Oral Answers to Questions

Steve Rotheram Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

The Attorney-General was asked—

[Steve Rotheram (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab)]

1. What recent discussions he has had with his Cabinet colleagues on implementation of the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations on human rights.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

6. What recent discussions he has had with his Cabinet colleagues on implementation of the UK’s domestic and international legal obligations on human rights. [R]

[The Attorney-General (Jeremy Wright)]

Hon. Members will know that I cannot discuss legal advice that I may have given to members of the Government, but I have regular discussions with colleagues about a large number of issues. Domestic and international human rights are an important aspect of our law and are a key consideration in the Law Officers’ work.

[Steve Rotheram]

Can the Attorney-General tell the House whether he supports the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights, and whether he and the Solicitor-General are completely in agreement with the Government’s position?

[The Attorney-General]

The answer to the latter part of the hon. Gentleman’s question is yes. On the first part, I do not support the Human Rights Act, but I do support the European convention on human rights. There is a misunderstanding here, perhaps on his part and certainly among some of his Labour colleagues, as the abolition of the Human Rights Act does not mean the abolition of human rights. The Conservative party is in favour of human rights and we have a proud record on human rights. What we do not agree with is the mess his party made of the relationship between this country’s courts and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg—we will do something about it.

Communications: Social Media

Steve Rotheram Excerpts

Tuesday 26th February 2013 Westminster Hall

[Steve Rotheram (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Dobbin.

On 19 December 2012, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer, issued interim guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media. It was a welcome move in the right direction and I hope that Parliament and the judiciary will study internet abuse more closely and begin, as I have been urging Ministers to do for some time, to distinguish between the different degrees of online abuse.

As I explained in my Adjournment debate in September last year, trolling first came to my attention following the tragic death of Liverpool teenager, Georgia Varley, in October 2011. Since then, it has become clear that there is no clear-cut definition of trolling. Too often, this is confused with cyber-bullying, cyber-stalking or even child grooming. Trolling is something very different. I would characterise it as something said online that carries online consequences and poses no offline, real-world risk to the individual in receipt of the message. Trolls demonstrate immoral and unethical behaviour and, quite often, as in the case of Georgia, they trade entertainment on the back of an individual’s personal grief. In essence, the victims of trolls suffer psychological, not physical, abuse.

It is a growing problem in British society and one that Parliament and the legal process have been slow to recognise. I want to focus on concerns regarding the advice given to prosecutors, suggesting that messages sent that are of a grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false nature do not meet the public interest test, inasmuch as they are unlikely to lead to prosecutions. Indeed, Crown Prosecution Service rules state:

“Just because the content expressed in the communication is in bad taste, controversial or unpopular, and may cause offence to individuals or a specific community, this is not in itself sufficient reason to engage the criminal law”.

That should concentrate the minds of parliamentarians. There are rightly concerns because the guidelines fail to articulate exactly what trolling is or identify what kind of people are commonly victims of it; instead, the guidelines attempt to issue a one-size-fits-all solution that is not contextually bound and takes no consideration of personal relationships between the sender, the recipient and/or the subject matter.

The guidelines set out by the DPP that most relate to that issue are referenced in section 127 of the Communications Act 2003. The interim guidelines attempt to make a clear distinction between the different degree of abuse sent via social media, and so instruct prosecutors accordingly. For example, because of the seriousness of the potential offence threatened in a message as outlined in paragraphs 12(1), 12(2) and 12(3), such misdemeanours would be prosecuted robustly using, it has to be said, mainly legislation designed for offline offences.

We are advised that offences deemed to have been committed in accordance with paragraph 12(4), which are likely to be grossly offensive, indecent, obscene, menacing or false, are unlikely to lead to a prosecution despite the distress, hurt and needless anxiety that such contraventions can cause. That is where the guidelines have failed adequately to address the growing problem. Indeed, the directive highlights one of the major problems for prosecutors, because, in accordance with the guidelines, something said online is not punishable in law in the same way as something said offline. In essence, the guidelines fail to address the increasing grey area of trolling: the difficulty of proving what a troll intends and what a victim interprets the troll’s intention as being. That, coupled with the ease with which anonymity is afforded to social media users, has led to deliberately manipulative and deceptive behaviours with which prosecutors have not been able to get to grips. Put differently, there is a fundamental failure to grasp the intention of trolls: namely, it is their sole purpose on the internet grossly to offend with obscene messages. The DPP’s justification for what I perceive to be leniency is that it is not in the public interest to prosecute such people, which is germane to my critique of the guidelines because, in my opinion, they misinterpret the public interest.

In describing the dilemma, I am aware of a quote from an illustrious former Prime Minister and Merseyside MP, Harold Wilson. He said:

“I doubt whether any Member could provide a legal definition of what he means by the public interest, capable of covering changing national conditions and of being applied to all…cases”.—[Official Report, 22 April 1948; Vol. 449, c. 2035-2036.]

I do not profess to being legally trained, so I would no doubt fail the Wilson test, but as the use of social media increases exponentially, the exposure to such gratuitous activity increases in proportion. It stands to reason, therefore, that the public’s propensity to want to see such crimes dealt with by the criminal justice system will have increased consequently.

Paragraph 39 of the guidelines specifically addresses the question of public interest. The guidelines advise that if a suspect has taken swift action to remove the communication or has expressed genuine remorse, he or she should not face prosecution. I broadly welcome that clarification, but swift removal does not necessarily mean someone has not already been grossly offended. The internet allows individuals to build an audience of tens, hundreds or even thousands within a very short space of time. Under the guidelines, an individual troll could post a series of grossly offensive messages that are seen by many people, but simply removing the posts within a short space of time—and “swift removal” is not defined in the guidelines—makes it hard for action to be taken against that troll.

Similarly, deletion does not take away the possible psychological impact on someone who has already seen the message. Deleting a message from the internet does not delete it from someone’s mind. Additionally, the guidelines advise that if swift and effective action has been taken by others, such as a service provider, to remove the communication in question, or otherwise to block access to it, prosecution is not in the public interest. Surely that would depend on the particular type and frequency of such transgressions. The guidelines are a “get out of jail free” card that offers virtually no deterrent whatsoever. To all intents and purposes, prosecution can be avoided because of the discretion of others, which is something we should not endorse.

[Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing this important debate. I have two points. First, he talks about people retweeting a message on Twitter. Does he agree that, whether someone is the first or the fifty-thousandth person to retweet a message, there should be equal liability? Otherwise some people would not be prosecuted because they retweeted later than others. Does he also agree that it is good to have a review of the guidelines? We need to make the public aware of how defamation laws apply to social media, otherwise people will say, “Well, I did not know.” The message has to go out to the country: “If you commit a crime or breach the defamation law, you will have to face the consequences.” We need new guidance, but, equally, people must be aware of the existing guidelines.

[Steve Rotheram]

The hon. Gentleman will know that, in law, ignorance is no excuse. So someone could be prosecuted for defamation if they transgress the guidelines. On the first point, I believe that anyone who engages in social media should be aware of the social consequences of posting such tweets or Facebook statuses, as my assistant, who is a regular Facebook user, tells me they are called.

The guidelines advise that if a communication is not intended for a wide audience, nor is that the obvious consequence of sending the communication, the offender should not face prosecution, particularly where the intended audience did not include the victim or target of the communication in question. That is weak and, with respect, misunderstands social media. In the case of an RIP memorial page on Facebook, for example, a troll’s message on a status is not directed solely at the person who authored the status but is also directed at other people who have commented on the status and all those who have visual access to it. In the case of Georgia Varley, more than 4,500 people had liked her page and were therefore able to see a whole host of comments, unfortunately including those posted by trolls. That calls into question how the DPP uses the term “wide audience.” Does a prosecutor have to investigate the computer literacy of a suspect to determine whether they knew the exact figure of the audience in receipt of their post? Additionally, the subject of an RIP memorial page on Facebook would, of course, be deceased. The intended victim of the troll, therefore, is not necessarily the deceased person but the reader of the message.

The guidelines also advise that if the content of a communication does not obviously go beyond what could conceivably be tolerable or acceptable in an open and diverse society that upholds and respects freedom of expression, no prosecution is necessary. Of course I agree with that, but I also believe that greater consideration must be given to enforcing the law when grossly offensive comments have been made. There should be some online equivalent to offences committed offline. Only two people in England have been successfully prosecuted and jailed for sending messages considered to be grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or menacing. Is that really an effective deterrent to the people who are sitting at their computers right now, contemplating sending a disgusting message that might cause gross offence?

I understand that questions have been raised about a person’s right to freedom of speech offline versus their right to freedom of expression online, and I accept that it is about proportionality, but the reality is that anyone who knows anything about trolling will say that the problem is that too much grossly offensive material exists, and it would be far too resource-intensive for the criminal justice system to investigate each and every case.

I agree with paragraph 29 of the guidelines, which suggests that any parliamentary proposal would have to ensure that it did not have

“a chilling effect on free speech”.

We must take into consideration the European Court of Human Rights directive, which protects an individual’s right to speech that is offensive, shocking or disturbing. There is still a debate to be had about whether free speech even applies to the sending of communications via social media, or whether it is classed as freedom of expression, which is not an absolute right.

We are talking about vile, insulting and unacceptable behaviour, such as the comments that I have seen posted on RIP memorial pages on Facebook and that were revealed in a BBC “Panorama” documentary. We are not talking about someone’s legitimate right to express themselves freely. There is a world of difference between a fair comment and a wilful denigration without validity that aims simply to cause as much hurt and offence as possible. If we try to protect trolls’ freedom to offend grossly, we are essentially defending the indefensible.

The guidelines clearly give preference to physical abuse or the risk of physical abuse over psychological abuse. When I met the Crown Prosecution Service, its view was that, given the complexity of online abuse, the police are not afforded enough time to compile the evidence necessary to take a case to court. Often, a maximum of six months is not long enough to gather sufficient proof of the alleged offence for a successful prosecution. In any such investigation, the police must routinely combat fake accounts, fake identities, fake e-mail addresses and issues with mobile communications, such as pay-as-you-go devices. Deception makes it difficult for officers to know where to start when looking for a troll hiding behind the anonymity of a computer.

However, that should not prevent us from trying to rectify the problem and eradicate the grey area that I have described. In fact, as I have said, I believe that granting the police and the CPS additional time to gather evidence for court cases would allow them to obtain evidence that meets the test of what is grossly offensive and even expose patterns of behaviour in some individuals that could lead to criminal prosecution.

As well as additional time to compile evidence, the police need innovative approaches to assist them. For example, the university of Central Lancashire is in the early stages of looking at ways to identify trolls through written word patterns. Dr Claire Hardaker, a lecturer in linguistics and English language at the university, said:

“Everyone has a unique way of writing, of putting certain words together, which is subconscious. Many teenagers say they are able to identify who sent a text to them just by the style of writing and word habits or the way the words are written. Someone might be pretending to be someone else, but by analysing the way they write online, we can determine a probable, age, gender, even a probable region from where they come from.”

Such creative approaches could be invaluable in convicting trolls. However, it is also true to suggest that any such invention will be for nothing until the DPP can adequately provide prosecutors with a definition of trolling that is separate from cyber-bullying, cyber-stalking or grooming and that can be robustly prosecuted where appropriate.

One conclusion that I reached early in my investigations into trolling is that a multi-agency approach is needed to tackle the problem effectively. As I have repeated, I am of the firm belief that the way to deter individuals from sending grossly offensive comments on social media is to change the culture of online users. That in turn requires a clear lead from the judicial system. That does not necessarily mean changing the law, but it does mean changing the application of the law, which the guidelines fail to do. The final part of Harold Wilson’s quote in the Commons is:

“In the last resort this House is, and must be, the authority which decides whether or not any particular practice is in the public interest.”—[Official Report, 22 April 1948; Vol. 449, c. 2037.]

He was, of course, right.

I conclude by thanking hon. Members for taking part and by asking the Solicitor-General the following questions. How does he define internet trolling? Does he agree with the DPP’s assessment that messages sent via social media that are grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false are unlikely to warrant prosecutions because it is not in the public interest to do so? Does he agree with the approach set out in paragraph 12, which is to assess initially offences that may have been committed using social media? What steps is he taking to work with prosecutors to find new ways to identify trolls, such as the scheme devised by the university of Central Lancashire? Finally, will he consider my request to increase the period of time that the police have to collect their evidence on trolls before a case must be brought before the courts?

Kevin Williams

Steve Rotheram Excerpts

Wednesday 22nd February 2012 Westminster Hall

[Steve Rotheram (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab)]

It is an honour to speak under your chairmanship for the first time, Mrs Main. For many people attending Westminster Hall today and for those watching at home, there may be confusion that after 118,000 people signed a Government e-petition, today’s proceedings are not being heard in the main Chamber of the House. People recognise the green Benches of the Commons, but understandably will be less familiar with today’s surroundings. The Government need to address that when public expectations are raised owing to a petition reaching 100,000 signatures. This debate could have happened in the exact same location and in the exact same format without a single person having signed the online petition. I feel some sympathy for the Backbench Business Committee because of the dilemma that it faces in looking for parliamentary time to debate such important issues—this is an important issue to hundreds of thousands of our constituents—but here, in the mother of Parliaments, what could be more important than justice? That is what we are trying to achieve today.

We are here to argue the case for the Attorney-General to review the overwhelming evidence relating to the unlawful killing of a young man—Kevin Williams. Some people have asked why we are back here again, following the success of the absolutely enthralling debate in the House on 17 October. It is simply because there are specific questions that still require specific answers. If there was a case in any other walk of life in which the police and members of the emergency services had altered statements, fabricated stories and covered their own backs, there would quite rightly be public outrage. Well, there is public outrage. The public of Merseyside and far beyond have been outraged for 22 and a half years, and it is time that the cynics who believe that we are

“like a blind man in a darkened room looking for a black cat that isn’t there”

woke up to what happened with the Hillsborough cover-up. For Anne Williams and her family, the backdrop to their individual tragedy is the same as that for the other 95 families—it is the dignified pursuit of justice.

In the limited time available, I will not repeat the sequence of events as laid out by the hon. Member for City of Chester (Stephen Mosley).He has provided the necessary detail to illustrate the specific circumstances of young Kevin’s death, and I congratulate him on the way he went about that during his contribution. Despite successive Attorney-Generals and Home Secretaries dismally and consistently failing to act on this issue, there may be light at the end of a very long tunnel. Credit where it is due: I have to thank the current Home Secretary for her contribution, commitment and forthright action back in October. The Hillsborough independent panel is now accessing all the unrestricted and unredacted documentation that our cross-party consensus on that night secured. My hope is that the current Attorney-General will look afresh at the evidence in this case, as he has suggested that he will.

There are options for us as parliamentarians. We can go down the path of hyperbole and trying to hide behind complex legal argument and archaic parliamentary conventions, or we can adopt a simpler approach based on the elementary principle of right and wrong.

[Maria Eagle (Garston and Halewood) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this case, of the many cases involved, illustrates just how appallingly inadequate the original inquests were in doing the job inquests are supposed to do: establishing the cause of death in each individual case and bringing a sense of closure to the relatives left behind? Does he agree that the 3.15 pm cut-off point and the accidental death verdicts were instrumental in creating the ongoing sense of deep injustice felt by families such as that of Anne Williams? That needs to be put right to put a stop to the suffering of people such as Anne Williams whose relatives died at Hillsborough.

[Steve Rotheram]

My hon. Friend is once again spot on with her forensic understanding of the issues. Her contribution in the debate on the Floor of the House highlighted her comprehensive appreciation of what happened at Hillsborough. She touches on two important issues. The first is that the original inquest was inadequate, and the hon. Member for City of Chester made absolutely clear why that is so. The second is the ongoing sense of injustice, which has resonated not only in Liverpool. The people who signed the online petition come from right across this country and from different political persuasions. They include football fans and people who are not interested in sport. People are beginning to understand what the people of Merseyside have fought for for 22 and a half years.

As a result of the overwhelming evidence, Kevin’s case proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that the 3.15 pm cut-off point was simply wrong. It is fundamentally flawed and it does not stand up to scrutiny. For those who failed in their duty on that day, it has, quite literally, been their get-out-of-jail-free card. They point to the 3.15 pm cut-off and claim there was nothing they could do. How wrong they are. They could and should have saved Kevin Williams.

Since becoming an MP, I have wrestled with how best to explain to people who are not necessarily familiar with the Hillsborough tragedy exactly why it still matters. Twenty-two and a half years on from the disaster, some might wonder why their MPs are in this Chamber debating it. They could be forgiven for asking that, and many were not even born in 1989. As human beings, however, they must surely understand that this debate, this campaign and this dark chapter in British history are, and always have been, about broken-hearted mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, and brothers and sisters fighting for loved ones who went to a football match and did not come home.

All deaths are tragic, especially when they involve children. It is also true that Britain has experienced other national tragedies over the past three decades, but has there ever been a national tragedy in which no one has been held to account?

[Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for City of Chester (Stephen Mosley) on his excellent speech. I also support Anne Williams’s campaign, which proves nothing is stronger than a mother’s love for her child. One point has never really been brought out to the extent that it should be. Not only was this disaster caused by incompetence and a complete disregard for people’s safety, but some of the people alive after 3.15 pm could have survived, and did not. A lot of people do not understand that. Not only was there a disaster because the crushing resulted in people being injured and killed, but others could have survived afterwards had they been looked after properly—it was a double disaster.

[Steve Rotheram]

My hon. Friend makes an important contribution. If we look not just at Kevin’s case, but at the disaster that took place that day, it is clear that had it not been for the quick action of Liverpool fans, the tragedy would have involved way more than 96 deaths and could have involved many hundreds of deaths. Liverpool fans acted, while those charged with our safety that day froze, and that should never be forgotten.

Today, we have heard that the cause of Kevin’s death should be re-examined. As we have heard, his mother is yet to pick up his death certificate, because the cause of death is wrong. Imagine a country that has so far allowed a broken-hearted mother to wait 23 years to find out the reasons why her young son died at a football match, when she knows it was not the result of traumatic asphyxia.

The e-petition stated that the overwhelming evidence makes it quite clear that the Attorney-General needs to look afresh at this issue to reach the logical conclusion that Kevin was not dead at 3.15 pm, but died subsequently, so that he can deem that it is right to grant a new coroner’s inquest.

The families have fought their dignified campaign for more than two decades, with an eternal flame burning bright—the flame of hope. Kevin’s mother, Anne, has hope in her heart today. She has been joined on her heart-breaking journey by the families of the other 95 victims of Hillsborough, some of whom I left earlier at a different venue. My hope is that we can finally get justice for those who lost their lives and the families who continue to mourn them. Only then will the families of the 96 be able to put their loved ones to rest.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

Phone Hacking

Steve Rotheram Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Watson]

I fully agree with the hon. Gentleman, and thank him for his brave contribution. I believe that Rebekah Brooks was not only responsible for wrongdoing, but knew about it. The evidence in the paper that she edited contradicts her statements that she knew nothing about unlawful behaviour. Take the edition that she edited on 14 April 2002, which reveals that the News of the World had information from Milly Dowler’s phone. In other words, they knew about the messages on her phone. They wrote that there was

“left a message on her voicemail after the 13-year-old vanished at 4pm on March 21. On march 27th, six days after Milly went missing in Walton-on-Thames, Surrey, the employment agency appears to have phoned her mobile.”

It was a central part of the paper’s story that it had evidence from a telephone—evidence that it could get only from breaking into that phone at the time. The story that Rebekah Brooks was far from the Dowler events is simply not believable when her own newspaper wrote about the information that it had gained from that phone.

I want to inform the House of further evidence that suggests that Rebekah Brooks knew of the unlawful tactics of the News of the World as early as 2002, despite all her denials yesterday.

Rebekah Brooks was present at a meeting with Scotland Yard when police officers pursuing a murder investigation provided her with evidence that her newspaper was interfering with the pursuit of justice. They gave her the name of another senior executive at News International, Alex Marunchak. At the meeting, which included Dick Fedorcio of the Metropolitan police, she was told that News of the World staff were guilty of interference and party to using unlawful means to attempt to discredit a police officer and his wife.

Rebekah Brooks was told of actions by people whom she paid to expose and discredit David Cook and his wife Jackie Haines, so that Mr Cook would be prevented from completing an investigation into a murder. News International was paying people to interfere with police officers and was doing so on behalf of known criminals. We know now that News International had entered the criminal underworld.

Rebekah Brooks cannot deny being present at that meeting when the actions of people whom she paid were exposed. She cannot deny now being warned that under her auspices unlawful tactics were used for the purpose of interfering with the pursuit of justice. She cannot deny that one of her staff, Alex Marunchak, was named and involved. She cannot deny either that she was told by the police that her own paper was using unlawful tactics, in that case to help one of her lawbreaking investigators. This, in my view, shows that her culpability goes beyond taking the blame as head of the organisation; it is about direct knowledge of unlawful behaviour. Was Mr Marunchak dismissed? No. He was promoted.

[Steve Rotheram (Liverpool, Walton) (Lab)]

Twenty-two years ago, my city warned anyone who would listen that scurrilous rags such as The Sun were out of control, after it printed blatant lies about the Hillsborough disaster. News International lied to the country in 1989, and it still seems to be lying to the country now. Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government should ensure that it does not take 22 years to put right this latest wrong?

[Mr Watson]

I agree, and, just as the people of Liverpool no longer buy The Sun, thousands of people have joined a Facebook group to boycott—along with advertisers—the News of the World. I am sure that people watching this debate will consider that fact.