Natasha Irons
Main Page: Natasha Irons (Labour - Croydon East)(1 day, 2 hours ago)
Public Bill Committees
Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)
Q
Tom Guest: That is one of the tests that we have tried to look at when we have been looking at the draft provisions. First of all, there is not a freestanding defence to the duty of candour—there is no reasonable excuse or anything like that—so the Bill is tightly drawn in that respect. There are also no viable defences elsewhere in criminal law that we can see, so the duty of candour is very tightly drawn to be complied with.
The one point that is important to draw attention to, in the interests of transparency and frankness, is clause 3(7), which makes it clear that
“The duty of candour…does not require a public authority…to breach any prohibition or restriction imposed by”
an Act of Parliament
“or a rule of law”.
When I say it is tightly drawn, it is not open ended. The public authority has to point to an actual Act of Parliament or a rule of law where the duty of candour does not require it to breach a prohibition or restriction. That is the one thing we wanted to draw to your attention, but otherwise there are no freestanding, wider reasons why public authorities cannot comply.
Seamus Logan
Q
Tom Guest: Just to make it clear, you are talking about the clause 11 offence, because the clause 12 misconduct offence also uses the words “seriously improper”. I will take the examples you have given to be referring to the offence of misleading the public.
The advantage of the Bill is that it clearly sets a standard for a jury to apply. Every jury is going to have to look at the specific evidence in the case. What did the suspects know? What were they withholding? What means did they take? What did they know at the time? Was it in the heat of the moment? The jury must consider all the evidence, and it is not possible to cater for all the different factual scenarios that might apply. The advantage, though, is that you have clearly set out in the Bill a standard set of considerations for a juror to apply, and they are clearly directed at setting a threshold between improper and seriously improper. Clause 11(3) is about as clear as you can get when you bear in mind that it has to apply to all kinds of potential factual scenarios; it is clearly set out there how to apply that assessment of seriously improper.