

Professor Brian Bell: I would not have thought so.