House of Lords Reform Bill

Simon Hughes Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Brady]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. The case is compelling. Ministers really cannot have it both ways.

Much of what has been said about the Bill, however, concerns not party commitments but calculations of party advantage. We spend too much time here pursuing party advantage. To do so in changing our constitution would be not just wrong but contemptible.

Let me turn to the other parts of the Deputy Prime Minister’s case—the points of principle on which I hope the House will judge any proposal to effect a massive change in our constitutional arrangements. These are whether reform is needed and the argument that there is an absolute principle that those who legislate for the people should be chosen by the people. There has been an effort to paint opposition to the Bill as reactionary opposition to any change. Nothing could be further from the truth. Few on either side of this House or in the other House would dispute the need for reform. The Lords is too big and it needs a route to retirement. It also needs a means of removing those found guilty of serious crimes. All this, as my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest (Mrs Laing) said, could be enacted with little dissent here or in the other place. However, desirable as reforming the Lords may be, I would contend that reforming the Lords without reforming this House would be to miss the point.

The public are not stupid: they know where power is located in our Parliament. They know that it is in this House and not the other. People certainly dislike politicians who break promises or who seem interested more in seeking or holding on to office than in serving the public good, but this is seen as a failing in the House of Commons far more than in the House of Lords. People notice that this House is poor at holding the Government to account. They see that we make only a desultory effort at scrutinising legislation—although I trust that this Bill will be an exception. People see the damaging effects of patronage—against which Lord Ashdown railed in the weekend press—but they know that patronage is a greater impediment to the freedom of this House than it is to that of the Lords. We are agreed that the House of Lords needs reforming, but reforming the Lords while flunking the far more important task of strengthening the Commons would be profoundly mistaken.

[Simon Hughes (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (LD)]

The hon. Gentleman will know that the coalition agreement is clear that we need to work to reform the effectiveness of this place, but is he clear that he appears to be proposing that we should end up with a second legislative Chamber that is slightly altered, but all of whose Members are appointed? Is that really justifiable in 2012?

[Mr Brady]

The right hon. Gentleman should be patient.

Let me turn to the most important pillar of the Deputy Prime Minister’s case: that those who legislate for the people should be chosen by the people. Many of the opponents of the Bill, on both sides of the House, reject that. They rightly point to the expertise of the upper House. They highlight the obvious truth that an elected or part-elected upper House would be more inclined to challenge the primacy of the House of Commons. I accept both assertions, but unlike many of my hon. Friends, I would support an elected upper House in spite of them. However, that is not what the Bill delivers. We do not have time today to analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the United States constitution. There can certainly be gridlock between the Houses in the United States, but the legislation it produces is at least as effective as ours, and Congress is certainly far better able to hold the Executive to account than we are. However, is the Bill before us today one that would excite Benjamin Franklin or Thomas Paine? Is it a great clarion call for government of the people, by the people? It is not.

--- Later in debate ---

[Oliver Heald]

My hon. Friend is right to be concerned about that.

The Joint Committee took evidence from Australian senators. The Australian system is similar to that proposed in the Bill. Senator Ursula Stephens from the governing Labour party told us:

“I am allocated a number of seats that are not held by the Government in the lower House in my state. I look after those constituents who do not have a government representative. Those people might come to me about issues and legislation.”

Senator Lee Rhiannon from the Australian Greens said:

“we have nine Senators and only one Member in the House of Representatives. The issue of working with constituents is very important for us and it takes up quite a bit of time.”

Senator Michael Ronaldson of the Opposition Liberal Party said:

“I do not think that you can make the assumption that you will not be engaged in constituency-type work, particularly if the elected Lords in an area—as Senator Stephens said—come from the other party. If you are a Member of the non-ruling party, the Lords might find that they have more people knocking on their doors than they might otherwise have anticipated.”

When the Clerk of the House gave evidence, he spoke of the danger of “constituency case tourism”. We must try to avoid such constituency conflicts.

[Simon Hughes]

I share my hon. Friend’s concern. That is a real issue, and I think it will have to be addressed if we proceed with the Bill. There are ways in which it could be dealt with: for example, it could be agreed that Ministers would deal only with Members of the House of Commons when it came to constituency casework.

[Oliver Heald]

That issue is not addressed in the Bill.

I mentioned the Clerk of the House a moment ago, and he has appeared on cue!

The power of the people is in this House, not at the other end of the building. That is why, when we are arguing with the Lords about a Bill, they always give way eventually. When I was a Whip, I went down there and had discussions with them, as many other Members will have done. In the end, they say, “You are the elected House; you have your way.” I recall hardly any occasions during my time here when, in the end, they have not caved in, because we are the elected House.

I believe in efficient and effective government. I think that it is something the Conservative party has stood for over the years. We have given this country more than 250 years of good government—or, at least, we have given a lot of it during that period. [Laughter.] I remember the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Mr Allen) saying “It must be healed.” I agree: it must be Heald.

Following the proposed changes, we will struggle to have effective government. The Parliament Acts cannot be used on every occasion. It is a nuclear option. We rely on the Lords’ giving way, but the fact is that without conventions and arrangements between the Houses —some means of ensuring that we always prevail in the end—it will be more difficult to ensure that we have effective government in this country. When a party makes promises in its manifesto, it will not be able to deliver on them. When we experience a crisis, as we have recently, it will be difficult to introduce urgent measures with the necessary speed.

Let me make a suggestion. It is in the Joint Committee report, the alternative report and in my pamphlet, which can be read on the website of the Society of Conservative Lawyers. Let us see whether we can avoid regional elections which provide a geographical power base, which would mean the people at the other end of the building representing a group of constituents from an area. Let us consider indirect election. There are various different models. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) mentioned the German model, and the right hon. Member for Neath mentioned the secondary mandate model. There are ways of doing this.

I support reform and I think that we should do it, but I do not agree with the Bill, and I believe that it needs to be looked at again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Blunkett]

That is at the heart of the criticism of this Bill. Once legitimacy is given to elected politicians without the accountability of their having to seek re-election and be re-elected, the very fundamentals of democracy are undermined. That is because, as I am on the record saying on the morning after the election, democracy is not simply about electing people; it is about being able to get rid of them. The admirable speech made at the Magna Carta lecture by the Archbishop of Canterbury on 15 June demonstrated that par excellence.

[Simon Hughes]

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that nothing in this Bill suggests that Governments would not be formed on the simple principle of needing to command a majority in the House of Commons? That is as it has been and as it is, and there is no proposal that it should not continue in that way. If that is the case, the threat, and the suggestion he makes, that electing people to the other place would change that is entirely unsupported by anything in the Bill.

[Mr Blunkett]

I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman read the Bill, because it suggests, for the first time in our history, that Ministers can be appointed outwith the second Chamber but report to it. We have always had to appoint people to that Chamber, who have worked within it and have continued to be a part of it, if they were to be Ministers.

The fundamental rub I foresee is that we will create mistrust in the electorate. We will say that we are going to replace people who are unaccountable and not legitimate, but then we will put up regional party lists—in the case of Yorkshire, the region covers 5 million people—and simply tell electors to tick the box on the list. People will turn on us, because that is a delusion. That is why we should vote against the Bill and against the programme motion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Graham Stringer]

I want to increase democracy where it is effective so that people feel that they are changing things, not being left behind and lost by politicians. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) said, the idea behind the genesis of the Bill is not the improvement of democracy but the improvement of the prospects of the Liberal Democrats, who are frightened of the prospect of democracy and the electorate at the next general election. What they are trying to secure in the Bill is proportional representation in the other place so that they can be in government for ever, but I do not see my job as coming to this House to put the Lib Dems in government for ever. To achieve that, they obviously have to introduce a system of PR, but just over 12 months ago the electorate said quite clearly that they did not want to move from first past the post, even though it was not PR that was put to them.

I must ask those who say that clause 2 will protect and provide security for the primacy of this House: how? There is only one legal basis for that primacy, and that is the Parliament Act, but we are not going to Parliament Act every Bill that comes through. All the other details such as the Salisbury convention and the convention on statutory instruments are just that—conventions. If I were elected to the other place, I would say, “The Salisbury convention no longer exists, because the basis of it was the fact that some people were elected and some were not.” If people in the other place are elected, they will have the right to say, “My electorate are as important as your electorate, and a great deal bigger, and I have been elected by millions of votes, so I will vote against what you in the House of Commons believe.”

It will be impossible to prevent freely elected people from doing that, particularly when they will never be accountable for anything because they will never go back to the electorate, and I see nothing apart from the Parliament Acts to prevent the other House from challenging the primacy of this House. That takes us back to the point made by the right hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Simon Hughes) that the proposals will not affect the Government. Ministers may be appointed, but by blocking legislation they could do exactly what the Lib Dems are doing in this debate: blackmail whatever Government are in office so as to get their own way and get posts in the Government.

[Simon Hughes]

rose—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. Before the right hon. Gentleman begins his intervention, I counsel him that those who persistently intervene may get dropped down the list. I hope that the House understands what will happen if there are continual interventions from the same Members.

[Simon Hughes]

I hope that the hon. Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer) accepts that, at the moment, at the other end of the building there is clearly no party with an overall majority. Indeed, everybody is in a minority. He is worried about having one period only for election and no need for re-election, but what would his alternative be that would end patronage and heredity in the second Chamber, if it is not something like this Bill?

[Graham Stringer]

That is the easiest question I have ever been asked in this Chamber: I would abolish the other House, for the simple reason that, in the constitutional position that we are in, it is difficult to improve and democratise it without diminishing ourselves or having a written constitution.

Policies and manifestos have been mentioned a number of times. On the day after the general election, it was my view that all the parties had lost. The advantage of our system is that the core parts of manifestos are voted for. If a party becomes the Government, it gets the rest of its manifesto because it put that manifesto before people, but when none of the parties has won and there are three differing commitments on House of Lords reform—incidentally, none of those commitments is embodied in the Bill before us—it is difficult to understand how my Front Benchers or Front Benchers from other parties could say, “This Bill is legitimate to put before people and we have the will of the people behind us.” We simply do not have the will of the people behind us on those manifestos and the only answer—again, the Lib Dems are particularly frightened of the electorate—is to put the proposal to a referendum.