Public Office (Accountability) Bill (First sitting)

Seamus Logan Excerpts

Thursday 27th November 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Maria Eagle]

Q The Bill seeks to deal with these things by having proper equal legal representation, which is a good thing in my view. Do you think it is enough? Again, it was the Hillsborough independent panel, a non-legal process, that finally got to the truth. All the legal actions that had taken place before it did not achieve that. What role do you think there is for panel-like arrangements?

Pete Weatherby: I think there is a huge role, and there is a discretion within the Government Bill to extend the duty of candour to panels. We would like that to be stronger—that would be great. Of course, there is no one size fits all. As somebody who has been involved in many public inquiries, I have a major criticism of the length of them. The duty of candour will scythe down the length of public inquiries, if it is used properly. Yes, there is an extension of legal aid in the Bill, but it will be dwarfed by the amount of money that will be saved if the duty of candour is used appropriately and properly.

On your point, absolutely, there is a huge role. I have been on panels myself, and it definitely is not a one size fits all. Internationally, there is learning about this. The best example is probably New Zealand, where there is a smorgasbord of different processes.

[Seamus Logan (Aberdeenshire North and Moray East) (SNP)]

Q Thank you for your evidence so far, Mr Weatherby. Notwithstanding the force of the command responsibility amendment that you have told us about, would you see an additional or bolstering role for the Intelligence and Security Committee of the UK Parliament, in addition to the recommendations that you are making?

Pete Weatherby: Yes, I think that would be a sensible additional measure. I think the measure that we put forward in the briefing would, in a practical and effective way, do what we are setting out to achieve, but the more oversight that can be provided, the better. The ISC is well placed to do that and therefore it would be an additional safeguard. I cannot speak for everybody on that, because I have not seen an amendment in time, but it sounds like a very sensible suggestion.

[Ian Byrne (Liverpool West Derby) (Lab)]

Q It is good to speak to you, Peter. I have a couple of quick points after what we listened to last week when we went to visit the security services; this was raised, and I would like your opinion on it. First, will anything in the Bill compromise the UK’s intelligence sharing with its partners? Secondly—we have come a long way to get here today, and I just want a definitive answer to a blunt question, because we really only have one shot at this—in its present format, would the Bill prevent a Hillsborough-style cover-up? I know that you just alluded to this with Maria, but I want a definitive answer on the record.

Pete Weatherby: I think that if the amendments that we are putting forward were made, it would be almost impossible for a Hillsborough-style cover-up to follow.

--- Later in debate ---

[Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)]

Q This question is for Mr Guest. What legitimate reasons might a body have for not complying with the duty of candour? Can you think of any examples?

Tom Guest: That is one of the tests that we have tried to look at when we have been looking at the draft provisions. First of all, there is not a freestanding defence to the duty of candour—there is no reasonable excuse or anything like that—so the Bill is tightly drawn in that respect. There are also no viable defences elsewhere in criminal law that we can see, so the duty of candour is very tightly drawn to be complied with.

The one point that is important to draw attention to, in the interests of transparency and frankness, is clause 3(7), which makes it clear that

“The duty of candour…does not require a public authority…to breach any prohibition or restriction imposed by”

an Act of Parliament

“or a rule of law”.

When I say it is tightly drawn, it is not open ended. The public authority has to point to an actual Act of Parliament or a rule of law where the duty of candour does not require it to breach a prohibition or restriction. That is the one thing we wanted to draw to your attention, but otherwise there are no freestanding, wider reasons why public authorities cannot comply.

[Seamus Logan]

Q This question is for Mr Guest. For a member of the public like me, could you draw out the difference between what you would regard legally as “seriously improper” conduct and simply improper conduct? What I am trying to get at are examples such as someone who does not draw attention to a computer program that is clearly flawed; someone who decides not to tell anyone about a medical product that is harmful; or a situation in which there is a large-scale loss of life. For a member of the public, what is the difference between improper and seriously improper?

Tom Guest: Just to make it clear, you are talking about the clause 11 offence, because the clause 12 misconduct offence also uses the words “seriously improper”. I will take the examples you have given to be referring to the offence of misleading the public.

The advantage of the Bill is that it clearly sets a standard for a jury to apply. Every jury is going to have to look at the specific evidence in the case. What did the suspects know? What were they withholding? What means did they take? What did they know at the time? Was it in the heat of the moment? The jury must consider all the evidence, and it is not possible to cater for all the different factual scenarios that might apply. The advantage, though, is that you have clearly set out in the Bill a standard set of considerations for a juror to apply, and they are clearly directed at setting a threshold between improper and seriously improper. Clause 11(3) is about as clear as you can get when you bear in mind that it has to apply to all kinds of potential factual scenarios; it is clearly set out there how to apply that assessment of seriously improper.

[Seamus Logan]

To be clear, it depends.

[Lizzi Collinge]

Q Professor Lewis, you spoke about the burden of proof lying with the prosecution. Have I understood correctly that if someone puts forward the defence of reasonable excuse—I think this is the phrasing—it would then be for the prosecution to prove that it was false rather than for the defendant to prove that it was true?

Professor Lewis: Yes. I would phrase it slightly differently: I would say that the prosecution will have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable excuse, rather than thinking about truth or falsity. But, yes, once the defendant introduces evidence that raises the defence of reasonable excuse, they will have met their evidential burden, and the persuasive or legal burden will then rest on the prosecution.