(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesClause 1 offers a comprehensive overview of the Bill’s structure, laying the foundations for essential protections across public venues. The Bill introduces a two-tier system, distinguishing between “standard duty” and “enhanced duty” premises, based on venue size. That tiered approach ensures that venues expecting 200 to 799 attendees may face manageable requirements, if needed, focusing on basic but effective protective measures that respect available resources. Meanwhile, venues expecting more than 800 attendees are subject to higher standards, proportionate to the risk.
Witnesses such as Matt Jukes, assistant commissioner for specialist operations in the Metropolitan police, said that
“the proposed measures in the Bill…are proportionate, and highly likely to be effective.” ––[Official Report, Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2024; c. 29.]
Another witness, Keith Stevens, the chair of the National Association of Local Councils, talked about the village halls where many parish and town councils meet, and was pleased that the threshold has now been lifted to 200 because that is proportionate. Those and other witness statements demonstrate that the balance of measures in the Bill will help prevent small venues from becoming overburdened, aligned with the Government’s commitment to proportionality and public safety.
By providing clear and adaptable guidelines, clause 1 provides an overview to the Bill that enables venues to enhance security in ways that suit their unique operational needs, promoting safer and more resilient public services across the UK.
I think I am right in saying that the right hon. Member for Tonbridge is withdrawing his amendment.
Fair enough. But I will speak to clause 1 of the Bill. I will focus on small businesses, because we heard a lot in the evidence session about the impact on them. They are the lifeblood of our economy and key contributors to keeping our high streets vital and thriving.
It is important to reflect on the evidence we heard about the impact that the Bill will have on small businesses, particularly what Mayor Andy Burnham said about the experience they have had in Greater Manchester already. The city council in Manchester held partnership sessions with large and small businesses alike—over 2,000 people across 10 sessions representing 700 businesses. They then held the tabletop discussions that Figen Murray talked about, including with large spaces such as the Printworks, all the way down to small independent restaurants. The response of those businesses was clear. They believe that there is a need for the legislation, and they do not believe that the provisions are prohibitively onerous. They believe that, at most, it would cost them two hours of staff time.
I will quote from Gareth Worthington, the night time economy officer at CityCo and Manchester business improvement district, which I am happy to place in the Library:
“If a venue operator does not know how to evacuate their venue they should not be running that venue and if training can be provided to help make that evacuation safer then venues should grasp it with both hands.”
Businesses recognise that their first duty is to keep their patrons safe, and that sensible practical measures can be taken to reduce the chance of harm. Businesses are aware of the threats out there. The Minister alluded to those when he spoke: 43 late-stage terrorist plots foiled, and in the last year the number of state-threat investigations launched by the security services increased by 48%. The practical measures in the Bill are necessary, reasonable and proportionate.
Finally, I want to talk about Figen Murray, as she is one of my constituents. I cannot put it better than the way Mayor Andy Burnham phrased it:
“Figen responded to an awful, evil act of hate, with love…Everything she has done since losing her son has been about making the world a better place in his memory.”
He also said:
“Through her work with young people and her campaign for Martyn’s Law, she is helping to prevent future tragedies and give every parent peace of mind. She is a real icon of Greater Manchester.”
I am proud that she is one of my constituents.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for tabling his amendments. Before I turn to them, I will briefly explain why clause 2, which sets out the criteria by which premises are determined to be qualifying premises that fall within scope, is so fundamental.
I recognise that the scope of the Bill—particularly the qualifying thresholds—is an important issue to discuss. Once more, I assure Committee members that the scope of the Bill, including the thresholds, has been developed following detailed discussion with those responsible for premises and with security experts within Government. That has involved hundreds of stakeholder engagement meetings, two public consultations and the important pre-legislative scrutiny process. As a result, the Government’s firm view is that the Bill strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the public and avoiding an undue burden on premises.
Let me turn to the detail of amendments 20 and 21, which were tabled by the right hon. Member. He will be well aware that the Government have increased the qualifying threshold in the Bill from 100 to 200. As he correctly set out, clause 32 provides for the Secretary of State to be able to increase or decrease that figure and the threshold for the enhanced tier. As a result, the number of premises in scope of the Bill, and therefore required to comply, may be increased or decreased.
I assure the right hon. Gentleman and the Committee that that power is narrow, and regulations made under it will be subject to the affirmative procedure before they are made, to ensure the appropriate level of scrutiny by parliamentarians. The power is also limited in that the Secretary of State may not amend the figure to less than 100 in respect of the standard tier or to less than 500 in respect of the enhanced tier. That provides a floor, or absolute minimum number, below which the qualifying threshold cannot go.
The Government’s intention, in having the power in clause 32, is to be equipped to respond to changes in the nature or level of the threat from terrorism. We envisage that the qualifying thresholds would be reduced to either floor in only very limited circumstances, such as the nature of the threat changing significantly. The power therefore provides a necessary lever that can be used, if needed, to ensure that the legislation remains fit for purpose and continues to strike an appropriate balance between protecting the public and avoiding placing an undue burden on premises. The Government do not therefore support the amendments.
Finally, I turn to amendment 22. As I set out during oral evidence, setting a threshold inevitably raises discussion as to whether it is the right figure, and what falls on either side of the threshold will inevitably be questioned. Indeed, the Committee heard a range of views from witnesses giving evidence on Tuesday, many of whom spoke to what they believe the appropriate threshold to be. The discussion included arguments for setting it higher or lower than 200.
Ultimately, the Government have to take a view about what the most appropriate threshold is. After careful consideration of the pre-legislative scrutiny findings and consultation responses, and after taking into account the views of stakeholders and security experts, the Government have decided that 200 is the right judgment.
The amendment changing the figure to 300 would significantly impact the outcomes of the Bill, and particularly what the standard tier seeks to achieve. Furthermore, as we will discuss when we debate clause 5, the standard tier requirements have been redesigned to be relatively simple and low-cost for responsible persons to take forward. They do not require premises to make physical changes.
The Government’s firm view is therefore that 200 represents the right threshold to bring premises into the scope of the Bill. That figure strikes an appropriate balance between protecting the public and imposing a burden on premises. The Government therefore do not support the right hon. Gentleman’s amendment.
I want to speak briefly to the point about thresholds, which has just been discussed. The consultations prior to the Bill were based on a threshold of 100 at the standard tier, and I welcome the ability the Bill gives the Secretary of State to reduce the threshold back to that, should the evidence warrant that. I think Members will be reassured by some of the safeguards the Minister has just talked about, which would have to be in place before any such change happened.
In the protect duty public consultation, half of respondents thought that the threshold should be 100. Moving it to 200 has already taken 100,000 premises out of the scope of the legislation, leaving 180,000 within it. Raising the threshold to 300 would in effect remove the standard tier altogether. Figen has been very clear on this point:
“Raising the threshold of 200 even higher would mean that proportionality would no longer exist”.
She has also pointed out that in her small town of Poynton, in my constituency, a threshold of 200 would already mean that not a single venue is covered by this legislation. A move to 300 would therefore be a mistake and fatal to the purpose of the Bill.
Given the very obvious numbers on the Committee, there is no point in pushing the amendment to a vote, but I still believe that the burden on small businesses is too great. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1
Specified uses of premises
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI have had the great privilege of meeting Figen and Brendan over many months on this, so I have no questions.
Q
Figen Murray: I think it is that as many places as possible are covered. We as a campaign team are concerned about the threshold, if I am honest. I live in a small town —more like a village—and with the original 100 threshold, quite a few of the restaurants as well as the little theatre we have and the pubs would have been covered under the law. With the change in the threshold, my little town is now not coming into scope at all and is completely not secure under Martyn’s law. It concerns me. The change from the 100 threshold to 200 will exclude about 100,000 premises. It feels like quite a lot now no longer need to be within that scope. It worries me.
Q
Figen Murray: The Manchester Arena inquiry obviously had Martyn’s law as one of its recommendations. If I remember rightly, Sir John’s words were that it is needed as a matter of urgency. I think he referred to training, and he also recommended—which is certainly not covered in Martyn’s law under the standard tier—that people have lifesaving training. That is not for debate in Martyn’s law at the moment. But certainly the ACT training was part of the recommendation.
Brendan Cox: To add to that, the other thing that has been amazing—I think you are hearing from Mayor Andy Burnham later—has been the extent to which Manchester has already started to operationalise some of this, so when we are having the debates about proportionality, we can consider some of the real experiences of businesses that are already implementing this. It is worth really digging into that conversation, because what it shows is that lots of businesses that fall below the threshold are voluntarily taking part in the training and starting to implement Martyn’s law, because they know what it gives them. Who does not want their venue to be safer from terror attacks? It is something that organisations in general want to do, and that is why we have been seeing the adoption of this ahead of the legislation being published, even by venues that will not be covered by the capacity legislation.
Q
Andy Burnham: Thank you very much, Minister. Before I get to the question, I will say a little more about my background, which has led me up to what I think. I was shadow Home Secretary at the time of the Paris attacks, and those at the Bataclan in particular. If that had happened here, this legislation would already be on the statute book. Obviously, as Figen said, we have lived through the terrible events of 22 May 2017, but in the seven and a half years since, the nature of the threat has changed. I do not think we could have imagined some of the incidents that we have seen since then, such as the terrible loss of a really loved colleague in Southend and the attack in Southport. We would not have expected that. I remember asking Theresa May at the time of the Paris attacks if we were prepared for an attack in an English city—even then we were thinking only of cities; we were not thinking outside of cities. I say that because all that has shaped my thinking over the years.
When Figen first came forward with the concept of this Bill, I took time to think it through with colleagues in our city region. We are part the Resilient Cities Network, which is a group of 100 cities around the world, and we are in the Strong Cities Network, so we are constantly sharing best practice with cities around the world, and it was our view that the lack of a clear set of standards for security in our venues was a real gap. We were conscious, though, that there may be an impact on venues, hence the measures that were brought forward had to be right but proportionate, and I think care has been taken over that.
As you have just heard, Manchester city council has done an exercise working with venues and surveying venues on some of the voluntary things that have already been done in our city region. As you heard a moment ago, the impact is negligible—it is low-cost—but venues also report that they think it has raised standards generally within the organisation and improved the visitor experience. The experience that people have when they visit—their sense of safety when they are in the city—matters a lot to us as a city region and we are working to raise it. We have gone ahead and, if anything, we want to keep going further and raising the bar.
I will finish by saying that my main message to the Committee this morning is that I ask all of you to please ensure that the Bill is not watered down any further—actually, I look to the Committee to strengthen it. Again, I believe that venues with a capacity of 100 to 200 should be covered by the Bill. I do not think it is right that there is no requirement for training within the standard tier; there should be a requirement for staff to take the free ACT training. The message from Greater Manchester is that we continue to support Figen and all the families who lost loved ones on that night. In one way, we support those measures for that emotional reason, and always will, but we also do so from a Resilient Cities perspective. We believe they will only strengthen people’s experience in our city. We think it is in the interest of parents whose kids come into our city to go to the many events that take place every weekend to understand that there is a basic level of security at all the venues across our city region.
Q
Andy Burnham: That is a fair question. Of course, we have had those conversations. I have been at events—with Figen, actually—with our night-time economy adviser, Sacha Lord, where we have said, “Look, we think we should do this.” Then there have been conversations like, “Well, it’s difficult. The hospitality sector has had challenging times,” but as we have talked it through I think people have come round to the idea that security and safety is one thing that no venue should compromise on, because in some ways that is the first thing to get right. If you get that right, you will get lots of other things right. It is about raising the standard of what the industry does.
There is evidence that the Manchester visitor economy —I know Manchester is not far from your constituency and you probably know it well—has improved over the years and in many ways mirrors the offer that people can find in London, but we have a night-time economy adviser because we want to keep raising the bar. We are not complacent at all. There just has not been an outcry or backlash. People have worked with it. This attack happened in our city: we lost 22 people—young people, mainly, but people of other ages as well—on that night. It is incumbent on us to challenge ourselves about what we do as a city to respond to that, and to recognise that life is changing and the outlying towns and villages of Greater Manchester could see an incident of that kind.
There is a broader point here: speaking as police and crime commissioner for Greater Manchester, I do not believe yet that the country has all of its procedures in place to face what we are experiencing. I say that with reference to fire and rescue services. Currently, it is still not clear what the role of fire and rescue services is in relation to what is called a marauding terrorist attack. How can that be the case? That clearly needs to be addressed. We have done local things, but this legislation should be only the start, in my view, of really ensuring that there are arrangements in place that provide clarity to blue-light services and venues, as well as others, on the basics of responding to an incident. I think there is still work in progress on that point.
Q
Andy Burnham: That is a really important question. The guidance that I want to see would advise them to have a night-time economy strategy. That is really important for a whole host of reasons, and it is not just about the most serious attacks. We see concerns about spiking or the unacceptable treatment of women and girls, and there is a whole range of issues that need to be addressed. If we want to have the levels of safety that we all want to see in our country, there has to a more serious look taken at some of what happens within the night-time economy. For me, that would include ending out-of-area taxi working, for instance. We have a situation in our city region right now where, if you go into the city centre of Manchester pretty much any night of the week, but certainly on a Friday or Saturday, you will see hundreds and hundreds of taxis with a Wolverhampton plate.
Q
Paul Laffan: For us, we already have the processes built in. We have been doing this for a number of years to ensure that we are prepared, as we should be as a public space. Although our venues are vast and wide, the majority are quite straightforward in terms of what we do. The events themselves do not vary a great deal—it is either a play, a musical, a comedy or whatever—the operation of the building does not alter too much and the buildings themselves are predominantly listed, large buildings.
We would expect to conduct initial assessments, which we have already done, and to review them at a similar frequency to all our health and safety approaches; just regular touchpoints subject to any massive changes. We therefore do not feel that the risk assessment element would be overly onerous upon us. For others in our industry, where they have more dynamic spaces and second spaces, it could be slightly trickier; having that resource and knowledge could be challenging. However, we do not foresee its being a huge concern for us.
Heather Walker: One of our thoughts is that the public will need to understand how venues will operate under this Bill. As an example, post covid when we were all opening up, we all worked very closely together to make sure the kinds of mitigations and arrangements in place, so that the public felt safe coming back into theatres, were similar.
Whichever theatre you went to, you saw the same sorts of things in place. I think the nature of risk assessing for this arrangement, which I totally agree with, is going to mean different things for different people. Having different kinds of events, or a different audience profile attending those events, will perhaps change what mitigations you put in place. From the public’s perspective, they will need to understand that not everybody is doing the same thing. That might create some concerns about just how safe one place is compared with another.
Paul Laffan: If I may add to that, I think this comes back to “reasonably practicable” and how we apply that. Someone’s risk assessment can vary from operator to operator, person to person, so it is a question of how much guidance there will be around the expectations so that, when we are weighing up that impact likelihood, cost analysis, of “reasonably practicable”, we understand how we quantify that for a large operator with significant funds behind, it versus a small operator with far less funds. That then would raise concern for me that we may inadvertently create a higher risk profile for another venue; if ATG or the Royal Opera House spent a lot of money strengthening our own resolve and it makes another operator who does not have the same access to funds appear a more viable target.
Stuart Beeby: Our principle is “deter”. That is the key thing: the counter-terrorism strategy is not “defend”, but “deter”. That means that if there is hostile reconnaissance and you look professional and so on, if you are being targeted you could be pushing them along to what is considered a softer target, although dynamically they are actually complying with all the requirements of the Bill.
Paul Laffan: There would be some shape and colour around the risk assessment process and what some of the expected outcomes and the suitable and understood control measures are that would be pragmatic and proportionate to the risk, but also replicable across the entire industry. On Heather’s point, if as a customer I go to see “Mean Girls” one day and a ballet the next, I should not be surprised that there is security and a similar experience on the front end.
Q
Alex Beard: It puts additional responsibilities on the SIA, which needs the resources and expertise to fulfil those duties. It is a big step up—that is my No. 1 observation.
Heather Walker: And it needs the time to put this in place so that it is consistent and appropriate.
Paul Laffan: Certainly from our point of view, it is a good appointment. It is the logical one, given what it already does in the private security sector. Our only real concern would be around its—forgive me for using the wrong word—ability to pragmatically apply the risk assessment and the review of processes in what is quite a different industry and setting across much of live entertainment, versus the classic private security sector, but we are sure that that will come out in its guidance as it starts forming.
It would be great to have clarity in the Bill on how the SIA will interact externally, such as with public planning. As we strengthen our own four walls, if that shifts the attack vector to externals, with things like vehicle-as-weapon, we have very little control over the public spaces outside our buildings, yet we will introduce a crowd of people leaving after a show. HVM—hostile vehicle mitigation—is an example. That is something that we always push for in planning applications and it is very swiftly declined, fundamentally on the basis of cost and whether it suits the planning aesthetic of pedestrianised areas. It is about understanding how much power the SIA will have in enforcing, collaborating and engaging with external bodies on behalf both of the Bill and of us as private entities.
Alex Beard: Ensuring that there are no cracks between the obligations on individual institutions and the role of the local authority and the statutory authority is absolutely key. Even when hostile vehicle mitigation is accepted as required or desirable, the time lag in implementing it can be very considerable.
Q
Heather Walker: Security is both a moral and a commercial obligation for our visitors and our staff. It is essential that the public and our staff feel safe in our building; that is an important part of their feedback and how we keep on attracting them. The reasonable practicableness is a very subjective view. As an example, we do bag searches for everybody who comes into the building. Some might feel that having security arches is reasonable, but we have to balance that with the fact that we are a theatre—we are providing entertainment and this is a social space to come into with your friends and family. All these things are about balance and assessment. Having a CTSA to guide us through that is certainly extremely valuable.
Stuart Beeby: Our view, looking across the United Kingdom, is very similar. Things are affected, and there is a groupthink. We can demonstrate with statistics how long it took people to come back into places of mass gathering for great entertainment: post covid, it has taken a long time. I speak as the largest operator of theatre in the UK. There will be areas, particularly in some constituencies, where there are still independent theatres run by local authorities. The challenge with the cost base in live entertainment is very real, given the national living wage, energy costs and just the costs of producing. There has always been a high bar, but with those three it is a bit of a perfect storm. Unfortunately, cost is a reality that makes people look.
As we tried to paint a picture earlier, when we talk about the formulaic, you could get the same effect by scanning the ticket, having the table, checking the bag, having another queue for bigger bags or maybe not even allowing bigger bags into your theatre. You can do all that. If you come to our theatre at the Lyceum, with Disney as our partner, where we are doing 2,100 people with eight shows a week, you will see dogs there. I do not use dogs at the Savoy or the Princess theatre in Torquay, but that does not mean that you are less safe. There is an assessment.
We have to constantly manage that message. We do customer feedback, and you are right that we get the two bookends: “You made us do a bag search, it was raining, it was ‘An Inspector Calls’, the average age was 65 and we were out in the rain,” versus, “You were rushing us through, I had a bag and the check by your security staff seemed cursory.” We are constantly having to balance it.
There will be a real challenge on cost, which comes back to the application. For us, I guess it is about being very clear. It needs to be effects-based in terms of how it is assessed and the mitigations you put in place, because good training and being professional are just as effective as somebody being poor and just trying to whizz everybody through an arch, which would create a lot of cost. That formulaic piece is key.
We are constantly managing the message that these are safe spaces to be, because in the theatre the average age is still higher. It is still that demographic that is 45-plus with more disposable income and, particularly in regional theatre with your matinées, there will be more retirees, so they are very receptive to trigger events.
(1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesQ
“displacing attacks from locations within scope of the Bill to a location out of scope”.
Do you want to comment on that? Then I will invite you to talk about thresholds, since you said that you had some thoughts on that.
Matt Jukes: Without making assumptions about terrorist intent, we know that there are some very enduring themes about attacks on public locations, major events and crowded places. Disrupting that through better protective measures or through better informed responses will remain an enduring feature, even if there is absolutely at the margins displacement. We see from our casework that there is evidence that better-protected targets sometimes do deflect terrorists to other targets or locations for their intent. We have seen some evidence of that.
The relevance of this Bill—I have already touched on it—serves to shift the whole of societal awareness in terms of vigilance and preparedness and increase protection overall. If there is displacement from one place to another, it is more likely still as a result of this—if this Bill were to pass and be enacted—that there will be a state of readiness, preparedness and deterrent in those other places. Tragically, the kinds of sectors and sites that have been in the sights of terrorists are much more susceptible to their ideology and their intent than they are to the shape of a particular Bill or legislation. Sadly, for example, places of worship will endure as a potential target.
For those who are fixated on targeting places of worship, it is more likely that they might desist from a particular attack or that that venue would be better prepared. There are examples from around the world. We have lots of practice in the UK where security at places of worship actually has saved lives. So I recognise Jonathan Hall’s reflections. Any sense of a rising tide of awareness and preparedness will serve to secure communities. I suspect that displacement is something that we can have in view and will continue to work at, but not something we should be preoccupied by. I would say, because it goes to thresholds, if I may bridge to that point, that there is an area of attention we need to apply to those places that are filled with smaller venues, but create big spaces.
If you think of the big public squares in London, they may be surrounded by premises with a capacity of 100, but overall they create spaces that are very significant and iconic. For that reason, going into the earlier evidence, we felt that the thresholds proposed previously were helpful, as they capture the scale of the premises that can be taken together. I could reel off the names of those squares; you would know which ones they are. I do not really want to give a target list to terrorists, but it is fairly obvious that there is a set of places across major cities in particular and towns where premises of 100 sit alongside each other and build up quite substantial public crowded places.
For that reason, we felt that 100 was a sensible place to start. You have to draw the line somewhere, and that felt like it. If we are to move upwards, we lose some of those premises, such as the bars, clubs and restaurants that would have been in Borough market, which might have been captured and therefore contributed to overall safety in that environment and may be missed. On thresholds, we are anxious about the effective moving further upwards and if there was any further consideration would have preferred that to move back down to where the earlier drafts had started.
Q
Matt Jukes: The first thing to say, as I am subject to a few watchdogs myself, is that the best performance of a watchdog is to raise overall standards and improve outcomes for the public. That might seldom be achieved by enforcement and best be achieved by the sharing of practice, the development of understanding and the support of the sectors involved. I do not have extant concerns about the investigatory and compliance powers, but I would expect a regulator and the authority that will come into that space to have their major focus on raising standards and for us all to hold compliance actions as the backstop to the cases that might be required.
I say that based on the fact that you will hear evidence from the Counter Terrorism Business Information Exchange, which we work with closely to work with sectors. We get an enormous amount of leverage from working with sector-specific experts themselves, and I expect that the regulator would want to do that, rather than investigate and enforce in any excessive way. Having said that, the absence of something that is rigorous and provides that backstop would undermine the overall effect of the Bill if it were not present.
Q
Neil Sharpley: The simple answer to that is yes. The comments we made previously have been taken into account. We think that for any piece of new legislation that is breaking new ground, which we of course support and our own research shows that there is a need for information to be disseminated to businesses about terrorism risk, the threshold has been set at the right level initially. We expect that it will be reviewed in due course as the Bill, or the Act when it becomes that, beds in, but we feel that the parameters have been set correctly at present.
The concerns we expressed previously were about very small venues, community venues, local societies and things of that sort. The one thing that is not touched on in the Bill, which I should perhaps mention initially, is what the role of local authorities should be in helping to achieve the aims of the Bill. We all agree that the aims are to ameliorate the risk as far as terrorism is concerned. I am sure it has been observed before that many open public areas are surrounded by a plethora of smaller businesses, many of which would never be in scope of the Bill but all of which, because of the current threat vectors, might possibly be at risk. My question to you is, should this Bill also contain some provision that requires local authorities to assess the risks of those open areas and to embark on some sort of training exercise in respect of the smaller businesses surrounding them, whether or not they fall within the scope of the Bill in terms of specific obligations? That is something that needs attention and something we have touched on a number of times before, and I think the local authority representative who gave evidence before the Bill was launched also touched on that. It seems to be an area where, especially in smaller towns and cities, a considerable amount of good work could be done to reduce the risk beyond what is currently envisaged within the Bill.
In general terms, we welcome the changes. We think the Bill will take some time to bed in. Businesses will become accustomed to the responsibilities and, in due course, those responsibilities may not be regarded in such an onerous way as they might be regarded now for any new piece of legislation. It may also be possible, with due consultation, to change the parameters, but that is a matter for the future; it is a matter for research and for data, and we need to do what is necessary to ameliorate the risk, not what is unnecessary but looks good in regulatory terms. We need to address the specific risks—the real risks—themselves, rather than create a system that does not target those risks as extensively as I think could be done.
Q
John Frost: In our organisation, regardless of any capacities, we would adopt an approach across all of our locations. The rationale for that would be that, having suffered incidents of this nature in sites, stores or premises that are below the threshold that has been set out, we would feel that there would be a moral obligation, as well as the legislative obligation, to equip all of our stores. Therefore, we will have our own inspectorate across stores in the enhanced tiers, but we will ensure that our management teams are trained, engaged, educated and equipped proportionately to respond to acts of this nature in every site that we operate in.
I call Sonia Cooper—sorry, Sonia Kumar. I’m making names and times up today! I apologise.
Q
Kate Nicholls: We do have some concerns about what is outlined around penalties. There are some gaps in the legislation. We know there will be secondary regulations and that there will be detail coming through in the guidance about the remit of the inspectors and the enforcement powers contained in the Bill, the level of fines and the powers available to people. We recognise this is a very serious situation, but there is an interrelationship between the Licensing Act, where you can have accelerated closure powers that could remove a licence entirely, and this piece of legislation, as well as the very high fines that could come through for the enhanced tier, particularly for those who are globally-based businesses. They are quite—eye-watering, shall we say?
There is a need to work with the industry. We appreciate that the Bill team and Ministers have worked with us to make some flexibility changes to the legislation as it has come through. We would also welcome the opportunity to work on this area, particularly around fines and the scaling of fines, the penalties that could be imposed, the way powers could be used, and the checks and balances around that enforcement mechanism, particularly to do with appeals and the ability to trade pending appeal, because there is a significant impact on a business if it is closed.
Are there any other questions for the panel? I want to ensure I do not miss anybody again. If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.
I understand that we may be so far ahead of ourselves that not all the witnesses for the next panel are here.
Q
Jeremy Leggett: Yes. We welcome the threshold’s being raised, but I should go into a little bit of technical detail. When the threshold was set at 100, it would have included pretty much all the 10,000 or so village halls in England. That is largely to do with the village hall dimensions you need for short mat bowls and a badminton court, which give you a theatre-style capacity of a little over a hundred. Whether that capacity is ever used in that way is very questionable. So, certainly following the introduction of the Bill after the supplementary consultation on the standard tier, we welcomed the threshold’s being raised, but more because it took a lot of those village halls where the legislation would be most problematic out of scope. I am more than happy to go further into why it is problematic for them if you wish.
Q
Jeremy Leggett: Having sat in on the discussion this morning, I obviously have some anxieties about the possibility of the threshold being dropped back down to 100, as well as about having a power in the Bill for the Secretary of State to bring the threshold back down to 100 anyway if that is seen to be required. The village halls that responded to the supplementary consultation on the standard tier did so thinking that the limit was going to be 100. If you recall, the supplementary consultation was carried out before a redraft of the Bill was made public so, as I understand it, there was some concern that a lot of village halls and similar organisations were responding quite negatively to the consultation because they thought the limit was going to be 100. Raising the threshold has taken quite a lot of those out, but it is probably worth at least thinking about why so many volunteer-run premises were so concerned about the standard tier when the lower threshold was 100. I can go further if you would like.
Q
Jon Collins: Most grassroots music venues operate on a 0.5% profit margin, which is not a profit margin, because the people who run those premises are not paying themselves properly. They actually subsidise, because of their passion and love for music.
Something like a bag check could actually create another type of security problem for venues like that. If they are 150 or 200-capacity premises, they might not have the conditions in which you need to search every person on entry, because of the scale of what they do. If that were imposed, there would be an additional cost because you would need to be able to staff that, but more concerningly there would be the creation of a queue outside the premises, which the Music Venue Trust has identified as creating a new risk. That may be addressing a risk that was not there in the first place. I apologise for being vague, but we are trying to pull numbers. Given that we are not entirely sure what the guidance in the final form of the Bill will say, the expectations of the inspectorate in terms of what operators should do are pretty challenging. However, if it is brought in in a way that is aligned with our licence requirements, it can be lower cost to comply.
Q
Jon Collins: I think that is a by-product of the fact that we operate with licences and have partnerships with local authorities that go back decades. The variable that we do not want to introduce is for an inspector to come to a venue or festival and insert new requirements with no appeal, which they can do at the moment on the balance of probabilities, and disrupt that well-established way of working between the venue and the regulator.
On the Home Office’s costs, the difference between the low-end cost and the high-end cost for the total bill is eightfold—it is around £593 million and up to £4 billion. That tells you just how open-ended a lot of this legislation is at the moment. Trying to work out compliance costs and so on can therefore be a challenge, but the Manchester experience is common to our work with local authorities up and down the country.
Q
Jon Collins: I will make one quick point before Melvin comes in. Because we operate with a licence, we are already considering counterterrorism safety and security in how we run the premises. The issue is the new variable. I do not see that there are two classes of venue; the Licensing Act takes care of that. If you are not meeting your obligations under that Act, your licence is at risk and can be removed. The fact that this can be imposed without appeal on a balance of probabilities, and disrupt what can be a decades-old relationship between the venue and the local authority, is the concern.
Melvin Benn: It is exactly as Jon said. Because there is an entertainment licence, the granter of the entertainment licence—be it a premises licence in England and Wales, or a yearly licence in Scotland, for example—has assessed that what the operator is doing is safe and makes the customer safe. In that sense, one could argue that there is no need for the legislation.
I think the industry generally would say that adding an additional safety piece about counterterrorism into the four pillars of the Licensing Act would have been a better route than creating an additional piece of legislation. We are not in charge of that, and we will go whichever way it is. We are fully supporting the direction of this. The simpler way would have been to add to what already exists, rather than to create something separate.
Q
Melvin Benn: Obviously, I am speaking from the point of view of my industry. But it is an industry that is quite grown up and has an incredibly good safety record. In our view, adding to what already exists would have been in some ways a simpler route. There would then be something separate for unlicensed premises. The fact that the Bill almost ignores the existence of licensed premises is a little bit of a failure. That is where we see conflict—and we do see conflict—not with the overall aim, of course, but there are two jockeys on the horse at some points. That is where you are going to get to, and when there are two jockeys on a horse, that horse never wins. At least, I have never backed one that won.
If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witness
Gary Stephen gave evidence.
Q
Gary Stephen: I am aware that in some parts of the security industry, the SIA has a poor reputation when it comes to the enforcement of licensed premises. But from the information provided to me, and with the creation of a separate entity within the SIA to manage the enforcement of new legislation, it is comforting. Looking at the alternatives, it seems like the most practical and logical appointment on the face of it.
Q
Gary Stephen: The majority of higher education organisations will be in the enhanced tier with public protection measures. I strongly believe that most of my peers have significant experience in dealing with counter-terrorism risk assessments and security plans, and I would be disappointed if that was not already a priority for most of them in the planning and preparation of events. However, I am aware that not every organisation has an experienced security professional to manage events on campus.
With that in mind, we created the special interest group CONTEST to share best practice and signpost to our members what good looks like. Most organisations have very good relationships with local counter-terrorism security advisers, and due to specialist research being carried out on many sites, the security posture is normally of a good standard. So I would be conscious to make sure that vice-chancellors and COOs are aware of their obligation under the new legislation.
Q
Gary Stephen: For me, the difference between who is responsible for the premises—the organisation—and the event—the person—is clear. However, in the discussions I have had with my peers, we believe it is important that there is a clear understanding between the organisation and the event organiser about who exactly is responsible for what. We would hope that would be done by having the correct risk assessments and security plans in place and sharing them appropriately. On the face of it, it looks clear to us that the organisation is responsible for the premises and a person for the event. We are quite comfortable with that.
Q
Gary Stephen: To give some context around that question, many higher education organisations are in a town and gown setting where the university is a small town in itself that is integrated into a busy part of the city. There are challenges of having multiple buildings with thousands of staff, students and tenants—elite sports clubs or teams; nightclubs, which you are referring to, which is where the GUU, the student union, comes into it; or commercial properties and theatres within the campus footprint. There could be confusion as to who is responsible for those buildings. The conversations we have had initially are that they are looking to us for guidance.
Most higher education organisations own the buildings and then lease them out to the smaller organisations. On the discussions we have had with them, the more premises around our institutions comply with the legislation, especially the smaller hospitality venues, the more protected our students and staff will be, both in and out of the academic setting. With that in mind, the original standard tier threshold of 100 people would be more beneficial for the Bill in my opinion. That would bring a lot more of those premises into scope and more venues would be prepared to deal with incidents. Does that answer your question?
If there are no further questions from Members, I thank the witness for his evidence. We will move on to our next and final panel. Thank you very much.
Examination of Witnesses
Dan Jarvis and Debbie Bartlett gave evidence.
Q
Debbie Bartlett: To clarify how we are treating places of worship within the legislation, they are being treated slightly differently. Regardless of their capacity, if they are over the 200 limit, regardless of whether they are over 800 or not, they will all be considered within the standard tier. That is to reflect the unique role that faith communities play in society.
In terms of “from time to time”, how we are calculating capacity within the legislation goes back again to the point about making it slightly more proportionate and more venue-specific. Venues themselves will have to consider the greatest number of people reasonably expected to be present at the same time. It is about that word, “expected”. If they know that there will be more than 200 people expected at their venue at one time, they will be caught within that.
Where “from time to time” comes from is if there is an unexpected event, which unexpectedly has 200 people, which could not have been considered beforehand. There will not be any sort of automatic “You will now be in enhanced tier”—sorry, the standard tier—or you will not jump to the enhanced tier from time to time. So it is about the expected. If you expect more than 200 people, then you will be in scope of the legislation.
Q
Debbie Bartlett: Again, that goes back to the proportionality aspect of the legislation and what we are actually asking of standard-tier premises. For standard-tier premises what the Bill requires is around putting in place protective security procedures. It is not asking as much as it is of enhanced-tier premises. We did not feel that it was appropriate to put in place restriction notices that could be conceived of as being more burdensome for those smaller businesses and smaller premises.
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Commons ChamberAs the hon. Gentleman will know, the impact assessment is provided by the Home Office, and what we inherited from the previous Government was not simply the incredibly costly Rwanda programme, but also the retrospective element of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which was so damaging that the shadow Home Secretary, when he was in the job, did not implement many of the measures. That retrospective element has cost the Home Office hundreds of millions of pounds, and those costs would go forward into the future.
We want to support genuine refugees, but will the Home Secretary provide an update on the progress on returns and deportations of illegal migrants, and say how the new command arrangements improve on the arrangements of the previous Government?
My hon. Friend makes an important point. To tackle the chaos in the asylum system the rules need to be properly respected and enforced. That is why we have increased by more than 20% the enforced returns over the summer of those who have no right to be here. We have also increased the number of charter flights, including the biggest ever charter flight return.