Support for Ukraine and Countering Threats from Russia

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The invasion of Ukraine is brutal and it is wrong; the justifications for it are a tissue of lies. The resistance of the Ukrainian people against such an onslaught, with Russia deploying internationally banned illegal weapons against civilian targets, is heroic. I imagine everybody here is humbled by the bravery and courage of ordinary people taking up arms to confront such aggression.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Less than an hour ago, I spoke to my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Adam Holloway), who is in western Ukraine. He is a military officer and has been talking to the military there, who are pleading, “Please send us defence anti-tank weapons and defence anti-aircraft weapons.” He has emphasised that, and he asked me to intervene in this debate to make that comment.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman. I backed today’s motion precisely because it calls for the provision of further defensive equipment and “humanitarian and other assistance”. Although it ought to be unnecessary, I also join the calls to ensure that the UK’s NATO defence and security obligations are fulfilled to counter the threats from Russia.

Those threats are not simply on the ground in Ukraine today, nor is the action to tackle hostile Russian activity limited to support against the current invasion. We must ensure that the tools required to counter Russia now—our continued work with NATO—and the resources required to keep our guard up against a long-term and growing threat are provided in full. I will turn briefly to each of those strands.

On 23 February, the Minister for Asia and the Middle East said in the debate on the Russian invasion:

“We are committed to bringing forward the economic crime Bill. It will establish a new public register of beneficial ownership of overseas companies… It will ensure that individuals and entities can no longer hide in the shadows.”—[Official Report, 23 February 2022; Vol. 709, c. 336.]

I very much welcome that, but given that the ISC Russia report published in 2020 included a chapter on tackling crime, it is hugely disappointing that we do not already have the necessary legislation on the statute book. That is particularly the case given that the Russia report contained the warning from the National Crime Agency that, for example,

“there are several ways in which the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 is too restrictive.”

The report also described the changes the NCA would wish to see to the legislation. I therefore welcome the new legislation, but can we have it brought forward with immediate effect?

On my second point, our relationship with NATO, again, the ISC Russia report was clear, saying at paragraph 129:

“NATO remains at the heart of strategic thought…Diminishing the strength of NATO is therefore a key aim of the Kremlin, as is undermining the credibility of Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and ‘delivering NATO and non-NATO deterrence’ therefore forms a key part of the 2019 cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy.”

The ISC was

“encouraged to note that Defence Intelligence shares its intelligence assessments with NATO, which we were told aim to try ‘to ensure as common an understanding of the nature of the Russian threat and situation that we face’. Defence Intelligence highlighted several ‘really important parts of how we feed into the NATO system’”.

It is self-evidently the case that with the attack on Ukraine, and for our future defence, that work with NATO will have to be supported and enhanced.

That leads me to my final and most important point—resources. The ISC asked this question:

“If we consider the Russian threat to have been clearly indicated in 2006 with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, and then take events such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as firmly underlining Russian intent on the global stage, the question is whether the Intelligence Community should—and could—have reacted more”.

MI5 was clear that there was an inevitable reprioritisation due to the terrorist threat. Defence Intelligence viewed it similarly. SIS and GCHQ saw it as due to the longer lead time required for work on Russia. SIS said:

“I don’t think we did take our eye off the ball. I think the appetite for work against the Russian threat has sort of waxed and waned.”

GCHQ agreed. The ISC fully recognised

“the very considerable pressures on the Agencies…and that they have a finite amount of resource, which they must focus on operational priorities. Nevertheless, reacting to the here and now is inherently inefficient and—in our opinion—until recently, the Government had badly underestimated the Russian threat and the response it required.”

I hope that no one now underestimates the scale of the Russian threat, or the resources necessary, now and in future, and not least to the intelligence agencies, to counter it.

Data Breach: ARAP Applicants in Afghanistan

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 21st September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement and for his commitment to update the House after the recess. When he does so in five or six weeks’ time, will he please ensure that he gives an accurate assessment of the additional threats and intimidation that Afghan nationals face as a result of the data breach? I am concerned less about the technical nature of the failing, however important that is, than about the lives of the individuals and their families.

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Member puts his question very well. I will be happy to update the House on the threat situation, both for Afghans who worked for us and for us in the United Kingdom overall, and on any growth in the terrorism threat from Afghanistan.

Trident Renewal

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Angus Robertson]

Indeed. The hon. Lady makes a very strong point, and I am pleased that there are Members in other parties who are clearly supporting the direction of the motion before us. Of course, it is not beyond the wit of Government or companies in the defence sector to concentrate their efforts on the conventional areas of defence rather than on nuclear submarines which have to be one of the most expensive ways of creating and maintaining jobs.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

May I take my hon. Friend back to the question of costs and try to put some numbers on this? Is it not the case that according to the last comprehensive assessment, the cost was something in the order of 9% of the MOD budget, around £2.9 billion a year, moving to around £4 billion throughout the 2020s? Does that not give a clear indication of the scale—the quantum—of the money we are wasting on these systems?

[Angus Robertson]

My hon. Friend makes a good point and it is what I was trying to outline in response to the interventions from those on the Liberal Democrat Benches. This is about many billions of pounds about which we have a choice: do we want to invest in something we can never use, or do we spend the money in an entirely more beneficial way for society as a whole?

Does the Secretary of State recognise the assessment that during the next decade more than £40 billion is due to be spent on submarines—among them, Trident’s replacement submarines—and that this figure is more than is due to be spent on new land equipment and air equipment combined? Does he agree that the waste of £4 billion with the scrapping of the Nimrod patrol aircraft is now being replicated with the expenditure of £4 billion on the Trident replacement submarine programme ahead of the maingate decision?

The scrapping of Nimrod has limited Vanguard’s operational effectiveness and must mean that the scrapping of Trident is now more certain. What cost has been incurred by the MOD in requesting the deployment of maritime patrol aircraft by allied forces since October 2010, now that Vanguard operates without the support of Nimrod? On how many occasions has the MOD requested deployment of MPA by allied forces since October 2010, now that Vanguard operates without the support of Nimrod?

The issue of Trident replacement comes at a time when the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons are being taken seriously by the international community. In December the overwhelming majority of countries attended the international conference on the subject hosted by the Austrian Government. After the US Government confirmed their attendance, the UK relented on its intended boycott and attended in an official capacity, which I welcome. A number of Members of the House, including me, attended the conference, which had a huge impact, forcing attendees to confront the calamity of what would actually happen should there be a planned or unintended nuclear explosion. The UK and other countries need to give a commitment that they will take this issue seriously.

Does the Secretary of State agree with the International Committee of the Red Cross’s findings that global cooling as a result of nuclear conflict could cut food production for many years and put 1 billion people at risk of starvation worldwide? Is this stark warning not further evidence that we must act on disarmament and scrap Trident? Does he not agree that publishing a UK assessment of the global atmospheric consequences of nuclear war would be a positive contribution to the international discussion on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons? Will the Government ensure that the issues raised at the Vienna conference are discussed at the meeting of the P5 nuclear weapons states in February?

While on the international issues relating to Trident, may I say to the Secretary of State that it is high time the Government stated their support for a new legal instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons that would complement our disarmament commitment under article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty? It is time that the Government recognised that the success of past international bans on weapons of mass destruction such as landmines, cluster munitions and chemical and biological weapons must be applied to nuclear weapons. Does the Secretary of State recognise, as those on the Opposition Benches do, the success of past international bans on weapons of mass destruction such as landmines, cluster munitions and chemical and biological weapons, and that this principle must be extended to nuclear weapons?

Before concluding, may I seek clarification relating to the Trident maingate decision that will follow if this vote is unsuccessful today? Will the maingate decision for Trident replacement be published as a report and discussed as a stand-alone issue, separately from the strategic defence and security review? Will the Secretary of State and the shadow Secretary of State both commit to a binding vote of the House at the maingate decision point for Trident replacement?

In conclusion, today’s debate and vote are an important opportunity to show that there is opposition to Trident renewal at Westminster. May I thank all the constituents who have lobbied all of us in past days, sending e-mails and messaging us via Twitter, encouraging us to vote for the motion?

Opposition to Trident is of course particularly strong in Scotland. It is opposed by our faith communities, including the Church of Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Church and many others among our faith communities. It is also opposed by the Scottish Trades Union Congress and the Scottish voluntary sector. Opinion opposing Trident is covered fully in today’s The National newspaper, which splashes on a new opinion poll that shows that, of those with an opinion, 60% of respondents in Scotland do not want Trident. Today, sadly, I fear that the Labour party will not represent the majority of its own supporters: in that poll it is clear that a significant majority of Labour voters agree with the SNP in not wanting Trident in Scotland. In the forthcoming general election, we have a huge opportunity to underline our opposition to Trident by electing MPs who have a policy opposed to Trident—in Scotland, that is the SNP; in Wales, it is Plaid Cymru; and in England, it is the Green party. With polls showing that we may very well hold the balance of power after the next general election, we will do everything we can to ensure that Trident replacement does not go ahead.

Army Basing Plan

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I would not want to encourage my hon. Friend to draw that conclusion. Marchwood military port is scheduled for disposal, and—this is not part of this announcement, of course—it may well still be used by the Army but under the ownership of a civilian contractor.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The Secretary of State said that the consolidation of the Army bases in Scotland would be around Leuchars and Edinburgh. He also made the welcome announcement that 45 Commando would remain in Arbroath, presumably at RM Condor. He then went on to say that the decisions on the training estate would be announced by the Armed Forces Minister later. May I urge him to ensure that those decisions are taken logically, and gently remind him that the excellent base and range at Barry Buddon in my constituency sits between Leuchars and Condor and ought to remain a very valuable part of the training estate in future?

[Mr Hammond]

I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s contribution to this debate. I have to say it is a delight to be in a Parliament where Members are arguing for military establishments in their constituencies. Many of my colleagues in NATO and EU countries do not enjoy that same level of parliamentary and public support for the armed forces. I am grateful to all Members of the House for that.

Future Reserves 2020

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Thursday 8th November 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I know that my hon. Friend commands great respect on this issue across the House and I am sure that the right hon. Member for East Renfrewshire will have noted what he has said, reinforcing the point that I have already made. I genuinely hope that we can build consensus on that issue.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

I thank the Secretary of State for giving me early sight of his statement. I welcome the intention to increase the number of reservists. However, the reserve forces will need to be reconfigured to meet his objective of integrating with the regulars. May I ask him about the Royal Marines Reserve in particular? Will he ensure that the reconfiguration is done sensitively, and that the modern, fully equipped bases around which recruitment is now good are protected wherever possible to ensure the broadest possible geographical spread of the specialist skills? This would help to achieve the Government’s objective of an overall increase in numbers.

[Mr Hammond]

One wonders whether the hon. Gentleman could be referring to any particular base. Yes, he is absolutely right. First of all, we have to fix the lay-down for the regular forces; and then we have to make sure that the location of reservists is appropriate, both from a recruiting and a training point of view. Our intention is that reservist units will be paired with specific regular units, so they will work with them on a routine basis. There are obviously issues of geography that need to be taken into account. We will set out the regular basing plot before the House rises for the Christmas recess—with your permission, Mr Speaker—and I then expect to be able to set out the reserve plot and the pairing pattern when we deliver our response to consultation conclusions and the White Paper in the spring.

Scottish-recruited Units

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd May 2012 Westminster Hall

[Pete Wishart]

It is with great regret that we have lost some of those fantastic regiments. There are ways to do it. Our regimental system is admired across the world, and we mess with it at our peril. We were not successful in retaining the historic Scottish regiments. They were amalgamated and the Royal Regiment of Scotland appeared. We acknowledge that with much regret.

One thing that we secured, an important concession that everyone recognises as valuable, was the idea of a golden thread that would allow the past to knit to the future and allow the former regiments some sort of identity and home within the Royal Regiment of Scotland.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

When my hon. Friend speaks about the golden thread, it is not mere history or sentiment. It is essential to recruitment and retention into those geographically recruited units, such as the Black Watch, when recruits come from that area. It is vital for recruitment and retention into units such as that.

Carrier Strike Capability

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Thursday 10th May 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

My right hon. Friend is correct to focus on that point, and I thank him for his comments. As I think I said in my statement, fitting cats and traps retrospectively to the Queen Elizabeth, after her completion, would undoubtedly be significantly more expensive than even the current £2 billion estimate for fitting them to the Prince of Wales in build. It is therefore not unreasonable to think of a likely cost of between £2.5 billion and £3 billion for retrospective fit to the Queen Elizabeth, making that project, as I suggested in my statement, in practice unlikely ever to occur.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

Can the Secretary of State confirm that the terms of business agreement signed in 2009 provide that on completion of the carrier build, the UK will be spending perhaps only £230 million a year—0.7% of the MOD budget—to maintain essential shipbuilding skills? More important, will he tell us whether, as a result of the additional costs announced in today’s statement, he envisages that very small figure being reduced further in the future?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right: the terms of business agreement with the shipbuilding consortium commits the MOD to underwriting overhead costs of about £230 million a year to maintain skills. The challenge for the MOD is so to manage the shipbuilding programme as to recover as much of that as possible. After the carrier programme is finished in the shipyards covered by the TOBA, we will move on to the Type 26 programme and recover costs in that way. As far as I am aware, there is no mechanism for reducing that £230 million—it is a contractual figure.

RAF Leuchars

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I have been approaching this matter on the basis of the speed of deployment within certain arcs. I understand that the approach is to take the base as the centre and then draw a circle, but there is no doubt that, because of its operations over the sea, there may well be occasions when RAF Leuchars would be deployed for the purpose of protecting interests in Northern Ireland.

I have heard no strategic argument for the closure of RAF Leuchars. The strategic case for its retention is exactly the same as the strategic case for its selection for the role that it now plays. It has been chosen to be the home of three Typhoon squadrons, one of which, 6 Squadron, is already in place there. The case stood up on 6 September, a few days before one of the last surviving air shows, which drew a crowd of some 50,000 people. That made it the second largest non-sporting event in Scotland—the largest is a rock festival entitled T in the Park. The fact that 50,000 people are able to go and want to go is a reflection, of course, on the base’s geographical position adjacent to the main centres of population.

RAF Leuchars was chosen for its role because it has ready access to training areas over land and over the North sea. It was chosen because the local weather—its particular climate—is very suitable for flying operations. As the hon. Member for Glenrothes (Lindsay Roy) said, Leuchars has been chosen to perform two essential components of the quick reaction alert, or QRA. The first is to protect northern Britain from unwelcome and illegal intrusion into United Kingdom airspace, which it is called upon to do on an almost regular number of occasions as other air forces seek to determine the state of readiness of the Royal Air Force to defend the UK’s airspace.

The second part of the QRA is the duty that RAF Leuchars has to protect us from terrorist attack from the air and stop any malign effort to do damage to the fabric or population of the United Kingdom. Only a few years ago that possibility would have been thought so remote as not to be regarded but, unhappily, it now has to be given more serious consideration because of the attack on the twin towers and its consequences.

RAF Leuchars was chosen, therefore, because the established strategic considerations were favourable, and they remain so. It was chosen because the fact that 80% of the Scottish population live within 80 miles demonstrates that it provides the immediacy of protection required. As 111 Squadron, to which I have referred, comes to the end of its service at Leuchars, 6 Squadron will take over. The 111 Squadron has been flying the Tornado F-3, an aircraft that has given us valiant service since its introduction. It is to be replaced by the Typhoon, formerly the Eurofighter, the most modern and up to date of aircraft available to the Royal Air Force.

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making an extremely strong case for the retention of Leuchars, which the Scottish National party supports. May I ask him to ensure that we do not allow the Government to play Lossiemouth off against Leuchars and to make the case for the retention of all the capacity we have and against the overall reduction of the RAF footprint in Scotland?