(10 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is correct to say that in Scotland humanist weddings are permitted, and that has been the case since 2005. The Scottish system is entirely different from that in England and Wales because it is based on who officiates, rather than the place where the marriage takes place. It will be a major change in our law to go down that road. As I said, I will report to the House before the end of the year.
May I add my voice to those from both sides of the House urging my right hon. Friend to make progress on this issue? Humanist celebrations are not only successful in Scotland, as there are humanist ceremonies for births and deaths in England and Wales as well. He will be aware that there are already exceptions in marriage law for Jews and Quakers, so there is no real reason not to go ahead.
My hon. Friend is right that Jews and Quakers receive particular consideration, and I am also aware that—according to the figures we have—between 600 and 800 people conduct humanist weddings every year, although they are not legally valid. I understand the importance of the issue and I was fully supportive of the legislation when it went through the House. I undertake to give a full report to the House with a proposal on how we should move forward before the end of the year.
T10. The rate of self-harm in women’s prisons is much higher than in men’s prisons. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that women in prison have access to mental health care so that they can tackle the problems they face?
It is true that the rate of self-harm is far too high in our prisons and is traditionally higher among women than men. I can reassure my hon. Friend a little, however: between 2004 and 2010, the number of incidents was over 10,000 a year, but that has come down significantly in the last three years to fewer than 6,000 last year. However, this issue is clearly linked to mental health, and the Deputy Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and I have made it clear that we want mental health services to be as good in prisons as in the rest of the country and as good as all other NHS services and that we want to identify mental health issues when people first enter the criminal justice system, so that, ideally, they can be diverted from prison, not sent to prison.
(10 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberI hear what the hon. Gentleman says. All Ministers in all Departments are very clear both that we need to use effectively the powers we already have and that we have to take new powers, which have been announced by the Prime Minister, to fill any potential gaps in the protections we have. The powers will be targeted, proportionate and effective, and they will ensure that we meet our commitment to international law and human rights.
As a Liberal Democrat Minister, may I make it absolutely clear on behalf of all the team in the Ministry of Justice that we as a Government will take all the measures necessary to keep our country safe? We have already announced that there will be new powers to take passports from people temporarily while investigations are made to prevent them from travelling to places such as Syria and Iraq.
Does my right hon. Friend agree with the Law Commission’s 10th programme for law reform, which states that the offence of treason should be looked at again because it is outdated and needs improvement? It covers many offences that we would not now consider to be offences, and it is not actually useful law. Will he get his team to look at that?
As I said, the offence of treason has not been used since 1945. It dates from a much earlier statute. The Law Commission has not looked at it recently, but there is no reason why it should not come forward with a proposal to do so. On this issue, the Government are absolutely focused on making sure that people who go abroad and either commit serious offences abroad or when they come back to this country are prosecuted now and effectively. I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that we need to make sure that we have the full panoply of powers while respecting our international obligations, and that there are plenty of such powers without using the offence of treason.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberMembers on both sides of the House will have shared my hon. Friend’s experience, which is principally a matter for my colleagues in the Department for Work and Pensions. It will certainly be helpful if the right decisions are made more often in the first place, but we must ensure that tribunals, particularly the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, have enough resources to be able to deal with cases as soon as possible after receiving the information that they require. Often the problem is collecting the data that will enable an appeal to be heard. The present situation is not acceptable, and we need to reduce the delay between initial decisions and appeals.
The Ministry of Justice faces large costs as a result of appeals against decisions made but by not just the DWP but the Home Office. Ensuring that the right decisions were made would save the MOJ a huge amount of money. Will my right hon. Friend consider applying the “polluter pays” principle, so that the Department that has caused an excessive number of appeals pays some of the MOJ’s costs? That would give Departments an incentive to make the right decisions.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI shall be very brief as we are short of time, and I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) also hopes to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I draw the attention of the House and those watching our proceedings to amendments 178 to 181 and 183. I do that not just in my own name, but on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which examined the issue as part of its consideration of the Bill. The Joint Committee is disappointed that the Government have not yet published in full their responses to their consultation on schedule 7. These are controversial issues. Of course, we need anti-terrorist legislation and there is always a balance to be worked out between the civil liberty of the subject and the powers of the authorities.
We believe, however, that it is very important that legislation distinguishes between the conventional powers to stop, to search, and to question, which can be exercised without reasonable suspicion, and more intrusive powers, such as those of detaining and taking biometric samples, for which the Committee believes the Government have not yet made a persuasive case. The Joint Committee recommends introducing a reasonable suspicion requirement for the more intrusive powers under schedule 7. I know that some argue that schedule 7 should go altogether. That is not the position of the Joint Committee nor, coincidentally, is it the position of my party, which debated this at our conference in Glasgow a few weeks ago and took a view that there should be amendment broadly along the lines set out by the Joint Committee.
The issue came to prominence, as the House will remember, in August, when Mr David Miranda was stopped at Heathrow when coming into this country on his way back home to Brazil and was detained for nine hours under the anti-terror laws. There were protests by the Brazilian Government and widespread concern about whether the powers were used extensively. We hope we can persuade the Government to take the position of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but we will not seek to divide the House this afternoon, hoping there might be a chance not just for my hon. Friend, but even for the Minister to respond to our concerns.
I shall do my best to be brief to allow the Minister time to respond to the debate.
I welcome Government new clause 11. It is right to extend powers to PCSOs, allowing them to issue fixed penalty notices to cyclists riding without lights. I am a huge champion of cycling. I was delighted when the House passed a motion to get Britain cycling. One of the banes of my life in that context is cyclists who do not obey the rules of the road. Anything that we can do to get people to cycle safely and legally will make it easier for those of us who want to extend facilities for cyclists. There are sensible ways forward. In Cambridge we have been using a “lights instead of tickets” campaign to make sure that people get their lights. I welcome the new clause as a sensible step forward.
I shall spend most of my time talking about schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, to which I have tabled a series of amendments. There has been particular controversy recently, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) mentioned, because of the detention of David Miranda, the partner of The Guardian journalist working on the Edward Snowden leaks. This has led to the Independent Police Complaints Commission taking the Met to the High Court over failure to address complaints and how schedule 7 is used. This is a very broadly written power. It should not be a surprise that it has expanded from its original use in Northern Ireland in the 1970s to become worse and worse as illiberal Governments have made it even heavier.
It seems to me that it is not right for people who “look like terrorists” to be detained. That is exactly what happens under schedule 7. StopWatch has done a huge amount of work on this. Last year there were 64,000 schedule 7 stops—a huge number. Twenty-seven per cent. of those stopped for under an hour were Asian, much more than their proportion in the community, and 77% of those stopped for more than an hour were from ethnic minority populations. We should not consider that acceptable. StopWatch cites some chilling quotes from one man Glasgow who said that
“the first thing you ask your friend is . . . not how was the holiday, it’s did you get stopped and what did they ask you?”
If we are setting up a power that creates huge concern in the Muslim and ethnic minority populations, that will separate people from the bulk of our country and is deeply alarming. The Equality and Human Rights Commission and David Anderson QC have also commented on how damaging that is.
This is a matter that Liberal Democrats have been concerned about for a long time. It is not just about David Miranda, who has the support of The Guardian. It is also about people who are detained routinely. That is why my party has debated this and why I tabled a range of proposals. There are many concerns about schedule 7. One option would be to get rid of it. There are alternative powers in section 47A. I hope the Minister will comment on that. There are other options that we have looked at. I would like to see us committed to David Anderson QC’s proposals to limit the scope of schedule 7. The Government should introduce provisions to that effect in the other place.
I have also proposed implementing proposals that my party made at our conference. They include getting rid of the principle that authorities can stop people without any suspicion at all, restoring the right to silence for those who are detained, and questioning to be recorded from start to finish. Restoring confidence and the basic principles of the rule of law to that process and making sure that data collected are not used inappropriately should be important in the case of David Miranda. I also propose a statutory principle of annual review and a sunset clause. The Government should look at these proposals and I hope they will take advantage of the process to make sure that that happens. I am glad that that is supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I would love to deal with the proposals made by the Opposition and their proposals to ban synthetic caffeine, but in the interests of time I will allow the Minister to respond.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberI wish to speak to the new clause and amendments that I and the hon. Member for Aberavon (Dr Francis) tabled, and I will also say a word about the Government amendments and Labour’s amendment 96.
Our amendments all arise from the deliberations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has just completed its report on the Bill. I welcome the Minister of State, Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewes (Norman Baker)—if I can have his attention for a second—to his new responsibilities. I hope it will help him and the House if I say that we do not intend to seek to divide the House on the new clause or the amendments, but I hope that he will be able to give me a positive and constructive response. On many occasions we have been on the same side, trying to get positive and constructive responses from previous Conservative and Labour Governments. We have not always succeeded, but I hope that the new form of double act will allow me to ask for some reasonable changes and him to agree, either today or very shortly, to the changes that we seek.
I will put on record the relevant parts of the summary of the Joint Committee’s report, which we published on 9 October. It was the Committee’s fourth report of this Session. It states:
“The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 9 May 2013…It is a substantial Bill containing many provisions with significant human rights implications”.
The new clause relates to one of those implications. All the amendments in this group have human rights implications, which is why Mr Speaker has grouped them
We should like Ministers to pay attention to the issue of antisocial behaviour, which I shall come to expressly; to that of forced marriage; and, probably most politically controversially, to those of powers to stop, question, search and detain at ports, and compensation for miscarriages of justice. We shall come to those matters later in our deliberations.
We are grateful for the way the Bill team facilitated the Committee’s scrutiny of those issues, but we have three qualifications, as set out in our unanimous report. It states:
“First, we doubt whether the mechanisms for ensuring that a systematic analysis of the impact of laws and policies on children’s rights is carried out are yet embedded across Whitehall. We repeat our call for the Government to reassure Parliament that in future it will conduct a thorough assessment of the impact of legislation on the rights of children under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child before the legislation is introduced. We propose to raise with the Children’s Commissioner the question of what can be done, in practical terms, to accelerate the Government’s progress towards implementing its undertaking to Parliament of nearly three years ago.
Second, the number of significant Government amendments to the Bill with potentially significant human rights implications has made our scrutiny—”
any Committee’s scrutiny, but ours in particular—
“of the Bill’s human rights compatibility more difficult”.
We take up that issue with the Leader of the House on a regular basis, because the more amendments are tabled late in the day, the more difficult Committees such as ours find it to report to the House and advise colleagues on how to respond. The summary continues:
“Third, the Government has not always provided us with information it has promised in sufficient time to enable us to scrutinise it adequately. We call on the Government, once again, to ensure in future that we are provided with the information we request in time to inform our scrutiny of Government Bills.”
Let me address the new clause and amendments to the antisocial behaviour proposals collectively, and then I will consider them individually although I do not anticipate detaining the House for too long. Parts 1 to 6 of the Bill reform current measures on antisocial behaviour, and the Committee’s view is that preventive measures against antisocial behaviour are, in principle, a welcome fulfilment of the state’s positive obligation to protect people against having their rights interfered with by others—that is the important context in which we consider all human rights implications of the Bill’s antisocial behaviour provisions.
New clause 33 would add to the Bill the requirement that
“The courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration”
when imposing an injunction. It is a common principle of criminal and welfare law that the best interests of children be taken into account, and we would like that written into the Bill. The new clause simply states that the best interests of the child should be taken into account in four situations, namely when the courts are deciding to impose
“an injunction;
the terms of any prohibition or requirement;
sanctions for breach of an injunction; and
when determining reporting of a child’s case.”.
The Committee considered the human rights compatibility of the new civil injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance—an IPNA. The Bill states that an IPNA may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent antisocial behaviour—a lower test than the test of necessity required by human rights law. We also considered that the new IPNA definition of antisocial behaviour is too broad and not clear enough. I hope Ministers will consider positively the idea that the Bill should be as clear as possible and compatible with other legislation; we should not start introducing concepts not found in other legislation, which would mean that people would not know how the law would be interpreted.
In the Committee’s view, the Bill’s current provisions on the prohibitions and requirements that can be attached to an injunction are far too broad. Furthermore, we have not been persuaded that it is necessary to state expressly that prohibitions and requirements in an IPNA must “so far as practicable” avoid any conflict with religious beliefs. The Committee is clear—the House has been clear about this on many occasions—that the freedom to hold religious beliefs, or any beliefs that may not be from a religious perspective, is not a relative right but an absolute right that cannot be interfered with. The power to exclude a person from his or her home through the use of an IPNA is a severe measure, and the Committee believes further provision is required to ensure that such a power is used only when necessary.
As the new sanctions can be imposed on children as young as 10, the Committee also scrutinised the provisions and considered their impact on the rights of children. To reduce the potential negative impact of IPNA measures on children, we recommend that the courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in any IPNA legal proceedings. That explains the Committee’s position, and I will now consider quickly other amendments in the group.
My right hon. Friend is making an extremely good point. Has he had a chance to consider the report by the Home Affairs Committee which, during pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, came up with many of the concerns he has highlighted? Perhaps the fact that two different Committees raised the same concerns will mean that our hon. Friend the Minister might reflect more on the issue.
I am aware of the report by the Home Affairs Committee. One good thing is that since I started—my hon. Friend was very young; indeed, he may not have been alive, or just about, I think—Select Committees have become more useful and effective. They play a strong and useful part not just in considering issues, as the Home Affairs Committee has done, but in looking at legislation and reporting to the House. If we set up Select Committees like the Home Affairs Committee, or the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I and the hon. Member for Aberavon have the privilege to serve and which he has the honour to chair, it is nonsensical if our recommendations are not properly considered by the Government.
Amendments 158, 163, 164, 159 to 162, 165 and 166 relate to part 1 of the Bill. They do not require any great supporting speech as I hope they are drafted clearly and make their point. Amendment 158 would amend clause 1 on the power to grant injunctions, and would add to subsection (2) the words “might reasonably be regarded”. If amended, the clause would read:
“The first condition is that the court is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in conduct that might reasonably be regarded as capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
That seeks to introduce an objective rather than a subjective test, which we believe would be helpful in ensuring the law is clear.
Amendments 163 and 164 go together and would mean that one test a court should apply when considering whether to impose an injunction, in addition to whether it is “just and convenient”, should be whether it is “proportionate”. That is a simple proposition, and as I know from my constituency work—and, I guess, the same is true for colleagues—it is always difficult to judge whether going to court and getting an injunction is the right way to deal with what may be growing, yet still relatively modest, antisocial behaviour. We think proportionality is appropriate and that it is better to write that into the Bill.
Amendments 159 to 162 ask for greater specificity about what the injunction prohibits, and we have tried to tidy up the language a bit—to put it bluntly—and remove some relatively loose wording. Clause 1(4) currently reads:
“An injunction under this section may for the purpose of preventing the respondent from engaging in anti-social behaviour—
prohibit the respondent from doing anything described in the injunction;
require the respondent to do anything described in the injunction.”
There is a prohibition provision and a requirement provision. We ask the House to consider whether, rather than “do anything” the clause could be a bit more specific—that is a pretty general phrase not normally found in legislation. Amendment 159 would prohibit the respondent from “specified actions”, so the injunction would state, “You cannot throw stones through windows”, rather than, “You cannot do anything,” which may or may not be specified. “You must stop behaving badly” seems a rather unsatisfactory and general instruction, whether it is men behaving badly, or women or anybody else.
My right hon. Friend is making an extremely good series of points. Does he share a concern about positive actions? There may be cases where somebody, through no fault of their own, cannot perform a positive action. There were cases with indeterminate sentences, for example, where prisoners were required to do various courses, which in some cases were not available for them to do. Would that also be checked?
One of the things that I hope we do better now because of Select Committees is take time to get Bills right. We have pre-legislative scrutiny which—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) knows that I was critical of large parts of the Health and Social Care Bill and I have been critical about the process for dealing with the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill, which has just gone through this House. I said here, and I have not changed my view, that the Government should have submitted the Bill for proper pre-legislative scrutiny. Unless it is absolutely impossible, pre-legislative scrutiny should always take place because draftspeople may do a good first job, but they may not think of all the issues that we, representing all parts of the United Kingdom, might spot and be able to use our experience to deal with. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), and I hope the Government will be positive. I am sure these issues crop up in Lewes as much as in Cambridge and in Bermondsey and Southwark.
The religious beliefs issue is the last in this set of amendments. We ask the Minister to consider removing clause 1(5)(a). At present there is a list of four things which the prohibitions and requirements in an injunction must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid: any conflict with the respondent’s caring responsibilities, any interference with the times at which the respondent normally works or attends school or any other educational establishment, and any conflict with the requirements of any other court order or injunction to which the respondent may be subject. The fourth one is
“any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”.
As I indicated earlier, we think that that cannot properly be there because somebody’s right to hold a religious belief is absolute and therefore should not be qualified by the words
“must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid—
(a) any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”.
I am encouraged to think that the Minister in particular will be helpful because he has a good human rights record and I am sure he will want to say, on behalf of the Home Office, that the Home Office is positive about that.
There is one more amendment in the group relating to part 1—amendment 166— which deals with whether people can be excluded from their homes. We are clear that the sanction of excluding somebody from their home should be a sanction of last resort. It is a very serious thing to take away that right. At present there is a power to exclude a person from home in cases of violence or risk of harm. Clause 12 states:
“(1) An injunction under section 1 may have the effect of excluding the respondent from the place where he or she normally lives only if—
(a) that place is owned or managed by a local authority or a housing provider,
(b) the injunction is granted on the application of the local authority or housing provider, and
(c) the court thinks that—
(i) the anti-social behaviour in which the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage consists of or includes the use or threatened use of violence against other persons, or
(ii) there is a significant risk of harm to other persons from the respondent.”
This is a well publicised issue. In my borough, both when my colleagues were running the administration and when it has been under Labour administration, there has been discussion publicly as well as among councillors about whether an injunction should be used to kick people out of their council home or their housing association home, and if so, in what circumstances. In a way, such a provision is slightly discriminatory because it applies only to people who are in publicly funded housing; it does not apply to someone in private rented property. That remains an issue. We want the Minister to be positive about our amendment 166, which would add to subsection (c) one more condition—that the court has to be satisfied that the exclusion is necessary and appropriate. Of course, if someone has engaged or threatens to engage in violence, or has threatened other people in the house, whether it is domestic violence among members of a family or household or otherwise, the logic might be that they should be excluded. I do not resile from that at all, but because it is such a draconian solution the court needs to be clear that it is necessary and appropriate. That is the run of amendments in relation to part 1.
There is a smaller number of amendments relating to part 2, which is about criminal behaviour orders. The Committee recommends that the appropriate standard of proof required to establish anti-social behaviour for the purpose of a criminal behaviour order, which is a new order being introduced by the Government, should be made clear on the face of the Bill. The reason we say that is that it could be assumed that it was a civil standard of proof, as opposed to a criminal standard of proof. We think we ought to make that clear, not just so that the public know, but so that law enforcers and the public authorities know.
The Bill provides that a criminal behaviour order may be imposed if the court considers it “will help in preventing” anti-social behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not consider this to be an appropriate or clear legislative test and we recommend that it is amended. As with the previous section, we consider that the broad and open-ended definition of the prohibitions and positive requirements that may be included in a criminal behaviour order do not satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, and we recommend to colleagues and to Government that the Bill be amended to achieve greater certainty.
Amendment 167 inserts after “satisfied” the words
“according to the criminal standard of proof”
in clause 21.
Amendment 168 would replace the words “help in preventing” with the single word “prevent”. Deciding whether something will help in preventing some behaviour gets us into rather esoteric territory and does not provide as clear a standard of proof as we would wish.
Amendment 169 is the same as an amendment we suggested to part 1, and would mean that instead of using the words “doing anything” to describe the actions, “specified actions” would have to be set out.
Amendment 170 is also similar to one of our amendments to part 1, and would ensure that the criminal behaviour orders
“relate to the anti-social behaviour which the respondent has engaged in”.
That would mean that there was a link between the activity and the public response.
Amendment 171 is a further amendment to clause 21 to make it is slightly more specific and, again, uses the phrase “specified actions” rather than “anything”. Amendment 172 makes the same change as amendment 170 a little further on, ensuring that the order relates to the antisocial behaviour in question.
Amendment 173 would leave out line 3 on page 12, which contains the same qualification as earlier about religious beliefs. The amendment would mean that the absolute right to religious beliefs would not be qualified when prohibitions and requirements in a criminal behaviour order were being considered by the authorities. We are trying to ensure that parts 1 and 2 are consistent and we hope that the Government will be positive about that.
Amendments 174 and 175 would add the following sentence, which reflects the principle I set out at the beginning of my speech, to the end of clauses 22 and 29:
“The courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration when determining reporting of a child’s case.”
We are seeking to ensure that the duty of the court is on the face of the Bill.
Amendment 176, the last in the group, applies to clause 34, which can be found on pages 19 and 20 of the Bill. Its last subsection states:
“A constable may not give a direction to a person under section 33 if the person is one of a group of persons who are—
(a) engaged in conduct that is lawful under section 220 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (peaceful picketing), or
(b) taking part in a public procession of the kind mentioned in subsection (1) of section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 in respect of which…written notice has been given…or…written notice is not required”—
that is, a lawful public procession. We think that, after that, a provision should be included so that a police officer cannot give a direction if people are engaging in any other lawful form of public assembly. There are public assemblies that are not marches or picketing but that are perfectly lawful, and we do not think that they should be interfered with under the powers in the Bill. I hope that my civil libertarian colleagues on both sides of the House will fully support that.
That is part 3 dealt with, which leaves only part 5. It deals with the recovery of possession on riot-related antisocial behaviour grounds. The Committee’s view is simply put:
“While we recognise the seriousness of riot-related offences, we are not persuaded by the Government’s justification for the new discretionary ground of possession for riot-related anti-social behaviour. We are concerned about its potential serious implications for family members, and consider that it may disproportionately affect women and children. We also consider that it amounts to a punishment rather than a genuine means of preventing harm to others. We therefore recommend that this provision is removed from the Bill.”
Let me pause and say that I am conscious that that area is controversial. The controversy arose in my constituency a year and a bit ago, in the summer, when we had “riots” on the streets of Southwark and—not to a huge degree, but to some degree—on the Walworth road and in Peckham. Other cities in Britain as well as other parts of London were affected by riots. The question is how we deal with those who are caught rioting. The issue that was the subject of widespread discussion was whether it is right to take away a home when one of the people living there has been involved in rioting. Is it right that a 15 or 17-year-old youngster living in a council property in Lewes, Cambridge, Southwark, Kingston-upon-Hull or anywhere else, should have their home taken away?
I absolutely accept that there are problems of antisocial behaviour, including in many areas of my constituency. I am sure that all hon. Members’ constituencies are affected by it. The fact that there is an antisocial behaviour problem, however, and the fact that the words “antisocial behaviour” appear in the name of the order does not mean that the one is a solution to the other. I simply do not accept that they have been a very effective mechanism. Much better approaches have been taken by a number of innovative councils. Islington, for example, has tried antisocial behaviour contracts, which have been far more successful and there has been a range of successes elsewhere.
Simplifying the toolkit available is another issue. I welcome the idea of going down from 19 powers to six, which will make it much it much easier for people to find out what the options are. That is another reason why I reject the idea of keeping ASBOs together with IPNAs—injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—which seems to me to be the worst of both worlds. The Bill must be aimed at trying to prevent harm and I hope that we will be able to solve that problem, helping people to get their lives back on track by dealing with the problems, rather than basing things on mediaeval punishment and state-aided revenge.
There are some concerns about the changes to IPNAs. ASBOs dealt with behaviour in
“a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress”,
while IPNAs talk about
“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
I certainly hope that my hon. Friend the Minister causes nuisance or annoyance to the Secretary of State; I expect that to be part of a working relationship and I am rather nervous about Secretaries of State being allowed to apply for IPNAs on this basis, if only for health-related issues. There is concern about what is meant by
“conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”.
I suspect we all carry that out on a regular basis or could find people whose conduct could be described in that way. That worries me, as it could be used more broadly. We heard from the Association of Chief Police Officers that IPNAs could stigmatise and criminalise young people unnecessarily, and they also tend to blur the distinction between criminal activity and nuisance.
The report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights—I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) for his excellent speech, clarifying detailed and important amendments—says that
“the new…definition of anti-social behaviour is broad and unclear”.
I agree completely; the definition must become rather more defined.
When the Home Affairs Committee carried out pre-legislative scrutiny, we argued that there should be a test of intent or recklessness and that any action taken should be “necessary”. Something in that space is absolutely essential: whether it be through the wording used or by the introduction of a mens rea to try to offset the lower threshold to avoid hitting people with mental health issues, we need something to tighten up the definition of IPNAs without being overly broad.
My right hon. Friend was absolutely right about positive requirements. These are, in principle, very good and very helpful, but the concern was, as we heard in the Select Committee, that the councils would struggle to deliver those positive requirements in some cases. We know that the court
“must receive evidence of suitability and enforceability before a requirement is imposed”,
but not that the positive option will be available to someone. We must check that the positive requirements are doable, which I hope can be confirmed.
We have to deal with the issue of children because a huge number of these IPNAs will be issued to children. They have to be heavily involved in the resolution programme while being viewed as victims. I agree with new clause 33, sponsored by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, as the courts must take into account the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in any of these legal proceedings. I hope that the Minister will focus particularly on that.
Sometimes, of course, the best interest of the child is to have discipline from outside the family. It is not a one-way street that says that the best interest of the child is always a soft option; it may sometimes be a tougher option when the family is not up to the job.
(11 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI will not, but with respect I want to say a word about humanism and speak to my new clause 18, which is in this group, on the difference between the church and the state.
Let me say to the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) that of course marriage is never only for the production of children. Many people get married without that intention, and it might be impossible for some. That is not the argument. In the theological tradition, one purpose of marriage is to have children, and that is not possible, biologically, between two men or between two women. Some churches believe that marriage is a sacrament or holds another special position.
We move from that position of faith to one where we legislate. My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) intervened earlier to make it clear that Methodists, Quakers, Jews and the Free Churches had to fight for the right to perform marriages in their churches. Now, places that have nothing to do with churches or faiths are licensed to carry out marriages—civil marriages became possible. The position of registrar was set up and people are able to have entirely civil marriages in a registry office. That is still the case. Marriages can be held in a place that is entirely civil—in a state-authorised location—or in a place of worship, which can also include the legislative provisions that the state requires.
In all my time in the House, I have argued that we should try to separate those two things. New clause 18 suggests a way of doing that, just as new clause 14, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Greg Mulholland), does. I believe in the disestablishment of the Church of England. I am a member of the Church, but I believe in its disestablishment. Just as the Church in Wales has been disestablished, I have always believed that in England we should separate as much as possible the activities of the Church and the activities of the state. Marriage, therefore, between a man and a woman in a Christian or religious sense is different from marriages, partnerships or unions that are secular, or between people of the same sex.
I pray in aid the view, which has been quoted already, of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). It was referred to in the Public Bill Committee and goes back to what he said in 2004. When he was asked whether he agreed with the proposition about same-sex marriage, which is at the heart of the Bill, he answered:
“I do not support that; I believe that marriage is an institution that is ordained of God and should be celebrated between a man and a woman. However, I also believe that two men or two women can have a relationship that in many ways mirrors that between a man and a woman but is not identical. Therefore, I believe that we should have in law separate institutions that reflect that reality.”—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 21 October 2004; c. 68-70.]
That has always been my position too. We should give equal rights to gay and straight couples to form partnerships, unions or relationships that give the same pension rights and status, but are not the same as the traditional marriage between a man and a woman.
Colloquially, people talk of equal marriage, and I understand that. People who are in civil partnerships talk of being married, and of their husbands and wives. We are not going to be able to put the clock back, which is why new clause 18 talks about “civil marriage” and not civil union. Many of my Christian friends say that that is an unacceptable compromise, because the Christian view of marriage cannot be changed by calling it civil marriage. We have to wrestle with that issue and sort it out, because we could have civil marriage that is different from faith, Christian or religious marriage, and I think that people would reasonably understand the difference.
I respect my right hon. Friend on many things, but I disagree with quite a lot of what he is saying. Is he genuinely saying that he would deny faith groups, which believe marriage should truly be equal, the ability to do that, because of his personal belief? Is he refusing to allow them to call it a proper marriage or a faith marriage?
If my hon. Friend will bear with me, I do not believe that and I am not arguing that. They should of course be entitled to hold that view.
This group of amendments seeks to give humanists the right to have humanist weddings. I support that proposal. I understand the objection to the technical drafting, and perhaps that needs to be considered. However, the principle—my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr Blunt) made the point—of allowing humanist weddings seems to me to be the right one. The hon. Member for Foyle argued that that is what happens over the border in Ireland. Humanists have a belief, and therefore they should be entitled to have weddings according to their belief. Constituents have argued for that, it happens already in Scotland, and, like other people, I too have been to a humanist ceremony—not a wedding, but a funeral.
As a light intervention, we should not be overly afraid of the word “pagan”. My dear late mother, who lived in a village in Herefordshire, in her latter years went to a pagan wedding in the orchard in Hampton Bishop. She said it was one of the most enjoyable weddings she ever attended. Of course, there was a civil ceremony beforehand. People should be allowed to have the practice they want, including humanist weddings.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is fascinating to follow Members’ comments on the internal dynamics of all parties, but I will not comment on them. I am not a fan of closed material proceedings, for reasons that have been expressed. I will not go through all the discussions we have had during the Bill’s previous stages.
The point has been well made that the measure does not apply to criminal cases, but there is a view that it does in some cases. We are still waiting for absolute clarity on whether it applies to cases of liberty and habeas corpus. I am sure that the Minister without Portfolio will be able to give us the latest update on that. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), made it clear in Committee that the position has changed somewhat.
Even without that, there are lots of cases where this is already in our law and which I find even more alarming, because they affect people’s liberty much more. We heard on Monday from the hon. Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) about a Special Immigration Appeals Commission case in his constituency. I remember talking to him about it two years ago, when his constituent was under detention during the period of the case, which was based on closed material proceedings, under legislation introduced by the previous Government. As I understand it, two years on the constituent is still being detained under the same legislation, because of evidence he has not had the chance to see. Whatever we think about a civil case, where money is involved, I hope that everyone here would say that a case involving two years of somebody’s life—curfews and the sort of internal exile that we saw with control orders and, to a lesser extent, terrorism prevention and investigation measures—is more serious. We should not allow ourselves to ignore that.
The Bill has been on a long journey and in that time it has got a lot better. Since the Green Paper, a huge number of changes have been made to what material would be excluded. There was the incredibly important switch from the language of public interest in keeping something quiet to the language of national security, which was definitely a step in the right direction. I do not think that anybody in the House wants to see silenced information that would just be embarrassing to the Government. I am sure that Governments would be quite capable of arguing that public interest includes their not being embarrassed too often.
It is also important that we have excluded inquests. It is right that we say to a family who want to know happened to a loved one that they will definitely know the truth and that they will not be told, “Something happened, but we can’t tell you.” It was a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), but I was surprised that he, along with some of his Labour colleagues and some Conservative support, wished to bring inquests back within the scope of the Bill. I am very pleased that that amendment was not put. Had it been, I hope it would have been defeated thoroughly.
We saw further changes in the Lords. I pay great tribute to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for its sterling efforts. There are interesting questions about how the Government and the Joint Committee might work together more on some of these issues. We have had the slightly unusual case where the Joint Committee made some suggestions, the Government claimed to have satisfied them and the Joint Committee disagreed, but all this happened at a very slow pace. Perhaps there should be some way for the Committee, its Chair or the legal adviser to talk to the Government early on about draft amendments and to say, “Yes, this would achieve what we are trying to do, but with some wording differences”, as opposed to disagreeing fundamentally on whether it achieves the same thing.
As a new member of the Joint Committee, and with the Chairman in his place, I would like to say that we would certainly like a routine system that gives us time to look at the Bill and to report, not just to the Government but to the House, so that we can have a proper debate that does not get curtailed or circumscribed because there is no time to do either those jobs properly.
I agree. That is now firmly on the record.
As a result of the Joint Committee’s work in the Lords, we saw the switch from “must” to “may”, which gave judicial discretion. That was one of the key changes made to the Bill. As a result of our efforts in the Commons, that led to full equality of arms and the reporting and review process, which the Minister agreed to take away and then came up with. It is definitely moving in the right direction, but there is further to go. I have mentioned the clarity on the subject of habeas corpus, but there is still the issue of a renewal process, be it annual renewal or five-yearly renewal, to give the House the chance to say, “Is it doing just what its proponents want it to do, or is it going further, as many of us feared it would?”
There have been several votes on the principle of the Bill, including one in the House of Lords, when my colleagues were joined by a total of two Labour peers and one teller and five others, and lost quite convincingly. It is a shame that amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), was not taken on Monday, because it would have given the House the chance to have that vote. I pressed the same principle in Committee. I hope that the Lords will now step up and do more on this. Part 1 is a good step forward; part 2 is not. I hope that in the process of ping-pong we will be able to make further progress, because sadly it seems that it will pass through this House.
(11 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw). Although I am not sure that we agree on everything, I think we do on some things. There have been some interesting discussions between Front and Back Benchers.
I want to focus on some of the amendments. I am pleased to see the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I used to have the pleasure of serving on. I pushed a number of those proposals during the Bill’s Committee stage and we had interesting debates and votes on a range of things. I do not plan to go through every single aspect, because we rehearsed them thoroughly. I am delighted to see that a number of the amendments that I tabled and supported in Committee have come back.
I hope that the Minister will clarify the position on habeas corpus. Indeed, I would be happy to take an intervention from him, because it is a very important issue. I was happy with his clear answer of no. If he can stick to that, it would be fantastic; if not, we should be clear.
I welcome some of the Government’s good amendments. One that has not really been mentioned—it was tabled in the Lords and accepted by the Government—is that which changes “must” to “may”, allowing discretion to the judge, rather than the Minister. That is very welcome and has made a significant improvement. I am pleased that the Government have stuck to it.
I am also pleased that the Government have agreed to amendments on equality of arms to achieve true symmetry. They were recommended by the JCHR and I spoke to them at great length in the Bill Committee. We lost the vote, but I am glad that the Government have now come around to them. Symmetry is important, because one can think of a number of examples where an ex-employee of MI6 may not be able to raise publicly a document that is important to a case that they may wish to bring. In such circumstances, they may wish to have a CMP themselves so that the document can be debated without putting other things at risk. Such cases may be relatively rare, but ensuring pure symmetrical equality is absolutely the right thing to do.
I am also pleased to see reinstated, at least in the text of the Bill, the role of public interest immunity. There is a debate about whether it goes far enough and about what it does, but including it in the Bill is extremely good. I share the view of those who think that PII is not a perfect process. I do not like the secrecy involved, and there is certainly not a great case for it—we have seen, for example, some of the concerns in the Litvinenko case.
There is an issue with regard to last resort. I would like to see closed proceedings as a last resort. I do not think that this is entirely about openness; it is also about fairness and the principle that both sides should have the chance to see the same evidence. I think that it would be accepted everywhere that a CMP can never quite get to that point, because one person is not able to see everything. That is not a great situation.
May I reinforce the point that has been made to the Minister without Portfolio by Members from across the House? The Joint Committee on Human Rights did not argue for an exhaustive exploration of PII, but for an assessment by the court of whether PII would be a realistic and sensible option and, if not, for the court to move on and look at other things. The Minister has said that that would be reasonable, so I do not think that there is much between him and those of us who take the position of the Joint Committee. I hope that we can reach agreement on that, even if it does not happen tonight, because the Joint Committee was clear that what we are arguing for is not an extreme position, but a moderate, modest, sensible and pragmatic one.