Support for Ukraine and Countering Threats from Russia

Stewart Hosie Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Stewart Hosie (Dundee East) (SNP)]

The invasion of Ukraine is brutal and it is wrong; the justifications for it are a tissue of lies. The resistance of the Ukrainian people against such an onslaught, with Russia deploying internationally banned illegal weapons against civilian targets, is heroic. I imagine everybody here is humbled by the bravery and courage of ordinary people taking up arms to confront such aggression.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Less than an hour ago, I spoke to my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham (Adam Holloway), who is in western Ukraine. He is a military officer and has been talking to the military there, who are pleading, “Please send us defence anti-tank weapons and defence anti-aircraft weapons.” He has emphasised that, and he asked me to intervene in this debate to make that comment.

[Stewart Hosie]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman. I backed today’s motion precisely because it calls for the provision of further defensive equipment and “humanitarian and other assistance”. Although it ought to be unnecessary, I also join the calls to ensure that the UK’s NATO defence and security obligations are fulfilled to counter the threats from Russia.

Those threats are not simply on the ground in Ukraine today, nor is the action to tackle hostile Russian activity limited to support against the current invasion. We must ensure that the tools required to counter Russia now—our continued work with NATO—and the resources required to keep our guard up against a long-term and growing threat are provided in full. I will turn briefly to each of those strands.

On 23 February, the Minister for Asia and the Middle East said in the debate on the Russian invasion:

“We are committed to bringing forward the economic crime Bill. It will establish a new public register of beneficial ownership of overseas companies… It will ensure that individuals and entities can no longer hide in the shadows.”—[Official Report, 23 February 2022; Vol. 709, c. 336.]

I very much welcome that, but given that the ISC Russia report published in 2020 included a chapter on tackling crime, it is hugely disappointing that we do not already have the necessary legislation on the statute book. That is particularly the case given that the Russia report contained the warning from the National Crime Agency that, for example,

“there are several ways in which the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 is too restrictive.”

The report also described the changes the NCA would wish to see to the legislation. I therefore welcome the new legislation, but can we have it brought forward with immediate effect?

On my second point, our relationship with NATO, again, the ISC Russia report was clear, saying at paragraph 129:

“NATO remains at the heart of strategic thought…Diminishing the strength of NATO is therefore a key aim of the Kremlin, as is undermining the credibility of Article V of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and ‘delivering NATO and non-NATO deterrence’ therefore forms a key part of the 2019 cross-Whitehall Russia Strategy.”

The ISC was

“encouraged to note that Defence Intelligence shares its intelligence assessments with NATO, which we were told aim to try ‘to ensure as common an understanding of the nature of the Russian threat and situation that we face’. Defence Intelligence highlighted several ‘really important parts of how we feed into the NATO system’”.

It is self-evidently the case that with the attack on Ukraine, and for our future defence, that work with NATO will have to be supported and enhanced.

That leads me to my final and most important point—resources. The ISC asked this question:

“If we consider the Russian threat to have been clearly indicated in 2006 with the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, and then take events such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as firmly underlining Russian intent on the global stage, the question is whether the Intelligence Community should—and could—have reacted more”.

MI5 was clear that there was an inevitable reprioritisation due to the terrorist threat. Defence Intelligence viewed it similarly. SIS and GCHQ saw it as due to the longer lead time required for work on Russia. SIS said:

“I don’t think we did take our eye off the ball. I think the appetite for work against the Russian threat has sort of waxed and waned.”

GCHQ agreed. The ISC fully recognised

“the very considerable pressures on the Agencies…and that they have a finite amount of resource, which they must focus on operational priorities. Nevertheless, reacting to the here and now is inherently inefficient and—in our opinion—until recently, the Government had badly underestimated the Russian threat and the response it required.”

I hope that no one now underestimates the scale of the Russian threat, or the resources necessary, now and in future, and not least to the intelligence agencies, to counter it.