Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Advice

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Thursday 29th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office if he will make a statement on the publication of the Attorney General’s legal advice on the proposed withdrawal agreement.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

The Government recognise the legitimate desire of Members on all sides of the House to understand the withdrawal agreement and its legal effect. That is why my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster confirmed to the House on Tuesday 13 November that the Government will publish a full reasoned statement to set out their position on the legal effect of the withdrawal agreement. That is in addition to the material that the Government have already published, including, for example, a detailed explainer of the withdrawal agreement and a technical explanatory note on the Northern Ireland protocol. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General will also make a statement to the House on Monday 3 December—the next sitting day—about the legal effect of the agreement, and he will answer questions from Members, I am sure in the fullest possible way.

[Keir Starmer]

Not good enough.

Mr Speaker, nobody who was present in the debate on 13 November, including the Solicitor General, could be in any doubt about what the House was asking for. During that debate I stated that

“the motion requires the publication of the final and full advice provided by the Attorney General to the Cabinet concerning the terms of any withdrawal agreement. This must be made available to all MPs. It is to be published after any withdrawal agreement is reached with the EU, but in good time to allow proper consideration before MPs are asked to vote on the deal.”—[Official Report, 13 November 2018; Vol. 649, c. 235.]

The motion was passed unanimously on those terms, and when it was passed, I made it clear that those were its terms.

It was perfectly clear to Ministers, including the Solicitor General who spoke at the end of the debate, that the House was not asking for a position paper or a summary of the Attorney General’s advice. That was the offer made from the Dispatch Box during the debate, and it was roundly rejected, as the Solicitor General knows full well. The binding motion that was passed was for nothing less than for the full and final legal advice provided by the Attorney General. It is therefore wholly unacceptable, and frankly shows contempt for this House, for Ministers, including the Prime Minister at the Dispatch Box yesterday, now to pretend that the House was asking only for partial or qualified legal advice. If the Government are not willing to comply with the order of the House, why did they and the Solicitor General not vote against the motion?

In 12 days’ time, this House will have to take the most important decision it has taken for a generation, and MPs are entitled to know the full legal consequences of the deal that the Prime Minister is asking them to support. That is why the order was made, and why it must be complied with. Throughout the Brexit process, the Government have repeatedly tried to sideline and push Parliament away. If they now intend to ignore Parliament altogether, they will get into very deep water indeed. I urge the Solicitor General to think again and to comply with the order of the House.

[The Solicitor General]

With the greatest respect to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, his request is wholly premature—[Interruption.]

EU Withdrawal Agreement: Legal Advice

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Tuesday 13th November 2018 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. I think that everybody across the House will want to know the legal ramifications of the decision that we are being asked to make, which is precisely why this advice should be disclosed at that stage.

I will now develop my third point, which is that legal professional privilege operates differently in relation to the advice of Law Officers than it does to other lawyers. That is an overlooked legal point, but an important one. Let me give the House two examples. First, legal professional privilege applies in ordinary civil litigation, but in general the Government waive that privilege when advice is central to the importance of the case and withholding it might prevent the court from reaching a conclusion that is fair and in the overall public interest. The ordinary rules of confidentiality that apply to all legal proceedings are waived as a matter of convention by the Government even when they are engaged in civil litigation, which is where such rules would be at their height, if they would prevent the court from reaching a conclusion that may not be fair or otherwise in the public interest. In other words, there is a public interest element that comes into the operation of privilege when it applies to the Government.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

indicated assent.

[Keir Starmer]

I see the Solicitor General agreeing; he knows this because he operates this way all the time in the advice that he provides.

The second example is that section 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 provides an exemption for the disclosure of information from the Law Officers that attracts legal professional privilege, but it only applies if the public interest in withholding outweighs the public interest in disclosure. In other words, there is an overriding public interest test in relation to advice provided by the Law Officers that does not apply in the same way to lawyers in private litigation.

My fourth point is a very important one. Confidentiality and privilege can justify non-disclosure, but what the Government cannot do is waive the rule for some MPs and not for others. There are a number of important individuals and groups of MPs whom the Government may well find themselves wanting to persuade to back their deal. In order to do so, they might be tempted to share the advice with those individuals to persuade them of the legal ramifications of the backstop.

I know that the Democratic Unionist party in particular—and everybody who represents anybody in Northern Ireland—is very concerned about that for obvious reasons, and I think I am right in saying that its Members have called for the legal advice to be published. It is acutely important to those in Northern Ireland, but I say to the Government that it cannot be acceptable to share the advice, or bits of the advice, with some in this House and not others. Therefore, if there is any proposal or suggestion that it is to be or might be shared with individuals in relation to this vote, it cannot then not be shared with others, because the ring of confidentiality and privilege will have fallen away, and there could be no justification for it not being available to all.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

It is more than a pleasure—it is a privilege—to speak at the end of this well-informed, wide-ranging and important debate. May I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster for, in the right spirit, reaching across and making a proper and considered offer with regard to the Government’s position? His contribution reflected very much the careful and deliberate argument of the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), who rightly, and perhaps almost inevitably—he will forgive me for saying that—moved away from the wide-ranging terms of the motion and very clearly set out his and his party’s position with regard to the subject matter that he and other Opposition Members wish to deal with.

The hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) rightly explained the context of the debate. This is an extraordinary time in our nation’s history, with grave decisions to be made by this place that will affect the lives of all of us. I readily accept all that, but I do hope that hon. and right hon. Members will forgive me if, as Law Officers have done in times gone by, and I hope will do so in the future, I dwell a little on the particularly important and unusual role that is filled by both the Attorney General and me within this wonderful unwritten constitution that we all have and celebrate. I will not repeat the proper references made by the hon. Gentleman and others to “Erskine May”, the ministerial code and indeed the Cabinet Office code—they all stand on the record and do not bear repetition.

It comes to this: the quality of collective decision making in government is dealt a fatal blow when, bit by bit, that decision making is subdivided, unpicked and, frankly, made almost impossible even in circumstances as important and exceptional as this. The argument that we are now having boils down to whether Labour Members and others in this House can accept the Government’s clear statement that we wish to provide a comprehensive position statement that deals with not just the economic and political consequences of any withdrawal agreement and future relationship, but the legal consequences of that decision.

We have inevitably and properly focused on the question of Northern Ireland, which the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) quite properly raised, together with the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), who is no longer in the Chamber. We accept all that, but say that, consistent with previous incidences when the Government’s legal position has been set out in a way that has helped debate in this House, that would be the appropriate course of action here, rather than publishing Law Officers’ advice.

Much has been made about the previous occasion when that was done in relation to the Iraq war—in fact it was the only occasion when the full text of Law Officers’ advice has ever been disclosed. It was two years after the event in particular circumstances when, as has already been referred to, the question of the lawfulness of an action by the Government lay at the heart of the debate. We are in a different position now.

Right hon. and hon. Members know that it would be wrong if I were to try to speculate about the content of any advice on this issue that may or may not have been given by Law Officers. I have to remain true to the convention that we have referred to, but doing the best that I can, it would seem to me that using the Iraq precedent, bearing in mind the particular context and the particular circumstances, is not a helpful guide for where we are today.

Instead, I have looked back to the time of a previous Solicitor General, the late Lord Howe of Aberavon— Sir Geoffrey Howe as he was then—who is sadly no longer with us. He was the Solicitor General who took through the accession of this country to the treaties and the European Communities Act 1972. Although he spoke a lot about the legal basis and effects of entry to the then European Economic Community and the other communities, there was no suggestion at that time that any advice that he may or may not have given should be published. That is probably the best parallel that we can draw between the important events of 2018 and the very important events of 1972. If the House can accept that parallel, perhaps it can go on to accept the Government’s position.

The right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras sought to make four key points. First, he spoke about the unprecedented context of the negotiations—I agree with that point—and, secondly, he referred to the nature of the advice as general, rather than something specific with regard to an action. Thirdly, he talked about the operation of the convention with regard to Law Officers’ advice and its position regarding privilege. His fourth point was that the advice or parts of it could not be shown to some but not others. These are all fairly reasonable and clear points.

I have already mentioned why I say that although these circumstances are exceptional, there is no reason at all for Law Officers’ advice to be published in the way in which the right hon. and learned Gentleman seeks. However, I want to deal with the point that he makes about—I hope he will forgive me if I use this phrase—a carve-out from the convention on the basis that the Government’s approach should allow for the disclosure of advice when that advice is in general terms. I would resist any suggestion that we should look at the disclosure of Law Officers’ legal advice on anything other than a strict case-by-case basis. In other words, the particular facts of each disclosure will very much depend on whether Law Officers’ advice should be published.

I agreed to some extent with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about legal professional privilege, although I would say that the context of litigation is really the source of any disclosure, rather than a particularly special status whereby Law Officers’ advice is in a different category of legal professional privilege. If anything, there is a particular premium on the care that Government Departments take about the disclosure of Law Officers’ advice for all the consent reasons mentioned by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). With respect to the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, one must look at the context. It is the litigation context that would allow disclosure, as opposed to anything intrinsically to do with the status of Law Officers’ advice.

I have dealt with the past as best I may, but I want to reiterate—I hope for the benefit of the House—why the Law Officers’ convention still remains important. It is important not just when it comes to legal professional privilege, but because it protects the public interest in reflecting collective Cabinet responsibility. That is a vital constitutional principle. Why? Because it would be wrong and damaging to start distinguishing the specifically legal components of collective decision making. This places the rule of law at the centre of Government decision-making processes and at the centre of the minds of all Ministers, not just the Law Officers, and it does not permit a delegation of those important responsibilities by Ministers to me and to the Attorney General.

As one of my illustrious predecessor Law Officers and fellow “sosbanite”, the late Sir Elwyn Jones, wrote:

“the Minister who is advised by the law officers that he cannot do something…is not allowed to say, ‘I cannot do it because the Attorney-General tells me that I cannot.’”

I could not have put it better myself. We are talking about the indivisibility of Government decision making, and I am sure that the House will agree that it is a pretty fundamental point.

It is the role of the Law Officers to guard this principle, however tempting—however convenient—it might be to publish legal advice. We are the stewards; we are here to jealously guard the gate. A decision to disclose Law Officers’ advice requires a very powerful countervailing public interest to override that position. The authority of the Law Officers to disclose the fact that they have or have not advised, and then the actual content of that advice, is rarely sought and rarely given. Contrary to what some people have suggested about the right of the client—in this case, the Government—the content of the advice must not be disclosed outside the Government without the authority of the Law Officers.

In the few short minutes I have left, as I am mindful of the need to move on to other important debates—the Opposition Chief Whip is in his place—I think it would be right for me to refer very briefly to some of the important contributions made by hon. Members. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the former Attorney General, spoke fundamentally about the need to speak truth to power—if Law Officers cannot do that, where are we? I entirely agree with him.

The right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) made a really important point about the difference between legal advice and the legal position of the Government. I think he accepted the point that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield made in an intervention. I do not wish to repeat that, but I simply reiterate the point for, I hope, the benefit of him and everybody in the Chamber.

I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Victoria Prentis), who spoke with authority as a former Government lawyer. She rightly reminded us in detail about the litigation position of the Government and the realities of disclosure, and the particular status of the Law Officers’ advice with regard to the deliberations of Government lawyers. Many other eminent lawyers spoke today—and many eminent non-lawyers as well, Mr Speaker, as I know that you regard the non-lawyer with particular affection, so I do not want to miss them out.

Today’s debate has been about not just dusty conventions, but pretty important constitutional positions. We know that the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras fully understands that. Admirable advocate though he is, I could not help but detect perhaps a little sense of sheepishness in his approach to the conventions. I readily forgive that, and I know that it will make him pause for thought in the days ahead. I hope that it can lead him and his colleagues to accept the clear view, and the clear offer, set out by my right hon. Friend the Minister. I readily adopt and repeat that offer. I hope that it will allow the right hon. Gentleman to draw back and, in the spirit of consensus and constructive dialogue, to accept the Government’s position and not press his motion to a vote today.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that she will be graciously pleased to give directions that the following papers be laid before Parliament: any legal advice in full, including that provided by the Attorney General, on the proposed withdrawal agreement on the terms of the UK’s departure from the European Union including the Northern Ireland backstop and framework for a future relationship between the UK and the European Union.

[Keir Starmer]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I seek your guidance and clarity on the fact that the decision of the House that has just been made is clear, and that the Government must therefore respond but, in fairness, respond in the terms that I set out from the Dispatch Box. If I may repeat them for the record, the motion requires the publication of the final and full advice provided by the Attorney General to the Cabinet concerning the terms of any withdrawal agreement. This must be made available to all MPs. It is to be published after any withdrawal agreement is reached with the EU, but in good time to allow proper consideration before MPs are asked to vote on the deal. I put it in those terms because it reflects what I said from the Dispatch Box in the debate.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Wednesday 13th June 2018 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am going to press on because I have taken lots of interventions and engaged with them. I have been on my feet for nearly 45 minutes, which is not fair to colleagues on both sides of the House who want to speak.

Our amendment is a strong single market proposition. It sets out the kind of new relationship we want to achieve with the EU—a close economic relationship, with full access, while ensuring there is no lowering of common standards and protection, and recognising that shared institutions are required to achieve that. It is a million miles away from the Government’s position on the single market. It does not set a narrow route; it sets the parameters of the new single market relationship we want to achieve, and it leaves options open to achieve that. I urge all Members on both sides of the House to support it.

Let me turn to the question of human rights and other protections. Lords amendment 4 sets out enhanced protections for employment, equality, health and safety, consumer standards, and environmental rights and standards. The argument is very simple; it was very simple at the start and it is very simple now. At the moment, these rights have enhanced status because we are members of the EU. They are being converted into our law—the Government said they would convert them and they are converting them; I will come on to the charter of fundamental rights in a minute—but not with any enhanced protection. All the amendment says is that if those rights and protections are to be changed, that should be done by primary legislation.

The amendment is not contentious, and it does not even say that the Government cannot change those rights. It just says that if they believe in these rights and think they should have enhanced protection, they should for heavens’ sake put them into a form that means that if they want to change them, they have to use primary legislation to do so. The only reason I can think of for resisting that is that somebody thinks it might be a good idea to chip away at these rights without doing so through primary legislation.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

indicated dissent.

[Keir Starmer]

The Solicitor General shakes his head. If that is not the case, he should accept Lords amendment 4 and get on with it. This is the same argument we have been making since the Bill started its life back in September 2017.

There is good reason to be concerned. I know these are old examples, but they are real ones. The Foreign Secretary has complained of “back-breaking” EU workers’ rights, and the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs has claimed that the Government should

“have the potential to...if necessary rescind”

employment protections after Brexit. Such examples give Opposition Members, trade unions and working people across the country huge cause for concern that, in the absence of enhanced protection, these rights will be vulnerable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I agree with my hon. Friend, which is why I am saying it is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough on its own and more is needed.

I turn finally to the question of refugee family reunion. I am pleased that Lords amendment 24 is before us, and I pay tribute to Lord Dubs for his tireless campaign on this issue. Labour supports Lords amendment 24, which is long overdue. We recognise that some concern has been raised about the scope of family reunion that qualifies under the Government’s clause, and I would welcome any clarification from the Minister on that issue. However, in general, Labour will support the amendment.

In conclusion, the Lords amendments address crucial issues. Along with Labour’s single market amendment, they would be a huge step forward in improving the Bill and protecting jobs and rights. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will support them today.

[The Solicitor General]

It is a pleasure to rise in this debate to set out the Government’s stance on these important amendments. The right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) was properly concerned about the effluxion of time. I share that concern; there is a lot to go over, and I will do my very best to cover all the amendments before us and, of course, to take interventions, as I always strive to do.

May I first echo the opening remarks made yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who talked about the important role of the other place as a revising Chamber? There is no doubt that in some instances the other place has made some constructive improvements to the Bill, which the Government have every reason to support. However, on other matters, which were debated at length and agreed to by this elected House, the other place chose to ignore decisions that were taken here. Instead, we have a set of amendments that, I am afraid, are not properly thought through and would have a negative impact on our plan for a smooth and orderly exit.

We heard from the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras that the Opposition do not accept Lords amendment 51, which seeks to make continued participation in the EEA a negotiating objective for the Government. Well, we are sure about his position, but we are not so sure about that of certain other Opposition Members. However, on this issue, we are certainly in broad agreement.

This country is party to the EEA agreement by virtue of its membership of the EU. After the implementation period ends, that agreement will no longer apply to the UK. Seeking to participate in the EEA agreement beyond that period does not pass our test—that our future partnership with the EU must respect the referendum result. It does not deliver the control over our laws, and indeed other aspects of our domestic policy, that we seek. On borders, it would mean that we would have to continue to accept all four freedoms of the single market, including the free movement of people.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Report: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Monday 6th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. The certainty point is really important. It is a point that Lord Judge made when he gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee. When I asked him about the reference to judicial review principles, he was concerned that that was not clear enough for the judges to know which particular test they were to apply. Now, with the new text in the manuscript amendment, it is crystal clear to the judges that they review the decision according to judicial review principles, but they must

“consider the matters referred in subsection (1)”—

necessity and proportionality—

“with a sufficient degree of care as to ensure that the Judicial Commissioner complies with the duties imposed by the section”.

That is the privacy clause. The test for the judges is now crystal clear: look at necessity and proportionality, and review the Home Secretary’s decision with a sufficient degree of care to make sure that the judicial commissioner complies with the duties imposed by the general provision in relation to privacy. That deals with the certainty point.

As far as the reasons are concerned, I cannot improve much on my previous answer. What I think is envisaged is that there will be a number of judicial commissioners whose task will be to undertake this review, and to take such time as they need to look at the material and apply this test. They will not necessarily have the constraints that the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary have, but obviously a lot of this will happen in real time, so there will be the constraint of time in that sense. As I said, they will not be doing that alongside the other sorts of duties that a Secretary of State has to carry out during the course of a day.

I share the concerns that have been expressed on this matter, but I am clear in my mind that close scrutiny on judicial review principles is markedly different from Wednesbury unreasonableness and makes a real difference in real cases, so long as there is access to all the material, and clarity that the privacy provisions must be complied with. That effectively means that there are factors that it is mandatory for the judicial commissioner to take into account. That makes a material difference. That is why we will support the amendment.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

The hon. and learned Gentleman and I debated this point closely in Committee, and I thank him for the way in which he has approached the matter. With regard to clarity, it is not now beyond any doubt that the test will depend not on the personality of commissioners, but the facts before them? They have a very clear basis on which to make their judgment, looking at the particular degree and seriousness of the case, and balancing the right to privacy with all the qualifications that he, I and others know exist in article 8.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. To illustrate why we are satisfied, under the general privacy clause—I have a tighter version of new clause 21, but for this purpose that does not matter—one of the general duties is to have regard to

“whether what is sought to be achieved by the warrant, authorisation or notice could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means”.

Under this test, a judicial commissioner will have access to the material, will obviously know the Secretary of State’s decision, and will have to ask himself or herself that question. That is a long way from simply asking whether a decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable Secretary of State could have taken it, and that is why the new clause makes it clear that it is close-scrutiny review, rather than long-arm review, that is being dealt with.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 15th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 3rd May 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

It is a pleasure to serve again under your chairmanship, Ms Dorries. I have listened carefully to what the hon. and learned Gentleman and others have said about their concerns regarding the provisions, but may I reassure him and put to bed the notion that somehow this is a back door or a blank cheque to allow the authorities to do what they like when it comes to interference with the privacy of individuals? Far from it. I will explain as far as I can the purpose of the type of warrantry, particularly the national security notice, that we are talking about, and indeed the technical proficiency provisions as well.

An example of the type of support that might be required would be the provision of services or facilities to help the intelligence agencies in safeguarding the security of their personnel and operations. A notice might typically require a communications service provider to provide services to support secure communications by the security and intelligence agencies—for example, by arranging for a communication to travel via a particular route in order to improve security. A notice may additionally require the confidential provision of services to the security and intelligence agencies within the communications service providers, such as by maintaining a pool of trusted staff for the management and maintenance of sensitive communications services. I hope that gives the hon. and learned Gentleman some insight into what we are talking about here.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that indication, but I am not sure why that is an argument for not subjecting what could be a wide-ranging power to the double-lock mechanism, which has been the preferred safeguard for such powers in the Bill.

[The Solicitor General]

There are clear reasons for not going down that route. We are talking about the preparatory stage as opposed to the stage of interference with privacy. If the Government’s position was that there was a loophole—a gateway—to allow such interference, the hon. and learned Gentleman’s argument would have real strength, but that is far from the case. This is all about the preparatory stages—the necessary stages that need to be taken by communications service providers before we get to the application for what we all accept is an intrusion.

I am afraid I cannot share with hon. Members their analysis that we need a “now and forever” definition of national security in law. There is a good reason why national security is not defined in statute. Any attempt to define it in the Bill runs a real risk of restricting the ability of this country to respond to constantly evolving and unpredictable threats. It is vital that legislation does not, however unintentionally, constrain the ability of our security and intelligence agencies to protect this country. The examples are all around us: who would have imagined a few years ago cyber-attacks of the nature and on the scale that now threaten us? My concern is that if we try to rigidly define what we mean by national security, we run the risk of defeating the means by which we can keep this country safe.

[The Solicitor General]

I have gone as far as I can to explain the types of scenarios that the national security notices would be used for. In essence, they deal with the nuts and bolts rather than the intrusion. If somehow there was a gateway into intrusion, the hon. and learned Lady would be absolutely right, but I assure her that there is not, so the worries that she and other people and organisations have about a blank cheque, while understandable, are unfounded. I can assure her in Committee and I am happy to continue to make the assurance that the function of this type of notice is not intrusion.

Indeed, we have oversight because national security notices will be overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The commissioner will have a duty to report at least once a year on what he or she has found and to make recommendations on where improvements can be made. The commissioner will also have the power to report on an ad hoc basis on any issue that he or she considers appropriate.

[Keir Starmer]

I am listening carefully to the Solicitor General. He says that the notices are not a gateway for preparatory steps to become steps that invade privacy, but where in the Bill is the provision that prevents that happening? The only restriction is subsection (4), which does not achieve that end.

[The Solicitor General]

With respect, I do not think that is necessary because any agency that sought to use this type of notice in order to get around the double-lock provisions in the Bill would soon come a cropper with the commissioner. That important oversight means that organisations are not operating in a vacuum; they will be held to account if they try to misuse these notices in the way that the hon. and learned Gentleman and others fear.

As I have said, we have the powers of review by the IPC. We also have the provision, pursuant to clause 220(5)(b) and (7), that the Secretary of State must consult the commissioner if a notice is reviewed, and the commissioner will then consider the proportionality of the matter before reporting conclusions to the Secretary of State. We have the checks and balances that the hon. and learned Gentleman rightly wants within the mechanism.

On amendments 853 and 854, I would say this: the role of the Secretary of State in issuing national security notices rightly reflects the responsibility of the Executive in protecting our national security; conversely, the role of the judicial commissioner in approving the issuing of warrants under the Bill reflects the particular and proper sensitivity regarding interference with private communications. We have got the double lock in place to ensure that, before the fact, a senior judge has to be satisfied that any interference with privacy is justified. The Bill explicitly prohibits—this is an important point—the issuing of national security notices for the primary purpose of obtaining private information, and the double lock then applies to the use of the most sensitive powers. We need to focus on the need for the double lock in relation to applications that result in the acquisition of private information. These types of notices do not permit the authorities to do that, so the amendments are unnecessary.

Amendments 845 and 855 deal with technical capability notices. Clause 217 builds on the current power provided for under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, where a company can be obliged to maintain a permanent interception capability in order to ensure that when a warrant is served, a company has the infrastructure in place to give effect to it securely and quickly. Again, any warrant served will have been reviewed by a judicial commissioner; he or she will play an important part in overseeing the operation of technical capability notices and any appeal that may be lodged against them. The commissioner will also be consulted about the making of regulations that will provide more detail about the operation of these types of notices, and those regulations will be put before Parliament for approval. Plenty of the checks and balances that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, others interested in Bill and I would expect and want to see are here.

I am not persuaded of the need for amendments 852 and 859, because clause 220 already sets out the role of the IPC in the process of review and the actions that the Secretary of State must take in that process. The IPC will be integral to any review, because the Secretary of State must consult the commissioner, who will then consider whether the notice is proportionate. Inevitably, considerable weight will be afforded to the advice of the commissioner. The role of the commissioner provides an opportunity for the person on whom the notice has been served and for the Secretary of State to present evidence. The conclusions of the commissioner will be reported to the Secretary of State and to the person who has made the reference. After consideration of the conclusions, the Secretary of State may decide to confirm the effect of the notice, to change or vary it, or to withdraw it. Until that decision is made, there is no requirement for the person who has referred the notice to comply with the specific obligations under review.

In a nutshell, there are plenty of adequate safeguards to alleviate the concerns expressed by the hon. and learned Gentleman. I urge him to withdraw his amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

In arguing in opposition to the amendments, I first want to address the last point that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras made. I can come back to his point about the tests, but in a nutshell, they are inherent to the Bill. The tests of necessity and proportionality are part and parcel of the decision-making process that the authority will be enjoined to carry out.

[Keir Starmer]

It is noticeable that, for obvious reasons, necessity and proportionality have been written into relevant clauses throughout the Bill, but here, I think for the first time, we have a wide-ranging power with no such test—unless I have missed it, in which case I will happily concede the point.

[The Solicitor General]

In strict terms, the hon. and learned Gentleman is right—I am looking at clause 218 in particular. I think that subsection (3) might help him, because although we do not have the words “necessity” and “proportionality” there, the matters to be taken into account lead one to conclusions based on necessity and proportionality, and perhaps do so in a more prescribed way that is more helpful to the decision maker. Subsection (3)(a) to (e) addresses the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point, and I put it clearly on the record that the principles of necessity and proportionality are part and parcel of the tests to be applied.

I also note that necessity is required under clause 217(6), which relates to the steps specified in a technical capability notice. I do not know whether that helps the hon. and learned Gentleman. I will certainly consider the issue carefully, but on the face of it, I do not think there is a worry of the sort that he envisages.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I looked carefully at that subsection, but perhaps the Minister could explain why it is a limiting provision. It is a requirement provision as far as the notice is concerned, but on the face of it, encryption is not limited to protection applied by, or on behalf of, the person themselves. It tells us how that situation would be dealt with, but it is not limited to that.

[The Solicitor General]

I have been interested in the clause for a while, because there are issues about what “relevant notice” means, for example. I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman that that applies only to technical capability notices, not national security notices. I will carefully consider how we can make that absolutely clear, and in that context I will have another look at the how the clause is worded. I want to put beyond any doubt the fact that the clause relates only to a technical capability notice and does not relate to third parties. That has been an important undertaking that we have given.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, and I will do that.

Before I go further, I will deal with the point that the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West made about Apple. My understanding is that the process will give her some reassurance. In that scenario, Apple, as the recipient of the notice, could refer it back to the Secretary of State, who in turn must then consult the technical advisory board and the IPC before deciding whether to proceed further with the notice. If the Secretary of State proceeded, it would then be judicable in the courts, which would determine whether the notice could be enforced. It is quite similar to the scenario that we discussed in the context of national security notices. I hope that gives her some assistance.

[Keir Starmer]

I have looked at this issue in the past day or two, and I was concerned about the implication that on the face of it, one could not challenge the provision in court, because there is an absolute bar on disclosure. Am I right in assuming—if I am, it should be on the record—that the Secretary of State will give permission, where appropriate, for a legal challenge to be brought? In other words, there could be disclosure for the purposes of legal proceedings.

[The Solicitor General]

On the face of it, that has to follow. If any clarification is needed on that, I am sure I can assist as I further develop my remarks.

I was dealing with the process of consultation before the giving of a notice, and we have had the Apple example. I would like to develop the importance of the draft codes of practice, which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred to.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

That question is about the definition of the provider. I am sure we will be able to provide some clarity on that before I draw my remarks to a conclusion. I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for raising that point.

Amendment 850 relates to consideration by the Secretary of State of the effect of a notice on the privacy and human rights of people both here and outside the kingdom. The amendment is unnecessary because of the point I made before, which I will reiterate: the clause is not about notices authorising an interference with privacy. A warrant provided for elsewhere in the Bill is required to do that, and we have already considered the potency of the double lock and the test to be applied. A point that is relevant to all the amendments in this group is the statutory function of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to oversee the use of notices. I raised that in the context of national security notices, and I pray it in aid here again.

Amendment 857 seeks to narrow the category of operators to whom a technical capability notice can be given. I am worried that that would limit the effects of law enforcement. We know about the diversification of criminality and terrorism in order to find new ways to avoid protection. I am concerned that narrowing the legislation would allow loopholes to get larger. It is therefore important that the obligations relating to the technical capabilities for a range of operators can be imposed by the Government in order to ensure we keep ahead of the curve.

The hon. and learned Lady made the powerful point that the clause does not relate to personally applied encryption. However, measures in part 3 of RIPA 2000 provide for where law enforcement agencies can require an individual to remove encryption that he or she has applied themselves. We know that the Bill generally does not cover all the agencies’ powers. This is perhaps a welcome opportunity to remind ourselves of the existing provisions in part 3, so I am grateful to her.

Of course we accept that it may well be appropriate to exclude certain categories of operator from obligations under the clause—I am thinking, for example, of small businesses; we are always mindful of the burden of regulation on small businesses—but it is our intention to use secondary legislation to achieve that. It would not be appropriate in primary legislation to impose blanket exemptions on services with a communications element that are not primarily communications services. To do so would send a rather alarming and clear message to terrorists and criminals that communications over certain systems will not be monitored. That sort of carve-out recalls the point that I made about the use by criminals of seemingly unrelated or innocuous communications channels in other internet facilities or apps, in order to hide their illicit enterprises.

I know that I have taken up an inordinate amount of the Committee’s time. I am obliged to the Committee and to you, Ms Dorries, for your indulgence. I hope that I have set out the reasons why I urge hon. Members to withdraw the amendment, and I pray in aid my arguments as advancing the case that the clause should stand part of the Bill. I urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I have only three issues to address. The first, which requires more attention from the Solicitor General—I say so with no disrespect—is the question of the extent of the prohibition on disclosure and, essentially, access to the courts or appropriate tribunals. On the face of it, clause 218(8) is a prohibition on disclosure, save with the permission of the Secretary of State. With respect to Committee members, I do not think that clause 220 provides the answer, because that deals with the consultation exercise where a notice is being reviewed.

I have no doubt that, if the Secretary of State exercised her power under clause 218(8) to prevent access to the courts, it would run straight into an article 6 access to courts argument that would succeed on judicial review. I had assumed that one could read into the clause by implication that permission would not be refused in a bona fide and proper case where access to court—or the relevant tribunal, which may be a better way of putting it—was an issue. If that were made clear for the record or by some redrafting of the clause, it would help. As I said, I think that, in practice, any court in this jurisdiction would strike down pretty quickly a Secretary of State who sought to prevent access to the court.

[The Solicitor General]

I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman is right about that. On that basis, I will have another look at clause 218(8), to get it absolutely right. I reassure him that it is not the Government’s intention to preclude access to the court.

[Keir Starmer]

I am reassured. I am sure that that would not be the case, but it might be sensible to clarify that rather than relying on clause 220, because I am not sure that that is the right way to do it. However, I will say no more about that.

I was going to press for votes on amendments 846 and 849, but I have listened carefully to what the Solicitor General said and to what the Minister said when he rose to make some observations earlier. They are by far the two most important amendments. Amendment 846 deals with encryption. I think I heard the Solicitor General say that he will look again at the wording of clause 218(4) to see whether it is possible to make clear what is clear in the code of practice, namely, that an obligation placed on a CSP to remove encryption relates only to electronic protections that the company itself has applied to intercepted communications and secondary data. That is clearly the position that the Government adopt, because it is now set out in the code. I think that the Solicitor General might accept that, at the moment, clause 218(4) does not quite achieve that objective. On the basis that he is prepared at least to look at that again, I will not press amendment 846.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 13th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I thank the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for setting out his case. He will be glad to know that there is more to this than mere cost. I say “mere”, but Ministers and parliamentarians have a duty to ensure we do not burden the Exchequer with unnecessary cost. My primary argument is focused on that. The amendments would only put us in the same position as we will be in under the Bill, but at greater cost.

The Home Office estimates that at least an extra £500,000 would be needed to staff and finance the proposed body. That is not an insignificant sum, which is why the Government are urging restraint when pursuing what might seem an entirely rational, reasonable and logical conclusion. I accept that a number of the bodies and individuals mentioned by the hon. and learned Gentleman would support the thrust of these amendments.

[Keir Starmer]

Is there a breakdown of the £500,000, given that this is, in broad terms, a structural proposal, rather than a numbers proposal ?

[The Solicitor General]

The impact assessment published alongside the Bill contains the figure. It is supported by that document, so there has been empirical research. I do not have the full figures, but I imagine that the research is based on estimates of staffing levels. The body would also have to deal with new corporate functions, such as human resources, IT, non-executive directors and procurement, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows well from his experience as Director of Public Prosecutions. This would be a non-departmental public body similar to, say, the Crown Prosecution Service. As an independent body and a key part of our constitutional arrangements for the prosecution of crime, it would obviously need that structure to maintain its independent role.

The amount of money is not insignificant, and the question I must ask is: what would the measure achieve? I remain unconvinced that it would achieve anything more than the current proposal does, because the powers and duties of the proposed body would remain exactly the same as the commissioner’s responsibilities, and the number of inspectors, technical experts and judicial commissioners employed by the organisation would remain exactly the same.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I respect the hon. and learned Lady’s point. I answer it by making the important point that we have stronger oversight if the body is able to look at everything from initial authorisation right through to implementation. The dialogue that can occur will therefore be much more immediate and focused, because the body will have a fuller and deeper understanding of the process. We end up with a body that is independent and flexible and will gain the public confidence that she and I want it to.

The worry is that if we pursue the attractive—seductive, almost—course proposed by the hon. and learned Lady and others and separate the powers, we will end up breaking the important links between the executive and judicial functions epitomised by the Bill. I say “links” in a neutral sense, and not in the sense that one can unduly influence the other—far from it. Rather, the Bill allows for the check-and-balance approach that epitomises the British constitution and its organic development over the centuries in a modern and relevant way. As a Tory, I am proud to stand here and argue for those values.

I want to deal with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s functions and the amendments seeking direct negotiation with the Treasury, rather than the Secretary of State, on the resources necessary for the commissioner to fulfil their functions. I think I am on safe ground in saying that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would warmly welcome not having to be involved in negotiations with the Treasury wherever possible, but I believe that removing his or her function from this negotiation would be an error.

There will be much more familiarity with the work of the IPC at the Home Office than at the Treasury, so the Home Office can make a far more accurate assessment of the resources that the IPC will need. That is important in ensuring that the IPC is properly resourced. Importantly, there can be meaningful challenge by the Home Secretary if they believe that the IPC is asking for too big a budget and is not providing proper value for money.

I do not think it is right or fair to say that the independence of the new IPC will be somehow compromised if it receives funding through a Secretary of State, because plenty of other non-departmental public bodies receive funding via that route, such as the Independent Police Complaints Commission and Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons. It is not an unusual or uncommon position, and we would have heard about it if there was an issue with the compromising of those bodies’ ability to act.

The Treasury has made clear in its guidance, “Managing public money”, that

“Functional independence is compatible with financial oversight”.

I am glad to say that the current oversight commissioners have repeatedly made clear in their annual reports that they have always been provided with enough money to undertake their functions. The same route of complaint will be available to the IPC, and I know that Parliament would take a keen interest if there was any suggestion by the new commissioner that the IPC was under-resourced. For those reasons, I respectfully ask Members to withdraw their amendments.

[Keir Starmer]

I intend to deal with funding under clause 208. I appreciate that new clause 19 is in this group, but that is probably only because it contains the word “commission”, so I will deal with it at a later stage. However, I have listened to what the Solicitor General said.

The amendments are supported by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, who was most concerned about the structural division of the two functions. The Solicitor General says that there are advantages in being able to do an end-to-end review, and that it brings focus; I can see that. If it were an end-to-end review of someone else’s work, that would be a good thing. The structural problem is that, within that end-to-end process, the same team takes the steps and does the overseeing. That is more than just a philosophical issue. It is a practical issue with how oversight works. I am therefore unpersuaded.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

We have prayed in aid Jo Cavan’s comments quite a lot, and I think it is interesting that she said:

“It is really important for the commissioners to work very closely with the inspectors and technical engineers and so on who will carry out the post facto audits.”

I am arguing that this is supervision of the agencies’ work, and that the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point would be stronger if it were purely about the commission itself.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to have been reminded of Jo Cavan’s evidence. The Solicitor General is right: there is a mixture of functions, and the oversight has to operate in quite a flexible way in relation to the different functions. However, this is a structural issue, and I therefore press amendment 741 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 14th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 28th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I can be brief. The short amendments would provide that when a person is notified so that they can pursue a remedy if so minded or advised, they are given sufficient detail to do so. I think they are self-explanatory.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

It is a pleasure to reply on these amendments. In the spirit of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s remarks, I will deal with them as quickly as I can.

The amendments are about a submission prepared by a public authority for the commissioner that relates to an error being shown to an individual affected. With respect, I do not think that is necessary or desirable and I will set out three reasons for that. First, the IPC is already required to provide to the person such details of the error as the commissioner considers necessary. If that test is met by any information provided to the IPC in the course of the submissions made pursuant to clause 198(5), the Bill already requires that the judicial commissioner provide those details to the person. The amendment is therefore unnecessary.

Secondly, I am concerned that the amendment might inhibit disclosure to the commissioner. The submission is intended to assist the commissioner in deciding the seriousness of the error and the impact of disclosure; as such, it will contain a full and frank admission of how the error occurred and what measures have been put in place to prevent it from happening again. If the public authority knows that any submission it makes will be provided to an individual, out of necessity, to preserve the secrecy of its operating systems and methods, it may need to be less candid in its submission to the commissioner. That will force the commissioner to take a decision on whether it is in the public interest for an individual to be informed without, regrettably, knowing the full facts behind the matter.

Finally, if a case is brought to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, disclosure of the relevant material will occur during the proceedings in the normal way. If the IPT thinks that any part of the submission should have been disclosed, it can order that to be so disclosed. The tribunal is best placed to rule on what should or should not be disclosed as the case progresses, rather than what I would regard as inappropriate disclosure before the initiation of proceedings.

Amendment 791 would remove the requirement for judicial commissioners to consult the Secretary of State before releasing information to any public authority or other person. I have made the point before and make no apology for repeating it that, given the responsibility of the Executive for the protection of the public, it is right that the Executive be given the opportunity to express an opinion on where the public interest lies. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 198 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 199

Additional functions under this Part

[Joanna Cherry]

I beg to move amendment 792, in clause 199, page 154, line 17, at end insert—

“(1A) A Judicial Commissioner may refer to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal any matter the Commissioner considers may have involved the unlawful use of investigatory powers.”.

This amendment would give the Judicial Commissioners power to refer issues of concern to the IPT without having to rely on a complaint being made.

The amendment, which would insert a new subsection in clause 199, was proposed by the Equality and Human Rights Commission and is jointly tabled by the Scottish National party and the Labour party. It would give the judicial commissioners power to refer issues of concern—matters that came to their notice and about which they were concerned—to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal without having to rely on a complaint being made.

Under the Bill as drafted the unlawful use of investigatory powers may not receive sufficient scrutiny, because often the subjects of surveillance will be unaware of it and so not in a position to make a complaint. The amendment would improve the safeguards in the Bill by addressing that problem so that where judicial commissioners are aware of a concern, they can refer it to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The judicial commissioners decide whether to approve the issue of warrants and are well placed to identify issues of systemic concern and of law requiring resolution by the tribunal. They are, in fact, much better placed to do so than those subject to surveillance, because they have an overview of the whole picture. It is therefore sensible to permit them to refer matters of concern to the tribunal.

The amendment is in line with a number of recommendations made during prelegislative scrutiny. Recommendation 66 of the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill was that

“The Judicial Commissioners should be able to make a direct reference to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal where they have identified unlawful conduct following an inspection, audit, investigation or complaint.”

Recommendation 16 of the Royal United Service Institute’s report, “A Democratic Licence to Operate”, says:

“The judicial commissioners should have a statutory right to refer cases to the IPT where they find a material error or arguable illegality or disproportionate conduct.”

The Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office, in written evidence to the Draft Bill Committee, made similar recommendations.

In their response to prelegislative scrutiny, the Government did not accept those recommendations, but they appear to have agreed that judicial commissioners should have this power, as it is referred to in the draft codes of practice. For example, the draft code of practice on interception of communications states:

“The Commissioner may, if they believe it to be unlawful, refer any issue relating to the use of investigatory powers to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal”.

However, there is no express power to do this in the Bill. We argue that the referral power needs to be set out clearly in the Bill for two reasons.

First, such an important power should be in primary legislation, rather than in a draft code of practice that may be subject to revision after the passage of the Bill through Parliament. If it is in the Bill, any change to the power in future would be subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny, requiring the amendment of primary legislation rather than the mere revision of codes of practice. Secondly, providing for the power in codes of practice but not in the Bill creates uncertainty, which the amendment would resolve. Without the amendment, there may be a lack of certainty about whether the judicial commissioners have what would be a crucial power, and it could be argued that the codes of practice cannot create such a power without it being in the Bill.

The confusion over those issues could be resolved in a straightforward manner by the Government accepting the amendment. Their general response to prelegislative scrutiny referred to the fact that courts and tribunals do not usually have the power to carry out investigations on their own initiative, but the amendment would not give the tribunal that power; rather, it would give the judicial commissioners the power to refer an issue to the tribunal, which the tribunal would then investigate on the initiative of the judicial commissioners. In support of that approach, I note that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal explains on its website:

“The Tribunal adopts an inquisitorial process to investigate complaints to get to the truth of what has happened in a particular case, unlike the adversarial approach followed in ordinary court proceedings.”

I suggest that that approach is appropriate in situations such as those envisaged in the Bill, where the victims of the measures will not have knowledge of them but the judicial commissioners will. They may therefore refer to the IPT, and because the IPT is an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial body, it is well placed to investigate a referral from the judicial commissioners. I ask the Government to take on board the amendment in the spirit in which it is intended and indicate that they will agree to it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The amendments relate to the grounds for appeal. The Bill provides that appeal on an error of law will only lie when an appeal raises

“an important point of principle or practice, or…there is another compelling reason to grant leave.”

The two amendments would remove that restriction and create a right of appeal against an error in law.

The history and background of this is that David Anderson raised the issue in his report last year. He suggested that appeals be permitted on an error of law. When it scrutinised the Bill at the tail end of last year and the beginning of this year, the Joint Committee agreed that an appeal should be permitted on any error of law. It is right that appeals should be allowed on errors of law, so that they can be corrected, and so that the right decision is arrived at on the right legal analysis.

The Government have refused to amend the Bill in the light of those recommendations, maintaining that there needs to be an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason for granting leave. That is unpersuasive. David Anderson and the Joint Committee were absolutely clear—they were right—that an appeal should lie where there is an error of law.

[The Solicitor General]

I am afraid that I am not persuaded by the amendments. I am concerned that within the Bill the IPT and the appellate court already have the significant discretion necessary when granting permission to appeal. I am worried that the amendments will have a detrimental effect. There is a risk that we will end up with appeals in cases where there is no significant point of law, and that is frankly a waste of everyone’s time and resources.

I want to deal with the background to clause 208. The Bill represents a significant step. The only route of appeal currently available to complainants from decisions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is by reference directly to the European Court of Human Rights. For the first time, we have established a domestic right of appeal, which will enable parties to seek redress here in the UK court system. That will also enable appeals to be heard more quickly. I think we would all agree that that is a massive step forward. Appeals will be heard by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, or the Court of Session in Scotland or the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, and ultimately it will be possible for appellants to seek permission to appeal from the appellant court to the Supreme Court.

I understand the sentiment behind the amendments, but there has to be balance and I think our approach is right. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal or relevant appellant court will be able to grant permission to appeal if it considers that it would raise

“an important point of principle or practice”,

or additionally, if there are any other compelling reasons to grant leave. That gives the courts an appropriately wide discretion when deciding whether permission should be granted. That makes it possible for any case that raises a significant point of law to be dealt with at appellate level.

As hon. Members are no doubt aware, this type of restriction is not unusual. Our approach in the Bill is directly modelled on restrictions that apply to judicial reviews from decisions of an upper tribunal—that is civil procedure rule 54.7A. I consider that the same restrictions should apply to appeals from the IPT.

It would be helpful for me to take the opportunity to put on record the number of cases that were considered by the IPT in 2015. Two hundred and nineteen cases were considered, of which 47%—nearly half—were deemed to be frivolous or vexatious; 30% were given a “no determination”; 17% were out of the IPT’s jurisdiction, withdrawn or not valid; 3% were out of time; and only 4% were found to have any merit to them.

Therefore, although creating an appeal route is very important—I am proud that we are doing that—not having any limits on that route would mean, I am afraid, a considerable amount of taxpayer money and court and agency time and resources frankly being wasted on continuing to manage and defend cases that, sadly, have no grounding in fact or merit in law. That is why I think the appeal route as currently delineated will still allow important cases that need further judicial scrutiny to progress.

Therefore, to strike the right balance, having broken new ground with the domestic right of appeal, I commend the clauses unamended to the Committee and urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

The Solicitor General is right that this is an important step forward, but it also needs to be the right one. I am not convinced that the point about frivolous and vexatious applicants has any bearing or substance, because there has to be an appeal on a point of law and it can be allowed only on a point of law. Therefore, if it is on a point of law, it is difficult to argue that it is frivolous and vexatious. Of course, the amount of those should be reduced—they waste a great deal of time—but this amendment would not increase the number of frivolous and vexatious cases, nor would it give them any grounds for success.

This important point was pressed by David Anderson and the Joint Committee, and I wish to press this amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

We have a long-standing principle of openness and open justice in this country. Case law as long as my arm sets out the importance of open justice. I readily accept that that principle, which we all adhere to, is more difficult to achieve in this field than in other fields, but with these amendments we are really arguing about the default position, not the automatic position.

On page 240 of his report, David Anderson recommended that the IPT be changed—I recognise what the practice is—

“to make open hearings the default and disclose the fact that closed hearings have taken place”.

The Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill recommendation 74 is that, when making a decision on whether part of a hearing should be open or not, the tribunal should apply a public interest test.

This amendment would make open hearings the default position, which was David Anderson’s preference, but to have a mechanism to change the default position to closed proceedings. It is important that we keep to the principle of open justice. People fought for it for many years, and it is one of the central planks of our justice system. A default position that proceedings are open is in keeping with that principle; the default position set out in the Bill is not. For those reasons, I will press this amendment.

New clause 20 deals with declarations of incompatibility, and speaks for itself. It would amend section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to give the IPT the power to make a declaration of incompatibility. Where there is a problem with legislation and convention rights that cannot be resolved during interpretation, the IPT would have the power to make a declaration of incompatibility, which would then trigger a dialogue with Parliament about what, if any, modifications or alterations to legislation should follow. That has proved worthwhile and effective so far under the Human Rights Act 1998.

[The Solicitor General]

In prefacing my remarks on the hon. and leaned Gentleman’s arguments, I, too, pray in aid my strong and long-held commitment to open justice. Like him, I practiced it for many years, and I believe fundamentally in it. However, as a parliamentarian, I have come to accept that there are occasions, which need to be very carefully prescribed, when that principle has to be departed from, but that must only be in cases where there is a clear public interest and a necessity that everybody would understand. That is why every time these matters arise—whether it was when the Special Immigration Appeals Commission was created nearly 20 years ago, or when the Justice and Security Act 2013 created closed material proceedings three or four years ago—they are the subject of very intense debate and proper scrutiny. I therefore welcome the opportunity to look closely at the position with regard to the new provisions in the Bill.

The amendment seeks to amend section 68 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to provide that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal must hold its proceedings in public unless closed proceedings are in the public interest. As has been outlined, the amendment would restrict the circumstances in which that can take place and would require the appointment of special advocates.

First, on the necessity, we are in something of a transitional period, but I will give the Committee some reassurance. Rule 9 of the tribunal rules, pursuant to section 69 of RIPA, currently states that all proceedings, including oral hearings, should be held in private. The problem is that the rules have not been updated to take into account changes that were introduced by the tribunal many years ago. There was a ruling in the 2003 Kennedy case, which is reported at IPT/01/62 and IPT/01/77, that the tribunal has the discretion to order that hearings take place in public. Happily, since then, in practice the IPT has regularly held open hearings, and copies of its judgments delivered in open proceedings are publicly available on its website.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am not sure that the Solicitor General is right about that. The declaration of incompatibility arises only where the primary legislation requires an outcome that is incompatible with the convention right. By definition, the legislation in place overrides the convention right, which is what bounces it back to Parliament. Technically, he is probably wrong about that. There cannot be a remedy; that is why the amendment is needed.

[The Solicitor General]

I am interested in that argument, although I am not entirely persuaded by it. I am afraid that the amendment would be a problem across the piece. If courts of lower record could issue declarations, obviously I would not be arguing the point. It would be unusual for us to single out the Investigatory Powers Tribunal as sui generis in this instance.

To return to the point that I was developing, under section 68(5) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the IPT is required to make a report to the Prime Minister in the event that it makes a determination in favour of a person that arises from any act or omission made by or on behalf of the Secretary of State. In such circumstances—this may be a helpful and practical point—the Government would of course be required to consider whether legislative change was needed. De facto, our position would be very similar to the result of the declaration of incompatibility.

For example, the IPT recently decided in the Belhaj and Saadi cases, both public judgments, that the regime for certain intrusive surveillance of legally privileged material contravened article 8. I know that this is a slightly different point from declarations of incompatibility pursuant to section 19, I think—I am sure Hansard will help me—of the Human Rights Act 1998. The tribunal is already making findings on the compatibility with rights under the convention.

Finally, I will deal with the question of review of the tribunal. As Committee members will know, the use of investigatory powers has been the subject of extensive reviews, to which we have referred repeatedly in this Committee’s deliberations. None of those reports recommended the wholesale change to how the IPT operates that the amendment suggests. Bearing in mind that we have ongoing and detailed scrutiny and important and recent reviews, I do not believe that we will get added value from a further review. The new clause would also require that any independent review must consider two issues.

The IPT can of course make clear any concerns that it might have about the operation of the tribunal. The tribunal published a report only recently, and it did not express any concerns about its effective operation, so I do not think that a further review will add anything. I believe that the key concerns identified in the amended clause have been and are being addressed. On reasons of lack of necessity, I therefore submit that the new clause would not take us any further. On that basis, I invite the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendments and new clauses.

[Keir Starmer]

I will not press new clauses 20 and 21, but I will press amendment 842 to a vote on the open justice principle.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 11th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

Ms Dorries, you permitted me to stray into discussion of clause 141 and therefore I will be brief on this amendment, because the point that I was making was that the specific operational purposes required under subsection (4) of the clause are still general, and the purpose of these amendments is to rectify that position. The best example of that is amendment 681.

The point that I made last week is that if there is to be movement on clause 141, as I suggest there should be, what we should try to do is to draft a clause that would be workable in practice and that I hope would reflect practice as it is.

I will say no more about it, because, as I say, I strayed into discussing these amendments when I was dealing with clause 138.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

It is a pleasure, Ms Dorries, to serve once again under your chairmanship.

As the hon. and learned Gentleman says, we echoed some of these arguments last week in relation to bulk interception warrants. I will say two things. First, we respectfully submit that the amendments are unnecessary. There are also some technical deficiencies within them, and I have some concerns about those.

As we know, what we are talking about—this is perhaps my first opportunity to say this—is fragments of initial intelligence. That is what bulk acquisition is all about. It is about taking those fragments and then being able to identify potential subjects of interest that might pose a threat to the UK.

Limiting the examination of data collected under a bulk warrant to circumstances in which an operation or investigation is already under way, or tying a warrant to individual persons or premises, would mean that a bulk acquisition warrant just could not be used in that way, and it almost goes without saying that it would then severely limit the capabilities of the security and intelligence agencies to keep us safe.

Clause 151—helpfully, we have already jumped to clause 141—is also an important clause. It makes it clear that selection for examination may take place only for one or more of the operational purposes specified in the warrant.

[Keir Starmer]

I, too, went to clause 151, expecting a further safeguard, but all one gets in subsection (2) is the repetition and reference back to clause 141. That is the point that I hope I am consistently making. We do not get a graded safeguard that ups the threshold at each stage; we get a threshold that refers back to the previous threshold.

[The Solicitor General]

I take the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point; it is one that we understand. Again, however, I must make the point that at the point at which warrants are served in this context, it is not possible to know what part of the data that is being collected will be examined and for what purpose. Therefore, the question of detail is not a question of reluctance on the part of the authorities—it is just about practicability. It is not possible, of course, to anticipate that.

May I just deal with amendment 683? Under the Bill, a warrant will only include the operational purposes for which it may be necessary to examine the data. The Bill makes it clear that that may include all of the possible operational purposes for which data may be selected for examination. The effect of the amendment would be to require all possible operational purposes to be specified on a warrant, regardless of whether they were necessary. I am sure that that is not the intention of the hon. and learned Gentleman, but that was the point that I was making about the amendment perhaps not quite achieving the purpose for which it was tabled.

Having said that, I would argue that in clause 141, in combination with clause 151, we have an adequate and sufficient safeguard to ensure sufficient granularity when applications are made. It will not be good enough for the authorities simply blithely to quote “national security”; there will have to be greater granularity in applications. I would say that that is clear from the Bill, and combined with the code of practice I think there is enough here for hon. Members to be reassured that this process is not a mere rubber-stamp exercise and is a proper and effective safeguard.

The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West made remarks in her interesting speech about the United States experience. It is important that I briefly put on record the important distinction between the United States regime of collecting domestic telephone records, which was pursuant to the Patriot Act—that has now been repealed by Congress—and the particular powers under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978, as amended. Those powers are what the US Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board addressed in its reports in July 2014 and more latterly this year.

Those powers to collect the content of electronic communications from targets outside the US are germane to the questions in this debate. As my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security said, the American board clearly found that there was value in and an important role for that particular programme. It is important that we take care to draw distinctions between different functions.

[The Solicitor General]

I share that anxious concern, which is why I think we not only have avowal here, but an enhancement of safeguards. There is no doubt about it: the Bill represents a dramatic improvement on blithe reliance on the 1984 Act, to which the hon. and learned Lady correctly referred, and then nothing ever being said or debated in this House or the other place about the extent of those powers and the important judicial safeguards we have here.

Underpinning all that—this is within the code of practice—is the oversight of the commissioner, who will be able to inspect and review and ensure that the powers are not being abused in a way that the hon. and learned Lady and I would find abhorrent. It is always a pleasure to hear a Scot quote the great Unionist Robbie Burns—[Laughter.] As a great patriot, he would have shared the Government’s anxiety to ensure that the security of our citizens is protected in a proportionate and necessary way. I therefore think that the clause strikes the right balance.

[Keir Starmer]

Granularity is a great word, and increasingly popular. It implies something crunchy and grain-like. I have made this point, but though clause 141(4) says that it is not sufficient to simply say “national security”, it does not say much else, and therein is the nub of the problem that the amendments are intended to correct.

I have made my submissions. I heard what the Minister said and I have listened carefully to the Solicitor General. We have been over the territory. I will not press the amendments at this stage, but I may be minded to at a later stage, because getting this issue right is critically important. It may be better if we try to get it right before that stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I have raised this issue before so I will not take much time on it now. I said previously and heard no contrary position put in the debate that in this chapter dealing with bulk acquisition warrants there is no specific provision for legal professional privilege for journalistic material or for communications with MPs. The Bill contains no guidance on how those categories of material are to be protected, if at all. New clause 15 deals with legal privilege. I have previously made points on the subject and I know the Solicitor General is looking at legal privilege generally. I simply ask that this be taken under the umbrella of consideration of privilege, so that however it is applied throughout the Bill there is consistency of approach that safeguards privilege properly. I do not intend to push the amendment to a vote at this stage.

[The Solicitor General]

I will briefly reiterate the Government’s position. We believe there is a logical basis for the differentiation at this point, before the examination stage, as it is at the examination stage that the particular sensitivities of the occupations of journalist, lawyer or parliamentarian come into play. We are dealing with an earlier stage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

My concern is that acquisition and examination are dealt with in the same warrant, so I think we are dealing with access. It probably does not affect the second point about how it is dealt with generally. The point is that these warrants do provide for examination.

[The Solicitor General]

There are, in fact, two stages. The code deals with sensitive professions at the examination stage. There are those two important stages, to which I have referred. The other aspect of the debate is when an obviously sensitive piece of information, namely a fact that a person has communicated with a lawyer, becomes privileged is a subject of ongoing discussion. It is more than an interesting point; it is an important point. There is a very respectable argument for saying that although the data might be sensitive, it might not attract LPP, but we need to discuss it further.

I can reassure Members at this stage that the protections for legal professional privilege in the draft bulk communications data code of practice mirror the protections that the divisional court deems appropriate. We are clear that the application of protections at the point of selection for examination is the correct approach. In the context of bulk communications data, we do not think that applying additional safeguards at that stage would be effective or necessary.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 12th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 26th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

Having tested the patience of the Committee on the point I was labouring on the last amendment—which I think is important, even if I am alone in that—I can indicate that these and the other amendments following in this chapter are all similar to previous amendments. I will deal with them quickly.

Amendments 698 and 699 deal with the test for the judicial commissioner. If it is helpful, I can indicate to the Solicitor General in advance that, having been round the track on this issue, I am not going to repeat the arguments or press them to a vote, because of the discussions we have been having.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I have nothing to add.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

From memory, the services could not at the moment envisage a circumstance in which they would need it, but they would not want to rule out the possibility that it might arise at a future date.

[The Solicitor General]

An example could be a group of terrorists who are involved in an explosion and sustain burns. Medical evidence about where they attended—the fact that they had attended a local A&E—could be relevant to that particular operation. That is the sort of category that we are thinking of.

[Keir Starmer]

That may well be. I listened carefully to the answer that was given—

[Keir Starmer]

It may well be that it could be dealt with in a more targeted way. As a general proposition, where targeted powers can be used they should be used. That is a theme that goes through the Bill and the code.

[The Solicitor General]

I can clarify: let us imagine a scenario where there is an unidentified individual or we do not know the identities of the people. We know that an atrocity has taken place, but we do not have names, so targeting is more difficult. It is an exceptional case, but there is that possibility.

[Keir Starmer]

These are all hypotheticals. I think the services themselves have said that they have not needed such powers yet, and we can speculate as to what the situation might be. However, I accept as a general proposition that the focus ought to be on the threshold test for accessing information. For the record, in relation to adult and child social care, there would be a concern not only for the vulnerable adult and child but among those providing the care, because they will be expressing their opinions in these reports and they would be concerned that that remained confidential. That highlights why we need to work on this position. However, for the time being, I look forward to that work and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 9th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

We have been over the territory of the judicial test, and I do not intend to rehearse the arguments again, other than to say that in circumstances where an equipment interference warrant has been issued by a law enforcement chief—it has not gone through the Secretary of State—it is particularly important for the review by the judicial commissioner to be tight. All the arguments made earlier about the test are reinforced in cases that do not go to the level of the Secretary of State. Any arguments about deference are unpersuasive. There is a particularly powerful argument for tightening up the judicial test throughout the Bill, and I have raised that topic on a number of occasions. There is a particular need for that where a warrant has come about by a different route, without receiving the scrutiny that a warrant signed by the Secretary of State would have.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. We need not rehearse the arguments that we looked at in some detail a few days ago, but I will say what I said then: although the Bill covers those points, there is merit in considering the matter carefully, and I shall continue to give it anxious consideration.

The sliding scale approach, to coin a phrase, is clearly relevant. We must remember that the absence of the Secretary of State in the case of the other agencies is not a problem, because we want them to have integrity and operational independence. We must always remember that underlying principle. I am not criticising anyone, but that sometimes gets a bit lost in the debate.

Having said that, the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point is well made about the different considerations that would present themselves to the mind of a commissioner, bearing in mind that the Secretary of State and national security and all those factors are not involved. I need not, perhaps, add more to the debate on that; I simply commend yet another clause that covers the double-lock authorisation process and applies it for the first time to the area of warrantry in question.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Our amendment 440 is modest and would insert the word “immediately”. I need say no more than that.

[The Solicitor General]

May I deal with the amendments in reverse order? On amendment 440, I am happy to consider amending the relevant draft codes to make it clear that the notification of judicial commissioners should happen as soon as is reasonably practical. That wording is more appropriate than “immediately”, given that it may take some small period of time to draw together the materials that the commissioner would want to review when considering whether to approve the issue of a warrant. On the basis that we might return to this issue at a future date, I invite the hon. and learned Gentleman not to press his amendment.

The amendment tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, to which she spoke with admirable brevity, is well understood by the Government, and the arguments remain as they did in our debate on clause 22. We want to create a workable framework, and if we limit the grounds, my concern is that the scenarios and case studies I set out in that debate—the drugs case and the Daesh case—would not be caught. We have a clear definition of “urgency” in paragraphs 41 to 44 of the draft code. The draft code also has a helpful flowchart that clearly sets out the parameters within which those seeking such warrants should operate. For those reasons, I respectfully urge her to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The amendment is minor, in keeping with the amendments that we have already debated on material obtained under warrants that are later cancelled or not authorised. The amendment would tighten the requirements in cases where a judicial commissioner refuses to approve a warrant; the reason for that is self-evident. We have rehearsed this territory to some extent.

[The Solicitor General]

I resist the amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right that we have considered similar amendments in relation to clause 23 in part 2 of the Bill. With respect, it is not right to fetter the discretion of the judicial commissioners, who are experienced and senior members of the judiciary. They should be allowed to decide such matters on a case-by-case basis. The amendment prompts the questions of what might be meant by “exceptional circumstances” and of who would determine whether the threshold had been met in a given instance. I worry that that would just complicate the process. We are all agreed that commissioners will give each case proper consideration, and the commissioners will seek to serve the clear public interest in ensuring that material that should not be retained is destroyed. Well intentioned though this amendment is, it would add undue complication, and we oppose it for that reason.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 100

Items subject to legal privilege

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

Again, I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. He is right to say that this is a repeat of arguments we had on another part of the Bill. As he has laid out his arguments by adopting his previous submissions, I do likewise on behalf of the Government. Recalling those briefly, my concerns about the dangers of over-definition remain. However, I do not want material that should not be caught by the Bill to be caught by it in any inadvertent way. We are talking about cases where the purpose of a targeted equipment interference or examination warrant is to acquire or examine items that are subject to legal professional privilege. We have additional protections that are a sufficient safeguard and strike that essential balance. For all the reasons I advanced previously, I urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment at this stage.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101

Requirements which must be met by warrants

--- Later in debate ---

[Joanna Cherry]

I am very grateful to the Solicitor General. I leave the other two amendments to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras.

[Keir Starmer]

Amendments 452 and 453 speak for themselves. Concern has already been expressed about the general nature of the requirements that must be met by warrants; this is a further example under the head of equipment interference warrants. Clause 101(3) sets out in some detail what is required, and the amendments would tighten that up by requiring more precision and more matters to be explicitly stated. They are a version of other amendments tabled to corresponding provisions for other warrants.

[The Solicitor General]

To deal with the thrust of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s argument, we would say that the amendments are unnecessary because the draft statutory code of practice already requires an application for a targeted warrant to set out what the conduct is and how collateral intrusion is being managed, which is the really important public interest here. That should rightly be in the warrant application itself, and the detailed requirements should be in the statutory code; that was recommendation 5 in the report by David Anderson QC, so we are faithfully following his recommendation.

On the code of practice, the hon. and learned Gentleman will find the requirements under the heading “Necessity and proportionality”, particularly in paragraphs 3.26, 3.27 and 4.10, which deals with collateral intrusion.

I note that amendment 453 is part of this group, so I will speak briefly to that. We have concerns that I have expressed before in other contexts about the problem of the police being asked to exhaust alternative methods even where there is unlikely to be any effect. That is not only wasteful and costly, but could unintentionally lead to further undue intrusion into people’s privacy. For those reasons, I have grave concerns about that amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The amendment relates to modification provisions similar to those in clause 30, which we discussed at some length last week. I will not go over the territory again, but all the arguments I made in relation to modifications under clause 30 apply equally to modifications under clause 105 and I will not take time by going through all the similar points. It is worth observing, however, that clause 104(2) lists in paragraph (a) to (f),

‘“The only modifications which may be made under this section”,

which cover practically all the matters that appear on the requirements of warrants, so it is an interesting use of the word “only”.

There is a substantive issue on which I would like an answer. When we were debating clause 30, I made the point that the test for a modification set out in clause 30(9) is a test of necessity and proportionality that only applies to major modifications, not minor ones. We have dealt with that and I will not go over it again, but it seems to me that the test for a major modification is, quite sensibly, whether it is necessary and whether the conduct authorised by it is proportionate. I was expecting to see in clause 104(4) a version of clause 30(9) and I did not. Perhaps the Solicitor General will explain why.

[The Solicitor General]

In this context, all modifications are considered major; that is the difference. I hope that helps.

[Keir Starmer]

Well, no. [Laughter.] I do not mean that disrespectfully, but the test in clause 30(9), which is in relation to major modifications, is whether the modification is necessary and whether it is proportionate. That is a sensible test. I accept that the test in clause 104(4) is in relation to all modifications, but one would expect to see the words “that the modification is necessary”, not

“that the warrant as modified continues to be necessary”.

[The Solicitor General]

In the context of EI, we are not making the distinction between major and minor, so the effect is that all modifications will be major. If there is a discrepancy, I am happy to look at the language again to make it absolutely clear. I hope that assists the hon. and learned Gentleman.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that indication. Otherwise, in relation to modifications, my points are essentially the same as I made on clause 30. I know the Solicitor General has agreed to look at and deal with at least some of the points I made last time; I ask him to take this modifications clause under the same umbrella when he looks at the modification provisions.

[The Solicitor General]

I will try to deal with this in short order. I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the way in which he advanced his argument. It is in that spirit that I adopt the arguments I made previously. I simply make the point that under this clause we are dealing with safeguards that in my view do not undermine the important double lock standard.

I have some concerns about the amendments that relate to the judicial commissioner having to approve the decision to make modifications to EI warrants. The decision will already have been subject to the safeguard, so to require the judicial commissioner to authorise tactical operation day by day—indeed, minute by minute—is not necessary; in fact, it could be operationally damaging. The Government believe that the code makes clear, on the basis of the arguments we had before, the way in which the scope of the warrant needs to be addressed. Reading across, I would say that the safeguards in the code are helpful and clear.

[Keir Starmer]

One concern is that under subsections (9) and (10) as they stand there is no requirement for modification that touches on MPs or legal privilege to go to a judicial commissioner, which is at variance with the point that the Solicitor General just made.

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman anticipates the point that I was about to make. I am happy to consider whether subsections (9) and (10) need to be strengthened to put it beyond doubt that the double lock will apply in those contexts. I hope that that helps him. I have already made similar points on the thrust of these amendments and there is nothing more that I need to add at this stage other than to respectfully invite him to withdraw his amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 104 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 105 to 108 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.— (Simon Kirby)

Investigatory Powers Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 10th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 21st April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I will deal with these amendments swiftly. They deal with the reasonable excuse defence and are similar to previous amendments. I foreshadow the amendments to clause 116, which essentially relates to the same issue as clause 114. Those amendments are about a public interest defence, which we have also debated already.

My two points remain. The first is the consistency of the reasonable excuse defence. In some clauses it is there and in others it is not, and I cannot see the logic of when it is in and when it is out. Secondly, the Minister has already agreed that there must be a route for those who want to expose wrongdoing, so that disclosures can be made in the public interest where necessary. I have been pursuing those two points, and they are the same for this provision. I do not need to elaborate further.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right to refer to arguments previously made. For the record, this morning I omitted to pay my own tribute to our sovereign lady on her 90th birthday, and I wish to add it here. I am sure that colleagues will indulge that observation, and hopefully this next observation too. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Security and I agree that the world is divided between cavaliers and roundheads. We know what side we are on: our hearts lie broken on the battlefield of Naseby—but that is perhaps for another day.

We contend that amendment 650 is unnecessary. Clause 115(2)(b) provides that a disclosure is permitted if it is

“authorised by the person to whom the warrant is…addressed”.

Disclosure can also be authorised by virtue of this clause within the terms of the warrant, which will have been agreed by the person issuing the warrant and by a judicial commissioner. It is much better for an impartial senior judge to take a view on what is reasonable than it is for, say, a junior official or an employee of a telecommunications operator, no matter how diligent they might be; none the less, it is important that such people can raise concerns without fear of prosecution. That is why clause 203, in part 8, provides for an information gateway so that whistleblowers can take their concerns directly to the commissioner without fear of sanction under the Bill.

It is right that the Bill’s provisions reflect the sensitive techniques of the equipment interference agencies and maintain that it will be an offence to disclose the existence of a warrant. It is a well known and well rehearsed argument that the techniques and details of EI capabilities must be protected. The amendments in the round seek to achieve something that I submit is already well catered for in the Bill, and on that basis I ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. We are familiar with the arguments and our response is that the information gateway, which allows people to take concerns directly to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, caters for the public interest. For that reason I urge him to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 116 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 117 and 118 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119

Bulk interception warrants

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

The hon. and learned Lady should not read into my observations any criticism of the approach that she has taken, or any suggestion that she or her party are seeking to reduce the capabilities of the security and intelligence services. I know her background and the work that she has done, and I know that would not be her position. I do not intend to impute that it is. I am keen to speak only for myself and my party.

The Bill brings a legal framework and definition to the powers, and a set of safeguards to go with the exercise of those powers. I think that is important. If the powers are to be exercised, I would rather they were exercised within a proper legal framework, with more effective safeguards than under the current framework. I think that is the only real difference of approach between us.

What we all have to bear in mind is not whether we personally have been persuaded by the case that the powers are justified, because we all have different experiences and backgrounds—I worked with the security and intelligence services for five years on very serious terrorist cases—but whether members of the public can have confidence that they are. That is why we have been pressing for further consideration and independent assessment of the operational case.

Clause 121 deals with the first part of the safeguards on the exercise of the bulk powers—the test of necessity and proportionality. The clause is in familiar form. Subsection (1) states that the Secretary of State has to consider

“that the main purpose of the warrant is one or more of the following…the interception of overseas-related communications, and…the obtaining of secondary data”

and then that

“the warrant is necessary…in the interests of national security,”

or on

“grounds falling within subsection (2)”

Subsection (2) adds that the warrant can be

“for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, or…in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”.

I will not test the Committee’s patience by going over the same ground about the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom being relevant to the interests of national security. The point that I have made consistently on that applies just as much to clause 121, but I will not repeat it.

It is important to appreciate that the necessity of proportionality test set out in subsections (1)(b) and (2) has very broad criteria. When the Secretary of State is considering a warrant, clause 121(1)(d) requires him or her to consider that

“each of the specified operational purposes…is a purpose for which the examination of intercepted content or secondary data obtained under the warrant is or may be necessary”.

On the face of it, that provides some comfort. That is the examination part of the exercise, and it is important because it recognises the distinction that I have made between collating or bringing together data and accessing it. It relates to accessing, because it involves

“a purpose for which…examination…under the warrant is or may be necessary”,

which brings us into the territory of what the test is for examining the data that has been collected. As I said, the Bill states that the Secretary of State will consider

“each of the specified operational purposes”.

However, in clause 125(4), we get into a circular argument. It states:

“In specifying any operational purposes, it is not sufficient simply to use the descriptions contained in section 121(1)(b) or (2)”,

the two provisions to which I have just referred. It is not enough to say, “It is necessary for the operational purposes of national security or preventing serious crime,” or, “It is in our economic interests.” That is not enough,

“but the purposes may still be general purposes.”

That is all there is on the subject in the Bill. At the vital stage when we move from hoovering up or collecting communications to accessing them, the test of necessity and proportionality bites on something that is not quite as general as national security, which would not be much of a test at all, but could be not much more than that—“general purposes”. That is a cause for concern, which has prompted our amendments to tighten it up.

In crafting the amendments, we have had one eye on the code. I refer to paragraph 6.19, which suggests that some detail should be put in the application, stating:

“Each application, a copy of which must be retained by the applicant, should contain the following information:

Background to the operation in question:

Description of the communications to be intercepted and/or from which secondary data will be obtained, details of any CSP(s) and an assessment of the feasibility of the operation…

Description of the conduct to be authorised, which must be restricted to the interception of overseas-related communications…

The operational purposes for which the content and secondary data may be selected”.

What is envisaged in the code includes:

“An explanation of why the interception is considered to be necessary…A consideration of why the conduct to be authorised by the warrant is proportionate…An assurance that intercepted content and secondary data will be selected for examination only so far as it is necessary”

under section 134. Paragraph 6.26 of the code adds further guidance on necessity and suggests, at the bottom of page 43:

“For example, if a bulk interception warrant is issued in the interests of national security and for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime, every specified operational purpose on that warrant must be necessary for one…of these two broader purposes.”

So the code operates on the basis that the detail will be provided in the application, even though it is not necessary under the Bill. I would therefore have thought it would be hard for the Minister and the Government to resist the amendments, which would simply lift the requirement to include the detail in the application from the code and put it into the Bill, so that we and the public could be assured that the test would be stricter than the combined effect of clauses 121 and 125(4).

[The Solicitor General]

I have been considering the hon. and learned Gentleman’s point about clause 125. Let me reassure him that the purpose of subsection (4) is to create, in the modern phrase, a greater granularity of approach when it comes to the basis of the application. That provision is in the Bill to prevent the authorities from just relying on generalities; the point is for them to go into greater specificity. I hope that gives the hon. and learned Gentleman some reassurance.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that indication, but I suppose it invites the comment that if that is the intention, it would surely be better to amend clause 125(4) to make it clear that the application must be specific, as set out in amendment 653, which would require the specific operation to be referred to. The amendment would take the spirit of the requirement in the code to set out the specific operational purposes and put it into the Bill so that everyone can see it.

Perhaps I am not making my point clearly enough. If in the end the necessity and proportionality requirements in the Bill for the bulk power and for access are no different, then no real distinction is being made between the two. I think a real distinction should be made in the Bill, to make it clear to everyone that at the point when material is to be accessed or examined, there is a higher threshold and a higher requirement to be specific. That would reflect what is in the code, and that is the spirit in which we tabled the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Amendment 664 is very simple and straightforward. In the light of our exchange, I would simply like to put it on the table, as it were, to show the spirit in which it has been introduced. I will not press it to a vote, because this is a matter that we may be able to discuss further.

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman remembers the intervention I made earlier to help short-circuit it. We think it conveys that granularity, but we are prepared to engage in ongoing dialogue on that issue. I am grateful to him.

Amendment 665 would require that bulk interception warrants “must” specify all operational purposes. In the Government’s drafting, the word is “may”. I am sympathetic to the amendment, but I do not think it is necessary. The purpose of the clause is simply to clarify that a bulk interception warrant may include multiple operational purposes. That is necessary because overseas-related communications, which are relevant to multiple operational purposes, will necessarily be transmitted and intercepted together under the authority of a bulk interception warrant. In the majority of cases, it will therefore be necessary for bulk interception warrants to specify the full range of operational purposes in use at a particular time. I submit that the Bill is sufficiently clear on that point without the amendment. On that basis, I invite the hon. and leaned Gentleman to withdraw it.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

These are familiar amendments to the familiar modification clause, which is similar to the other modification clauses. They are intended to serve the same purpose, which is to clarify, tighten, better define and regulate the modification process.

In light of the ongoing discussions about modifications in general, I take it that all the modification provisions come within the same further consideration that I know the Government are giving to modifications, and I will not say anything more about it. However, I cannot resist saying that subsection (6) perhaps gives an example of how one could achieve approval by judicial commissioners of all major modifications.

It is interesting that subsection (6) is markedly different to the provision in clause 30. In other words, some thought has been given by whoever drafted clause 128 to how one gets major modifications back through the judicial commissioner, but that was not a technique deployed in clause 30. I simply point that out because it perhaps gives further strength to my argument that that is the correct way of dealing with these modifications, not only in this clause but in all clauses, and to similar effect. However, as I have said, we have rehearsed these discussions and I will not add to them on modification.

[The Solicitor General]

I listened to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s last point with interest. He is right about our general approach to this area. What I would say in response to his proper analysis is that I think there are some technical deficiencies in the wording of amendments 667 and 685. I am just concerned that there is a lack of clarity, but that is part of what is ongoing. On that basis, I hear what he says and I am grateful to him.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

As the hon. and learned Gentleman’s arguments are the same, my arguments, as he anticipates, are the same. Bearing in mind the sensitive nature of these matters, we do not want decisions to be rushed and, accordingly, we resist the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

Again, we note that the amendments are similar to previous amendments. We still say that they are unnecessary. The clauses already provide safeguards so that any bulk warrant may be implemented only to the extent required for the purpose for which the warrant was issued. For example, in relation to bulk interception in clause 119(4) and (5), a warrant may only authorise conduct that is described in the warrant or conduct that

“it is necessary to undertake in order to do what is expressly authorised or required by the warrant”.

That clearly sets out the scope of the authorised conduct. Well intentioned though the amendments are, we submit that they are unnecessary.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

These provisions deal with legal privilege, which we have dealt with on a number of occasions. I will not repeat the points I have made, but one concern I had about the previous clauses that dealt with legal privilege, among others, was that they distinguished between a situation in which the purpose was to obtain the legally privileged material and a situation in which the relevant communication likely to be included was subject to legal privilege. In other words, there was a situation in which the legally privileged material was deliberately targeted and a situation in which there was no intention deliberately to target legally privileged material, but it was accepted that what was targeted was likely to include such material.

In clause 25, the first time we looked at the matter, the distinction was important because the higher test in the Bill—exceptional and compelling circumstances—applied only to the situation in which legally privileged material was purposely targeted, and that test did not apply where it was not being targeted, but it might none the less be picked up because the items targeted would be likely to include material subject to legal privilege. I was uncomfortable with that distinction and I made my submissions at the time.

Curiously—this is understandable; it is not a criticism of different drafting hands in different parts of the Bill—when we get to clause 135, we have a version of the legal privilege provision that sets out in subsection (1)(b)(i) and (ii) both the purpose being to intercept or to obtain legally privileged material and the situation in which the use of the relevant criteria is likely to identify such items, so it sweeps up the targeted and the incidental, and then subjects both to the higher test.

For all the reasons I have set out, I do not think even that is enough, but when the Solicitor General looks again at all the provisions on legal privilege, I ask him to note that there is not even consistency through the statute, perhaps because it was differently drafted at different times. I cannot work out why under clause 25 incidental legally privileged material is not subject to the special test, but under clause 135 it is. I want to put that on the table and invite the Solicitor General to bear it in mind if he gives further consideration to how legally privileged material will be dealt with consistently through the Bill.

[The Solicitor General]

I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his remarks. First, we have the exceptional and compelling circumstances test in subsection (3)(b), which is consistent. Also, I think there is a slight misunderstanding about what we are dealing with, because the amendments seem to be predicated on the basis that targeted interception and equipment interference and then their bulk equivalents can be directly equated, but they cannot.

We have safeguards in place that we would say are strong. We are having a debate about that; I entirely concede that point. We are having a debate about items subject to legal profession privileges in circumstances where content collected under a bulk interception or equipment interference warrant is being selected for examination. That is the key stage. Before that, we are dealing with the stage of acquisition, not examination.

[Keir Starmer]

I am not sure that the Solicitor General is right; if he is, I apologise. This is a safeguard for a bulk warrant that allows for both gathering and access. In other words, the whole point—I go back to the beginning of part 6 of the Bill—is for a scheme that provides for the obtaining of interceptions on a bulk basis and their examination. They are dealt with in part 6. The warrants that are referred to would include an examination warrant.

[The Solicitor General]

May I correct myself? The hon. and learned Gentleman is right. I think I used the word “acquisition”. What I meant is that we are talking about when content collected under the terms of part 6, through an interception or equipment interference warrant, is being selected. The stage point about selection for examination is still important.

When content is being selected for examination for the purpose of identifying items subject to legal privilege, or selections such as under the distinction that we have discussed, clause 135, relating to the bulk interception provisions, is the relevant clause, together with clause 171, which deals with equipment interference provisions. That action requires approval from a senior official in the warrant granting department, only on the basis that they are satisfied that there are specific safeguards in place for the handling, retention, use and destruction of items that are subject to legal privilege. In addition, in circumstances when selection for examination is taking place for the purpose of identifying items subject to legal privilege, the senior official must be satisfied that the exceptional and compelling circumstances test that we have discussed is applicable. Furthermore, when an item that is subject to legal privilege is intercepted under a bulk interception warrant and is then retained following its examination, the investigatory powers commissioner must be informed of course.

My point about collection, and I think the hon. and learned Gentleman gets it, is that meaningful safeguards must be applied at that key point, because one does not know what one is getting. That is the wording, and that is why there is that difference in clause 135.

[Keir Starmer]

I intervene only to say that I accept that it is a necessary evil of bulk powers that otherwise protected information will come within the bulk power at the point of retention, for want of a better word. Safeguards for MPs, for journalists and their sources, for constituents and for clients bite at the later examination or access point.

[The Solicitor General]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. A lot of the material that is collected will never be examined. The key point is the next stage.

Briefly, the other amendments relate to the arguments about legal professional privilege, and the question whether there are circumstances in which material would not be covered by the iniquity exemption but would be of interest. We have discussed that point before, and I draw my remarks to a close on the same terms that we have discussed previously.

[Keir Starmer]

In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 8th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 175, in clause 79, page 62, line 34, at end insert—

“() the public interest in the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data; and

() the public interest in the integrity of communications systems and computer networks.”.

Clause 79 sets out those matters to be taken into account before giving a retention notice, as well as likely benefits and the likely number of users. Amendment 175 would add two public interest matters to that list. My argument is similar to the one I made on other provisions. Where matters are to be taken into account, it is important that the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data and of communications systems are specifically listed. I have moved to a position of thinking that an overarching privacy clause is probably the way to achieve this end; this is therefore a probing amendment and I will not press it to a vote.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful for the way in which the hon. and learned Gentleman states his case. To put it extremely simply, we would argue that the public interest in the protection of privacy and in the integrity of personal data are already factored in by the provisions of the Bill.

First, proportionality must include consideration of the protection of privacy. Secondly, the integrity of personal data being such an important public interest is why clause 81 requires any retained communications data to be of at least the same integrity as the business data from which they are derived. A retention notice will therefore not be permitted to do anything that would undermine the integrity of the data that the operator already holds for business purposes. That is all I want to say about the matter, but I assure hon. and learned Gentleman that those important considerations are at the heart of the processes we have followed.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 80

Review by the Secretary of State

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Lady asks a perfectly proper question. I reiterate the position that we have taken in principle: the Secretary of State is the appropriate and accountable person to be responsible for reviewing retention notices. However, although the Secretary of State must be responsible for giving notices and must therefore be the person ultimately responsible for deciding on the outcome of the review, that does not mean that she or he can make the decision on the outcome of the review without consultation—far from it.

Clause 80(6) ensures that the Secretary of State must consult both the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the technical advisory board. The commissioner must consider the proportionality of the notice; the board must consider the technical feasibility and financial consequences of it; and both must consult the operator concerned and report their conclusions to the operator and the Secretary of State. Only then can the Secretary of State can decide whether to vary, revoke or give effect to the notice. That system provides rigorous scrutiny of the notice and maintains the accountability of the final decision resting with the Secretary of State. We therefore believe it is the best mechanism for review. Accordingly, I commend the unamended clause to the Committee.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 81

Data integrity and security

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Christian Matheson]

I seek the Minister’s guidance. Throughout our considerations, I have spoken of my fears whether data held under this Act are held securely. I hope that clause 81 will address many of my fears; I seek the Minister’s advice on whether it lays responsibility on communications providers to maintain those data securely. I simply reiterate my concern that when theft does take place, there has to be a consideration of an offence of unlawful possession of stolen data, on the basis that the communications provider that has suffered the theft would also be legally responsible for that theft when the provider is in fact a victim of the theft itself. Bodies that seek to obtain illicitly a person’s private communications data may try to make financial gain as a result. Is the Minister confident that clause 81 gives me the kind of assurances that I have been looking for on internet security? Is there sufficient deterrent, in terms of possession of unlawfully obtained data, that might be included later in the Bill?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Gentleman has been consistent in stating his concerns. I assure him that clause 81 contains the sort of requirements that he would reasonably expect. It sets out the matter clearly. It should be read in conjunction not only with other legislation that I have mentioned, such as the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Privacy in Electronic Communications Regulations 2003, but with clause 210, which provides for the Information Commissioner to audit the security, integrity and destruction of retained data, and the codes of practice to which I referred earlier. The provisions in the communications data draft code of practice go into more detail about the security arrangements.

We had a discussion some days ago about the existence of adequate criminal legislation. The Bill has a number of provisions that relate to those who hold data, and we discussed whether existing legislation could cover those who come into possession of the data unlawfully. I say to the hon. Gentleman that I will take the matter away and consider it, and come up with a proper considered response to his query.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 84

Enforcement of notices and certain other requirements and restrictions

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 225, in clause 84, page 65, line 20, after “not”, insert “, without reasonable excuse,”.

There are two points to make here. One is to state the principle that reasonable excuse defences are needed to protect those who are exposed in wrongdoing. We had that debate last week and I listened carefully to the response given. The practical reason is the inconsistencies may be intentional, or they may be unintentional. Clause 73(1), under which unlawful disclosure is made an offence under part 3, has a “without reasonable excuse” provision. Clause 84, which is in part 4, does not. There may be a very good reason for that, but it escapes me at the moment. That is either a point that the Solicitor General can deal with now, or I am happy for him to deal with it later on. It may be just one of those things when you draft a long, complicated Bill, but there is an inconsistency of approach here, because reasonable excuse is sometimes written in and other times not, for no apparent reason.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Just to be clear, I do not need to be persuaded about the policy objective of a clause that keeps a retention notice safe. It is the policy objective of not having a “reasonable excuse” defence to the provision, which operates as an exclusion to the prohibition, of which I need to be persuaded. I do not need persuading about the prohibition for safety.

[The Solicitor General]

I was coming to that. We are talking about a duty here; the earlier clause the hon. and learned Gentleman referred to is an offence. That will, I think, explain the importantly different context.

To deal with the question of “reasonable excuse”, the problem is that once the information is out in the public domain, it cannot be withdrawn—whether that information has been introduced with good or bad intentions does not matter. It cannot be right for the Bill to allow a person to release sensitive information in that way and then subsequently rely on a “reasonable excuse”.

May I deal with clause 84(4), which is relevant to this provision? It provides an exemption where the Secretary of State has given permission for the existence of the notice to be revealed. The Government intend that such permission would be given, for example, where a provider wishes to discuss the existence of their retention notice with another provider subject to similar requirements. Should the operator wish to reveal the existence of the notice, they should discuss the matter with the Secretary of State, and in such circumstances permission is likely to be given. There will be those sort of scenarios, as I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman will understand, and they will help improve the operational model.

My concern about using the “reasonable excuse” provision in the context of a duty would be that it would undermine the important policy objective that I have set out. For that reason I would urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I will withdraw the amendment. As to the difference between a duty and an offence, I understand that in principle, but I am pretty convinced that elsewhere in the Bill a breach of the duty becomes an offence, as otherwise it is an unenforceable provision, so I am not sure it is a distinction that withstands scrutiny. That being said, I am not going to press this to a vote. It would be helpful and reassuring if the Solicitor General would agree to set out the route by which a whistleblower brings this to attention. I think we have already agreed in general terms and it may come within the umbrella of the undertaking that has been given; if it does, all well and good. That would reassure those that have concerns about exposing wrongdoing. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

These amendments were consistent with earlier amendments that have now been withdrawn, the purpose of which was to put the decision-making power in the hands of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or the judicial commissioner. The other amendments having been withdrawn, I will not press these to a vote; they do not make sense within the unamended Bill as it now stands.

[The Solicitor General]

We have already discussed the importance of protecting the identities of those companies subject to data retention notices, but there are circumstances where a telecommunications operator should be able to disclose the existence of a retention notice. Clause 84 allows the Secretary of State to give them permission to do so. The amendment would ensure that a telecommunications operator could disclose the existence or content of a retention notice to the IPC without the need for permission to be given. I would say the proposal is unnecessary, because it is absolutely the Government’s intention to give telecommunications operators permission to disclose the existence and content of the retention notice to both the relevant oversight bodies—the IPC and the Information Commissioner—at the point at which a notice is given. In any event, clause 203 as drafted would permit the telecommunications operator to disclose a retention notice to the IPC in relation to any of his functions.

Amendment 224 would mean that the IPC, not the Secretary of State, would be granting permission for a telecoms operator to disclose the existence of the notice. In practice the Secretary of State would consider, at the point that a retention notice was issued, to whom the telecommunications operator could disclose the existence of a notice. It would not make any sense for this issue to be considered separately by the commissioner following the issue of a notice by the Secretary of State.

Further requests by a telecommunications operator to disclose a retention notice are likely to cover administrative matters, such as disclosure to a new systems supplier. Such matters should appropriately be considered by the Secretary of State. I think that explanation not only justifies opposition to the amendments, which I know are being withdrawn, but supports clause 84.

[Keir Starmer]

I have nothing further to add, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

It is good to serve under your chairmanship once again, Ms Dorries. I welcome the spirit in which the amendments have been tabled. There is a common sense of purpose among Committee members to ensure that the ambit of the authorities that have power to access communications data should always be strictly scrutinised. In that spirit, the Government have progressively reduced the number of such authorities. They have reviewed that number and keep it under review. The list of such authorities in the Bill is not simply a replication of the list in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, but has been the subject of careful consideration.

It has been judged that it is necessary for those public authorities to be allowed to access communications data for a narrow range of purposes. For example, insider trading needs to be investigated, and the Financial Conduct Authority is the body to do that. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency will need access to such information to locate people lost at sea. Bodies such as the Food Standards Agency and the Department for Work and Pensions have been given clear remits by Parliament to investigate certain types of criminality and civil matters, because such investigations often require dedicated resources and specialist knowledge. To unduly restrict those agencies in their work would cause an imbalance.

I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman shares those views, because in his previous incarnation as the Director of Public Prosecutions he made it clear, for example, that communications data should be available to organisations such as the DWP in investigating any abuse of the welfare system or other public funds. I therefore know that he has a common purpose in mind.

The Bill for the first time brings together all the public authorities with access to communications data in primary legislation. That is an important and welcome step up from previous practice. I should be clear that all the authorities listed in the Bill were required to make the case that they needed the power to access communications data. Therefore, as I have outlined, the list in the Bill is not just a blind replication of existing lists. As I have said, we removed 13 public authorities from the list in February last year. Amendments that were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security and that we will debate shortly will introduce further restrictions on certain public authorities. That shows that the Government are taking great care in this area.

[Keir Starmer]

I wonder whether the Solicitor General can assist the Committee, either now or at some later stage, by setting out some detail about how the case was made for each of the agencies, and in particular why the designated senior officer grades were chosen. That is quite a complicated question, but it is striking, from the Committee’s point of view, that a watch manager is listed as a designated senior officer when one is talking about accessing communications data. I have already given other examples.

[The Solicitor General]

I shall try to assist the hon. and learned Gentleman. I will not be able to give him an exhaustive list here and now, as he is aware, and I am pretty sure that the information that he seeks is available in some form. We will, of course, help to signpost him to it.

I make the simple case about watch managers that there will be emergency situations, such as missing persons inquiries, in which fleetness of foot is essential. Suggesting that a more senior level of management would be appropriate risks important data being lost or not being available in those emergency situations. There are certain key situations where we are talking about the protection of life in which the balance needs to be struck in the way that we suggest in schedule 4.

With regard to schedule 4, public authorities cannot all acquire communications data for the full range of statutory purposes. Each can acquire data only for the purposes for which it has justified a need for them. That maintains the essential principle of proportionality, so that the public authorities concerned only have the powers for which they have made a compelling case.

To give some examples of the changes from RIPA, ambulance services will no longer be able to acquire communications data for the purposes of preventing and detecting crime, and the Prudential Regulation Authority will no longer be able to acquire communications data in any circumstances. In addition, the Bill allows for the ability of a public authority to access communications data to be removed, should a public authority cease to have a requirement to make those acquisitions. That is a very important check and balance.

To fill in some more detail in respect of the question the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras asked about the detailed justification for each public authority, each authority has been required to provide evidence of utility and the need to acquire communications data. That included detailed consideration of the level of authorising officers, so that we got the balance right in terms of appropriateness.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady and can correct the record in this way. I should have used the phrase “utility and need”. I think that important word, to which she quite rightly draws my attention, answers the point. In one of the examples I have given, where a need was not demonstrated by the PRU, the power was removed entirely.

Among the bodies that the amendment seeks to remove are Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Ministry of Defence. I am afraid that both bodies are intercepting agencies, and communications data are part of their work in targeting interception so that the powers which we all accept are intrusive are used in as tightly constrained circumstances as possible. My worry is that the amendment, however well intentioned, might well have the contrary effect on that important targeted work and the need for those organisations to target their activities.

I remind the Committee that David Anderson QC concluded in his report:

“It should not be assumed that the public interest is served by reducing the number of bodies with such powers, unless there are bodies which have no use for them.”

The Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill also recognised communications data as

“an important tool for law enforcement and other public bodies.”

For those reasons, I urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General. There is obviously concern about the threshold and safeguards for accessing communications data. That is what the Digital Rights case is all about; it is what the Tom Watson and David Davis case will test. To some extent, until that case is concluded, we will not know in specific terms what the safeguards are, although, as I foreshadowed last week, my view is that the requirements for safeguards will tighten as time goes by. It may not be exactly as the divisional court set out.

The Solicitor General has indicated that he will point me to the material that at least summarises why it was thought that each body should be on list. I am grateful for that and will consider it carefully. Will he also, either in a letter or some other appropriate form, set out the test that was applied in clear terms, so that it can be contrasted with the Digital Rights case and any outcome of the David Davis case in due course? I acknowledge that the hon. and learned Gentleman makes a powerful point about Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and, on that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady for that intervention. As she will know, there is a 20 to 25-year history of the evolution of protections for journalists, from the point when they were not put on notice to the point when they are now routinely put on notice. There are exceptions that have been tested in the Court of Appeal, but journalists are pretty well always put on notice and on many occasions will go and argue their corner to protect their source. Over the years, the case law has determined what the proper test is; on some occasions it has protected the source and on others it has allowed access. Under the PACE regime, there is now a clearly established way to proceed in cases in which journalists’ sources are an issue. It is well understood and it works well. It is significant that none of the law enforcement bodies to my knowledge are complaining that the on-notice PACE procedure for obtaining material that relates to journalists’ sources is not working in practice. Having battled it out over 25 years, pretty well all the sides accept that the current arrangement represents and protects their interests.

The amendment would essentially apply the same regime to communications data where communications data has been retained and is now being accessed. In the modern world, as journalists have made absolutely clear, to say that authorities have to go via PACE when they want to get a physical address book with a source in it but not when they want the virtual version through comms data is to cut right through the protection that has been so carefully crafted over the last 20 to 25 years. That does not protect journalists’ sources and is a cause of real concern.

Amendment 141 reflects current practice by providing for exceptional circumstances in which applications do not have to be on notice, whereas the Bill simply does not offer journalists any meaningful protection whatever. It is a carefully thought through, constructive amendment, intended to give journalists the protection they need without thwarting an investigation that needs to be protected. The test in paragraph (b) of the fourth subsection of the amendment puts the code of practice into the Bill. There is then a provision on costs.

The amendment is simple: it preserves PACE protections and extends them to communications data. It sets out the right test for the designated senior official and the judicial commissioner to apply. Nobody can quarrel with the test, because it is taken from the code of practice itself. It is all very well having warm words in the code of practice and warm words, which we have heard many times, about the protection of journalists’ sources, but unless they are translated into something that has real bite and effect, they remain warm words. I do not say that to underplay what the Solicitor General will say. I know that he believes in the underpinning principles I have outlined, but history shows that unless protection for journalists is written into legislation in a meaningful and effective way, it will not apply in practice as it should.

[The Solicitor General]

I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for clearly outlining the kernel of his concern about the way the clause is drafted. Although in the drafting of the clause we have tried, quite properly, to address what is a sensitive occupation—I hesitate to use the word “profession” because some journalists do not like to be described in that way—we are in danger of moving the focus away from the public interest that journalists serve, which is freedom of expression in a democratic society without fear of intrusion by the authorities and in a way in which sources, and the journalists themselves, can be protected. We have to draw a very important distinction. It is tempting to try to draft amendments dealing with journalists in an ad hominem, or group, way. However, we are not talking about that; we are talking about the source material. Therefore, in a nutshell, I am afraid that the amendment does not really deal with the essential public interest, and that is why I commend the Government’s approach to the Committee.

I will say to the hon. and learned Gentleman, by way of reassurance, that if we can do better in the code of practice, we will. I am certainly open to active consideration of the ways in which we can improve the drafting to make the principles of freedom of expression, and the points that he and I agree on, even clearer to those applying these rules.

[Keir Starmer]

The Solicitor General is resisting this sensible and constructive amendment, which reflects the PACE approach, on the basis that one should not get too specific and one needs to understand the underlying public interest. He must accept that the points he makes apply equally to the PACE test. It does not matter whether someone is physically seizing a document that reveals a source or seizing something that serves virtually the same purpose. He must accept that the test is working well in practice and that all sides are pretty content with the way it works at the moment.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman, but, tempting though it is to draw that comparison, I think that he is mistaken. The PACE code of practice focuses on the person who, as it appears to the judge, is in possession of the material. That is not always the journalist; for example, a journalist’s material in regards to comms data will be held by the communication service providers and not by the journalist. Under PACE, journalists are not notified in such cases.

[Keir Starmer]

Will the Solicitor General give way?

[The Solicitor General]

I will not give way at this stage because I want to explain the position. I have given way repeatedly and I want the chance to make my argument. I am sorry if people think, for some reason, that I am not listening or being reasonable. I need to explain the case because I do not think that it has been fully understood.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to talk about the position under PACE whereby journalists are asked to surrender data, such as in notebooks; however, under RIPA and the PACE procedures, applications are already being made to others in possession of material, journalists are not notified and the principles are very clear. I do not think it is right of him to draw such an easy comparison and to say, “It is working for PACE, therefore it should be read across the provisions of the Bill.” That is comparing apples with pears—with respect to him.

[Keir Starmer]

I have obviously looked carefully at what the Government said in the past on this issue and what was said in response to the pre-legislative Committees. The point has been made that, on the one hand, it is seizing from the journalist themselves and on the other hand, it is seizing from the person who holds the data; that is a material difference and we cannot compare the two schemes. I wonder whether that withstands proper scrutiny. The whole point is to give a source confidence that they can come forward and tell a journalist something and they will be protected. Otherwise, all the case law recites the fact that sources will not come forward and wrongdoing will not be exposed, which is unhealthy for democracy.

The argument that, if you seize my name in physical form from a journalist, it is to be protected, but if my name is being held by a data holder it can be given up and does not require protection, defies common sense. For the source, the question is: what is the protection for me if I come forward and try to expose someone? The argument that you are fine if it is written in a notebook and held by the journalist, but you are not protected if it finds its way into a bit of data held by someone else does not hold up.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

In amendment 141, which the Solicitor General is resisting, we have deliberately and intentionally accommodated the test that notice need not be given where it is necessary

“in order to avoid prejudice to the investigation.”

He has given a powerful example, but we have catered for that by saying that notice does not need to be given in that instance. The norm is that notice is given in the usual way, but the exception is where there is prejudice to the investigation. That absolutely meets his concerns; but it does meet my point that notice should otherwise be given.

[The Solicitor General]

I am glad we both note that we are trying to get to the same objective. I have already said to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the combination of legislation and the code of practice will be the way in which this framework is set out. I have indicated that if we can do better on the code of practice, we will; we will work with him on that. I also reiterate the amount of care that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security and I are taking on this particular issue. We have met with leading representatives from journalism on three occasions to discuss the Bill. We have written to the National Union of Journalists and the News Media Association about the concerns they have raised. This is part of a dialogue that is very much ongoing about the protections afforded by the Bill to journalistic material. They rightly say to us that it is not about them but about the interests that they serve. I cannot reiterate enough that we must focus on that issue when drafting the legislation.

May I deal with other Members who have considered the issue? The Interception of Communications Commissioner carefully considered it last year. He made it clear in his recommendation that, where communications data are sought that do not relate to investigation to determine the source of journalistic information, then judicial authorisation is not necessary. I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman is trying in effect to replicate that carve-out. On the proposed restrictions on the circumstances in which a communications commissioner may approve the obtaining of communications data that are journalistic in nature, where the request is for one of the legitimate aims in article 10.2 of the convention, there is an overriding public interest necessitating the order and the order is proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims being pursued, we already have the concepts of necessity and proportionality under part 3 as spelt out in the draft code of practice—as indeed they are in the code of practice for existing legislation. We already have a tightly constrained framework here, which offers a high degree of reassurance to all of us who care passionately about these issues, as I do. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal has been clear in recent authority, such as the case of News Group Newspapers Ltd and others v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner in December last year, that the 2015 code of practice drafted under the current provisions and replicated in the regime in the Bill meets the standards on freedom of expression set out in article 10.

On the proposed requirement for a judicial commissioner to ensure that all reasonable alternative measures to such an authorisation have been exhausted, I am afraid that in my view, there are problems with its practicability. There are many reasons why a particular approach to an investigation might be selected and the use of a particular power might be called for. Judicial commissioners, with respect to them, are not the experts in this consideration and should not be expected to be. It is for those with expertise in the range of investigative options available in the particular circumstances of the case to decide that. Then, of course, the tests can be applied.

I do not want to take technical points. With regard to the technicalities of the amendment, there are some drafting issues that would need to be worked on, but I accept that it is really about principle and the approach to be taken. At this stage, although I disagree with the means by which the hon. and learned Gentleman seeks to make the change, continuing dialogue on the issue is meaningful. For those reasons and in that context, I respectfully ask him to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I have listened carefully to the Solicitor General. In the end, it boils down to a matter of principle. I think that he accepts what amendment 141 says in proposed new subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d). He criticises (c), but I will not spend time on that. The most important thing is to establish that the order is directed to one or more of the legitimate aims in article 10.2 and that an overriding public interest makes it necessary. He says that that is the framework within which the decisions should be taken, so there is no disagreement between them.

The difference, then, appears to be simply that I say it should be on the face of the statute and clear to all, and he says, “No, it can be in a code without express reference in statute.” There is a problem in principle with that. Protection of journalists’ sources should be on the face of the Bill. That is important in a modern democracy. For the Bill to be silent about the test, and for only the code of practice to apply it, is wrong in principle.

Secondly, I am afraid that there is a test spelled out in the Bill, and it is inconsistent with that test. The test for the judicial commissioner in the Bill is simply to check that there were reasonable grounds for considering something, but that the other requirements in the provisions were complied with. As a matter of statutory construction, the judicial commissioner is bound to apply the test in the Bill and cannot apply any other test, so it is wrong in principle not to put it in the Bill. It is also problematic, because there is a test in the Bill and it is not a special test. Ultimately, it says that the judicial commissioner must ensure that the other provisions of the Act are complied with. We would expect that; it is hardly an enhanced test by anybody’s standards.

In those circumstances, I am afraid that the Solicitor General’s arguments are wholly unpersuasive. I will withdraw the amendment, partly because I think that there is room for improvement, on which I will certainly work with the Government. To be absolutely clear, partly because I want to reserve my position to propose the amendment at a later stage, as it is of such importance to the Bill, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I think the guidance that we are given in declaring our interests to the House is that, for legal work, the identity of the person advised is not to be disclosed, because that comes within legal professional privilege. In other words, the fact that somebody has sought advice and who has sought advice are protected by legal professional privilege. I have never known there to be any doubt about that. This is an area where there is a need for special protection; that ought to be in the statute. I think that is common ground. That is how I have always understood it. I am not entitled to say who instructs me without the consent of the client, certainly before the matter comes to court.

[The Solicitor General]

While I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman on the principle and the absolute nature of the privilege—subject to the iniquity exemption that we all know about and those of us who practise are familiar with—I am talking about a restricted area, in which we are looking at the threads of an investigation as opposed to the actual meat of the subject.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. There might be an earlier stage, for example at a police station in a criminal investigation, when that might not be a matter that is automatically disclosed in that way.

[Keir Starmer]

I absolutely accept that, for litigation in open court, it is pretty clear who everybody is acting for. It is common practice in the commercial world for protection to be put around whether a client is seeking advice and from whom. That is jealously guarded by every law firm that I have ever had anything to do with, for very obvious reasons. People go to lawyers; they do not necessarily want the world at large to know that they have gone and to which lawyer they have gone. I cannot over-emphasise that, in the commercial reality of the real world, that is jealously guarded.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to hon. Members for trying to sift their way through what appears to be something of a labyrinth at times. I do not want to overcomplicate the situation. The Government’s view is that, combined with the code of practice, we have the necessary protections in the Bill that acknowledge that the degree and nature of the interference in an individual’s rights and freedoms will of course be greater in these sort of circumstances, so considerations of the necessity and proportionality become highly germane because they draw attention to any such circumstances that might lead to an unusual degree of intrusion or infringement of rights and freedoms, in particular privacy.

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Lady makes her point with force. Although the concerns she has about content and the issues that we have debated and will debate in part 5 are understandable, we are talking about a different nature of material and a different regime, where considerations can be distinct from those that apply in other parts of the Bill.

I will deal as quickly as I can with the points that have been made. I would argue that we have, in effect, a particular restriction that I would regard as not striking the right balance with respect to those who need it. We have to think in the context of the operational capability of our security and intelligence services in particular.

If there is a specific requirement for the use of PACE powers in these circumstances, I am worried that the requirements of clarity, consistency and transparency that we have to abide by will be undermined. The Interception of Communications Commissioners Office was clear in its rejection of the claim that public authorities had utilised RIPA to avoid the use of PACE. In fact, under this Bill part 3 authorisations for communications data to identify or confirm a journalistic source are subject to more stringent safeguards than under PACE, because the Bill replicates those procedures but at a higher level of authorisation, with a serving or former High Court judge, as opposed to a circuit judge, making the authorisation.

Making communications data accessible to those who have a lawful need for them at the right level of authorisation is a fine balance, but it is struck most effectively in the Bill as drafted. I am sure that Opposition Members do not intend us to reach a position where communications that have been made for the intent of furthering a criminal purpose are missed or are not accessible as they would want them to be. For those reasons, I urge the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am afraid I simply do not follow the argument that transparency and accountability are lost if the protection that should properly be accorded to lawyers, journalists and MPs is spelled out in the Bill, with clear guidance to those who operate the authorisations on how to apply them. As I have indicated, these are matters of real concern that go to important issues in the Bill. In order to reserve my rights at a later stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Collaboration agreements

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fifth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 5th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I am sure that in due course we will outline where we are with regard to the role, or lack thereof, of the commissioner. With regard to a warrant involving a Member of Parliament, if that relates to a single individual—let us say a single Member of Parliament—that cannot be modified to have other people added in that category. There would have to be a fresh application relating to separate names. That is an important caveat that deals with a lot of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s genuine concern.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention; I am happy to be intervened on. I think that comes from paragraph 5.61 of the code, on page 33, which says:

“A targeted warrant that relates to just one specified person, organisation or location, for example, cannot be modified to go beyond the original scope of the warrant.”

Slightly further down it says:

“Whilst this can be subject to modification, it cannot be modified to move beyond or outside of the scope of the original thematic warrant.”

This is an important point. First, something as important as that needs to be in statute—that is critical. In other words, if someone has a warrant for person A on a Monday and they want to add person B on a Tuesday, they must get a new warrant, not modify the existing warrant. That should be in statute, not in a code. There is obviously the question of what goes in the code, but that safeguard is important. If, for an example, a warrant touched on A on a Monday and could be modified in a way that might touch on an MP or go into prohibited legal privilege on a Tuesday, that requires more than a paragraph in a code of practice, because it is really important.

Again, I invite an intervention, but the code says:

“A targeted warrant that relates to just one specified person, organisation or location, for example, cannot be modified to go beyond the original scope of the warrant.”

That is a carefully drafted sentence. What is the position when there is a targeted warrant that relates to two people and the idea is to add one, and that one is an MP or a solicitor? I invite an intervention because that is not covered by the code’s wording.

[The Solicitor General]

I think I can assist. Perhaps there is a bit of a misconception about the current situation. If a warrant says, let us say, person A and others are known, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 does not require an amendment to the warrant even if another person becomes known and therefore becomes a potential target. We are tightening that up and making it a requirement that if person B becomes known, even though the ambit of the warrant at the moment covers others unknown, there has to be an amendment where we know the identity of individuals. The answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman’s question is that it can only be amended if there is an unknown part to the original warrant, as opposed to specific names.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. This is an improvement on RIPA, but that is setting the bar pretty low when it comes to modifications.

[The Solicitor General]

Let us not forget that modifications to add MPs can only be authorised by the Secretary of State. That is another important safeguard. I would not pooh-pooh what we are doing by saying that we are improving on RIPA. This is a significant improvement from where we are.

[Keir Starmer]

I look forward, on Report or Third Reading, to somebody informing MPs that a modification of the warrant that includes them can be made by the Secretary of State, without the involvement of a judicial commissioner. Understandably, great play was made of the role of the judicial commissioner when colleagues on both sides of the House were concerned about their communications with constituents. They were assured that there was a double lock and that a modification could not happen without a judge looking at it as well. Somebody has to stand up, be honest with them and say, “Well, it can actually, because it can be modified to bring you within it.” There is nothing on the statute or in the code to prohibit that. That is a very serious proposition because these are not urgent modifications. They are permanent and, in many cases, slower-time modifications.

I understand that, in a fast-moving case, urgent procedures are needed and urgent modification procedures may be needed, but these include slower-time, considered, permanent modifications to a warrant. Somebody needs to tell our colleagues that they can be included in the warrant by modification, and that it starts and ends with the Secretary of State and goes nowhere near a judge. They need to know that.

Somebody also needs to address the legal privilege point because I do not think that is addressed at all on the face of clause 30 or, as far as I can see, in the modifications part of the code of practice. Again, if I am wrong about that I will be corrected. From my reading of the Bill, a modification could be made to allow intercept in the otherwise protected area of legal professional privilege. The Secretary of State has to apply the higher test—I accept that—but it will never go to a judge. A sort of comfort is being held out to lawyers that, even in the extreme case where they will be targeted, it will at least be seen by a judge. That comfort is shot through by this provision. The clause really needs to be taken away and reworked in the light of the significant flaws—that the code is not clear enough and is not the right place for protections for MPs or for legal professional privilege. That should be on the face of the statute through an appropriate amendment.

I turn to the so-called minor amendments. We must remember that although they are called minor amendments, they are not minor. Clause 27(8) is really what comes within the ambit of a minor amendment, and that is all the detail about how the content will be examined. There is a bulk warrant, which, by its very nature, hoovers up a lot of communications. Then there is an examination warrant, which is intended to be a check and balance, and that is why there is a requirement to set out how the examination warrant will work—the address, the numbers, the apparatus, and a combination of other factors and so on. That is the really important safeguard. It is the only safeguard for bulk warrants accessing content, yet all of that is deemed to be a minor amendment. The amendments to the examination warrant—which, in truth, is the most important warrant for the bulk powers after the wide bulk warrant in the first place, as this is where we are actually looking at stuff—are all deemed to be minor.

What is the route for a so-called minor amendment? Let us trace it. Who can make the decision on a minor amendment? Clause 30(6) states that a minor amendment may be made by the Secretary of State, the relevant Scottish Government Minister, a senior official, the person to whom the warrant is addressed or a person who holds a senior position in the same public authority as that person. There is no urgency requirement. Real-time, slow amendments to the way bulk warrants will be subjected to examination can be made in the ordinary, run-of-the-mill case by the person to whom the warrant is addressed—they can modify their own warrant—or by a person who holds a senior position in the same public authority as them. With no disrespect to the individuals in those positions, we have dropped a long way down the ranking when it comes to the authority for sign-off of an amendment to an examination warrant that allows my content or anyone’s content to be looked at where it has been scooped up under a bulk provision.

I am afraid it gets worse. Whereas for a major modification there is a requirement for the decision maker to look at necessity and proportionality, there is no such requirement for minor amendments. That is astonishing and very hard to justify. I will listen carefully in due course to what is said, but why is there no need on the face of the Bill to consider whether a so-called minor modification to an examination warrant in relation to bulk powers is necessary or proportionate? Subsection (9) is clearly drafted only to catch major modifications.

Consider that a minor amendment to a warrant that applies to an MP or that touches on legal professional privilege could be made by the person to whom the warrant is addressed or someone in a senior position in the same public authority. I ask Members to inform their colleagues of that. There is no requirement that a minor amendment even goes to the Secretary of State, and certainly nowhere near a judicial commissioner.

The approval mechanism in clause 31 is only for major modifications. There is a low level of authority for making minor modifications, and there is no test. If I were a senior official in the public authority, I might say, “You just asked me to make a modification. What am I supposed to take into account?” but on the face of the Bill, there is not even a test to be applied. There is no duty—again, I am happy to be corrected—to inform the Secretary of State. For major modifications, there is such a duty, but for minor ones, there is not. Someone in a senior position in a public authority can therefore make the modification and not notify the Secretary of State. There is certainly no double lock. It is no wonder the Joint Committee was so concerned about this provision, and it is no wonder so many others have raised such concerns.

[Keir Starmer]

I would be interested in the Government’s position on that, because it does not sit with what is in the code of practice. If all clause 30 intends is to say, “We thought he was called Keir Starmer; now we know he’s called Steve”—I have always wanted to be called Steve—“but the warrant applies to exactly the same person,” or, “We thought it was 137 Charlton Road; we now realise it’s 172, but it’s the same premises”, I will sit down now and invite an intervention.

[The Solicitor General]

For minor ones.

[Keir Starmer]

No, I think the intervention is suggesting major modifications—subsection (2)(a) only applies to major modifications. That is, apart from the removing, it is the description of a major modification. If a major modification is only intended to allow the name of the same individual to be swapped—where it is appreciated that it is the same person, now called not X, but Y— that is one thing, but the code of practice then does not make much sense, because it is written on the basis that individuals are being added.

I am inviting an intervention, but I am not getting one. I would quite like one, because I would be less concerned. If this is right and that is what the Joint Committee was told—that that was the intention—then the measure clearly needs to be rewritten, which would remove a lot of concern. That is why I invite some clarification. I suspect that the non-intervention is because that understanding is not the right answer.

[The Solicitor General]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

For that very reason, Minister—interventions have to be short. The debate is continuing and Keir Starmer has the Floor; then there is the opportunity to respond.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General. That was helpful, because if the previous intervention is right, a lot of my concern would be focused elsewhere and save a lot of time—but I am afraid it is not. On the face of the Bill, and consistent with the code of practice, named—[Interruption.] I want to be clear, to have clarity about what we are arguing about, because the point is a very serious one. As everyone can see, there is the real potential for all the careful checks and balances devised under the Bill to be shot through by the modification process. That is the real concern, and I think it is a shared concern, certainly in the Joint Committee, but also in other places.

To be clear, I think that the Solicitor General is accepting that the measure is not simply about re-identifying with a different name a person who is already specified on the warrant; he is suggesting that it would be used if a warrant was issued in relation to a gang of some sort, when some members are known and others become known, and a mechanism for adding them is needed. If that is what was intended, why is that not what has been written in the clause?

Clause 30, as drafted, does not limit in that way. If it did, the subheading would be “Modification of thematic warrants”, then it would state that where a thematic warrant has been issued naming a person, an organisation or whatever, and it becomes necessary to amend it, to clarify further the persons within the organisation, and so on, then that would be a much more restricted clause. That would probably have met some of the concerns of the Joint Committee and be a very different proposition, but that is not what has been drafted. In the code of practice, it is true, there are some warm words, but—

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman knows that the code of practice is much more than that and makes it clear that the measure is about thematic warrants. The mischief that he is worried about here is cured by the fact that if a sole named person is on the warrant, it cannot be modified to add another name; we would have to apply for a new warrant.

[Keir Starmer]

The question for the Minister is, if that is the purpose, why is the measure not limited to thematic warrants? It is impossible to answer that question unless one wants to keep open the option of modifying non-thematic warrants. It is a simple amendment, that the provisions of a warrant issued under whatever the relevant clause is may be modified by an instrument. In subsection (1), we could achieve exactly what the Solicitor General says is the clause’s purpose by amending it to “themed warrants”, but it has not been done, notwithstanding the concerns of the Joint Committee.

[Keir Starmer]

I have considered that, and it is fair to say that subsection (2)(a) would not allow, in essence, a completely fresh warrant to be issued under the modification procedure. There has to be a relationship between the modification and the warrant, so someone could not say, “I want a warrant against X today, and I’ll modify it to include Y, which has nothing to do with X but it is handy to modify this warrant, as we have it before us.” There has to be a relationship, which I accept is the intention and the purpose of clause 30, but the drafting is still far too wide. What if an MP or a solicitor is involved? What if it becomes known that there is a gang and we think that X, Y and Z are involved—we do not know the others—and we then learn that one of them is talking to their solicitor? The solicitor is then related. A modification would allow something to be brought in, and there is nothing to prevent it.

With all due respect to everyone who has worked hard on clause 30, of all the clauses in the Bill it is the one that the further I went through it, the further my jaw dropped because of just how wide and unlimited it is. In an area such as this, where we are talking about safeguards, it is not enough simply to point to what are in fact limited words in the code of practice. I will not invite the Minister to do something now, but I am curious—I may have misunderstood—that paragraph 5.64 of the code says:

“Minor modifications that are made by the warrant requesting agency are valid for five working days following the date of issue unless the modification…is endorsed within that period by a senior official…on behalf of the Secretary of State. Where the modification is endorsed in this way, the modification expires upon the expiry date”.

I cannot find any reference to that anywhere in the Bill. If I am wrong, I will happily be corrected, but I do not know where that comes from. Obviously, my amendments would restructure the clause to try to make it workable, but I do not see paragraph 5.64 anywhere in the clause. It would help to have that clarified.

That brings me to the amendments, which I will address briefly. In the spirit of constructive dialogue, I have tried to propose a restructuring of the clause in a way that would narrow it while leaving a workable modification provision. My amendments are not intended to be unhelpful. Amendment 68 would leave out subsection 5(c) so that the modification for a major case sits with the Secretary of State. Amendment 69 would leave out subsections (6)(d) and (e) to cut out people below senior official level so far as minor modifications are concerned. Amendment 70 would leave out subsections (7) and (8) because they are not necessary. Amendment 71 would make it clear that, in relation to MPs and legal professional privilege, all modifications must go through a judicial commissioner—if a modification goes into a protected area, it would have to go through a judicial commissioner. Amendment 72 would leave out subsection (12) because it would no longer be relevant, as senior officials would be taken out of the equation. Amendment 74 would make it clear that certain modifications have to go through the judicial commissioner. I tabled those amendments as a serious attempt to improve clause 30, which is seriously deficient for all the reasons that I have outlined. For the Government to nod this through at this stage, without standing back and asking if they have got it right, would not be the right approach.

[The Solicitor General]

Although we have only heard one speaker, we have covered the ground on the issues at hand. The hon. and learned Gentleman’s points about the importance of warrantry and the involvement of commissioners are interesting and important. This is all about fine-tuning what I regard to be an important step forward from RIPA in ensuring that we do not end up undermining the vitally important world-leading double-lock system that this Government want to introduce, by allowing the system of modification to be a back-door route. I am absolutely with him on that and know that he and other members of the Committee have advanced these amendments in that spirit.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right to set the context of this debate and talk about the three areas of thematic warrantry that we are talking about—targeted interception, targeted assistance and mutual assistance warrants. He made the point about trying to make that clear on the face of the Bill and the code of practice not being enough. I will go away and think about that, because I think it is a reasonable point to make. If it needs to be made clearer, we are only too happy to help. I want to ensure that what I am about to say is underlined and made clear; what I say in Committee will greatly help to inform those who will operate in this area in the future.

We must be clear about what can be achieved by a modification in the first place. I have already said that the introduction of the concept of major modifications is an important new safeguard in the Bill, because of the absence of references to that in RIPA. What we had with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was the authorisation of warrants on a thematic basis. I have given the example of a kidnap gang; RIPA requires that if, for example, the National Crime Agency wishes to intercept the communications of members of such a gang, their telephone numbers must be added to the warrant as they become known—not their names and identities, just that information. I do not think that is good enough and that is why that particular oversight and anomaly—I will be generous in that respect—needs to be corrected, which is what the Bill does. The code of practice makes it clear that names can only be added to a warrant when they are within the scope of the original warrant. For example, the name of a kidnapper could be added to a warrant that relates to a kidnap gang.

[Keir Starmer]

Is there a reason why paragraph 5.61 states that a

“targeted warrant that relates to just one specified person, organisation… cannot be modified”,

which is pregnant with the idea that there is a different position when it is not just one? Was that a carefully drafted sentence that means exactly what it says, in which case what the hon. and learned Gentleman has just said has limited it, or was a wider application intended?

[The Solicitor General]

I do not think it was. I can give an example; let us say you and I are named on a warrant—God forbid—then that is a restricted warrant. There is no wriggle room. It is a bit like a conspiracy, where we might plead a conspiracy between A and B and others are known, which is perfectly permissible and very often the case in a conspiracy. But if it was a much more limited warrant naming you, me and perhaps one other named person, that does not give space to use the modification procedure to add another name because it has already been limited in its terms of reference.

[Keir Starmer]

I understand the Solicitor General’s point. However, let us say that there was a warrant that named him and me, and a third person was then identified as being in league with us, whatever we were believed to be doing. What provision in the Bill or sentence in the code would actually prevent a modification to add that person? The Bill does not; paragraph 5.61 does not. The scheme that the Solicitor General describes is not the scheme in the Bill and the code. That is the problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I take issue with the hon. Lady’s assertion that the clause is defective. I do not think it is. There are one or two other points that I was already going to reflect on, and I will come to them later in my speech.

Let us just come back to the point that I know the hon. Lady wanted to make. If we end up with an original application that is too wide, it will not get through the double lock, because the commissioner will say, “Hold on. This is neither necessary nor proportionate. It doesn’t pass the test of review. Sorry, Secretary of State, you’ve got it wrong.” That is the whole thing that we are in danger of forgetting. I can see that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras is desperate to get in, so I will give way.

[Keir Starmer]

I really am desperate, because I want—if possible—to have an answer to the question that I put before, which is this: if what the Solicitor General is now saying is right, why does clause 30 apply to a section 15(1) warrant, because that simply does not come within the formulation?

[The Solicitor General]

What I would say to the hon. and learned Gentleman is that I am afraid we are forgetting the context. The mischief that he wants to deal with is that somehow an applicant for a warrant has got something in through the back door—it is too loose, too wide, and modification therefore becomes, in effect, a way of getting round the whole system. I do not believe, given my understanding of both the code of practice as drafted and of the proposed legislation as drafted, that we will get near to that nightmare scenario.

A section 15 warrant can be about an organisation. The point that I am seeking to make is that we are already in the realms of thematics, and therefore if someone has a warrant that has been drafted specifically, the process must be started again if they want to include other individuals.

May I deal with the question of the ability to modify warrants themselves? I do not think anybody is saying there should not be an ability to modify warrants; that was not part of the recommendations of any of the Committees that we know about. Also, of course, such a change would be a very significant reduction in the operational effectiveness of the warrantry process. It would mean, for example, that it would be necessary to seek new warrants each and every time it was identified that an intercepted target got a new telephone or a new phone number. I am afraid that would slow down the process, and we think there is a significant danger that investigative and intelligence opportunities would be lost.

I am not accusing anybody on this Committee of wanting to do anything to endanger an investigation or indeed lives, but we have got to think about this issue in that context. Therefore, getting the balance right is quite clearly what we all want to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and to try to manipulate this process to undermine that important procedure would be immediately spotted as a misuse of the processes and the safeguards that we are incorporating into this Bill.

I want to deal with the practicalities because, tempting though it is to impose a requirement on a judicial commissioner to authorise the day-to-day or sometimes minute-by-minute tactical operation of a warrant, it would be unnecessary and operationally damaging. There must be an element of agility when operating the system of investigation and there is real concern that we would fail to do the job of detecting crime and making sure the interests of everyone we represent are protected.

Ordinarily, such modifications will be made by a senior official in the warrant-granting Department, but when, for example, the identity of a gang member becomes apparent only in the middle of the night, it is right that the intercepting agency should be able to make the modification. That deals with the point about the fast-moving threat and the immediacy of the situation.

I will deal with as many as possible of the points the hon. and learned Gentleman raised, starting with the minor rather than major modifications in amendment 69. The amendment would prevent either the head of an agency or a senior official within that agency from making a minor amendment. We are dealing with minor modifications relating to adding a new communication address for warranted targets. An example is MI5 discovering a new mobile telephone number for a warranted target who is plotting to kill someone. The Bill enables the intercepting agency—MI5 in this case—to make the minor modification to the warrant, which will have been through the double-lock procedure, and to add that new mobile number. The danger of the amendment is that it would remove the ability to act swiftly to get coverage of the new subject’s communications. With respect, I do not think it is necessary because the Secretary of State and the judicial commissioner will already have considered the necessity and proportionality of targeting interception against the individual. I will not repeat the point, but it is important for public safety.

On parliamentary and legal privilege, I have already indicated that a major modification would not be sought to a warrant against a Member of Parliament or in relation to any warrant that names a specific individual. The code of practice makes it crystal clear that major modifications can be made only to warrants that apply to a group of persons or an organisation.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for the way the Solicitor General is explaining how the Government intend the modifications to apply. He says they would not be used in that way for legal professional privilege and Members of Parliament, but he cannot say they could not be. If I have missed it, I will sit down sharpish, but I do not think there is anything on legal professional privilege or MPs in the modification parts of the code of practice. It is silent on that. There is no guidance.

[The Solicitor General]

What I am trying to do is to explain that there is no difference for any member of the public. If the warrant is specifically named, it cannot, as I have explained, use the modification procedure to try to catch other people, whether journalists, Members of Parliament or lawyers. Rather than constantly seeking carve-outs, it is far better to have a general principle about specificity and the danger that the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North raised.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am very well aware of the evidence of Sir Stanley, which is why I have couched my remarks in the way I have. It is of course important to balance what he said against the view of his predecessor, Sir Anthony May, who in the 2015 annual report said:

“A case could be made however, that it would be appropriate to use thematic warrants more widely against, for example, a well-defined criminal or terrorist group working for a common purpose.”

I have said what I have said: my thoughts today are that the clause is perhaps getting an unfair battering. However, I listen to everything that is being said, including the hon. and learned Lady’s remarks.

Amendment 95 deals with the question of whether the Bill should require necessity and proportionality with respect to the consideration of minor modifications. I am going to think about it. It is a reasonable point and we may be able to return to it on Report.

To conclude, I think that, in the round, the Government have set out our position clearly. We will consider two points that have been raised, in particular, which I have addressed; but in general terms, while I will resist any amendments that are pressed to a vote today, I want more time to reflect. I hope that that will give Members an opportunity to reflect as well. For those reasons, I urge the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for taking the time to set out how he understands the process will work. As will be clear from our exchanges, my concern is that the comforting way in which he set out how the modifications process is intended to work is not reflected in the drafting of the Bill. Nevertheless, I have listened to what he said about considering the matter further.

At one point during the submissions he just made, he said that the word “thematic” made everything clear. My point is that the word “thematic” is not in the Bill. I would like the Solicitor General to think about whether the provisions could be improved by an amendment that made it crystal clear that the power is intended for modifications to themed warrants and not to other warrants. It may not be quite as simple as that, but that would certainly reflect the gist of what the Solicitor General said.

[The Solicitor General]

As I have said, I will take that away and consider it.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that. To be clear, I accept that in urgent cases there needs to be a process so that the security services, the police and others are not inhibited from doing what they need to do in real time and fast, but what we are discussing is not an urgent modification process. Again, it is about restricting the scope.

I was going to push the amendment to a vote, but I have been mulling it over in my mind and have decided that I am going to withdraw it in the spirit of the Solicitor General’s approach.

[The Solicitor General]

It is good to remind ourselves that the codes of practice have been published in draft and we have ample opportunity to revisit them to make the language even better. I hope that that helps the hon. and learned Gentleman.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that intervention. This is one of those matters on which we probably need to do as much of the work now as possible, because when the code finally comes back for a vote one way or the other, if there is a deficiency over an issue such as this, we will be put in the invidious position of voting down the whole code because we cannot change it. I am very happy to work with the Solicitor General to set out our concerns even more clearly and to see whether we can make improvements. I doubt that all my concerns would be met, but we might be able to draft a vastly improved model. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Joanna Cherry]

I was minded to push for a vote on clause stand part, but given what the Solicitor General has said and the very detailed arguments made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, I am content not to push the matter to a vote at this stage. Like the hon. and learned Gentleman, I would be very happy to work with the Solicitor General and the Government in looking at this clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am obliged to the hon. and learned Lady.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 31 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 33

Special rules for certain mutual assistance warrants

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

No amendments have been tabled, and I do not oppose the clause, but I have a question that I would like the Solicitor General to deal with now, or at some other convenient point. In any event, I understand that these warrants are not particularly common.

Clause 33(1) makes it clear that the provisions apply predominantly where the subject of interception is outside the United Kingdom, and it effectively allows for sign-off at the senior official level. Notwithstanding that the subject is outside the United Kingdom, do the measures permit interception involving individuals in the UK or the British Isles if they are in communication with the subject? I ask for clarification, because I cannot find an answer myself.

[The Solicitor General]

I am happy to clarify that. The position is that if the Secretary of State or a senior official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State believes that a person, organisation or set of premises named or described in the warrant as the subject of the interception is in the United Kingdom, that person must cancel the warrant. I hope that that answers the question.

[Keir Starmer]

It is probably my fault for not putting the question clearly enough. I accept that in relation to the target, but the warrant will cover others than the target. Can the Minister clarify what protection there is under this procedure for people in this country who, although they are not the target, might come within the warrant?

[The Solicitor General]

What I am trying to deal with is anybody within the warrant, whether person, premises or organisation. If they are within that, they will be covered and it will have to be cancelled. I hope that that gives the hon. and learned Gentleman some reassurance.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 34

Implementation of warrants

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 252, in clause 34, page 28, line 37, at end insert—

“(4A) Subsection (4) shall not apply where the person outside the United Kingdom is established for the provision of services in a country or territory with which the United Kingdom has entered in to an international mutual assistance agreement or is subject to an EU mutual assistance instrument.”

This amendment establishes international mutual assistance agreements—as recommended by Sir Nigel Sheinwald and currently under negotiation between the UK and US—as the primary route by which UK agencies obtain data from overseas CSPs. It would continue to enable the imposition of warrant on CSPs in non-MLA countries.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 6th sitting: House of Commons
Thursday 14th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

Regarding the Joint Committee’s recommendation, all I can say at this stage is that my understanding of the clause is that the issuing authority must also ensure that restrictions are in place that would prevent to the extent considered appropriate the material being used in any legal proceedings outside the United Kingdom, which of course would be prohibited by clause 48. There will be other obligations that the agencies will have to follow—for example, consolidated guidance. If the hon. and learned Gentleman would like any further clarification, I would be happy to write to him.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48

Exclusion of matters from legal proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is right about avowal but, of course, evidence pursuant to equipment interference has always been admissible. It is a bit of a mixed picture when you look at the detail of it.

[Keir Starmer]

I accept that there have been different avowals at different times in the past two years. I was speaking more generally. The argument about techniques is harder to sustain in the current set of circumstances. My view is that if there were a way to get around this exclusion, being able to use the evidence would bring very many benefits. When it comes to those involved in serious crimes, my strong preference is that they should be charged, put before a jury and, if convicted, serve the appropriate sentence, rather than be dealt with in some other way. For reasons that everybody understands, this provision frustrates that process. That is why I think it is time for a review against the current set of circumstances.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to hon. Members for giving us the chance to have this brief but important debate. The hon. and learned Lady is right to characterise the existence of the prohibition, which has been in existence since the Interception of Communications Act 1985, with good reason.

I accept the points made by the hon. and learned Gentleman about evolution of powers and the avowal of particular techniques. Of course, very often we are talking about the protection of individual capabilities and that is a slightly more nuanced argument than the general points he makes. Therefore, ground No. 2 of the objection to the adduction into evidence of intercept material still remains a strong one, and ground No. 1 has to be acknowledged.

My hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle made the point well about the need to recast disclosure because it is material and relevant to the debate, and about ensuring that what is now intelligence but what would be evidence is in a form that can therefore be handled and admitted by a court. There is a cost to that, and the estimates given in the 2014 report vary between £4.25 billion and £9.25 billion. Those are not insignificant sums and they cannot be ignored or dismissed when balancing out the merits of taking this step.

The Government take the view—this is iterated in the 2014 report—that the problems outweigh, for the present at the very least, the potential benefit. The potential benefit is not clear, save for the points that the hon. and learned Gentleman makes. As a litigator and a prosecutor myself, I share his frustration and have been in those circumstances many times. I will not repeat the points he makes: I will adopt them.

The Government’s position in that report was to say that they will keep under review any changes that might affect the conclusions of their latest review. That remains very much the position. I do not think it is appropriate in this legislation for us to depart, in the absence of any further evidence, from the position that has been iterated in no fewer than eight different reports over the past few years.

Many of us in the room are familiar with this issue. The debate is held regularly and will continue, but in the absence of compelling reasons to depart from the provisions of the 1985 Act I commend the clause to stand part of the Bill.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the question. Our answer is that, looking at clause 150(3), we say that it would come under head 2 and that the Secretary of State would have discretion to disclose—[Interruption.]

[Keir Starmer]

Sorry. Which clause was that?

[The Solicitor General]

Sorry. It is clause 50(3), where we have head 2 and:

“(a) in the case of a warrant under Chapter 1 of this Part, a disclosure made to, or authorised by, a judicial Commissioner;

(b) in the case of a warrant under Chapter 1 of Part 1…a disclosure made to, or authorised by, the Interception of Communications Commissioner or a Judicial Commissioner”.

The disclosure is made by the Secretary of State. That might not be clear on the face of it, but that is the intention as I understand it of the clause.

[Keir Starmer]

I am just not sure. I think the Solicitor General has just quoted clause 152 to me.

[The Chair]

For clarification, will the Minister explain which clause he is referring to?

[The Solicitor General]

May I correct the record? It is my error. I omitted a number. I was talking about clause 150(3). Page 117 of the Bill states:

“For the purposes of subsection (2) something is necessary for the authorised purposes if, and only if”,

and then we have paragraphs (a) to (f). That underpins the discretion of the Secretary of State to make that disclosure.

[Keir Starmer]

I am happy to pursue this matter outside the Committee if it is more convenient, but I think the provisions in clause 150 apply to bulk acquisition warrants rather than all warrants. Clause 150(1) sets out that it is expressly dealing with bulk acquisition warrants, and subsections 150(2) and 150(3) follow on from that. This is not intended as an exercise. Standing back from this, what I am concerned about is that it—

[The Chair]

Order. That was a lengthy intervention to help the Minister, who I now think wants to get back and explain the situation to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I appreciate that the necessity and proportionality test has to be applied—in any given case there will always be an argument about whether it is necessary and proportionate—but as ever with necessity and proportionality the question is: what are we assessing necessity against and how are we arguing that it is proportionate? Is it necessary to do what? We get that only from the face of the statute. In other words, necessity does not give us anything unless we have some subject matter that it bites on, which is why the subject matter that it bites on is so important. Whether it is necessary for serious crime is one question; whether it is necessary for crime is another.

There are many, many things that one could say were necessary to prevent or detect crime. I absolutely accept that in practice those two tests are applied at all times, but the question is: what are they applied to? The question that the designated senior officer has to ask him or herself is: “Am I satisfied that it is necessary to prevent crime?” That would be good enough under the clause. It is, in principle, an inadequate threshold. I also think it will invite challenge in due course, because I do not think for one moment that, in the long run, the European Court and our courts are going to be satisfied with a scheme that does not have any threshold, even though there will be and are arguments about the precise threshold. We can see what the divisional court said in the Tom Watson case, so it is not just counsel’s argument that was never accepted by anybody. In that case in the divisional court, counsel’s argument that the serious crime threshold was an important safeguard was accepted. Thankfully, the writing is therefore on the wall if the clause is not taken back and reconsidered.

I shall move on to the second “who”. The first “who” I focused on was who can issue the necessary authorisation, which is the designated senior officer. Under clause 53(2), that person can

“authorise any officer of the authority to engage in any conduct”.

It goes from a relatively low-level authorisation to somebody even further down in the authority having to get on with the job of obtaining data.

The breadth of what can be done is outlined in clause 53(5), which states:

“An authorisation…may relate to data whether or not in existence at the time…may authorise the obtaining or disclosure of data by a person who is not an authorised officer, or any other conduct by such a person, which enables or facilitates the obtaining of the communications data”—

so it goes beyond the specific authorisation to the facilitation—

“and…may, in particular, require a telecommunications operator who controls or provides a telecommunication system to obtain or disclose data relating to the use of a telecommunications service provided by another telecommunications operator in relation to that system.”

It is a very broad provision.

That enables us to see the amendments in their proper context. There are three categories of amendment. The first category is to be taken as a set and would insert some rigour and independence into the process by requiring judicial commissioners to sign off the necessary authorisations. The second set of amendments, which we will come to in due course, seeks to amend the threshold to provide a meaningful threshold for the judicial commissioner. To call clause 53 as drafted a set of safeguards is to mis-describe the words on the page.

[The Solicitor General]

It is with this amendment, I am afraid, that we have a strong disagreement. To say that there are no thresholds is a misrepresentation of the situation. Putting it bluntly, the Government’s worry is that creating a serious crime threshold will miss a whole panoply of crimes that are extremely serious to victims. I am thinking in particular about crimes relating to harassment, stalking and other types of offences that would not fall within the threshold of serious criminality.

It is important that we couch our remarks carefully—the hon. and learned Gentleman has tried to do that, and I respect him for it. We are not talking about targeted interception here; we are talking about the retention of evidential leads—information that could, not of itself build a case, but which, in combination with other material, could allow investigators to build a case against a suspect. The analogy is with existing comms data, namely telephonic records and mobile phone records—the sort of material that he, I and others on the Committee have regular use and an understanding of, as prescribed by the RIPA regime. We are all familiar with it. The difficulty is that, as the days go by, the reliance by criminals on conventional methods of telecommunication changes.

The old system, where the SMS message would be the way things would be done, is increasingly falling into disuse. WhatsApp, internet chat forums and all sorts of encrypted means of communication are now being used. There is no doubt that the ability of the agencies—the security and intelligence agencies, the police and other agencies—to obtain even those evidential threads is therefore becoming more difficult. We are not talking about content, nor should we be. I draw an analogy with the sort of drugs observance case where the police officers can see people coming and going from a house that is of interest, but cannot see what is going on inside that house. That is what we are talking about here. Adopting these amendments would be entirely the wrong step to take.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I want to be clear with the Committee. In fairness to the Solicitor General, I can see the argument that, for harassment, there can be serious consequences for the individual. I had to deal with a number people in that situation and I do not underestimate for a moment the serious consequence that a series of minor actions can have. I do not think that necessarily means that we cannot have a serious crime threshold. I would be willing to work on what that threshold would look like, but I should not be taken as thinking that harassment, for example, cannot have serious consequences.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for that concession. It is important and it is not straightforward, and that is why I am afraid, as currently constructed, these amendments are deficient.

If I can develop my argument, I would like to give an example from Gwent police—a force that I know very well and have prosecuted on behalf of for the Gwent CPS on many occasions. Last November, a female victim returning home from a night out was approached by an unknown male who proceeded to sexually assault her. As a result of her cries, two witnesses approached and, thankfully, the male fled the scene before the offence was completed, serious though it was. An urgent press release was issued, along with CCTV footage of the offender. As a result, a member of the public called the police stating that she recognised the offender, who had given her his number. Investigators acquired subscriber data on that number and identified a suspect, who was subsequently arrested. In court, the offender pleaded guilty and received a 12-week prison sentence that was suspended for 12 months, and was placed on the sex offenders register for five years. I think we would all agree that that sounds very serious.

[Keir Starmer]

It is.

[The Solicitor General]

But is it? We have got to be absolutely clear. None of us would want that type of offence to fall outwith any of the criteria in these provisions—I am sure that would be the case.

[The Solicitor General]

Of course, there are plenty of offences that do not involve violence or the threat of violence, such as fraud, although I understand that the potential consequences of some fraud can cause stress. May I reassure him that the test of necessity and proportionality in clause 53(7) remains very much at the centre of everything? I would not want him to be misled into thinking, as has perhaps been suggested by some of his Front Bench colleagues, that this is a free-for-all; far from it.

[Keir Starmer]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Solicitor General]

No, because I want to develop the argument. It is vital that we look at the underpinning of all this. None of the three reports that informed the drawing up of the Bill, nor the three reports arising from the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, recommended any changes whatever to the authorisation regime for communications data. For example, David Anderson QC recommends authorisation of the acquisition of communications data by a designated person in a public authority. RUSI recommended:

“For the acquisition of communications data otherwise than in bulk, an authorisation by the relevant public authority. Communications data should only be acquired after the authorisation is granted by a designated person.”

Prior to that, the report from the Joint Scrutiny Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill 2012 looked into the authorisation regime in depth and concluded that it was indeed the right model.

I entirely accept that anything that can sensibly be done to improve the already strongly regulated regime should be done. That is precisely why we have, for instance, provided for a new criminal offence that applies to persons in public authorities who knowingly or recklessly obtain communications data from a communications service provider without lawful authority. We have made the highly regarded SPOC—single point of contact—regime, which provides expert advice and guidance to authorising officers, a mandatory requirement in the Bill.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful for that powerful example provided by my hon. and learned Friend.

It is important to note that in the report on the draft Bill—I am looking at paragraph 11 of the summary of conclusions and recommendations—the Joint Committee stated:

“We believe that law enforcement should be able to apply for all types of communications data for the purposes of ‘saving life’. We recommend that the Home Office should undertake further consultation with law enforcement to determine”—

the report then makes references to various things in the draft Bill that would not necessarily read over to the Bill that is before the Committee.

The point I am seeking to make, in the round, is that we have a tried and tested system, which is being replicated—indeed, enhanced—by the Bill, that deals with a very large number of applications. According to the latest annual report by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, in 2013 there were 517,236 authorisations and notices for communications data in total. That contrasts that with warrantry and intrusive and limited interception of communications—in the same period, there were 2,795—so we are talking about a very different set of parameters, with a large volume of requests. My worry is that, however well-intentioned the amendment is, it is wholly unrealistic when it comes to fighting crime.

[Keir Starmer]

I rise only because this is an important point about how the powers will come to be exercised. It is of course possible to say that the precise wording of the amendment might not work in certain circumstances—all but sentences of 10 weeks or less are serious cases, and so on—but I do not want us to miss the point. The challenge to the Solicitor General is that there is no threshold. It is perfectly all right to say that the amendment does not necessarily achieve in precise terms the right level of seriousness, but it is not right simply to push back at the notion that there must be some threshold in the measure that is meaningful, which at the moment there is not.

[The Solicitor General]

I hear what the hon. and learned Gentleman says, but I do not agree with him about the threshold. It is set out in subsection (7). I can give another example: what about a missing person inquiry? We would not know whether it was a crime; it might well be a young person who has run away. We all have some direct or indirect experience of that.

I will address the point, but I have to be careful, because the case to which the hon. and learned Gentleman has referred is sub judice. I do not disagree with any of his characterisation, by the way, and of course I have read with care the Court of Appeal judgment of Lord Justice Lloyd Jones, but the hearing in the Court of Justice of the European Union is this week, I think. We will have to see how that develops.

I am very conscious of how case law develops in this area, and I am mindful of it, bearing in mind my duty as a Law Officer to uphold the rule of law. I am sure the hon. and learned Gentleman understands that, but where we are is in a sensible place. My worry is that if we start to get too restrictive, we will in effect end up in a position in which many serious matters—matters that are serious to the victim, but might not be serious according to other criteria—are lost or missed.

I have already mentioned necessity and proportionality. I should also pray in aid the fact that there will have to be compliance with a detailed code of practice and independent oversight and inspection of the regime by a senior judge, currently the Interception of Communications Commissioner. The current internal authorisation regime is working well. No deliberate abuse of it has been identified in any ICC reports, which speaks volumes for the integrity of the current system.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am familiar with what the hon. and learned Lady is talking about, but again, that involves a particular failure by the NCA on warrantry. Here we are talking about various agencies’ abilities. With respect to her, it is not the same. We are discussing a different regime. Tempting though it is to read over, that would be to frustrate the important work of many law, detection and investigative agencies in our country.

I do not see the purposes within the Bill as inconsistent in any way with the purposes set out in the exemptions from and limitations of the right to privacy in article 8.2 of the European convention on human rights. There has never been a serious crime threshold for the acquisition of communications data. No such limit is placed in article 8.2, which is why the Government’s position on this issue—I will not mention the case—is legally respectable and sustainable. That is why the provisions in the clause meet the challenge that faces the agencies in a way that is proportionate and necessary, and that keeps pace with the breathtaking rate of change of technology being taken advantage of by many people of good will, but also by people of less than good will. For that reason, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.

[Keir Starmer]

I will not repeat the concerns that we raised. Proceeding with a clause that has no seriousness threshold, however expressed, is fraught with difficulties, but the Minister has indicated that he will consider some of the issues and I want to reserve this issue for a later stage, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I will make such comments as I have during the clause stand part debate.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. It was puzzling me, and he has solved the mystery. The amendment seemed to remove the safeguard, which I am sure he does not want to do.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

It is important that we go through this carefully. The shadow Minister talked about browsing history. The full history does not constitute comms data; it is not an ICR for the purposes of this legislation. It is like looking at everything after the forward slash. Let us take the example of a website such as telegraph.co.uk: the fact that a person visited the website may be one thing, but everything after the forward slash—the detail of what the person is doing—is not an internet connection record for the purposes of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for that reply. The same point was made on Second Reading by the Home Secretary and was also made in Committee, but I have a difficulty with it that is important to put on the record. Where are the words in the Bill that result in what the Solicitor General said? I am concerned, because I cannot see them.

I accept that, when it comes to accessing internet connection records, there is the further test in clause 54(4). At the moment, a constituent might say, “Will my internet connection records and browsing history be kept?” People are concerned about whether there is a record of what they have looked at on the internet. They feel very chilled by that. The Solicitor General says that it goes so far but no further. That is to give people comfort and I understand why it is said. The difficulty I have is finding the precise words in the Bill that give effect to that proposition.

[The Solicitor General]

Is not the real question whether the authorities will have access to that history without due process? Therein lies the rub. As I have said to the hon. and learned Gentleman, the full browsing history will not be capable of being accessed without further warrantry.

[Keir Starmer]

I understand the Solicitor General’s point, which is that when it comes to access, there is a further, stricter test. I absolutely understand that and I accept that clause 54(4) is there for a purpose. The question that my constituents and I, and others, want answered is, “What about what is being retained?” There is a chilling feeling if it is being retained. The comfort of the Government saying, “Well, we are keeping everything but we will not look without a stricter test”, is, of course, a comfort, but it is not that much comfort to many concerned individuals.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister for pointing that out but that was the route that I trod a few days ago when I was preparing my submissions. The problem is that content is given the description that he just set out, but it also says,

“any meaning arising from the fact of the communication or from any data relating to the transmission of the communication is to be disregarded, and (b) anything which is systems data is not content.”

That obviously led me to have a look at what systems data are, for which we have to go to clause 225(4), which states that systems data

“means any data that enables or facilitates, or identifies or describes anything connected with enabling or facilitating, the functioning of…a telecommunication system”.

It is true, and I accept, that an internet connection record does not include content in the form set out in 223(6), but then one gets to systems data, and part of it comes back out again. It would be very helpful if someone were to attempt to describe, by reference to the Bill’s provisions, why it is said that, at the point of retention, the provision does not include web browsing history. That is a question that many people would like answered. I leave that challenge on the table for the Government.

I rose to say that at this late hour and it is a complicated point, but it goes to the heart of the question about ICRs. At the moment, it is being framed in the sense of, “Well, they won’t look at it unless”, but people are genuinely concerned about the retention of their browser history.

[The Solicitor General]

As a preface to my remarks, which will have to be succinct, I do not want to stray into the debate on clause 78. I do not want to criticise the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, but she has made points that will properly be answered when we come to that debate. She is right to raise the point about the Danish experience and, like me, she has read the evidence in the Committees, but there are significant differences between what we are trying to do in the UK and what happened in Denmark. The Danish experience was not a great one. There are significant operational, financial and other differences that mean that the Danish Government are looking carefully and with a great interest at what we are attempting to do in the UK. This is not straightforward and it is not easy, but it is our duty as legislators to get ahead of the curve when it comes to the development of technology and to make sure we are not playing catch-up when it comes to criminals’ increasingly sophisticated use of the digital sphere.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Third sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Joanna Cherry]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his constructive approach. I am happy not to press the new clause at this stage on the basis that the Government will look at it. I am happy to receive any suggestions about the drafting, which is mine. I had some discussions about the terms of the drafting with Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland and James Wolffe, the dean of the Faculty of Advocates, but any infelicities are my fault alone. I would be happy to discuss the drafting with the Government.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Definition of “interception” etc.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

There are no amendments tabled to the clause, which we support, but I say for the record and for clarification that what is welcome in clause 3 is the spelling out in legislation of the extent of an interception—an issue that has bedevilled some recent criminal cases. Importantly, as the explanatory notes make clear, it is now provided in clear terms that voicemails remaining on a system, emails and text messages read but not deleted and draft messages stored on a system will count within the phrase “in the course of transmission” and will therefore be covered by the offence. We welcome that. I wanted to emphasise that point and put it on the record, because a lot of time and effort was spent when that phrase was not so clearly defined.

[The Solicitor General]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. He is right: we have moved a long way from phone tapping, which he, I and many others understood to be clear interception whereas, for example, the recording and monitoring of communications at either end of the process was not interception. As he rightly says, the internet and email have caught up with us, so as part of the Government’s thrust to have greater clarity and simplicity, this essential definition is a welcome part of the statutory framework that now exists.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 4 and 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Monetary penalties for certain unlawful interceptions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

Again no amendments are tabled to the clause, but there are some questions that arise from it. The explanatory notes say, and it is clear in the Bill, that the clause creates a power for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to impose fines where an interception has been carried out, but there was no intention. It relates to action that might otherwise be an offence, but the intention element is not made out. Against that background, I have some questions for the Solicitor General.

If the power applies where an interception is carried out but there was no intention to do so, it is hardly likely to have a deterrent effect because the person did not intend to do it in the first place, so what is the rationale and purpose of this provision? It is clear in schedule 1, which is related to clause 6, that the commissioner has very wide discretion in relation to the operation of the powers under the clause including, in paragraph 13, powers to require information from individuals

“for the purpose of deciding whether to serve”

an enforcement notice. Thus we have a provision that is premised on a non-intentional interception that then triggers quite extensive powers to require information with penalties for failure to provide that information. Schedule 1 states that guidance will be published on how the powers are to be exercised, but what is the real rationale and purpose? Why are the powers as extensive as they are and will the Minister commit to the guidance envisaged under schedule 1 being made public?

In clause 6(3)(c) there is reference to a consideration by the Commissioner that

“the person was not…making an attempt to act in accordance with an interception warrant”,

which suggests that that is outside the scheme of the provision. We have also noted that the provision relates only to a public telecommunications system. It is in many ways supplementary or complementary and we are not questioning it in that sense, but there is a number of unanswered questions. If we are to scrutinise and probe, it would be helpful to have those answered now if possible, and if it is not answered in writing.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for his questions. I assure him that there is a very good rationale for the inclusion of these powers. They are a replication of powers that were added to RIPA in 2011. Monetary penalty notices followed a letter of formal notice that was issued by the European Commission setting out its view that the UK had not properly transposed article 5(1) of the e-privacy directive and articles of the data protection directive. In particular, the Commission identified:

“By limiting the offence in Section 1(1) RIPA to intentional interception, the UK had failed to create a sanction for all unlawful interception as required by Article 5(1) of the E-Privacy Directive and Article 24 of the Data Protection Directive.”

The Government rightly conceded the defective transposition that had been identified and therefore the monetary penalty notice regime was established to introduce sanctions for the unintentional and unlawful interception in order to remedy the deficiency.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is quite right that it is a step down from a criminal offence, where intention has to be informed, but as my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security said when opening the debate, underpinning all of this is the importance of privacy, and the right to privacy is demonstrated in practical form by the inclusion of clause 6 and schedule 1. It is important so that we cover all aspects of intrusion because, as the hon. and learned Gentleman will know, privacy is not just about confidentiality. That is often misunderstood, particularly in the light of recent debates about injunctions. It is about intrusion into the lives of individuals, and that intrusion by the authorities in particular should be marked in some way by the imposition of some alternative sanction if it cannot be criminal sanctions. Therefore, there is a very sound rationale for the inclusion of these powers and replicating them from RIPA, and therefore I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 7

Restriction on requesting interception by overseas authorities

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I rise to make essentially the same point as I made on the previous clause, albeit more briefly. This is a good and right in principle clause to ensure that there are restrictions on requesting assistance under mutual assistance agreements, but again the sanction for breach is not entirely clear. That may be something that, under the umbrella that the Minister for Security just indicated, could be taken away to see what the enforcement regime is for these important safeguarding provisions.

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman will know that this mutual legal assistance regime definitely benefits from statutory underpinning. It has become increasingly important. Sadly we have all learnt that relying just on good will or informal arrangements is no longer sufficient, which is why the international work that I know hon. Members are aware of, particularly negotiations with the United States, are so important in speeding up the process and making it ever more efficient, particularly in the light of all the political controversies we have been dealing with in recent days. I undertake to deal with the question that he raises, which I think we can deal with in an umbrella form as he suggests.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9

Offence of unlawfully obtaining communications data

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)]

It is, as always, a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Dorries. The Solicitor General has given examples of wide-ranging powers that are available to protect the public. I was grateful to listen to his contribution. However, during Second Reading I queried the Home Secretary’s position on the new offences that are being created. Many of the offences the Bill refers to, particularly in clause 9, relate to the regulation of investigatory powers. My concern is that later the Bill requires internet service providers, for example, to amass a large amount of personal data, and there is a danger that those data may be stolen rather than intercepted. I gave the example of a newspaper perhaps finding a low-grade technical operator in a telecommunications company, passing a brown envelope to them and stealing a celebrity’s internet connection records. I am concerned that the offence in clause 9 of unlawfully obtaining communications data does not go far enough.

I bear in mind the Solicitor General’s comments on other protections that are available, but would he or the Government consider an offence of not just obtaining but being in possession of unlawfully obtained communications data, which would strengthen the protections given to members of the public? We all know that the kind of scenario that I am expressing concern about has not been unknown in the last few years, as various court cases have demonstrated—though I should not discuss their details. Is the Minister satisfied that the protections he has outlined and those raised by the hon. Member for South East Cambridgeshire are sufficient, or should we take this clause a bit further, to give the public broader and wider protection of their privacy and the security of their internet and telecommunications transmissions?

[Keir Starmer]

It is a pleasure to follow my hon. Friend because I want to develop the point. This is a welcome clause, it is right that it is here, and we support it. However, we question whether it goes far enough. It only covers obtaining communications data. We think that serious consideration should be given to an overarching offence of misuse of the powers in the Bill. At the moment, there are specific provisions in relation to intercept which are replicated frim RIPA and we now have this welcome provision, but there is no overarching offence of misuse of the powers in the Bill.

It is all very well to say that there is the tort of misfeasance in public office. That is not the equivalent of a criminal offence. It has all sorts of tricky complications when one tries to apply it in practice. It is fair to say that there are other bits of legislation that might be made to fit in a given case, but it would be preferable and in the spirit of David Anderson’s approach for a comprehensive piece of legislation for an overarching criminal offence to be drafted, either out of clause 9 or in some other way, relating to misuse of powers in the Bill. It has been a source of considerable concern in the past and I ask the Government to think about a wider offence that would cover all the powers, because comms data are only one small subset of the issues and material information we are concerned with.

I have two short supplementary points. In subsection (3) there is a reasonable belief defence. It would be helpful if the Minister said a bit more about that. May I also foreshadow the inconsistency that we will need to pick up as we go along in the way reasonable excuse and reasonable belief are dealt with in the Bill? It is set out in subsection (3), but there is an inconsistency in other provisions that I will point to when we get there.

My other point is to ask the Minister to consider whether obtaining communications data unlawfully is a sufficient definition to make the offence workable in practice. I put my questions in the spirit of supporting the clause, but I also invite Ministers to go further and consider drafting a clause that covers the misuse of powers in the Bill, rather than simply saying that if we fish about in other bits of legislation or common law we might find something that fits on a good day. In my experience, that is not a particularly helpful way of proceeding.

[The Solicitor General]

Thank you, Ms Dorries, for allowing me to reply to a stand part debate on clause 9. I think we have elided the this and the previous clause, but I crave your indulgence to deal with everything in a global way. May I deal properly with clause 9 and set out the Government’s thinking on this?

The measure is all about making sure once again that those who hold office within a public authority are properly held to account for any abuses of power. The clause will make it an offence knowingly or recklessly to obtain communications data from a communications service provider without lawful authority. Somebody found guilty of that offence might receive a custodial sentence or a fine. The maximum punishment will vary according to whether the offence was committed in England and Wales, or in the jurisdiction of Scotland or Northern Ireland.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to point out the reasonable belief defence. The offence will not have been committed if it can be demonstrated that a person holding office acted in the reasonable belief that they had lawful authority to obtain the data. Where a communications service provider willingly consents to the disclosure of the data, including by making it publicly or commercially available, that would constitute a lawful authority.

The question about reasonable belief is about making sure that genuine error is not penalised, because there will be occasions when genuine errors are made. In the absence of such a defence, public authorities could be deterred by notifying genuine errors to the IPC. It is important that the Investigatory Powers Commission is an effective body monitoring failure and lack of best practice, and preventing future errors.

I think the hon. and learned Gentleman will agree that we both have fairly considerable criminal litigation experience. In this area, I think a regulatory approach will be just as effective, and in some ways more effective, than a criminal sanction. I am grateful to the hon. Member for City of Chester for reiterating the remarks that I remember him making on Second Reading, when he made some powerful points, but I caution that we are in danger of creating an entirely new criminal framework, catching people further down the line, which ultimately will only lead to more confusion and, I worry, the replication of existing offences.

An unauthorised disclosure by someone in a communications service provider would be covered by the Data Protection Act 1998, because those providers have duties and obligations under that Act just like any other holder of data. I hear what the hon. and learned Gentleman says, and I will consider the matter, but my initial reaction to his question and that of the hon. Member for City of Chester is that the Data Protection Act covers such a disclosure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I will be very quick. The clause is welcome and we support it, but again my concern is that there is no enforcement mechanism or sanction. Will the Minister take it under the umbrella of these clauses that are intended to ensure good governance, effectiveness and that the proper routes are used, and look in an overarching way at what their sanction might be? I am asking a similar question to one I made before: what is the sanction if what should happen does not happen?

[The Solicitor General]

Yes, of course, we will do as the hon. and learned Gentleman asks. I welcome his endorsement of the importance of the clause, bearing in mind what it sets out and the clarity we are achieving through its introduction.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Restriction on use of section 93 of the Police Act 1997

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

I make the same point again: the clause is a good provision but appears to lack any enforcement mechanism or sanction, so if it could go into the basket of clauses that are being looked at in relation to sanction, I will be grateful.

[The Solicitor General]

The clause confirms that section 93 of the Police Act 1997 may not be used to authorise conduct where the purpose of the proposed interference is to obtain communications, private information or equipment data and the applicant believes the conduct would otherwise constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, and the conduct can be authorised under an equipment interference warrant issued under part 5 of the Bill. So it does not prevent equipment interference being authorised under the Police Act where the purpose of the interference is not to obtain communications and other data—for example, interference might be authorised under the Act if the purpose is to disable a device, rather than to acquire information from it.

That reflects the focus of this Bill. We are trying to bring together existing powers available to obtain communications and communications data. I emphasise that the measure does not prevent law enforcement agencies from using other legislation to authorise interference with equipment that might otherwise constitute an offence under the Computer Misuse Act. For example, law enforcement agencies will continue to exercise powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to examine equipment that they possess as evidence. The result of this clause is that all relevant activity conducted by law enforcement agencies will need to be authorised by a warrant issued under part 5 of the Bill.

[Keir Starmer]

Based on what the Minister has just said, it may be that it is anticipated that any attempt to use other legislation in breach of this provision would automatically be refused. That is the bit where there might need to be some clarity, because in effect it will not be an application under this legislation; it would be an application under different provisions, so does this operate as a direction to any decision maker that that is an unlawful use of another statute? That is not entirely clear. I think that that is what is intended. If it is, that is a good thing, but I am not entirely sure that a decision maker would say, “I am prohibited by law from exercising powers available to me under other legislation.” I leave that with the Minister because it may be something that can be improved by further drafting.

[The Solicitor General]

I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for that intervention. While I will answer the specific question, I think it is important that I set out the fact that this provision is not the only means. What we are dealing with here is part 5 and the double lock and the enhanced safeguards. If any agency or authority fails to use new part 5 or PACE, for example, in other circumstances, they will be committing an offence under the Computer Misuse Act. Public authorities are no different from any other individual or body: if they are not complying with the existing legal framework by this or other means, they fall foul of the law themselves. I will endeavour to answer the other points raised about sanction but I urge the Committee to agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 13

Warrants that may be issued under this Chapter

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 13, page 10, line 16, after “content”, insert “or secondary data”

This amendment, and others to Clause 13, seek to expand the requirement of targeted examination warrants to cover the examination of all information or material obtained through bulk interception warrant, or bulk equipment interference warrant, irrespective of whether the information is referable to an individual in the British Islands. They would also expand the requirement of targeted examination warrants to cover the examination of “secondary data” obtained through bulk interception warrants and “equipment data” and “information” obtained through bulk equipment interference warrants.

Investigatory Powers Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Committee Debate: 4th sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 12th April 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

The answer to my question appears to be no, there has never been an example of the ISC or any Committee ever commenting publicly on the exercise by the Secretary of State of her specific powers to issue warrants or not. That is what leads David Anderson to the view that the political accountability card is overplayed in the discussion.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

This is a very important aspect of the debate. On the last remark made by the hon. and learned Gentleman, about David Anderson’s potential conclusion about political accountability being overplayed, I was interested in the arguments, but the fundamental point is the source of the authority that allows the Secretary of State as a democratically elected politician to make the decisions. Also, in particular in the context of national security, it is well set out in case law, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, that proper deference should be paid to the Executive on important decisions of national security. That is at the top end of the scale, then we move down—or across, in a different context—and is that not the issue?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. There is a danger when dealing with primary legislation of gilding the lily. I mean that in the spirit of co-operation that I know we have managed to engender in these debates, in the main. For those reasons, I respectfully ask the hon. and learned Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for the way he has approached this, but it misunderstands the amendment. Of course, whether information could be reasonably obtained by other means is relevant to the assessment of proportionality and necessity. The amendment proposes that, having taken all the factors into account, if it transpires at the end of that exercise that the information could have been reasonably obtained by other less intrusive means, it is not proportionate—that is the end of the exercise. That, in our submission, is the right test that should be on the face of the Bill. At this stage, I will withdraw the amendment with a view to raising it at a later stage if it is appropriate to do so. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Grounds on which warrants may be issued by Secretary of State

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I agree. I notice that my name is not on amendment 89. I think it should have been, because amendment 62 only works if subsection (2) comes out, but that is neither here nor there at this stage. I am not quite sure what happened, but given that both amendments have been tabled, it does not matter one way or another.

To be clear, the position is that it should be a substantive decision by the judge according to necessity and proportionality, and those terms obviously have their own special application. Through amendment 89, the review, whether by judicial review principles or otherwise, would come out, making it a true double and equal lock.

It is a new approach and a new provision, so it is for Parliament to decide on the appropriate way forward, but the amendments would give clarity and a real safeguard with an equal lock. That is the position. There probably is a fall-back position, which is that if it is to be a review of some sort, amendment 89 should stand on its own feet—that the review should not be on the principles of judicial review, and something more would need to be written into the Bill.

I do not know what response the Minister will give, but this matter goes to the heart of the issue, and it may be that further consideration needs to be given to the precise test. As it stands, the test is insufficiently precise and will lead to difficulties in its application. It is a matter of real concern to the judiciary. Lord Judge does not make such comments without a good deal of thought. If he is concerned about the provision, the Government should be, too. The simple way through is to have a simple but substantive double and equal lock.

[The Solicitor General]

The debate has been interesting. On a point of order, Mr Owen, I want to ensure that we are dealing with both groups of amendments. The grouping that I have seeks to group new clauses 1 and 5 in one group—

[The Solicitor General]

That is fine. I am grateful to you, Mr Owen. I will address those amendments, rather than the new clauses, which will be dealt with in the usual way, but the purport of the argument is similar.

To summarise, amendment 89 would remove the provision in the Bill that specifies that when reviewing the decision by a Secretary of State or a Scottish Minister to issue a warrant, the judicial commissioner must apply the same principles as would be applied by a court in an application for judicial review. Instead, the amendment would require him or her to determine the necessity and proportionality of a warrant for him or herself.

There has been a lot of debate on the important report by David Anderson and the Royal United Services Institute review. They have played a huge part in bringing the Bill to germination and its current state. There is a danger here. I listened very carefully to the evidence of Lord Judge and, indeed, asked him a number of questions. The dilemma that I put to him still remains. I can see the attractiveness in seeking to narrow or prescribe the particular criteria to be applied by the commissioners in every instance, but there is a danger that, in doing so, we fetter the proper discretion of judges exercising their review function in looking at each case purely on a case-by-case basis.

The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras set out his stall very clearly. He prays in aid the equal lock, as he calls it. In essence, he wants a different approach from that which the Government say we should take. We make no apology that the decision made by the Secretary of State is reviewed by the judicial commissioner before coming into force. That is a very simple, staged approach that clearly reflects the way in which case law is going and is also ahead of the curve when it comes to the development of judicial oversight of warrantry in these particular cases.

I will deal with the Anderson carve-out, if I may use that phrase. The problem with the genuine intention of David Anderson in trying to carve out what he recognised to be an important part of the function of Government—namely, national security and foreign affairs, where he recognised that the Executive are the part of our constitution best placed to deal with those matters—and then creating a certification process is that that, in itself, is juridicable. An Executive decision will be made that is, in itself, capable of challenge. My concern is that, however well intentioned attempts to create a hard and fast definition that creates a theoretical space for Ministers to act might be, we will end up with further difficulty, further lack of clarity and, frankly, further litigation that means that the Bill is not future-proof in the way that I want it to be.

[Keir Starmer]

To save time—I probably should have made this clearer an hour ago when we were rowing about other things—I had seen this certification clause, or new clause 1, as going with the amendments to clause 17. In other words, it was my acceptance that, on certain measures, there ought to be a certificate from the Secretary of State for the limited accountability that I accept is there. Therefore, if it is helpful, amendments 62 and 89 are intended to be taken on their own, not cluttered by the certification process, which possibly would have been better discussed under clause 17.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. I remind myself that we will be able to debate those new clauses but I thought it important to look, in essence, at the full picture of David Anderson’s recommendations, bearing in mind that we had quite a lively debate about the role of the Executive. It would be a mischaracterisation of Mr Anderson’s view about the role of the Executive to say that somehow there was a wholesale move away from the Executive’s position with regard to warrantry and what Government Members certainly strongly feel is the important role of the Executive.

Coming back to where we are with regard to the judicial review test, we have already heard reference to the noble Lord Pannick. The intervention he has made is powerful and it is important that he thinks the test is robust. The criticism is, perhaps, not justified. Of course, that is not the only basis on which we have reached that conclusion. We all know—those of us who are lawyers and those who are not—the growing importance of judicial review in our public life. It is a concept that has evolved and that will continue to evolve. It is flexible, too.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

That is an interesting way of putting it. I want to make it clear that the review is on an appeal. There is a danger that we will end up mistakenly looking at some sort of a de novo application entirely on its merits, not an appeal. There are other mechanisms by which this matter could be taken further up. At this stage, it is part and parcel of the decision being made. That is an important point of clarification.

[Keir Starmer]

Can the Solicitor General point me to the words in clauses 1 and 2 that would make it wrong for a judge to apply long-armed judicial review principles to a decision?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras. The hon. and learned Lady was very clear about the different basis of her amendment. My concern is that there are two schools of thought here. There is the amicus curiae school of thought, with which I have a great deal of sympathy. One of the roles of the Law Officers is, when we are approached by various jurisdictions, to consider whether the attorney himself should intervene or whether the court should have an amicus appointed. The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to talk about some of the confusion that can exist in regard to inherent jurisdiction. I am going to take that point away and consider it.

I am concerned about a full-blown replication of the important special advocate system that we have to assist, for example, the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, or of the genesis of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the closed material procedure. There is an important difference between the public interest in having special advocates and this type of scenario. In such cases, there are affected parties—usually respondents to important applications—for whom huge issues are at stake and who need that sort of quality representation within what we accept are exceptional and unusual departures from the principle of open justice. That is why special advocates were created. They perform an invaluable and important role.

I do not see the read-across from that to this scenario. What we have here is an investigatory procedure. It takes place at the early stages—to take a case example—of the investigation of a crime or a threat to national security. There may not be at that stage an identifiable suspect; there is, therefore, a difference and a difficulty in identifying the prejudice that could be caused to the interest of an individual who is a party to the proceedings. It is a different scenario and, tempting though it might be to introduce that type of regime, it would serve only to introduce delay, bureaucracy and extra expense with no tangible benefit to the integrity of the system.

In a nutshell, I will consider carefully the amicus curiae point, but I have wholly to reject a wider approach and the creation of a special advocate system which, frankly, would go beyond even the American jurisdiction, with which comparison is often made—in the foreign intelligence surveillance court in the US they have amici curiae available to assist the court. On that basis, I urge the hon. and learned Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I have nothing to add. In the light of what the Solicitor General has said I will not press the amendment. I look forward to what he produces and to further discussing that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

We have dealt admirably with many of the issues in the clause and I will not speak to the stand part debate.

[Keir Starmer]

I do not wish to speak to new clause 1. It stands or falls with the clause 17 amendments and is to that extent withdrawn along with them.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras for seeking not to get ahead of himself with respect to the arguments on legal professional privilege. I feel a degree of sympathy, because the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West was inevitably going to deal with these matters in the round. Although different considerations apply to each category—parliamentarians, journalists and legal professionals—both hon. and learned Members are absolutely right to lay emphasis not on individuals in those professions but on the client, the source and the constituent. That is why these roles have a special status: it is about the wider public interest. The Government absolutely understand that and we place it at the very heart of our consideration of how warrantry should operate in these areas.

As you will know, Mr Owen, there has already been significant movement by the Government as a result of the various reports that we know all too well. I am delighted that matters of legal professional privilege are now in the primary legislation in great measure. The debate will therefore be about the extent to which safeguards are placed in the primary legislation and about what form they take. I will heed the hon. and learned Gentleman’s exhortation and not stray too far into that area.

I will therefore deal with the amendment to clause 24 and the question of parliamentarians. We heard last year the Prime Minister’s statement about the issue and the important requirement that he or she is to be consulted before the Secretary of State can, with judicial commissioner approval, issue a warrant to acquire communications sent by or intended for a Member of a relevant legislature. The clause applies to all warrants for targeted interception, with the exclusion of warrants authorised by Scottish Ministers, and includes the all-important requirement for the Prime Minister to be consulted before a targeted examination warrant can be issued to authorise the examination of a parliamentarian’s communications collected under a bulk interception warrant.

Part 5 contains similar provisions for equipment interference carried out by the security and intelligence agencies. The important protection in clause 24 will apply to the communications of Members of Parliament, Members of the House of Lords, United Kingdom MEPs and Members of the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. It is important to observe that for the first time, what was a doctrine for the best part of 50 years is now codified and enshrined in primary legislation.

It is important to remember in the spirit of the wider public interest that nobody, least of all parliamentarians, is above the law. The Wilson doctrine has perhaps been misunderstood for many years as a blanket exemption for parliamentarians, but that is exactly what it was not. It was actually an explanation that there will be times when the national or the public interest demands that the communications of Members of Parliament be intercepted because there might be criminal purpose behind them. We hope that that will never happen, but sadly human experience teaches us otherwise. It is therefore important to strike a balance between the proper exercise of the privileges of being a Member of this place or of the other Assemblies and Parliaments in the United Kingdom and the principle of equality before the law.

The amendments introduce the concept of special procedure material and try to combine the approach to the safeguards afforded to the three categories that I have discussed. To put it simply, I submit that what is on the face of the Bill and in the accompanying codes of practice already provide those safeguards and indeed go beyond what can be encompassed in primary legislation. At this stage, I will not say anything further, because I want to deal with points that I know hon. Members will raise about the other categories.

[Keir Starmer]

Can I ask the Minister about journalistic sources? I am concerned that there is nothing about them on the face of the Bill. He will know how anxious journalists are about this. Will he consider whether something should be put on the face of the Bill? There is an inconsistency: in other parts of the Bill, such as clause 68, there is express provision relating to journalists. There is something in the code of practice, but there is nothing on the face of the Bill, which is the problem. Without committing himself to a particular form of words, will he commit to considering one and perhaps liaising with us about what form it could take?

[The Solicitor General]

I am mindful of the fact that my colleague the Security Minister is meeting with the National Union of Journalists. I cannot commit the Government to a particular course of action, but let me put this on record. We are absolutely committed to the preservation and protection of a free press and freedom of expression in our democratic society. That includes the ability of sources to provide anonymous information to journalists, which is absolutely vital if we are to have throughput of important information that needs to be in the public domain.

At the same time, there is a danger. We must not unduly fetter, on the face of the legislation, the important work of our law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. We live in an age of constant blogging and other social media tools. Journalists themselves do not like being defined as a profession. I have been criticised in the past for using that terminology when talking about journalists, for example in the context of the Leveson process. Now, however, there are increasingly wide and loose definitions of who are journalists and what journalism is, and my worry is that that will, and does, inadvertently prevent legitimate investigation of those who are threatening our national security or who are planning to commit serious crime.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I accept that it is a high standard to meet, but it is focused on the wrong target. If it is wrong in principle to target legally privileged material on the basis that that material might involve communications that further crime, on a proper understanding, that material has already lost its legal privilege. Having a higher test to target something that has not lost its legal privilege is a good thing, but it is not enough. Material that has not lost its legal privilege should not be targeted, because it is in fact not furthering crime. The proper way to deal with it is to recognise that what one really wants to target is communications that have lost their privilege. However, there is a risk of including—unintentionally, because one does not want to target it—other material, and that requires a different approach and a different regime. That is really the point. It is good to have a threshold, but the threshold does not work within the confines of this scheme.

I urge the Solicitor General to view the clause in that light and to reflect again on it. A lot of work has been done to try to get it into a better state, but that has not met with the approval of the Bar Council and, following analysis and discussion with the council, I can see why. New clause 2 is the council’s attempt to get it right. It has spent a lot of time on it and is very concerned about it. I invite the Minister to reflect again and commit to looking again at the clause, perhaps with us and the Bar Council, to try to get a clause that meets with the approval of everyone concerned. If that can be achieved, it will be a prize worth having; if it cannot, it will be a waste of a bit of time on a good cause.

[The Solicitor General]

Although it comes at a late hour, this is an important debate. We have come a long way on this issue. There was silence as to the presence of legal professional privilege in the draft Bill. The Government have rightly listened to the evidence and have now made important amendments to clause 25.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I and the Bar Council would like an example of that. If it is being advanced that even where the iniquity exception is not made out—in other words, it is properly legally privileged communications—there none the less may be circumstances in which the privilege yields under the Bill. We need to be clear about the circumstances he envisages. In a sense, he is suggesting that the communications can be targeted once they have lost their quality in cases where the iniquity exception is not made out—in other words, where it is a proper professional exchange between lawyer and client, fully protected until now. We had better have an example. The Bar Council will be very interested, because this issue goes to the heart of the privilege.

[The Solicitor General]

I know that the hon. and learned Gentleman has looked at the code, and the example I will give him is the example in the code under paragraph 8.37. I will read it into the record, because this is an important point. The example is:

“An intelligence agency may need to deliberately target legally privileged communications where the legal consultation might yield intelligence that could prevent harm to a potential victim or victims. For example, if they have intelligence to suggest that an individual is about to conduct a terrorist attack and the consultation may reveal information that could assist in averting the attack (e.g. by revealing details about the location and movements of the individual) then they might want to target the legally privileged communications.”

In other words, that is not the furtherance of a crime, because the legal adviser is not hearing or in any way participating in the outline of a plan. There might be information in there that seems to the adviser to be innocent information about the suspected terrorist living in a particular location or associating with particular individuals, but which, because of the surrounding intelligence in the case, may well give a basis for the intelligence agency to target that individual, because the information means more to the agency.

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister points to an example that I have discussed with the Bar Council. I must put its view on the record, which is that in those circumstances, there would be an offence if someone was not providing the relevant information about that sort of incident to other than the lawyer. We may need to take this discussion forward in an exchange of letters, with the benefit of what the Bar Council has to say, but in its view that is not a good example for what would be an exceptional incursion into legal privilege. That is why I urge the Minister, rather than batting this back at this stage, to take the opportunity to have further discussions with the Bar Council to get this provision into a form that is acceptable to all.

[The Solicitor General]

I am always happy to discuss matters with the Bar Council. As one of the leaders of the Bar, the hon. and learned Gentleman knows that I go to regular Bar Council meetings. I was with it on Saturday, and I listen carefully to what my friends and colleagues at the Bar have to say.

However, the example I am giving explains the situation. There might be information that is entirely innocuous to the lawyer. Let us say that there is a consultation happening. The lawyer might ask a few questions about the address and associates of the person that do not, to him or her, disclose an offence being committed, but which might, in the wider context, provide the security and intelligence authorities with evidential leads that build a wider picture of which the lawyer will be unaware. That is not the furtherance of a crime; it is innocent. What would be innocuous information to the lawyer might mean something more, because a wider context might give the appropriate agency the grounds upon which it could then make its application for warrantry.

There is a distinction. I am not saying that it will be commonplace—far from it. That is why we have worded the terms of the clause very carefully. We talk about “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. I cannot imagine a higher threshold for an applicant to meet than those words.

An additional attraction is that, for the purposes of this legislation, we do not try to define what is meant by legal professional privilege. It is a bit like the argument about parliamentary privilege—the more we try to modernise and define it, the more it ceases to exist as a meaningful concept. One has to be careful about using vehicles like the Bill to define what is a very wide-ranging principle that applies to myriad circumstances involving lawyers and their clients. Although I am in the spirit of dialogue, that is why I would strongly hesitate before adopting the amendments.

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend sums it up admirably. We have taken a different approach from RIPA, and rightly so. We have listened to the concerns expressed by the wider community, not just members of the profession, and are fully cognisant of the importance of legal professional privilege. It was part of my daily professional life for nearly 20 years so, as a Minister and as a lawyer, I fully understand its importance. Therefore, I hope that the example I have given gives an important insight into what we regard as “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. For those reasons, I urge the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I will not take much time. The Solicitor General prays in aid the dangers of over-defining, but the danger of the clause is that it will cut across legal professional privilege. Let us be realistic about what that means: wire taps to listen to privileged legal communications where the iniquity exception does not apply. A lawyer will never again be able to say that a communication—even one within the proper limits of a legal communication—is protected, because there could be no such guarantee. There will always be the possibility that it will not be protected. At the moment, it can be said that as long as it does not fall into the inequity exception, a communication is protected. In the other examples that have been used, it would not be interceptors; it would be bugs in cells. In the end, that is the road that will be opened by this proposal. A lawyer believes that they are having a confidential discussion on proper terms and appropriately with their client, yet that is intercepted. That is why I think the Bar Council feels so strongly about it.

Of course, there is a danger in defining legal professional privilege, but there is a much greater danger in getting to a position where a lawyer can never again say, “I guarantee that, as long as it is within limits, this is a protected communication.” That is at the heart of the Bar Council’s concern. I have said all I need to say. That is the problem.

[The Solicitor General]

We have to be careful about this. We have prison rules, for example. The hon. and learned Gentleman and I know that there are already certain prescribed circumstances and scenarios that exist. I am not advocating a coach-and-horses approach that can be taken by authorities who have a cavalier regard for LPP. This is a very prescribed exception. The words “exceptional and compelling” are strong. He paints a nightmare scenario—I know that he does so with genuine concern for a privilege that he and I hold dear—but I think that we are getting the balance right and that what he envisages will not come to pass.

[Keir Starmer]

I stand only to give way.

Investigatory Powers Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Thursday 24th March 2016 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

Thank you, Ms Dorries. May I make a declaration of interest in relation to this witness and a number of other witnesses generally? I know this witness and some others; I have worked with them both as a lawyer and as Director of Public Prosecutions. I therefore put that on the record—if I may make a general declaration, it applies to Mr Anderson and quite a number of the witnesses today.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

Ditto. I know many of the witnesses as well.

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Thursday 25th February 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General]

My hon. Friend asks probably the most important question about that balance. I can reassure him that the draft Bill, and indeed the legislation that will come forward shortly, strikes that balance, most notably in involving judicial authorisation for the granting of warrants. That double-lock process, which involves the Secretary of State and the judiciary, strikes the right balance.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

The case involving the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson), which the Solicitor General has referred to, and which is before the Court of Appeal, but with a reference to the European Court of Justice, could have implications for the draft Investigatory Powers Bill. The case is being heard in April. How does the Solicitor General see that impacting on the timetable for the Bill going through this House?

[The Solicitor General]

While we understand that the case will be heard in April, it is still very much an unknown factor as to when a judgment will come. What I can say is that the outcome of any case will, of course, be carefully considered. However, I do not anticipate that causing a delay to the introduction of that important Bill, bearing in mind the sunset provisions in DRIPA.

Immigration Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Tuesday 10th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Minister for those assurances. I wonder aloud how long that immunity provision, however long-standing it is, can survive. The idea that people are immune from criminal law in that way is hard to reconcile with later legislation, but that is a much bigger argument than the one we are having now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 109, in schedule 8, page 114, line 17, leave out “detain” and insert “retain”.

This amendment and amendments 110 and 112 are minor drafting changes for consistency with language used elsewhere in the Schedule and have no substantive effect.

Amendment 110, in schedule 8, page 118, line 40, leave out “detain” and insert “retain”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 109.

Amendment 111, in schedule 8, page 122, line 6, leave out “(in England and Wales or elsewhere)” and insert “in the United Kingdom”.

This amendment is a minor drafting change for consistency with the language used in the equivalent provisions for England, Wales and Scotland.

Amendment 112, in schedule 8, page 123, line 17, leave out “detain” and insert “retain”.—(James Brokenshire.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 109.

Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 38

English language requirements for public sector workers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Solicitor General]

Clauses 38 to 45 deal with the question of English language requirements for public sector workers.

I will deal with the subsections of clause 38 in turn. Subsection (1) sets out the requirement for public authorities to ensure that each of their workers in customer-facing roles speak fluent English. I know you will have an interest in this, Mr Owen: clause 43 provides specifically that where there are statutory duties in Wales, the requirement includes fluency in English and in the language of heaven. All members of the public who access public services need to be able to understand the information provided and be confident that their needs are thoroughly understood. Ensuring that that is the case will not only create better and more efficient services for taxpayers but will contribute to meeting our manifesto commitments to promote British values, in a positive and appropriate way.

Subsection (2) will require all public authorities to have regard to a code of practice when deciding how to comply with the duty set out in subsection (1). Of course, public authorities will have an opportunity to help shape that code of practice by responding to the open consultation that has been live since 13 October and will run until early December. Copies of the consultation documents have been placed in the Library of the House.

Subsections (3) and (4) will require each public authority to operate a complaints procedure. Citizens must, of course, be able to report their experience of a customer-facing worker not speaking fluent English. Public bodies must consider and respond to those complaints.

Subsections (5), (6) and (7) explain that a worker in the scope of the duty will be someone working under a contract of employment or of apprenticeship with a public authority, as a contractor to do work personally for a public authority, as an agency worker or as a police officer, civil servant or member of the armed forces. Speaking with members of the public must be a “regular and intrinsic part” of their role.

[Keir Starmer]

There is some concern that such a clause could operate in a discriminatory manner, with complaints and assumptions being made about what is fluent English and who is able to speak fluent English. Will the Solicitor General give an assurance that effective measures will be put in the code or elsewhere to ensure that any potential discriminatory effects and consequences are mitigated or eliminated?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for sharing her anecdotal experiences, but the Home Office has done pre-consultation modelling, based on the proportion of over-16s in employment in the public administration, education and healthcare sectors according to 2011 census data—those are important, objective, statutory data obtained from the British population. According to that modelling, about 3.6 million employees are within the scope of the proposed duty and about 1.5 million employees in Great Britain, excluding Northern Ireland, are subject to English language standards, so an extra 2.1 million employees will be newly affected by the duty. We anticipate that between a low of 8,500 workers and a high of 25,000 workers may not have the required standards of English fluency. There is objective evidence upon which we can base this policy.

The policy is not designed suddenly to change the game or somehow create a wholly new structure that will alter the balance and change societal attitudes towards people who have a heavy accent. I include myself in that—I know the hon. Lady is as proud of her accent as I am proud of mine. We are seeking to standardise and enhance the position of people who have come to this country to work and who might have a different ethnicity or background. They will be employed under the same objective criteria that will be applied to everybody else in the public sector.

[Keir Starmer]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Solicitor General]

I will give way in a moment, but first I want to read a highlighted extract from the draft code of practice consultation relating to complaints. I hope that it will help the hon. Lady. Paragraph 4.5 says:

“Public authorities are not obliged by this Code of Practice to respond to complaints that are vexatious, oppressive, threatening or abusive. These should be given their usual dictionary meaning and could be defined as those complaints that are without foundation and/or which are intended to result in harsh or wrongful treatment of the person referred to in the complaint. In these types of circumstances a complaint should not be allowed to continue.”

I commend that paragraph to the House.

[Keir Starmer]

In so far as the measures extend the existing duties on public authorities to consider the requirement in the first place, they do not go much further than the existing position, but I think that the hon. Lady is pointing at the complaints procedure, which the Minister just touched on. Will he assure the Committee that the only complaints that the provision is intended to open up are complaints against the public authority for failing to carry out its duties, and not complaints made about an individual? That would give a considerable degree of assurance that there is no intention for the measures to allow anyone to say, “I am complaining about X,” when what they are really complaining about is public authority Y, which has not done its job properly. There is a big difference in terms of how the complaints procedure would then be used.

[The Solicitor General]

I can confirm that paragraph 4.1 of the draft code says:

“This section of the Code is about the procedure a public authority should take should there be a complaint regarding a breach of the fluency duty.”

That means a complaint against the public authority for having breached that duty. There are no sanctions in part 7 that could be applied directly to staff. As I said, it is a duty for the public authority.

[Keir Starmer]

This is an important point. Can the Minister write to us on that specific issue? It also arises from clause 41(2)(c), according to my reading; I think that he would provide assurance if he wrote to the Committee—to me and other hon. Members—to say that that is the intention of the complaints procedure. One can see the scope otherwise for concern about complaints.

[The Solicitor General]

I understand entirely, and I am happy to do so. I assure the hon. and learned Gentleman and any Committee members concerned about consequences for staff that dismissal would be a matter extremely far down the line in these procedures. We are talking about improving systems. That does not entail an ad hominem attack on individuals; it is about the public authority and any perceived failure on its part.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for the assurance about frivolous and other vexatious complaints. I know from having 9,000 staff of my own that what causes great anxiety is the fact that a complaint has been made to the individual, even if some weeks or months down the line it might be ruled out. If a number of complaints are made about a particular member of staff, that will increase anxiety hugely. The greater the clarity that the Minister can give here, the better. For a member of staff, simply knowing that a complaint might be knocked out in three months does not affect the anxiety that they feel when doing in their job.

[The Solicitor General]

I take point made by the hon. and learned Gentleman, and that made by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East. I will write to the Committee, as I have indicated.

On the question of bureaucracy, the measures take a minimalist approach. The code of practice will guide public authorities to align their actions regarding the new duty with existing practice. We expect a minimal expansion to existing procedures to suffice. Our open consultation will allow any concerns about bureaucracy to be raised and taken into account.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Lady has mentioned a body that operates its own minimum standards. I envisage that where organisations are already doing that work, it will be a fairly easy task for them to satisfy a code of practice, but again, I would be interested to hear what they have to say as part of the consultation. I am sure that the intention is for dovetailing in any expansion of the duty, so that we standardise it across the whole public sector, thanking those particular outliers for being proactive in the area.

[Keir Starmer]

Again, this is by way of seeking assurance. This discussion is in the context of an Immigration Bill, but the measures will cover all individuals. Can the Minister give an assurance that careful consideration will be given to how the measures apply to individuals with any kind of learning or speech difficulty, regardless of background, ethnicity and so on? There is the potential for impact on people who fall into those categories. I know that that is not the intention, but we would gratefully receive a high level of assurance.

[The Solicitor General]

I am happy to give that. From my own understanding and experience of such issues, I am extremely keen to ensure that people who are fluent but who might, due to disability, express themselves slightly differently, are not discriminated against in any way.

On the question of setting a single standard, again, to enlarge the point that I was making, because the public sector has such a broad range of customer-facing roles, whether they be heart surgeons or parking enforcement officers, different particular standards will be appropriate. Therefore, the code will guide public authorities to set a standard that is proportionate to the nature of the spoken interaction that is an integral part of each role. To reinforce the point that I just made to the hon. and learned Gentleman about discrimination, public authorities, like all employers, are prohibited from discriminating against members of staff and job applicants by the terms of the Equality Act 2010, under which disability is a protected characteristic. Of course that will be relevant to individuals with a speech impediment.

[The Solicitor General]

I hear the hon. Lady, but I must remind her that we are talking about public authorities, which have had to, quite rightly, adapt their practices to take into account legislation such as the Equality Act 2010, which consolidated and enhanced a number of other statutes passed over a generation or more, which in turn dealt with racism, disability discrimination and so on. They were Acts of Parliament passed by all parties in this House. I would be as distressed as she if a public authority misused in any way what I would submit are the benign duties in the clause to reverse the progress that we have made. It is not about whether somebody looks or sounds different; it is about basic standards of proficiency and fluency that will improve public services.

[Keir Starmer]

I apologise for adding to the shopping list of assurances, but it is done, I hope, in the right spirit and with concern that is shared across the House. This problem might have been addressed, but there must be some public authorities that use sign language for some of those deemed to be customers or service users. Those fluent in sign language may not in fact be able to speak fluent English. Perhaps there is an obvious answer to this—if there is, I apologise—but the words “speaks fluent English” in clause 38(8) cause me some concern. There may be an easy reassurance. If there is, I will be assured.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for raising an issue in which I take a personal interest—the use of British sign language and other means for deaf people to participate in all aspects of our mainstream life. To parenthesise for a moment, I am sure that he would be interested in the work that I am doing to explore why deaf people cannot serve on juries, for example. It seems to me wholly ridiculous, but that is the position at the moment. Perhaps we can talk about that offline.

A British sign language interpreter is of course arguably a reasonable adjustment that is provided under an employer’s duty towards staff with a disability under the Equality Act 2010. That would be part and parcel of a person’s work; so to use it as a basis for suggesting lack of fluency would be wholly wrong and self-defeating. It is important to remember that people with disabilities, with reasonable adjustments, increasingly form part of the mainstream workforce. The provision is not designed to cut across that.

I think we all benefit from the fact that people with different ethnic origins work in our public services. Whatever they sound like and wherever they are from we welcome them all; but it is important—and they would agree—that we make sure there is a basic standard, to ensure that all sections of society have the fullest confidence in our public services. The measure goes a long way to protect our public servants.

Immigration Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Thursday 5th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Anne McLaughlin]

I do not disagree, and my friend was very aware of the need to submit the original document; she just put the photocopy in accidentally without realising, but that meant that she had to start the entire process over again—and, if memory serves me correctly, she had to pay all over again. As well as people understanding how important it is to do the correct thing and provide the correct information, it would be useful if the Home Office could take into account the fact that someone made a mistake, and just ask them to sort it out. That is just one example.

The Government are looking at this situation the wrong way around. Instead of improving the accuracy of the original judgments or taking into account what we just talked about—the fact that problems could be sorted out relatively quickly—if feels as if they are trying to hinder reviews and appeals, worthy or not, by hampering appellants in submitting their claims. Human error alone will lead to faulty judgments which—given the consequences, such as having to appeal from overseas, or criminalisation for remaining in the UK—will inevitably lead to human suffering that could have been avoided. That is why previous legislators included a workable administrative review and appeals system. Those of us who have knowledge of that system will be familiar with its problems, but they pale into insignificance in comparison with the general policy of appeals from overseas and the criminalisation of those whose leave has expired.

There should be no doubt: those who support part 4 of the Bill will needlessly split up families. The fact that it will be impossible for families to stay together while appeals are dealt with makes a mockery of the Government’s professed support of family values. The family life of British citizens with foreign family members could hinge on such minor matters as faulty judgments, typos, stray documents or, to use my recent example, the accidental submission of a photocopy, which should be picked up during the appeal. Tat is no way to run an immigration system.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

I want to make sure I have understood the measure. As I understand it, section 3D leave was for people whose leave had been cancelled or curtailed by the Home Office for various reasons including deception, so that they could bring an appeal—so they would be entitled to remain to bring an appeal. That seems sensible. There might be an error and it is usually best to put errors right. I have worked in a big organisation of 9,000 staff making hundreds of thousands of decisions. There is an always an error rate, however well trained the staff. It seems sensible therefore that if there has been an error the person in question should have the right to remain and appeal.

What happened, I think, is that the right of appeal was removed last year, but on an undertaking that there might be administrative review. Again, that might be quite sensible: we will remove the right of appeal but provide a different mechanism so that someone can simply correct a wrong decision. I understand that the administrative review procedure has not been put in place. Now, in cases where a decision is made to cancel someone’s leave, the Government want to strike out section 3D on the basis that since they will not let the individual affected do anything about it, there is no point in it. So when a wrong decision is made about an individual, what are they to do—in a nutshell?

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions to the debate. The hon. Member for Glasgow North East is concerned about the availability of administrative review. I am grateful for her more general observations, and I hope I answered them in response to the debate on clause 31; I hope that she will forgive me for not repeating my observations on those points. I mean no disrespect.

On the hon. Lady’s specific points, we do not think that administrative review should be available where a person has their immigration leave cancelled or revoked. There are a number of circumstances where it would not be appropriate. One example would be where a migrant worked in breach of their immigration conditions and had their leave cancelled. Another example would be a person whose conduct or behaviour has made it undesirable for them to remain here—people who facilitate sham marriages, for example.

[The Solicitor General]

I will come to that point and the point that the hon. Lady made about error. It is an amplification of the intervention she kindly allowed me to have. In place of administrative review, the Home Office has an error correction policy for when immigration leave is cancelled. So an application for error correction under the policy does not extend the immigration leave, but it does allow errors to be raised with the Home Office. We are getting the balance right between effective immigration control on the one hand and the fairness point that the hon. Lady quite properly raised.

[Keir Starmer]

Will the Solicitor General give way?

[The Solicitor General]

I will in a moment. I just want to finish this point. The Home Office contacts people who make applications and who have paid a fee to give them the opportunity to correct errors in their applications.

[The Solicitor General]

There are examples. The case of Iqbal, which we cited yesterday, was an example where individuals were invited to correct errors. So the process works. Statistics show that only 2.45% of applications were found to be invalid—invalid is when an application is made, but because of error it is of no effect, so the process is having an impact, which is good. I accept the point that the hon. Lady made about the case that she raised, but we believe that the error correction policy fills a particular gap and addresses the mischief that hon. Members have raised.

[Keir Starmer]

An error correction mechanism is a very good idea. I tried to introduce one in the Crown Prosecution Service to avoid people having to go to court. It provides a much quicker process and allows staff to understand where errors have occurred and correct them, but it is not foolproof by any stretch of the imagination, and there will be wrong decisions that are not picked up by an error correction mechanism. What happens in such cases? Simply saying there are some people who might bring inappropriate appeals, therefore there should not be a right of appeal, is, when broadened, an argument against any appeal in any case of administration decision. Of course some people will bring inappropriate cases.

[The Solicitor General]

Let us not forget the context here. We are dealing with situations in which people have had their leave revoked or varied because of due process, and a trigger event will have allowed that to happen. It is not fair to say we should look at such cases as a blank page where an administrative review might be the first opportunity for the issues to be aired. There is a residual and important right to judicial review of Executive decisions as well, so the checks and balances are there.

[Keir Starmer]

I am interested in this because, as we have gone through the proceedings, every time we hit the problem that there is no simple appeal or review, the suggestion is to go for a long shot—judicial review, which everyone knows is a long and expensive process. Has there been consultation with the judiciary on the policy of requiring all these cases to go to the High Court by way of judicial review as the only avenue of review? I think there would be concern about all these cases going to the High Court when they could have been dealt with much more cheaply, swiftly and efficiently.

Immigration Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Thursday 5th November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

We are talking about the 18-month period between 16 and a half to 18 years of age. That is the period we are dealing with. I have already made the point about age in previous debates, but I will develop the point I was making just now. For example, if a 17-year-old who lives in the UK with members of their wider family has made a human rights claim to stay that has then been refused, and if they have parents or family in another country to whom they can return and successfully establish their life there, these provisions might apply. To develop the general point about the interests of children, the welfare of children will continue to be a primary consideration in decisions by virtue of statute under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, so each case will be assessed depending on individual circumstances.

[Keir Starmer (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)]

The Solicitor General is dealing with a very important point and reassuring us that an assessment will be made, particularly when it involves children, but how precise will that assessment exercise be? How will the detailed circumstances be ascertained and what is the remedy if it is thought that a wrongful decision has been made?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman has hit upon the more general point about successful appeals. It is wrong to assume that the reason for the number of successful challenges to Home Office decisions lies fairly and squarely at the door of the Home Office and any failures that it might exercise in using its discretion. We have due process, and he will of course be aware that when an applicant makes an application, they should do everything they can to provide the fullest evidence and information about their situation at the earliest opportunity. I would think that evidence about the welfare needs of children would be at the forefront of any applicant’s mind, or the minds of those who are instructed to represent them. It is therefore vital—this is a good opportunity for me to put this on the record—that everybody involved in such proceedings understands that early reliance on comprehensive evidence is essential if we are to avoid the issues that the hon. and learned Gentleman rightly raises.

On the handling of children’s cases, revised guidance has now been published following the recent Court of Appeal judgment, which we are well aware of, and is now available on the gov.uk website.

[Keir Starmer]

It may be my fault for not expressing myself clearly enough, but in relation to the assessment of the impact on a child who is required to appeal from abroad—which is a different assessment from the ordinary assessment of an impact on a child—how is that to be conducted? What is the guidance? For example, does the guidance say more than six months for a child under 10? Is separation from a parent acceptable or unacceptable? What is the guidance for the decision maker if they are presented with two children under 10 and a possible separation of six to 12 months? Are they told that that is okay or not okay?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman has asked a specific question about the wording of the guidance. I am at a slight disadvantage because I do not have it to hand. It might be that I can get a response to him about that. However, guidance that goes into huge prescriptive detail on time limits or time indications is not really guidance. Guidance must give decision makers discretion and allow them to look individually on a case-by-case basis.

[Keir Starmer]

rose—

[The Solicitor General]

I will finish this point, then the hon. and learned Gentleman can by all means intervene again.

I want to give the Committee an example about individual circumstances. An example of where the welfare of a child might make a case unsuitable for certification by the Secretary of State is if the individual whose article 8 claim has been refused is acting as the primary carer for a child, even temporarily—for example, if the child’s parents had separated and the parent who is normally the primary carer is unavailable to take care of the child temporarily and the other parent is caring for the child while their appeal is being determined. In that example, welfare issues clearly come into play.

In each case, individuals will be asked to provide any reasons why the power should not be applied in their circumstances, which will be fully considered. Of course, they will be able to challenge the decision to certify; we must not overlook that important point. The decision to certify is an administrative decision that can be challenged by judicial review.

[Keir Starmer]

I want to probe the question of guidance. The Solicitor General’s example is of a primary carer. Unsurprisingly, it is not thought a good idea to certify in those circumstances—that case makes itself. The Children’s Commissioner published a report about a month ago about the impact of different rules, including the rules about the income requirement that must be met before a spouse can join a family, which focused on the impact on the child of not having access to one parent for months, and sometimes years. Has the Solicitor General or the Department taken those findings into account? They seem to be pertinent here, given the impact on a child of not having contact with one parent for a prolonged period.

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a powerful point, but those sorts of considerations can be taken into account by the decision maker.

I now have to hand the guidance on the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 issued by the Home Office. The latest version is dated 30 October, so it is fresh off the printing press. The section 55 duty is described in paragraphs 3.6 to 3.8 inclusive, which I will read for the record:

“When considering whether to certify a human rights claim pursuant to section 94B, the best interests of any child under the age of 18 whom the available information suggests may be affected by the deportation decision must be a primary consideration.”

That is a very helpful start.

“Case owners must carefully consider all available information and evidence to determine whether or not it is in the child’s best interests for the person liable to deportation to be able to appeal from the UK. This is particularly relevant in considering whether deportation pending appeal would cause serious irreversible harm to the child. The case owner must also consider whether those interests are outweighed by the reasons in favour of certification in the individual case, including the public interest in effecting deportation quickly and efficiently.”

That is the balancing exercise in a nutshell.

Paragraph 3.7 might help the hon. and learned Gentleman:

“Case owners must carefully assess the quality of any evidence provided in relation to a child’s best interests. Original, documentary evidence from official or independent sources will be given more weight in the decision-making process than unsubstantiated assertions about a child’s best interests or copies of documents.”

Paragraph 3.8 states:

“For further guidance in relation to the section 55 duty, see…Section 55”.

It also contains links to an introduction to children and family cases and to criminality guidance for article 8 ECHR cases. I think that is a helpful encapsulation of the balancing exercise that decision makers have to carry out.

[Keir Starmer]

I want to explore that guidance. For clarity, if the assessment states that there will be serious harm to the child, but it would not be irreversible, that suggests that the decision maker would go ahead with the decision and certify. Is it right that the harm has to be serious and irreversible?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to read the words in that way. We do not have the words “and” or “or”—we are back to “and” or “or”. He and I like these arguments because they are important; we do not indulge in them for the sake of semantics. However, what I am referring to is guidance, so it takes a different form from primary legislation or secondary legislation. It allows decision makers to get clear in their minds what the balance should be. There is a public interest in swift and efficient deportation. The party that the hon. and learned Gentleman represents had no issue with the principle when it introduced this power or when it was extended in the 2014 Act, so that principle is something on which he and I can agree.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for setting out the provisions of clause 31 in detail. The clause is a wide extension of the powers that I accept already exist in relation to a limited class of individuals and will now cover very many people who are appealing their cases. I urge the Government to consider the impact, particularly on children, of separation in these and similar circumstances.

I have already mentioned the report by the Children’s Commissioner. I appreciate that the context is slightly different in that usually in those cases the spouse is already abroad, but the report gives powerful testimony about the impact on children of being unable to have any meaningful contact with one of their parents for a prolonged period. I do not think that has been assessed and taken into account in the guidance that has just been mentioned, because the timing probably would not have allowed that, but such separation should be considered and taken into account, and there should be a proper impact assessment of the existing remove first, appeal afterwards provisions.

We can dance around article 8, and we can argue as lawyers about whether or not that article has been breached, but among the most powerful points in the Children’s Commissioner’s report of a month ago were the human stories of the impact of suddenly depriving a child of one of their parents for a prolonged period. The report contained stories of children who were highly distressed because their father or mother was no longer available to them for contact for a prolonged period. Some of those families came to the launch and gave their evidence.

Sometimes we need to step out of these Committees and step out of our lawyerly, political selves. I am the father of a four-year-old and a seven-year-old. I heard those families describing what it was like trying to get their children to bed—the crying and distress during month after month of separation. In some cases it may well be that article 8 is breached and in some it may not be, but that is highly distressing for the children, and as a father I found it highly distressing to hear their testimony. I thought about what I would feel if I were separated from my children, whom happily I see nearly every day, for just a week or two. We should not lose sight of the idea of being separated for six months or a year because it does not tick the box of crossing a threshold into article 8, or any other legal provision. This measure will have a profound impact on human lives, and we need to approach this debate with that in mind.

The Solicitor General kindly gave us the statistic of a 42% success rate for appeals, which he puts forward as evidence that there is no obvious detriment in appeal after removal, but let us start by focusing on that figure: 42% of those removed won their appeal. So 42% of the families—if a family is involved—who suffered the human distress that I have described, whether or not there was a breach of the law, succeeded on appeal. That is an alarmingly high success rate in those circumstances.

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Gentleman is making a proper point about that, but we must be careful not to fall into the trap of assuming that that success rate is always due to failure by the Home Office. It is not. Very often it is due to the applicant’s failure to provide evidence that clearly would have helped in a timely way. It is not fair to keep beating the Home Office over the head for the failures of others.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I recognise some of what the hon. Gentleman has said. As he indicated, where that is a problem, it is for the professional bodies to regulate better or follow up in individual cases, and nothing that I say should stand in the way of that, but I do not want to step outside the human aspect. Ultimately, in cases where that is an issue, it is the individual who is removed who suffers as a result; if children are involved, it is the children who suffer. If an appeal is successful because bad advice was given months or years earlier and something relevant was not put before the decision maker or court, but it has come to light and been put before an appeal court, the impact on the individual who is not at fault should not be lost.

That is one difficulty with the proposed scheme for removing individuals. However, I recognise some of the picture that the hon. Gentleman has painted, and I agree that where professional follow-up can take place, it should as it would help in such cases. It is, however, also a fact that many appeals take a long time. If decision making were of a higher quality and decisions were quicker, a lot of the concern would evaporate, and we would not be debating the need for deport first, appeal later provisions.

I come to the practicability of appealing from abroad. We are familiar with the notion of a hearing in this jurisdiction. In some ways, a hearing is not dissimilar to the exchanges we have across this Committee Room, where physical human beings make submissions and listen to what is said against those submissions. Here, we have you, Mr Owen; in court, we would have a judge. That judge listens to the exchanges, takes into account the evidence and comes to a decision. Anybody who has ever been in any court of any form will know that many cases are determined through those exchanges, with the decision maker making their mind up as the process unfolds. Attention can be drawn to a particular piece of evidence, a point can be rebutted and additional evidence can swiftly be put before the court or the tribunal, if it is necessary to do so. If a judge has questions, they can be dealt with there and then by the parties.

That is how we have been doing things for 200 years —certainly in the criminal context—and it is a highly effective way of resolving differences between the parties. It is a very different experience if someone is appealing from abroad. In the first place, their submissions will probably be made in electronic or hard, written form way before the hearing. There is no prospect of the sorts of exchanges that get to the truth or resolve the critical issues between the parties. Until recently, it has been possible for some individuals to have representation in the proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that they are abroad. I have a question for the Solicitor General: if the proposed residence test for legal aid comes into force, will that effectively mean that, for this large, extended category of individuals, the prospect of any representation is gone once they are removed, unless they have private money? That is a serious consideration. That proposal would fundamentally change how the scheme operates, when taken with the proposed change before us.

[The Solicitor General]

I can assist the hon. and learned Gentleman there. The position on legal aid is not altered by an individual having to appeal from overseas. Legal aid is not available for article 8 appeals before the tribunal, regardless of whether the appeal is lodged from overseas or within the UK. I hear the point he makes, but the issue he raises is immaterial to the question of legal aid. He also asked about residence, and I will see whether I can get a specific response on that.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful. I realise that may not be easy, so if the Solicitor General writes to me or the Committee, I will be grateful. The question was: what impact, if any, will the proposed resident test for legal aid have on those exercising their right to appeal from abroad? I would be happy to receive the answer by way of a letter.

There is, however, a more fundamental point here. There is a very real difference between a hearing at which the individuals are present and able to deliberate and to make submissions in the way I indicated, and one where the individuals are abroad. So my next question is: what practical steps will be taken to ensure that the procedure is as effective as it can be? To break that down: what steps are being taken to ensure that evidence can be made available by way of video, using the technologies available? As I understand it—the Solicitor General will correct me if I am wrong—an individual’s ability to use technical means to appear virtually, as it were, in the courtroom depends on the courtroom being set up to receive such evidence, and not many are. It is for the individual to finance that from wherever they have been removed to and I do not think that the procedural rules for such proceedings have been amended sufficiently to allow that to happen with any great ease or regularity.

Accepting those very real differences between a live appeal and an appeal from abroad, what steps are being taken to ensure the best possible access and ability to participate by those who have been removed? That would include steps to ensure that there is an exchange of submissions, rather than just a set of submissions that are put in in the first place. In other words, how does the appellant abroad deal with the points that the tribunal wants to make as the tribunal begins to make up its mind?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The words I used are the words of the Court of Appeal—not as advantageous—but that does not mean prejudicial. The points that the hon. Gentleman raises are a summary of the points raised by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras about the process itself, which I will try to help with in due course, but there is a difference. If the Court had come to the conclusion that there was a clear gap—an injustice gap—for individuals, I am sure the decision of the Court of Appeal would not have supported the submissions made by Lord Keen, the Advocate General.

On the point raised by the hon. Member for South Shields, I will write to her and set out the position in full. The point made by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North about going further and using the statute to exclude children from the scope of the power is, with respect, an unnecessary step to take for the reasons that I hope I have clearly outlined about the necessary protection that children enjoy under section 55 and the guidance. I do not think that going a stage further would serve any particular purpose, however well intentioned.

The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised important points. I want to try to do justice to them in turn. First, I will deal with the issue he raised about the important report by the Children’s Commissioner. I remind the Committee that the power does not represent a blanket approach. It allows caseworkers to individually consider the impact on individual children—that human element that he prayed in aid so powerfully—and the range of possible effects that a decision to certify might have.

[Keir Starmer]

I wonder whether that is right. As I understand it, decision makers take into account whether there is serious and irreversible harm, not the distress and anxiety that I was talking about. The Children’s Commissioner’s report gives examples of children wetting the bed, being highly distressed for weeks on end, and so on, which may not reach the test of serious and irreversible harm—I do not know. People will argue differently about that, but it is highly distressing, and it is highly distressing to hear about it. Distress will probably be taken into account, but it certainly will not enable the decision makers lawfully to determine against certification.

[The Solicitor General]

I caution the hon. and learned Gentleman against using the term “test” about serious, irreversible harm. We must not forget that the overall test is the article 8 test. We are talking about the guidance. Of course, there will be input from the family, and there might be input from the school and social workers. Those people are best placed to provide evidence about what the impact will be.

It is a reality in our society that many parents and children have to live separately temporarily. Many parents work away—many in this room are in that position—and many are on active service and have to spend long periods of six months or more away from their children. I do not minimise—I really do not, from my own experience—how that affects the family dynamic and the effect that that has on children, but we have to be careful not to single out that category of individuals and say their experiences are sui generis, unique or wholly different from those of other families in those circumstances.

Family separation is sometimes in the best interests of the children. I can think of examples—although not involving examinations, because they take place when children are older—involving children who need a stable term in school, perhaps because they have particular special needs. We should be proud that our country leads the world in special needs provision. I can think of examples involving children who can be supported more effectively in special needs education in the UK. I hope that gives at least some insight into the Government’s thinking on the nuances that will appear in the cases.

The hon. and learned Gentleman made a point about the process itself. He said he is concerned about the fact that the process and procedure of out-of-country appeals are different from that of the hearings that he and I are familiar with. Technology is increasingly used in our courtrooms and, as he knows, the use of virtual technology is often in the best interests of children and vulnerable witnesses, in particular. We are exhorted, and indeed mandated, through statute and practice direction to use such mechanisms increasingly to move away from the effects that what I would call traditional court proceedings can have on individuals. His point is important, but I want to put it in context.

[Keir Starmer]

I do not want to be misunderstood. I championed the use of digital working in our courts. There was a very good pilot in a Birmingham court for criminal cases. However, it took a lot of resource and very good modern technology to make virtual hearings as close as humanly possible to actual hearings. Is the Solicitor General able to say whether steps will be taken for similar arrangements in these cases?

[The Solicitor General]

I am able to give the hon. and learned Gentleman this assurance. If a person appealing from overseas submits that oral evidence is needed, an application can be made to the tribunal for evidence to be given via video link, Skype or telephone. Of course, we have specialist immigration judges who are best placed to make an informed decision about whether the quality of the evidence will be enhanced if it is given in that way. That is similar to the tests that are applied up and down the country every day, increasingly as a matter of course, when it comes to the use of TV links, for example.

Immigration Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that explanation, but I want to clarify the position. I think, having listened to the Solicitor General, that the primary purpose of the clause is to enable a valid—on the face of it—driving licence to be seized for the purposes of revocation, and if it is not revoked or if it is challenged, it is returned. It would be helpful if the Solicitor General could confirm that that is the driving purpose of the clause.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. The position is that, for revoked and unrevoked driving licences, the power will be there to seize both. For example, a valid driving licence can be seized and proceedings then undertaken to revoke it because it is held by someone who ought not to be here.

[Keir Starmer]

I do not think we are at odds, but I need to ensure that I understand. The process is straightforward where a driving licence is invalid or already revoked, but if a licence is not revoked and is, on its face, valid, the purpose of the provision is to allow a revocation process to be completed.

[The Solicitor General]

Yes, that is right.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I would, Mr Owen.

In our evidence session, those points were, quite properly, put to the chief superintendent, and we received reassurances that it is all about intelligence-led policing and intelligence-led investigations by immigration officers. The provisions will not, in my view, lead to the random targeting of people based on their ethnicity. That would be wholly wrong and it is not something that the Government support.

As I said, the police will have cause to stop a vehicle; they may then check the driver’s circumstances, and then, if the driver is found to be an illegal migrant, the powers we intend to introduce can be used. There will not be a misuse of power, as the action taken will be based on information that is already available. Bearing in mind the demands that are placed on our investigative authorities, it is a sensible use of their resources. Certainly I, and the Government, will not encourage the authorities to randomly target individuals based on any arbitrary judgment about their status. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady the reassurance she seeks.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Offence of driving when unlawfully in the United Kingdom

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 17, page 19, line 39, at end insert—

“(1A) A person does not commit an offence under subsection (1) if they had a reasonable belief that they had legal right to remain in the United Kingdom and acted in good faith.”

This amendment would provide a defence for those prosecuted for driving while illegally in the UK if they can show that they had a reason to believe that they did have legal right to be in the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

Let me deal first with the question raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman about the evidence. There is a loophole involving people who are unlawfully here—illegal migrants—who are driving with foreign-issued licences. The offence will cover all aspects of driving by migrants who are in the United Kingdom unlawfully.

Every year, about 10,000 queries are referred to the Home Office by the police relating to either road-side stops or vehicle stops. We do not have precise numbers on cases where an illegal migrant was found to be driving a vehicle, but of the one fifth of cases related to vehicle stops, about 10% relate to drivers who are in the UK legally. I am talking about a loophole here. I think it is right that we try to close that when it comes to covering all incidents in which the authorities through other intelligence and other reasons to stop vehicles come into contact with people who are here unlawfully. The provision is another important tool to deal with a matter of public concern.

I recognise the reasons behind amendment 75, but in my view it is very broad and very subjective. It will create scenarios, for example, in which a defendant might claim they had reason to believe they were in the UK legally, simply because they had misunderstood the date on which their leave expired. It would be difficult to prove otherwise and then the purpose of the offence is undermined.

Let me deal with offences of strict liability in the context of driving. This concept is not new. For example, the offence of driving while disqualified under section 103 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, as amended, is an offence of strict liability, so this is not a new departure, although the defence would be a new departure when it comes to driving offences of this nature.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his explanation. I readily accept that this quasi-strict liability is not uncommon when it comes to driving and disqualification. The difference is that if someone is disqualified, they know they are disqualified. If there were a situation in which somebody, perhaps through sponsorship, genuinely and simply did not know that their status was as it was and would come within this defence, is the Solicitor General’s answer that that is just tough?

[The Solicitor General]

Not quite. There are a couple of caveats. First, a person who is prosecuted for this offence has the opportunity before the court issues judgment to put in mitigation about their belief as to whether they were legally present in the UK, and that would affect any sentence that might be passed by the court. Also, the Crown Prosecution Service will have guidance to ensure that migrants are not inappropriately prosecuted for this offence. Should a migrant be able to genuinely show that they believed themselves to be legally present, the public interest test, with which the hon. and learned Gentleman is very familiar, would apply.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful—I can see where this is going. Obviously, any guidance will be for the CPS to draft. Will the Solicitor General be writing to the Director of Public Prosecutions to ask her to consider whether this matter should be included in the guidelines? Obviously, it would be a matter for her, but he could suggest that she consider it.

[The Solicitor General]

I am more than happy to draw the DPP’s attention to this debate, which I hope will be of assistance to her in drafting guidelines.

I assure the Committee that the offence is not aimed at victims of modern slavery who have been forced to drive. I hope that goes some way to answering the concerns raised by the hon. Member for Rotherham. As she is aware, the statutory offence under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 will apply. If a person has been compelled to drive as a direct consequence of slavery or human trafficking, they will not commit this offence. Further, there are common-law defences. For example, it will remain a defence for someone to show that they committed the offence under duress, regardless of whether they are a victim of modern slavery. I have mentioned potential new guidance, and there is existing guidance from the DPP to ensure that victims of modern slavery are not inappropriately prosecuted. These are effective safeguards against the inappropriate use of the offence that hon. Members have expressed concerns about.

Amendment 76 has been tabled because of genuine concerns about the validity of motor insurance. We are exploring with the insurance industry the potential impact of the offence on policies, but I can give reassurance today that a person involved in an accident with an illegal migrant driver will be protected. By virtue of sections 151 and 152 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, insurers have certain liabilities to innocent third parties that they cannot exclude from insurance policies. Those liabilities derive from obligations under European law which mean that an innocent third party involved in a traffic collision with an illegal migrant driver will be entitled to make a claim on the illegal migrant’s insurance policy, even if the policy is voided as a result of the migrant being unlawfully present here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for those explanations and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Solicitor General]

I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 17, page 20, line 33, leave out “as to whether” and insert “not”

This amendment and amendment 45 clarify that a vehicle must be released where a decision is taken not to institute criminal proceedings for the offence of driving when unlawfully in the United Kingdom.

[The Solicitor General]

As we know, clause 17 inserts a new offence of driving while unlawfully present. Amendments 44 and 45 are technical in nature. They make clear that a vehicle must be released from detention where a decision is taken not to institute criminal proceedings for the offence of driving when unlawfully in the United Kingdom.

Amendment 46 ensures that a police or senior immigration officer may detain a vehicle at any place where they are lawfully present, including private property that is open to the public, such as a privately owned car park. Amendment 47 provides a power for the police or a senior immigration officer to enter premises, such as the suspect’s property, for the purpose of searching for and detaining a vehicle used in the commission of the offence. Those two amendments ensure that a person cannot frustrate seizure of the vehicle used in the commission of the offence by keeping it on private land, such as in a garage. Amendment 47 also provides that the power to enter premises may be exercised by a senior immigration officer or constable without warrant, where the officer knows the vehicle is present—for example, they can see the suspect’s car parked on the driveway. Where a senior immigration officer or constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a vehicle may be found on premises but does not know it is there, the amendment provides the facility to apply for a warrant enabling the officer or constable to enter premises to search for the vehicle.

The provisions for obtaining a warrant reflect certain differences in the legal, procedural and administrative framework governing the issuing of warrants between Scotland and the rest of the UK. In particular, the Scottish criminal justice system does not provide for warrants to be issued for multiple entries to multiple premises by constables in Scotland. These forms of warrants are a feature of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England and Wales. The amendment therefore makes special provision to disapply this form of warrant for constables in Scotland. I hope Scottish National party Members note that great care has been taken to ensure that the two systems dovetail in a way that is acceptable to everyone.

Amendment 48 ensures that a person accompanying a constable in the execution of a warrant, such as a person contracted by the police to remove and store a vehicle used in the commission of the offence, may detain that vehicle. It also provides that a constable may use reasonable force in order to detain a vehicle.

I invite the Committee to accept those amendments.

Amendment 44 agreed to.

Amendments made: 45, in clause 17, page 20, line 35, leave out “have been” and insert “are”.

See the explanatory statement for amendment 44.

Amendment 46, in clause 17, page 20, line 45, at end insert—

‘( ) A power in subsection (1) or (3) may be exercised by a senior officer or constable at any place at which the senior officer or constable is lawfully present.” —(The Solicitor General.)

This amendment makes clear that a vehicle can be detained by a senior officer or constable at any place they are lawfully present.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 74, in clause 17, page 21, line 30, at end insert—

‘(10A) Before laying regulations to bring Section 24D into force, the Secretary of State must ensure a pilot of the arrangements takes place.

(10B) Following the completion of the pilot mentioned in subsection (10A) the Secretary of State must prepare a report and lay it before each House of Parliament.

(10C) The pilot mentioned in subsection (1) must take place in a minimum of two police force areas and last for a minimum of six months.”

This amendment would ensure that the Home Secretary conducted a pilot of the proposed powers to allow police forces to confiscate the cars of suspected illegal immigrants before the measures were introduced.

I can deal with this amendment briefly. We have debated the provisions in the clause itself. Several concerns have been raised and several assurances have been given by the Government, but these are new provisions, so the amendment simply provides that they should be piloted before they are rolled out, partly to ensure that those assurances work in practice and partly because, when introducing new provisions of this sort, piloting is always a good idea to ensure that they work in practice. However, the substance of the debate has already been had, in terms of the concerns and assurances.

[Sarah Champion]

I was on the Select Committee for Transport and went out with the DVLA when it was doing some of its stops with police officers. I apologise for raising this question in this debate, but I did not know where else to raise it. I was shocked when the Minister said that 10,000 inquiries were made to the police last year. I know that the DVLA has vast concerns that it does not have the resources to investigate people driving illegal vehicles rather than illegal driving. How will the police, immigration and the DVLA work together? Also, has he considered the resources, which will be considerable if there are already 10,000 inquiries? Acting on those and investigating will be pretty resource-intensive. Can he comment on that?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

Yes, I can. Perhaps I have not clearly outlined that we do not expect police officers to take on a whole new swathe of different inquiries, independent of already existing intelligence and information; rather, this provision is a bolt-on. It allows police officers to follow another reasonable line of inquiry as a result of the intelligence they have already obtained. The scenario that the hon. Lady is concerned about is not one that is going to come to fruition. This is about putting another tool in the box, rather than an expectation that there are suddenly going to be new independent operations as a result of these new powers. I hope that gives the hon. Lady some reassurance.

[Keir Starmer]

The Minister mounts a “Dukes of Hazzard” defence. I am not quite sure that is right, because this provision is focused on the confiscation of the vehicle rather than the moving vehicle, but he makes a persuasive argument about the technical issue, which is his best point, and on that basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendments made: 47, in clause 17, page 21, line 32, at end insert—

“24DA Powers to enter premises to detain motor vehicle

(1) A senior officer or a constable may enter and search any premises for the purposes of detaining a vehicle under section 24D.

(2) The power in subsection (1) may be exercised—

(a) only to the extent that it is reasonably required for that purpose, and

(b) only if the senior officer or constable knows that a vehicle which may be detained under section 24D is to be found on the premises.

(3) The power in subsection (1) may be exercised—

(a) by a senior officer (“S”) only if S produces identification showing that S is an immigration officer (whether or not S is asked to do so);

(b) by a constable (“C”) only if C produces identification showing that C is a constable (whether or not C is asked to do so).

(4) Subsection (5) applies if, on an application by a senior officer or constable, a justice of the peace is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a vehicle which may be detained under section 24D may be found on premises mentioned in subsection (6).

(5) The justice of the peace may issue a warrant authorising any senior officer or constable to enter, if need be by force, the premises for the purpose of searching for and detaining the vehicle.

(6) The premises referred to in subsection (4) are—

(a) one or more sets of premises specified in the application, or

(b) subject to subsection (10), any premises occupied or controlled by a person specified in the application, including such sets of premises as are so specified (in which case the application is for an “all premises warrant”).

(7) If the application is for an all premises warrant, the justice of the peace must also be satisfied—

(a) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to search premises occupied or controlled by the person in question which are not specified in the application in order to find the vehicle, and

(b) that it is not reasonably practicable to specify in the application all the premises which the person occupies or controls and which might need to be searched.

(8) Subject to subsection (10), the warrant may authorise entry to and search of premises on more than one occasion if, on the application, the justice of the peace is satisfied that it is necessary to authorise multiple entries in order to achieve the purpose for which the justice issues the warrant.

(9) If it authorises multiple entries, the number of entries authorised may be unlimited, or limited to a maximum.

(10) A justice of the peace in Scotland may not issue—

(a) an all premises warrant under this section authorising entry on premises by a constable, or

(b) a warrant under this section authorising multiple entries by a constable.

(11) In the application of this section to Scotland, references to a justice of the peace are to be read as references to the sheriff or a justice of the peace.

(12) In this section “senior officer” means an immigration officer not below the rank of chief immigration officer.”

This amendment provides the police and immigration officers with the power to enter premises in order to detain a relevant vehicle. This ensures that an illegal migrant who commits the offence of driving when unlawfully present in the United Kingdom cannot frustrate seizure by keeping the vehicle on private land.

Amendment 48, in clause 17, page 22, line 22, at end insert—

‘( ) In section 16(2A)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (powers of persons accompanying constables in execution of warrants) after “seizure” insert “or detention”.

( ) In Article 18(2A)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (SI 1989/1341 (NI 22)) (powers of persons accompanying constables in execution of warrants) after “seizure” insert “or detention”.

( ) In section 146(2) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (use of reasonable force) before paragraph (a) insert—

“(za) section 24DA(1) (powers to enter premises to detain motor vehicle),”.”—(The Solicitor General.)

This amendment ensures that a person accompanying a constable in the execution of a warrant may detain a vehicle and that a constable may use reasonable force in order to detain a vehicle.

Clause 17, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Bank accounts

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 77, in clause 54, page 45, line 11, at end insert—

‘(4A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) in relation to Section 18 shall only be made after having been laid in draft before each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”

This amendment would require the regulations bringing into force Clause 18 to be subject to debate and approval by the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for that clarification, Mr Owen. To some extent, given the way that it is set out, the amendment pretty well speaks for itself in any event. There is obviously a distinction between the freezing provisions and the closure provisions, in terms of the right of appeal open to individuals. It may be that the Minister can give a degree of assurance about how that will operate, but the reason I raised it at this stage is because amendment 77, requiring scrutiny, is to some extent premised on the concern about that limited class of individuals. I take it together in that way, but I hope I have made the sprit clear. This is about being supportive of the approach, but also exploring and seeking assurances on what happens in the case of an error that could be very costly to the individual.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 3

Bank accounts

[The Solicitor General]

I beg to move amendment 22, in schedule 3, page 70, line 35, leave out “or a court of summary jurisdiction”.

This amendment and amendment 23 change the definition of “relevant appeal court” for appeals in Northern Ireland. The effect is that an appeal against a decision by a court of summary jurisdiction in Northern Ireland to make a freezing order is made to a county court instead of the Crown Court.

Immigration Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Tuesday 3rd November 2015 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Starmer]

I had the opportunity when we were discussing clause 18, which inevitably included a discussion of schedule 3, to speak to the amendments. I hope the Minister heard my concerns. I do not think I will make them any stronger by repeating them.

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for his observations. We believe amendments 93 and 94 are unnecessary and would create a disproportionately expensive bureaucracy around the provisions. The Home Office will only share the details of migrants who are liable for removal or deportation from the UK, such as those who have exhausted all appeal rights. Those will include people who have been served with a deportation order or enforcement papers or who have absconded from immigration control. They will be fully aware of the reasons why they are considered to be disqualified people. Those who are refused permission to stay will be warned in the Home Office decision letter of the practical consequences, including for their continued ability to operate a bank account in the UK. To require the Home Office separately to actively provide them with such information in every case where their data are shared would cause delay and waste resources. Details of the individuals are already shared with the anti-fraud organisation CIFAS for the purpose of enabling banks to comply with the Immigration Act 2014 and also to assist in the prevention of fraud. The accuracy of the data is subject to rigorous checks by the Home Office before it is shared. This is reflected in the fact that the Home Office receives very few complaints or inquiries from banks or individuals regarding the current sharing of data arrangements under section 40 of the 2014 Act. Only three official complaints have been received since the Home Office started to share data with CIFAS in 2011.

Under the new provisions, the Home Office will be notified by banks when they believe that an account holder is a disqualified person. It will then carry out a further thorough check before the bank will be required to take any action to close an account. The bank will be notified if circumstances have changed and the person is no longer disqualified. This double check will act as a further safeguard to make sure that the bank acts on the most up-to-date information. Individuals whose accounts are subject to closure will be told by the bank of the reason why, provided that it is lawful to do so. If, despite all the checks, a person still considers they are lawfully present and that incorrect information has been provided, they will then be given the information they need to swiftly contact the Home Office so that any error can be rectified.

As is currently the case with data provided to CIFAS, the Home Office will be able to correct any mistake in real time so that the person’s details will immediately be removed from the data that are shared with the banks. That will be a far swifter and more effective means of correcting any error than in the process proposed in the amendment. If an account is closed, any credit balance will not be withheld from the individual, but returned to them by the bank in the normal way. In the unlikely event that an account is closed by mistake, the situation can be swiftly rectified in the way I have described without the serious consequences for the individual that have understandably been envisaged by the hon. and learned Gentleman. We believe the proposed compensation would therefore be disproportionate in the circumstances, and I invite him to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his explanation and reassurance as to how it is intended the scheme will work. Would he be good enough to write to me or to the Committee, setting that out, since it is not in the Bill?

[The Solicitor General]

I am happy to write to the hon. and learned Gentleman. That is now on the record.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. Gentleman’s interpretation is interesting. I am sure it would be an attractive submission to make were the issue to be revisited, particularly in litigation. It is nearly 30 years since that case. Since then, the Home Office has relied on it. There has been no attempt by a Government of any colour to redefine things and go back to what he would describe as the original 1971 position. There must be a very good public policy reason for that; that reason is simply that it is entirely reasonable to allow the immigration authorities to have a little more time and space, based upon a reasonable suspicion, in which they can question a person who they reasonably suspect might be an illegal immigrant. The published guidance reflects the Singh v. Hammond judgment. It makes it clear that before any inquiry begins, there has to be reasonable suspicion.

My concern is that if the power of examination is limited only to the point of entry, we could have—perversely—an increase in people being arrested, because the power to ask questions is, as I said, not a power of arrest, but a different type of power. It allows people to give a reasonable explanation before we get to the stage of any apprehension or arrest, which I think is a good thing. I would not want to see a perverse situation where, in effect, the immigration authorities are shooting first and asking questions afterwards. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree that that sort of approach would definitely inflame the situation and lead to the perverse consequences that we all worry about.

[Keir Starmer]

I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation and justification. It must follow that operations at tube stations or other places against a number of individuals, based perhaps on what they look like, would be outwith the guidance and outwith the Minister’s explanation and role.

[The Solicitor General]

I entirely agree. If their operations relate to other intelligence—for example, on organised fare dodging or some sort of illegal activity on the tube that was either antisocial or worse—then clearly, that joint working would be very important and would reflect the best intelligence-led operations. We are all keen to eliminate a random use of these powers that would be arbitrary and would not, in my judgment—and I am sure, in any reasonable person’s judgment—reflect the criteria set out in the Singh case and reflected in guidance ever since.

[The Solicitor General]

I fully expect that any revised guidance notes published to reflect any changes passed in this Act will be a faithful reflection of the case law as we have outlined it today. I am absolutely sure that my colleagues in the Home Office will keep these matters under continuous review. If, indeed, a body of evidence emerges that challenges the position I have outlined today, I am sure that colleagues would look at that. It would perhaps be wrong of me to commit to anything specific today, but the hon. Lady has placed her concerns on the record for all to hear, and I am sure that the observations that we have made in this debate will be heard in another place and at other stages before the Bill, as we hope, eventually becomes law.

The final point I want to make is that I do not think that anybody wants to see the lawful and proportionate operations of our immigration authorities severely hampered. My genuine fear is that however well intentioned this amendment might be, it would lead to a hampering of those operations. Therefore, for those reasons, I urge Opposition Members to withdraw the amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful to hon. Members for setting the context within which the powers that now exist operate and to the Solicitor General for his explanation. I accept that technically, in a number of legal respects, there is a difference between stop-and-check and stop-and-search, but I am not convinced that the impact on community relations follows from what are legal distinctions. In other words, I am not sure that the public out there quite accept and understand the nuances that we in this Committee might understand as the differences between the two, and there are real concerns about the way in which the existing power is being exercised. In the end, this comes back to the words that the Solicitor General used, which I jotted down. He said that it makes sense to have a little more time and space, and that that would avoid action possibly being taken on arrival that need not be taken. That is true in the sense that this is supposed to be a power that is excisable on arrival, but it very quickly moves from a little more space to a generalised power that has been exercised in the way that has been described. On that basis, I do not withdraw this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I do not want to criticise the hon. Lady for repeating an important point but, as I have already said to her, it is vital to remember that these powers are going to be exercised in a proportionate way, based on genuine intelligence. They are not going to be exercised in a scattergun way that would demand a significant increase in resources. We are confident that the proposals and powers we propose to introduce will make it easier for immigration officers to take that action and remove some of the understandable practical obstacles that exist with administrative procedures such as this, which then end up with a civil consequence as opposed to a criminal consequence. In short, at the moment it is easier for immigration officers investigating a criminal offence to search and seize than it is when it comes to the more practical measure of enforcing the civil consequences of decisions made after due process. This is a harmonisation of powers, if you like—let us remind ourselves that this is not a new power of entry. It relates to a time when immigration officers are already lawfully on the premises. It is a reasonable and proportionate measure. I think that the concerns that the hon. Lady raises are therefore met by the increased flexibility that the authorities are now going to enjoy.

[Keir Starmer]

As I think the Minister accepts, powers of search and seizure in connection with the imposition of civil penalties are rare in our law. There are other examples, but they are rare. The usual circumstances are for search and seizure powers to be in connection with the imposition of criminal penalties. The question I want to put to the Minister is, what is the principle? I do not think that anybody would argue that it is sensible to move to a situation where all civil penalties give rise to a power of search and seizure and therefore there is a sub-class that may have these powers connected to it. What is the principle behind this clause and that sub-group of civil penalties that attracts the search and seizure powers?

[The Solicitor General]

Putting it as simply as I can, the principle is that we want to ensure that, rather than having to resort to the use of criminal sanction—which, although it might mark the commission of offences and impose a punishment and penalty on individuals, could properly be seen as a disproportionate use of state power—we can resort to what, as I have said, is perhaps a lesser used path but one that is still within what the hon. and learned Gentleman and I would regard the bounds of compatibility with the European convention on human rights and our existing law. It is a proportionate use of powers. I remind the Committee that this is not a power of entry. Immigration officers have to be lawfully on the premises before these powers can be used—and, of course, there have to be reasonable grounds to suspect that the person with regard to whom the powers are being used may be liable to be detained and removed from the United Kingdom. There is a caveat, too: the search should only be to the extent reasonably required to find the documents, so a complete top to tail, fingertip search of the house, which would be wholly disproportionate, would not be within the particular use of this power.

I will give another example. There is concern about seizure of mobile telephones. Yes, there is a power to seize, but any such device on which electronic documents are stored will be seized only if it is not possible for the owner otherwise to produce the document in a visible and legible form. Again, that is an example of the proportionality and the safeguards that exist in this particular instance. I hope that on the grounds of principle and particular efficacy I have outlined what I regard as a middle way, which these provisions represent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20

Search of premises in connection with imposition of civil penalty

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

Clause 23 inserts a new section 28ZI into the Immigration Act 1971 that provides for the retention of material seized by immigration officers for the purposes of a criminal investigation. This simply aligns the framework for the retention of anything seized by an immigration officer for a criminal purpose with that applying to police in England and Wales under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That should be a welcome insertion that all Members will feel comfortable with, knowing that there is a harmonisation of the powers.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24

Search for nationality documents by detainee custody officers etc.

[Keir Starmer]

I beg to move amendment 197, in clause 24, page 30, leave out lines 13 to 16

To remove the power to conduct a strip search from detainee custody officers.

We now move to an area of considerable concern. The amendment would remove the power to conduct a strip search from detainee custody officers. The context in which the amendment is put forward is one of considerable concern for some time about the exercise of powers over those in immigration detention—a concern that I believe is shared across the House.

Clause 24 (1) provides:

“The Secretary of State may direct a detainee custody officer, prison officer or prisoner custody officer to exercise any of the powers in subsection (6) in relation to—

(a) a detained person who is detained in a removal centre, prison or young offender institution, or

(b) a person who is detained in a short-term holding facility.”

Subsection (5) provides that the relevant officer must then comply with the direction, with subsection (4) providing that the Secretary of State must have reasonable grounds to believe that,

“a relevant nationality document will be found if a power in subsection (6) is exercised in relation to the person.”

If we press on through the clause, we find a point that ties in with amendment 198—that the definition of nationality document is very wide. Under subsection (15) “nationality document” means,

“a document which might—

(a) establish a person’s identity, nationality or citizenship”.

A document that might establish a person’s identify is a very wide class of documents for all of us. Many documents might establish or help to establish our identity. This gives the Secretary of State a wide power to make a direction in relation to a wide class of documents where the relevant officer must then comply, and the power to include strip search in an environment and a context where there has already been heightened concern about the exercise of powers within immigration detention.

Those are the reasons why these amendments will be pursued. They are pursued with real concern about how the powers will be exercised, based on many points that have already been raised and the reports that have been written about this area.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

This is one of the most important functions that we as a Committee can perform: not having artificial debates but putting on the record the concerns, using the evidence we have as Members of Parliament or, indeed, from our observation of important events at places such as Yarl’s Wood, then seeking clarification from Ministers. I hope that my colleague the Minister for Immigration feels exactly the same way I do—that this is an opportunity for the Government to put on the line what we expect the standards to be when it comes to non-intimate full searches.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for the Solicitor General’s explanation, and I understand exactly the case he puts for the power, but there is sometimes, as he will understand, a gap between the words that go into Hansard as a result of this exchange and what happens on the ground. That is the real cause for concern, particularly in the light of the Yarl’s Wood example. What practical steps can be taken to turn the assurances the Solicitor General is rightly giving into reality on the ground?

[The Solicitor General]

We are going to provide additional guidance on the power to search under clause 24. That is for those who are directing the search on behalf of the Secretary of State and those who are conducting the search. Detainee custody officers, prison officers and prisoner custody officers are trained in the use of search powers, which includes strip searches. Detention services order 9/2012 provides instructions to detainee custody officers, and prison service instructions 67/2011 and 16/2014 provide instructions for searching persons in prisons and young offenders institutions respectively. We will build on those and ensure that the new provisions contain clear guidance.

The hon. Member for Rotherham made a point about the wording, “in the presence of”. We would say that the words are clear: it obviously means the person conducting the search as well. I hope that the explanation that I give as the Minister presenting the clause will be sufficient clarification to allay her fears on that point.

[The Solicitor General]

I was coming on to that very point. The power to search children in this way will only be used in exceptional circumstances. Let me explain the background. The Government’s policy is not to detain children in immigration and removal centres, so as part of the family removal process where children are held in a short-term holding facility a few days prior to removal, we believe that this search power will not be necessary because we will have the travel documents in place already.

Regarding young offender institutions, children under the age of 18 are exempt from the automatic deportation provisions for foreign national criminals, so one ground is already removed. Let me give me an example of exceptional circumstances. A 17-year-old male might be held in a young offender institution following a conviction of rape. He is facing deportation on conducive grounds because of this sentence and gang affiliations. If the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that he may have nationality documents in his possession, then it may be necessary for officers to conduct a full search in the way that we have described. I hope that gives the hon. Lady reassurance that we really are talking about exceptional circumstances, such as an older male who has perhaps been convicted of a very serious offence, where there is a clear public interest in making sure that all reasonable steps are taken before removal from the UK.

[Keir Starmer]

The example that the Solicitor General gives is a 17-year-old male. What does he see as the limits on children under the age of 17? At what age does it become inappropriate to ever exercise this power? I know that is a difficult question in general but this is a sensitive area. A 17-year-old male is one thing—he has given a good example, but there are clearly other examples of concern. What are the limits as the age goes down?

[The Solicitor General]

The only answer I can give is that it will depend on a thorough case-by-case analysis. For example, it might be somebody younger who is a persistent offender who has committed a very serious offence. It would be wrong to say that there would be a hard and fast threshold, other than one that would be based on a genuine case-by-case analysis. Many people in this room have had experience of the youth offending system. I think that with training and guidance, we can get this right and make sure that the power is not used in a disproportionate way that reasonable people would regard as an infringement and an inappropriate use of the power with regard to young people. [Interruption.] There is Ministry of Justice guidance which says that searches of males in young offender institutions must be risk based or following intelligence on a case-by-case basis. That is the guidance that will be followed. There will be a read-over and therefore the fear of randomness and of arbitrary judgment is removed by the use of that guidance and careful case-by-case analysis.

[Keir Starmer]

I appreciate that to some extent we are exploring the limits of this as we go along and I am grateful for the way that the Minister is dealing with that. It may be a simple question of reassurance but are there any circumstances where under this provision, a child under the age of 10 would be subject to a search? I do not think that would be available under any other provision in criminal law because they would be under the age of criminal responsibility. This is a genuine concern. I am not asking for an instant answer if it is impossible. It may be something that is better done in writing. I think for all criminal law provisions, 10 would be the lower trigger for obvious reasons.

[The Solicitor General]

I think, in asking the question, the hon. and learned Gentleman is almost answering the point. In that case, a child under 10 would not have been convicted of any criminal offence. That is an important start. I am happy to give the assurance that the measure would not apply to a child under 10.

[Keir Starmer]

Of course, the question answers itself regarding young offender institutions. I was not exploring that aspect but I am grateful for the Solicitor General’s assistance. My concern relates to those and any other centres. It is an exploring question, rather than one that may be capable of being answered straight off the cuff.

[The Solicitor General]

I am happy to give a direct answer. In any circumstance, this will not apply to children under 10.

[The Solicitor General]

Yes.

[Keir Starmer]

I have said all that I need to say on amendment 197. I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I appreciate that the definition has been used elsewhere. It is the combination of that definition with the strip search that is of such great concern, although in the circumstances, and given the assurances on strip searches, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 25

Seizure of nationality documents by detainee custody officers etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Solicitor General]

Clause 25, like clause 24, deals with a gap in the powers of officers charged with the care and security of immigration detainees and foreign national prisoners who are liable to deportation to obtain nationality documents to help the Home Office remove these people from the United Kingdom. As noted on a number of occasions, the ability to remove foreign nationals who have no right to remain here is often delayed by the need to obtain a passport or other travel document. We need to take all necessary steps to obtain those documents that will facilitate removal. This clause allows relevant officers to seize nationality documents that are found in the course of a routine search conducted using their existing powers and to seek the Secretary of State’s consent to retain that document and to pass it on to the Home Office where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe the document will help with the person’s removal from the UK.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 26

Amendments relating to sections 24 and 25

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Let me start by setting out the purpose of these two amendments. Amendment 220 is intended to make mandatory the issuing of the code of practice that immigration officers must follow. Amendment 221 would delay the entrance into force of the provisions of part 3—which concerns enforcement, under the sub-heading “Powers of immigration officers etc”—until such time as the Secretary of State has made a direction under section 145 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and has laid the code specified in that direction before both Houses of Parliament. The context here is an agreement across the House that there has to be care, professionalism, necessity and proportionality in the exercise of all the powers that we have been discussing this afternoon.

The amendments are prompted by the current mismatch between Home Office guidance and the successive reports of the chief inspector of borders and immigration. To elaborate on that, the Home Office guidance by and large suggests that enforcement raids on premises and businesses are directed on the basis of specific intelligence about an individual who does not have leave to be in the UK. However, successive reports by the chief inspector of borders and immigration paint a different picture. In the inspection that the chief inspector conducted from October to November 2013, he reported that 59% of the cases he examined lacked the required justification for the use of the power and that in a further 12% there was insufficient information for him to form an opinion. Taken together, that 71% is a very high percentage of cases that the inspector is reporting. There is a mismatch between the guidance being issued and what is happening on the ground.

In the same report that related to October and November 2013, the chief inspector reported high varying use of the power across the country. In south London it was used in two-thirds of illegal working operations, and in east London it was used in 3% of cases. Therefore, the purpose of the amendments is to bolster the provisions for a code, to make the code mandatory and to delay the provisions until the code is laid before the Houses of Parliament.

[The Solicitor General]

In essence, our objections to these amendments are, with respect, that they have no substantial effect, given that it is already the case that immigration officers’ coercive powers are subject to the Immigration (PACE Codes of Practice) Direction 2013 and that the specified codes themselves—that is, the PACE codes of practice—have been laid before both Houses of Parliament.

Section 145 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 makes it mandatory that immigration officers should have regard to such provisions as the PACE codes of practice as may be specified. “Specified” means in a direction given by the Secretary of State. It is already the case that the 2013 direction applies the relevant parts of the PACE codes of practice to the powers exercised by immigration officers. This direction is available in the Libraries of both Houses and is also published on the gov.uk website. Hon. Members will be well aware that any changes to the PACE codes of practice are laid before Parliament. We will of course update the immigration direction to reflect the new immigration powers in part 3 of the Bill and will ensure that is done in time for the commencement of these enforcement powers.

The hon. and learned Gentleman raised some points about a criticism about the use of enforcement powers, for which I am grateful to him. I think it was Liberty that referenced some statistics from the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration’s report on the use of the power to enter business premises without a search warrant—that was published in March of last year. An internal review had already highlighted that as an area for improvement, and the inspector’s report noted the following:

“During the course of our inspection, the Home Office moved quickly to address the issues that we identified. This was positive and demonstrated that the Home Office was, for the first time, starting to exert a much stronger grip on how the power was used by its staff.”

I hope that that is encouraging information for all Members present.

Where immigration officers are entering premises using a warrant, in order for that warrant to be issued, they will have to have satisfied the court that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person who is liable to be arrested for a relevant offence is to be found on the premises or that there are reasonable grounds for believing that material that is likely to be relevant evidence of an immigration offence is on the premises. The safeguards for the use of these warrants is set out in sections 28J and 28K of the Immigration Act 1971 and reflect those provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

In the light of those points, I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will agree to withdraw his well-intentioned amendment.

[Keir Starmer]

I am grateful for the Minister’s explanations and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 30, in schedule 4, page 78, line 1, leave out from “application” to “, or” in line 3.—(The Solicitor General.)

See the explanatory statement for amendment 24.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 29

Immigration bail

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

I apologise for coming to very technical amendments at this stage of the day and the proceedings; we seem to have been dealing with technical amendments for some time. Perhaps it will be possible for the Minister to give an assurance; the purpose of the two amendments is to ensure that individuals in the circumstances set out in the explanatory statements will not be in a worse position under the Bill than they are now.

[The Solicitor General]

Amendment 216 seeks to change the way the leave that is extended by section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 operates. With respect, there has been a misunderstanding of the current position. The effect of the amendment would be that where a person applies for leave to remain and their application is refused while they still have immigration leave, their leave would be extended by section 3C while they bring an appeal or administrative review. Where an appeal or administrative review is lodged, leave will continue to be extended until any appeal or administrative review is no longer pending.

It was said that the reason for the tabling of the amendment is that people in that situation do not have their leave extended by section 3C, and that is an unintended consequence of the Immigration Act 2014. That is not the case. In fact, if anything, the 2014 Act actually improved the position with regard to section 3C. It has always been the case that, where an application is refused while the applicant still has immigration leave, leave is not extended by section 3C while a challenge to the refusal can be brought. In other words, section 3C applies only to undetermined applications. Where somebody is still waiting for an application to be dealt with, section 3C kicks in to allow the delay to be remedied.

[Keir Starmer]

Just to clarify that point, what is the position if the Secretary of State cancels the leave during that period?

[The Solicitor General]

The whole purpose of the provision is to deal with the question of cancellation where there has been a breach of the conditions. I will come on to that point in the clause stand part debate. At this stage, we see no reason to change the position in the way that is outlined in amendment 216.

Amendment 217 would have highly undesirable consequences and is unnecessary. With respect to the hon. and learned Gentleman, he does not fully outline the Government’s case in the Iqbal case, the Court of Appeal judgment by Lord Justice Elias that was reported earlier this year. The amendment, as outlined by the hon. and learned Gentleman, would mean that immigration leave would be extended by virtue of section 3C for anyone who makes an invalid application for further leave.

The problem is that that is clearly open to potential abuse. A person could deliberately make an invalid application, for example by neglecting to pay the required fee or by failing to provide mandatory documents, and continue to remain in the UK lawfully. That leave would continue until the Home Office determined that the application was invalid. That, I am afraid, would potentially be a charter for exploitation by unscrupulous people who could make invalid applications simply to extend their immigration leave and to take advantage of the section 3C provision.

The amendment is also unnecessary, because our rules and guidance set out clearly how to make a valid application, and an opportunity is provided for mistakes that lead to an application becoming invalid to be made good. That provides a safeguard for people who, from time to time, make a genuine error. Where a fee is paid, we will contact those who make invalid applications to tell them what steps they need to take to make their application valid. Where people respond within the specified time limit and provide the missing information, they will be deemed to have made a valid application, and their leave will be extended by section 3C if the application was made before the expiration of their previous leave. That point was dealt with chiefly in the case of Iqbal.

The safeguard works. More than 650,000 applications were made between April last year and June this year, of which only 2.45% were rejected as invalid. I understand the concerns expressed about access to services and about the offences that the Bill introduces for those who work illegally or drive while unlawfully in the UK. However, in practice, those measures will not be applied to individuals until the Home Office has determined whether an invalid application has been made.

Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Tuesday 20th October 2015 Public Bill Committees

[The Solicitor General]

Q 147 Are you satisfied that these provisions will not cut through or cut across the excellent work being done by the police service on reforming stop and search and having a much more intelligence-led approach to it, as opposed to the random problems that we all acknowledge we saw in the past?

Chief Superintendent David Snelling: In terms of the example I have given, it is a series of steps that we can say objectively are what have led us to form the suspicion. We would be referring to an authorised database, owned by a Government agency. That should allay the view of various members of the public that we would just be, to use your terms, stopping people on speculation.

[Keir Starmer]

Q 148 Chief Superintendent Snelling, can I follow up on the questions about driving? You have talked us through the way in which a vehicle would be stopped at the moment, using current powers. I think a number of licences have been revoked as the result of the exercise of existing powers, and of course when you find someone in a car who is not legally allowed to be here or has an irregular immigration status, there are various enforcement actions that can be taken in any event. Have you, on behalf of the chiefs’ council or in any other capacity, asked for a further offence of driving while not having a regular immigration status? In other words, have you identified a gap in your powers that has led you to ask for further offences to be considered because you have found a problem?

Chief Superintendent David Snelling: Can I give you a short answer?

--- Later in debate ---

[Keir Starmer]

Q 172 To be clear, absent that co-operation and support, in a simple case of deport first and appeal later, is your answer as I understand it, namely, that it is simply impossible to assess whether deportation is in the best interests of the child because the exercise is never carried out?

Adrian Matthews: I would add one thing. There are enormous practical difficulties in appealing from abroad, particularly for families who have been destitute in the UK. They will be going back with virtually no resources at all; questions about how you organise an effective appeal from abroad in those circumstances need to be answered. But I do not think it will be, because once they are out of the country, they are out of sight and out of mind. Appealing from abroad is a really tricky problem.

Kamena Dorling: Presumably you can envisage a situation in which there is a mind to remove a parent or a family from the country so that they can appeal from abroad, and we would move the family unit as a whole. That might not be detrimental to the child. Families move all the time. I could remove my son from the UK with me and that would still be in his best interests. I go back to the point that we do not have an assessment of the impact on the children so we do not know.

Ilona Pinter: To put this into a little perspective, one thing that is often overlooked is that deport first, appeal later is going to affect a range of families, including those in which the children are British, those who have status, those who do not have status or those who have an irregular status. We know from the University of Oxford that 120,000 children are undocumented in this country and over half of those were born and have grown up here. Many will not have the language of the country that they are being returned to; they may have never been there, as they have grown up here. Effectively they will be going to a country to which they have never been before.

On the point about British children, which is important, we have had cases in which families have been removed where we believed that the children were British. Because there is no system for finding out the best interests of the child, or even for checking details such as whether the child is British, or whether they would be stateless if returned, there is a real risk that those families would be removed and find themselves in very difficult circumstances.

[The Solicitor General]

Q 173 You are making an assertion that the best interest of the child is not part of the consideration of the decision maker—for example, in this provision relating to certification of whether a deport first, appeal later procedure should be adopted—but is that actually right? Is not the evidence that, on a case-by-case basis, each individual family situation will be assessed? There may be occasions when it is in the best interests of the whole family to deport the entire family, and there may be instances when it is better for the child to remain in the UK while the subject of the application is deported. Is it not really an issue of looking at matters on a case-by-case basis, rather than the blanket suggestion that the best interests of the child simply do not come into it?

Ilona Pinter: I think we agree that it is on a case-by-case basis. We are saying that there is no assessment of children’s best interests. The UNHCR report highlights strong examples in which children’s best interests were not taken into account in the decision making.

Crown Prosecution Service

Debate between Robert Buckland and Keir Starmer

Tuesday 23rd June 2015 Westminster Hall

[The Solicitor General]

I am sorry to disagree with the hon. Gentleman, but therein lies the problem. If we as politicians and commentators start making such value judgments, we undermine confidence in the independence of the prosecutorial system. We must trust an impartial and objective application of the threshold test. Any questioning of that causes me and many others great concern about the integrity of our prosecutorial system.

[Keir Starmer]

Does the Solicitor General agree that, when a case is charged and the judge decides that there is a case to answer, that case is properly brought, even if there is an acquittal? It is important to our criminal justice system that we adhere to that. The mere fact that a case, high-profile or otherwise, does not end in a conviction is not a test of whether the charging decision was right or wrong. A better test is whether the judge left it to the jury. If that is so, it normally means that the case should have been brought.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. He presages the point that I was going to make about sufficiency, and about the checks and balances throughout the court process. Arguments can be made about the sufficiency of the evidence at the beginning of a case, at the end of the prosecution case, and, indeed, in some rare circumstances whereby judges withdraw cases from juries—it does not often happen—at the end of defence cases, but the power remains.

In making such criticisms, we are also in danger of calling into question the jury process and indeed the whole system, which is so integral to the rule of law in this country. I was asked—rhetorically, perhaps, but I will give an answer—what strategy this Government have. It is a criminal justice system that upholds the rule of law, enhances public confidence in the system and ensures that there is a consistent approach to bringing cases and sentencing, so that the public feel confident and are protected by due process within the system. That is nothing new—it has been with us for generations—but this Government believe in it as passionately as previous Governments, of whatever colour.

I want to deal with each contribution in turn, but particularly with the opening speech by the hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead and her experience of giving evidence in a trial. It does not sound to me as though best practice was followed in her case. I am glad she has brought it to the attention of the House, because those with responsibility for the administration of justice, not only in the magistrates court in Bexley but elsewhere, will do well to remember that the housing of witnesses for the prosecution with either defendants or their families is wholly inappropriate and leads to all sorts of complications that I need not recite here.

[Nadine Dorries in the Chair]

The hon. Member for Erith and Thamesmead asked specific questions about witness care officers. I accept that the numbers have been reduced in line with other staff reductions, but, importantly, those reductions have been accompanied by reforms to better target our limited resources to help witnesses who are intimidated or vulnerable, and those who are in greatest need. Even more is being done with regard to the change of culture to which my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham referred. For example, the Government are now improving access to information for victims through the new online and telephone-based victim information service that was launched in March. The increasing commissioning of victims’ services through local police and crime commissioners will create a more responsive service—a more localised service—that I do not believe will create a postcode lottery, but will emphasise best practice from which other areas can learn. Although I accept there have been reductions in expenditure, the change in culture that everybody in the system—counsel, solicitors, and lawyers in their role in explaining matters and reassuring and supporting witnesses and victims—has experienced continues to grow.