Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Second sitting)

Simon Opher Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 28th January 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)]

Q I hear what you have said already regarding capacity. Of course, the Mental Capacity Act relies on the capacity principles. They include the presumption of capacity, the principle that a person cannot be seen as lacking capacity unless all practicable steps have been taken to support them to make a decision, and the principle that a person cannot be seen as lacking capacity merely because the decision is unwise.

I also heard what you said about the scaling of decision making, but within the Bill, in some of those scenarios there is no mandating; the word “may” is used rather than “must”. I want to understand your viewpoint on whether it would provide stronger safeguards if those parts of the Bill were tightened to include “must” rather than “may”, and if the reference to capacity were replaced with a separate definition of “ability”, as proposed in our amendments.

Professor Whitty: I am probably not the best person to ask about the exact drafting of the Bill in terms of “may” and “must”, but I can answer the second part of your question, which is really important.

If there were no Mental Capacity Act, there would be an argument, which has been used for a long time, that the Bill would have to define what was meant with a fair degree of clarity. It would not be able to do that with just one clause; there would have to be quite a lot of clauses, if I am honest. All systems of this sort are going to be imperfect. The reason why I think it is sensible to base yourself on the Mental Capacity Act is that it is well used and well understood in practice by practitioners every day. Having a system with two completely separate groups of assessment, one of which has never been tested in the courts or used outwith this Bill, would lead to a whole set of potential complications and ambiguities, which are not there at the moment because we have a well-tested mechanism through the Mental Capacity Act.

People should move away from the Mental Capacity Act with some caution, because I think that will cause as many problems as it solves. It is not clear to me what problem people are trying to solve by doing that, given that the Mental Capacity Act clearly makes the point that the more severe the decision, the greater the degree of capacity that has to be assumed before people can actually take that decision. That is the foundation of some of the disquiet that people have had, but it is central to how the Mental Capacity Act works in practice.

[Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)]

Q You have already said some words about prognosis, which is causing some anxiety. First, are you happy with a six-month prognostic period? Secondly, the Bill says that death should

“reasonably be expected within 6 months.”

Is that in line with your thoughts on the matter?

Professor Whitty: I think that is a reasonable point in time provided that, in taking that period into account, Parliament assumes that we mean a central view that this is six months, although it might be before that and it might be after. Other times would be equally reasonable, but if you are going to choose one, then six months is reasonable. It is generally very predictable that someone is going to die in the foreseeable future, but predicting whether that will be in five months or seven months is a lot harder, and there would be some caution.

Notably, in the countries that have chosen to go down an assisted dying route—a variety of different ones have been chosen—a significant minority of people die before they actually get to the point where that occurs because there is uncertainty in both directions. I think that period is as good as any other, but I want people to be clear that this is not an exact science where you can say, for example, “On 20 August.” It is not as tight as saying that a baby is going be born on a certain date. It has a wider spread of uncertainty around it. In the overwhelming majority of cases, that does not mean that it will go on for months or years longer, but there will be some degree of uncertainty.

[Dr Opher]

Q I am interested in the opt-out whereby ethically, doctors can opt out of taking the decision for patients. Would they then need to steer someone towards another doctor, or can they just simply refuse to do it?

Professor Whitty: Duncan may wish to comment for nurses. For doctors, we should be very mindful of the fact that for some doctors, as for some citizens, this is a point of very strong principle indeed, therefore there will be a gradation of people feeling that they can personally be involved in it. I suspect that if they themselves did not feel able to do it—because of conscience or choice, or because they did not feel that they had the necessary skills—the great majority would have no problem referring on, but it might be an issue for some people.

Personally, my view is that we should be able to have the range, provided that people are aware in general that, if one person cannot provide it and then does not wish to discuss it, there are alternative routes. But that really is a matter for Parliament and if Parliament says, “No, actually, that is unfair on the patient, because then the patient is having to go through an extra step,” that is an alternative and perfectly reasonable principle. Parliament is going to have to balance those two principles; that is not for me as a doctor. I just think that that range of opinion needs to be thought through when people are coming to that final parliamentary decision.

Duncan Burton: If I could add to that, again, I think that bit about the wider workforce and how we would support them is really important. We have situations like this already. We have advice professionally around things such as abortions and working in embryo services and fertility, for example, so we need to make sure that the safeguards for our staff are really clear. As Chris has said, our staff will have a range of views and opinions on this, as will the wider public. So the work you do in creating this Bill is really important in terms of the advice that we give to people about signposting and having those conversations. Actually, our clinicians are having conversations every single day about the choices that people have at the end of their lives.

[Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)]

Q Sir Chris Whitty, you said that not all mental capacity assessments are safe. Do you think that hopelessness and low mood can affect someone’s capacity and that a sudden diagnosis of terminal illness can lead to some of those states—depression, low mood and hopelessness? Do you think that all doctors are capable of identifying those states?

Professor Whitty: I would hope that most doctors are capable of identifying that someone has some degree—or a large degree—of mental health distress, or mental health illness, if you wish. What not all doctors will feel comfortable doing is actually deciding whether that is sufficient to interfere with someone’s ability to make a decision with full capacity. That is where help from colleagues from psychiatry, and mental health more widely, is going to be useful.

But that should be good medical practice, in my view, under all circumstances. This Bill takes it to a high level of need because of the seriousness of the decisions being taken, but that is part of medical practice. Duncan will have discussed with senior nurses, when he when he was operating clinically, “Should we actually get an opinion from a mental health colleague”—either a community psychiatric nurse, if it is that kind of question, a psychiatrist or others—“to make that assessment?”

That is really the question, but I certainly would not want to be in a situation where the fact that someone with a terminal diagnosis will have some degree of low mood in itself just rules them out from any kind of medical intervention—this, or any other. That should not be the case. They have to have access to whatever the state and the medical profession are able to provide—again, obviously, depending on what Parliament decides on this particular Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lewis Atkinson]

indicated assent.

Dr Green: With regard to the specific questions, no, I do not believe that a doctor has to be a specialist in the individual disease at stake to advise a patient about prognosis. I can only refer you back to what Dr Whitty said: that in the majority of cases, it is fairly clear—this applies to capacity, too—but in some cases, it is not so clear. What is important is that the doctor has the ability to seek further advice if they need it; it is not always required.

[Dr Opher]

Q I have a couple of points to make. First, clause 4(5) states that a

“registered medical practitioner who is unwilling”

to go forward with the assisted dying request

“must, if requested…refer…to another registered medical practitioner”.

Are you happy with that clause?

Dr Green: No, we are not, because we know from our survey that some doctors feel very strongly about this. The word “referral”, to a doctor, means writing a letter or communicating with another doctor to see, but some doctors would find themselves not able to do that. For that reason, we believe that there should be an information service for the doctor to direct to. There is a particular problem with the word “referral”. Doctors would not be able to be obstructive; they have the same duties under good medical practice as they do, for example, with termination of pregnancy requests.

[Dr Opher]

Q My other point follows on from the previous question and is about status. The GMC and the BMA have all specialties of doctors beneath them. Would it be appropriate to have, for example, both doctors as general practitioners, or should there be provision for different doctors as the second doctor?

Dr Green: We have not taken a view on the qualifications of the doctors involved. We had discussions about what grade they should be, for example, but we took the view that their skillset and training was more important than their grade or position.

[Dr Opher]

Q In some legal medical situations, you need to be five years post training before you can have a view. Is that something you would have in both of these practitioners, or is that not necessary?

Dr Green: We did not take a view on that. We thought that training and experience was more important.

[Sarah Olney]

Q Leading on from Dr Opher’s question about the “must refer” clause, you and Professor Whitty both stress the importance of the relationship between the doctor and the patient, yet there may be doctors who feel very strongly against mentioning assisted dying. Given the existence of clause 4(5) and the “must refer”, do you think there is a danger that there might be doctors who would be reluctant to provide a prognosis of six months or less if they thought that that would make the patient eligible for assisted dying, and that simply was not something they could support?

Dr Green: That is why it is important that doctors should be able to opt out at any stage of this. There are doctors who would find it difficult to do that, and it is important that their position is respected.